1. GOOD SECURITY IS A GROUP
EFFORT
THE OFFICE OF SECURITY
Operations Security (OPSEC)
Operations Security (OPSEC)
2. "Even minutiae should have a place in our collection,
for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when
enjoined with others of a more serious cast, may lead
to valuable conclusion."
— George Washington, known OPSEC practitioner
Operations Security (OPSEC)
Operations Security (OPSEC)
3. What Is OPSEC?
OPSEC Defined
OPSEC Defined
The OPSEC Process
The OPSEC Process
Critical Information
Critical Information
Indicators
Indicators
Adversaries
Adversaries
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Protective Measures
Protective Measures
4. OPSEC at Home
You have probably been practicing OPSEC in your
personal life without knowing it! When you are getting
ready to go on a trip have you ever:
Stopped the delivery of the newspaper so that they
would not pile up outside?
Asked your neighbor to pick up your mail so the
mailbox would not fill up?
Connected your porch lights and inside lights to a
timer so they would go on at preset times?
Connected a radio to a timer so that it comes on at
various times?
5. What Is OPSEC?
A
A process to deny potential adversaries
process to deny potential adversaries
information
information about capabilities and/or
about capabilities and/or
intentions by identifying, controlling, and
intentions by identifying, controlling, and
protecting unclassified information that gives
protecting unclassified information that gives
evidence of the planning and execution of
evidence of the planning and execution of
sensitive activities. It is just as applicable to an
sensitive activities. It is just as applicable to an
administrative or R&D facility as a military
administrative or R&D facility as a military
operation.
operation.
6. OPSEC
A Process With Five Components
Identify
Identify YOUR
YOUR Critical
Critical
Information
Information
Analyze
Analyze YOUR
YOUR Threat
Threat
Analyze
Analyze YOUR
YOUR Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Assess
Assess YOUR
YOUR Risk
Risk
Employ
Employ appropriate
appropriate Protective Measures
Protective Measures
7. Critical Information
Critical Information
Critical information is the
Critical information is the core secrets
core secrets of
of
an activity, capability, or intention that if
an activity, capability, or intention that if
known to the adversary, could weaken or
known to the adversary, could weaken or
defeat the operation.
defeat the operation.
8. Critical information is the information about your
Critical information is the information about your
operations an adversary needs to achieve their goals.
operations an adversary needs to achieve their goals.
Critical information usually involves only a few key
Critical information usually involves only a few key
items.
items.
If those items are unavailable to us they could impact
If those items are unavailable to us they could impact
the way we conduct business.
the way we conduct business.
Our critical information is information required to be
Our critical information is information required to be
successful in our jobs.
successful in our jobs.
Critical Information
Critical Information
9. Our adversaries may want to harm personnel and/or
Our adversaries may want to harm personnel and/or
damage property and resources
damage property and resources
Critical Information could relate to:
Critical Information could relate to:
Employees’ Safety (911)
Employees’ Safety (911)
Fleet of ships and aircraft (USS Cole)
Fleet of ships and aircraft (USS Cole)
Facilities Design (Oklahoma City)
Facilities Design (Oklahoma City)
Security Vulnerabilities (Anthrax Mailings)
Security Vulnerabilities (Anthrax Mailings)
Satellite Data (Weather, Environmental)
Satellite Data (Weather, Environmental)
Law Enforcement Activities (Fisheries)
Law Enforcement Activities (Fisheries)
Management Decisions (All levels)
Management Decisions (All levels)
Critical Information
Critical Information
10. Indicators
Information may be collected by monitoring telephone
and public conversations, analyzing telephone
directories, financial or purchasing documents,
position or "job" announcements, travel documents,
blueprints or drawings, distribution lists, shipping and
receiving documents, even personal information or
items found in the trash.
11. Need-to-know
Our adversary’s makeup has changed,
Our adversary’s makeup has changed,
but the need to
but the need to know and understand
know and understand
your
your Critical Information
Critical Information is still the
is still the
means for their success.
means for their success.
If you don’t protect it, then prepare to
If you don’t protect it, then prepare to
lose it!
lose it!
12. Adversary
Who are we talking about? In the Cold War days you
Who are we talking about? In the Cold War days you
knew it was the communist threat. Today, the Cold
knew it was the communist threat. Today, the Cold
War is over but new threats have emerged.
War is over but new threats have emerged.
Economic superiority and political gain are other
Economic superiority and political gain are other
driving forces. Our former allies during the Cold War
driving forces. Our former allies during the Cold War
and Desert Storm are now collecting technology from
and Desert Storm are now collecting technology from
us to gain an advantage in the global market.
us to gain an advantage in the global market.
14. Terrorist
Media reports indicate some terrorist
training schools ran curricula which
included irregular naval warfare techniques
such as Ship Mining, Sabotage and Civil
Aviation Terrorism. Another school ran
programs dedicated to espionage and
counter-espionage techniques which helped
“graduates” run clandestine terrorist
networks overseas.
15. Those selected to become top-level terrorists
received training in Foreign Languages,
Principles of Espionage and Counter-
intelligence as well as Code Making and
Deciphering.
Terrorist
16. Political/Economic
Competition
Remember that there are other adversaries -
foreign intelligence services continue to
collect information on us that could be used
against us in the future. It is a certainty that
our adversaries will continually look for and
find any weak links.
17. Economic superiority is another driving
force. Although not as lethal as terrorism it
still impacts our way of life. Our former
allies during the Cold War and Desert Storm
are now making efforts to acquire our
technology at minimal costs to gain an
advantage in the global market
Political/Economic
Competition
18. Information Collection
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
)
19. Traditional Collection
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence is the
interception of Electro -magnetic signals from
telephones, faxes, computers, radios, and/or
anything else transmitted in the open.
IMINT: Photographic imagery includes
overhead photography by satellite or any other
means including individuals with cameras.
HUMINT: Traditional spy. Least likely means!
20. Open Source Intelligence
OSINT: In the world of secret services, Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT) means useful
information gleaned from public sources, such
as scientific articles, newspapers, phone books
and price lists.
21. Open Source Intelligence
Open source intelligence includes internet
probes which are very effective. Adversaries
are not the only ones interested in our e-mail.
Sailors aboard USS Cole were shocked to find
out that the personal e-mail messages they sent
home to family and friends were forwarded to
the media to be used as quoted material in news
stories without their permission.
22. Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are defined as the
Vulnerabilities are defined as the
characteristics of a system which can cause it to
characteristics of a system which can cause it to
suffer degradation as a result of having been
suffer degradation as a result of having been
subjected to some level of a hostile threat.
subjected to some level of a hostile threat.
23. Vulnerabilities
Determining our vulnerabilities involves
Determining our vulnerabilities involves
analyzing how we conduct operations. We
analyzing how we conduct operations. We
must look at ourselves as the adversary would.
must look at ourselves as the adversary would.
From this perspective we can determine what
From this perspective we can determine what
are the true, rather than the hypothetical,
are the true, rather than the hypothetical,
vulnerabilities.
vulnerabilities.
24. Protective Measures
Vulnerabilities and specific threats must
Vulnerabilities and specific threats must
be matched. Where the vulnerabilities are
be matched. Where the vulnerabilities are
great and the threat is evident, the risk of
great and the threat is evident, the risk of
exploitation should be expected. A high
exploitation should be expected. A high
priority for protection should be assigned
priority for protection should be assigned
and corrective action taken. Where the
and corrective action taken. Where the
vulnerability is slight and the adversary
vulnerability is slight and the adversary
has a marginal collection capability, the
has a marginal collection capability, the
priority should be lower.
priority should be lower.
25. Countermeasures
Countermeasures need to be developed that
Countermeasures need to be developed that
eliminate the vulnerabilities, threats, or utility
eliminate the vulnerabilities, threats, or utility
of the information to the adversaries. The
of the information to the adversaries. The
possible countermeasures should include
possible countermeasures should include
alternatives that may vary in effectiveness,
alternatives that may vary in effectiveness,
feasibility and cost.
feasibility and cost.
26. Countermeasures
Countermeasures may include anything that is
Countermeasures may include anything that is
likely to work in a particular situation. The
likely to work in a particular situation. The
decision of whether to implement
decision of whether to implement
countermeasures must be based on cost/benefit
countermeasures must be based on cost/benefit
analysis and an evaluation of the overall
analysis and an evaluation of the overall
program objectives.
program objectives.
27. The Threat Is REAL!
Protect our technological advantage
Protect our technological advantage
Asymmetric Threats (threats from nontraditional
Asymmetric Threats (threats from nontraditional
and/or unknown origin) are today’s concern and
and/or unknown origin) are today’s concern and
not always clearly evident
not always clearly evident
Practice common sense and include OPSEC in your
Practice common sense and include OPSEC in your
daily routines
daily routines
28. The Bottom Line
The adversary is watching!
The adversary is watching!
Are you?
Are you?
THINK
OPSEC