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GOOD SECURITY IS A GROUP
EFFORT
THE OFFICE OF SECURITY
Operations Security (OPSEC)
Operations Security (OPSEC)
"Even minutiae should have a place in our collection,
for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when
enjoined with others of a more serious cast, may lead
to valuable conclusion."
— George Washington, known OPSEC practitioner
Operations Security (OPSEC)
Operations Security (OPSEC)
What Is OPSEC?
 OPSEC Defined
OPSEC Defined
 The OPSEC Process
The OPSEC Process
 Critical Information
Critical Information
 Indicators
Indicators
 Adversaries
Adversaries
 Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
 Protective Measures
Protective Measures
OPSEC at Home
 You have probably been practicing OPSEC in your
personal life without knowing it! When you are getting
ready to go on a trip have you ever:
 Stopped the delivery of the newspaper so that they
would not pile up outside?
 Asked your neighbor to pick up your mail so the
mailbox would not fill up?
 Connected your porch lights and inside lights to a
timer so they would go on at preset times?
 Connected a radio to a timer so that it comes on at
various times?
What Is OPSEC?
A
A process to deny potential adversaries
process to deny potential adversaries
information
information about capabilities and/or
about capabilities and/or
intentions by identifying, controlling, and
intentions by identifying, controlling, and
protecting unclassified information that gives
protecting unclassified information that gives
evidence of the planning and execution of
evidence of the planning and execution of
sensitive activities. It is just as applicable to an
sensitive activities. It is just as applicable to an
administrative or R&D facility as a military
administrative or R&D facility as a military
operation.
operation.
OPSEC
A Process With Five Components
Identify
Identify YOUR
YOUR Critical
Critical
Information
Information
Analyze
Analyze YOUR
YOUR Threat
Threat
Analyze
Analyze YOUR
YOUR Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
Assess
Assess YOUR
YOUR Risk
Risk
Employ
Employ appropriate
appropriate Protective Measures
Protective Measures
Critical Information
Critical Information
Critical information is the
Critical information is the core secrets
core secrets of
of
an activity, capability, or intention that if
an activity, capability, or intention that if
known to the adversary, could weaken or
known to the adversary, could weaken or
defeat the operation.
defeat the operation.
 Critical information is the information about your
Critical information is the information about your
operations an adversary needs to achieve their goals.
operations an adversary needs to achieve their goals.
 Critical information usually involves only a few key
Critical information usually involves only a few key
items.
items.
 If those items are unavailable to us they could impact
If those items are unavailable to us they could impact
the way we conduct business.
the way we conduct business.
 Our critical information is information required to be
Our critical information is information required to be
successful in our jobs.
successful in our jobs.
Critical Information
Critical Information
Our adversaries may want to harm personnel and/or
Our adversaries may want to harm personnel and/or
damage property and resources
damage property and resources
Critical Information could relate to:
Critical Information could relate to:
Employees’ Safety (911)
Employees’ Safety (911)
Fleet of ships and aircraft (USS Cole)
Fleet of ships and aircraft (USS Cole)
Facilities Design (Oklahoma City)
Facilities Design (Oklahoma City)
Security Vulnerabilities (Anthrax Mailings)
Security Vulnerabilities (Anthrax Mailings)
Satellite Data (Weather, Environmental)
Satellite Data (Weather, Environmental)
Law Enforcement Activities (Fisheries)
Law Enforcement Activities (Fisheries)
Management Decisions (All levels)
Management Decisions (All levels)
Critical Information
Critical Information
Indicators
 Information may be collected by monitoring telephone
and public conversations, analyzing telephone
directories, financial or purchasing documents,
position or "job" announcements, travel documents,
blueprints or drawings, distribution lists, shipping and
receiving documents, even personal information or
items found in the trash.
Need-to-know
Our adversary’s makeup has changed,
Our adversary’s makeup has changed,
but the need to
but the need to know and understand
know and understand
your
your Critical Information
Critical Information is still the
is still the
means for their success.
means for their success.
If you don’t protect it, then prepare to
If you don’t protect it, then prepare to
lose it!
lose it!
Adversary
 Who are we talking about? In the Cold War days you
Who are we talking about? In the Cold War days you
knew it was the communist threat. Today, the Cold
knew it was the communist threat. Today, the Cold
War is over but new threats have emerged.
War is over but new threats have emerged.
 Economic superiority and political gain are other
Economic superiority and political gain are other
driving forces. Our former allies during the Cold War
driving forces. Our former allies during the Cold War
and Desert Storm are now collecting technology from
and Desert Storm are now collecting technology from
us to gain an advantage in the global market.
us to gain an advantage in the global market.
Terrorist
Terrorism has recently become the
most significant threat to our way of
life.
Terrorist
 Media reports indicate some terrorist
training schools ran curricula which
included irregular naval warfare techniques
such as Ship Mining, Sabotage and Civil
Aviation Terrorism. Another school ran
programs dedicated to espionage and
counter-espionage techniques which helped
“graduates” run clandestine terrorist
networks overseas.
 Those selected to become top-level terrorists
received training in Foreign Languages,
Principles of Espionage and Counter-
intelligence as well as Code Making and
Deciphering.
Terrorist
Political/Economic
Competition
 Remember that there are other adversaries -
foreign intelligence services continue to
collect information on us that could be used
against us in the future. It is a certainty that
our adversaries will continually look for and
find any weak links.
 Economic superiority is another driving
force. Although not as lethal as terrorism it
still impacts our way of life. Our former
allies during the Cold War and Desert Storm
are now making efforts to acquire our
technology at minimal costs to gain an
advantage in the global market
Political/Economic
Competition
Information Collection
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
)
Traditional Collection
 SIGINT: Signals Intelligence is the
interception of Electro -magnetic signals from
telephones, faxes, computers, radios, and/or
anything else transmitted in the open.
 IMINT: Photographic imagery includes
overhead photography by satellite or any other
means including individuals with cameras.
 HUMINT: Traditional spy. Least likely means!
Open Source Intelligence
 OSINT: In the world of secret services, Open
Source Intelligence (OSINT) means useful
information gleaned from public sources, such
as scientific articles, newspapers, phone books
and price lists.
Open Source Intelligence
 Open source intelligence includes internet
probes which are very effective. Adversaries
are not the only ones interested in our e-mail.
Sailors aboard USS Cole were shocked to find
out that the personal e-mail messages they sent
home to family and friends were forwarded to
the media to be used as quoted material in news
stories without their permission.
Vulnerabilities
 Vulnerabilities are defined as the
Vulnerabilities are defined as the
characteristics of a system which can cause it to
characteristics of a system which can cause it to
suffer degradation as a result of having been
suffer degradation as a result of having been
subjected to some level of a hostile threat.
subjected to some level of a hostile threat.
Vulnerabilities
 Determining our vulnerabilities involves
Determining our vulnerabilities involves
analyzing how we conduct operations. We
analyzing how we conduct operations. We
must look at ourselves as the adversary would.
must look at ourselves as the adversary would.
 From this perspective we can determine what
From this perspective we can determine what
are the true, rather than the hypothetical,
are the true, rather than the hypothetical,
vulnerabilities.
vulnerabilities.
Protective Measures
 Vulnerabilities and specific threats must
Vulnerabilities and specific threats must
be matched. Where the vulnerabilities are
be matched. Where the vulnerabilities are
great and the threat is evident, the risk of
great and the threat is evident, the risk of
exploitation should be expected. A high
exploitation should be expected. A high
priority for protection should be assigned
priority for protection should be assigned
and corrective action taken. Where the
and corrective action taken. Where the
vulnerability is slight and the adversary
vulnerability is slight and the adversary
has a marginal collection capability, the
has a marginal collection capability, the
priority should be lower.
priority should be lower.
Countermeasures
 Countermeasures need to be developed that
Countermeasures need to be developed that
eliminate the vulnerabilities, threats, or utility
eliminate the vulnerabilities, threats, or utility
of the information to the adversaries. The
of the information to the adversaries. The
possible countermeasures should include
possible countermeasures should include
alternatives that may vary in effectiveness,
alternatives that may vary in effectiveness,
feasibility and cost.
feasibility and cost.
Countermeasures
 Countermeasures may include anything that is
Countermeasures may include anything that is
likely to work in a particular situation. The
likely to work in a particular situation. The
decision of whether to implement
decision of whether to implement
countermeasures must be based on cost/benefit
countermeasures must be based on cost/benefit
analysis and an evaluation of the overall
analysis and an evaluation of the overall
program objectives.
program objectives.
The Threat Is REAL!
 Protect our technological advantage
Protect our technological advantage
 Asymmetric Threats (threats from nontraditional
Asymmetric Threats (threats from nontraditional
and/or unknown origin) are today’s concern and
and/or unknown origin) are today’s concern and
not always clearly evident
not always clearly evident
 Practice common sense and include OPSEC in your
Practice common sense and include OPSEC in your
daily routines
daily routines
The Bottom Line
The adversary is watching!
The adversary is watching!
Are you?
Are you?
THINK
OPSEC

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DOC_OPSEC security operations of a group.ppt

  • 1. GOOD SECURITY IS A GROUP EFFORT THE OFFICE OF SECURITY Operations Security (OPSEC) Operations Security (OPSEC)
  • 2. "Even minutiae should have a place in our collection, for things of a seemingly trifling nature, when enjoined with others of a more serious cast, may lead to valuable conclusion." — George Washington, known OPSEC practitioner Operations Security (OPSEC) Operations Security (OPSEC)
  • 3. What Is OPSEC?  OPSEC Defined OPSEC Defined  The OPSEC Process The OPSEC Process  Critical Information Critical Information  Indicators Indicators  Adversaries Adversaries  Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities  Protective Measures Protective Measures
  • 4. OPSEC at Home  You have probably been practicing OPSEC in your personal life without knowing it! When you are getting ready to go on a trip have you ever:  Stopped the delivery of the newspaper so that they would not pile up outside?  Asked your neighbor to pick up your mail so the mailbox would not fill up?  Connected your porch lights and inside lights to a timer so they would go on at preset times?  Connected a radio to a timer so that it comes on at various times?
  • 5. What Is OPSEC? A A process to deny potential adversaries process to deny potential adversaries information information about capabilities and/or about capabilities and/or intentions by identifying, controlling, and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting unclassified information that gives protecting unclassified information that gives evidence of the planning and execution of evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. It is just as applicable to an sensitive activities. It is just as applicable to an administrative or R&D facility as a military administrative or R&D facility as a military operation. operation.
  • 6. OPSEC A Process With Five Components Identify Identify YOUR YOUR Critical Critical Information Information Analyze Analyze YOUR YOUR Threat Threat Analyze Analyze YOUR YOUR Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities Assess Assess YOUR YOUR Risk Risk Employ Employ appropriate appropriate Protective Measures Protective Measures
  • 7. Critical Information Critical Information Critical information is the Critical information is the core secrets core secrets of of an activity, capability, or intention that if an activity, capability, or intention that if known to the adversary, could weaken or known to the adversary, could weaken or defeat the operation. defeat the operation.
  • 8.  Critical information is the information about your Critical information is the information about your operations an adversary needs to achieve their goals. operations an adversary needs to achieve their goals.  Critical information usually involves only a few key Critical information usually involves only a few key items. items.  If those items are unavailable to us they could impact If those items are unavailable to us they could impact the way we conduct business. the way we conduct business.  Our critical information is information required to be Our critical information is information required to be successful in our jobs. successful in our jobs. Critical Information Critical Information
  • 9. Our adversaries may want to harm personnel and/or Our adversaries may want to harm personnel and/or damage property and resources damage property and resources Critical Information could relate to: Critical Information could relate to: Employees’ Safety (911) Employees’ Safety (911) Fleet of ships and aircraft (USS Cole) Fleet of ships and aircraft (USS Cole) Facilities Design (Oklahoma City) Facilities Design (Oklahoma City) Security Vulnerabilities (Anthrax Mailings) Security Vulnerabilities (Anthrax Mailings) Satellite Data (Weather, Environmental) Satellite Data (Weather, Environmental) Law Enforcement Activities (Fisheries) Law Enforcement Activities (Fisheries) Management Decisions (All levels) Management Decisions (All levels) Critical Information Critical Information
  • 10. Indicators  Information may be collected by monitoring telephone and public conversations, analyzing telephone directories, financial or purchasing documents, position or "job" announcements, travel documents, blueprints or drawings, distribution lists, shipping and receiving documents, even personal information or items found in the trash.
  • 11. Need-to-know Our adversary’s makeup has changed, Our adversary’s makeup has changed, but the need to but the need to know and understand know and understand your your Critical Information Critical Information is still the is still the means for their success. means for their success. If you don’t protect it, then prepare to If you don’t protect it, then prepare to lose it! lose it!
  • 12. Adversary  Who are we talking about? In the Cold War days you Who are we talking about? In the Cold War days you knew it was the communist threat. Today, the Cold knew it was the communist threat. Today, the Cold War is over but new threats have emerged. War is over but new threats have emerged.  Economic superiority and political gain are other Economic superiority and political gain are other driving forces. Our former allies during the Cold War driving forces. Our former allies during the Cold War and Desert Storm are now collecting technology from and Desert Storm are now collecting technology from us to gain an advantage in the global market. us to gain an advantage in the global market.
  • 13. Terrorist Terrorism has recently become the most significant threat to our way of life.
  • 14. Terrorist  Media reports indicate some terrorist training schools ran curricula which included irregular naval warfare techniques such as Ship Mining, Sabotage and Civil Aviation Terrorism. Another school ran programs dedicated to espionage and counter-espionage techniques which helped “graduates” run clandestine terrorist networks overseas.
  • 15.  Those selected to become top-level terrorists received training in Foreign Languages, Principles of Espionage and Counter- intelligence as well as Code Making and Deciphering. Terrorist
  • 16. Political/Economic Competition  Remember that there are other adversaries - foreign intelligence services continue to collect information on us that could be used against us in the future. It is a certainty that our adversaries will continually look for and find any weak links.
  • 17.  Economic superiority is another driving force. Although not as lethal as terrorism it still impacts our way of life. Our former allies during the Cold War and Desert Storm are now making efforts to acquire our technology at minimal costs to gain an advantage in the global market Political/Economic Competition
  • 18. Information Collection Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Open Source Intelligence (OSINT Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) )
  • 19. Traditional Collection  SIGINT: Signals Intelligence is the interception of Electro -magnetic signals from telephones, faxes, computers, radios, and/or anything else transmitted in the open.  IMINT: Photographic imagery includes overhead photography by satellite or any other means including individuals with cameras.  HUMINT: Traditional spy. Least likely means!
  • 20. Open Source Intelligence  OSINT: In the world of secret services, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) means useful information gleaned from public sources, such as scientific articles, newspapers, phone books and price lists.
  • 21. Open Source Intelligence  Open source intelligence includes internet probes which are very effective. Adversaries are not the only ones interested in our e-mail. Sailors aboard USS Cole were shocked to find out that the personal e-mail messages they sent home to family and friends were forwarded to the media to be used as quoted material in news stories without their permission.
  • 22. Vulnerabilities  Vulnerabilities are defined as the Vulnerabilities are defined as the characteristics of a system which can cause it to characteristics of a system which can cause it to suffer degradation as a result of having been suffer degradation as a result of having been subjected to some level of a hostile threat. subjected to some level of a hostile threat.
  • 23. Vulnerabilities  Determining our vulnerabilities involves Determining our vulnerabilities involves analyzing how we conduct operations. We analyzing how we conduct operations. We must look at ourselves as the adversary would. must look at ourselves as the adversary would.  From this perspective we can determine what From this perspective we can determine what are the true, rather than the hypothetical, are the true, rather than the hypothetical, vulnerabilities. vulnerabilities.
  • 24. Protective Measures  Vulnerabilities and specific threats must Vulnerabilities and specific threats must be matched. Where the vulnerabilities are be matched. Where the vulnerabilities are great and the threat is evident, the risk of great and the threat is evident, the risk of exploitation should be expected. A high exploitation should be expected. A high priority for protection should be assigned priority for protection should be assigned and corrective action taken. Where the and corrective action taken. Where the vulnerability is slight and the adversary vulnerability is slight and the adversary has a marginal collection capability, the has a marginal collection capability, the priority should be lower. priority should be lower.
  • 25. Countermeasures  Countermeasures need to be developed that Countermeasures need to be developed that eliminate the vulnerabilities, threats, or utility eliminate the vulnerabilities, threats, or utility of the information to the adversaries. The of the information to the adversaries. The possible countermeasures should include possible countermeasures should include alternatives that may vary in effectiveness, alternatives that may vary in effectiveness, feasibility and cost. feasibility and cost.
  • 26. Countermeasures  Countermeasures may include anything that is Countermeasures may include anything that is likely to work in a particular situation. The likely to work in a particular situation. The decision of whether to implement decision of whether to implement countermeasures must be based on cost/benefit countermeasures must be based on cost/benefit analysis and an evaluation of the overall analysis and an evaluation of the overall program objectives. program objectives.
  • 27. The Threat Is REAL!  Protect our technological advantage Protect our technological advantage  Asymmetric Threats (threats from nontraditional Asymmetric Threats (threats from nontraditional and/or unknown origin) are today’s concern and and/or unknown origin) are today’s concern and not always clearly evident not always clearly evident  Practice common sense and include OPSEC in your Practice common sense and include OPSEC in your daily routines daily routines
  • 28. The Bottom Line The adversary is watching! The adversary is watching! Are you? Are you? THINK OPSEC