Effective Management of External Support to Security Sector Reform-West-Africa-Toolkit

Effective Management of External
Support to Security Sector Reform
Valerie Yankey-Wayne
Toolkit for Security Sector Reform
and Governance in West Africa
Tool 4

Effective Management of
External Support to Security
Sector Reform
Valerie Yankey-Wayne
Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and
Governance in West Africa

About the author
Valerie Yankey-Wayne holds a postgraduate degree in international law and politics from the University of
Cambridge, United Kingdom.She has worked extensively on results-oriented monitoring and evaluation of
security and justice sector reform and community safety in over 20 countries in Africa and the Caribbean
region. Valerie has supported governments and regional organisations like the African Union, ECOWAS,
the League of Arab States and the European Union to provide training and develop training materials,
operational guidelines, and policy and strategic documents on conflict management and security sector
reform. She has participated in the drafting and negotiation of international and regional protocols
on arms control and conflict management. Valerie is presently a member of the United Nations Expert
Reference Group on Arms Control. She is also a senior expert on security sector reform for EPES Mandala
Consulting and a member of the African Security Sector Network. Valerie has published widely on arms
control and conflict management.
Editor: Ornella Moderan
Editorial assistant: Lisa Boström
Consulting editors: Kossi Agokla and Fabrice Ramadan
Editorial board
Emma Birikorang, Abdourahmane Dieng, Eboe Hutchful and Christophe Kougniazonde.
Acknowledgements
The author and editors would like to thank the following for their valuable contributions to the production
of this tool: Jeremy Astill-Brown, Ibrahim Bangura, Scott Deely, Anja Ebnöther, Mpako Foaleng, Jolie-Ruth
Morand, Baly Ouattara, Daniel de Torres, Okey Uzoechina and Alwin Van den Boogaard.
DCAF
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is a world-leading institution in
the areas of good governance and reform of the security sector, established as an international foundation
in 2000. In Africa, DCAF supports regional organisations, national institutions and non-state stakeholders
in their efforts to improve the effectiveness and accountability of the security sector.
Cover picture: UNDP 2007
Graphic design: Alice Lake-Hammond (www.alicelh.co)
ISBN: 978-92-9222-360-1
© DCAF 2015
Cite as: Valerie Yankey-Wayne, “Effective management of external support to security sector reform”, in
Ornella Moderan (ed.), Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa (Geneva: DCAF, 2015).

About the toolkit
What is the toolkit?
This publication is part of the Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa. Its
aim is to support implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) policy
framework for security sector reform and governance through practical advice and guidance tailored for
the West African context, and based on regional experiences. It specifically aims at facilitating policy
development, implementation and management of SSR processes at the national level.
Who is the toolkit for?
The toolkit has been developed as a resource for the ECOWAS Commission and all national stakeholders
within ECOWAS Member States, including the executive, the parliament, the judiciary, statutory oversight
institutions and civil society. It can also be useful to other actors involved in West African SSR processes,
such as international partners.
What is the structure of the toolkit?
The toolkit comprises eight complementary chapters (or tools):
Tool 1: Political Leadership and National Ownership of Security Sector Reform Processes
Tool 2: Security Sector Reform Programming
Tool 3: Good Financial Governance of Defence and Security Institutions
Tool 4: Effective Management of External Support to Security Sector Reform
Tool 5: Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector
Tool 6: Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance
Tool 7: Non-State Justice and Security Providers and Security Sector Reform
Tool 8: Integrating Gender in Security Sector Reform and Governance
Who developed the toolkit?
The toolkit has been produced by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
at the request of ECOWAS.
The tools are written primarily by West African experts and have been examined by an editorial board
made up of world-renowned researchers and practitioners. The members of the board are West African
specialists in security sector reform and governance, with long experience and excellent knowledge of
the region.
The toolkit has been produced with financial support from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom
of Norway and the Swiss Confederation.

List of boxes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Relevance of external support to SSR in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. What is security sector reform? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Why is national funding of SSR challenging? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Why is there increasing will in the international community to assist SSR? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Addressing risks and challenges associated with external support to SSR from a national
perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Challenges in national sovereignty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.1. Limitation of policy autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.2. Partner conditionalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.3. Outsider agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.4. Exposure of confidential defence and security information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2. Challenges in financial autonomy and sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1. The risks of financial dependency on policy autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.2. The risks of open-ended funding agreements for SSR sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.3. The risks associated with short-term partners’ commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.4. The risks of unfulfilled commitments and partner withdrawals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3. Challenges in institutional capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.1. High transaction costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.2. Duplication of efforts due to uncoordinated procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. Applying principles of effective development partnerships to SSR support . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1. Core principles for development assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2. Securing national ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.1. SSR assistance must be demand driven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.2. Demand for SSR assistance should rely on country-led needs assessment and capacity gap
analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2.3. SSR should follow national pace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3. Ensuring partner alignment with reliable country systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3.1. Policy alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3.2. System alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.4. Encouraging harmonisation among external partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4.1. Improving coordination among partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4.2. Sharing responsibilities according to the added value of each external partner . . . . . . . . 30
4.4.3. Building synergies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Contents

4.5. Managing for results with a country-owned framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.5.1. Understanding performance assessment frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.5.2. Fostering an institutional culture for result-based management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.5.3. Developing effective tools for result-based management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.6. Building trust through effective mutual accountability mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.6.1. Accountability to respective constituencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.6.2. Joint accountability to national stakeholders of the recipient country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.6.3. Reciprocal accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.7. Multilevel coordination as an effective partner management tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5. Developing an effective strategy for resource mobilisation in support of SSR . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.1. Assigning clear mandates and responsibilities for establishing partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2. Understanding the external assistance environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.1. Identifying potential funding sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.2. Mapping the profiles and interests of potential partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2.3. Understanding funding modalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.3. Managing the external assistance environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.3.1. Selecting funding arrangements according to national specificities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.3.2. Managing partners’ preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.3.3. Sustaining an integrated approach by encouraging GBS over project-limited funding . . . . 45
5.4. Building credibility for resource mobilisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.4.1. Establishing the framework for a partnership of equals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.4.2. Building external assistance into a national framework for financing SSR . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.4.3. Strengthening national management capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.5. Engaging with external partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.5.1. Developing partner-specific documentation for resource mobilisation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.5.2. Developing a proposal to request funding support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.5.3. Managing the negotiation phase and formalising agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.5.4. Distributing allocated resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6. Developing special support strategies for underfunded or overlooked areas . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.1. Putting emphasis on governance reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.2. Intelligence reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.3. Gender equality in SSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.4. Public financial management of the security sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.5. External oversight and accountability mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.5.1. Fostering accountability by supporting capacity building of external oversight stakeholders 59
6.5.2. Fostering accountability by integrating anti-corruption into SSR programming . . . . . . . . 60
6.5.3. Fostering transparency by supporting access to information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

iv
6.6. Traditional security and justice providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7. The role of ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.1. Providing normative guidance on partner relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.2. Facilitating the effectiveness of external support to SSR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.3. Exploring the possibility of a “dedicated wallet” under the financial division of the ECOWAS
Commission Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department for SSRG support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Checklist: Effective mobilisation and management of external partnerships in support of SSR . 67
Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

v
List of boxes
Box 1: SSR definitions in the African Union 2013 policy framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Box 2: Civilian supremacy and loyalty to constitutional authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Box 3: What are reform and democratic governance of the security sector? ECOWAS definitions . . . 5
Box 4: A few examples of external support to SSR processes in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Box 5: Understanding the political challenges faced by foreign administrations supporting SSR
abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Box 6: National funding for national definition of priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Box 7: External funding is never guaranteed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Box 8: Acknowledging the burden of external assistance on the national budget . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Box 9: Frequent shortcomings of external support to SSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Box 10: AU guidelines on external assistance to SSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Box 11: Quick reminder: National ownership and leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Box 12: The role of external actors in supporting the strengthening of national systems . . . . . . . 29
Box 13: Developing a strong framework for partners’ accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Box 14: Setting up inclusive working groups to follow up on complex interventions . . . . . . . . . . 36
Box 15: Risks associated with a lack of strategy on resource mobilisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Box 16: Who are potential external partners for SSR in West Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Box 17: Points of consideration for partner mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Box 18: Strengths and weaknesses of particular funding instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Box 19: What is value for money? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Box 20: Matching external contributions to national funding through joint project funding and
counterpart financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Box 21: Rebalancing funding allocation between soft and hard areas of SSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Box 22: Why is intelligence reform important? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Box 23: SSRG and gender in the ECOWAS policy framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Box 24: Democratic control and oversight of the security sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Box 25: Examples of ECOWAS contributions to transborder security initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

vi
Acronyms
AU African Union
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
GBS general budget support
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SBS sector budget support
SPS sector programme support
SSG security sector governance
SSR security sector reform
SSRG security sector reform and governance
UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union
UN United Nations
VFM value for money

Security sector reform (SSR) is a highly political and technically complex process which requires
considerable human and financial resources. The management of these resources is, in itself, a politically
sensitive and technically challenging matter which involves defining a shared agenda for security, rolling
out complex budget processes, setting up reliable mechanisms for financial accountability of security-
related expenditures and, in many instances, engaging in constructive partnerships1
with both domestic
and external actors for complementary funding on the grounds of national leadership and mutual
accountability. In the context of SSR, failure to support reform needs in an effective and transparent
manner can have negative impacts on the security of the state and the people.
West African states facing limited financial capacities may want to request support from bilateral or
multilateral counterparts in funding their SSR processes. While external assistance is an opportunity for
ECOWAS member states willing to engage in SSR, mobilising and managing such support entails political,
policy and technical challenges. Most critically, the value of partnerships that aim at filling the resource
gaps of a national SSR process should be balanced with the necessity of maintaining national ownership
and leadership of the reform process, regardless of the origins of complementary funds supporting it.
Indeed, it is common for sovereign states to express reservations about opening up to international
partnerships that bear the risk of resulting in external interference in core domestic affairs, such as
defence and security-related issues.
Despite an extensive contribution on framing international assistance relations, the general discourse
on development assistance has only benefited the area of SSR and security sector governance (SSG) in a
limited way, and mostly from the perspective of international assistance providers. Yet context-sensitive
application of the principles of effective partnerships for development can provide nations engaging
in SSR with a workable framework for effective management of external support to the reform process.
This tool is based on the observation that there is a relative wealth of guidance for international actors
willing to support SSR as part of their foreign assistance engagement, while practical advice aimed at
countries implementing such reforms on how to manage relationships with external partners remains
scarce. Acknowledging the unique challenges that West African states may face while extending their
development cooperation relationships to the field of SSR, this tool aims to provide ECOWAS member
states with practical guidance on how to manage external assistance to SSR in a way that supports
national vision, secures cost-efficiency, enforces mutual accountability and strives for sustainable results.
Introduction
1

2
It also discusses the role of ECOWAS in supporting member states in managing their relations with partner
countries and institutions in a manner consistent with regional norms for good SSG and international
standards for effective development partnerships.
Due to the scope of its topic, the tool is mainly aimed at national administrations of ECOWAS member
states specifically in charge of planning, managing and overseeing internal and external resource
allocation to SSR. However, it may also be useful for non-statutory oversight stakeholders involved in
monitoring the national security agenda, the national budget or cooperation policies, such as the media,
academic research centres and civil society observatories and organisations.

2.1. What is security sector reform?
ECOWAS defines SSR as “the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures,
and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more
effective, efficient, accountable and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice
needs of the people”.2
See also Box 1 for African Union (AU) definitions.
Relevance of external support to SSR
in West Africa
2
Box 1: SSR definitions in the African Union 2013 policy framework
3. Security: As guided by, but not limited to, the definition of security given in the Solemn Declaration on
a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The CADSP gives a multi-dimensional definition
of security which encompasses both the traditional state-centric notion of the survival of the state and
its protection from external aggression by military means, as well as the non-military notion of human
security based on political, economic, social and environmental imperatives in addition to human rights.
4.Security Sector: The components of the security sector vary according to each national context.However,
in general terms and in an African context, a security sector comprises individuals, groups and institutions
that are responsible for the provision, management and oversight of security for people and the state.
These include but are not limited to the following:
(a) Primary Security Institutions: such as the armed forces, the police, gendarmerie and other law
enforcement agencies, presidential guards, anti-terrorist units, border management, customs and
immigration authorities, Office/Directorate of the State Department, as well as any other services set
up by a Member State;
(b) Specialized Intelligence and Security Institutions: such as those that are in charge of finding and
using intelligence to preserve state sovereignty, state security and to defend vital national interests.
These may be involved in security activities such as counter espionage, counter terrorism and the fight
against all forms of organized crime;
(c) Public Oversight and Management Bodies: such as the executive, the justice ministries, the
legislature, national security advisory bodies, parliamentary sub-committees, anti-corruption bodies,
customary authorities, the Pan African Parliament, and regional parliamentary bodies;

4 Effective Management of External Support to Security Sector Reform
The SSR agenda acknowledges that sustainable peace, security and development require a security sector
that:
• is responsive to the actual security needs of the state and the people;
• guarantees and delivers effective and accessible justice and security services to all women, men, boys
and girls;
• offers equal opportunities to men and women to contribute to public safety and security at local and
national levels;
• is respectful of human rights and abides by the rule of law, notably through strict observance of the
separation of powers and submission to civilian authority (see Box 2);
• displays high standards of professionalism, notably by operating ethically, showing integrity and being
responsive to democratic control.
The main goal of SSR is to improve SSG, which “refers to the structures, processes, values and attitudes
that shape decisions about security and their implementation”.3
An essential aspect of an efficient and accountable security sector is the responsiveness of security
institutions to both internal control and external democratic oversight mechanisms. The draft ECOWAS
Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa defines democratic governance
of the security sector as “the provision, management and control of security sector based on democratic
Box 2: Civilian supremacy and loyalty to constitutional authority
Article 2 Civilian Supremacy: The Armed Forces and Security Services shall be at the disposal of
the constitutionally established political government and are subordinate to the constitutionally,
democratically elected authorities. Political authorities and groups shall refrain from undue interference
or extending partisan politics to the operations of the Armed Forces and Security Services. Personnel of
the Armed Forces and Security Services shall observe strict neutrality in political matters.
Article 13 Loyalty to Constitutional Authority: Personnel of the Armed Forces and Security Services shall
be disciplined and loyal to the State at all times. They shall owe loyalty and obedience to democratically
elected constitutional authorities and all lawful commands of such authorities shall be executed.
Source: ECOWAS Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services, 2011.
(d) Justice and Rule of Law Institutions: such as the judiciary, prisons and other correctional facilities,
Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Public Prosecutor, ombudspersons, traditional and
transitional justice systems, human rights commissions, tribunals and courts;
(e) Civil Emergency Units: such as search and rescue services, firefighting, riot control, natural disaster
management and natural resource protection units; and
(f) Non-state Security Bodies: such as private security companies, informal, traditional and customary
authorities and others, as may be decided by each Member State.
5. Security Sector Reform (SSR): In this policy, SSR refers to the process by which countries formulate
or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security
sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the
security and justice needs of the people. This policy takes note that “Security Sector Reform” is sometimes
expressed as security sector governance, security sector transformation, security sector development,
security sector review as well as security and justice reform.
Source: AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform, Addis Ababa, 2013.

5Relevance of external support to SSR in West Africa
principles and values for the benefit of the people. It requires separation of powers, a participatory
and inclusive approach involving citizens through their legally and regularly chosen representatives
in decision-making processes, management and control of state activities and functions in the security
sector.” See also Box 3.
The draft policy document also specifies that, “while security sector reform and governance (SSRG) is a
key component of conflict prevention, ECOWAS recognises that SSRG should also be part of a broader
reform agenda on promoting human rights, the rule of law, peace-making, peacekeeping, peacebuilding
and sustainable development”.
In practice, this means that SSR targets both the reinforcement of operational capacity and the
consolidation of integrity and accountability of the entire security sector. SSR also acknowledges the
importance of the role of civil society actors in regards to democratic governance of the security sector.
The security sector of a country is a product of its history, its context, its culture, etc. This is why every
country possesses a unique security sector. Sustainable changes within this sector need to be based on
these peculiar characteristics. Local ownership is a primary condition, not only to ensure that the actual
security needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, but also to arrive at a legitimate
and trustworthy security sector which is sustainable.
As a change process which touches on core national values, SSR is about reinforcing or sometimes
even introducing a new approach to security governance, on the basis of democratic values, transparent
management mechanisms and constructive relations with the people. This process of change cannot be
imposed from the outside; it must grow from a national conversation on the kind of security architecture
that is desired by all segments of the population. As such, the role of external actors is not to lead SSR,
but to support national authorities leading it.
2.2. Why is national funding of SSR challenging?
National funding of SSR is a powerful way of demonstrating national ownership and leadership of the
reform process. However, this can prove challenging in national budgets for several reasons, some of
which are listed below.
• Because it requires covering security costs at multiple levels simultaneously
SSR is an expensive process which requires intense and long-term budgetary effort. The budget
requirements associated with SSR can be identified at three distinct yet complementary levels which
operate concurrently.
Box 3: What are reform and democratic governance of the security sector? ECOWAS definitions
The draft ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance offers the following
definitions.
“Security sector reform: In this policy framework, SSR refers to the process by which countries formulate
or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security
sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, accountable and responsive to democratic control,
and to the security and justice needs of the people.
Democratic governance of the security sector: Refers to the management of public affairs based on
democratic principles and values for the benefit of the people. It requires separation of power, [and]
a participatory and inclusive approach involving citizens through their legally and regularly chosen
representatives in decision-making processes, management and control of State activities and functions.”
Source: Draft ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance, Articles 4–5.

(a) Funding the ordinary structures and activities of the security sector, such as the operating budgets of
the armed forces, police, gendarmerie, domestic and foreign intelligence services, border management
agencies, courts and public prosecutions, penal administration, etc., including the operating costs of
their line ministries (ministries of defence, security and justice) and internal control mechanisms such
as inspectorate services, internal audit departments, anti-corruption taskforces, martial courts, etc.
(b) Funding governance mechanisms that are responsible for ongoing democratic oversight of the
security sector, which usually include parliamentary bodies such as the defence and security committee,
budget and finance committee and any relevant parliamentary inquiry commission, statutory oversight
bodies such as the ombuds institution and national human rights commission, office of the auditor
general or court of accounts, independent anti-corruption agency, the judiciary and any special
oversight body. Unless adequately resourced, these institutions cannot perform their oversight duties
in an effective way, which in turn jeopardises the possibility for any significant improvement in the
governance of the security sector.
(c) Funding the specific reform process that aims to reframe security policies, institutions and
governance structures towards increased efficiency and accountability.This reform process has specific
budget requirements, such as the costs of conducting a security needs assessment, organising national
consultations on security, developing and funding a far-reaching national SSR programme or limited
reform initiatives, funding the right-sizing of the national security architecture and the modernisation
of security sector pension systems, etc.
• Because it requires balancing the funding of state responses to security needs and other social and
institutional needs
Taking charge of security costs at multiple levels while also meeting other essential commitments,
such as the provision of basic social services, can prove a major challenge for West African economies,
most of which are classified by the World Bank in the low or middle-low income categories.4
The
combination of scarce national resources and tremendous development needs demanding high
levels of public and private investments leaves most ECOWAS member states in a difficult position
for financing the development and implementation of an SSR process matching the governance and
security needs of both the state and the population.
SSR funding requirements should be adequately balanced with the funding of socio-economic
development sectors. National authorities arbitrating fund allocation should be wary of the risk for
a securitisation of development, acknowledging that failure to respond to basic social needs of the
population may increase risks of insecurity. There are multiple examples of how poor provision of
accessible education, health and employment services has contributed to an increase in violence,
criminality and radicalisation of certain segments of the population.
• Because it requires enabling long-term national planning
SSR is a long-term endeavour which can cause more harm than good if actions undertaken are left
unfinished. As a process of change, it takes time to become rooted within the society and to generate
sustainable impact on the mechanisms governing the security sector. SSR funding must therefore be
arranged in the long term and through sustainable mechanisms.
Multiyear funding arrangements help secure sufficient predictability of domestic funding to enable
consistent support to SSR interventions in the medium to long terms.However,this can prove extremely
challenging in national budgets that are subject to high fluctuations from year to year.
In the context of unstable macroeconomic frameworks subject to frequent variations of growth and
income and backed by poorly efficient tax systems, it can be difficult to plan for long-term investments
into structural improvement of security service delivery and associated oversight mechanisms. To
mention just two of many challenging factors, uncontrolled vulnerability to exchange rate volatility
and disproportionate reliance of national revenue on unpredictable sources of income, such as oil or
other natural resources highly subject to global price fluctuations, can hinder sustainable funding of
public policies in general, including SSR.

• Because it requires managing expectations
Experience has proven the importance for national authorities to monitor cautiously and address
promptly expectations relating to the reform process. Unsatisfied expectations, including financial
expectations, can generate frustrations and create spoilers. This can eventually jeopardise the
improvements of SSG, or the security situation at large.
Some actors may expect the reform process to improve their own financial status, for instance through
reform of the military pension system or a re-evaluation of pay scales as part of the revision of human
resource policies. The example of Guinea-Bissau speaks for how disappointed expectations can trigger
resistance from influential local actors. In this case, a large proportion of high-ranking military officials
had serious reservations about an earlier SSR programme that was managed by outsiders. Their main
complaint was that the funds spent on foreign programme advisers could have been used to support
their retirement package.
Where there is a lack of communication about what SSR is, security institutions may also expect an
increase in their operating budgets as a result of SSR being declared a national priority. However,
experience proves that an arithmetic increase in military budgets is not necessarily the most effective
way to improve the performance of security institutions.
Therefore, national authorities leading the SSR process should closely monitor the emergence of
unrealistic expectations, and improve communication on the reform process in order to diffuse such
expectations at an early stage. If false hopes are allowed to take root in security sector institutions or
personnel, they will result in high levels of disappointment and mistrust, which are detrimental to SSR.
Expectations are not only projected by individuals or groups on the reform process designed by others;
they are also shaped by those developing the SSR programme. When programming SSR it is important
to set strategic and operational goals that are attainable in light of the technical, institutional and
financial capacity of the state. Although the provisional budget for SSR can integrate the assumption
that external support will be mobilised to complement domestic funding, the impact of this assumption
should rely on a realistic assessment of the state’s attractiveness for external partners and ability to
mobilise external resources.
SSR programming requires high levels of awareness and realism in terms of both the budgetary effort
that can be maintained in the long run and the amount and nature of support that a country can
realistically expect to mobilise and manage. In cases when the estimated costs of reforms needed are
by far disproportionate to the means of the state, it may be useful to sequence the reform programme
according to predefined priorities, and identify affordable high-impact entry points which come close
to the funding capacity of the state as starting points.
• Because it requires managing resistance
SSR requires state authorities to go through a process of consulting security professions and the
people in the definition of a security agenda, finding common grounds for reform objectives, explaining
policy arbitrations, negotiating, convincing and sometimes overcoming resistance to build broad-based
national ownership. In most cases this consultation process, which is necessary to diffuse resistance at
an early stage, will consume time and resources, adding to the financial burden of SSR.
If unrealistic expectations are allowed to take root in security sector institutions
or personnel, they will result in high levels of disappointment and mistrust and
generate avoidable resistance. This is detrimental to the success of SSR.

SSR is also challenging because it involves rethinking how the state budget is allocated to security
institutions. This may result in a redistribution of resources among institutions, with the risk of
antagonising actors who may face a decrease or reframing of their funding allocation.
SSR further looks into transactional cultures in the security sector, and involves striving for efficient
and transparent use of national resources in a way that reflects agreed priorities. As a consequence,
SSR is likely to question individual and institutional habits relating to financial management in the
security sector. In many cases, the promotion of integrity, transparency and accountability will make
some national stakeholders nervous, strengthening the need for firm political commitment and
efficient change management mechanisms.
2.3. Why is there increasing will in the international community to assist SSR?
There is increasing interest and readiness among international actors to support SSR in West Africa
(see Box 4). This trend represents an opportunity for ECOWAS member states, as it increases financial
feasibility of SSR in a region faced with the challenges of scarce resources.
Several factors contribute to SSR increasingly topping the international cooperation agenda.
• Over the years, SSR has built credibility as an important peacebuilding tool and a critical stabilisation
instrument, which makes it worthy of national and international interest.
Both states engaging in SSR and their international partners understand the process as being part of
broader and long-term stabilisation, peacebuilding and democratisation efforts. The final conclusions
of the Africa SSR Forum held in November 2014 in Addis Ababa recommend that “good security sector
governance, oversight and management, including in the area of public financial management, should
be key priority areas for international support”.5
• There is a common recognition that the costs incurred by SSR may exceed the financial capacity of
most West African countries.
Budgeting and funding SSR are first and foremost a national prerogative. However, acknowledging
the challenges of exclusive national funding of SSR in low- and middle-income countries, the role of
external actors is to support efforts by national governments to meet their security needs, notably by
supplementing resource gaps that cannot be filled through domestic means. This helps enhance the
ability of the state to respond to its own security needs and to those of the people.
• There is a general consensus on the need to articulate the development agenda with the response to
security needs of the state and the people, which requires a delicate balance of budget allocations.
The human security approach acknowledges that rule of law, development and security are intrinsically
interconnected. Impunity for human rights violations, endemic poverty, illiteracy and other social
ills lie at the roots of a wide range of security threats, from domestic violence to urban criminality
and violent extremism. Therefore, while it is important to link SSR with the national development
agenda, there is a danger of this process leading to the securitisation of development, shifting critical
resources from development to security. In the long run, this could result in increased social tensions
and consequently the emergence or intensification of security threats fuelled by high levels of social
frustrations.
By increasing the amount of resources available to implement the national security policy, external
partners contribute to lightening the overall budgetary burden, so that fund allocation to SSR does not
impede resources needed for other critical socio-economic programmes.

• External support to SSR is not a matter of charity, but a strategic tool for promoting global peace and
security.
There is constantly increasing awareness of the interdependency of security challenges faced across
the region, as well as their strategic implications at the international level. The multiplication of
transnational security threats and the impact of local insecurity and national instability on regional and
international peace and security have been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt by the dynamics of
recent conflicts, such as the 1990s’ conflicts in the Mano River Basin (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone) and
the 2012 crisis in Mali. Some threats faced in West Africa are transnational in nature, such as piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea, cross-border human trafficking and arms and drugs smuggling, and development of
terrorist factions in the Sahel, northern Nigeria and bordering regions. These threats do not only affect
single West African countries, but impact on the neighbourhood and more generally on global security.
Thus supporting West African states to strengthen their governance structures with the aim of
enhancing their ability to respond effectively to threats is also a way for international partners to help
contain strategic threats with global implications, such as terrorism and transnational crime. As such,
the provision of external assistance to SSR offers a win-win situation for the recipient countries and
external partners.
• SSR touches on a variety of broader, interconnected governance issues in which external partners may
have special interest.
Through increased effectiveness and accountability of security institutions, SSR helps improve state
capacity to strengthen aspects of governance and human security that may be prioritised by external
partners under their international cooperation policy.
In the wider framework of the national agenda set by the country engaging in SSR, external partners
may be willing to support specific components of the reform programme which relate to their own
priority areas of intervention. For instance, supporting a police reform project can be a way for external
actors to support a variety of governance and human security elements, such as the strengthening of
institutional response to gender-based violence, promotion of gender equality in public institutions,
decentralisation of public service delivery, local dialogue mechanisms, human rights, civil society
engagement in policymaking and public service accountability, etc.
As such, support to a variety of SSR features falls under the development assistance interests and
priorities of many external partners (see also Section 5.5.1 on how to highlight these advantages in
communication with potential partners), which is conducive for a win-win approach to cooperation.
Box 4: A few examples of external support to SSR processes in West Africa
The increasing interest of the international community in supporting SSR is an opportunity for national
stakeholders to access additional human, logistical and financial resources.
• ECOWAS has supported the SSR processes in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau since the 1990s.
• In Sierra Leone the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) has been a
major partner in national SSR efforts after the 1991–2002 civil war.
• The United Nations (UN) Regional Office for West Africa has also made SSR a priority area for its
support to conflict prevention efforts in Guinea.
• In Mali the UN and European Union (EU) have developed programmes that support SSR after the 2012
crisis, through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the
EU Training and Capacity Building Missions (EUTM/EUCAP Sahel Mali).
Source: Ornella Moderan,“Political leadership and national ownership of security sector reform processes”,
in Ornella Moderan (ed.), Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa (Geneva: DCAF,
2015).

Although external assistance increases SSR feasibility in West Africa, it also comes with a number of
challenges from a national point of view. These disincentive factors may cause external assistance to
be perceived as a double-edged opportunity, thereby hampering its relevance in the eyes of countries
engaging in SSR.Acknowledging these obstacles and setting up mechanisms to diffuse them are essential
in order for West African states to make the most of external support opportunities while minimising
their downsides.
Some of the challenges that may discourage West African states from engaging in international
cooperation on SSR are outlined below, with suggestions on how to overcome them.
3.1. Challenges in national sovereignty
Arguably, a sovereign state should not depend on foreign support for a sector that is central to national
security and autonomy and deeply intertwined with core values of society, such as justice, security and
human rights. The actual or perceived risks of interference in domestic affairs constitute a major political
challenge and require careful selection of external partners.
Several aspects of external assistance partnerships have a potential for challenging self-determination.
3.1.1. Limitation of policy autonomy
Risk: Countries engaging in SSR are often concerned that external actors providing human and financial
assistance may also try to influence the elaboration of national policies. Accepting external assistance
would therefore represent a risk of reducing the country’s own policy autonomy.
What can be done: Anchor partnership in early political conversation.
It is legitimate for external partners to try to ensure that they are not supporting a state apparatus which
runs against their values. However, it is just as legitimate for countries engaging in SSR to ensure that
the partners they are interacting with respect them as equals and show consideration to their sovereignty
and their own core values within the limits of international law. National authorities should insist on
Addressing risks and challenges
associated with external support
to SSR from a national perspective
3

building partnerships of equals that are based on common and shared values, rather than on the forced,
unsustainable internalisation of principles that are perceived as imported.
As a forerunner to any form of SSR cooperation, political conversation must take place at a high level of
representation (between heads of state or government, foreign ministers, ambassadors, etc.) on the core
values underlying the reform process, on the national vision of security and on nationally set objectives.
This conversation offers both parties the opportunity to assess whether there is sufficient convergence
in their visions to form a reliable ground for partnership. Following this process, countries engaging in
SSR should be prepared to turn down a funding offer if the basic conditions for a mutually respectful
partnership are not met.
See also Section 3.2.1 on how to overcome the negative impact of financial dependency on policy
autonomy.
Caution: The phase of political conversation is sometimes overlooked,with the consequence of developing
partner projects or programmes that are only negotiated at a technical level, without a clear consensus
on underlying values or a common understanding of the broader framework for action. This can result in
unbalanced relationships which hamper national ownership and leadership of SSR.
3.1.2. Partner conditionalities
Risk: Linked to the issue of policy autonomy is the issue of conditionalities,which are sometimes perceived
as illegitimate, unilateral ways for foreign actors to try to dictate a conduct to a sovereign state. At first
sight, countries engaging in SSR might feel their sovereignty questioned by conditionalities imposed by
international actors as prerequisites for the provision of any assistance.
What can be done: Allow conditionalities to run both ways, and foster mutual understanding of the
political context in both partner countries.
National authorities should enter the conversation on conditionalities from a constructive perspective
and on an equal footing, with a clear vision of what is and is not negotiable on their side and on the
partner’s side. In order for the discussion to be constructive, conditionalities should be approached as
indications of the political context of both partner countries.
Equal footing from the start. Systematic rejection of all forms of conditionalities has not proven an effective
way of building trust with external actors and securing partnerships. Rather, the establishment of equal
partnerships requires both parties to state their own exigencies openly and decide freely and knowingly
whether or not they are willing to comply with each other’s demands. Conditionalities should therefore
run both ways. It is important for West African states not only to examine the preliminary demands of
potential partners, but also to expose their own exigencies and prerequisites.This is necessary if the rules
of the game are to be defined collaboratively and not imposed unilaterally.
Mutual understanding of political contexts throughout the partnership. When faced with partner restrictions
which were not initially discussed, West African countries should consider the origins and motivations
of such modifications. When partner conditionalities evolve in the course of a partnership, recipient
countries are sometimes prompt to condemn such evolutions as abusive without a deeper analysis of
their cause.
Such evolutions may be dictated by political developments in either the recipient or the partner country.
For instance, a deterioration of the human rights situation in the country receiving assistance is normally
considered a legitimate cause for the introduction of additional prerequisites to further the cooperation.
Unforeseen restrictions on the collaboration may also result from a change in the political situation of
the country providing assistance, such as a shift of government following elections.
Sometimes a hardening of the parliamentary opposition in the country providing assistance can lead its
ministry of foreign affairs to introduce new restrictions proactively, with the aim of protecting existing

13Addressing risks and challenges associated with external support to SSR from a national perspective
programmes against the risk of parliamentary or other forms of political pressure that could lead to their
premature closure. In such situations, it may be in the interest of the country receiving assistance to “help
the partner help them”, by accepting additional conditions as a way to demonstrate their transparency
and protect the partnership programme from exposure to political manipulations on the side of the
country providing assistance.
As a general rule, it is of the utmost importance that the authorities of receiving governments are
well aware of the political context in the partner country. Mutual understanding of domestic political
challenges in both countries is an advantage for successful cooperation.
To build effective partnerships for SSR assistance, West African states should ensure that:
• the conditionalities attached to partner assistance are consistent with their own national vision;
• there is mutual understanding of the characteristics and challenges of the reform process, including
its objectives;
• there is mutual understanding regarding the necessity to maintain constructive ongoing political
dialogue, and awareness of each other’s political context as it affects the partnership;
• external partners also accept the prerequisites set by national authorities of the country conducting
SSR,such as the obligation to focus on national priorities and report on a national canvas,the limitation
of funds allocated to international consultants and partner operating costs to a certain ceiling, or the
strict compliance of all partner staff to national legislation on sexual abuse and exploitation.
3.1.3. Outsider agenda
Risk: One fear is that the nature of external assistance could cause West African governments to prioritise
the demands of development partners at the expense of state responsiveness to the needs expressed
by citizens. This would hamper inclusive national ownership of the reform process and cause SSR to be
guided by misplaced aims.
Box 5: Understanding the political challenges faced by foreign administrations supporting SSR
abroad
Avoiding losing external partners also means understanding the (often political) context within the
partner countries.
Often the context of the country in which SSR takes place is the only context observed, while the
political dimensions of assistance for SSR within the partner country are ignored. Governments of partner
countries can easily be challenged by their political opposition if the process stalls, and certainly in cases
of human rights abuses. In that case partner governments can take one-sided measures to avoid losing
domestic political support. Good relations and a sense of mutual commitment are very helpful in these
circumstances. Good and open relations with human rights non-governmental organisations can also
help in maintaining good relationships with partners.
When external support arrangements depend on measures to be taken by the
national government, the fulfilment of these commitments should be guaranteed
according to the agreed timeframe. In case of delay, it is necessary to reduce the
negative impact by timely communication.

What can be done: Establish the buy-in of external actors into a broad-based national vision of security
as a precondition for partnership.
At the stage of the preliminary political conversation (Section 3.1.1),it is important for national authorities
of countries engaging in SSR to build consensus with external partners on the division of roles: leadership
of and primary responsibility for SSR by national actors; supportive role of external actors.
ECOWAS member states should frame any request for external assistance not just in terms of funding
needs, but on the basis of a political buy-in from potential partners into the national vision of security
developed by the country itself through a consultative process.
This involves developing a home-grown agenda that reflects the security needs of a broad constituency
of national stakeholders, including through consultations with civil society and in local communities.
Not only does an inclusive process contribute to broad national ownership, but it also establishes a more
legitimate and credible framework for external partners to buy into.
Caution: Building inclusive consensus on a national vision of security is one of the critical and
fundamentally sovereign areas of SSR that are often rushed by international partners eager to move
fast. At times, partners may even propose their own analysis as a less costly and easier alternative to
what can be perceived as a laborious process of national consultations. Despite the difficulty of resisting
such pressures, national authorities should invariably commit sufficient time and effort to determine
their own national policy needs in consultation with the people. Involving civil society actors in the
consultation process is an effective way to build legitimacy and collective ownership among national
stakeholders. This often requires national authorities to temper the will of some international actors to
fast-track policy development processes. Ultimately, the elaboration of a national policy agenda through
an accessible, transparent and inclusive process will reinforce national ownership and motivate external
partners to support reform implementation.
3.1.4. Exposure of confidential defence and security information
Risk: Countries engaging in SSR are sometimes concerned that involving external actors in this process
will require them to share information that should remain strictly national and confidential. Used for
The fundamental and abiding principle of national ownership is that external
support and engagement must be informed, directed and led by national
stakeholders. It is therefore crucial, to the extent possible, for external actors
to seek to buy into national reform processes, rather than to bring national
actors on board for ideas and processes that are externally generated and
inspired. National stakeholders should be encouraged and supported in seeking
the commitment or “buy-in” of externals into locally generated, negotiated and
inspired ideas, and their vision of security. Where that buy-in is lacking, the
strategic opportunity for sustainability of the reform process will be lost.
Source: UN Inter-Agency SSR Taskforce, Security Sector Reform, Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (New
York: United Nations, 2012), p. 16.

intelligence purposes, such information may undermine the geostrategic position of the country and
increase its vulnerability to diplomatic pressures or security threats.
What can be done: Set clear norms on the nature of information to be shared for programmatic reasons.
One the one hand, effective partnership requires constructive communication and information sharing.
On the other hand, contributing to filling funding gaps in the SSR process does not entitle external
partners to access all information relating to this sector.
To balance these two requirements,it is advisable to develop clear guidelines on the nature of information
that can be shared and processes for sharing it. Not only should such guidelines be in place, but they
should also be well known by national personnel working closely with external partners. The rules
contained in these guidelines should be consistent with national classification laws. They should not be
theoretical and subject to interpretation, but rather practical and easy-to-understand instructions that
can be integrated into the operating standards of security institutions interacting with external partners.
In most cases, the information actually needed by external partners for programmatic purposes remains
fairly basic and does not threaten national security.
3.2. Challenges in financial autonomy and sustainability
External assistance carries the risk of generating dependency,and consequently hindering national control
over the reform process. Unpredictable partnerships expose SSR to financial uncertainty. In cases where
the feasibility of reforms largely relies on external funding, unforeseen withdrawal of commitments by
external partners can paralyse the SSR process.
Sometimes the modalities attached to external assistance can seem subject to unilateral interpretation,
which amplifies a sense of dependency and vulnerability to partner desiderata. Overall, a lack of
predictability in terms of the volume, conditions and timing of financial assistance affects the state’s
ability to carry out the reform according to a strategic and fine-tuned plan.
With respect to national ownership of the security sector, governments should consider sustainable ways
to scale down their dependency on external support in the medium to long term. Here are a few solutions
to be considered.
3.2.1. The risks of financial dependency on policy autonomy
Risk: There are legitimate concerns that systematic recourse to external support may inhibit the state’s
initiative and ability to mobilise domestic resources in support of national priorities. This may in turn
limit autonomy in the framing of a policy agenda.
What can be done: Prioritise domestic funding of core decision-making processes and highly political
consultative actions.
Opening SSRG to international assistance is often seen as bearing the risk of
letting outsiders’ eyes into core national security matters, thus raising issues
of unbalanced access to information by the partner country compared to the
recipient. Clear regulations on the type of information to share and procedures
for sharing it can help to address this challenge.

The mobilisation of external resources should not be a systematic reflex action, but a carefully considered
decision in each instance. Far from being automatic, it should rely on a clear definition of needs and
assessment of national capacities to cover them, as only the gap may legitimately require external
support (see Section 4.2).
To the extent possible, the core and most sensitive components of SSR, such as the
definition of priorities (see Box 6) and strategic-level interventions, should be funded
by national resources, as a way to maintain core national independence in the guidance
of the reform.
3.2.2. The risks of open-ended funding agreements for SSR sustainability
Risk: There is an argument that open-ended funding arrangements create the expectation for constant
renewals of external funding. Not defining clear timeframes for partnerships increases the risk of
dependency on external funding, as it does not encourage the search for national funding options that
are sustainable in the long run. In the absence of clear exit strategies, partner withdrawal usually comes
as unexpected and destabilises the SSR process, which is a very long-term undertaking.
What can be done: Anchor partnerships in clear timeframes, and plan early for exit strategies.
When entering partnership with external actors, national governments should start planning for exit
strategies and sustainable national funding options right away, without waiting for the last phase of the
partnership. Linking partnerships with external actors to predetermined and clearly stated objectives and
timeframes from the beginning helps to delineate partner engagement in time. Funding renewal beyond
strictly contractual commitments should not be assumed or taken for granted. It can also be useful to
integrate a section on partner exit strategy in the partnership agreement.
Box 6: National funding for national definition of priorities
It is advisable that process-oriented initiatives which aim at establishing an initial diagnosis of governance
challenges calling for reforms are integrally or at least significantly covered by domestic funding.
Nationally funded actions to identify SSR priorities may include:
• conducting an assessment of the security sector at large, or an organisational audit of particular
security institutions;
• reviewing security sector legislation, possibly in collaboration with parliamentary staff, academic
experts and civil society practitioners;
• conducting a gender assessment of either the security sector in general or particular security
institutions;
• holding a governmental seminar on SSR, as a way of formally initiating a collective reflection on areas
of improvement in SSG;
• initiating dialogue with civil society and local communities on the self-identified security needs of
men, women, boys and girls living in the national territory.
Considering that such initial actions will typically inform the definition of national priorities, ensuring
their coverage by domestic resources helps to reduce the risk of external actors influencing the definition
of the reform agenda according to their own interests or concerns. It thereby contributes to ensuring not
only that external support is demand driven, but also that this demand is actually home-grown.
Self-funding of core fundamental activities aimed at shaping the national agenda is a crucial element to
strengthen the state’s capacity to channel external support towards areas truly determined by national
stakeholders, rather than by outsiders. To the extent possible, external support should come at a later
stage, as a way to fill particular resource gaps identified by national authorities.
See also Tool 3
on good financial
governance of
defence and security
institutions.
3

3.2.3. The risks associated with short-term partners’ commitments
Risk: Experience has shown that external partners sometimes prefer to engage through repeated short-
term assistance commitments, rather than a single longer-term commitment. This allows them more
flexibility in the renegotiation of partnership terms at the time of each funding renewal. However, this
practice deprives the recipient country of the possibility of planning effectively in the medium to long
term.
What can be done: Focus on medium- to long-term commitments.
National governments engaging in SSR with external support should give priority to external partners
willing to commit to medium- to long-term assistance programmes. As a general rule, the national policy
or guidelines for partner relations should prioritise coherent, multiyear partnership agreements over
one-off assistance opportunities, however often repeated.
Multiyear assistance agreements have the advantage of giving better visibility of incoming partner
funding, which can therefore be included in the national budget process beforehand.They also have lower
transactional costs, as the assistance framework does not require constant renegotiation. In contrast,
short-term assistance offers do not allow for a strategic overview of available resources and thus hinder
the consistency of national budget planning. They also generate higher transactional costs, as assistance
needs to be rearranged more often.
3.2.4. The risks of unfulfilled commitments and partner withdrawals
Risk: Even when best negotiated, the commitments of partners are not always fulfilled. Unmet
commitments leave the country engaged in SSR with unanticipated resource gaps (see Box 7).
What can be done: Diversify partnerships and formalise commitments.
Good practices recommend systematically formalising external support arrangements in official
partnership documents that specify the scope of respective commitments and mutual responsibilities
of all parties, and identify a clear timeframe and modalities for the provision of agreed assistance. The
observance of contractual arrangements should be closely monitored by the government engaging in
SSR.
Box 7: External funding is never guaranteed
Unexpected withdrawals of commitments can harm the overall process due to the potentially
counterproductive impact of unachieved interventions. A change of government, a shift of foreign policy
or an economic crisis are just a few examples of events that can cause unexpected withdrawals by
partners, leaving the recipient country unable to carry on the reform process.
Many SSR processes in West Africa have been hamstrung by external partners unexpectedly withdrawing
their commitment at a time when it was most needed. For example, security institutions in Sierra Leone,
Ghana and Guinea-Bissau have been affected by funding cuts in the wake of the 2008 global economic
crisis. Such situations have highlighted the need for national core funding, clear partnership frameworks
and contingency plans to cope with the uncertainty of external support.
in Ornella Moderan (ed.), Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa (Geneva: DCAF,
2015).

When external support arrangements provide for multiple settlements, it is advisable to match each
settlement with a coherent unit of activities,as a damage-control precaution in case of partner withdrawal.
Indeed, matching funding settlements with coherent programme sequences helps to guarantee the
funding of each meaningful set of interventions almost as stand-alones. In this way, a suspension of
external funding will neither hinder ongoing activities nor leave an organic set of actions disturbingly
unachieved. This approach helps countries engaging in SSR to secure a minimum level of certainty over
the availability of funding for each sequence of intervention (either particular projects or programme
components) before initiating it.
West African governments should also insist on committing external partners to an agreed framework
for timely disbursement of funds. A practical way of doing this consists of requiring external partners to
provide official forecasts of scheduled disbursements at least four to six months before the commencement
of the preparation of the annual budget. This allows partner commitments – at least in the short term
(less than a year) – to be captured in the annual national budget planning, and increases the political
weight of such commitments.
To minimise the impact of unexpected individual withdrawals, national governments should also consider
diversifying funding sources and planning for flexibility to reassign or renegotiate assignment of external
funding to unanticipated priorities. For the purposes of such flexibility, general budget support modalities
are usually preferable (see Section 5.2.3).
3.3. Challenges in institutional capacity
Although it can be an opportunity, external funding also comes with a price for national administrations.
External resource mobilisation and management require time and effort; they also create the need for
coordination and multiply reporting requirements. External funding eventually increases pressure on
often already scarce human resources and stretches limited institutional capacity.
3.3.1. High transaction costs
Risk: External partners often place significant expectations on governments in terms of the use of a
country’s resources to enable the implementation of assistance programmes, while imposing heavy
contractual constraints. National administrations are expected to meet multiple country assessment
missions and dedicate time to numerous and sometimes redundant partner consultation processes, keep
up with iterating reporting demands, etc. This results in high transaction costs.
Furthermore, the fragmentation of external assistance in a multitude of small and medium projects
multiplies operating costs without necessarily increasing the scale of results. It also compels national
administrations to commit more in-kind and sometimes financial resources to the coordination of
international partners. The combination of these elements heightens transaction costs, which in turn
lower the actual value of assistance received.
Considering the transaction costs against the sometimes limited added value of international cooperation
partnerships, the benefits of external assistance may not always seem to be worth the investments
required to make them possible.

What can be done: Assess the benefits of external assistance in a comprehensive manner and encourage
synergies.
Byencouraging external partners to adopt synergies and joint initiatives,such as joint funding mechanisms,
national authorities of countries engaging in SSR can minimise the operating costs associated with
fragmented partner interventions. This can be stated as a national preference in the national cooperation
policy or equivalent. Alternatively, it can be discussed on a case-by-case basis with external partners,
based on the identification of common interests with different partners.
Building synergies among external partners helps to:
• reduce management and operating costs;
• scale up impact;
• lower the burden of coordination and reporting requirements on the national administration.
To ensure that partnerships present sufficient net value, national authorities should also assess the
promised commitment of partners in terms of the direct and indirect costs of their assistance. This helps
to get a more comprehensive and realistic overview of the actual benefits of external assistance, which
facilitates sound decision-making on the opportunity of engaging in a particular partnership with an
external actor.
Moreover, it is important to track and report the costs associated with external assistance as part of the
national contribution to the success of assistance projects implemented by international partners (see
Box 8). This is necessary for both strategic management of SSR costs and policy evaluation purposes
(evaluating the national cooperation policy as well as the SSR strategy).
West African countries should not consider external assistance as a grant
mechanism devoid of any cost to them, but rather as partnership mechanisms
that require a certain level of investment by the recipient country. Hence it is
important to secure a strategic overview of costs and gains associated with
external assistance, in order to make rational partnership choices.
Box 8: Acknowledging the burden of external assistance on the national budget
The national budget covers the costs of often overlooked in-kind contributions, such as the provision of
public premises and the allocation of civil servants’ work time to support external partners. Although
seldom properly accounted for, these “invisible costs” of partners’ programmes and projects represent an
additional burden on scarce national resources – which can only be outweighed by significant results
from international assistance.
To be able to account properly for external assistance, West African governments accepting external
support for their SSR processes should strengthen national capacities for analysing the content of
expenses reported by partners as official development assistance (ODA) relating to SSR. This will provide
a solid basis for discussing the contribution of external partners accordingly, and ensuring that partners’
reports to international arenas match the data accepted by the recipient country as SSR support. This
eventually helps to secure a common ground for negotiating further assistance.
For more information see Tool 2: “Security sector reform programming”. 2

Tip! To match the requirements of their activities with the calendar of the recipient government with
minimum inconvenience, development partners should be required to share a harmonised calendar
containing major development activities (missions, meetings, reviews, strategies, etc.) on an annual or
biannual basis, with agreed flexibility mechanisms to review it periodically.
3.3.2. Duplication of efforts due to uncoordinated procedures
Risk: Related to the problem of high transaction costs is the diversity of partners’ management procedures
and redundancy of project management requirements.The reluctance of external partners to use national
procedures and mechanisms for project and programme management inflates the burden on national
institutions, which have to cope with a variety of uncoordinated and often repetitive partner processes.
What can be done: Insist on partners’ coordination and alignment with national management systems.
The coordination of external assistance is primarily the responsibility of the national government
conducting SSR. Regular coordination with all external partners is necessary to ensure consistency in
the various forms of support being provided by those partners. Besides bilateral encounters, inclusive
coordination meetings gathering all external partners around the government leading SSR help to
maintain adequate sharing of information and a comprehensive overview of the external assistance
environment.
Moreover, the use of national procedures and systems is a requirement endorsed by the vast majority of
international development actors (see Section 4.3.2). However, implementing this principle can prove
challenging on the ground. West African governments should first of all set up credible management
systems based on international norms, harmonised procedures with oversight and audit mechanisms,
and sufficient human capacity to operationalise these systems. Ensuring the training of national staff on
how to implement national procedures and communicating clearly with external partners on existing
management procedures are essential steps towards building a common framework for project and
programme management that is effective and country-owned.
To minimise the waste of time and resources of national administration on double-dipping procedures,
it can be useful to mandate the national SSR coordination unit (within the national SSR coordination
mechanism) to develop harmonised reporting templates, organise joint reviews, define standard budget
procedures and design other harmonisation tools.
Box 9: Frequent shortcomings of external support to SSR
Advisably, West African governments engaging in SSR should beware of frequent and often interrelated
shortcomings of external assistance to SSR, such as the following.
• Weak understanding of the local and national context by outsiders. International partners sometimes
bypass constructive inputs from national stakeholders. Yet without continuous guidance from national
stakeholders, development partners may fail to perceive cultural sensitivities, historical heritages and
other context-specific features. This could lead them to design interventions that do not fit the actual
needs of a particular country, institution or community, potentially with the risk of doing more harm
than good. Explaining the context, the historical heritage and other background features should be a
continuous activity of the host government and its national stakeholders (including civil society). It is
essential to ensure that all initiatives by international partners are validated and conducted through
inclusive mechanisms that involve national stakeholders in a substantial manner.
• Tendency to replicate foreign models. External partners sometimes tend to overlook the peculiarities
associated with the local and national context in the reform process,and promote a recipe-type solution
to complex governance challenges. Although policy transfer can be a useful tool for capitalising on
the experience of other countries, consideration must systematically be paid to contextualising SSR
actions. When it comes to SSR, one size does not fit all. If the host government wishes to examine
foreign experiences in order to nurture its own national policy process, several cases should be looked
into.

• Over-technicisation of SSR. International partners often overlook the social and political dimensions
of SSR and rush into providing support in overly technocratic ways. This underestimates the
fundamentally political nature of SSR, thereby failing to address critical issues of national values
and vision, institutional cultures and public trust underlying the construction or consolidation of a
functioning and accountable security sector. It also hinders the ability of SSR to engage with social
and political actors who have a great influence on security governance, such as national leaders,
members of parliament, leaders of key civilian self-defence movements and other non-state security
providers, and community-based opinion leaders.
• Narrow focus on primary security providers. Acknowledging the broad definition of the security sector
according to the AU and ECOWAS policy frameworks, development partners and recipient governments
should not focus exclusively on the core defence and security institutions, but also take into account
relevant civilian management and oversight actors, such as parliament, national human rights
commissions and other ombuds institutions, financial oversight agencies and civil society actors.
• Narrow focus on “train and equip” interventions. Rebuilding an effective and accountable security
sector requires more than material, infrastructure and operational training support. Although these
elements are necessary, they do not qualify as SSR unless they are associated with improvements in
governance structures and strengthening of ethical norms. A broader approach to SSR also requires
that reform efforts should not be limited to areas such as defence, intelligence, border management,
justice and probations,policing and community safety,but should address related structural challenges,
such as human rights and gender equality in the security sector. Furthermore, SSR should be designed
as a constituent part of wider state reform efforts, which may include tax reforms, youth employment
initiatives, women’s empowerment policies and other institutional processes that affect the general
environment of human security.
Note: The narrow focus on “train and equip” often leads international partners to overlook other areas
of SSR intervention, such as those outlined in Section 6.
• Lack of transparency on assistance provided. Multiple, mismatching systems of reporting from one
international partner to another make it difficult to understand how SSR-related ODA is developed
and what it actually encompasses. This uncertainty affects the reliability of what some partners report
as SSR-related ODA to the recipient government and to international bodies in charge of collecting
development cooperation data, such as the Development Co-operation Directorate of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Unclear reporting mechanisms also increase
the odds for untimely, incomplete and poorly explained reporting on external assistance. Overall,
poor readability of assistance reports hinders the ability of the recipient government to monitor and
manage assistance received appropriately.
• Lack of predictability. See Section 2.2.3.
• Excessive limitations with technical assistance. Some external partners tend to entrust a great deal of
theirtechnicalassistanceservicestointernationalexperts.Althoughtheprovisionoftechnicalassistance
is, in itself, a valuable way of gathering high-level expertise to support SSR, the systematic recourse
to international consultants is often perceived as partner driven, non-transparent and unnecessarily
expensive. To make the most of external assistance, it is recommended that the mobilisation of foreign
experts should be restricted to cases where the required expertise is not available at the national
level. When national expertise is not available, foreign technical assistance should have the objective
of building national capacities. Arrangements should be made for sustainable skills transfer through
training of national trainers, mentoring mechanisms or pairing international experts with national
counterparts, for example.

When it comes to SSR, insufficient use is often made of existing international guidance for development
cooperation, notably because SSR projects and programmes are not always accepted as developmental.
However, recognising the linkages between security and development,various international organisations
(the OECD, UN, EU, etc.) have increasingly admitted as development assistance the “soft” forms of security
assistance that are aimed at strengthening both institutional efficiency and the democratic nature of
security governance.6
SSR assistance and what is usually considered traditional development assistance do share common
dynamics when it comes to partnership relations. Although SSR is a particular area of interventions
that does require additional precautions, international guidance for effective development cooperation
provides a basic framework that can effectively inform good partnership practices the field of SSR.
4.1. Core principles for development assistance
Drawing on lessons learnt from decades of international development cooperation, the international
community has developed a set of principles aimed at improving the effectiveness of international
cooperation for development. These principles are essentially captured in milestone documents, such as:
• the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005);
• the Accra Agenda for Action (2008);
• the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation Agreement (2011);
• the Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013).
Applying principles of effective
development partnerships to SSR
support
4
Generic guidelines for effective development assistance, such as those stated
in the 2005 Paris Declaration, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the 2011
Busan Partnership document, must also apply to SSR assistance.

These international initiatives provide useful guidelines on how to optimise the relevance and upscale
the impact of external assistance in all areas of international cooperation. ECOWAS and its member
states, along with their traditional bilateral and multilateral partners, have endorsed a number of these
guidelines.
Efforts for implementing these principles must come from both sides of the partnership. On the one
hand, international actors must improve the structures and coordination of their cooperation policies
and practices. On the other hand, countries benefiting from external support must also improve their
approaches to partner relations. In this regard, viewing external assistance relationships as a domain of
mutual responsibility for improvement is critical to enable effective partnerships.
These generic principles for effective development assistance should inform the management of external
assistance of SSR like any other area of governance cooperation. Accordingly, West African governments
willing to engage in SSR-related cooperation should be guided by the following core principles.
• National ownership of reform priorities, supported by a country-led needs assessment.
• Alignment of external support with national policies, strategies, institutions and procedures.
• Harmonisation through enhanced coordination among external partners as well as with the national
party, to improve the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of support provided.
• Managing for results with country-owned, results-oriented frameworks.
• Mutual accountability in all aspects of the partnership, including shared responsibility in the use of
resources, achievement of reform goals and ethical accountability.
Beyond global commitments,the AU and ECOWAS have formulated specific guidelines for external support
to SSR in their member states (see Box 10 for AU guidelines and Section 7.1 for ECOWAS guidelines).
Box 10: AU guidelines on external assistance to SSR
National vision and parameters for external support for SSR: External support for SSR will adhere to
a nationally defined vision of security and security sector reform. Where such a vision has not yet been
coherently articulated, external partners may seek to support the development of such a national vision.
At the same time, national actors need to share the responsibility of ensuring that external support
advances a national vision and need to be willing to (re)negotiate external assistance if it is not consistent
with nationally-defined goals and objectives.
Coordination of SSR assistance: Coordination of SSR assistance is ultimately a national responsibility.
When and where national authorities lack the capacity for coordination, the RECs [regional economic
communities], the African Union and/or the United Nations may, where appropriate, partner with national
authorities to facilitate coordination of SSR assistance and to build national capacities for the Member
State to eventually assume a lead coordination role.
Source: AU Policy Framework on SSR, Section B, Article 16, paras (d) and (j).

25Applying principles of effective development partnerships to SSR support
4.2. Securing national ownership
4.2.1. SSR assistance must be demand driven
Asserting country ownership and leadership is indispensable to allow effectiveness of external support
to SSR. Effective external support must be demand driven, not supply commanded. This means that for
external support to be effective, it must respond to existing local needs and not set its own agenda.
National demand constitutes the fundamental benchmark for assessing the relevance and usefulness of
external assistance to SSR.
One possible way to help ensure that assistance responds to home-grown demand is to establish, as part
of the procedure for entering partnerships, a requirement for:
• the source of the demand to be explicitly identified (“at the request of XYZ stakeholder…”);
• the documents and national strategic planning on which the support is aligned to be explicitly outlined.
Any support initiative should be systematically validated to demonstrate its contribution to the overall
vision of security promoted by the state. Formal documentation (such as memoranda of understanding
or cooperation agreements) should contain official and precise terms of collaboration, clearly stating
national leadership, state sovereignty and partner accountability as part of the basic prerequisite for
assistance to be accepted. In all cases, it is critical that West African states enter partnerships in a
selective and insightful manner.
Box 11: Quick reminder: National ownership and leadership
Experience has demonstrated the importance for West African states to take strong leadership in:
• identifying their own national governance and security needs;
• setting their own national agenda for SSRG;
• assessing their own capacity to implement this agenda;
• expressing clear areas of interest for external support as a complement to national investments;
• asserting the need for partners to use national management systems;
• setting the pace for their own reform processes (see Section 4.2.3).
Local [or national] ownership is defined as a state in which the reform of security
policies, institutions and activities is designed, managed and implemented by
domestic rather than external actors. What is required is not local support for
donor programmes and projects, but rather donor support for programmes and
projects initiated by local actors.
Source: Leopold von Carlowitz, “Local ownership in practice: The justice system reform in Kosovo and
Liberia”, DCAF Occasional Paper 23 (Geneva: DCAF, 2011), p. 2.
For more detailed guidance see Tool 1 on political leadership and national ownership of SSR processes. 1

4.2.2. Demand for SSR assistance should rely on country-led needs assessment and capacity gap
analysis
The demand for external assistance should be based on national needs identified through an inclusive
and comprehensive country-led assessment of security needs and of national capacity to respond to
these needs. This participatory process must account for the security needs of the state, those of the
population as a whole and those of specific social groups within the population, such as security needs
specific to men, women, boys, girls, particular age groups, undereducated segments of the population,
minorities or remote rural communities.
The analysis of existing response capacity against security needs identified through this inclusive needs
assessment process will lead to a clearer overview of capacities that are missing to enable the state
to respond better to relevant security challenges. By shedding light on concrete areas that require
improvement, this gap analysis helps define reform priorities. It evaluates the funding needed to enable
security sector institutions to fulfil their mission with the required effectiveness, which will then serve
as a roadmap for external resource mobilisation. The capacity and funding needs that cannot be filled by
national resources are considered to be gaps.
A capacity gap analysis for defining external assistance needs should start with the clear definition of
a national vision of security through an inclusive and participatory consultation process which reaches
out to a broad constituency of national stakeholders. Country-led security needs assessment should not
be limited to government institutions; it should rather adopt an inclusive approach that engages with
all national and local stakeholders and interlocutors. The objective is to build confidence in the reform
process and foster shared ownership among a wide range of stakeholders within the security sector and
local communities. National authorities organising the consultation process should partner with credible
civil society organisations to achieve more inclusiveness.
This commonly shared national vision should then become the basis of political dialogue with external
partners (see Section 3.1.1), in an effort to generate buy-in (see Section 3.1.3) and agree on common
grounds for the provision of assistance towards realisation of nationally set goals within the framework
of locally expressed needs.
4.2.3. SSR should follow national pace
There is often pressure on national authorities by international partners to speed up certain processes
in order to keep up with the partners’ expectations or funding cycles, which may not match national
governance cycles.
Although fine-tuned progression of the reform process is important to maintain its vitality and credibility,
the pace of SSR must not be imposed by programme cycles of external partners at the expense of
societal or institutional buy-in within the host country. Reforms are long-term efforts, and should be
Good practices recommend that states initiating SSR should establish as a
political and procedural requirement that only demand-driven support matching
a specific home-grown expression of needs is welcome. The partnership
agreement should duly document the origin of the demand, as well as the
alignment of the proposed response with identified national priorities.

SSR takes time and requires careful change management mechanisms to achieve
sustainable results.
presented as such from the beginning. National authorities should be realistic in the deadlines they
set for societal-level goals, and avoid unrealistic commitments that may lead to counterproductive and
overly technocratic reform overloads.
At a societal level, processes such as national consultations, parliamentary capacity development and
trust building are among the most critical areas that should not be rushed by external partners or any
other actor. Core national funding helps to maintain state control over the pace of reforms.
At an institutional level, reforms require institutional transformations that go well beyond the sum of
technocratic modifications in management procedures to encompass necessary shifts in institutional
cultures and individual mentalities. Such transformations require continuous efforts over what may come
close to the timespan of an entire generation.
At an activity level, the need to prioritise continuous capacity building may slow down the execution of
certain tasks. For instance, external partners providing technical assistance for a policy review may be
tempted to “do it themselves” in order to move faster; however, this approach will not be sustainable as
it will not allow for skills transfer. Instead, it is preferable to support the development of strong national
expertise through a process of collaborative working and mentoring. Since this type of approach requires
more time, this should be taken into account when planning reforms.
4.3. Ensuring partner alignment with reliable country systems
The principle of alignment refers to two important commitments. The first is that partners providing
assistance should base their support on nationally defined priorities, policies and strategies. The second
is that external assistance should be delivered through country systems.
4.3.1. Policy alignment
Policy alignment refers to the need for external partners to tune their assistance offer to the agenda and
priorities defined by national stakeholders, by virtue of the national ownership principle (see Section 4.2).
To facilitate alignment of external support to national priorities, West African governments should
endeavour to develop a national security policy and/or sector-specific policy or strategy documents which
articulate the priorities, strategic goals and objectives of SSR. Such documents are important references
for national stakeholders and external actors to understand the national vision for security and be able
to align with it. Ideally, a national security policy will provide the most comprehensive and consistent
overview, from which a specific SSR strategy could be derived, while subsector strategies (e.g. defence
white paper, internal security strategy, border management strategy, etc.) would feed into the overall
national policy strategy on SSR.
However, developing a comprehensive national security policy framework is an extremely ambitious
undertaking. As a more accessible alternative, governments of countries engaging in SSR may want to
develop shorter yet clear statements of intent, with strategic goals and objectives for the specific security
sector. In all cases it is important to provide an unambiguous strategic background for partners to align
on.

4.3.2. System alignment
Experience in the West African region and elsewhere has proven that external partners are sometimes
tempted to design and implement SSR-related projects according to their own systems and procedures.
This runs contrary to the principles of effective partnerships and national leadership of SSR. Instead,
programmes and projects funded by external partners should be managed according to national
procedures and through national structures.
Creating the conditions for partners to align on national systems and procedures requires efforts to
increase trust and credibility, notably by modernising overall national management systems and fighting
corruption. West African governments willing to mobilise external assistance in support to SSR should
develop reliable country systems that adhere to broadly accepted standards for transparency, especially
as relates to public procurement and financial management systems. Strengthening national procedures
and structures is sometimes a necessary prerequisite, which should then be properly planned for as an
integral part of the external assistance agreement (see Box 12).
As a general rule, national authorities should discourage the establishment of parallel implementation
structures and strive for partners either to help improve national systems or to use them as they stand.
In cases where partners have started using parallel management systems, urgent action should be taken
to assert political commitment to the principle of alignment, demonstrate the technical reliability of
national mechanisms and agree realistic integration plans.
Ensuring partner alignment on national systems increases the visibility of government in the forms and
quantity of assistance being provided. This is essential to enhance the predictability and tracking of
external assistance, and to ensure that external funding is fully and accurately reflected in the national
budget.Ultimately,it helps improve consistency in budgetary planning and comprehensiveness in external
assistance monitoring and reporting.
The credibility of country systems relies on both their effectiveness and their
transparency. Independent and systematic external audits of public accounts and
active parliamentary oversight of public finance management help build partner
confidence in country systems.

4.4. Encouraging harmonisation among external partners
4.4.1. Improving coordination among partners
In many cases, West African states are rightfully concerned about the fragmentation of development
assistance across a multitude of funding channels and initiatives. The proliferation of assistance
micro-projects inflates operating costs and pressure on national coordination mechanisms. However,
competition between external partners often makes it difficult to turn wishful declarations in favour
of joint planning and action into reality. The persistence of unharmonised, overlapping and duplicative
assessments, reviews, audits, expert missions and consultations overburdens national administrations.
Similarly, the lack of harmonisation of the review mechanisms of external partners results in multiple
reporting requirements that overstretch the capacity of national bureaucracies (see also Section 3.3).
In accordance with the principle of national ownership and leadership, West African governments
engaging in SSR assistance partnerships should take the lead in harmonisation of external assistance by:
• raising partners’ awareness of risks associated with duplicated efforts;
• creating credible coordination mechanisms and developing effective coordination tools;
• entrusting a legitimate external partner (such as the AU, ECOWAS, UN or a respected bilateral partner,
for instance) with the responsibility to coordinate all external partners;
• creating opportunities for information sharing and facilitating exchange with and among partners.
In this respect, harmonisation requires high levels of trust and communication between national
stakeholders and development partners,as well as among the latter.The use of integrated SSR dashboards
helps to capture the variety of external assistance initiatives in a manner synthetic enough to foster
relevant synergies. See also Section 4.7 on multilevel coordination as an effective partner management
tool.
Box 12: The role of external actors in supporting the strengthening of national systems
When the weakness of national systems undermines the principle of partners’ alignment, external
partners should support the strengthening of these systems rather than impose their own systems.
In the framework of effective partnerships that aim for long-term and structural impact, national
governments may benefit from external support in strengthening their own management structures.
Typically, partner support for strengthening national management systems would include institutional
capacity building in such fields as:
• budget cycle management;
• management of public accounts and expenditure in the security sector;
• financial reporting of public policy implementation relating to the security sector;
• auditing of public accounts;
• streamlining of procurement procedures;
• support to transparency initiatives, such as plans against corruption and misappropriation of funds or
assets.
In Togo the EU implements a multiyear institutional support programme which includes an entire
component on strengthening economic decision-making and management of public finances, alongside
various budget support projects. Although this example does not apply to SSR assistance specifically, it
illustrates how international partners can improve the processes of national systems while supporting
the actual delivery of public services through these systems.

4.4.2. Sharing responsibilities according to the added value of each external partner
As a way to scale up effectiveness of external support, the Accra Agenda for Action promotes the principle
of specialisation in international assistance delivery. It encourages international actors to focus on a few
sectors where they have a comparative advantage, in order to reduce the breadth of their intervention
while increasing the odds for high-quality delivery.
Accordingly, some development partners have embarked on division of labour exercises, along the lines of
their respective mandates and expertise. In the case of SSR, such sharing of tasks could result in external
partners sharing responsibilities for support to particular sectoral reforms or cross-cutting projects, such
as defence reform, police reform, justice reform, support to parliamentary oversight of the security sector,
human rights and penal reform or gender equality in the security sector.
By conducting joint SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analyses to determine the areas
of comparative advantage of each external partner, national administrations can effectively encourage
partner specialisation as a way to enhance external assistance efficiency.
4.4.3. Building synergies
Based on the comparative advantages of each individual external partner, it is easier to identify areas of
mutually reinforcing added values. This helps to create synergies that contribute to scaling up the impact
of external assistance while increasing overall coherence of external support to SSR. Opportunities for
synergies can be identified at all levels, from a one-off activity to a broader project or programme.
National authorities may also want to encourage development partners to use cooperation modalities
designed for joint interventions, such as pooled funding or co-financing, in an effort to share responsibility
best in the provision of assistance under a coherent overall umbrella.
Such modalities usually involve:
• joint analysis and identification of programme objectives;
• joint programme design and implementation planning that specify the role and responsibility of each
partner;
• joint monitoring and evaluation, and joint auditing;
• joint critical reflection processes associated with monitoring and evaluation.
As such, they create momentum for harmonisation of vision and management tools. Moreover, pooled
funding and procedural harmonisation reduce transaction costs and lighten the management burden on
recipient governments.
4.5. Managing for results with a country-owned framework
4.5.1. Understanding performance assessment frameworks
International commitments for effective development cooperation urge both development actors and
recipient countries to manage and implement their projects and programmes through performance-
oriented frameworks. Such frameworks aim at facilitating the management of interventions in such a way
as to produce desired results at lesser cost and following an agreed plan.
Performance assessment frameworks require the identification of agreed objectives (results that are
aimed for) and the determination of relevant indicators to assess progress towards the achievement
of these predetermined objectives. Results-based accountability systems monitor progress made, while
results-based evaluation systems identify why programmes are succeeding or failing and what actions
should be taken to improve programme results.

Using results indicators together with systems for monitoring them provides momentum to feed the
results of solidly documented performance analysis into decision-making at different levels (operational,
institutional and policy). In this sense, when results-based evaluation systems are linked with results-
based accountability systems, they become valuable management tools.
4.5.2. Fostering an institutional culture for result-based management
In several ECOWAS member states managing for results requires a fundamental shift of institutional
cultures in public administration, especially in the security sector. In many places security institutions
have little experience in the use of such frameworks to inform policymaking and implementation.
Consequently, creating a culture of managing for results will require long-term efforts and incremental
approaches.
Despite the limited capacity of some government agencies, ECOWAS member states can generally
incorporate country-owned results-oriented management frameworks into their SSRG programming.
It may be useful to put in place change managements mechanisms to accompany the introduction of
performance assessment routines, to minimise the risks of staff resistance to such evaluations.
4.5.3. Developing effective tools for result-based management
Country-owned management frameworks allow West African governments to organise their own reform
processes and develop the most suitable tools to monitor progress within their particular national and
institutional contexts. With regard to the principle of alignment, external partners should adapt their
management frameworks to national tools for performance assessment, not the other way around.
Although logical frameworks or theories of change are often mentioned as the typical result-based
management frameworks, these should be regarded as programmatic tools whose value depends on the
robustness of the strategic planning on which the reforms rely.
Instead of considering them as superficial procedural requirements imposed by external partners,
countries engaging in SSR should regard the development of such tools as an exercise, breaking down
their strategic vision into operational steps that can be monitored and will therefore facilitate progress
towards predetermined results.As such, this exercise offers a unique opportunity for the country engaging
in SSR to tell the story of the changes it is striving for, and to organise the operational phases for turning
the general strategy into reality. Moreover, logical frameworks should be seen as living documents which
should evolve with the country context and strategy, continuously helping to clarify the operational route
towards achieving the aims of SSR.
Considering the complexity and sensitivity of SSR, such management tools are particularly useful in
clarifying the logic of actions, which helps to streamline the reform process, sequence actions in the most
efficient way and lower associated costs. Ongoing monitoring should be seen as a tool for identifying
possible miscalculations that may hinder project performance in the long run, in order to trigger necessary
corrections while there is still time.
Because SSR entails a considerable and uncountable political dimension, the technical features of a
typical logical framework may not suffice to monitor the progress of reforms. Alongside quantitative
progress indicators and other fixed elements, an effective result-based management system for SSR
should also capture evolutions in institutional cultures, ethical standards and other soft dimensions of
reform results.
Most importantly, partner-supported interventions (activities, projects, programmes) must
embrace the national framework designed to track reform progress. This is part of the need
for system alignment outlined in Section 4.3.2. Partners’ buy-in to the nationally set result
monitoring system is necessary to harmonise reporting requirements and enabling ongoing
operational and strategic consultation on the basis of consistent and shared information.
For more
information, see
Tool 2 on SSR
programming.
2

4.6. Building trust through effective mutual accountability mechanisms
4.6.1. Accountability to respective constituencies
International guidelines for effective development cooperation call on both development partners
and recipient countries to be first and foremost accountable to their own constituencies. This involves
accountability to their parliaments and electorates on the use and impacts of external assistance
resources. External partners usually report to their mandating authorities, such as the executive boards
of international organisations or the ministries of foreign affairs and finance and parliaments of countries
providing resources.
National governments receiving external assistance in the conduct of an SSR process should also report
to their constituencies, through both internal and external accountability mechanisms involving:
• the parliament, especially parliamentary committees for defence and security and for budget and
finance;
• national independent oversight institutions, such as the national human rights commission, the
national office of audits and the independent anti-corruption agency;
• local governments, including local elected officials and traditional leaders;
• civil society actors, including women’s organisations, youth associations, academic research centres,
transparency initiatives and the media, including at local and community levels.
To the extent possible,these national institutions and organisations should tryto contact their counterparts
within the partner country. Exchange between oversight institutions and organisations can improve
mutual understanding and context awareness on both sides. This can help strengthen the partnership
framework through a constructive diversification of channels for dialogue and political support.
4.6.2. Joint accountability to national stakeholders of the recipient country
National administrations and external partners should also jointly be accountable to the people of the
country undergoing SSR with external support. Concrete ways for West African states to operationalise
this exigency include:
• integrating parliamentary briefing sessions in the work plan of externally supported SSR projects and
programmes;
• involving parliamentary representatives in joint reviews of externally supported projects and
programmes;
• planning field visits of parliament members and civil society representatives to the premises of security
institutions supported by external assistance initiatives;
• enabling and encouraging parliament to hear representatives of external partner institutions willing
to support, supporting or having supported an SSR-related intervention;
• enabling parliamentary inquiry commissions and national human rights institutions to investigate
allegations of human rights abuse, sexual exploitation and other gender-based violence committed by
external partners;
• encouraging the development of security sector budget analysis by civil society;
• commissioning independent operational audits of programmes supported by external partners by civil
society observatories or research centres;
• submitting programmes supported by external partners to independent auditing, either by renowned
private firms contracted through a competitive process or by a statutory financial oversight institution
such as the court of accounts or the auditor general;

• enabling independent anti-corruption agencies to oversee the delivery of assistance by external
partners and the management of subsequent resources by the government;
• enabling citizen participation in external assistance oversight through public feedback initiatives that
enable and encourage whistleblowing in cases of serious misconduct by staff members of external
partner institutions, fraudulent financial practices of national and international actors, and misuse and
waste of public resources coming from international assistance;
• facilitating public access to non-confidential reports of projects and programmes implemented with
external funding, by external partners or through other forms of external assistance.
4.6.3. Reciprocal accountability
Perhaps the core of mutual accountability lies in the reciprocal accountability of external partners and
national development actors towards each other. Implementing this principle requires West African
countries to approach external assistance opportunities as equal-to-equal partnerships, and not as a
taker-giver relationship. Although most countries in the region are familiar with reporting to external
partners on the use of resources allocated through assistance programmes, the reverse movement is
sometimes uneasy.
Yet it is important for national governments to design effective mechanisms aimed at holding external
partners accountable for the effectiveness of the technical and funding assistance that they provide. Such
mechanisms should pay consideration to factors such as:
• non-alignment of external partner programmes on national policy;
• poor use of national systems by external partners;
• fragmentation of external assistance and poor coordination among the partner community;
• unclear composition of resources reported as ODA, including overrepresentation of self-institutional
costs;
• timeliness of funding disbursements according to contractual agreements;
• relevance and affordability of technical assistance provided, including any instance of overpriced
expert costs.
Concrete ways of operationalising the need for reciprocal accountability include joint project reviews,
ongoing sharing of information and regular joint project briefs. Where feasible with little or no extra
transaction cost, national governments may wish to consider establishing an independent mutual
accountability monitoring framework involving representatives of external partner institutions, national
administration, civil society and the parliamentary defence and security committee, with an oversight
role to ensure the credibility of mutual accountability processes. Independent observation of the mutual
accountability mechanisms could also be requested from ECOWAS as a form of regional support to
effective management of external assistance by member states.
Moreover,communication plays a major role in building trust with external partners.In general,maintaining
good relations with external partners through open and transparent communications reduces the risk
of losing partners. Explaining the context, the progress and the challenges should be elements of the
information exchange. In case of shortcomings, it is better to communicate actively by explaining the
nature of challenges faced and the measures taken or proposed to overcome them. Mutual trust and
understanding between partners ask for open and transparent communication. Partnerships should be
built and nurtured in order to be able to face difficult situations together.

4.7. Multilevel coordination as an effective partner management tool
Effective coordination of all actors, including external actors, is a cornerstone for effective country-led,
country-owned SSR. In keeping with the principles of effective development cooperation, it is important
to ensure that the contributions of the different external partners feed into a coherent framework directed
towards the achievement of strategic SSR goals.
For that purpose, it is advisable to organise the coordination of partners at three levels.
• Coordination among government actors is necessary to ensure that the government speaks to external
partners with a single and consistent voice. This responsibility can be entrusted to the national agency
or mechanism responsible for coordinating the SSR process, to the government entity in responsible
for coordinating partner relations or to another relevant institution.
• Coordination among external partners is useful to ensure that partners share information among
themselves and take into consideration the contributions of others in the course of their own assistance
programmes.The recipient government may ask an external partner which enjoys legitimacy among its
peers to take the lead for coordinating external actors. This role is often assigned to the UN resident
coordinator’s office, to the in-country representation of the AU or ECOWAS, or to a particular bilateral
partner with the necessary credibility and capacity.
• Coordination of external partners by the recipient government is necessary to
ensure that all funding and actions supporting SSR, regardless of their sources, feed
into the national reform agenda and are consistent with one another. It is generally
the responsibility of the national coordination mechanism for SSR to oversee the
consistency of external assistance with national objectives and actions. This requires
institutional capacity for centralising information on partnerships and projects, and
facilitating information sharing among all actors involved, both national and external.
All three forms of coordination should happen at both political and technical levels.
• At the political level, coordination is necessary for the consistent provision of strategic guidance.
• Intragovernmental coordination at the political level is usually handled by the office of the
president or prime minister, ministers or directors, depending on the government policy and
complexity of the project/programme. Overall guidance and coordination of the SSR process
often lie with the head of state or government, who chairs the office of national security, the
national council for SSR or similar entity responsible for leading the SSR process. Involvement
at this level guarantees strong political support for SSRG programmes and provides a consistent
strategic vision for SSR.
Box 13: Developing a strong framework for partners’ accountability
National mechanisms should hold partners accountable and demand transparency of external assistance
in two main areas.
• Ethics and behaviour. In countries like Liberia, national stakeholders have been confronted with
serious cases of misconduct by external actors implementing assistance programmes. Practices like
bribery, gender-based discrimination in the allocation of jobs or contracts and sexual exploitation of
members of the civilian population must not be tolerated under any form of assistance partnership.
• Use of funds and means. A breakdown of the utilisation of funds provided and directly expended by
international partners sometimes may reveal an overrepresentation of operating costs or expensive
fees for international expertise that could be mobilised at national level at lower cost. Preventing such
excesses requires solid monitoring, budget analysis and project evaluation capacities.
For more
information, see
Tool 2 on SSR
programming.
2

• Inter-partner coordination at the political level usually happens between the heads of
diplomatic representations and development agencies, under the leadership of the coordinator
of external partners.
• Government-partners coordination at the political level entails communication between
national authorities at high levels of leadership and institutional leaders of development
partner organisations and agencies. Weak communication lines at this level can lead to
increased volatility and unpredictability of external assistance. Ongoing political dialogue
between national authorities and leaders of partner institutions is necessary to agree on the
conditions and targets of assistance to be provided, and to maintain a common understanding
thereof. Ways to sustain communication at this level include (but are not limited to) bilateral
consultations, high-level meetings and exchanges of official mail.
• At the technical level, coordination is necessary to foster complementarity in project and programme
implementation, and more generally in all forms of daily SSR work. Technical coordination also
reinforces the quality of inputs from technicians to decision-makers thanks to a more comprehensive
overview of SSR from a practitioner’s perspective.
• Intragovernmental coordination at the technical level requires information sharing between
administrators and practitioners both within and among national institutions. Periodic technical
meetings can provide opportunities for the different ministries to discuss ongoing reform
actions, improve interagency collaboration and identify possible synergies. Building on the
complementarity of different state actors involved in the SSR process, this form of coordination
contributes to optimising the use of national resources, both human and financial, through a
holistic and intersectoral approach to SSR. This form of coordination can be encouraged, for
instance, by the creation of intersectoral working groups or operationalisation of existing ones
(see Box 14).
• Inter-partner coordination at the technical level relies on strong communication channels
between project and programme personnel of the various partner institutions. Creating
interagency clusters or taskforces may help to improve coordination at the project or programme
level, especially among partners supporting the same national stakeholders or areas of reform.
• Government-partners coordination at the technical level helps to ensure the effective delivery
of assistance through unified channels. Setting up communities of practice or other information-,
knowledge- and expertise-sharing forums can serve to foster constructive interactions between
specialists and practitioners from government agencies and external partner institutions. By
bringing together specialists and practitioners from different national and partner institutions,
such mechanisms contribute to the circulation of information and facilitate the identification of
entry points for collaboration and joint initiatives. In some cases, common training opportunities
for pools of technical staff drawn from diverse national and international institutions will
offer valuable opportunities to initiate interpersonal communication, with the advantage of
facilitating daily collaboration thereafter. Joint needs assessments, project reviews, field visits or
other project cycle management initiatives can also be organised as a way to reinforce technical
coordination and create opportunities for mutual support while operationalising mutual
accountability. Sharing updates on potential obstacles, delays and reporting also contributes to
fostering trust and constructive collaboration at the technical level.
Making external support effective requires high levels of trust and continuous
communication between the recipient government and development partners at
all levels.

36
Partner coordination is indispensable to foster consistency in complex SSR processes and upscale the
impact of external assistance. It helps to:
• increase the credibility of the host government, which demonstrates leadership by assumes the primary
responsibility for coordination;
• minimise the risks of redundancy, with similar actions being undertaken in parallel by different actors;
• minimise the risk of contradictory actions, as a lack of communication and coordination among actors
involved in the provision and management of external assistance to SSR can lead to contradicting and
mutually neutralising interventions;
• reduce operating costs through synergies, joint interventions and appropriate sequencing that allow
each actor and funding window to support the part of a broader strategy for which it is most suited;
• make the most of each actor’s added value, through adequate sharing of responsibilities that takes
into consideration the comparative advantages of external partners in support of national objectives;
• mutualise knowledge by exchange of information, best practice, lessons identified and use of each
other’s means if needed.
To the extent possible, the recipient government or implementing agency should use, strengthen and
consolidate existing coordination structures rather than creating parallel structures. This reinforces the
coherence of structures and ensures the sustainability of projects.
In some cases, informal coordination among individuals working directly on projects has been the
most effective option. With numerous documents and correspondence flowing between the recipient
government and development partners, there can easily be misunderstandings and errors. One way to
mitigate this is to create informal communication lines (in addition to formal ones) between the partner
institution and government agency, with the objective of improving the flow of information.
Box 14: Setting up inclusive working groups to follow up on complex interventions
Setting up thematic working group or committees often contributes to enhancing coordination, while
securing an inclusive approach at the technical level. Such groups may comprise individuals from
security institutions working on the projects, representatives from the parliamentary defence and security
committee, representatives from the relevant government agencies and other stakeholders, including
oversight bodies and a representative from the donor agency or government, as appropriate. In addition,
civil society representatives should be coopted into working groups. Members of working groups should
include women as well as men.
The technical coordination working group ensures timely implementation of actions contributing towards
the strategic aims of SSR, in accordance with an agreed plan. Often such technical working groups act
as collaborative monitoring mechanisms. The working group or committee may need to work with the
budget oversight committee or budget office to ensure timeliness of fund allocation and improve the
speed and predictability of funding.
As a reform management mechanism, the membership of these groups should generally be reserved to
national stakeholders. However, invitations to attend particular meetings as observers and/or contributors
may be extended to external partners, as relevant.

The mobilisation of external support for SSR, especially funding, requires a clearly defined strategy and
harmonised approach. When engaging development partners to support SSR, ECOWAS member states
should proceed cautiously and methodically. It is critical for West African states to develop a consistent
partnership and resource mobilisation strategy to guide their engagement with external actors, and to
put in place the necessary structures to implement this strategy.
Acknowledging the challenges that the fragmentation of external intervention poses to effective delivery
of cooperation results, it is appropriate for government agencies to maintain among themselves dialogue,
communication and coordination on any intention to solicit either financial or large-scale technical
assistance.
Most importantly, effective mobilisation of external support should rest on high-level political dialogue
clearly establishing the common goals pursued by all parties involved in the partnership. Regardless of
whether they are based on good intentions, unsolicited or inaccurately monitored assistance initiatives
can damage the aims of the reform while undermining national leadership and ownership.
5.1. Assigning clear mandates and responsibilities for establishing partnerships
In the absence of clearly defined mandates and procedures for requesting, negotiating and signing
partnerships for such a complex process as SSR, national institutions may engage in parallel discussions
with the same external actors and find themselves competing for resources or technical assistance on
the basis of concurrent expressions of needs. This can undermine the overall coherence and usefulness
of the support provided by outsiders, possibly with redundant or contradictory efforts. The absence of
coordination among national stakeholders may further result in a dislocation of the demand for assistance
and consequently increase transaction costs.
From the partners’ perspective, difficulty in identifying clear interlocutors officially mandated by national
authorities to lead discussions on SSR-related cooperation may deter potential partners from getting
involved in the sensitive arena of SSR. The lack of a single government voice in the dialogue with
external partners also tends to damage the credibility of national leadership of the SSR process, giving a
perception of confusion and indecision in the national party.
Developing an effective
strategy for resource
mobilisation in support of SSR
5

To avoid these shortcomings, the designation of a particular national agency to take the lead on
cooperation discussions is essential. The purpose of this leading role should be to centralise and
coordinate assistance requests emanating from various national institutions, and to ensure that relevant
information on upcoming, ongoing and past partnerships is adequately circulated among relevant
government institutions.
Although the ministries of finance, planning or foreign affairs are often assigned the responsibility to
coordinate external support relations, other structures can also be designated for that purpose, depending
on the national context. Where a national SSR coordination mechanism has been set up with direct
affiliation to the prime ministry or presidency, it may be, in collaboration with all relevant ministries,
an appropriate actor to facilitate the consistency of the national voice in the dialogue with external
partners. Most importantly, whichever structure is assigned this responsibility should:
• have the ability (mandate and capacity) to engage in high-level political discussions on the basis of
clear guidelines provided by top national authorities;
• assess the consistency of proposals presented by national institutions with existing projects, and avoid
redundancy and contradictory approaches;
• ensure that proposals presented to external partners are consistent with the government’s priorities
and in line with any nationally agreed strategies or policies.
Beyond the designation of an institutional lead for in-house coordination, it is also important to clarify
assistance mobilisation procedures, which usually require the involvement of various national institutions
at different stages and in different capacities.
a) The discussion on a potential area of assistance may be initiated either by the leadership of the
concerned institution (such as the minister of defence, of security or of justice), or by an intersectoral
institution mandated to mobilise assistance on behalf of the line ministries and based on the needs
expressed by them.
b) In instances where a line ministry or government agency identifies a clear need for external
assistance in a reform component, it should inform other relevant departments of its intentions and
enquire about existing government interactions with this partner before proceeding to engage in
discussions with the interested external partner.
c) The ministry of foreign affairs may have an important role to play as an interface between domestic
institutions and external partners, and should be kept informed of any developments affecting
diplomatic relations.
d) It is usually necessary to keep the ministry of planning informed of proposed projects, to allow for
a strategic overview of external assistance.
e) Whenever assistance is envisioned to be financial, the ministry of finance may need to be involved to
keep track of external funding, advise on appropriate fiscal management of the proposed interventions
and integrate external resources in the management of the national budget. It may also be involved
as the national authorising office in discussions regarding funding that will be channelled through the
government’s central budget.

39Developing an effective strategy for resource mobilisation in support of SSR
5.2. Understanding the external assistance environment
Before actively engaging in external assistance mobilisation, it is necessary for West African governments
to have a precise understanding of existing cooperation options, including who the potential partners
are, what their specific areas of interests and added values consist of, and how their preferred cooperation
modalities may or may not fit with national needs for SSR.
5.2.1. Identifying potential funding sources
National governments seeking to mobilise external resources in support of SSR should first of all have a
clear overview of potential funding partners. Box 16 presents an indicative overview of potential partners
for West African states. The mapping of potential funding sources should be conducted at the national
level and updated as often as necessary.
Box 15: Risks associated with a lack of strategy on resource mobilisation
The lack of a clear process for external resource mobilisation often leads line ministries and decentralised
entities to negotiate directly with potential partners. This undermines the role of the finance and foreign
ministries in negotiating and managing proposals. Experience has also demonstrated that the lack of a
clear policy or strategy for resource mobilisation provides an opportunity for external actors pushing an
agenda of their own to manoeuvre one agency or ministry against another.
While substantial expressions of needs emanate from core security sector line ministries (defence,security,
justice), involvement of the ministry of planning (or equivalent) may help to ensure intragovernmental
consistency, while the ministry of foreign affairs traditionally plays an important role as interface in
the conversation with external actors, and the ministry of finance takes responsibility for coordinating
funding flows in a manner coherent with the national macroeconomic framework.
It is therefore advisable that these three ministries are always informed of consultations with bilateral
partners undertaken by core security sector ministries or institutions.
Box 16: Who are potential external partners for SSR in West Africa?
Potential partners for SSR in West Africa include, but are not limited to, the following.
• Multilateral organisations of which the countries are members, such as the UN, the AU, ECOWAS,
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the Mano River Union, l’Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie, the Commonwealth, etc.
• International or regional financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank,
the West African Development Bank (as a UEMOA development financing instrument), etc.
• Other multilateral organisations, such as the EU, the OECD, etc.
• Bilateral partners (states and their agencies), from either developed or emerging economies.
• International civil society actors, such as international foundations and non-governmental
organisations, academic and research institutions, think-tanks, policy advisory teams, etc.
• Private security companies.
• Private sector companies and corporations (not specialised in security). The government can engage
private sector companies through various means, including corporate social responsibility policies and
special taxation.
in Ornella Moderan and Kossi Agokla (eds), Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa
(Geneva: DCAF, 2015).

Beyond the pool of “traditional” partners with which a country has historically been engaged, the
mapping of potential partners provides momentum to explore opportunities for innovative partnerships.
Expanding the pool of external partners provides access to increased funding opportunities and reduces
dependency on single assistance programmes.
New partners may be identified among countries or organisations which do not have a diplomatic
representation in the country but are active in international support to democratic governance, civil
society participation, women’s and girls’ access to justice and security, community policing, human rights
or other issues that offer strong entry points into SSR.
An often overlooked potential source of funding is the private sector.The private sector can be encouraged
to see the benefits to the business climate if it works in partnership with governments to support and
expand the capacity of law enforcement agencies to address criminality and strengthen the rule of
law. The sector should also be sensitised to the benefits of developing corporate social responsibility
portfolios that support projects with a strong community focus, such as those aimed at improving the
access of women and girls to justice and security. Private companies can contribute to SSR by funding
civil society projects, or by supporting infrastructure development and donating non-combat equipment
(vehicles,communication material,etc.) to security institutions as a contribution to the professionalisation
of defence and security forces.
However, considering the sensitivity and complexity of SSRG, recipient governments should be cautious
of the legal and operational framework for funding agreements with the private sector. When considering
a funding source, especially from the private sector, the track record and credibility of a potential partner
should be duly considered to determine its acceptability to the recipient government. In most cases, it
is advisable to make civil society a full part of the conversation. Most importantly, all funding should be
compatible with the government’s priorities and processed through transparent procedures in order to
ensure accountability and minimise the risks of corruption or conflicts of interests.
5.2.2. Mapping the profiles and interests of potential partners
International organisations and cooperation agencies of partner countries usually have a specific mandate
and particular fields of interest, which also shape their areas of specialisation and delineate their fields of
expertise.The priority areas for their international engagement are usually defined by their foreign policy
(for bilateral partners) or mission statements (for multilateral organisations). As such, their expectations
and domains of interests vary, providing different opportunities for direct or indirect support to SSR.
It is therefore important first of all to map out the profile of potential funding partners, including:
• the scope of their particular mandates;
• their history of collaboration with national institutions;
• their history of support to SSR-type initiatives in the region or globally;
• their declared and implicit areas of strategic interest;
• their funding portfolios, looking at funds available, funding windows and requirements and guidelines
for accessing funding support.
Development partners offer support to programmes that align with their
humanitarian concerns, strategic interests and development policy priorities.
Securing a clear understanding of these features increases the chances of
mobilising the right form of assistance from the right partner.

See also Box 17 on points of consideration during partner mapping.
Since each potential partner has its own methodology for analysing support allocations for SSR
programmes, identifying their priorities helps to determine a win-win approach for cooperation which
crosses the priority interests of both partners involved. This can help governments engaging in SSR
better to assess the compatibility of their needs with partners’ priorities, which affects the determination
of which partner to approach on what issues.
Although sensitive underlying objectives are not always openly stated, embassies and local offices of
development partners are generally able to provide information on their expectations and interests as
cooperation institutions upon request from the host government. Ideally, the ministry of foreign affairs
should be responsible for maintaining broad policy dialogue with external partners through the country’s
foreign missions. Line ministries soliciting external support should be updated on relevant developments
in diplomatic relationships. In collaboration with relevant line ministries or agencies, the ministry of
foreign affairs should help in identifying potential new partners.
5.2.3. Understanding funding modalities
The term “funding modalities” describes the way ODA is delivered. Different modalities are defined by the
process used to transfer the funds, and how the funds are managed and disbursed.These include type and
terms of finance, disbursement channels, procurement conditions, and targeting and tracking of resources
allocated by the external partner.
ODA can be provided in a variety of modalities, including:
• budget support, where the funds are directed through the national budget, providing discretionary
funding for implementation of national or sector programmes;
• programme-based and sector-wide approaches, where funding is provided in support of a sector or
thematic strategy, with close partner coordination and a structured process for increasing use of in-
country systems;
Box 17: Points of consideration for partner mapping
Points for consideration during the partner mapping exercise include, but are not limited to, the following.
• The identification of all external actors potentially available to support overall SSR or a particular
component thereof.
• The definition of specific mandates, interests and priority areas of engagement of each potential
partner.
• The assessment of consistency between those partner interests and national priorities of the country
requesting assistance.
• The lessons from experience of past cooperation with these partners, especially in terms of their:
ú level of understanding of the national context and receptivity to input from national stakeholders;
ú consideration for national leadership and ownership of development programmes in general and
SSR in particular;
ú flexibility on partnership conditions (including operational issues like limitations of outsourcing);
ú willingness to enter partnerships on an equal-to-equal basis;
ú reliability in keeping to funding and other forms of official commitments;
ú usefulness and efficiency in the technical support they may provide along with funding.

• project support, where funding is delivered through dedicated management structures and
arrangements;
• technical cooperation or non-financial support such as technical assistance, where support is delivered
through development partners seeking to transfer knowledge in a sustainable manner.
Numerous funding instruments can be used to operationalise each of these modalities: for example,
multi-donor funding for a sector programme or stand-alone project.
West African nations may receive SSR support from international partners through:
• different types of financing (grants, loans, etc.);
• different kinds of procurement conditions (provision of cash or in-kind support in terms of material or
technical skills which can be tied to specific sources of supply);
• various disbursement channels and traceability mechanisms – general budget support (GBS), sector
budget support (SBS), sector programme support (SPS), stand-alone projects, pooled funding or multi-
donor trust funds with or without earmarked funding.
Each of these arrangements has specific strengths and weaknesses (see Box 18 for an overview based on
experiences from Ghana and Sierra Leone). Understanding the nature and implications of all available
options is essential in order to decide which partnership modalities are best suited to a particular
national context.While elements such as the level of democratic openness, institutional stability, national
capacity to fight corruption and reliability of the public finance system will inform the preference of
external partners to opt for a particular cooperation modality, the host government should also ensure
that proposed options are consistent with national priorities, needs and management capacities.
Box 18: Strengths and weaknesses of particular funding instruments7
Type of funding
instruments
Strengths Limitations/cautions
General budget
support
• Funds are channelled through
the recipient country’s national
budget. This focuses on overall
budget priorities and allows
flexibility in allocation of the
national budget through the
sovereign budget process.
• GBS increases the amount of
discretionary funding available
for programming through the
budget, and creates incentives
for partner countries to improve
their planning and budgeting
systems as a whole.
• It is usually not earmarked, and
fully embraces the national
public expenditure management
rules and procedures.
• GBS requires a certain level of
institutional reliability and fiscal
discipline, thus it may be particularly
challenging in fragile contexts.
• Risks include lack of transparency of
funding flows due to weak budget
reporting, and especially a risk of low
domestic accountability.
• Due to its generality, GBS is incapable
of encouraging particular reforms
(“fixing reforms”), unless the recipient
government and its institutions are
committed to policy reforms.

Sector budget
support
• Funds are channelled through
the recipient country’s national
budget, but targeting a
predefined sector (e.g. defence,
internal security, civilian
protection, penal reform, etc.).
• This option focuses on
supporting a specific
sector under the recipient
government’s leadership, using
common management and
reporting procedures.
• The preference is to have SBS
unearmarked, especially when
defined within the framework of
a sector-wide approach.
• SBS allocated to sector-wide
programmes that include traditional
security sectors like defence and
intelligence (embedded in cultures of
secrecy) sometimes creates problems
in coordination, management and
accountability.
Sector programme
support
• Funds can be delivered through
SBS, pooled funding or project
funding. SPS often relies on a
single budgetary framework,
and usually supports a specific
sector or thematic strategy.
• SPS is beneficial if it is in clear
alignment with government priorities,
if it is on budget and on plan, with
predefined exit strategies, and
more importantly if costs to the
government for accepting such
assistance are minimised.
Project support • Individual interventions
for stand-alone projects
with specific objectives and
implementation schedules,
often within an agreed national
framework.
• Sometimes used to support
infrastructure investments,
which can be “stand-alone
projects”.
• Can be used for specific
activities in highly sensitive
subsectors within the security
sector, such as defence and
intelligence.
• Demand driven, based on
needs that have been clearly
identified by, or together with,
the recipient government.
• Since project support budgets are
individual interventions, they can
run the risk of not being clearly in
alignment with government priorities
and existing institutions.
• Recipient governments should
encourage project support to be
designed in a way that prioritises
knowledge transfer and includes a
sustainable skills transfer component.
It should represent value for money
(see Box 19), and be time-bound with
a predefined exit strategy.
• If not strategically managed, project
support can cause a proliferation of
several parallel units and result in
high transaction costs.
Multi-donor trust
funds or pooled
funding (basket
arrangements)
• Very useful in fragile contexts,
since funds are disbursed quickly
to obtain results on the ground.
• If pooled funding is not properly
integrated into existing government
structures, it undermines the recipient
government’s ownership of the
intervention.

5.3. Managing the external assistance environment
5.3.1. Selecting funding arrangements according to national specificities
When it comes to SSR, one size does not fit all. Any programmatic arrangements must be tailored to
country specificities. This applies to funding arrangements as well. The national context will determine
Box 19: What is value for money?
Value for money can be defined as ‘achieving the best possible development outcomes over the life of an
activity relative to the total cost of managing and resourcing that activity and ensuring that resources
are used effectively, economically, and without waste’.8
Originally used by the private sector, the concept of value for money (VFM) has increasingly been used
by development agencies and partner countries to frame their approach to foreign assistance allocations
and account for taxpayers’ contributions. For DFID, for instance, value for money is “about maximising the
impact of each pound spent to improve … people’s lives”.9
Despite sporadic references to and isolated interventions for VFM on their side, most developing countries
engaged in international assistance programmes have not made sufficient use of this concept to guide
their own approach to optimising the use of domestic and external resources allocated to development
and governance programmes, such as SSR.
Using a VFM framework can help West African governments to assess the net worth of external assistance
to SSR,taking into account not only the amount of funds mobilised and disbursed but also the transactional
costs associated with these allocations and the social return they generate (through job creation and
long-term institutional capacity building).
As a comprehensive approach, VFM considers the following.10
• The economic use of funds allocated: are goods and services procured at the least cost for the relevant
level of quality? The principle of economic use of funds does not mean that only the cheapest options
should be taken, but that the best price for the desired quality should be sought. For instance, it may be
less costly to task an individual consultant with drafting an institutional policy against discrimination
and sexual harassment in the police services; but the need for institutional buy-in may justify the
decision to go through a more inclusive policy development process, although this would be longer
and more costly.
• The efficient use of funds allocated: efficiency refers to the optimal use of available resources to reach
agreed objectives. It checks whether the same results could have been achieved at a lesser cost. For
instance, the tendency of some external partners to contract international consultants systematically
despite the availability of competent national experts at lower costs questions the efficient use of
funds.
• The effective use of funds allocated: have the funds used actually generated the expected results?
Effectiveness refers to the actual implementation of agreed actions and the level of success of these
actions in achieving given goals. In linking both, it considers the relevance of actions funded in the
perspective of broader objectives. For instance, if funds are allocated to developing constructive
civil-military relations as an outcome-level objective, VFM verifies that any activity funded under this
objective brings an actual added value to its achievement.
• The equitable use of funds allocated: equity is closely linked to effectiveness, and considers whether
the benefits of an assistance programme are distributed fairly and in such a way as to ensure the
best possible social impacts. For instance, a civil society engagement initiative that did not reach
women’s organisations and community-based organisations may not have made the most equitable
(and effective) use of funds.

feasibility and desirability of various funding options, from the point of view of both national authorities
and external partners.
Different funding arrangements (such as particular support lines, disbursement mechanisms, etc.) can
have different impacts in different contexts. Depending on the nature, characteristics and priorities of
a country, different modalities and instruments for external funding support are regarded as less or
more suitable. For example, national features such as the reliability of public financial systems and
the administration’s ability to fight corruption will determine the appropriateness of certain funding
mechanisms.
In all cases, recipient governments should ensure that aid options are consistent with national needs,
priorities and management capacities.
5.3.2. Managing partners’ preferences
To negotiate the most suitable funding arrangements, it is important for West African governments
to understand partners’ perspectives on SSR resource allocations in the region and in their particular
country. The country’s context usually determines to a large extent the preference of partners for a
particular type of funding instrument.
Assessing partner preferences can be challenging, because each development partner has its own
methodology for analysing funding requests and assessing the national management of resources
allocated for SSRG programmes. Such methodologies are not always shared among partners or with
beneficiary administrations. Besides, differences in approach and perspective among funding partners
add to the uncertainty on the flexibility in resource allocations and risk management, which are critical
to delivering results in SSRG programmes.
Partner practices differ in crisis-afflicted societies, post-conflict settings, transitional societies and stable
democracies. For example, some funding instruments will be particularly challenging in fragile and
conflict-affected environments because the public financial management systems and fiscal discipline
may be weak and cannot adhere to the reform incentives attached to external resource allocation.
In an effort to obtain more flexible conditions, it is therefore important for recipient governments to
demonstrate the reliability of national financial management and oversight mechanisms.
In other cases, funding instruments are predetermined by the external partner’s internal policies for
resource allocation. For instance, the European Commission encourages its services to move towards
programme-based approaches jointly funded with other international contributors. The European
Commission is also streamlining its interventions by focusing on a limited number of sectors per country.
Through research and dialogue with ongoing and prospective partners, West African countries should
document partners’ policies and adjust their resource mobilisation strategies to institutional and political
constraints faced by partners. This helps to focus negotiations on areas where the partners do have room
for flexibility.
5.3.3. Sustaining an integrated approach by encouraging GBS over project-limited funding
West African states engaging in SSR funding partnerships should encourage external partners to shift
away from individual (stand-alone) projects towards programmes or sector-based programming through
GBS or similar machineries that allow more flexibility at the national level. With regard to a whole-of-
government approach that helps secure the consistency of SSR interventions with other public policies,
this contributes to strengthening comprehensive management of resources at the disposal of the national
administration. Moreover, since GBS funding is channelled through the national budget, it also facilitates
democratic accountability for the allocated funds, which parliament and public audit institutions may
have easier access to overseeing.

Although most individual national agencies would prefer external assistance to target stand-alone projects
because it gives them direct access to and control over the funding, a more integrated programming
approach enables strategic coherence. However, this requires a change in habits and strong leadership
from national authorities.
In line with their commitments on development assistance effectiveness, some international funding
agencies have started moving their services from small stand-alone projects to larger programmes in line
with the partner country’s policy.There is also an increasing shift towards co-financing or pooled funding.
This evolution is an opportunity for governments conducting an SSR process, because co-financing
reduces the risk of duplication of effort.
For the country receiving external support, co-financing arrangements have the advantages of:
• reducing transactional costs and burden byharmonising reporting and other management requirements;
• extending government autonomy in allocating resources according to national priorities.
5.4. Building credibility for resource mobilisation
5.4.1. Establishing the framework for a partnership of equals
As a general rule for international cooperation, and with particular regard to the political sensitivity of
SSR, agreements for external assistance should be built on mutual trust and understanding between
the parties, and rely on a common set of core principles for effective partnerships. For that purpose,
international commitments provide a solid general framework, which can be complemented by consistent
country-specific principles.
To establish an equal relationship with external partners, national governments should approach external
assistance arrangements as strategic partnership frameworks and actively engage in high-level political
dialogue on the goals to be pursued. This is important in order to move away from the traditional
giver-taker relationship, which induces imbalance in partner relations and undermines the credibility
of national leadership. Technical programmatic discussions should only come after agreement has been
reached at the political level on the nature and aims of the partnership.
The initial phase of political dialogue provides an opportunity for West African governments to state
clearly their areas of interests in such a way as to spark partner alignment, while also assessing the
opportunity and relevance of the partnership being considered, as not all assistance is desirable. This is
a critical moment for national authorities to assert their strategic leadership of the reform process and
collaboratively define the rules of the game. Ministries of foreign affairs can be instrumental in engaging
and maintaining broad policy dialogue with external partners.
In an effort to build trust, national governments should set up credible systems of accountability, based
on a combination of procedural harmonisation, external auditing, national auditing and oversight by the
parliamentary committee of finance and public accounts. Opportunities should also be created for public
oversight of public funding targeting the governance and reform of the security sector, by involving
credible civil society actors.

5.4.2. Building external assistance into a national framework for financing SSR
National governments requesting external funding to support their SSR process should aim to demonstrate
credibility as reform leaders and reliable partners fully assuming the primary responsibility for SSR. For
that purpose, it is essential to approach external funding as part of a broader, nationally conceived
framework for financing SSR, which needs to be organised in a rational and comprehensive manner so as
to ensure cost-efficiency, relevant prioritisation, transparency and accountability.
With respect to the fundamental principles of national leadership and ownership of SSR processes,
external support should only come in to complement national efforts. In terms of funding, this means
that external contributions are intended to complement domestic resources in general, and national
budget provisions in particular. By allocating seed resources, national authorities send a strong signal of
ownership of the SSR process.
For instance, committing seed resources from the national budget to preparatory activities aimed at
defining reform needs and priorities (see Box 5) helps to trigger further resource mobilisation from
external partners, while demonstrating national ownership of and state responsibility for security
governance. It is also an effective way for West African states to take clear leadership in assessing their
own needs, developing their priorities and creating the conditions for partners to buy into a nationally set
security agenda. National funding of preliminary assessments demonstrates the state’s awareness of the
need for reform and a commitment to invest time, effort and resources into the improvement of public
service delivery in the area of justice and security.
Including SSR costs in the state budget contributes to demonstrating political commitment and
emphasising national leadership of and responsibility for defence and security expenditures. Considering
the budget limitations faced by many West African countries, improving tax systems and encouraging
domestic savings and investments can help to strengthen domestic capacity for funding SSR.
Instead of being a starting point of resource mobilisation, requests for external
assistance should only come to complement core national funding mobilised
through domestic resources in the first place. Section 17.1 of the Sustainable
Development Goals recognises the need to “strengthen domestic resource
mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries to
improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection”.11

5.4.3. Strengthening national management capacity
National management capacity represents an important feature of credibility in negotiating external
funding. External partners are usually more inclined to allocate funding to countries with a functioning
administration governed by effective management and oversight procedures.
National capacity for managing external assistance depends on both institutional systems and procedures
and human resources. West African governments willing to mobilise additional resources to support SSR
may wish to consider how to improve institutional mechanisms affecting the management of national
and external funds supporting critical governance programmes such as SSR. Interesting features to look
at may include the following.
Box 20: Matching external contributions to national funding through joint project funding and
counterpart financing
Funding of SSR programmes through the national budget is one of the best indicators of two essential
success factors: political will and national commitment.
As with national resources allocated to SSR, funding provided by development partners must be included
in an integrated programming approach and allocated within the state budget.
Establishing convergence mechanisms between national investments and external contributions helps to
guarantee budget consistency and the rational use of all resources allocated to SSR. There are matching
mechanisms for this purpose, which can be used to link the use of external contributions to that of
national resources. The most frequently used mechanisms are joint project funding and counterpart
financing.
Joint project funding consists of the state contributing to funding every project supported by an external
partner. The proportion (percentage) of the cost that the state intends to cover is determined for each
project. In joint funding arrangements, the national authorities play the role of a donor on the same basis
as the external partner, which strengthens national leadership.
In technical terms, joint project funding implies that the state and the external partner agree on a shared
management system, from setting up the project to evaluating costs, determining what expertise is
required, recruiting consultants, procurement procedures, monitoring and evaluation, etc. Implementing
a system of this kind can be difficult in a fragile state with particularly limited resources.
Counterpart financing, on the other hand, involves planning a provisional joint fund in the national
budget, aimed at covering the state’s share of funding for all SSR activities and components.This provides
the twofold benefit of the immediate availability of funds and relative flexibility as to their use. It can be
a convenient solution when reciprocal charges are not yet agreed with each partner, or the state’s share
has not been calculated in detail.
In this mechanism, however, there is a risk of a lack of transparency or efficiency in the use of funds. To
limit this risk, it is recommended to combine counterpart financing with management rules designed to
encourage transparency, such as eligibility criteria for the activities to be funded and the implementation
partners, an upper limit on funds available for grants, disbursement and control methods, reporting
requirements, etc.
Source: Mpako Foaleng and Amadou Mahamane Ousmane, “Security sector reform programming”, in
Ornella Moderan and Kossi Agokla (eds), Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa
(Geneva: DCAF, 2015).
Credibility is also a matter of institutional and technical capacity.

• In terms of institutional performance and business processes: decision-making procedures, budget
management processes, procurement processes, institutional rules and regulations, intra- and inter-
institutional coordination mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation capacities, human resource
management policy and practices, internal and external accountability mechanisms, etc.
• In terms of human capacity and skills: availability of national expertise in all required fields, including
budgeting and finance, training and other capacity development for civil servants, mechanisms for
promotion and career management aimed at retaining male and female talents, etc. Stand-alone
partner projects also tend to monopolise qualified national personnel, so the government is therefore
deprived of their expertise.
In many cases, conducting institutional audits or capacity needs assessments may help delineate the main
areas for improvement. Depending on the case, major institutional reshuffling may be needed, whereas
in other cases limited readjustments may have a disproportionate impact on the overall efficiency of a
system.
5.5. Engaging with external partners
5.5.1. Developing partner-specific documentation for resource mobilisation
In some instances, external partners may approach West African governments with offers of
assistance. However, in many cases the government conducting SSR should be prepared to
take the initiative in approaching potential partners. Requests for support are more likely
to be successful if they are consistent with the development assistance priorities of the
partner and presented as win-win opportunities for collaboration.
Indeed, having an effective approach to partner relations is critical to raise the interest of potential
partners. Such communication requires both a presentation of the full scope of the SSR process and a
more specific demonstration of how the national SSR programme joins up with the fields of interest of
each particular partner. As outlined in Section 2.3, SSR touches on a variety of interconnected governance
issues in which external partners may have a special interest.
Considering that a narrow understanding of SSR may lead potential partners to exclude themselves from
the external assistance discussion, this approach helps to highlight the multiple linkages between SSR
and broader governance concerns. It is usually beneficial to get partners to shift away from a narrow “train
and equip” understanding of SSR towards a more comprehensive approach to improving the governance
of security and security institutions.
The mapping of potential partners and identification of their foreign assistance priorities should help to
determine points of convergence around which to tailor partner-specific communication tools. It can be
useful, for example, to derive partner-specific documentation from the generic framework of the national
SSR process and programme.
Without distorting the content of the agenda or betraying national priorities, this approach consists of
highlighting how the preferred areas of interest of the targeted partner converge with the SSR process
as a whole. It helps identify partner-relevant entry points. Typically, these could relate to the following.
• Promoting gender equality: when engaging with a partner whose strategic focus is on gender equality,
government authorities of the country conducting SSR may wish to explain that gender equality is an
integral part of good security governance. The integration of a gender perspective in the management
of security institutions is likely to improve the attractiveness of these institutions as a workplace
for women, and increase the quality of security services provided to men, women, boys and girls.
Government authorities may want to request assistance from this partner on specific projects (through
For more
information see
Tool 2 on SSR
programming,
Section 6.3.
2

GBS or SBS) aimed at enhancing the access of women and girls to justice and security, developing or
reviewing gender policies within law enforcement institutions or raising gender awareness in the
judiciary, for instance.
• Combating corruption: when engaging with a partner whose strategic focus is on rolling back
corruption and bribery, government authorities may emphasise that a strong component of SSR deals
with improving financial governance of defence and security institutions.This helps create institutional
cultures that are more resilient to corrupt practices. It can be useful to specify that SSR also addresses
ethical and behavioural norms within the security sector, which are an essential aspect of the fight
against corruption in the public service. Government authorities may want to request assistance from
this partner on specific projects (ideally through GBS) aimed at strengthening the capacity for internal
and external financial oversight, for instance. External funding channelled through GBS can also be
earmarked for supporting civil society contributions to budget analysis or participation in oversight of
public funds used in and by the security sector.
• Protecting children: when engaging with a partner who has a strong interest in supporting child
protection initiatives, national authorities leading the SSR process may want to highlight that the
professionalisation of defence and security institutions will help increase institutional responses to
child abuse and violence. SSR also provides for the strengthening of collaborative relations between
civil society and security institutions, which is critical to improve both prevention of and response to
child abuse and violence.
• Support for decentralisation and local governance: in countries where poor, overly centralised
administration of a vast territory has resulted in the emergence or intensification of threats to human,
national or regional security, national authorities willing to mobilise additional resources for SSR can
make a strong argument for the development of effective models for community safety and building a
space for dialogue between communities and security institutions at the local level.
• Promoting and protecting human rights: when discussing potential assistance with a partner whose
foreign assistance policy mainly focuses on human rights, national authorities may want to explain
how SSR will contribute to improving respect for human rights and strengthening the rule of law in
their country. It may then be useful to point out that important aspects of SSR:
• deal with strengthening the legal framework of security governance, including through due
integration of all human rights requirements;
• reinforce security sector accountability, including as it pertains to human rights, and that
specialised human rights institutions (such as national human rights commissions) and human
rights organisations from civil society play an important role in democratic oversight of the
security sector;
• seek to strengthen the capacity of security and justice institutions to protect effectively the
fundamental rights of the population to life, physical integrity and gender equality (which is a
human right);
• contribute to a peaceful environment that is conducive for realisation of the socio-economic
rights of the people.
• A variety of other SSR features may be of interest to point out to raise partner interest. Emphasis
can be put on the positive impacts of the national SSR programme on the transnational security
environment, on parliamentary development as a democratisation priority, on the sustainability of a
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, and on many other aspects that are directly
connected to the aims of SSR as a rule of law, peacebuilding and conflict-prevention tool.
Even if attention is focused on a particular aspect of the reform, it is important also to present the
programme as a whole and emphasise its overall coherence in terms of coordination and expected
outcomes. This helps to reassure partners about the overall robustness and sustainability of the reform
framework. It also provides a strong rationale for advocating GBS rather than project-limited funding,

even if partner preference goes to a particular area of intervention.
5.5.2. Developing a proposal to request funding support
Whether the initiative for partnering comes from the potential partner or from the country conducting
SSR, it should go through a procedure that requires the host administration to frame the type, content
and scope of assistance that is desired. An important phase for this purpose may be the formulation of a
funding request for SSRG, which often requires the development of a proposal outlining the aims, strategy
and requested resources for achieving predetermined results contributing to the overall enhancement of
security governance. Although this is not a systematic requirement, indicating the share of budget that is
covered by domestic resources against gaps remaining to be filled with partner support often adds to the
credibility and helps trigger additional funding.
Proposal drafting requires programming and technical writing skills, as well as financial management
literacy. In order to ensure that cross-cutting issues of gender equality and human rights are adequately
mainstreamed, specific expertise in these areas may be required.
However, developing a proposal for SSRG is a substantial undertaking that demands not only technical
skills but also strategic vision, and the ability to break it down into operational planning through a
programming approach. It is essential to align the proposal with the national vision of security, which
may be captured in a national security policy or equivalent existing document. Proposal drafting should
also be informed by a country-led assessment of the support needed.
Following the provisions of the national policy guiding external resource mobilisation for SSR, proposals
supporting requests for external assistance may be drafted:
• by the government institution requesting sector-specific support (typically the ministries of defence,
security or justice);
• by the SSR coordination mechanism (office for national security, coordination cell of the national
steering committee for SSR,etc.) in collaboration with all relevant ministries and institutions,especially
when the scope of the proposal is intersectoral;
• by the agency responsible for coordinating SSR resource mobilisation (see Section 5.1), which can
be requested to centralise expressions of needs from all relevant stakeholders and formulate an
integrated proposal on that basis.
Usually, for intersectoral proposals a small team is set up consisting of representatives from the different
government ministries or agencies concerned to ensure that all relevant sector leads are on the same
page.
For coordination reasons, government agencies seeking to mobilise external assistance should make
a habit of contacting the agency mandated to coordinate resource mobilisation for SSR, outlining
the proposal, explaining how it fits with relevant national and/or sector strategic plans and sharing
information on any initial discussions with or expressions of interest from development partners. These
contacts should occur at an early stage of project proposal development, based on an initial concept.
Thenceforth, and before the proposal is actually written, the resource mobilisation coordination agency
should ensure that the proposal concept fits with national priorities and policies.
Regardless of which government agency is assigned the responsibility of coordinating external resource
mobilisation for SSR, all correspondence and details of any relevant discussions with development
partners should be copied to appropriate ministries or government agencies, not omitting:
• the ministry of finance, which oversees the national budget and financial flows affecting public
institutions;
• the ministry of foreign affairs, which is at the forefront of interactions with international actors.

52
5.5.3. Managing the negotiation phase and formalising agreement
External funding can be negotiated bilaterally, or through enlarged engagement with multiple partners
concurrently at a round-table conference or similar forms of meetings aimed at sparking partnerships.
Thanks to its diplomatic legitimacy and credibility, the ECOWAS Commission is well placed to assist
member states in organising such events. The ECOWAS Commission has, in fact, in many instances
provided support either by directly organising events and convening external partners on behalf of a
member state, or by providing political, financial and operational support to member states willing to
hold partners’ meetings.
When fundraising meetings are organised with external partners, a knowledgeable negotiating team
composed of skilled and experienced men and women should be appointed. The members of this team
should have a strong background in finance, procurement, programme management and capacity-building
strategies. If necessary, a programming, finance or procurement expert (or a small group of experts) with
sufficient understanding of the proposal and SSR constraints may be contracted either to support the
negotiating team or to take on the responsibility for building its negotiating capacities beforehand.
The treasury department or ministry of finance should be consulted at an early stage on any discussions
concerning a loan element, i.e. any funds which the government will be required to repay in the future.
Since conditions within the security sector in particular can quickly deteriorate, it is critical for the
negotiation team to make arrangements that ensure the timeliness of external assistance, and improve,
to the extent possible, the speed and predictability of funding in order to facilitate programme success. In
this regard, the team should negotiate for disbursements of mobilised funding assistance to be released
according to agreed annual or multiyear schedules.
When both parties are satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations, the agreement should be recorded
in writing in the form of a memorandum of understanding or similar documentation capturing the main
terms of the agreement, which is then signed by a minister or other authorised individual on behalf of
the government.
5.5.4. Distributing allocated resources
Once the proposal is approved and resources allocated, the budget office of the authorised government
agency should proceed with resource distribution to the relevant departments or institutions, in line with
institutional priorities and the provisions of the funding agreement. This process should be conducted
with due diligence and an adequate balance of discretion and openness,allowing for democratic oversight
of the use of resources mobilised on behalf of the nation.

6.1. Putting emphasis on governance reforms
As a holistic process, SSR should not only address the material needs for the development of defence and
law enforcement, such as facilities, equipment and operational training of security sector personnel. SSR
is also and most importantly a governance-oriented process which focuses on improving the management
and governance structures that influence decision-making, service provision and accountability in the
security sector.
For a successful transformation of the security sector, the focus has to transcend “hard” initiatives aimed
at operational support in order to integrate “soft” aspects of SSG. This includes putting the emphasis on
the observation of ethical and professional behavioural standards, on human rights, on the promotion of
gender equality and on the implementation of other good governance requirements in the administration
of security institutions. It also includes enabling inclusive accountability mechanisms that allow for
civilian participation in security policymaking and monitoring of security service delivery.
In the absence of a holistic vision that incorporates the reinforcement of integrity, promotion of human
security, protection of human rights, (re)orientation to democratic norms and good governance principles,
reforms of institutional structures and strengthening of professional skills, SSR will not be transformative.
Instead it may end up reinforcing a dysfunctional security architecture, with the risk of further weakening
state legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
Developing special support
strategies for underfunded or
overlooked areas
6
“Implementation of SSR must place an equal emphasis on the effectiveness of
core security providers as well as their oversight and proper management. SSR
involves not only building effective security institutions in a coherent manner,
but it also involves laying down the foundations of good governance upon which
they must stand. The latter remains a gap area for international support.”
Conclusions of the Africa Forum on SSR, Addis Ababa, 24–26 November 2014.

The mobilisation of additional resources in support of SSR provides an opportunity to increase fund
allocation to support soft dimensions that are usually overlooked and sectoral reform areas that are often
little considered. This section suggests action points for some of the traditionally underfunded areas in
SSRG, including (among others):
• intelligence reform;
• gender equality and the security sector;
• public financial management of defence and security institutions;
• accountability mechanisms such as anti-corruption and freedom of information;
• traditional/indigenous security and justice systems.
6.2. Intelligence reform
Due to the culture of secrecy in which they are embedded, intelligence services are often a blind spot of
SSR. Yet civilian and military, internal and overseas intelligence services constitute an integral part of the
security sector and play an important role in the state’s ability to understand its strategic environment
and anticipate internal and external security threats.
Among other tasks, intelligence services:
• gather and analyse information that can be critical to state and human security;
• support strategic decision-making by providing analysis in areas relevant to national and regional
security;
• anticipate, monitor and give early warning of risks of crisis or imminent crisis;
• inform national security planning and defence and security operations.
In most West African states intelligence services play a critical role in the prevention of and response to
internal and transnational threats such as violent extremism, terrorism and trafficking by organised crime
(small arms, narcotics, human trafficking, money laundering, etc.).
Box 21: Rebalancing funding allocation between soft and hard areas of SSR
In its thematic review of security sector reform and peacebuilding in 2012, the Peacebuilding Support
Office concluded that the support efforts of the Peacebuilding Fund in “software” areas such as
institutional governance or oversight were marginal in relation to the resources dedicated to “hardware”
priorities such as infrastructure, training and equipment.
[For instance], according to the thematic review of security sector reform and peacebuilding, 93 per cent
of the resources allocated by the Peacebuilding Fund had been directed towards infrastructure, training
and equipment and operations support, whereas only 7 per cent had been allocated to general security
sector reform.
In order to create basic trust between citizens and State institutions, and to begin to address social
contract deficits, security institutions must improve the quality of the security services they provide to
the public. This requires a clear focus on the ultimate objective of increasing people’s security and safety
which, in turn, necessitates an inclusive dialogue and the participation of communities and civil society
organizations, including women’s groups.
Source: “Securing states and societies: Strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to
security sector reform”, report of the Secretary-General, 13 August 2013, paras 54 and 55.

55Developing special support strategies for underfunded or overlooked areas
However, most SSR funding allocations fail to address intelligence reform needs. This is partly because
governments initiating SSR often underestimate the importance of reforming intelligence services. They
are often reluctant to include the sensitive domain of intelligence in the reform agenda, and even more
reluctant to involve civilian stakeholders and external partners in any aspects of the governance of this
sector.
For their part, external partners are constrained by mandates and internal guidelines that sometimes
advise precaution when it comes to highly sensitive areas, such as anything related to state intelligence
services. Most external partners consider support to the reform of intelligence services too risky.
However, considering intelligence services as part of the security architecture of a country, supporting
their effectiveness and accountability in the framework of democratic governance contributes to overall
national stability and rule of law consolidation.
Although foreign offices and ministries of defence of some development partners may be interested
in supporting intelligence capacities of developing countries facing security threats with potentially
global implications, support for intelligence reform should not be the exclusive prerogative of military
cooperation. International organisations and specialised civilian partners can also provide financial and
technical assistance in:
• rethinking the institutional framework and procedures of intelligence services in light of human rights
and rule of law requirements;
• strengthening capacities for parliamentary and other forms of civilian oversight of intelligence
services;
• developing national security legislation (including laws, policies and strategies) that establishes a
foundation upon which all the structures, regulations and mandates of the intelligence services are
developed;
• developing ethical norms and standards applicable to intelligence institutions, especially relating to
human rights and integrity;
• supporting the professionalisation of intelligence personnel through provision of training on ethics,
human rights, gender equality, financial integrity, communication and other relevant soft skills;
• setting up or improving national and regional information-sharing systems, recognising that emerging
security issues related to counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics and counter-human
trafficking are transnational in nature;
• enhancing financial management of intelligence services.
Box 22: Why is intelligence reform important?
Intelligence reform aims at improving the effectiveness and accountability of intelligence services in the
broader framework of SSR.
Effectiveness: Intelligence reform contributes to improve the quality of services provided by intelligence
services, fine-tuning internal management systems and optimising value for tax payers money.
Oversight: Intelligence reform contributes to enhancing democratic governance of the intelligence
services (including their accountability to the electorate), to uphold the rule of law, and to ensure the
effectiveness and efficiency of service activity.
Source: Hans Born and Gabriel Geisler Mesevage, “Introducing intelligence oversight”, in Hans Born and
Aidan Wills (eds), Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Toolkit (Geneva: DCAF, 2012).

6.3. Gender equality in SSR
Gender equality is integral to good SSRG. It is a constituent part of each of the principles of good SSG and
should consequently inform all reform strategies for the security sector. It is not only a founding principle
of good governance, but also an operational requirement for effective provision of security services to all
members of a given society.
• Gender equality is a human right, enshrined in a variety of international and regional instruments,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women,
the Protocol of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
and the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa. The ECOWAS policy framework for SSRG
acknowledges “the obligation of Member States to apply the principles of gender equality and women’s
empowerment, including in SSR processes”. See also Box 23.
• Gender equality is fundamental to the rule of law: gender-based discrimination violates the requirement
for equality before the law. In contrast, equal access of women and men to justice and security bolsters
effective rule of law.
• Gender equality is a democratic principle. A fundamental democratic principle is the equal participation
of all citizens in the governance of public affairs. Applied to SSRG, this means that men and women
should have equal opportunity to participate in the leadership, management and operations of security
institutions at all levels. Gender equality in SSG also implies equal access for women and men to take
part in external oversight by parliament, statutory oversight institutions and civil society.
• Gender equality is fundamental to human security: the human security framework requires placing
the security needs of the people at the heart of the national security agenda. This means that security
policies must take into consideration all forms of gender-based violence (including domestic violence
and all forms of sexual violence) as threats to the human security of women, men, boys and girls.
• Gender equality is essential to more representative and effective security services. To be able to provide
effective justice and security for all members of society, security institutions should strengthen their
capacity to respond to a variety of vulnerabilities and security threats which affect citizens differently
depending on their gender identity. Employing more women and engaging men as partners in the fight
against all forms of gender-based violence help to create more representative security institutions,
which increases their ability to deliver security to a diverse constituency of public service users. More
gender-equal security services are more credible and legitimate in the eyes of the population.
Gender equality is not just a normative requirement; it also increases
operational effectiveness in the security sector. By pursuing the aims of gender
equality, the security needs of the entire population will be taken into account in
a more inclusive way.

However, experience has shown that in many cases external support to the integration of a gender
perspective in SSRG remains driven by external actors. West African governments should take strong
country leadership and ownership in promoting gender equality as a way to improve effectiveness and
accountability of the security sector. This entails promoting gender equality as an integral and sine
qua non part of the SSR agenda, and consequently being proactive in the mobilisation of national and
external resources to support this goal.
Strategies for integrating the aims of gender equality in SSR include the following.
• Mainstreaming gender in all SSR projects and programmes, starting from the design and throughout
implementation.Effective integration of a gender perspective in SSRG requires a systematic institutional
approach which should be driven by national actors.
• Dedicating specific projects to gender-related challenges, either with a particular institutional focus
or through intersectoral interventions. Such dedicated projects should, however, be designed and
implemented in coherence with the overall SSR framework, rather than as isolated stand-alones.
Good practice recommends securing specific funds for gender equality in SSR programmes: earmarking
funds for specific gender interventions in GBS or SBS allocations can be an effective way of ensuring
that adequate funding is allocated to gender in a manner coherent with and integral to the overall SSR
programme. Monitoring mechanisms should be set up at the national level to ensure that earmarked
funds are directed towards activities supporting the aims of gender equality in the midst of broader
projects or programmes. Even if funds are earmarked for gender, support can still be provided to gender
mainstreaming by generic funding envelopes.
Box 23: SSRG and gender in the ECOWAS policy framework
“SSRG programmes will adhere to the principles of gender equality and women empowerment as enshrined
in article 63 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993), the ECOWAS Gender Policy (2004), article 81 of the
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework and the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan for the implementation
of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (2010). SSRG programmes will also adhere to the
principles enshrined in other relevant gender instruments of the AU, the UN and ECOWAS Member States.
SSRG programming will include gender-specific activities with the aim to promote gender equality within
the security sector.”
Source: Draft ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance, Article 16(f).
The readiness of external partners to support gender equality initiatives in SSR
is an underexploited opportunity for West African governments. Government
institutions engaged in SSR programming should proactively seize this
opportunity, by not only using gender terminology as a set of buzzwords but
actually taking the lead in addressing grassroots and concrete expressions of
gender inequality as a challenge for good security governance. Gender equality
must neither remain nor continue to be considered an agenda pushed by
outsiders.

Project funding for gender in SSR can have the advantage of securing dedicated resources
for this often overlooked dimension of SSR; however, it also bears the risk of isolating
and “othering” gender interventions from the rest of SSR, especially if such projects are
embedded at the ministry in charge of women’s affairs. If project funding is adopted instead
of GBS or SBS for certain aspects of gender in SSR, it is advisable that a ministry of the
security sector is assigned the management of such projects to bolster consistency and
encourage mainstreaming.
6.4. Public financial management of the security sector
Many external partners funding governance aspects of SSR have the mandate to support the security
sector’s public financial management. However, it has been difficult to create incentives to open up areas
such as defence expenditure for external review, whether by international actors or national actors like
the parliament or civil society.
Off-budget transactions, especially budgets for intelligence or national defence programmes that are
traditionally embedded in a deep-rooted culture of secrecy, provide an enabling environment for opaque
financial management. Poorly harmonised and rationalised financial management procedures also
nourish spending inefficiency, resulting in funding waste, increasing the cost of SSR and challenging
reform sustainability in low- and middle-income West African countries.
In response to such challenges, SSR seeks to improve cost-effectiveness of security sector institutions
while enhancing transparency in the use of public funds by security actors. External partners willing to
support SSR in West African countries should not only commit funds to fill gaps in the SSR budget; they
should also support the development of a reliable framework for sustainable financial management of
the security sector as part of a durable reform process.
It is therefore important to include support for the development of national systems and capacities for
sound public financial management in the goals of assistance partnerships. Support for security and
justice expenditure review should not only focus on funding one-off reviews, but accompany sustainable
capacity building of audit departments or accountability mechanisms. For financial management systems
“Good security sector governance, oversight and management, including in
the area of public financial management, should be key priority areas for
international support. There is a need to rebalance processes and programmes
from a predominant focus on capacity building to equal prioritisation of
effective, efficient and accountable use of existing and planned resources
invested in reform initiatives … Security sector reform could be a significant
expenditure burden to countries, which if left unchecked may crowd out other
development priorities … Reforms should therefore be supported by robust
public financial management laws and policy frameworks in order for them to be
accountable and sustainable.”
Conclusions of the Africa Forum on SSR, Addis Ababa, 24–26 November 2014
For more
information
see Tool 8 on
integrating gender
in security sector
governance and
reform.
8

to be fully functioning and effective, key security sector managers should have the necessary skills to
understand and appreciate financial management and analysis, financial oversight and expenditure policy
issues in the security sector.
For example, external support can be directed towards the following.
• Review, rationalisation and harmonisation of financial procedures and systems used by security sector
institutions.
• Institutionalisation of security sector expenditure reviews.
• Developing innovative approaches and tools for transparent human resource management.
• Management and procurement (including procurement protocols and procurement control of classified
items).
• Skill development for civil authorities responsible for managing and internal oversight of security
sector budgeting. Key financial managers within security institutions should have the capacity to
understand fully and execute resource allocation processes.
• Design and strengthening of the legal framework for financial oversight of the security sector, including
clear definition of the roles and prerogatives of parliament and other statutory oversight institutions
competent in budgetary and financial oversight (anti-corruption agency, office of public audits, etc.)
and the role of civil society.
• Capacity building for the legislature, especially parliamentary committees on
defence and security and on budget and finance. Members of parliament should
have the capacity to play their role effectively in the national budget process by
allocating resources to security institutions according to their mandates and national
priorities. They should also be empowered, through capacity building and the
development of a conducive institutional environment, to oversee the execution of
funds allocated to the security sector in respect of human rights and rule of law, and in
line with their mandates and the needs of the people.
6.5. External oversight and accountability mechanisms
6.5.1. Fostering accountability by supporting capacity building of external oversight stakeholders
External partners may have a tendency to overlook the importance of external oversight mechanisms
as an integral part of SSR. Approaching SSR in a narrow way, they may be prompter to help core justice
and security institutions improve their internal governance mechanisms than to support parliamentary
capacity development for effective oversight of the security sector or civil society engagement in public
oversight of the security sector, for instance.
Box 24: Democratic control and oversight of the security sector
“The AU advises Member States to commit themselves to strengthening instruments for democratic
oversight of the security sector. These oversight instruments may be country-specific whilst seeking
to promote and uphold good governance principles, the rule of law, respect for the legal framework
including human rights and gender equality.”
Source: AU SSR Policy Framework, Article 40.
For more
information
see Tool 3 on
good financial
governance
of defence
and security
institutions.
3

Government agencies negotiating partnerships may also have a tendency to view SSR through a
government-only lens, thus overlooking the role and needs of national stakeholders outside the executive
branch of government. This tendency risks jeopardising national ownership of SSR, which goes beyond
government or state ownership to include civil society, the legislature, the media, informal and traditional
justice institutions, etc.
External oversight is an essential part of good SSG. It is particularly useful to fight
corruption in the security sector and to hold security institutions accountable to the
public for their actions.
The relationship between civil society and the security services is one of the main issues
of SSR. It represents a critical link through which an inclusive, participatory security
governance framework can be operationalised. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the
security services will benefit from a positive relationship with citizens.
6.5.2. Fostering accountability by integrating anti-corruption into SSR programming
SSR seeks to build public trust in security institutions by fighting corruption in the security sector. This
is, however, an often overlooked aspect of SSR, and in many cases suffers from insufficient funding and
attention.
Generally, conditionalities attached to budget support play an important role in facilitating and assisting
reform implementation, which includes improvements in the conditions that encourage corruption
and misappropriation of funds. Such conditionalities include improvements in management of public
expenditures and auditing (see Section 7.3). However, budget support cannot fight corruption unless
it is backed by a strong government commitment to transparency and reform, coupled with adequate
democratic oversight of the security sector.
It might prove difficult for parliament and civil society responsible for democratic oversight to analyse
financial data related to security budgets. Procedures for requesting information from official sources and
methodologies to analyse the data against best practice benchmarks are not always sufficiently mastered.
In most cases, the media and other civil society organisations lack the resources and expertise to follow
the workings of parliament and the security sector, and to simplify budget analysis for the general public.
Partner support to fight corruption in the security sector may go towards:
• reviewing, revising and drafting appropriate anti-corruption legislation;
• training oversight bodies such as a parliamentary select committee, anti-corruption agencies, civil
society, media and other oversight bodies on budget analysis and investigations;
• operationalising and strengthening public complaints bodies;
• establishing and building the capacity of independent oversight bodies with the power to investigate
and adjudicate complaints and conduct investigations into corruption within the security sector;
• assisting with reform of education and training, and review and revision of human resource policies
and laws on recruitment, employment, wages, salaries, promotions, retirement and pension systems of
all state security agencies.
6.5.3. Fostering transparency by supporting access to information
Building security institutions that are accountable before the law and the people requires a certain
level of public access to security-sector-related information. However, access to information is an often
overlooked area in SSR. Mobilising national and external resources in support of this aspect of the reform
process requires the government, which usually holds the information, to see things from the perspective
of national stakeholders involved in external oversight of the security sector. This is a counterintuitive
exercise and can therefore prove highly challenging.
For more
information
see Tool 5 on
parliamentary
oversight of the
security sector and
Tool 6 on involving
civil society in SSRG.
5 6

In 2013 22 organisations and academic centres launched new global principles on the right to information,
known as the “Tshwane Principles on National Security and the Right to Information”. The principles
address how to ensure public access to government information without jeopardising legitimate efforts
to protect people from national security threats. They were developed to provide guidance to those
engaged in drafting, revising or implementing relevant laws and policies.
According to the Tshwane Principles, although a government may legitimately withhold information in
narrowly defined areas, such as defence plans, weapons development and the operations of and sources
used by intelligence services, and may withhold confidential information supplied by foreign governments
that is linked to national security matters, the government should still be accountable for violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law.
ECOWAS member states could consider reflecting these principles in their interpretation of national
security law. They could seek support for:
• legislative review and revisions to incorporate the key Tshwane Principles on National Security and the
Right to Information in relevant national legislation or strategy frameworks;
• training oversight bodies, such as a parliamentary select committee, civil society and other oversight
bodies, on the principles of transparency and accountability under human rights and humanitarian law.
6.6. Traditional security and justice providers
In most West African countries there are traditional security and justice systems, which include local
leaders such as chiefs and spiritual leaders, local courts, chiefdom police in anglophone settings,
traditional transitional justice mechanisms and community vigilantes. Informal local arrangements for
justice and security also include neighbourhood watch outfits, street committees and a wealth of informal
dispute-resolution systems. These traditional and informal systems are often the closest justice and
security providers for poor, marginal and rural communities.
However, their relations with the state institutions are sometimes problematic, especially where they are
not formally recognised by the state or they directly challenge state authority. In such cases, the national
government engaging in SSR may be tempted to exclude these stakeholders from the reform process.
Nonetheless, they are often perceived as legitimate institutions by the local populations with which they
are associated. In other cases their exclusion may not be actively sought by government, but simply the
result of a narrow vision of SSR that fails to engage with informal and traditional security providers.
Acknowledging that traditional and informal justice and security systems play a central role, particularly
in the resolution of disputes or contentious intra/inter-community conflicts and the preservation of
community safety, SSR should address this often overlooked dimension of security governance. For West
African states, improving access to justice should include informal justice institutions as important
stakeholders. Their positive potential can only be effectively used if their knowledge of human rights,
Ghana’s 2006 Whistleblowers Act (Act 720) enables individuals to disclose
information that relates to unlawful or other illegal conduct or corrupt practices
of others, in the public interest. It also protects persons who make such
disclosures from victimisation or reprisals.

62
accountability and rule of law is strengthened, and linked to state institutions.
Support can for instance go towards the following.
• Building or restructuring the traditional courts. For instance, ECOWAS member states may wish to draw
inspiration from the Ethiopian Kebele social courts, which have been recognised as quasi-formal state
organs that provide court-like decisions applying shimglina, a traditional mechanism of arbitration.
• Enhancing problem-solving skills of traditional leaders, community leaders and arbitrators on issues
such as land disputes, as a way to discharge law enforcement and formal justice institutions from
certain community-level disputes without jeopardising peace.
• Raising awareness of traditional and informal security providers on human rights and strengthening
their understanding of the importance of accountability and the rule of law.
• Raising awareness of traditional and informal security providers on gender inequalities and
strengthening their capacity to address gender-based violence, including domestic violence, in a
manner that secures effective provision of security to women and girls.
• Educating and empowering the users of traditional justice providers to know and claim
their rights, and to demand accountability.
• Building the effectiveness and integrity of traditional security and justice providers for
the benefit of all citizens.
• Strengthening cross-communities or cross-traditional lesson sharing on issues pertaining
to conflict resolution, crisis management, violence-reduction initiatives, etc.
For more
information see
Tool 7 on non-
state justice and
security providers
and security sector
reform.
7

ECOWAS as a regional institution continues to play a key role in providing an added layer of support to
the efforts of member states.
7.1. Providing normative guidance on partner relations
As part of the draft Regional Policy Framework for SSRG in West Africa, ECOWAS provides its member
states with normative guidance for “effective resource mobilization strategy and financing of SSRG
programmes” (Section G). The guidance stipulates as follows.
• Article 49: To have a transparent, sustainable and long-term financing of SSRG programmes, Member
States have the responsibility to allocate a sufficient and a proportionate part of the national budget to
the security sector subject to independent and parliamentary scrutiny.They also have the responsibility
to coordinate with bilateral and multilateral partners the mobilization of resources for effective SSR
processes.
• Article 51: Member States shall put in place an effective strategy to secure funding from internal
and external sources in order to sustain long-term financing for SSRG programmes. The resource
mobilization strategy may include:
a) An advocacy campaign targeted at potential internal and external donors detailing national
security and justice needs and the required resources to fulfil them;
b) Contribution from the private sector and business community beyond corporate social
responsibility, in the nature of investments to promote a safe and stable environment for doing
business;
c) A monitoring mechanism for financial flows/reflows;
d) A sound management of resources mobilized and an obligation to communicate all the results
to relevant stakeholders;
e) Regular reports and sound record keeping which would be available to the public and other
stakeholders.
The role of ECOWAS
7

• Article 53: Member States shall assume responsibility for coordinating external support to national
SSRG programmes. Where Member States do not have this capacity, external support and capacity-
building assistance may be requested from the ECOWAS Commission, the African Union, the United
Nations or other partners until such States have the capacity to lead.
• Article 54: Member States shall establish a national structure or framework for cooperation and
partnerships to support the implementation of SSRG programmes. The national structure will be
composed of several stakeholders such as government officials, CSOs [civil society organisations],
international partners, CBOs [community-based organisations], research and academic institutions.
• Article 55: For post-conflict Member States with fragile State institutions, ECOWAS with the assistance
of the international community and other relevant actors may take the lead in coordinating external
assistance until the Member States have the capacity to lead.
• Article 56 c: Member States implementing SSRG programmes shall have an effective communication
strategy in order to … secure more support including funding from internal and external partners.
7.2. Facilitating the effectiveness of external support to SSR
The AU Policy Framework on SSR advises that regional economic communities such as ECOWAS should
“engage international partners such as the United Nations in the implementation of national SSR
activities of Member States” (Article 69(e)).
The Regional Policy Framework for SSRG in West Africa provides that the ECOWAS Commission should
“contribute to the resource mobilization strategy of Member States implementing SSRG programmes”
(Article 64(g)). It also specifies that “when necessary, ECOWAS shall support Member States to design,
implement and evaluate their SSRG programmes within the limit of available resources. ECOWAS may
also seek the assistance of partners in this respect” (Article 50).
Practical recommendations therefore may include the following points.
• Strengthen the capacity of member states in SSRG programme design, implementation, monitoring
and evaluation.
• Provide platforms to facilitate dialogue on external funding support targeting common transnational
security threats, including issues pertaining to crime, terrorism, maritime security and piracy, drug
trafficking and human trafficking, among others. Several regional forums, such as the ECOWAS
development partners’ annual conference and thematic groups (including peace and security),
ECOWAS-P3+ Partners meetings, etc., discuss such issues.
• Take part in joint assessments, fact-finding missions and monitoring and evaluation assessments on
issues pertaining to external aid effectiveness for SSRG (if requested by a member state). For example,
ECOWAS was part of such missions in Mali and Guinea-Bissau between 2012 and 2015.
• Provide a platform that facilitates dialogue and technical or advisory support to SSRG between ECOWAS
member states and other actors across Africa and the international community.
• Convene and partake in conferences by development partners to source funding, commit resources
to support SSRG and monitor progress. For example, the ECOWAS P3+ Partners donor coordination
meeting and the annual ECOWAS development partners’ meeting and follow-up engagement bring
together ECOWAS representatives and key development partners to support peace and security
initiatives. As such, they can be good opportunities to engage in discussion on external funding for
particular SSRG initiatives in member states.
• Support member states in organising country-focused partner conferences or other forms of resource
mobilisation meetings.

65The role of ECOWAS
7.3. Exploring the possibility of a “dedicated wallet” under the financial division of
the ECOWAS Commission Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department for SSRG
support
Considering the human resource, institutional and structural challenges of the ECOWAS Commission, it
would be practical to set up a “dedicated wallet” under the financial division of its Political Affairs, Peace
and Security Department for SSRG support to member states. In view of the lack of dedicated funds for
SSRG and human-security-related issues in particular, funds from the dedicated wallet could also be used
to support transnational security threats such as cybercrime, trafficking in humans, drugs and illegal arms,
terrorism, insurgency, armed violence and other forms of transnational organised crime. Internal issues
which pose a threat to human security in a state and have the potential to spiral into insecurity in other
states are also legitimate concerns for ECOWAS to act upon, within the limits of the Community’s Treaty.
The establishment of a dedicated wallet may create unnecessary political instruments and burden the
capacity of existing institutions on how to manage such a trust fund. Nonetheless, such an initiative could
possibly enhance ownership and alignment of interventions to regional and national strategies on SSRG.
To pursue this, ECOWAS would need to clarify some political as well as technical issues before such a
fund can be established and operationalised. In establishing a possible fund that specifically supports
transnational issues on SSRG, the following key questions should be considered.
• Will there be a common understanding among member states on setting up a “dedicated wallet” for
SSRG support under the financial division of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department of
the ECOWAS Commission?
• Will a “dedicated wallet” that supports transnational issues on SSRG under the Political Affairs, Peace
and Security Department conflict with the mandate of the Human Development and Gender Unit that
deals with transborder crime?
• Will a “dedicated fund” under the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department complement and
advance aid effectiveness at the national level?
• Will a “dedicated wallet” improve access to additional resources from bilateral and multilateral
donors? Presently (since 2014), ECOWAS development partners in peace and security are using the
implementation plan (matrix) for the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework as a rallying point for
coordinating donor support. The implementation plan (which has a regional security portion but does
not address SSRG specifically) is a unique document, as it articulates the priority actions of several
relevant directorates. Although it is still being finalised, it makes it somewhat easier for development
partners to know what gaps exist and what ECOWAS directorates are asking for.
• Will ECOWAS serve as an effective platform to access alternative funding, especially from the private
sector, foundations and individual philanthropists, for an “SSRG dedicated fund”?
• Will the “dedicated fund” improve coordination by development partners, and harmonisation and
alignment of aid to recipient governments’ priorities?
• How can efficient, accountable, responsive and transparent management of such a “dedicated fund” be
ensured?
Box 25: Examples of ECOWAS contributions to transborder security initiatives
ECOWAS continues to extend both technical and financial support to its member states working to
improve transborder security. For instance, ECOWAS extended financial support to Liberia in 2012 and
2013 to tackle insecurity at the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border in order to prevent a reversal of the peaceful
and stable environment. ECOWAS also earmarked the sum of $500,000 to support implementation of the
Mano River Union strategy in 2014, with the goal of establishing a joint border consultative forum for
conflict prevention and early warning.

This checklist is inspired by field experiences in many countries, including in West Africa, other parts
of Africa and the Caribbean. It should be regarded as a reminder of points for consideration in order to
assess and improve effectiveness in the management of external assistance to SSRG by West African
governments. It does not provide an exhaustive or imperative list of actions, and should be adapted to
each specific context as necessary.
1. Define the reform agenda and determine associated resource capacities and requirements
• Conduct a comprehensive assessment of security needs of the state and the people, and develop
a national vision of security through an inclusive process.
• Review and assess the capacity of the security sector to respond to the needs identified.
• Determine the capacity gaps which need to be addressed to enhance national capacity to
respond to the security needs of the state and the people.
• Define priority areas of reform accordingly, and develop a national SSR programme.
• Develop the budget of the national SSR programme.
• Identify national funding capacity to cover the budget requirements.
• Determine the remaining gaps for which external support may be sought.
2. Develop an effective resource mobilisation strategy
• Assign clear mandates and responsibilities among government agencies for establishing
partnerships, specifying the roles of key actors such as line ministries, the ministry of finance,
the ministry of planning, the ministry of foreign affairs and the national SSR coordination
mechanism.
• Define clear procedures for initiating discussion with prospective external partners, entering
partnerships and sharing information on partnerships within the administration.
• Identify potential sources of funding (partner mapping), determine the profiles and interests
of potential partners and identify entry points for negotiations based on convergence between
national priorities and the interest areas of the potential partners.
Checklist: Effective mobilisation
and management of external
partnerships in support of SSR

• Initiate high-level political dialogue to agree on the prerequisites for a partnership (especially
equal relationship, national ownership and leadership of the reform process, partner alignment
on national priorities, external partners’ harmonisation, results-based management and mutual
accountability).
• Provide partners with a broad presentation of SSR goals, and resource mobilisation
documentation that is tailored to each major prospective partner.
• Engage in negotiations and select funding arrangements according to national specificities
(general budget support typically offers the most flexibility and is best adapted to the holistic
nature of SSR).
• Consider the benefits of assistance offered versus transactional costs, and enter partnerships in
an insightful and selective manner.
• Agree simplified and harmonised management and reporting requirements with partners.
3. Strengthen national management capacity
• Include actions aimed at improving the mobilisation of domestic resources in partnership
frameworks.
• Include support to security sector financial management capacity development in partnership
frameworks as necessary, including anti-corruption actions.
• Demonstrate political commitment to changes in institutional cultures, including the shift to
results-oriented management of security-allocated funds.
• Strengthen and harmonise administrative and financial management frameworks within the
security sector, including procurement procedures, asset management and internal oversight
mechanisms.
• Create an enabling environment for oversight of the security sector budget by the parliament,
especially the budget and finance committee and the defence and security committee.
• Create an enabling environment for financial oversight of the security sector by statutory public
audit institutions, anti-corruption agencies and civil society.
• Set up monitoring and evaluation mechanisms aimed at ensuring relevance, effectiveness, cost-
efficiency and other fundamental features of expenditures.
• Keep reporting on commitments in order to build and maintain partners’ trust.
4. Develop special support strategies for overlooked reform areas
• Dedicate sufficient funding to governance reforms, and not just infrastructure development,
material procurement and operational training.
• Mainstream the aims of gender equality across the entire reform process, and dedicate special
funding to gender-specific interventions.
• Make provisions for intelligence reform and other neglected or sidelined sectoral reforms.
• Make provisions for long-term development and strengthening of public financial management.
• Make provisions for long-term development of internal and external oversight mechanisms,
including parliament and civil society capacity building in budget analysis.

69Additional resources
Additional Resources
African Union, African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (Addis Ababa: African Union
Commission, 2013) www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ae-ssr.
pdf.
Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (eds), Gender & Security Sector Reform Toolkit (Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/
ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008) www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Gender-Security-Sector-Reform-Toolkit.
Hans Born and Aidan Wills (eds), Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Toolkit (Geneva: DCAF, 2012) www.
dcaf.ch/Publications/Overseeing-Intelligence-Services-A-Toolkit.
ECOWAS, Draft Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance (Abuja: ECOWAS, 2015).
Ghana Whistleblower Act (Act 720), GPC/A532/350/8/2006 (Accra: Assembly Press, 2006) www.
drasuszodis.lt/userfiles/Ghana%20Whitsleblwer%20Act.pdf.
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
(Dili: G7+, 2011) http://www.g7plus.org/en/new-deal/document.
OECD, Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 2011) www.oecd.org/
development/effectiveness/49650173.pdf.
OECD, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris: OECD, 2005) www.oecd.org/dac/
effectiveness/34428351.pdf.
OECD, Accra Agenda for Action (Paris: OECD, 2005) www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf.
OECD-DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform – Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD,
2007) http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-
reform_9789264027862-en.
Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, The Siem Reap CSO Consensus on the International
Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness (Siem Reap: Open Forum for CSO Development
Effectiveness, 2011) www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/seimu/nakano/pdfs/hlf4_8.pdf.
Open Society Foundations, Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (The
Tshwane Principles) (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2012) www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/files/global-principles-national-security-10232013.pdf.
Sida, Public Finance Management in Development Co-operation – A Handbook for Sida Staff (Stockholm:
Sida, 2007) http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Books/Public-Finance-Management-in-
Development-Co-operation-A-Handbook-for-Sida-Staff.

Notes
1. In this toolkit, and in line with terminology used by
the ECOWAS Commission, the terms “support” and
“partner” are preferred over “aid” and “donor”, to reflect
the increasingly nuanced partnerships between West
African national actors and external partners.
2. ECOWAS, Draft Policy Framework for Security Sector
Reform and Governance (Abuja: ECOWAS, 2015). As of
the publication date of this tool, the draft ECOWAS
policy for SSRG has been endorsed by technical
experts representing ECOWAS member states and is
pending official adoption by the heads of state and
government.
3. DCAF, “Security sector governance and reform”, DCAF
Backgrounder (Geneva: DCAF, 2009).
4. World Bank,“Country and lending groups”, http://data.
worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups.
5. African Union, Conclusions of the Africa Forum on
Security Sector Reform (SSR), Addis Ababa, 24–26
November, 2014 (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2014).
6. Alejandro Pachon, “Financing security sector reform:
A review of official development assistance data”,
SSR Issue Papers No. 4 (Waterloo, ON: Centre for
International Governance Innovation, 2012), https://
www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR%20
Issue%20Paper_Pachon_ODA%20as%20SSR_final.pdf.
7. The information in this box is based on experiences
from Ghana and Sierra Leone (see Government of
Ghana, “Ghana aid policy and strategy 2011–2015”,
2010; Government of Sierra Leone, “Aid policy”, 2010;
Republic of Ghana, “National anti-corruption action
plan 2012–2021”, 2011), as well as on the author’s
field experience and feedback from monitoring and
evaluation of SSR-related projects in ten West African
countries.
8. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
“Value for money guideline”, 2009, www.aid.govt.
nz/sites/default/files/Value%20for%20Money%20
Guideline.pdf
9. Department for International Development, “DFID’s
approach to value for money (VfM)”, (London: DFID,
2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67479/DFID-
approach-value-money.pdf.
10. Freely adapted from Farida Fleming,“Value for money”,
BetterEvaluation, 2014, http://betterevaluation.org/
evaluation-options/value_for_money.
11. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
“Sustainable Development Goals”, 2015, https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics.

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