Escaping_capability_traps_PDIA

Escaping Capability Traps through
Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation
(PDIA)
Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock
CID Working Paper No. 240
June 2012
© Copyright 2012 Andrews, Matt; Pritchett, Lant; Woolcock,
Michael, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Working Papers
Center for International Development
at Harvard University

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Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem
Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)
Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock1
June 15, 2012
Abstract
Many reform initiatives in developing countries fail to achieve sustained improvements in
performance because they are merely isomorphic mimicry—that is, governments and
organizations pretend to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like rather than
what they actually do. The flow of development resources and legitimacy without demonstrated
improvements in performance, however, undermines the impetus for effective action to build
state capability or improve performance. This dynamic facilitates ‗capability traps‘ in which state
capability stagnates, or even deteriorates, over long periods of time despite governments
remaining engaged in developmental rhetoric and continuing to receive development resources.
How can countries escape capability traps? We propose an approach, Problem-Driven Iterative
Adaptation (PDIA), based on four core principles, each of which stands in sharp contrast with
the standard approaches. First, PDIA focuses on solving locally nominated and defined problems
in performance (as opposed to transplanting pre-conceived and packaged ―best practice‖
solutions). Second, it seeks to create an ‗authorizing environment‘ for decision-making that
encourages ‗positive deviance‘ and experimentation (as opposed to designing projects and
programs and then requiring agents to implement them exactly as designed). Third, it embeds
this experimentation in tight feedback loops that facilitate rapid experiential learning (as opposed
to enduring long lag times in learning from ex post ―evaluation‖). Fourth, it actively engages
broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant and supportable (as
opposed to a narrow set of external experts promoting the ―top down‖ diffusion of innovation).
1
Andrews and Pritchett are with Harvard University‘s Kennedy School of Government; Woolcock is with the
Development Research Group, World Bank. The corresponding author is Matt Andrews, Assistant Professor,
Harvard Kennedy School, 116 Rubenstein, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA. Email
addresses for correspondence: matt_andrews@hks.harvard.edu, lant_pritchett@hks.harvard.edu and
mwoolcock@worldbank.org. This paper is part of a broader research agenda at the Harvard Kennedy School‘s
Center for International Development supported by WIDER. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors alone, and should not be attributed to the respective organizations with which they are affiliated. Helpful
comments from participants at various seminars and conferences are gratefully acknowledged.

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Introduction
Some building is easy. Development projects have, by and large, been successful at building
physical stuff: schools, highways, irrigation canals, hospitals and even building the buildings that
house government ministries, courts and agencies. But some building is hard. As anyone with
experience in development knows, building the capabilities of the human systems is hard. That
applies to the human system called ―the state.‖ Getting the human beings in the state to use the
physical stuff available to produce the flows of improved services (learning in schools, water to
farmers, cures for patients) that lead to desirable outcomes for citizens has proven much more
difficult.
There is no shortage of small and large scale examples. One of us was recently asked to
review the design of an education project in an African country; it was the sixth in a string of
large projects supporting education in this country. The project documents described the
deplorable state of the capability of the ministry of education to even implement the project—
much less to autonomously define problems, gather and analyze information, make decisions
based on analysis, and implement their own decisions. Therefore the project proposed funding to
build more schools but also significant funding to build the capability of the ministry. But of
course all of the five previous projects over a span of twenty years had also sought to build both
schools and ministry capability, and had succeeded at only one of those objectives.
This dynamic also often characterizes ―policy reform‖: a government succeeds in passing
laws or creating new boxes in organizational charts or declaring new administrative processes,
but these ―reforms‖ are frequently not implemented or used. Andrews (2011), for example,
documents the case of the adoption of public financial management reforms in Africa, showing
how the higher level and surface processes changed (e.g., how budgets were written and new
accounting techniques were adopted) but how the core processes determining how money was
actually spent remained impervious to reform. Perhaps the most spectacular large-scale
contemporary example is that the richest and most powerful nation in the history of humankind
has just spent a decade—and enormous amounts of blood (almost 2000 dead) and treasure (over
half a trillion dollars)—attempting to (re)build state capability in a very small and poor South
Asian country. The United States is now committed to leaving by 2014, almost certainly leaving
behind a state less capable than what Afghanistan had in the 1970s.

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Why has building state capability been so hard? In past work we argued that development
interventions—projects, policies, programs—create incentives for developing country
organizations to adopt ‗best practices‘ in laws, policies and organizational practices which look
impressive (because they appear to comply with professional standards or have been endorsed by
international experts) but are unlikely to fit into particular developing country contexts.2
Adapting from the new institutionalism literature in sociology3
, we suggested that reform
dynamics are often characterized by ‗isomorphic mimicry‘—the tendency to introduce reforms
that enhance an entity‘s external legitimacy and support, even when they do not demonstrably
improve performance. These strategies of isomorphic mimicry in individual projects, policies
and programs add up to ‗capability traps‘: a dynamic in which governments constantly adopt
―reforms‖ to ensure ongoing flows of external financing and legitimacy yet never actually
improve. The fact that the ―development community‖ is five decades into supporting the building
of state capability and that there has been so little progress in so many places (obvious
spectacular successes like South Korea notwithstanding) suggests the generic ―theory of change‖
on which development initiatives for building state capability are based is deeply flawed.
How might countries escape from capability traps? This is the question we begin
answering in the current article. We first revisit the argument about how and why countries
and development partners get trapped in a cycle of reforms that fail to enhance capability
(indeed, may exacerbate pre-existing constraints). We posit that capability traps emerge
under specific conditions which yield interventions that (a) aim to reproduce particular
external solutions considered ‗best practice‘ in dominant agendas, (b) through pre-
determined linear processes, (c) that inform tight monitoring of inputs and compliance to
‗the plan‘, and (d) are driven from the top down, assuming that implementation largely
happens by edict.4
2
See Pritchett and Woolcock (2004); Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2010); and Andrews (2011).
3
See the classic work of Dimaggio and Powell (1983).
4
An important paper by Denizer, Kaufmann and Kraay (2011: 2), however, shows that implementation is
actually of crucial importance to project quality. On the basis of an examination of 6000 World Bank projects,
these authors conclude that ―measures of project size, the extent of project supervision, and evaluation lags are
all significantly correlated with project outcomes, as are early-warning indicators that flag problematic projects
during the implementation stage… measures of World Bank project task manager quality matter significantly
for the ultimate outcome of projects.‖

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A second section suggests that capability traps can be avoided and overcome by fostering
different types of interventions. In direct counterpoint to the four conditions above, we propose
that efforts to build state capability should (i) aim to solve particular problems in local contexts,
(ii) through the creation of an ‗authorizing environment‘ for decision-making that allows
‗positive deviation‘ and experimentation, (iii) involving active, ongoing and experiential learning
and the iterative feedback of lessons into new solutions, doing so by (iv) engaging broad sets of
agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate and relevant—i.e., politically supportable and
practically implementable. We propose this kind of intervention as an alternative approach to
enhancing state capability, one we call Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). We
emphasize that PDIA is not so much ‗new‘ thinking as an attempt at a pragmatic and operational
synthesis of related arguments articulated in recent years by an array of scholars and practitioners
of development working in different sectors and disciplines.
I) Capability traps in the effort to build state capability
Development interventions can be usefully analyzed at three social levels (Figure 1): agents, at
the front line and in leadership positions; organizations inhabited by agents; and the environment
or ecosystem of organizations. Within each category, Figure 1 also illustrates the poles of
behaviors (for agents and organizations) or conditions (within eco-systems).
Frontline workers decide daily between mere compliance with rules (or even negative
deviations) and positive performance-driven actions. Leaders and managers choose between
using their positions to pursue narrow private or organizational gain or to create new public
value within and through the organizations they run. Organizations manage how and from
whence they derive the legitimacy needed to survive and thrive, balancing isomorphic pressures
to comply with external expectations of what they should look like and the challenge of
demonstrating performance regardless of appearance.
At the systemic level, fields of organizations that include suppliers, producers, regulators,
funders and consumers determine implicit and explicit ways of evaluating change and novelty.
Systems could reward compliance with fixed agendas of what is considered appropriate and

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‗right‘ practice at one extreme, or look to the simple demonstration of improved functionality at
another. A second tension also plays out at this systemic level, affecting the space created for
novelty: closed systems constrain novelty and do not allow new approaches to emerge, while
open systems facilitate novelty (see Brafman and Beckstrom 2006).
Figure 1.Tensions playing out at different levels of engagement in development
Source: Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2010)
Countries find themselves in capability traps when conditions at each level foster
decisions and behaviors on the left side of Figure 1; this can create a low level equilibrium.
When the ecosystem for organizations evaluates novelty based on agenda-conformity rather than
enhanced functionality, then the space for novelty is closed and subsequently cascades (Carlile
and Lakani 2011). In such situations, organizations adopt ―isomorphic mimicry‖ strategies of
looking like successful organizations: leaders seek organizational survival, continued budgets
and rents by complying with external standards of legitimacy instead of encouraging new ideas,

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products and solutions, while front line workers choose routine compliance (at best; at worst,
often corruption or malfeasance) over concern for the customers, clients and citizens they serve.
The difficult reality is that once the ―capability trap‖ is sprung there is no incentive—and often
no possibility—for any one organization or leader or front-line agent to break out.
Much of the literature on capacity and corruption focuses on the role agents play in such
situations. It is common to hear statements like: ―The country would progress if only it had less
corrupt leaders and more capable and concerned civil servants.‖5
Blaming agents in this way
suggests a personalized rather than systemic perspective on why countries remain poor—one
which is obviously false. This perspective has yielded efforts to discipline agents and limit the
opportunities for rent seeking via organizational interventions like civil service, judicial and
public finance reform. Organizations in developing countries have been required to accept such
interventions for decades now. As Rodrik (2008: 100) notes, ―institutional reform promoted by
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the
World Trade Organization (WTO) is heavily biased towards a best-practice model. It presumes it
is possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante, and views
convergence toward those arrangements as inherently desirable.‖ Such apparent convergence is
undertaken to ensure continued legitimacy with, and support from, the international community.
A common example is procurement reform: laws requiring competitive bidding are a procedure
that many development organizations require their client countries to adopt in order to receive
financial support. Such requirements, for instance, were among the first demands international
organizations made in post war Liberia, Afghanistan and Sudan. They are intended to constrain
corruption, discipline agents, and bring an air of formality and legitimacy to the way
governments operate.
We hold, however, that these reform initiatives are now, ironically, among the drivers of
capability traps in developing countries, because they create and reinforce processes through
which global players constrain local experimentation—while at the same time facilitating the
5
For example, Greg Mills from South Africa‘s Brenthurst Foundation recently noted that Malawi would be doing
better ―If only Malawians were luckier with their leaders.‖ See his article in the Malawi Democrat:
http://www.malawidemocrat.com/politics/long-fingers-in-the-warm-heart-of-africa/

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perpetuation of dysfunction6
. The conditions we allude to have characterized the politics and
processes of international development since at least the 1980s, a period when government
reform became an important dimension of development work. At that time, many external
development organizations began tying their funds to such reforms, as well as using conditions
in structural adjustment and other budget financing initiatives (e.g. ―sector wide‖ approaches).
This has made it increasingly difficult for a developing country to receive external financial
assistance without committing to change their government and market structures. The
commitments must be made ex ante and promise reform that is open to visible evaluation in
relatively short time periods, such that external development partners have something tangible to
point to when justifying the disbursement of funds. In this relationship, development partners
have to accept proposed reform ideas and sign off on their attainment. This role has fed the
creation of various scripts defining acceptable types of reform. The World Governance
Indicators, for instance, guide countries in choosing governance reforms by illustrating what is
considered legitimate. Similarly, the Doing Business indicators inform what reforms are needed
to the institutions connecting government and the private sector, while mechanisms such as
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators focus developing countries
on conforming with characteristics ostensibly reflecting “good international practices … critical
… to achieve sound public financial management‖ (PEFA 2006: 2).
Such scripts, we argue, have essentially closed the space for novelty in the development
system, imposing narrow agendas of what constitutes acceptable change. Developing countries
and organizations operating within them are regularly evaluated on their compliance with these
scripts, and the routine and generalized solutions they offer for establishing ―good governance‖,
facilitating private sector growth, managing public finances, and more. Organizations like
finance ministries or central banks gain legitimacy by agreeing to adopt such reforms, regardless
of whether they offer a path towards demonstrated success in a particular context. Leaders of the
organizations, for their part, can further their own careers by signing off on such interventions.
Their agreement to adopt externally mandated reforms facilitates the continued flow of external
6
Our argument at the institutional and organizational level is similar to that made by Nicolas van de Walle
(2001) about ―structural adjustment‖ in Africa. He points out that engagement of governments in the process of
reform—even when patently insincere on the part of governments and when reforms were not implemented—
brought external legitimacy. This contributed to the puzzle of the region with the worst development outcomes
having the most stable governments.

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funds, which can further various public and private interests. Front line workers ostensibly
required to implement these changes are seldom part of the conversation about change, however,
and thus have no incentive to contribute ideas about how things could be improved.
The example of procurement reform in countries like Liberia and Afghanistan is a good
instance of this dynamic in action. PEFA indicators and United Nations models of good
procurement systems tout competitive bidding as a generic solution to many procurement
maladies, including corruption and value for money concerns. Competitive bidding regimes are
introduced through laws, as are the creation of independent agencies, the implementation of
procedural rules and the introduction of transparency mechanisms. These various ‗inputs‘ are
readily evaluated as ‗evidence‘ that change is in effect. Countries are rewarded for producing
these inputs; government entities and vendors subjected to such mechanisms are assumed to
simply comply. The result is a top-down approach to building procurement capacity (and
beyond) in these governments, through which external role players impose themselves on local
contexts and crowd out potential contributions local agents might make to change. These local
agents have every incentive to treat reforms as signals, adopting external solutions that are not
necessarily politically accepted or practically possible in the local context. But when the
conditions are wrong, this mimicry signaling is the easiest route to achieving legitimacy,
especially when the pathway to creating real value and facilitating actual improvement in
performance is uncertain, risky and potentially contentious. Local agents have little incentive to
pursue improved functionality in such settings, especially when they are rewarded so
handsomely for complying with externally mandated ‗forms‘ (appearances).
II) Escaping capability traps and actually building state capability
The emphasis on form (what organizations ‗look like‘) over function (what they actually ‗do‘) is
a crucial characteristic of the capability trap facing many developing countries. The challenge of
escaping this trap therefore involves focusing on improved government functionality as the key
to improved state capability. The basic message must be that interventions are successful if they
empower a constant process through which agents make organizations better performers,

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regardless of the forms adopted to effect such change. The politics of this re-focusing
recommendation are obviously complex. They require, for instance, challenging perspectives
about when and how to tie development funding to reform results, asking if external agents and
solutions can build local state capabilities, and clarifying whether and how local agents and
solutions should play a greater role in their own development. They may also entail adopting
reforms that, at least initially, powerful critics can deride as unprofessional (‗promoting non-
best-practice solutions‘), inefficient (‗reinventing the wheel‘), even potentially unethical (‗failing
to meet global standards‘). These are far from idle concerns.
This section does not address these political narratives. Instead, it offers some potential
ideas and practical suggestions for how the development process might look if political discourse
did call for a change in the approach to reforming governments and building state capability. As
noted above, we fully recognize that others have voiced related concerns across various sectors
in a range of forums; these previous articulations, however, have mostly stopped at critique
rather than moving on to propose concrete, supportable, implementable alternatives. To this end,
our alternative draws on and synthesizes related themes that get at the common core idea:
‗learning organizations‘ (Senge 1990 [2006]), ‗projects as policy experiments‘ (Rondinelli
1993), ‗adaptive versus technical problems‘ (Heifetz 1994), ‗positive deviance‘ (Marsh et al
2004; Pascale, Sternin and Sternin 2010), institutional ‗monocropping‘ versus ‗deliberation‘
(Evans 2004), ‗experimentation‘ (Mukand and Rodrik 2005; Manzi 2012), ‗good-enough
governance‘ (Grindle 2004), ‗democracy as problem solving‘ (Briggs 2008), the ‗sabotage of
harms‘ (Sparrow 2008), ‗second-best institutions‘ (Rodrik 2008), ‗interim institutions‘ (Adler,
Sage and Woolcock 2009), ‗upside down governance‘ (Institute for Development Studies 2010),
‗just-enough governance‘ (Levy and Fukuyama 2010), ‗best fit‘ strategies (Booth 2011),
‗principled incrementalism‘ (Knaus 2011), and ‗experiential learning‘ (Pritchett, Samji and
Hammer 2012), among others.
Our proposed approach, which we call Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA), is
based on four core principles. We are at pains to stress that these are broad principles which are
consistent with a wide range of implementation options rather than a specific single program or
approach. That is, what we are proposing is not itself yet another ―solution‖ that countries need
to implement or a recipe they should follow. Rather, we believe these are the elements of

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approaches that will create enhanced possibilities of success in an array of sectors and can be
implemented in a variety of modalities and country contexts.
The four elements, to be amplified below, stress that reform activities should
(i) aim to solve particular problems in particular local contexts via
(ii) the creation of an ‗authorizing environment‘ for decision-making that encourages
experimentation and ‗positive deviance‘7
, which gives rise to
(iii) active, ongoing and experiential (and experimental) learning and the iterative
feedback of lessons into new solutions, doing so by
(iv) engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate and
relevant—that is, are politically supportable and practically implementable.
We now address each of these items in turn.
(i) The importance of solving problems, not selling solutions
Efforts to build state capability should begin by asking ―what is the problem?‖ instead of ―which
solution should we adopt?‖ Focusing on prevailing problems is the most direct way of redressing
the bias to externally prescribed forms towards internal needs for functionality; it ensures that
problems are locally defined, not externally determined, and puts the onus on performance, not
compliance. It provides a window onto the challenge of building state capability, forcing agents
to assess the ambiguities and weaknesses of incumbent structures, to identify areas where these
need to be broken down and de-institutionalized, and to look for better ways of doing things.
The idea of a ‗window‘ is reminiscent of Kingdon‘s (1995) work on policy change. The
many applications of his ‗multiple streams‘ theory show that problems commonly bring an array
of policy and institutional issues onto the change agenda.8
Faced with problems they cannot
ignore, agents across the social and political spectrum become aware of structural weaknesses
they usually do not consider. This awareness often becomes the basis of coalition building across
7
The precise meanings and origins of the terms ‗authorizing environment‘ and ‗positive deviance‘ are
provided below. They come from different literatures (the first from public administration, the second from
nutrition) but we have found it fruitful to bring them together.
8
See Barzelay and Gallego (2006); Guldbrandsson and Fossum (2009); and Ridde (2009).

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networks, where agents at different positions are drawn together to deal with a common concern
(Zakocs 2006; see also Pires 2011). Problems also generate action and change from these
communities, given the common argument that ―[i]nstitutional change and improvement are
motivated more by knowledge of problems than by knowledge of success‖ (Cameron 1986: 67).
Not all problems foster such attention and motivation, however. Valéry Ridde (2009)
shows, for instance, that health care reformers in Burkina Faso were quite inattentive to the
problem of unequal access in the country. He offers various reasons for this, including the lack of
widely shared measures of access and inequality. Without such measures, ―verbal gymnastics‖
allowed different stakeholders to hold varying views about the issue, some even believing it had
been solved by past initiatives (Ridde 2009: 944). His observations support Kingdon‘s argument
that ‗issues‘ or factual ‗conditions‘ have to be politically and socially constructed to gain
attention as ‗problems‘. This involves raising the visibility of issues through spectacular
‗focusing events‘ (such as crises), the use of statistical indicators, or manipulation of feedback
from previous experiences.
Initiatives to build state capability can focus on problems by facilitating this kind of
‗construction‘. This could involve using use tools like the ‗5-why technique‘ or Ishikawa
diagrams.9
These serve to de-construct problems, identify root causes and help agents reflect on
contextual inadequacies. The 5-why technique pushes agents to identify a problem and then
answer ‗why‘ it is a problem five times. The rationale is that agents typically focus on issues and
need to think beyond these to specify the problem that could motivate change. A seasoned
development expert, for instance, might say that her problem relates to the lack of a particular
‗form‘ of government—or externally mandated best practice—but will be forced to reflect on the
functional challenge when asked repeatedly ‗why‘ this matters, and for whom. Imagine the
following:
• ―The problem is that we get a D on the PEFA procurement indicator, because we
do not have a law requiring competitive bidding across government.‖
• Why does it matter? ―Without this law there is an incentive not to use competitive
bidding in procurement deals.‖
9
See Ishikawa and Loftus (1990); Serrat (2009); and Wong (2011).

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• Why does it matter? ―Without this incentive, most procurement deals are currently
done through sole source methods.‖
• Why does it matter? ―Sole source methods can increase corruption and lead to
higher procurement costs and lower quality.‖
• Why does it matter? ―We have evidence that many procurement deals have been
overly costly and goods are poorly provided.‖
• Why does it matter? ―High cost, low quality procurement is undermining the
provision of key services across government.‖
Figure 2. Breaking problems down, so that they drive to solutions
This kind of specification engenders a focus on the high cost and low quality of
procurement across government, which is a functional problem of performance. Contrast this to
the starting point where the emphasis was on introducing an externally defined ‗best practice‘
law to mandate competitive bidding. In shifting the emphasis towards a concern for improved
functionality, this kind of process uncovers the real challenges of building capability in

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development. In this case the challenge is not to adopt a new law but to improve the cost and
quality of procurement. This is a much more complex problem but the one that needs solving
and, crucially, the one that is unlikely to be addressed by simply mandating the use of
competitive bidding. Problem-focused processes can get agents to work through the complexity
of these problems and identify possible entry points for solutions. Cause and effect exercises can
help in this respect, ensuring problems drive the search for solutions. As an example, Figure 2
shows a potential Ishikawa analysis of the proposed problem.
Problems always have multiple causes, which a well-constructed problem focus helps
emphasize. Reflecting this, Figure 2 shows how the procurement problem alluded to earlier
might be framed and broken down to garner attention and empower a local process of finding
solutions. The problem effect is specified at the right, for a particular sector, using data that helps
stimulate attention. It is then de-constructed into potential causes and sub-causes, with three
major ‗branches‘ illustrated—reflecting problems in the contracting process, the contracting law
and the vendor itself. The issue of sole sourcing contracting is mentioned as a potential sub-
cause, but is one of many such issues and not the focal point of engagement. When local agents
are taken through such exercises they become invested in solving the problem, focused on the
many potential entry points to start addressing them, and disabused of the notion that there is any
one easy externally mandated solution.
When external agents provoke such processes they communicate the intention to provide
an open space for novelty and an emphasis on improved functionality as the basis of evaluating
reform. The focus on problems also incentivizes organizations to emphasize their performance,
and encourages contributions from leaders and front-line workers to work for change. Many
argue that agents only mobilize such contributions when prompted by problems, actively
participating in change ―only when they are able to frame the grievances of aggrieved
constituencies, diagnose causes, [and] assign blame‖ (Snow and Benford 1992: 150). All of these
influences involve a shift towards the right hand side of Figure 1—and out of the capability trap.
(ii) The importance of ‘authorizing environments’ for decision-making that
encourage experimentation and ‘positive deviance’

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Problem-driven interventions facilitate an escape from capability traps most effectively when
they point to ―feasible remedial action [that] can be meaningfully pursued‖ in the search for
solutions (Chan 2010: 3). In this respect, and to be genuinely useful, problems must offer local
agents a pathway to find solutions. We do not believe immediate solutions are needed in these
situations, given that agents who see the complexity of real problems are seldom likely to accept
the mirage of one-best-way solutions. Even if they do, given isomorphic pressures, we strongly
advise against closing the space for novelty by providing or imposing easy answers; even if these
answers have value, they are unlikely to address all of the problem dimensions needing attention.
If completely new to a context, they are also likely to lack the political acceptance and everyday
capacity required to work effectively. As such, external agents may possess potential answers but
those ‗answers‘ must still be experimented with through a process that empowers the search for
―technically viable solutions to locally perceived problems‖ (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings
2002: 60).
In thinking of what such process should look like, we are reminded of theoretical
arguments about how policy and institutional solutions often emerge; as a puzzle, over time,
given the accumulation of many individual pieces. Modern versions of such a perspective are
commonly called incrementalism or gradualism, and attributed primarily to Lindblom (1959),
who famously referred to these processes as ‗muddling through‘. The approach holds that groups
typically ‗find‘ institutional solutions through a series of small, incremental steps, especially
when these involve ‗positive deviations‘10
from extant realities. One might start addressing the
problem shown in Figure 2 by gathering evidence of the textbook vendor‘s contractual
violations, for instance, or building an informal database of when textbooks were delivered.
Such steps are relatively cheap and have the prospect of early success, or quick wins. The
blend of cheapness and demonstrable success characterize positive deviations and are important
in contexts where change encounters opposition, which is usually the case with government
10
The notion of ‗positive deviance‘ in development comes from important research on nutrition in poor
communities in Vietnam (see Marsh et al 2004), where some children, despite the desperate physical conditions in
which they lived, were nonetheless found to be relatively quite healthy. Seeking an explanation, researchers
discovered that the parents of the relatively healthy children were routinely defying community norms about the
‗proper‘ way to feed and raise children. These parents, for example, provided their children with several small meals
each day rather than one or two large ones; continued to feed their children even when the children had diarrhea; and
added sweet-potato greens, a low status food, to the children‘s rice. On the broader implications of ‗the power of
positive deviance‘ for innovation and reform, see Pascale, Sternin and Sternin (2010).

15
reforms in developing (and developed) countries. The small steps also help flush out contextual
challenges, including those that emerge in response to the interventions themselves. Facilitating
such positive deviations, through incremental steps, is especially important in uncertain and
complex contexts where reformers are unsure of what the problems and solutions actually are
and lack confidence in their abilities to make things better.
‗Muddling through‘ like this does not mean being muddled in the search for change
options. Instead, it implies taking a gradual approach to addressing particular problems. In
reflecting on this, Bonnie McCay (2002: 368) describes ‗muddling through‘ as ―a go-slow,
incremental approach to problem solving.‖ Given this, one would expect incremental reforms to
be focused on specific problems and the contextual realities in which these fester. This kind of
focus ensures that actions taken in the name of development are what Richard Rose (2003: 20)
calls ‗relevant‘, or ―politically acceptable and within the resources of government.‖ The focus on
problems helps to build political support, with incremental reform gains consolidating it. The
awareness of factors that are causing problems ensures that the chosen solutions are possible,
given contextual constraints. Stepwise reforms contribute to building capacity and loosening
these constraints over time.
Incremental reforms focused on addressing problems frequently result in hybrid
combinations of elements that work together to get the job done. Various authors have described
the path to such solutions as bricolage (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott 2002: 50; see also Campbell
2004: 65), or the process by which internal agents ‗make do‘ with resources at hand to foster new
(or ‗hybrid‘) structures and mechanisms.11
The final product thus contrasts with what Ostrom
(2008) calls ―optimal‖ solutions embodied in external ideas of ‗right rules‘ or ‗one-best-way‘ or
‗best practice‘ reforms. As argued, we believe the imposition of such ―optimal‖ solutions is a
main reason why novelty is constrained in development. The process of positive deviance
through bricolage is, in contrast, only possible when novelty is encouraged and rewarded within
the authorizing environment12
within which key decisions are made. It is a process that helps
organizations escape capability traps but must be accommodated by system-wide mechanisms
11
See Mair and Marti (2009). Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2012) deploy similar language in calling for measures
in development programming that facilitate ―crawling the design space‖—that is, allowing specific project design
elements in particular contexts to emerge as a result of pragmatic explorations for best-fit solutions within the range
of possible options.
12
The notion of ‗authorizing environments‘—the delimited organizational domains over which managers have
formal decision-making authority—comes from Moore (1995).

16
that allow non-linear, frustrating (sometimes even contentious) processes of change that are
liable to produce idiosyncratic (perhaps odd-looking) solutions. In Figure 2‘s example, for
instance, the government might end up proposing a continued sole source textbook procurement
mechanism because of a deficient set of potential vendors, but take practical steps to improve the
timing of contracts and provide community-level inspections of vendor performance. This is like
choosing a slow and odd-looking camel to help one ride through the desert, in lieu of a much
faster and more impressive looking horse, given the camel‘s relevance in its context. It is the
kind of decision that reformers make as a result of positive deviance and experimentation, but
will always be difficult to ‗sell‘ to outsiders who did not muddle through with them, and whose
primary metric of success or ‗rigor‘ is the extent to which a given option complies with a known
global ‗best practice‘ (‗professional‘, ‗expert‘) standard.
(iii) The importance of active learning mechanisms and iterative feedback loops
A problem-driven, stepwise reform process can thus help countries escape from capability traps.
This kind of process typifies change in the cooperative structures studied by authors like Elinor
Ostrom.13
Drawing from such experiences, we argue that positive deviance and experimentation
has its greatest impact when connected with learning mechanisms. These ensure the dynamic
collection and immediate feedback of lessons about what works and why. McCay references
such mechanisms in noting that ―[e]fforts to learn and the capacity to adapt … contribute to the
emergence of effective‖ solutions in cooperatives.14
We note further that this learning is active,
happening in the process of real-world experimentation. In referencing such, Ostrom argues that
―[t]he process of choice … always involves experimentation‖15
because ―[i]t is hard to find the
right combination of rules that work in a particular setting‖; as such, one has to ―try multiple
combinations of rules and keep making small adjustments to get the systems working well.‖16
Active learning through real-world experimentation allows reformers to learn a lot from
the ‗small-step‘ interventions they pursue to address problems (or causes of problems). They
learn, for instance, about contextual constraints to change in general, how specific interventions
13
McCay (2002: 368). This approach is exemplified in Ostrom (2005, 2008).
14
Ibid.
15
Ostrom (2008: 47).
16
Ostrom (2008: 49).

17
work (or not), and how these interventions interact with other potential solutions. This facilitates
bricolage, with lessons becoming part of the landscape of knowledge and capacities ‗at hand‘
from which new arrangements emerge in resource constrained settings.17
Some call this ―trying
out solutions‖ (Baker and Nelson 2005: 334) while others refer to it as the continuous testing of
new combinations of ideas. The lessons learned in such experimentation are dynamic and make
the biggest difference when immediately incorporated into the design discussions about change.
In this respect the learning mechanism differs significantly from traditional monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms that focus on compliance with a linear process of reform and allow
‗lessons‘ only at the end of a project.
This kind of experimentation and learning is also very different from the field
experiments used in randomized trials.18
The experimentation we refer to does not involve
(always) performing a scientific experiment where the context is suspended and the intervention
(by construction) is not allowed to change or vary over the life of the experiment. Rather, it is
about trying a real intervention in a real context, allowing on-the-ground realities to shape
content in the process. This is also not about proving that specific ideas or mechanisms
universally ‗work‘ or do not work. Rather, it is about allowing a process to emerge through
which attributes from various ideas can coalesce into new hybrids. This requires seeing lessons
learned about potential combinations as the key emerging result. The necessary experimentation
processes require mechanisms that capture lessons and ensure these are used to inform future
activities.
Using the procurement reform example shown in Figure 2, one might think of the first
step as experimentation around an intervention intended to show the possibility of positive gain
and which yields lessons for next steps. Information about the timing of textbook deliveries
might be collected to contribute a database of vendor performance, for instance, helping foster
state capabilities to oversee contracts. The collection process could be bound by time and
location, focused on a set of districts and a period of just one month. In this period monitors
would work daily with teams going out to record when textbooks were delivered, constantly
transcribing lessons about which information sources were most reliable, which kinds of
17
Dorado, 2005; Garud and Karnøe, 2003; Mair and Marti, 2009.
18
For a discussion of the distinction between ‗experimentation‘ and ‗experiments‘ in learning about development,
see Pritchett (2011) and Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2012).

18
questions yielded information quickest, and so forth. The lessons would be fed back to collection
teams on an ongoing basis and these teams would be empowered to adjust their methods as the
lessons suggested; perhaps focusing on select sources instead of others. The goal would be to
allow front line workers and their leaders to find new solutions that improved organizational
performance, in due course yielding greater state capability and functionality regardless of form.
(iv) The importance of broad engagement for assuring viability, legitimacy and
relevance
The discussion should make it apparent that we do not believe that building the state‘s capability
for implementation—or development in general—happens exclusively or even predominantly
from the top-down. We hold, rather, that change primarily takes root when it involves broad sets
of agents engaged together in designing and implementing locally relevant solutions to locally
perceived problems. Our argument draws on literatures about institutional entrepreneurship and
the importance of distributed agency in the process of change and development.
Many articles in the literature on institutional entrepreneurship start by noting the
problematic paradox of embeddedness. This asks how agents embedded in institutional
mechanisms can simultaneously find and introduce changes to these mechanisms.19
This paradox
offers a particular challenge to those who believe change happens from the top-down in
societies, where the most powerful ministers or managers push through radical reforms.
Essentially, these powerful agents or elites are commonly considered the most embedded in their
contexts, and thus are often the least likely to perceive the need for change, to have access to
ideas for change, or to risk their interests in pressing for change. In contrast, agents at the
periphery—or front line—are less embedded in extant rules, which is partly why they also
benefit less from them. Their low embeddedness makes them more open to criticizing
incumbents and to entertain change; but they lack the power to make it happen.
Given such thinking, change is only possible if something bridges the agents with power
to those with ideas. At its most simple, this could involve a direct or third party link between a
19
Carlile and Lakhani (2011) refer to this as the ―novelty-confirmation-transformation‖ cycle and point out
that organizations need both ―confirmation‖ mechanisms that reinforce organizational continuity and
coherence but also some way of recognizing, evaluating, and incorporating novelty.

19
central leader and front line agent. Such a bridge could open the elite to an alternate awareness of
their reality and spur a process of entrepreneurship, through which multiple agents combine to
define and introduce change in their contexts. These can be organizations or individuals. They
connect over time—directly and indirectly—in networks that facilitate transitions from one rules
system to another. Different agents have different functional roles in these networks: some
provide power and others bring awareness of problems; some supply ideas or resources, while
others act as connectors or bridgers. Change comes out of their interactions, not through their
individual engagements.
Consider, for example, the importance of connecting the technical head of the
procurement bureau implied in Figure 2 to political heavyweights protecting established
vendors‘ interests. Consider also the need to involve field-level officers and school principals
who manage procurement transactions, receive textbooks, and have face-to-face interactions with
suppliers. This last group is commonly called de-concentrated or distributed agents and is often
ignored in state capability interventions or seen as passive targets of change. Andrea Whittle and
colleagues note that this is a major omission, ―because an institutional template that is not
enacted by all members of an organizational field would invariably fail to become an institution
at all‖ (Whittle, Suhomlinova and Mueller 2011: 552). They argue that any kind of change,
including by implication state capability building for development, requires ―the involvement,
interaction and conjoint activity of multiple actors‖ and especially ―the more mundane and less
prominent, but nevertheless essential, activities of ‗others‘ in the institutional work associated
with emergent institution-building‖ (p. 553). These ‗others‘ need to be considered because they
are also subject to questions of institutional embeddedness. If institutionalized rules of the game
have a prior and shared influence on these agents, why should they be expected to change simply
because some leaders tell them to?
A host of new institutional scholars emphasize the importance of fostering broad
engagement in the process of institutional change and institution building. Multiple entrepreneurs
and distributed agents come to implement new institutions through a process that promotes
―understanding, using, and mastering‖ them (Jin, Kim and Srivastava 1998: 231). Such processes
can be conceptualized in light of Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings‘ (2002) influential model of
‗Theorizing Change‘. They suggest that institutional adjustment typically emerges from a
process that begins with jolts but passes through a series of five stages, with the last two titled

20
diffusion, and re-institutionalization. The details of this model are not important for this article.
What does matter is that the model suggests an extreme limit where change processes in the
stages preceding diffusion are characterized by narrow, top-down engagement. Diffusion
demands broad support for change which is not attained through narrow hierarchical processes.
This idea is reinforced in research showing that higher levels of decision centrality in
institutional change processes yield lower rates of intra-organizational diffusion (Jin, Kim and
Srivastava 1998). In contrast, higher rates of participation in change decisions produce greater
rates of diffusion.
Such effects are amplified where the organization or field undergoing change is large, de-
concentrated and informal, and where distributed agents co-inhabit multiple other fields that
foster heterogeneous interests and cognitions in those targeted for change. Diffusion is extremely
difficult under such conditions and is further undermined by an overly-centralized approach to
change. One will find that many agents in the heterogeneous, de-concentrated group will not
implement the adopted changes under such conditions. They cannot be forced to do so and will
not do so voluntarily because they do not share the understanding that change is needed or that
the prescribed solutions are appropriate.
We argue that these are the realities of many contexts in which state-building initiatives
are introduced. Narrowly engaged change processes in such contexts exacerbate capability traps,
giving front line workers and even indirectly-involved leaders a message that their concerns and
value creation ideas are not welcome. We advocate, therefore, for the adoption of convening and
connection mechanisms that allow broader engagement in designing, experimenting and
diffusing reforms intended to strengthen states. ‗Convening‘ typically involves bringing groups
of leaders together with key implementers to craft local experiments and solutions (Dorado
2005), while ‗connection‘ involves ensuring second and third degree interactions with frontline
workers who will ultimately have to implement final changes (Andrews, McConnell and Wescott
2008). These processes allow and encourage agents to move from left to right in Figure 1,
escaping capability traps and moving into a context where organizations demand inspired,
informed and concerned contributions from their people.
III) Contrasts and similarities

21
The main contrast of PDIA would be with the dominant ‗big development‘ efforts of mainstream
development organizations such as bilateral donors and the World Bank. These organizations are
full of amazingly dedicated and intelligent people, but these agents are themselves often locked
into ecosystems and organizational practices beyond their control. That this leads to problems
with effective implementation of Bank projects has long been identified and discussed (at least
since the Wapenhans Report of 1992) but it is very difficult to solve, in part because certain
organizational stakeholders have the power to veto actual or potential changes.
This dynamic leads mainstream development organizations to be extremely effective at
some types of development activities and much less good at others. There are two types of
activities that are easily supported and are likely to lead to success; hence by no means have the
World Bank (or donors more generally) been widespread failures, as is often the caricature. First,
if a task really requires a ‗logistical‘ solution—e.g., the scaling up of a technologically known
solution that does not involve high implementation intensity in operation—then donor projects
nearly always succeed.20
One should not lose sight of the basic fact that on many standard
indicators of well-being, development has been a massive success, such as the expansion of
schooling or the ―millions saved‖ through expansion of vaccinations or simple public health
interventions (Levine 2004). In nearly every physical dimension of access—to roads, sanitation,
schools, electricity—the approach has been a resounding, unqualified success (Kenny 2011).
Second, if a task really requires less government intervention then the donors‘ actions
have often been effective, since scaling the state back out of certain things that were both
misguided about cause-effect relationships and beyond the implementation capability of
governments was desirable and possible. For instance, many governments, through a variety of
ideological commitments, policy mis-steps and macroeconomic shocks, backed themselves into
rationing foreign exchange. This was, by and large, a disaster, as it had both economic and
organizationally perverse consequences. Hence ‗at a stroke‘ or ‗policy implementation light‘
reforms that eliminated this rationing through devaluation and liberalization were truly ‗win-win‘
and could be implemented via external conditionality and financial support.
20
On this point see Pritchett and Woolcock (2004).

22
Where the ‗mainstream‘ approach founders, however, is precisely when it confronts
activities like building organizational and state capability, since these tasks require (a) enormous
numbers of discretionary decisions and (b) extensive and intensive face-to-face transactions to be
carried out by (c) implementing agents needing to resist large temptations to do something
besides implement the policy that would produce the desired outcome, and yet do so by (d)
deploying ‗technology‘ (or instruments) to bring about the desired change that are largely
unknown ex ante. It is for precisely these types of development activities—and, importantly,
elements of activities within more traditional technical sectors—that we propose PDIA as a
pragmatic alternative.
Table 1: Contrasting current approaches and PDIA
Elements of approach Mainstream Development
Projects/Policies/Programs
Problem Driven
Iterative Adaptation
What drives action? Externally nominated
problems or ‗solutions‘ in
which deviation from ‗best
practice‘ forms is itself
defined as the problem
Locally Problem
Driven—looking to solve
particular problems
Planning for action Lots of advance planning,
articulating a plan of action,
with implementation
regarded as following the
planned script.
‗Muddling through‘ with
the authorization of
positive deviance and a
purposive crawl of the
available design space
Feedback loops Monitoring (short loops,
focused on disbursement
and process compliance)
and Evaluation (long
feedback loop on outputs,
maybe outcomes)
Tight feedback loops
based on the problem and
on experimentation with
information loops
integrated with decisions.
Plans for scaling up and
diffusion of learning
Top-down—the head learns
and leads, the rest listen and
follow.
Diffusion of feasible
practice across
organizations and
communities of
practitioners
Finally, we wish to emphasize that our critique and approach share many similarities with
other new approaches. For instance, Nancy Birdsall and the Center for Global Development have

23
been promoting ―Cash on Delivery‖ (COD) aid (see Birdsall and Savedoff 2010). This is a
mechanism by which donors would deliver resources to countries for achievements (versus a
benchmark). This frees up the country to achieve those results however it wishes; rather than a
focus on disbursement against planned inputs it would disburse against outcomes, however
achieved. Similarly, there are new organizations like Innovations for Scaled Impact (iScale)21
that are based on very similar principles of bringing together local control over the problem
nomination and definition stage with support to innovations built within tight feedback looks of
evaluation and embedded in communities of practice. The World Bank itself is attempting
support to various types of ―results based financing‖ (see Brenzel 2009 on World Bank
supported health projects) and the very recently introduced Program-for-Results lending.
Conclusion
This article is a follow up on our past work trying to explain the limited results of many efforts to
build state capabilities in developing countries. This work‘s core argument is that the politics and
processes of development interventions have fostered and exacerbated capability traps in many
developing countries, wherein governments are being required to adopt best practice reforms that
ultimately cannot work and end up crowding out alternative ideas and initiatives that may have
emerged from local agents. Capability traps close the space for novelty, establishing fixed best-
practice agendas as the basis of evaluating developing countries and of granting organizations in
these countries support and legitimacy if they comply with such agendas. In so doing they have
all but excluded local agents from the process of building their own states, implicitly
undermining the value-creating ideas of local leaders and front line workers. The upshot is
unimplemented laws, unfunded agencies, and unused processes littering education sectors, public
financial management regimes and judiciaries across the globe (Pritchett, Woolcock and
Andrews 2010). Governments adopting such reforms look better for a period—when laws are
newly passed, for instance—but ultimately they do not demonstrate higher levels of
performance, as new laws are not put into practice.
21
See www.scalingimpact.net (accessed February 13, 2012).

24
Here we have suggested an approach that can help countries escape from the capability
trap. It involves pursuing development interventions based on a very different set of principles.
These interventions should (i) aim to solve particular problems in local contexts, (ii) through the
creation of an authorizing environment that facilitates positive deviance and experimentation,
(iii) involving active, ongoing and experiential learning and the iterative feedback of lessons into
new solutions, and (iv) engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate
and relevant—i.e., politically supportable and practically implementable. We suggest that these
four principles could be combined into a new way of doing development and state building,
which we tentatively title Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). Our aim beyond this
article is to use PDIA methods in particular interventions, and to gather accounts of where they
may already have been introduced, the better to learn from the grounded experiences of others
and to adapt/update/refine PDIA accordingly. As such it is an ongoing process to which we
actively encourage readers to contribute.
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