International Business Management Summary by k.jeetun BSc(Hons) Management

THE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
Unit Structure
Overview
Learning Objectives
The Evaluation Framework
Efficiency Criterion
Distribution of Gains
Sovereignty Issue
Self-reliance issue
Exercises
Summary
Suggested Readings
3.0 OVERVIEW
The possession of an ownership advantage gives a firm the opportunity to sell goods
overseas but it fails to explain why this is carried out through production in the foreign
market rather than exporting to the foreign market. As a result, there is the need for an
evaluation framework.
3.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES
By the end of this Unit, you should be able to understand and grasp the following:
1. the importance of an evaluation framework;
2. the 4 criteria of the evaluation framework;
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3. assess the contribution of MNEs in a foreign country by using the Evaluation
Framework.
3.2 THE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
The contribution of MNEs to the development of the host nation, more particularly
developing countries or LDCs has been the subject of much debate over the years. Whilst
it is generally accepted that MNEs do contribute by way of technology transfer, skills
diffusion and by bringing much needed finance capital, nevertheless criticisms abound as
to the negative impact of MNEs in that they are viewed as exploiting the local labour
force, they transfer outdated technology, and they strip the LDCs of much needed
resources.
However, MNEs were and still remain a very important ingredient of growth, especially
for developing countries. This is why it is crucial for a host country’s government that it
should be able to assess FDI in a policy context. The latter process is usually done by
way of an Evaluation Framework. An evaluation framework usually encompasses 4
criteria.
3.3 Efficiency of Resource Allocation
Efficiency of resource allocation relates to the extent to which there exist
complementarities between of economic interests between the multinationals and the host
countries. In a similar vein, it highlights the following: under what conditions do the
operations of the TNC in a host country contribute to the world economic welfare that
could not be achieved before?
However, the presence of MNEs in host countries is often prompted by government-
induced imperfections including protection from imports. Such a situation mainly
occurred when countries were adopting an import substitution industrialization strategy.
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Adopting an import-substitution strategy entailed a high level of protection, via tariffs,
import restriction measures and quotas, which discriminated against exports via explicit
and implicit tax of export activities and an overvalued foreign exchange rate. Also, the
government used investment license, differential taxes, tax holidays, exemptions and
remissions to influence resource allocation between industries and sectors.
The proponents of IS strategy firmly believed that they would be able to meet the
domestic demand for manufacturing products; provide employment opportunities for
skilled labour; ease pressure on the balance of payment and strengthen the long term
productive capacity of the economy by importing the production technology via foreign
firms1
and by using the “infant” industry argument.
Under such an era of protectionism2
, MNEs were mainly regarded as being of a “market-
seeking3
” nature. Firms set up plant within foreign nations in order to supply their
national markets in the most profitable way possible. The key location advantages (in
Dunning’s terminology) which determined these market-seeking investments were the
cross-border transport and communication costs; artificial barriers (import restrictions) to
trade in goods and services; the size, income per capita and the expected growth of the
local market. Though cost considerations were deemed important and even decisive in
certain marginal markets, an efficiency-seeking motivation was deemed to be of a very
secondary nature (Pearce, 1999).
However, the overwhelming consensus is that IS was a failure4
. IS strategy has turned out
to be self-defeating since it has resulted in huge increases in imports of equipment and
inputs while transfer pricing constituted a severe drain on foreign exchange. Also, IS
granted excessive protection to industries producing inefficiently non-essential goods for
high-income elite. Furthermore, fiscal credit and exchange rate policies, coupled with
1
Incentives were given to both the foreign and local firms.
2
Inability to export to countries using IS strategies.
3
Hence, miniature replica subsidiaries (White and Poynter, 1984) were set up in response to strong natural
and artificial restraints on trade and low or moderate economies of scale in production.
4
See Schmitz (1984); Burton (1970); Baer (1972); Sutclife (1971); Diaz Alejandro (1975); Donjes (1976);
Nixson (1982).
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subsidies on imports of capital goods, made it possible and advantageous to entrepreneurs
to rely on high capital intensive equipment produced abroad and technology unsuited to
the factor proportions prevailing in less developed countries.
As a result, a new orthodoxy emerged in the late 60’s and early 70’s which stressed the
role of exports of labour intensive manufactures as an engine of growth. This represented
a return to the static theory of comparative advantage with trade based upon different
factor proportions prevailing in various countries which meant that the pendulum turned
full swing for development policy in LDCs from import substitution to manufactured
exports.
Export oriented strategy not only encourages free trade5
, but also the free movement of
capital, labour, enterprises and an open system of communication. It also entailed more
efficient allocation of resources with firms competing internationally6
based on their
relative comparative advantages. These considerations, coupled with the emergence of
trade blocks, were factors motivating changes in the strategic orientation of MNEs.
MNEs underwent a complete restructuring of their global and regional supply profiles.
This entailed locating7
manufacturing operations in only a few countries but exporting for
a wider market. Each subsidiary were opened to a fully competitive market situation
which permitted the realisation of economies of scale and the attainment of optimal
efficiency in production (Pearce, 1999). The “where” to produce clearly gained in
prominence during such an era which led to MNEs redistributing their unchanged
ownership advantages in order to create an international network of subsidiaries8
which
optimised their supply of established range of products. Thus, investments undertaken by
MNEs were mainly of an efficiency-seeking nature.
5
Responding to both GATT and WTO rounds.
6
Dynamic effects are very important. For e.g. EO permits exploitation of economies of scale in the wider
export markets; exposure to more competition; better quality control and enlarged technological and social
capabilities; and also EO tended to be more labour intensive which meant an increase in employment.
7
Cost considerations were very crucial.
8
The types of subsidiaries set up were the rationalised manufacturers (Whyte and Poynter, 1984).
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However, one should not underestimate the crucial role played by the government during
that period. It was not only the choice of trade strategy but also the appropriate role of
government policy which was at the heart of the development issue. For example, export-
oriented growth and appropriate macroeconomic policies9
were mutually of economic
development in the NICs. The integration of NICs into world and regional economies
was essential for their long-term growth. This required less government intervention and
greater reliance on private initiatives and market forces. It provided an environment
conducive to foreign investment and domestic entrepreneurship. The Government was
expected to actively promote economic growth and use its resources to direct and support
the private industry.
It was the pursuit of such appropriate policies by these developing countries’
governments permitted shifts in their pattern of international specialisation in response to
the changing structure of their comparative advantage at different levels of industrial
development. As a result, the efficiency of resource allocation improved, the rates of
growth accelerated, with benefits accruing to all concerned.
3.4 DISTRIBUTION
Distribution relates to the extent to which the gains arising from the MNEs operations are
distributed between the partners. The host country would demand a fair share of the
benefits created by the investment. However, the identification of a fair distribution is
very difficult since it is almost impossible to price correctly some contribution such as
technology diffusion and managerial expertise which are intangible in nature.
In addition, the issue of distribution is even more contentious especially when profits of
the multinationals are due less to the efficiency of resource allocation and more to market
distortions or imperfections created and sustained in the first place by the government to
attract these foreign firms. Also, the distribution of such rent is influenced by the relative
9
For example exchange rates liberalisation; removal/minimisation of quantitative restrictions on imports;
non inflationary fiscal/monetary policies; but also the absence of large price distortions created by
government intervention and private monopoly.
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bargaining strength of the multinationals and the host governments in the light of factors
such as tax concessions, tariff protection and labour training.
In this light, it may be argued that there is a direct relationship between the bargaining
strength of the host country and its level of industrialization such that, the lower the
industrialization level, the weaker its bargaining power. Finally, host nations are unable
to extract their fair share of benefits because imperfections in the market for factors of
production in which the multinationals are strong permits them to earn monopoly rent on
these factors.
3.5 SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty relates to the ways in which the multinational may compromise the
economic independence of host nations in either the short or long term. It highlights how
the behaviour of multinationals may compromise the effectiveness of certain aspects of
the host countries’ policies.
For example, the intra-group transfer of rent, via transfer pricing practices, may
undermine the autonomy of the host countries in areas such as fiscal policy, monetary
policy, trade policy and its attempt to control and organize the structure of industries.
3.6 SELF RELIANCE
Self-reliance relates to the ways in which the operations of the multinational may
undermine the viability or independence of local firms or enhance their potential. The
self-reliance issue also crops up during the investigations of the impact of multinationals
on the industrial structure of the host nations; for e.g. the level of concentration and/or
modes of operations.
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It is also concerned with whether the operations of multinationals in the host nations may
either enhance or hold back the availability of particular types of skills for local
enterprises since there are claims that multinationals remunerate better their employees
than local enterprises.
However, there is no reason as to why the relationship between local enterprises and
multinationals should be a competitive one. They may in fact complement each other
rather than act as rivals. For e.g. multinationals may have recourse to indigenous forms
for their supply of inputs and this may lead to significant benefits for the indigenous
firms by way of improved technology, better quality control procedures and diffusion of
skills.
3.7 EXERCISES
1. MAURITIUS CASE STUDY
Mauritius is unique in having had a wealthy class of sugar plantation owners who were
actively seeking to diversify their investments in the first years of independence. They
have experimented with horticultural and industrial exports, as well as with tourist
facilities, for many years. It took the arrival of Hong Kong and Taiwan textile firms to get
industrialization going, however. And South African hotel chains first brought the tourist
facilities up to world class standards. Why couldn’t they do it alone? The key missing
ingredient was the much vaunted keystone of the “new economy:” knowledge. Mauritian
investors lacked the depth and breadth of knowledge needed to create viable industry and
tourism on their own.
The overseas Chinese and South African investors brought in-depth knowledge of how to
run an efficient firm. They also had intimate knowledge of customers and their
preferences, as well of what the competition was offering. They were able to train the
Mauritian workforce, interspersing production lines with faster Chinese workers and
more flexible Indian ones to bring up productivity. Domestic investors, whether the sugar
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barons or more locals of more modest and ethnically diverse origins, unanimously
reported that they were not squeezed out by foreign investment. On the contrary, they
worked with, learned from, and in many cases bought out foreign investors.
Ethnicity has been handled delicately in Mauritius, in surprising contrast to analysts'
predictions at independence. The few dozen Franco-Mauritian sugar barons who
controlled the economy at independence in 1970 faced the classic South African
nightmare of being washed into the sea. The majority of the electorate comprised landless
descendants of cane-cutters brought in from the Indian subcontinent as contract labor.
Yet Mauritians found a stable accommodation, in both politics and the economy. The
constitution explicitly recognizes ethnic minorities, providing for 10 percent of
parliamentary seats to go to “also rans” from ethnic minorities that would otherwise not
be represented. The tiny new polity attained in two decades an economic transition from
monocrop Sugar Island to a balanced economy in which textiles, tourism and sugar are
the pillars.
New forays are being made into business services, information technology and other
diverse export products. Indo-Mauritians are still minimally represented as entrepreneurs,
though they dominate the civil service. Sino-Mauritians, hitherto concentrated in
smallscale commerce, enhanced their status through association with Hong Kong and
Taiwan industrialists whose knowhow and investment initiated the textile sector.
Economic tensions are worked out in annual tripartite negotiations between labor,
government and employers, most of whom are Franco-Mauritians. Sound institutions
have played a critical role in the process. The rule of law has prevailed consistently. The
sturdy financial sector, led by Mauritius State Bank since 1828, provides investment
capital to both domestic and foreign investors. The British tradition schools graduate
fully bilingual, often tri- and quadrilingual students, whom employers find a great asset in
the new global economy.
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Foreign And Local Investment In Mauritius
Mauritius was chosen as a case study because it has a reputation as a country in which
foreign investment has played a critical and unanticipated role in industrialization, driven
largely by good policies. The case study bore this out, but added great complexity to the
portrait. Ethnicity was a complicating factor that could have derailed growth, and sound
institutions played as important a role as policies in its success.
An Overview of Investment Policy and Performance in Mauritius
In the 1960s as independence from Britain approached, James Meade and Burton
Benedict published several studies that foresaw a bleak economic and political future for
Mauritius.11 Meade proposed strategies to improve the standard of living while taking
into consideration projected continuing rapid population growth (then over 3% per year).
He foresaw pressures of population growth on economic resources on this small volcanic
isle and suggested several mitigating strategies, including increasing productivity,
encouraging emigration and family planning. Burton Benedict challenged Meade’s
proposed solutions, asserting that even if Meade's suggestions on ways to increase
productivity were followed, this would not produce results strong enough to counter the
population growth problem.
To the Malthusian logic in these first analyses, Benedict added concern over the future
political stability of Mauritius. He analyzed the 1953 and 1962 censuses and documented
the impact of ethnic, religious, caste and linguistic fragmentation on local politics—from
the national level to the squabbles over a repair contract for a small town road. He began
with the observation that Mauritians rarely identified themselves and others as
Mauritians. In 1962 people from the Indian subcontinent were the majority, but did not
comprise a single ethnic group. 50.5 percent of the population was Hindu and 16.2
percent Muslim Chinese comprised 3.4 percent of the population, and the “General
Population,” mainly Creoles and Franco-Mauritians constituted 29.9 percent. Although
Africans had been brought to Mauritius in slavery, African languages and ethnic groups
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had melded into a mixed population speaking the Creole French patois that gradually
became a lingua franca of the Island. The Indo-Mauritian population was 63 percent
Hindu Sanatan and 19 percent Muslim Hanafi. There were generally endogamous
minority sects of both major religions (the largest of which were Arya Samaj and
Ahmadiyya), as well as Indian Christians. Castes had consolidated into a bipolar mode.
They had no corporate organization, but were generally endogamous. Chinese were
nearly evenly split between Christians and Buddhists. Indo-Mauritians were further split
by language, which sometimes had ethnic connotations. Hindi was the mother tongue of
36 percent of the total population and Urdu of 13.5 percent. Smaller Tamil and Telugu
groups rarely intermarried with other Hindus. The “General population” of metisse,
Franco-Mauritians and others was 96 percent Roman Catholic. The Franco-Mauritian
families, are mostly descendants of French nobility who fled there during the French
Revolution. The British gained control of the island during the Napoleonic wars
andgoverned it until 1968, but the French families dominated the domestic society and
economy.
For the dependency theorists of the 60s, Mauritius was an archetypical monocrop
colonial economy. It depended on sugar for 99 percent of exports and one third of GDP.
Cane fields occupied 90 percent of arable land. Of that, 55 percent was owned by 25
Franco-Mauritian families, often dubbed sugar barons. The remaining 45 percent of sugar
estates were owned by 84,000 small farmers, predominantly of Indian origin. Almost no
food was produced on the island. The majority who would dominate numerically in a
democratic Mauritius was a land-poor population of former indentured laborers on sugar
plantations from the Indian subcontinent. Until recently they had been considered
transients, not counted as members of the population.
Benedict's complex analysis of the ethnic situation did little to lift the prevailing
pessimism about Mauritius’ future. The colonial government commissioned Meade to
head an appointed commission to produce an economic strategy. The Meade Report was
to strongly influence the government in creating its initial import substitution
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industrialization policy. The key recommendations in the Meade Report included tariff
protection for certain local industries, a decrease of corporate tax from 40 to 30 percent,
tax holidays for five of the first eight years of a company, priority of capital expenditure
for projects leading to productive employment and the abolition of tariffs on importation
of machine tools and equipment. These policies already focused on investment
promotion, a policy which successive Mauritian governments have consistently favored.
Even as early as 1960, investment in Mauritius reached 30% of GDP, a figure only
recently achieved by the most successful economies in East Asia and largely unheard of
in the developing world.
At this time, however, neither the new government of Mauritius, nor others in the
developing world, had recognized the connection between investment policy and the
larger political and economic context. A number of trends of the first government, which
was dominated by the Mauritian Labour Party from independence in 1968 until 1982,
limited the effectiveness of investment promotion incentives. One concern of foreign
investors was political stability. There had been some communal violence just before
independence, and the new Hindu dominated government maintained a fragile truce with
minorities, including Muslim, Chinese and Franco-Mauritians. Other concerns centered
around macroeconomic policies. Currency controls and protective tariffs designed to
nurture import substitution industries [for the tiny national market], raised energy and
transaction costs and times for potential exporters. The involvement of government in
labor/ management negotiations and the creation of state corporations in key sectors led
investors to take a wait and see attitude toward government. And the fledgling transport
and telecommunications infrastructure was barely adequate.
The idea of creating an export promotion zone (EPZ) was added to the policy mix in
1970, only two years after independence. It was inspired by the success of Taiwan.
Within a year the EPZ legislation was passed. In a stroke of brilliance, industrial leaders
and policy-makers realized that Mauritius, being a small island with readily controlled
access, could declare the whole island an EPZ—it did not need to have a fenced area.
This allowed investors to build in dispersed locations, to facilitate transport for their
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workers and/or their products. Only a few foreign investors took advantage of the EPZ
law in the 1970s, however.
Mauritius’ isolated location in the Indian Ocean, its currency controls and uncertain
political situation reportedly influenced the first investors to limit their commitments.
What became the flagship textile firm, for example, was set up initially to do only the
manufacturing - marketing and management were based in Japan and Hong Kong
respectively.
By the end of the 1970s Mauritius was experiencing many of the same problems that
other African countries had with state corporations, protective tariffs, and currency
controls. With no petroleum resources, it had been hit hard by OPEC’s escalation of oil
prices and the global economic distortions that ensued. Government was running
unsustainable annual deficits, the balance of trade was negative, industry was stagnant,
and foreign exchange rationing slowed down all transactions. A devastating cyclone
catalyzed a change in direction and in government. An alliance of former opposition
parties, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) and Mauritian Socialist Party (PSM),
won the 1982 elections, changing the dominant party position for the first time since
electoral politics was introduced in 1947.
The new government scrapped the mixed strategy of the 1970s, liberalized the currency,
retreated from subsidizing state corporations, and put its full efforts into voluntary
structural adjustment and promoting export-led growth. In retrospect, a recent
government report sees that decision as an inevitable logical consequence of Mauritius’
geographic situation. The report, Mauritius at Crossroads (1995) explains that as a small
island, physically limited by lack of arable land and relying solely on sugar for foreign
exchange, "Mauritius was condemned to turn to an aggressive export strategy. However,
it was not until the early 80s that foreign investment actually took off. And, it appears,
partly as a consequence so too did domestic investment take off.
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Today, according to Mauritius at Crossroads, every Mauritian is taught the concept
"Export or Die." This philosophy has led to the development of a sound business
environment which is friendly to investors, both local and foreign, and which offers an
attractive investment incentives package to compensate for the lack of resources and the
no-longer inexpensive labor force. The older generation of industrial and government
leaders also stresses that Mauritians have learned to make a virtue of their ethnic
diversity. The switch to an export-led strategy came at a time of crisis. The ill-paid labor
force was still predominantly of Indian origin, as was the government, whereas the
industrial sector was led by Franco-Mauritians, Hong Kong/Taiwan investors and a few
Sino-Mauritians.
Several interviewees described the moment as if they had looked at one another, then at
the surrounding hundreds of miles of ocean, and decided that they would sink or swim
together. For the export strategy, Mauritius needed to reach out to Hong Kong and
Taiwan textile magnates, who had the capital and skills to organize a competitive
industry. Franco-Mauritian local capital and know-how, and contacts were needed to
open up European markets. A cooperative, trainable labor force was needed to attract
investors. And government needed to be fully committed to its investor-friendly strategy.
Mauritius had hard-working bilingual predominantly male labor force. They were skilled
in farming, not industrial work. Most analysts doubted that Hindu or Muslim women
would ever come out of the home and into the workplace. Within six or seven years,
Mauritius had full employment, and industrial workers were mainly women.
Policies were the main, but not the only factor in investment decisions. Promoting
investment has been on the top of the government's industrial agenda throughout the
different development phases, but the understanding of what works for investors, for
government and for the society as a whole, has evolved continuously. The first clearly
defined policy came in 1961, as the colonial government began to prepare for an
independent Mauritius, with the Industrial Development Tax Relief Act. The Export
Processing Zone took effect in 1971, as one of the first acts of the newly independent
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government. Support services for exporters were given a fillip in 1981 with the Export
Service Zones Act.
In 1985, the Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority (MEDIA) was
established as the executive arm of the Ministry of Industry. Its main responsibilities are
to attract investment, promote exports and manage industrial estates. Investors clearly
weighed these incentives against the inconveniences created by location, lack of local
food and fuel supplies and small market size. The only major policy disincentive for
foreign investors is that they are not allowed to own land. Government has compensated
by providing fully equipped industrial sites for lease. Hotel investors generally partner
with a local landowner. In the 1980s Mauritius offered inexpensive labor, but within a
decade the development of the textile and hotel sectors had brought wages to a middle
level, by world standards. From the late 1980s through early 1990s, Mauritius
experienced full employment. Rising wages have gradually priced the textile industry out
of its mass-production T-shirt lines, and forced both government and industry to rethink
development strategies.
The Industrial Expansion Act of 1993 was a partial response to this dilemma. Through it
Mauritius confirmed its commitment to permanent zero tax rates for exporters, and added
a bundle of new-targeted incentive programs, providing for high technology investors,
offshore financial services and freeport services. The full range of incentive programs
Mauritius which were offered is shown in Table 6.1. To increase confidence in the
industrial sector in general, corporate tax for manufacturers who do not qualify for the
EPZ zerorate was cut from 35 to 15 percent.
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Table 3.1: Manufacturing - Fiscal Incentives
INCENTIVE SCHEMES
QUALIFYING ACTIVITIES INCENTIVES
Export Enterprise
(EPZ)
• All manufactured goods for exports
• Produce of deep sea fishing (Including fresh or frozen fish)
• Printing and publishing as well as associated operations
• IT activities
• Agro Industries
• No customs duty, or sales tax on raw materials and equipment
• No corporate tax
• No tax on dividends
• No capital gains tax
• Free repatriation of profits, dividends and capital
• 60% remission of customs duties on buses of 15-25 seats used for the transport of workers.
• Exemption from payment of half the normal registration fee on land and buildings by new
enterprises.
• Relief on personal income tax for 2 expatriate staff
Pioneer Status Enterprise
• Activities involving technology and skills above average existing in Mauritius and likely to
enhance industrial and technological development.
• Applicant companies may come under one of three broad categories:
(a) new technology,
(b) support industries and
(c) service industries.
• No customs duty, or sales tax on scheduled equipment or materials.
• 15% corporate tax
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• Free repatriation of profits, dividends and capital
Strategic Local Enterprise
• Local industry manufacturing for the local market and engaged in an activity likely to promote
and enhance the economic, industrial and technological development of Mauritius.
Modernization and Expansion Enterprise
• Two broad categories:
• Investment in productive machinery and equipment, such as automation equipment and
processes and computer applications to industrial design, manufacture and maintenance
CAD/CAM)
• Investment in anti-pollution and environment protection technology to be made within 2 years
of date of issue of certificate.
• No customs duty on production equipment
• Income tax credit of 10% (spread over 3 years) of investment in new plant and machinery,
provided at least Rs 10 million are spent and this occurs within two years of date of issue of
certificate. (This is in addition to existing capital allowances which amount to 125%of capital
expenditures.)
• Enterprises incurring expenditure on anti-pollution machinery or plant benefit from a further
incentive, i.e. an initial allowance of 80% instead of the normal 50%
Industrial Building Enterprise
Construction for letting purposes of industrial buildings or levels thereof, provided floor space is
at least 1000 square meters. Special conditions:
The applicant can only be a company intending to erect an industrial building to be let to the
holder of a certificate (other than an industrial building enterprise certificate) issued under this
Act or to an enterprise engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods or materials except the
milling of sugar.
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• Registration dues for land purchase: 50% exemption
• There is also a non-fiscal incentive, namely the disapplication of the Landlord and Tenant Act,
i.e. rent control
Source: Destination Mauritius, Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority
(MEDIA).
Table 3.2: Services - Fiscal Incentives
INCENTIVE SCHEME QUALIFYING ACTIVITIES INCENTIVES
Offshore Business
Conduct of business with non-residents and in currencies other than the Mauritian Rupee.
Activities include: offshore banking, offshore insurance, offshore funds management,
international financial services, operational Headquarters, international consultancy services,
shipping and ship management, aircraft financing and leasing, international licensing and
franchising, international data processing and other information technology services, offshore
pension funds, international trading and assets management, international employment services
• No tax on profits
• Free repatriation of profits
• Complete freedom from exchange control
• Concessionary personal income tax for expatriate staff
• Complete exemption from taxes on imported office equipment
• Complete exemption from import duties on cars and household equipment for two expatriate
staff per company
• No withholding tax on interest payable on deposits raised from non-residents by offshore banks
• No withholding tax on dividends and benefits payable by offshore entities, no estate duty or
inheritance tax is payable on the inheritance of share in an offshore entity, no capital gain tax.
Freeport Transshipment and re-export trade, e.g. warehousing and storage, bulk breaking,
sorting, grading, cleaning, mixing, packing and repacking, minor processing and simple assembly
• No corporate tax
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• Complete exemption from payment customs duty and sales tax on:
a. all machinery, equipment and materials imported into a Freeport zone for exclusive use in
the freeport
b. all goods destined for re-export, access to offshore banking facilities, warehousing and
storage fees at preferential rates
Export Service Zone Export oriented service companies, such as accountancy, law, medicine,
international marketing, quality testing, pre-shipment services, civil engineering, management
consultancy, re-insurance, entrepot trade, transshipment
• 15% Corporate tax
• Exemption from payment of income tax on dividends
• No customs duty on office equipment
(MEDIA).
Table 3.3: Others - Investment Incentives
INCENTIVE SCHEME INCENTIVES
Agricultural Development
Certificate
• Exemption from payment of income tax on dividends
• Free repatriation of capital, profits and dividends
• Exemption from payment of customs duty on machinery and equipment
• Exemption from payment of 50% of the normal registration fee on land and buildings purchased
by the new enterprise.
Hotel Management
Incentives
• Tax free dividends for 10 years
• Free repatriation of profit, dividends and capital subject to original investment being received
"A" status from the Bank of Mauritius
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• Term loans and overdraft at preferential rates
Hotel Development
• Tax free dividends for 10 years
• Exemption of customs duty on importation of equipment as per approved list
• Free repatriation of profit, dividends and capital subject to original investment being received
"A" status
• Term loans and overdraft at preferential rates
(MEDIA).
Factors in Investor’s Decisions
Negatives
Four main factors initially tended to detract from Mauritius as an investment location: its
size, isolation, lack of natural resources, and uncertain sociopolitical future. Mauritius is
an isolated speck in the Indian Ocean. The nearest country, Madagascar, is some 500
miles to the West. Sri Lanka is 2000 miles in the East. The great distances from potential
markets for its products tend to add to its transport costs, whether by sea or air. The
island is of volcanic origin and has no mineral deposits of any commercial value. The
soils are shallow and poor in phosphates, and farming without fertilizers is impossible.
The one natural resource Mauritius has been able to develop is its beaches. It has over 95
tourist hotels.
With independence in 1968, Mauritius inherited a fierce problem of unemployment and
landlessness. The population skills were limited mainly to sugar plantation work.
Moreover, a population of barely 700,000 constitutes a very small domestic market. The
policies favoring import substitution industries clearly was based on political pressures
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and nationalism. Neither theories nor realities of international competition were well
understood.
Furthermore, dependence of the economy on sugar, for 99 percent of exports and 70
percent of employment, meant that the economy was extremely vulnerable to fluctuations
in world sugar prices and natural disasters like cyclone, drought and diseases. With such
a hostile beginning for investment, what factors then led to the choice of Mauritius as an
investment location to foreign investors? How did local investors get started? What were
the catalysts behind the investment boom in Mauritius?
Positives
Foreign investment was not a factor in the early years of independence. Local investment
grew strongly from 1972 through 1978. Foreign investment only began to be recorded as
a separate phenomenon in 1976. The registry of firms and oral interviews suggest that it
was negligible until one year earlier. Domestic investment thus clearly led the investment
boom in Mauritius, making it an exception to the global pattern. There was a brief three
years of foreign investment from 1975 through 1977, a period when local investment also
continued to grow. The first Hong Kong textile firm pioneered with the EPZ legal
framework, but it struggled in the early years and inspired little imitation.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s came a series of economic, political and climatic crises
that caused an abrupt falling off in new investment, both foreign and local. Sugar prices
were down on the world market, the country was experiencing political tensions, and a
major cyclone destroyed both the sugar crop and much of the island’s infrastructure. The
crisis of 1979-81 proved a turning point for Mauritius’ economy, a time of rethinking that
led to a renewed national consensus and common economic strategy.
The turn around came with the announcement of an appropriate structural adjustment
strategy by the government. Unlike structural adjustment programs imposed elsewhere on
unwilling and/or uncomprehending governments, Mauritians seem to have devised its
Page 20

own strategy and united behind it. The new policy stance grew out of a dynamic civic
leadership on the part of local investors and government. Investors explained why the
EPZ law was not sufficient to overcome the constraints, and worked together with
government to plan a more liberal, more dynamic future.
By then the socio-political situation appeared more stable. Tripartite labor negotiations,
held annually then as now, provide a forum in which all parties come to understand the
economic dynamics affecting them and to reach a consensus on development strategy.
When the government changed hands through peaceful elections in 1982 and the new
government appeared even more committed to a market economy, foreign investors took
note.
In the early 1980s, after more than a decade of misguided attempts at industrialization, it
became clear that the limited size of the domestic market meant that an import
substitution strategy could not be viable. The government opted for an outward-oriented
strategy leading to export-led growth. Ironically, the EPZ legislation had been in effect
from 1970, but only became a factor in Mauritius’ development from 1983 on, when all
parties agreed to try to make it work. Once the strategic planning and policy dialogue
processes were established, they became a tradition. Three successive pillars have
contributed to investment, the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), tourism and
financial/business services. The EPZ was the main focus from 1983 through 1993,
tourism from 1990 to the present, and financial/business services only in the past few
years.
Once the new policies were clear and a peaceful national consensus was established,
foreign investment came in a strong spurt from 1983 to 1990. Investors from Hong Kong
and Taiwan brought know how essential for the development of the textile/garment
industry. Local investors, mainly Franco-Mauritian with some Sino-Mauritians,
welcomed them and openly sought to learn from them. While local investors had surplus
capital to invest, they did not have the know-how to establish manufacturing industries
Page 21

such as textiles. They took advantage of the opportunity to learn from the foreign
investors, and within a few years, they ended up buying out most of the foreign owners.
Foreign Investors
The 'Pull Factors'
The success of Mauritius in attracting foreign investment in the mid-1980s rested on
creating the right economic and social climate by emphasizing the following factors:
• Political stability and policy consistency
Governments in Mauritius have changed several times since independence, without
violence and without changes in investment policies. The long-term strategy, the overall
vision and economic policies have become increasingly stable and pro-investor.
Investment incentives have gone from favorable to even more favorable.
• Sound Institutions
Sound institutions have been shown to be the one factor that can outweigh the negative
influence of ethnic diversity on economic policies and economic growth. (Easterly and
Levine 1996) Mauritius inherited a unique set of sound legal, financial and educational
institutions at independence and has resisted the institutional deterioration experienced in
most African countries. Mauritian institutions had French underpinning with a British
superstructure. Napoleonic Code, for example, was overlaid with British common law
and courts.
The unique constitution provides for ethnic and geographic balance in Parliament. Single
member districts elect 62 of the 70 seats. This system favors local accommodation
between representatives and their constituents of all ethnic origins, unlike the polarizing
proportional representation system. In addition, the Mauritian constitution provides for up
Page 22

to eight seats to be awarded to ethnic minority candidates who place “next best,” if their
group is not otherwise represented in Parliament.
A French patois is the lingua franca and formal French is taught in the schools, but the
main language of instruction is English. At independence there was 70 percent literacy,
generally in both English and French. Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Tulugu, and several Chinese
languages are spoken. Written literacy in these languages is less widespread, but the
availability of native speakers of investors’ own languages has made a wide range of
investors feel comfortable in Mauritius. In the early years, basic literacy was sufficient.
Today factory owners are pressuring the government to provide higher quality,
bettertargeted vocational and technical education.
A single bank served the island at independence, but it was a sound one, providing a
range of financial services since 1828. Investors trusted their funds to it, and sometimes
also benefited from local credit. Financial services today are comparable to the level in
South Africa, a vastly larger economy. A wide range of supporting services including
commercial, development and investment banks, insurance companies, auditing,
accounting and consulting firms has developed to serve the new industrial economy.
Mauritians use credit cards freely, whereas many African businesspeople lack access to
credit cards. Automatic teller machines outside major banks provide cash and accept
deposits after hours. These facilities reduce transaction costs, which is greatly appreciated
by investors. Economic development literature also emphasizes the importance of respect
for private property rights and an efficient and honest bureaucracy. On this score
Mauritius gets mixed results. There has been no history of expropriation and no evidence
that investors had been required to give a percentage of their business to government
officials, as happened in other African countries. On the other hand, two or three cases
were found where major investments were abandoned at a loss by the original foreign
investors. It was beyond the scope of this paper to investigate all of the reasons, but there
clearly were some quite disappointed investors.
Page 23

Business integrity can also be considered an institutional factor. Mauritian firms regularly
publish audited accounts. This contributed to the trust necessary for government to allow
an island-wide EPZ, and for banks to sustain the credit system. This basis for mutual trust
is an important missing element in many business communities in Africa. While the high
rate of literacy provides a skilled labor pool for the civil service, surveys ranking the
government on a number of indices indicate important shortcomings in overall
effectiveness. The 1998 African Competitiveness Report for the World Economic Forum
provides the most recent survey data, which is summarized for key countries in Table 6.4.
(See Annex)
• Cheap, trainable labor force
In the early years, that is, before the investment boom, there was massive unemployment.
Labor was therefore cheap compared to places like Hong Kong and Taiwan where the
1980s wave of investors in Mauritius originated. The adaptation was not simple, as
Mauritians were initially slow in assembly line work and unreliable in their attendance.
Factory owners use many combinations of carrot and stick to enhance their productivity.
Some are trying team approaches to production. Several factories reported that they
intersperse along the assembly line experienced Chinese workers, whose output is often
three times the Mauritian average. They also bring in Indian workers with multiple task
skills to fill in for absentees in different spots each day. After a few years, production
reached an acceptable level of both productivity and quality in most factories. Several
succumbed, however, during the early years. In those who survived, skilled contract
Chinese and Indian laborers are still an important stimulus to productivity. With a literacy
rate of over 90 percent and most of the labor force having at least attended primary
school, Mauritian workers could be trained relatively easily, especially as most of the
techniques of production in sectors being targeted (textiles) were simple and labor-
intensive. The firms benefited greatly from sales and office staff who were fluent in both
Asian and European languages. Much credit goes to the good quality schools, in which
students learn both English and French in addition to their mother tongues.
• Good economic management
Page 24

After 1980, the government created a sound macroeconomic environment through
judicious blending of policies. Inflation was kept at a low level and monetary policy was
geared towards promoting a savings culture. The Rupee is convertible and the exchange
rate against other currencies has devalued only slowly.
• Infrastructure
The Mauritius Government invested heavily in infrastructure. This involved the
overhauling of the road network, the airport, extension of the telecommunications,
electricity and water network. Fully operational industrial estates provided sites and
services for lease, to minimize investors’ start-up costs. Mauritius Telecom has been one
of the last to be privatized, so there is little competition in the sector. Nevertheless, it has
consistently modernized and reduced costs of service.
• Preferential market access
Mauritius has preferential access to the European market through the Lomé Convention
and Sugar Protocol and to the US through the Multi-fiber agreement. It also has a sugar
quota with the United States. During the 1980 and early 1990s it joined the so-called
“frontline states” surrounding South Africa in ignoring sanctions, for the sake of its own
economic survival. This proved a boom, as South Africa became a major trading partner
and source of tourists. Membership in regional economic cooperation groupings such as
SADC is an advantage on which Mauritius is counting for the next phase of development.
• Investment incentives and promotions
Hong Kong investors described actively surveying potential investment sites. Most were
eliminated after considering the above factors. When the final selection time came,
investment incentives determined their choice of Mauritius from among the last two or
three candidates.
Page 25

• The people
The multi-ethnic, multilingual nature of Mauritian society has been an asset in providing
a welcoming and friendly investment environment to foreigners. In particular, the
Mauritians of Indian and Chinese origin have provided an environment which is 'home-
like' to investors especially from India, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan. They feel safe,
accepted and can trust the people around them while in Mauritius.
• Strategic use of its location
Mauritius has turned its lonely island location into a “gateway to Africa” in its
promotional literature. Its first success came in attracting South African stopover flights
and tourism during the sanctions period, when South Africans had nowhere else to go
between home and Europe. For the textile industry, Mauritius’ location was an acceptable
halfway between headquarters in Asia and markets in Europe, although without strong
push factors, it is doubtful that they would have sought it out. More recently Mauritius’
offshore banking arrangements have targeted investors from India and Europe interested
in the advantages offered by bilateral double-taxation treaties. Mauritian policy-makers
believe that it can attract a significant volume of shipping by encouraging ships with
containers full of Asian goods to stop and repackage mixed shipments for different
African countries. This is a new concept and new facility, currently operating well below
capacity.
6.2.3.2 The 'Push Factors'
Mauritius’ success is due in no small measure to alertness and ability to respond to
external global events. This capacity for quick response is the newest new thing in
strategic planning. Having indigenous leaders with close ties to Asia and Europe allowed
Mauritius to understand and integrate lessons from the trends in each before the age of
instant cheap global communications. The key events for Mauritians were the British
decision to hand over Hong Kong to China and the international Multifiber Agreement,
which together sent Hong Kong industrialists searching for new havens for capital and
textile industry production.
Page 26

• The Sino-British agreement over Hong Kong
When in 1985 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher signed an agreement to end British rule
over Hong Kong in 1999, and relinquish it to communist China, Hong Kong capitalists
felt insecure. There was an atmosphere of uncertainty over what would befall Hong Kong
after its handover. Business people in Hong Kong were looking to diversify, if not
relocate.
• The Multifiber Agreement
In the early 1980s, the multifibre agreement was signed and US further tightened its
quota of textiles from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The overseas Chinese textile barons saw
an opportunity to take advantage of the Mauritius unfulfilled US quota and the
preferential textile market access to European market. Hong Kong and Indian investors
reported studying alternative investment locations, such as Madagascar and Sri Lanka
which were also providing EPZ facilities. Madagascar had inadequate infrastructure and a
poorly educated population, while Sri Lanka was riddled with insecurity due to the Tamil
Tigers rebellion. Madagascar was considered unsafe and had unfavorable government
policies towards investment. Mauritius offered a safe enclave with the people of the same
cultures and way of life.
• High labor cost in Hong Kong
By the mid-1980s the maturing textile industry in Hong Kong and Taiwan was seeing
wage pressure. In Mauritius, with its high unemployment, they hoped to find cheap labor
that might be as efficient as that in Asia.
6.2.4 Local Investors
The factors that attracted foreign investors were equally import to local investors.
However, local investors had additional considerations that served to catalyze their new
investments in the 1980s. Among these, were the following:
Page 27

• Need to diversify
A number of sugar barons had capital available for investment in the 1980s, and they
knew better than anyone the concentrated risks of a monocrop economy. Moreover, new
sugar investment was precluded by lack of land. They tried many non-traditional
agricultural exports, such as cut flowers grown in ecological microclimates. Once shown
the way by foreigners, however, they started reinvesting the sugar profits in textiles, and
later tourism and other types of light industry.
• EPZ scheme and government incentives
Local investors seem to have been more motivated by the EPZ advantages than
foreigners, perhaps because their economic activities were rooted in Mauritius. They
could quickly calculate that having a significant—and possibly fluid—portion of their
assets in tax-free corporations should be good business.
• Local bank lending
Banks played an important role in bringing up local investors by providing them loans at
attractive rates. The State Bank of Mauritius, founded in 1828, was the mainstay of
investment banking in Mauritius, although in recent years a half-dozen new banks have
entered the scene. Local investors could finance up to 80 percent of their investment.
Foreign investors could finance 50 to 60 percent locally. Interest rates at the time of the
field research in October 1997 were 9-10 percent on long-term loans.
• Local population linkages with Europe, India and China
Local investors could access the required technology, entrepreneurial skills, start-up
capital and markets through linkages with Europe (France and Britain) and Asia.
Page 28

• The potential in tourist industry
The Mauritians either working in hotel industries previously owned by foreign firms or
wanting to break away from the monocrop culture identified tourism as a potential sector
with growth prospects. Because of the land laws and local political influence, they had an
edge over foreigners in acquiring plots along the beaches. The sugar barons, in the drive
to diversify, started investing in the hotel industry.
• Historical factors
Many Mauritians credit the grit of immigrants for the national success. Immigrants in
general develop a strong instinct to survive and have a spirit of adventure. Immigrants
generally leave the motherland with the hope and determination of a better life. They
arrive in a new land with all energies mobilized for survival, as there is little social safety
net. Therefore the spirit of excelling is inherent in their lives. The fact that no group can
claim territorial rights also helps blunt the edge of ethnic sentiments.
6.3 Linkages between Foreign and Local Investment
6.3.1 Linkages between Foreign and Local Partners
Local and foreign investors have been present from the start in both main sectors of
economic diversification in Mauritius, industrialization and tourism. In most areas of
both industrialization and tourism, local investors preceded foreign in the first efforts, but
the real boom began when foreigners took the lead. Foreign investors had the technical
manufacturing knowledge, factory management know-how and market contacts needed
to succeed. Local investors were interested from the start, however. They brought land,
management capability and capital to the table.
Similarly in tourism, there were some locally owned hotels early on. The real growth
spurt, however, came when Sun International, then a South African based chain, brought
international standards of architecture, services and entertainment to the business. They
Page 29

were a minority partner, Mauritian sugar interests having provided the majority of the
capital and access to the land, but Sun managed the first luxury hotels. Local hotels
quickly began innovating themselves, raising the overall quality in the sector. Today the
most recent and most luxurious hotels are Mauritian owned and managed.
The EPZ law was passed shortly after independence, but many of the first industries
catered to import substitution for the local market. At the end of the first decade there
were only 100 EPZ firms. The import substitution industries were a good industrial
apprenticeship for local investors, as the mass-market products produced required
relatively simple manufacturing techniques, and quality was not at a premium in a
protected market. Foreign investors were slow to decide on Mauritius in the first decade
after independence, because its now renowned political and social stability was
considered uncertain at the time. None knew whether the Hindu majority would
nationalize land and industries or let the Franco-Mauritians and Sino-Mauritians continue
to dominate the economy.
As exports industries began to expand in more complex and competitive industries from
1983 on, both local and foreign investors recognized that there was strong synergy
between their enterprises. Kin and ethnic networks played an important role in forging
viable partnerships. Hong Kong manufacturers came looking for a safe haven for capital
and quota-free access to markets. They knew the machinery, the factory organization, the
worker training needs, and the customers' tastes. In fact they arrived with orders in hand.
The first big firms, however, lacked sufficient confidence in Mauritius' social stability to
transfer all of its operations here.
Purely local investors welcomed the foreign investors instead of seeing them as
competition. Many local garment firms got their start doing commission work (cut, make
up and trim) on shirt orders too big for a foreign factory to handle. They hired away
skilled labor and managers from the foreign companies when they could. Buyers who
came to deal with the foreign-owned firms stopped by to see what other factories were
producing. Thus local firms acquired new customers.
Page 30

The Fragile Early Years
Floreal Knitwear, one of the Island's current flagship firms, was established by Oriental
Pacific Export (Hong Kong) in 1971 to do only manufacturing. Marketing was supposed
to be handled by a Japanese firm. When that arrangement failed, Oriental Pacific sold out
three years later rather than set up local marketing operations. Their successors believe
that it was mainly because Mauritius was then experiencing a period of political tension,
and that the investors feared for its future stability. In retrospect, they misjudged the
political situation. The local firm created by the sugar interests which bought out Oriental
Pacific has gone on to become a local and regional conglomerate.
Joint ventures were one means of collaboration, particularly at first. Today they are not
the most common. Less than half of current foreign firms are joint ventures. Joint
ventures are voluntary on both sides, and joint venture local partners always bring capital
to the table. This is a major difference between obligatory joint venture schemes that
have been tried, with little success, elsewhere in Africa. Often, in the latter, the capital
subscribed by the African partner was a fiction—either lent him by the foreign partner or
exacted as a political favor. Mauritius seems to have largely avoided this type of joint
venture.
In the hotel sector similar relationships apply, although Mauritian investors have a strong
advantage in their access to prime land. The sale of land to non-Mauritians is prohibited
by law. Foreigners can overcome this by creating a local firm, which then has the right to
buy land. In practice, however, most of the prime land for both tourism and industry is
held by Mauritians. In the hotel sector one finds several hotels owned 80 to 100 percent
by Mauritians but managed by foreign firms. There are also 100 percent foreign owned
hotels, but they are not many and they report difficulty buying land.
6.3.2 Outsourcing/Jobbing
Page 31

Many local firms reported that they got their start working on a contract basis for big
foreign firms. When large firms have a rush order larger than they can handle, they
commission smaller locally owned ones to cut, make and trim the pieces. The smaller
firms reported that this is how they learned which models were selling and the quality of
work that was required. The big firms would come work with them to ensure that the
work was completed correctly. That way both they and their labor force received
additional training.
6.3.3 Global Sourcing
The multiple ethnic linkages on the island created an instant international sourcing
network before the age of globalization. The MEDIA spokesperson considers that
Mauritius' garment industry has a major advantage over South Africa's much larger sector
in this respect. South Africa's garment and textile industries are vertically integrated,
which ties garment makers to high-cost mediocre quality fabrics in a limited range of
styles.
In Mauritius, most of the local garment industry is knitwear rather than woven cloth.
Knitwear involves several less steps than woven, as the fabric and garment are made in
an integrated operation. Many knitting firms do their own spinning, getting their raw
cotton mainly from India. Others source their yarn from India. Raw wool comes mainly
from Australia and New Zealand, but specialty wools come from the UK. Dyes for both
cotton and wool come mainly from Germany. Mauritian firms were able to compare
global sources early on, and they quickly diversified whenever price/quality ratios
change. In this area as well, local firms reported being glad to be able to learn from the
bigger foreign firms.
There is some vertical integration in Mauritian textiles and garments, but it is at the high
quality end and clearly mutually beneficial. Two ultramodern Mauritian textile firms
produce shirting for garment makers supplying Marks and Spencers (UK) and other
upscale firms. Both were created by garment makers working with top-end retailers
Page 32

seeking to integrate their operations upstream to ensure quality and availability. All of the
woven cloth is sold to local garment makers, and demand exceeds capacity.
6.3.4 Training and Technical Assistance
Firms are conscious of the fact that they benefit from one another's efforts to train the
workforce and from shared technical assistance. Technical assistants sent by a buyer to
work with a large firm will sometimes also work with their smaller outsourcers. And all
firms compete to recruit qualified personnel. Initially the Hong Kong firms provided
much of the workforce training. At first they brought in line managers and most of a line
of workers from Hong Kong workers to show the Mauritians the needed skills.
In the hotel sector, training has involved far less direct foreign technical assistance. The
managers of Mauritian hotels, however, reported on the job experience working under
foreign managers at local hotels.
6.3.5 Labor Force
In the early 1980s Mauritius was fifteen years into independence and still had 23-25
percent unemployment. Its one big advantage was that over 90 percent of adults were
iterate, and most secondary school graduates spoke both French and English. When the
second wave of Hong Kong investors began to arrive in large numbers in 1984, they set
up textile factories as they knew them, based on intense, rapid, accurate work at low
wages. Mauritius had a tripartite wage negotiation system, involving employers, unions
and government. Government’s votes came from the workers, but it seems to have helped
them accept a gradualist approach, as the alternative appeared to be economic stagnation
or decline. The unions swallowed hard and accepted.
There is a wide consensus among employers and government officials interviewed that
Mauritian workers learn manufacturing skills quickly enough, but that they do not have
the necessary persistence and speed to make firms competitive with Asian norms. They
Page 33

tend to work more slowly, resist overtime, take all of their 21 days of annual sick leave,
and like their weekends and holidays.
Foreign workers have played an essential role in raising productivity. Both foreign and
Mauritian firms customarily bring in foreign workers to work alongside the Mauritians.
In the chain they speed up the work of the whole group. These "expatriate workers" as
they are called, come on two or three year contracts. Employers must pay their round trip
transport, lodging, food, cleaning services and work permits. Their total cost is double or
more the wages paid a Mauritian worker, but a minority of such workers speeds up the
whole line enough to more than compensate. Few African countries have been as flexible
in their labor laws and practices as Mauritius.
3.8 SUMMARY
1. The contribution of MNEs to the development of the host nation, more
particularly developing countries or LDCs has been the subject of much
debate over the years. Whilst it is generally accepted that MNEs do contribute
by way of technology transfer, skills diffusion and by bringing much needed
finance capital, nevertheless criticisms abound as to the negative impact of
MNEs in that they are viewed as exploiting the local labour force, they
transfer outdated technology, and they strip the LDCs of much needed
resources.
2. However, MNEs were and still remain a very important ingredient of growth,
especially for developing countries. This is why it is crucial for a host
country’s government that it should be able to assess FDI in a policy context.
The latter process is usually done by way of an Evaluation Framework.
3. Efficiency of resource allocation relates to the extent to which there exist
complementarities between of economic interests between the multinationals
and the host countries. In a similar vein, it highlights the following: under
what conditions do the operations of the TNC in a host country contribute to
the world economic welfare that could not be achieved before?
Page 34

4. Distribution relates to the extent to which the gains arising from the MNEs
operations are distributed between the partners.
5. Sovereignty relates to the ways in which the multinational may compromise
the economic independence of host nations in either the short or long term. It
highlights how the behaviour of multinationals may compromise the
effectiveness of certain aspects of the host countries’ policies.
6. Self-reliance relates to the ways in which the operations of the multinational
may undermine the viability or independence of local firms or enhance their
potential. The self-reliance issue also crops up during the investigations of the
impact of multinationals on the industrial structure of the host nations; for e.g.
the level of concentration and/or modes of operations.
3.9 SUGGESTED READINGS
Dunning, J.H. (1993). ‘Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy’, Addison-
Wesley, Wokingham.
Page 35

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