Final Project Part III Part III Overview To make c.docx

Final Project Part III
Part III Overview
To make corporate finance decisions, take an advanced finance
course, or pursue a career in finance, you will need to
understand basic concepts. This includes
going beyond the number crunching and reading graphs in order
to analyze various financial indicators. This analysis can lead to
many important decisions in
your financial career. For this part of the final project, you will
be given a scenario in which you are asked to illustrate your
financial knowledge and analysis
skills.
This part of the assessment addresses the following course
outcomes:
in confirming compliance with federal and shareholder
requirements
institutions by comparing and contrasting options when
selecting appropriate private and corporate
investments
s
using industry standard tools for optimizing financial success

evaluating past and future financial performances
Part III Prompt
The results of both sections of your employment examination
have finally been received, and you were offered the position.
You have a few important decisions
to make before you can formally accept or decline the position.
When composing your answers to these decisions, ensure that
they are cohesive and read like a
short essay.
Your submission must address the following critical elements:
I. School Versus Work
A. The school you would like to attend costs $100,000. To help
finance your education, you need to choose whether or not to
sell your 1,000
shares of Apple stock, 1,000 EE Savings Bonds (with $100
denominations and 4.25% coupon rate) that are five years from
their 30-year maturity
date, or a combination of both. Provide the appropriate data and
calculations that you would perform to make this decision.
B. What are the advantages and disadvantages of selling a
combination of stocks and bonds? Be sure to support your
answers.
C. Suppose that you choose to sell your stocks, bonds, or a
combination of both. What is your choice, and what is your
financial reasoning behind
this choice? Consider supporting your answer with quantitative
data.

D. Suppose that you choose to accept the job. What is your
financial reasoning behind this choice? Be sure to support your
answer with
quantitative data.
II. Bonus Versus Stock
A. The company has offered you a $5,000 bonus, which you
may receive today, or 100 shares of the company’s stock, which
has a current stock
price of $50 per share. Mathematically, what is the best choice?
Why?
B. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each option?
Be sure to support your answers.
C. What would you ultimately choose to do? What is your
financial reasoning behind this choice? Consider supporting
your answer with
quantitative data.
III. Compliance
A. While investigating the shares offered to you by your
potential boss, you discover that the company you are
considering working for is not
registered as required under the Securities Act of 1933. How
does this influence you as a potential employee and as a
potential shareholder? Be
sure to reference any applicable statutes or laws.

B. You know that accepting this job may eventually lead to a
promotion into the role of the financial manager. As the
potential financial manager,
what federal and shareholder requirements would you need to be
familiar with in order to ensure that you are being completely
compliant?
Final Project Part III Rubric
Guidelines for Submission: Please ensure that your decision
plan is submitted as one comprehensive and cohesive short
essay. It should use double spacing, 12-
point Times New Roman font, and one-inch margins. Citations
should be formatted according to APA style.
Instructor Feedback: This activity uses an integrated rubric in
Blackboard. Students can view instructor feedback in the Grade
Center. For more information,
review these instructions.
Critical Elements Exemplary Proficient Needs Improvement
Not Evident Value
School Versus Work:
Finance Your Education
Accurately calculates the worth
of stocks, bonds, and
combinations of stocks and
bonds, including the appropriate

data and calculations with
submission (100%)
Calculates the worth of stocks,
bonds, and combinations of
stocks and bonds, but calculation
is inaccurate or appropriate data
and/or calculations are not
included in submission (55%)
Does not calculate the worth of
stocks, bonds, and combinations
of stocks and bonds (0%)
11.88
School Versus Work:
Advantages and
Disadvantages
Meets “Proficient” criteria and
provides historical data, as well
as quantitative data, to support
answer (100%)
Comprehensively differentiates
the advantages and
disadvantages of selling a
combination of stocks and bonds
and provides support for answer
(85%)
Differentiates the advantages and
disadvantages of selling a
combination of stocks and bonds,
but analysis is not comprehensive

or support is cursory or missing
(55%)
Does not differentiate the
advantages and disadvantages of
selling a combination of stocks
and bonds (0%)
11.88
School Versus Work:
Choose to Sell
supports examination with
quantitative data (100%)
Examines choice to sell stocks,
bonds, or combination of both,
explaining the financial
reasoning behind the choice
(85%)
Examines choice to sell stocks,
bonds, or combination of both,
but explanation of the financial
reasoning behind the choice is
cursory or missing (55%)
Does not examine choice to sell
stocks, bonds, or combination of
both (0%)
7.92
School Versus Work:

Accept the Job
supports examination with
Examines choice to accept the
job, explaining the financial
(85%)
Examines choice to accept the
job, but explanation of the
financial reasoning behind the
choice is cursory or missing (55%)
Does not examine choice to
accept the job (0%)
7.92
Bonus Versus Stock:
Offered
Meets “Proficient” criteria, and
explanation of the best choice
demonstrates nuanced
understanding of the time-value
of money (100%)
Accurately calculates the best
choice of receiving a cash bonus
versus receiving company stock,
including an explanation of the
best choice (85%)

Calculates the best choice of
receiving a cash bonus versus
receiving company stock, but
calculation is inaccurate or
explanation of best choice is
cursory or missing (55%)
Does not calculate the best choice
of receiving a cash bonus versus
receiving company stock (0%)
11.88
Bonus Versus Stock:
Advantages and
Disadvantages
Meets “Proficient” criteria, and
analysis includes quantitative
data (100%)
Comprehensively analyzes the
advantages and disadvantages of
the cash and stock options,
supporting each option (85%)
Analyzes the advantages and
disadvantages of the cash and
stock options, but analysis is not
comprehensive or support for
each option is cursory or missing
(55%)

Does not analyze the advantages
or disadvantages of the cash and
stock options (0%)
11.88
Bonus Versus Stock:
Choose
supports choice with
Chooses cash or stock option,
including logical financial
(85%)
Chooses cash or stock option,
including financial reasoning
behind the choice, but reasoning
is illogical or missing (55%)
Does not choose cash or stock
option (0%)
7.92
Compliance:
Investigating
references demonstrate
knowledge of current events in
finance (100%)

influence of noncompliance on
potential employees and
potential shareholders, including
references to statutes and laws
in analysis (85%)
Analyzes the influence of
noncompliance on potential
employees and potential
shareholders, but analysis is not
comprehensive or support does
not include references to statutes
or laws (55%)
Does not analyze the influence of
noncompliance on potential
employees or potential
shareholders (0%)
11.88
Compliance: Accepting Meets “Proficient” criteria, and
analysis demonstrates nuanced
understanding of requirements
for compliance with federal laws
(100%)
federal and shareholder
requirements necessary for a
financial manager to become
familiar with in order to ensure
compliance (85%)
Analyzes the federal and

shareholder requirements
necessary for a financial manager
to become familiar with in order
to ensure compliance, but
analysis is not comprehensive
(55%)
Does not analyze the federal and
shareholder requirements
necessary for a financial manager
to become familiar with in order
to ensure compliance (0%)
11.88
Articulation of
Response
Submission is free of errors
related to citations, grammar,
spelling, syntax, and
organization and is presented in
a professional and easy to read
format (100%)
Submission has no major errors
spelling, syntax, or organization
(85%)
Submission has major errors
that negatively impact readability
and articulation of main ideas
(55%)

Submission has critical errors
that prevent understanding of
ideas (0%)
4.96
Earned Total 100%
Adaptive memory: The survival scenario enhances
item-specific processing relative to a moving scenario
Daniel J. Burns1, Joshua Hart1, Samantha E. Griffith1, and
Amy D. Burns2
1Department of Psychology, Union College, Schenectady, NY,
USA
2Department of Psychology, Marist College, Poughkeepsie, NY,
USA
Nairne, Thompson, and Pandeirada (2007) found that retention
of words rated for their relevance to
survival is superior to that of words encoded under numerous
other deep processing conditions. They
suggested that our memory systems might have evolved to
confer an advantage for survival-relevant
information. Burns, Burns, and Hwang (2011) suggested a two-
process explanation of the proximate
mechanisms responsible for the survival advantage. Whereas

most control tasks encourage only one type
of processing, the survival task encourages both item-specific
and relational processing. They found that
when control tasks encouraged both types of processing, the
survival processing advantage was
eliminated. However, none of their control conditions included
non-survival scenarios (e.g., moving,
vacation, etc.), so it is not clear how this two-process
explanation would explain the survival advantage
when scenarios are used as control conditions. The present
experiments replicated the finding that the
survival scenario improves recall relative to a moving scenario
in both a between-lists and within-list
design and also provided evidence that this difference was
accompanied by an item-specific processing
difference, not a difference in relational processing. The
implications of these results for several existing
accounts of the survival processing effect are discussed.
Keywords: Adaptive memory; Survival processing; Planning;
Item-specific; Relational; Free recall; Cumulative
recall.
The capabilities of the human memory system
have undoubtedly been sculpted by evolution as a
consequence of problems faced by our ancestors
(e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Sherry & Schacter,
1987), with species adaptedness being the ulti-
mate function of these capabilities. Nairne et al.
(2007) reasoned that one likely consequence of
memory system evolution is that information
relevant to survival would be afforded special
status by our memory systems, producing a
memorial advantage. In their original study parti-
cipants were presented with a list of words and
performed one of three orienting tasks on the

items. In the survival processing task participants
were instructed to imagine they were stranded in
the grasslands of a foreign land without any food
or supplies, and were asked to rate words in terms
of their relevance to surviving in this situation.
The second task was a pleasantness rating task,
which was chosen because it is known to produce
particularly good retention performance (e.g.,
Einstein & Hunt, 1980). The third task was
designed to promote a level of schematic proces-
sing similar to that of the survival scenario, and
required participants to rate the words for their
relevance to moving to a city in a foreign land.
Unexpected recall of the items following a short
distractor task revealed a substantial free-recall
advantage for the survival condition relative to the
other conditions, consistent with Nairne et al.’s
Address correspondence to: Daniel J. Burns, Department of
Psychology, Union College, Schenectady, NY 12308, USA. E-
mail:
[email protected]
This research was supported in part by an internal faculty
research grant from Union College.
Memory, 2013
Vol. 21, No. 6, 695�706,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2012.752506
# 2013 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2012.752506

conjecture that human memory has adapted to
help us remember survival-relevant information.
Across numerous replications comparing the
survival task to a variety of different control tasks,
the survival processing retention advantage has
proven reliable and robust (e.g., Kang, McDermott,
& Cohen, 2008; Kostic, McFarlan, & Cleary, 2012;
Nairne, Pandeirada, Gregory, & Van Arsdall, 2009;
Nairne, Pandeirada & Thompson, 2008, Smeets,
Otgaar, Raymaekers, Peters, & Merckelbach,
2012; but see Howe & Derbish, 2010). Most of
these control tasks can be divided into two types:
(1) those requiring participants to imagine them-
selves in a particular scenario and to rate the
items for their relevance to that scenario (e.g.,
moving, robbery, vacation, city survival), and (2)
those not involving a scenario, but nonetheless
requiring a decision be made about the items
(e.g., pleasantness, self-relevance, and imagery
ratings, category sorting, and item generation).
For the second type of control task, those not
involving scenarios, it has been suggested that the
survival task may encourage the processing of
both item-specific and relational information,
whereas the control tasks may have encouraged
only item-specific or only relational processing
(Burns et al., 2011; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008).
Item-specific processing refers to the encoding of
individual characteristics of items, whereas rela-
tional processing refers to encoding the relation-
ships between list items. Each type of processing
serves a different function during retrieval (Ein-
stein & Hunt, 1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981).
Relational processing is believed to facilitate

retention by providing an organised plan for
efficient retrieval of the items, whereas item-
specific processing presumably facilitates discri-
mination of individual items on the list from other
items, as well as providing specific retrieval cues
for individual items (e.g., Burns, 2006; Burns &
Gold, 1999; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). It has been
demonstrated repeatedly that the combination of
item-specific and relational processing is particu-
larly beneficial to recall (e.g., Einstein & Hunt,
1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981).
Nairne and Pandeirada (2008) compared sur-
vival processing to a pleasantness rating task
known to induce item-specific processing. Addi-
tionally they used a categorically related list of
words, ensuring that all participants would encode
relational information. This procedure of requir-
ing pleasantness rating of categorically related
items is the technique of choice for recruiting
both item-specific and relational processing, and
results in recall performance superior to that of
conditions promoting only item-specific or only
relational processing (e.g., Burns & Schoff, 1998;
Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981;
Klein, Loftus, Kihlstrom, & Aseron, 1989). The
results, however, still revealed a recall advantage
for the survival processing group, suggesting that
survival processing produces recall above that
produced by the combined processing of item-
specific and relational information.
However, Burns et al. (2011) argued that the
amount of relational processing in the survival
and pleasantness rating groups might not have

been equivalent in Nairne and Pandeirada’s
(2008) experiments. The list items were selected
from categories that were highly relevant to the
survival scenario (fruits, vegetables, four-legged
animals, and human dwellings), which may have
resulted in more relational (or more congruous)
processing for the survival group than for the
pleasantness group. Burns et al. compared survi-
val processing both to a pleasantness-rating con-
dition, presumed to encourage item-specific
processing, and a category-sorting group, known
to promote relational processing. In the first two
experiments a list of categorically related items
was used, and in the remaining two experiments a
list of seemingly unrelated items from ad hoc
categories was used. (Previous research has
shown that categorically related list items inher-
ently foster relational processing, whereas unre-
lated lists foster item-specific processing.)
In the first two experiments survival processing
was contrasted with a condition presumed to
perform only relational processing (category sort-
ing) and a condition presumably performing both
types of processing (pleasantness rating). In the
latter two experiments survival processing was
compared to a condition performing only item-
specific processing (pleasantness rating) and a
condition processing both types of information
(category sorting). The results showed a recall
advantage for survival processing over conditions
performing only item-specific or only relational
processing, but not over conditions involving both
types of processing. Moreover, several indices of
item-specific and relational processing were con-
sistent with the hypothesis that item-specific and

relational processing differences were responsible
for the recall differences. For example, a final
recognition test revealed that the recognition
scores, which index item-specific processing,
tended to be higher for the survival processing
condition than for conditions performing only
696 BURNS ET AL.
relational processing, but not for conditions
performing only item-specific processing or both
types of processing. Similarly, a minute-by-minute
cumulative-recall analysis showed that compared
to conditions fostering only item-specific proces-
sing, the survival task produced greater recall
during the first few minutes of the recall period;
results indicative of a relational processing differ-
ence (e.g., Burns & Schoff, 1998). Compared to
conditions performing only relational processing,
the survival processing recall advantage occurred
in the latter portions of the recall period, indicat-
ing an item-specific processing difference (see
Burns & Schoff).
Burns et al.’s (2011) experiments provide
evidence that the proximate cause of the reten-
tion advantage associated with survival processing
is enhanced processing of item-specific and rela-
tional information. They argued that many of the
control conditions tested in previous studies
resulted in the processing of only one type of
information, affording survival processing a mem-
orial advantage, and proposed a two-process
account of the survival processing effect. Accord-

ing to this account the survival scenario recruits
both item-specific and relational processing,
whereas control conditions have usually recruited
only one type of processing or the other. When
control conditions foster both types of processing
the survival advantage should be eliminated.
This two-process explanation seems particu-
larly useful for explaining the results of experi-
ments that used non-scenario control conditions
(e.g., pleasantness rating, imagery rating, genera-
tion), because many of these control conditions
are known to induce primarily item-specific
processing (e.g., Burns, Curti & Lavin, 1993;
Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Hodge & Otani, 1996).
It is not clear, however, why survival processing
would produce more item-specific or more rela-
tional processing than control conditions invol-
ving other scenarios (e.g., moving, robbery, etc.).
For example, some control scenarios were created
specifically to be equivalent to the survival
scenario in terms of thematic structure, so one
would expect a similar degree of relational
processing. There is also no obvious reason to
expect the survival scenario would promote more
item-specific processing than other scenarios.
According to the two-process account, however,
the superior recall for the survival scenario is due
to either more relational processing or more item-
specific processing than other scenarios.
Recent findings by Kroneisen and Erdfelder
(2011) suggest that the survival scenario may
promote more item-specific processing than
non-survival scenarios. In the first two experi-
ments the standard survival and moving scenarios

were compared to a simplified survival scenario
involving only one problem or potential threat to
survival: the search for potable water. In Experi-
ment 3 participants were given the standard
survival and moving scenarios but were required
to generate either one or four arguments con-
cerning the relevance of each list item. The results
showed that when the participants were required
to solve only one problem or generate only one
argument, the survival scenario produced recall
that was statistically equivalent to the moving
scenario. The authors suggested that the typical
survival scenario may promote more elaborative
processing, resulting in more distinctive encoding
of the items, relative to the moving scenario.
Simplifying the survival tasks reduces the amount
of elaborative processing, thereby eliminating the
distinctiveness advantage that typically accompa-
nies survival processing.
Although Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011)
discussed their results in terms of elaboration
and distinctiveness*terms that may suggest the
enhanced processing of either item-specific or
relational processing*their actual manipulations
might have primarily affected only item-specific
processing. For example, increasing the number of
arguments that participants generate about each
item’s survival relevance seems very similar to
increasing the number of word associates gener-
ated for each list item, a procedure known to
enhance item-specific processing (e.g., McDaniel,
Moore, & Whiteman, 1998). Whereas Kroneisen
and Erdfelder’s (2011) results suggest to us that
the survival scenario enhances item-specific pro-
cessing relative to a moving scenario (an inter-

pretation that must remain tentative because they
did not use direct measures of item-specific and
relational processing), there is also reason to
believe that survival processing may lead to
greater relational processing than other scenarios
under certain conditions. Both Howe and Derbish
(2010) and Otgaar and Smeets (2010) showed that
survival processing produced higher recall than a
moving scenario when the list items were related
either categorically or semantically (i.e., lists used
in the Deese, Roediger and McDermott [DRM]
task). Moreover, survival processing also pro-
duced greater false recall of the critical lures
that were related to the list words but not
SURVIVAL PROCESSING 697
presented. It has been shown that relational
processing of related words increases both true
and false memories, whereas item-specific proces-
sing increases recall of the list items but decreases
false memories (e.g., Burns, Jenkins, & Dean,
2007). Hence there is some evidence that, at least
for related lists, survival processing may induce
more relational processing of the list words.
The purpose of the two experiments presented
here was to examine whether survival processing
enhances relational or item-specific processing of
seemingly unrelated list words. We focused on
unrelated words because we were interested in
whether the two-process explanation could ex-
plain the bulk of the published research contrast-
ing survival scenarios with other scenarios, nearly

all of which used unrelated or minimally related
items.
Similar to Burns et al. (2011), we used cumu-
lative-recall curves to assess item-specific and
relational processing. We observed the number
of items recalled during each minute of the 10-
minute recall period, and plotted the cumulative-
recall curves for each condition. It is known that
the following exponential equation provides a
good fit of cumulative-recall curves:
n tð Þ ¼ n 8ð Þ 1 � e�kt
� �
(1)
where n(t) is the number of items recalled at time
t, n(8) is asymptotic level of recall, e is the base of
the natural logarithm, and l is the rate of
approaching asymptote (e.g., Bousfield & Sedge-
wick, 1944; Indow & Togano, 1970; Roediger,
Stellon & Tulving, 1977). Whereas a strong
inverse relationship between asymptotic recall
level, n(8), and rate of approaching asymptote,
l, usually exists (e.g., Bousfield & Sedgewick,
1944; Hermann & Chaffin, 1976; Hermann &
Murray, 1979; Indow & Togano, 1970; Johnson,
Johnson, & Marks, 1951; Kaplan, Carvellas, &
Metlay, 1969), differential processing of item-
specific and relational processing produces an
exception to this inverse relationship. Relational
processing produces curves with a steep slope that
reach asymptotic levels very quickly, whereas
item-specific processing produces more gradual
cumulative recall. Examples from Burns and

Schoff’s (1998) experiments of the curves pro-
duced by varying the amount of item-specific and
relational processing are shown in Figure 1. As
can be seen, conditions performing both types of
processing produce high initial recall as well as a
relatively gradual approach to asymptote,
whereas conditions performing only relational
processing produce initially high recall that
asymptotes relatively quickly. Finally, conditions
fostering only item-specific processing produce
relatively slow initial recall that remains steady
throughout the remainder of the recall period.
Thus the shapes of the cumulative-recall curves
and the estimates of l and n(8) can be, and have
been, used to assess both item-specific and rela-
tional processing differences (see Burns, 2006;
Burns & Hebert, 2005; Burns et al., 2007; Burns,
Martens, Bertoni, Sweeney, & Lividini, 2006;
Congleton & Rajaram, 2012).
We also gave a final recognition test following
the recall test. Good recognition performance is
highly dependent on item-specific processing (see
Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981).
Recall Duration (Min)
C
u
m
u
la
tiv

e
R
e
ca
ll
S
co
re
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Relational and Item-Specific
Relational
C
u
m

u
la
tiv
e
R
e
ca
ll
S
co
re
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Relational and Item-Specific
Item-Specific

60 2 4 8 10 12 14 16
60 2 4 8 10 12 14 16
60 2 4 8 10 12 14 16
C
u
m
u
la
tiv
e
R
e
ca
ll
S
co
re
0
5
10
15

20
25
30
Relational
Item-Specific
Figure 1. Mean cumulative-recall scores for conditions
tested in Burns and Schoff’s (1998) experiments that varied
in amount of item-specific and relational processing per-
formed.
698 BURNS ET AL.
We note here that the survival scenario has
already been shown to produce higher recogni-
tion performance than non-survival scenarios
(e.g., Nairne et al, 2007), so we expected to
replicate this finding.
EXPERIMENT 1
The main objective of Experiment 1 was to
determine whether, as suggested by Kroneisen
and Erdfelder (2011), survival processing induces
more item-specific processing than the moving
scenario. We hypothesised that the survival sce-
nario would produce greater recall than the
moving scenario and that the recall advantage

would be accompanied by a recognition advan-
tage. We also predicted that the survival scenario
would produce a cumulative-recall curve that
diverged from the curve produced by the moving
group, but only after the first few minutes of
recall. This pattern of cumulative recall was
expected to produce fairly similar estimates of l
for the two groups, but the survival scenario was
expected to produce a higher estimate of n(8).
These results would suggest that the survival
scenario induces more item-specific processing,
but not more relational processing, than the
moving scenario.
Method
Participants. A total of 73 college students who
were paid either $6.00 or received credit towards
an out-of-class activities requirement in their
introductory psychology course took part in the
experiment, with 37 participants assigned ran-
domly to the survival group and 36 assigned to the
moving group.
Lists and design. The list of words used was the
same as the list of seemingly unrelated words
used by Burns et al. (2011). It consisted of four
words from each of 12 ad hoc categories (e.g.,
things women wear, things that have an odour,
and things that are round). The ad hoc list was
used to allow for a more direct comparison with
Burns et al.’s results. All 24 items from a random
six categories were presented first, followed
by the 24 items from the remaining six cate-
gories. The items from each set of six categories
were presented in random order, with the

exception that no two items from the same
category were presented in adjacent serial posi-
tions. We presented all items from six categories
prior to presenting any items from the remain-
ing categories to keep the procedures in both
experiments consistent (Experiment 2 used a
within-list manipulation of scenario type, neces-
sitating that the list to be divided into two sets of
24 words, so we did the same in Experiment 1).
On the five-alternative-choice recognition test,
each list item was presented with four lures
which were selected from the same ad hoc
category as the list item.
Procedure. Participants were informed that
they would be seated in front of a computer
where they would be required to perform a rating
task on a list of words. With the exception that
participants were required to rate the relevance of
words on a 1�4 scale instead of a 1�5 scale, the

instructions for both the survival scenario and the
moving scenario were identical to those used by
Nairne et al. (2007). The survival-rating task
required participants to rate each word according
to how relevant it would be to their survival if
they were stranded in the grasslands of a foreign
land. The moving scenario instructions required
participants to rate each word according to how
relevant it would be if they were moving to a new
home in a foreign land. Words were presented for
6 seconds each, and centred on the middle of the
computer monitor. This rating scale (1 �extre-
mely irrelevant, 2 �somewhat irrelevant, 3 �
somewhat relevant, and 4 �extremely relevant)
remained on the lower portion of the screen
during list presentation.
Following list presentation, instructions were
read describing the 2-minute digit-recall task (a
filler task used by Nairne et al., 2007, and others
to delay recall). The task consisted of four trials

in which participants see seven digits (ranging
from 0 to 9) one at a time each for 1 second,
followed by a 15-second recall period in which
participants typed the digits in the order they
were shown. Following this distractor task, parti-
cipants were given 10 minutes to write the
previously presented words on a recall sheet in
any order. Participants were asked to draw a line
under the last word recalled after each minute of
recall, which allowed for the cumulative recall
analysis. An untimed final recognition test was
administered approximately 45 seconds after the
recall test.
Results and discussion
Independent groups t-tests revealed that neither
the relevance ratings nor response times differed

across conditions, t(71) �0.24, and t(71) � �
0.12, respectively (see Table 1). These results
rule out the possibility that any of the memory
measures are the result of processing time differ-
ences or congruity effects.
As can be seen in Table 1 there was a
significant recall advantage for the survival group
over the moving group, t(71) �2.09, d�0.49. The
cumulative-recall scores, displayed in Figure 2,
show that the two groups recalled roughly the
same number of items during the first 2 minutes
of recall. However, the survival group tended to
recall more items during each of the next several
minutes of the recall period. We used Equation 1
to produce individual estimates of l and n(8) for
participants in both groups. The estimates (see
Table 1) revealed no between-group differences
in the rate of approach to asymptote, t(71) � �
1.18. However, the survival group did produce a
higher estimate of asymptotic recall than the
moving group, t(71) �2.15, d�0.51. These curve
estimates are highly similar to those found by
Burns and Schoff (1998) in their experiment that
compared two conditions, both of which per-
formed relational processing, but only of which
performed item-specific processing.Finally, the
survival group also produced significantly higher
recognition performance than the moving group,

t(71) �3.92, d�0.93. The recognition results
suggest that the survival task enhanced item-
specific processing. However, the recognition
test was given after free recall, so it is possible
that the recognition scores are contaminated by
prior recall. To help rule out this possibility we
analysed recognition performance only for those
items not successfully recalled. The mean percen-
tage of non-recalled items that were correctly
recognised by each group is presented in Table 1.
The survival group produced significantly higher
conditional recognition percentages than the
moving group, t(71) �4.02, d�0.95. These results
show that the recognition advantage for the
survival group extended to the non-recalled items.
The results replicated the significant recall
advantage for the survival processing group over
the moving group (e.g., Nairne et al., 2007). The
unique aspect of our experiment, however, is that
we analysed cumulative-recall curves, as well as
recognition performance to assess potential dif-
ferences in item-specific and relational proces-
sing. Both measures of item-specific processing
(cumulative recall and recognition performance)
showed differences, converging on the conclusion
that the survival scenario produced more item-
specific processing than the moving scenario. The
initial portions of the cumulative-recall curves,
however, provided no evidence of a relational
processing difference. On the basis of this pattern
of results we suggest that previously reported
demonstrations of recall differences between
survival processing and other scenarios were the
result of a differential processing of item-specific
information, a conclusion consistent with that of

Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011).
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15
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Survival
Moving
Figure 2. Mean cumulative recall percentages for the two
conditions tested in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. Because the comparisons of greatest
interest are between the survival and moving groups, the error
bars are based on the error term from separate ANOVAs
comparing the two groups at each minute of recall (see Loftus
& Masson, 1994).
TABLE 1
Mean performance measures for Experiment 1 (pure-list
design) as a function of type of orienting task
Type of orienting task
Survival Moving
Measure M SD M SD
Rating 2.28 0.32 2.26 0.36
Response time (ms) 2473 458 2485 462
Recall 19.19 4.56 16.72 5.49
Recognition% 93.13 5.87 84.20 12.50

Cond. Recognition% 90.11 7.97 78.48 15.63
Approach to asymptote (l) 0.63 0.25 0.73 0.43
Asymptote (n(8)) 19.06 4.30 16.44 6.01
700 BURNS ET AL.
EXPERIMENT 2
The survival processing advantage over other
scenarios has been obtained in both pure-list
and mixed-list designs. Experiment 1 suggests
that, with pure-list designs, the survival processing
effect is the result of greater item-specific proces-
sing given to the survival items. It is tempting to
conclude that this item-specific processing differ-
ence is also responsible for the survival processing
advantage found in mixed-list designs. This con-
clusion may be premature, however, because
there are several list-learning effects for which
item-specific and relational processing differences
occur in one type of design but not the other (e.g.,
McDaniel, Einstein, DeLosh, May & Brady, 1995;
Serra & Nairne, 1993). Therefore we thought it
was important to test whether the survival pro-
cessing advantage that has been found with
mixed-list designs is also accompanied by an
item-specific processing difference.
Method
We used a within-participants (and mixed-list)

manipulation of scenario type in Experiment 2,
rather than the between-participants manipula-
tion used in Experiment 1. Half of the 28
participants rated the first 24 words for their
relevance to the survival scenario and then rated
the remaining words for their relevance to the
moving scenario. The other 14 participants were
given the two scenarios in the reverse order. All
other aspects of the procedure were identical to
those of Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
Dependent groups t-tests showed that response
ratings did not differ among the two conditions,
t(27) � �0.79, nor did the response times, t(27) �
�0.45 (see Table 2). Replicating the main result of
Experiment 1, the overall recall scores revealed
that words rated for their survival relevance were
recalled better than the words rated for moving
relevance, t(27) �2.51, d�0.51.1
Although participants recalled the words rated
for survival- and moving-relevance together, we
plotted cumulative recall for each set of words
separately. Burns and Hebert showed, that the
effects of relational and item-specific processing
on the shapes of the cumulative-recall curves
produced in within-list designs are similar to
those found in between-list designs.2 Not surpris-
ingly, with the obvious exception that recall is
much lower because recall is based on 24 words
instead of 48, the cumulative-recall curves, shown
in Figure 3, produced a pattern of results very
similar to that of Experiment 1, resulting in no

significant difference between conditions for l,
t(27) � �0.40, but a significantly higher estimate
of n(8) for the survival condition, t(27) �2.75,
d�53. Both the standard recognition percentages
and the conditionalised scores produced a sig-
nificant advantage for the survival condition:
t(27) �2,28, d�0.37, and t(27) �2.65, d�0.61,
respectively.
Experiment 2 closely replicated the main
findings of Experiment 1. The survival processing
advantage in free recall was accompanied by
greater recognition performance and a cumula-
tive-recall advantage in the latter portion of the
TABLE 2
Mean performance measures for Experiment 2
(mixed-list design as a function of type of orienting task
Type of orienting task
Survival Moving
Measure M SD M SD
Rating 2.26 0.33 2.33 0.37
Response Time (ms) 2340 421 2377 444
Recall 12.32 4.06 10.43 3.39
Recognition% 92.71 8.76 89.29 9.52
Cond. Recognition% 92.15 9.35 85.24 12.94

Approach to Asymptote (l) 0.63 0.35 0.66 0.28
Asymptote (n(8)) 12.33 4.23 10.28 3.47
1 The original standard deviations were used in calculating
Cohen’s d, rather than the pooled standard deviations
corrected for the amount of correlation between the two
scores (see Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996).
2 Burns et al. (2011) did not present cumulative-recall
curves for their mixed-list experiments because participants
tended to cluster recall by categories, recalling most of the
items from one processing condition before recalling items
from another condition. Although participants did some
clustering of items in our Experiment 2, they did not do so
extensively. On average they switched from recalling items
from one condition to the other condition 7.39 times. More-
over, the cumulative-recall scores for the two different
counterbalanced orders of condition presentation (moving
first vs survival first) produced highly similar patterns, both of
which were similar to the pattern shown in Figure 3.

recall period, not the initial few minutes. These
results are exactly what would be predicted if
survival processing induces more item-specific
processing than the moving scenario. Experiment
2 suggests that mixed-list survival processing
effects can be accounted for with the two-process
explanation proposed by Burns et al. (2011).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The memorial advantage conferred by processing
information for survival relevance may be the
consequence of evolutionary adaptations. Burns
et al. (2011) provided evidence for the proximate
mechanisms responsible for the survival advan-
tage and proposed a two-process explanation.
One potential concern with this two-process
explanation is whether it is able to explain the

retention advantage for the survival scenario over
control tasks involving other scenarios (as op-
posed to non-scenario control tasks). It is not
obvious why the survival scenario would induce
more item-specific or more relational processing
than other scenarios, some of which are very
similar in terms of thematic structure. Although
the present results do not explain why, they
clearly suggest that the survival scenario pro-
motes more item-specific processing than the
moving scenario.
Does the survival scenario also
increase relational processing?
The results also suggest that the survival scenario
does not increase relational processing relative to
the moving scenario, although this conclusion is
more tentative because there was a slight recall
advantage for the survival conditions during the
first few minutes of recall. This pattern of results
leaves open the possibility of a slight relational
processing advantage for the survival task. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that such a small relational
processing difference would be responsible for

the obtained recall differences.
Even if our measures of relational processing
showed absolutely no difference between condi-
tions, we would not be able to definitively
conclude that the two conditions encoded an
equivalent amount of relational information. It
may be that survival processing enhanced rela-
tional processing, but that the relational informa-
tion was not used to guide retrieval. Perhaps
participants focused primarily on the extensive
item-specific cues during recall, ignoring the
relational cues. This explanation is similar in
many respects to the differential-retrieval-process
framework proposed by McDaniel, DeLosh, and
Merritt (2000) to explain the bizarreness effect.
That hypothesis states that ‘‘contextual factors . . .
influence the extent to which various types of
information are used at retrieval’’ (p. 1045),
suggesting that under some conditions partici-
pants may use only one type of information to
guide retrieval even when other types are avail-
able. But if so our results would still suggest that
the survival processing recall advantage is the
result of enhanced item-specific processing, be-
cause the relational processing was not used to
benefit recall.
There is yet another reason to expect that
survival processing may sometimes enhance the
encoding of relational information. As men-
tioned in the introduction, research by Howe
and Derbish (2010) and Otgaar and Smeets
(2010) using semantically or categorically related
list words, which are known to increase proces-
sing of relational information, has suggested a

relational processing advantage for the survival
condition relative to the moving condition. Ot-
gaar and Smeets argued that survival processing
enhances gist processing, which increases recall
of both true and false items. Gist processing is
often viewed as similar to, or a form of, relational
0 2 4 6 8 10
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4
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8
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12
14
Survival
Moving
Figure 3. Mean cumulative recall scores for the two condi-
tions tested in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. Because the comparisons of greatest
interest are between the survival and moving conditions, the
error bars are based on the error term from separate within-
participant ANOVAs comparing the two conditions at each
minute of recall (see Loftus & Masson, 1994).
702 BURNS ET AL.
processing, especially with the procedures used in
their study (cf. Burns et al., 2006). Howe and

Derbish also suggested that survival processing
induces more relational (or associative proces-
sing) because it increases the ease with which
themes that relate to (or integrate) many list
items are activated. These integrative themes
provide an organisational structure for the list.
It seems plausible, therefore, that some encoding
procedures, especially those involving related
lists, may produce a relational processing differ-
ence between the survival scenario and other
scenarios. Again, however, most studies have
used unrelated or minimally related word lists,
suggesting that the proximate cause of the
survival processing advantage typically reported
in the literature is an increase in item-specific
processing.
Possible explanations for the enhanced
item-specific processing associated
with survival
Our results extend the explicative power of the
two-process account to the research using alter-
native scenarios as control conditions. They also
provide an important clue about the nature of
survival processing: Apparently there is some-
thing unique about the survival scenario that
typically fosters item-specific processing relative
to other scenarios.
This finding is somewhat surprising, at least in
relation to Burns et al.’s (2011) findings. They
found that, when they used the same list of
ostensibly unrelated words as used in the present
experiments, there was no item-specific proces-
sing difference between the survival condition

and non-scenario control conditions (pleasantness
rating and category sorting). They suggested that
the unrelated list structure fostered item-specific
processing for all conditions (see also Hunt &
Einstein, 1981). If unrelated words fostered item-
specific processing in Burns et al.’s study, why
didn’t they do so to the same extent for our
moving condition? We are unable to provide a
definitive explanation for this interesting discre-
pancy. We speculate, however, that when scenar-
ios are included in the encoding task, relational
(or thematic) information may be inherently
encoded (e.g., by providing themes for inte-
grating the items). The encoding of this rela-
tional information may reduce the amount of
item-specific processing typically induced by un-
related words.
Regardless of the reason, it appears that the
use of unrelated lists does not equate item-
specific processing across scenarios. Why might
that be? One possibility alluded to by Kroneisen
and Erdfelder (2011) is that the survival task
requires the solving of more problems (e.g.,
finding food and water, and avoiding predators)
than control scenarios. Although this is possible
for some scenarios, other scenarios seem very
closely matched on this dimension. For example,
in the burglary scenario used by Kang et al. (2008)
and others, participants were required to find
people to help them rob a bank as well as to
gather supplies for the robbery. Similarly, Nairne
and Pandeirada (2010) used nearly identically
worded scenarios, changing only a couple of
words pertaining to the nature of the problem,

not the number of problems (e.g., finding medic-
inal plants vs finding relevant antibiotics).
A second possibility that is consistent with
Klein, Robertson, and Delton’s (2010) findings is
that survival processing involves more planning
than other scenarios, with the additional planning
resulting in more item-specific processing. Klein
et al. showed that the extent to which camping
scenarios involved planning largely determined
free recall differences, with a future camping
scenario producing recall superior to that of a
survival scenario. At first glance, however, it
would seem that planning would be more likely
to result in greater relational processing, not
greater item-specific processing; anyone who has
planned extensively for a future event realises
that successful planning depends heavily on good
organisational skills.
If planning is not the critical factor responsible
for the survival advantage, then perhaps the
survival task induces more self-relevant proces-
sing than moving. Burns et al. (2011) speculated
that survival processing might induce more self-
referential processing than control conditions, and
Klein (2012) has provided some evidence in
favour of this explanation. The present finding
that survival increases item-specific processing
relative to other scenarios fits nicely with this
self-referential processing explanation. The self-
reference task has been shown to increase both
item-specific and relational processing relative to
different control tasks (e.g., Klein & Loftus,
1988), so it is possible that the survival scenario
involved more self-referential processing, which

produced both the recall and item-specific
processing advantage. Of course the problem with
this explanation is that there was no difference in
amount of relational processing between the
survival and moving conditions. One solution is
that, as suggested above, the use of scenarios
induces relational processing for both conditions,
thereby eliminating, or at least minimising, the
relational processing advantage for the survival
condition.
Still another possibility is that survival proces-
sing instils thoughts of dying (i.e., thoughts of not
surviving), thereby placing participants in a mor-
tality-salient state. Hart and Burns (2012) offered
this suggestion and showed that free recall of a list
of words increases after participants are placed in
a mortality-salient state. They suggested that
mortality salience may lead individuals to process
information more deeply or complexly than usual,
and tentatively suggested that this deep proces-
sing might be partly responsible for the survival
processing advantage. Clearly more research is
needed to fully understand why the survival
scenario improves item-specific processing.
Future directions
One concern for future research is to explain a
discrepancy between the results of Burns et al.
(2011) and those of Otgaar and Smeets (2010).

The former authors found that pleasantness rating
of a categorically related list produced recall
equivalent to that of survival processing, whereas
Otgaar and Smeets used categorically related
items and found that survival processing re-
mained superior to pleasantness rating, thus
posing a challenge to the two-process account.
There were several procedural differences be-
tween studies, including the fact that Burns et al.
intermixed items from different categories within
the list, whereas Otgaar and Smeets blocked
items by category. Another difference is that the
list used by Burns et al. contained 4 items from
each of 12 categories, whereas the category size
used by Otgaar and Smeets was much larger
(10 items from each of 6 categories). Both of
these procedural differences likely resulted in
considerably more relational processing for Otgaar
and Smeets’ participants. In fact, Englekamp,
Biegelmann, and McDaniel (1998) showed that
increases in category size increase relational pro-
cessing but have little effect on item-specific
processing, regardless of orienting task (cf. Hunt
& Seta, 1984). It is possible, therefore, that
item-specific processing differences were elimi-
nated in both studies. However, the survival
processing effect might have persisted in Otgaar
and Smeet’s experiment because, under condi-
tions of abundant relational information, survival
processing utilises that information more so than
pleasantness rating. This conclusion is consistent
with Otgaar and Smeets’ conclusion that the
survival task resulted in more gist processing. It
would be interesting to replicate Otgaar and
Smeets’ (2010) experiment, using the various

measures of item-specific and relational proces-
sing employed in our experiments.
Of course, it is also possible that control tasks
that foster both types of processing minimise, but
do not eliminate, the survival processing recall
advantage. Perhaps the absence of a survival
processing effect in the Burns et al. (2011) studies
represents a failure to detect the small effect.
Logically, however, control tasks that foster both
types of processing must reduce the survival
processing effect relative to tasks resulting in
only one type of processing. We know this is
true because the former tasks have consistently
produced higher recall than the latter tasks (e.g.,
Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981).
Another interesting topic for future research
concerns false memories. As noted in the intro-
duction, both Howe and Derbish (2010) and
Otgaar and Smeets (2010) found that survival
processing not only increases recall and recogni-
tion of items from DRM lists, it also increase false
memories. Burns et al. (2006, 2007) used several
of the indices of relational and item-specific
processing that we used in the present experi-
ments to assess the type of processing given to
both list items and critical lures in the DRM task.
At least as determined by the indices used, the
results suggested that list items in the DRM task
tended to receive more relational processing than
the critical lures but that the critical lures actually
received more item-specific processing*a finding
that contradicts most theoretical accounts of false
memories. Moreover, manipulations that in-
creased relational processing of the DRM list

items resulted in even greater item-specific pro-
cessing of the critical lures, whereas manipula-
tions increasing item-specific processing of the list
items decreased item-specific processing (and
false recall) of the lures.
Perhaps, then, survival processing increases
both true memories and false memories for
different reasons? If, as Otgaar and Smeets
(2010), and Howe and Derbish (2010) speculate,
704 BURNS ET AL.
survival processing increases gist or relational
processing of the list items under some conditions,
this additional relational processing may actually
enhance item-specific processing of the critical
lures. If this is true, then one task for researchers
theorizing about the evolutionary significance of
false memories (e.g., Howe, 2011; Howe &
Derbish, 2010) is to consider how increasing the
item-specific content of those false recollections
might be adaptive.
Manuscript received 16 July 2012

Manuscript accepted 19 November 2012
First published online 24 December 2012
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