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From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability
DevelopingaComprehensiveApproach (CA) tocivil-militarycooperationrepresentsone of the major
challenges facing an operation today.
The questionisnolongerone of whether anorganization needssuchanapproachbut ratherdefining
the content. Thisisno easytask inviewof the complexityof the concept. A lot more work is needed
to forge a common understanding on the scope, nature and direction of the organization
Comprehensive Approach. As a supplement it is important we continue the informal dialogue,
exchange of ideas and collection of lessons learned on previous civil-military cooperation.
As a starting point, we could agree on some proposition reflected on this challenge:
-To achieve victory, an organization must have a Comprehensive Approach to civil-military
operationsencompassingitsownresources, its cooperation with the international community, and
most importantly its work with the local Government. This is not a debate for tomorrow; it is a
requirementtoday. Anoperation cannotbe successful inachieving its agreed political goals without
well-coordinatedcivil-military capabilities throughout the campaign. Well-coordinated capabilities
mustbe plannedandexercised;theyrequire integrated training. Best practices and lessons learned
must update training and education programs to be understood and employed. They cannot be
achieved through ad hoc methods.
As we looktothe future,we will face up more complex missions,whether they are led or supported
by an Alliance. Even as we conclude and implement proposals on a CA, greatly increased energy
should be devoted to knitting together integrated civil-military operations from the field to the
school house and the exercise arena.
There are two distinct but related asset pools for preparing an organization to work closely on a
Comprehensive Approach - military forces and critical civilian capabilities.
First, a commandermustdetermine the military resources necessary to achieve initial stability and
the returnof essential servicesinthe immediate wake of military operations. These are assets such
as militarypolice,CIMIC,constructionengineers and military medical personnel. These forces have
the mission to move into areas in the wake of conflict and work with combat forces that are still
securing the area. They must provide public security, temporary governance and the most basic of
services. These forces must be culturally aware and accustomed to working with both traumatized
populations and civilian actors, including NGOs that may already be in the conflict area.
Second,militaryorganizationsatall levels must be able to prepare and conduct integrated military-
civil missions, including through two-way, co-equal organizational interfaces. This requires pre-
establishedinformationsharing,comprehensive planning methods, role integration and ultimately
operational support. Military support to civil agencies can be extensive and generally requires
resources(vehicles,shelter, communications,security,supplies, etc) in excess of the kit required by
the military unit alone. Joint pre-mission exercises and training are key to ensuring common
understanding of the different organizations’ approaches, cultures and objectives.
Civilian capabilities that might be integrated with military capabilities can come from two broad
sources.
First,theycan come from Allies’andpartners’ national assets. In fact, as with military assets, so too
withcivilian - the preponderance of capabilities are ownedbynations.These includecapabilitiessuch
as interagency departments of member governments. Contractor support has also become a large
factor in national support
Second,civiliansupportcan and usually does come from a host of international organizations, both
nongovernmental and multinational, many with specialized and highly desirable skills. Key
organizational partners are well known: the UN, EU, and OSCE. Other potential partners include
regional organizations and major NGOs such as the Red Cross.
Mutual support and communication is one of the key tenets of getting the most out of a
comprehensive approach.Whenworkingwiththese organizations,amemorandumof understanding
to enable planning and capacity development should – as far as possible – be agreed upon well in
advance,inadditiontocrisis-specific work from the earliest stages in the pre-deployment planning
phase. Most operations have a dearth of civilian resources, and military commanders are eager to
partner with any quality civil resource. That calls for cooperation with national and international
partners,bothnongovernmental andmultilateral.Foranycivilian-military cooperation, institutional
liaison is essential at the operational and tactical levels, and ideally at the strategic level as well.
- Anotherchallengetobe overcome inbuildinganintegratedcomprehensive capabilityisthe
task of communicating across dissimilar cultures.
Critical tothis isaddressingthe problemof organizedcrime thatoftenfills the gaps in governance in
the immediate aftermathof majorcombat.Civiliancapabilitiesmusttake the leadindealingwiththis
pervasive de-stabilizing menace. That requires specialized advanced intelligence planning and
continued access to information both from international law enforcement and from local
governments.Inturnthe militarymustbe tiedcloselytothe informationflow oncriminal activityand
enforcement actions in their operational area.
- Another critical civilian task in crises resolution is police training.
Here again, close coherence of civil and military efforts is key to operational effectiveness. Justice
and rule of lawcouldbe an area suitable forenhancedcooperationbetween different organizations,
for example through the establishment of joint centers of excellence with a view to enhancing
transatlanticthinkinganddevelopingcommonstrategies,basedonlessonslearned, on how to solve
this difficult challenge in future peace missions.
- Anotherchallengetobe overcome inbuildinganintegratedcomprehensive capabilityisthe
task of communicating across dissimilar cultures.
Just as NATO’s many militaries have cultural differences, so too each civilian organization has a
unique culture.OperationsinAfghanistanandKosovoexperienced hard communication stovepipes
amongorganizationsthatproveddifficulttobreech.Forcivilianorganizations working with a strong,
large and ever-present military organization, individuality is important. NGOs are special
organizations with cultures of strict impartiality that are essential to self-protection and
effectiveness. The military should do nothing in word or deed to compromise NGOs’ impartiality.
To break down barriers between military and civilian partners, integrated training, educating,
exercising,andplanningformilitaryand civilian personnel who may be operating together must be
conducted.Itis alsoneededasa topprioritythe imperative to share information laterally as well as
vertically across the network.
What can be concludedfrom thisbrief essayonthe real civil-militarycapabilitiesthat operate within
the Comprehensive Approach concept is that prior, civil-military integrated planning and
coordination is essential to achieving and maintaining early post-conflict success and setting the
optimum conditions for a return to normality.
The more effective the civil-military team, the quicker the operation moves to subsequent phases
and ultimatelyitsculminationanddrawdown,reducingdeploymenttimes,costsandcasualties, both
civilianandmilitary.There isacompellingcase for a standing military capability and agreements for
advanced planning and more effectively integrated civilian-military teams.
Withthat in mind, anorganization shouldre-double itseffortstomove beyondthe currentlimitedad
hoc arrangements, and take another step to ensure that the Comprehensive Approach initiative
moves closer to a Comprehensive Capability.

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From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability

  • 1. From Comprehensive Approach to Comprehensive Capability DevelopingaComprehensiveApproach (CA) tocivil-militarycooperationrepresentsone of the major challenges facing an operation today. The questionisnolongerone of whether anorganization needssuchanapproachbut ratherdefining the content. Thisisno easytask inviewof the complexityof the concept. A lot more work is needed to forge a common understanding on the scope, nature and direction of the organization Comprehensive Approach. As a supplement it is important we continue the informal dialogue, exchange of ideas and collection of lessons learned on previous civil-military cooperation. As a starting point, we could agree on some proposition reflected on this challenge: -To achieve victory, an organization must have a Comprehensive Approach to civil-military operationsencompassingitsownresources, its cooperation with the international community, and most importantly its work with the local Government. This is not a debate for tomorrow; it is a requirementtoday. Anoperation cannotbe successful inachieving its agreed political goals without well-coordinatedcivil-military capabilities throughout the campaign. Well-coordinated capabilities mustbe plannedandexercised;theyrequire integrated training. Best practices and lessons learned must update training and education programs to be understood and employed. They cannot be achieved through ad hoc methods. As we looktothe future,we will face up more complex missions,whether they are led or supported by an Alliance. Even as we conclude and implement proposals on a CA, greatly increased energy should be devoted to knitting together integrated civil-military operations from the field to the school house and the exercise arena. There are two distinct but related asset pools for preparing an organization to work closely on a Comprehensive Approach - military forces and critical civilian capabilities. First, a commandermustdetermine the military resources necessary to achieve initial stability and the returnof essential servicesinthe immediate wake of military operations. These are assets such as militarypolice,CIMIC,constructionengineers and military medical personnel. These forces have the mission to move into areas in the wake of conflict and work with combat forces that are still securing the area. They must provide public security, temporary governance and the most basic of services. These forces must be culturally aware and accustomed to working with both traumatized populations and civilian actors, including NGOs that may already be in the conflict area. Second,militaryorganizationsatall levels must be able to prepare and conduct integrated military- civil missions, including through two-way, co-equal organizational interfaces. This requires pre- establishedinformationsharing,comprehensive planning methods, role integration and ultimately operational support. Military support to civil agencies can be extensive and generally requires resources(vehicles,shelter, communications,security,supplies, etc) in excess of the kit required by the military unit alone. Joint pre-mission exercises and training are key to ensuring common understanding of the different organizations’ approaches, cultures and objectives. Civilian capabilities that might be integrated with military capabilities can come from two broad sources.
  • 2. First,theycan come from Allies’andpartners’ national assets. In fact, as with military assets, so too withcivilian - the preponderance of capabilities are ownedbynations.These includecapabilitiessuch as interagency departments of member governments. Contractor support has also become a large factor in national support Second,civiliansupportcan and usually does come from a host of international organizations, both nongovernmental and multinational, many with specialized and highly desirable skills. Key organizational partners are well known: the UN, EU, and OSCE. Other potential partners include regional organizations and major NGOs such as the Red Cross. Mutual support and communication is one of the key tenets of getting the most out of a comprehensive approach.Whenworkingwiththese organizations,amemorandumof understanding to enable planning and capacity development should – as far as possible – be agreed upon well in advance,inadditiontocrisis-specific work from the earliest stages in the pre-deployment planning phase. Most operations have a dearth of civilian resources, and military commanders are eager to partner with any quality civil resource. That calls for cooperation with national and international partners,bothnongovernmental andmultilateral.Foranycivilian-military cooperation, institutional liaison is essential at the operational and tactical levels, and ideally at the strategic level as well. - Anotherchallengetobe overcome inbuildinganintegratedcomprehensive capabilityisthe task of communicating across dissimilar cultures. Critical tothis isaddressingthe problemof organizedcrime thatoftenfills the gaps in governance in the immediate aftermathof majorcombat.Civiliancapabilitiesmusttake the leadindealingwiththis pervasive de-stabilizing menace. That requires specialized advanced intelligence planning and continued access to information both from international law enforcement and from local governments.Inturnthe militarymustbe tiedcloselytothe informationflow oncriminal activityand enforcement actions in their operational area. - Another critical civilian task in crises resolution is police training. Here again, close coherence of civil and military efforts is key to operational effectiveness. Justice and rule of lawcouldbe an area suitable forenhancedcooperationbetween different organizations, for example through the establishment of joint centers of excellence with a view to enhancing transatlanticthinkinganddevelopingcommonstrategies,basedonlessonslearned, on how to solve this difficult challenge in future peace missions. - Anotherchallengetobe overcome inbuildinganintegratedcomprehensive capabilityisthe task of communicating across dissimilar cultures. Just as NATO’s many militaries have cultural differences, so too each civilian organization has a unique culture.OperationsinAfghanistanandKosovoexperienced hard communication stovepipes amongorganizationsthatproveddifficulttobreech.Forcivilianorganizations working with a strong, large and ever-present military organization, individuality is important. NGOs are special organizations with cultures of strict impartiality that are essential to self-protection and effectiveness. The military should do nothing in word or deed to compromise NGOs’ impartiality. To break down barriers between military and civilian partners, integrated training, educating, exercising,andplanningformilitaryand civilian personnel who may be operating together must be
  • 3. conducted.Itis alsoneededasa topprioritythe imperative to share information laterally as well as vertically across the network. What can be concludedfrom thisbrief essayonthe real civil-militarycapabilitiesthat operate within the Comprehensive Approach concept is that prior, civil-military integrated planning and coordination is essential to achieving and maintaining early post-conflict success and setting the optimum conditions for a return to normality. The more effective the civil-military team, the quicker the operation moves to subsequent phases and ultimatelyitsculminationanddrawdown,reducingdeploymenttimes,costsandcasualties, both civilianandmilitary.There isacompellingcase for a standing military capability and agreements for advanced planning and more effectively integrated civilian-military teams. Withthat in mind, anorganization shouldre-double itseffortstomove beyondthe currentlimitedad hoc arrangements, and take another step to ensure that the Comprehensive Approach initiative moves closer to a Comprehensive Capability.