SlideShare a Scribd company logo
HACKING EXPOSED
AWS EBS VOLUMES
BY BEN MORRIS
MORE KEYS THAN
THE JANITOR
•	No post-exploitation was performed.
•	Everything sensitive discussed in this talk
was gathered from the EBS volumes
themselves, which are publicly available.
•	Metadata stored has been anonymized.
I don’t want your secrets, and I delete them
after marking them as valid or expired.
•	I’m releasing the tool in two weeks to give
companies a chance to pull up their pants.
Disclaimer
(Hello FBI)
WHAT IS AWS EBS?
https://aws.amazon.com/ebs/
Virtual hard disks in the cloud
Usually private
WHAT COULD
POSSIBLY
GO WRONG?
HOW CAN THIS HAPPEN?
AWS dashboard has a Permissions tab
Once a volume’s here, it’s compromised
LOOT!
{
“UserId”: “AIDA[REDACTED]”,
“Account”: “[REDACTED]”,
“Arn”: “arn:aws:iam::[REDACTED]:user/robot”
}
DISK A - I AM ROBOT
Valid AWS key inside of a path:
/var/aws/userdata.config
Detective Work Leads us to a SaaS Company
Tracking ISIL Social Media
Border Interdiction
Robot’s Keys Exposed
DISK A - I AM ROBOT
DISK B - w00t w00t
Found AWS Keys in a Docker File
Ran Some Golang Binary
root@ip-172-31-0-0:~# aws sts get-caller-identity
{
“UserId”: “AIDA[REDACTED]”,
“Account”: “[REDACTED]”,
“Arn”: “arn:aws:iam::[REDACTED]:user/root”
}
Could result in in total compromise of the AWS account
DISK B - w00t w00t
DISK C - HAROLD & BOTNET GO TO WHITE CASTLE
root@ip-172-31-17-203:~# aws sts get-caller-identity
{
“Account”: “[REDACTED]”,
“UserId”: “AIDA[REDACTED]”,
“Arn”: “arn:aws:iam::[REDACTED]:user/kumar”
}
DISK C - HAROLD & BOTNET GO TO WHITE CASTLE
DISK C - HAROLD & BOTNET GO TO WHITE CASTLE
Large Software Company
Does Work For:
Salesforce
Apple
FIS
•	Leaked Source Code:
-- Government contractors
-- Large tech companies
•	SSH Private Keys
-- Major businesses
-- IoT companies
•	PII (Emails and Passwords)
-- SQL files containing tens of thousands of
records, including email and hashed passwords
•	Wordpress Installations
-- Password hashes,API tokens, etc.
•	VPN Creds
-- OpenVPN connection files
•	AWS Keys, Google OAuth Tokens, Email Passwords
-- Something called “SurveillanceApp”
WALL OF SHEEP
HOW DID I
FIND ALL THIS?
Exploitation process is simple on the surface
	 01: Pick an exposed snapshot
	 02: Attach the volume to your EC2 instance
	 03: Search the disk for secrets
...but there’s just way too much data!
JUNK IN THE TRUNK
ARCHITECTURE
AWS EBS API
SQS
Master
Determines if Snapshot is a Candidate
Query for Public Snapshots
SECRETS
DB
us-east-2
Worker
us-east-1
Worker
us-west-2
Worker
01
WHAT TO READ?
Tons of Hidden Failure Points
Metadata URL Failure
Mounting Disks
Filesystem Issues
02
THE “AWS BUTTERFLY EFFECT”
https://www.bishopfox.com/resources/tools/google-hacking-diggity/attack-tools/
03
DLP DIGGITY
Have Tests for Your Code
AWS butterfly effect is real
AWS Will Return Errors you Don’t Expect
Ex: Metadata URL can fail!
Design for Multi-Region Up Front
LESSONS LEARNED
REMEDIATION
•	If you find a disk that is:
-- Unencrypted
-- Public
-- Contains sensitive information
01.	Take down the snapshot
02.	Rotate any creds on it
03.	Investigate how you got here
EXPOSED DISK DISCOVERED
Check your AWS environment:
https://github.com/bishopfox/dufflebag
“Coming Soon...in two weeks”
MORE LOOT
•	Passwords
-- My favorite: nug!L0v3r
•	Captured the Flag
-- root@ip-172-31-0-0:~# cat /mnt/snap-0489
716372dc4b8c3/1/home/ec2-user/.flag_here
-- flag::NSSCloudHackLabFLAG53::6a55505df2550
fb680b1e0b23df42293fd099cf9ac5d7ae94ef0b938
•	Bitcoin Miners
-- wallet.dat
•	SSH Private Keys
-- Lots of Windows disks
CONCLUSIONS
50 CONFIRMED EXPOSURES
Manually validated in one AWS region
~750-1,250 TOTAL EXPOSURES
Estimated across all AWS regions
WIDE-RANGING INDUSTRIES IMPACTED
Government contractors, software, healthcare, etc.
TOTAL COST:
$300 + R&D Time
THANK YOU!
SPECIAL THANKS TO
Dan Petro, Jake Miller, Cici Tran
Zach Glick at Amazon for the
great responsible disclosure process
(Hi Mom, Hi Dad, Hi Nick)

More Related Content

PPTX
Using RStudio on AWS
PDF
AWS Lambda for Data Science @Celerative
PPTX
PDF
Docker and AWS for data science
PPTX
Managing AWS infrastructure using CloudFormation
PDF
There is No Server: Immutable Infrastructure and Serverless Architecture
PDF
Installing WordPress on AWS
PDF
How to scale to 100k users using Windows Azure
Using RStudio on AWS
AWS Lambda for Data Science @Celerative
Docker and AWS for data science
Managing AWS infrastructure using CloudFormation
There is No Server: Immutable Infrastructure and Serverless Architecture
Installing WordPress on AWS
How to scale to 100k users using Windows Azure

What's hot (16)

PPTX
Rock Solid WordPress
PPTX
Amazon Workspaces Master Class
PPTX
Iac d.damyanov 4.pptx
PPTX
Managing Secrets in Production
PPTX
Aws ebs snapshot with iam cross account access
PDF
MySQL administration in Amazon RDS
PDF
The "Holy Grail" of Dev/Ops
PDF
Deploying a Kubernetes App with Amazon EKS
PDF
CloudFormation Dark Arts
PPTX
Wordpress Security & Hardening Steps
PPTX
Assembling an Open Source Toolchain to Manage Public, Private and Hybrid Clou...
PPTX
Learn Electron for Web Developers
PDF
Brisbane DevOps Meetup - Logstash
PDF
20211120 Automating EC2 operations / EC2運用の自動化
PDF
ChefConf 2014 - AWS OpsWorks Under The Hood
PDF
Deploy and Scale your PHP App with AWS ElasticBeanstalk and Docker- PHPTour L...
Rock Solid WordPress
Amazon Workspaces Master Class
Iac d.damyanov 4.pptx
Managing Secrets in Production
Aws ebs snapshot with iam cross account access
MySQL administration in Amazon RDS
The "Holy Grail" of Dev/Ops
Deploying a Kubernetes App with Amazon EKS
CloudFormation Dark Arts
Wordpress Security & Hardening Steps
Assembling an Open Source Toolchain to Manage Public, Private and Hybrid Clou...
Learn Electron for Web Developers
Brisbane DevOps Meetup - Logstash
20211120 Automating EC2 operations / EC2運用の自動化
ChefConf 2014 - AWS OpsWorks Under The Hood
Deploy and Scale your PHP App with AWS ElasticBeanstalk and Docker- PHPTour L...

Similar to Hacking Exposed EBS Volumes (20)

PPTX
Cloud Security At Netflix, October 2013
PPTX
Security Basics in AWS or How To Get Rid of Hardcoded Credential and Reduce D...
KEY
2009.11.20 BPstudy#27 Amazon Web Service
PPTX
Owning aws infrastructure services
PDF
Introduction to AWS Security
PDF
Pwned Cloud Society - BsidesSLC 2017
PPTX
Hack proof your aws cloud cloudcheckr_040416
PDF
Amazon Container 환경의 보안 – 최인영, AWS 솔루션즈 아키텍트:: AWS 온라인 이벤트 – 클라우드 보안 특집
PPTX
Hackproof Your Cloud: Responding to 2016 Threats
PDF
Running Docker clusters on AWS (November 2016)
PPTX
Cloud security best practices in AWS by: Ankit Giri
PPTX
Aws primer Amazon Web Services
PDF
MySQL on AWS 101
PDF
Practical Cloud & Workflow Orchestration
PPTX
Aws(in)security - the devil is in the detail
PDF
[Jun AWS 201] Technical Workshop
PDF
Thotcon - All aboard the Fail Whale
PPTX
In the Cloud, nobody can hear you scream: AWS Cloud Security for DevOps
KEY
AWS Security: A Practitioner's Perspective
PPTX
Secrets management in the cloud
Cloud Security At Netflix, October 2013
Security Basics in AWS or How To Get Rid of Hardcoded Credential and Reduce D...
2009.11.20 BPstudy#27 Amazon Web Service
Owning aws infrastructure services
Introduction to AWS Security
Pwned Cloud Society - BsidesSLC 2017
Hack proof your aws cloud cloudcheckr_040416
Amazon Container 환경의 보안 – 최인영, AWS 솔루션즈 아키텍트:: AWS 온라인 이벤트 – 클라우드 보안 특집
Hackproof Your Cloud: Responding to 2016 Threats
Running Docker clusters on AWS (November 2016)
Cloud security best practices in AWS by: Ankit Giri
Aws primer Amazon Web Services
MySQL on AWS 101
Practical Cloud & Workflow Orchestration
Aws(in)security - the devil is in the detail
[Jun AWS 201] Technical Workshop
Thotcon - All aboard the Fail Whale
In the Cloud, nobody can hear you scream: AWS Cloud Security for DevOps
AWS Security: A Practitioner's Perspective
Secrets management in the cloud

More from Bishop Fox (20)

PDF
OWASP LA – SharePoint Hacking – 22Feb2012 – Slides.PDF
PDF
InfoSec World 2016 – RFIDiggity – Pentester Guide to Hacking HF/NFC and UHF...
PDF
InfoSec World 2013 – W4 – Using Google to Find Vulnerabilities in Your IT Env...
PDF
DEFCON 20 (2012) – Tenacious Diggity – 29July2012 – Slides.PDF
PDF
SpellCheckV2 Rules
PDF
Smarter Home Invasion With ZigDiggity
PDF
Ghost in the Browser: Broad-Scale Espionage with Bitsquatting
PDF
Ferris Bueller’s Guide to Abuse Domain Permutations
PDF
Check Your Privilege (Escalation)
PDF
Introduction to Linux Privilege Escalation Methods
PDF
Penetration Testing Resource Guide
PDF
Network Penetration Testing Toolkit - Nmap, Netcat, and Metasploit Basics
PDF
How Perceptual Analysis Helps Bug Hunters
PDF
Getting Buzzed on Buzzwords: Using Cloud & Big Data to Pentest at Scale
PPTX
Evolving Cyber Adversary Simulation: How Red Teaming Benefits Organizations
PDF
ASU Cybersecurity Symposium - Breaking Into a Career of Breaking In
PDF
CactusCon 2018 - Anatomy of an AppSec Program
PDF
Preparing a Next Generation IT Strategy
PDF
Lord of the Bing: Taking Back Search Engine Hacking From Google and Bing
PDF
Pulp Google Hacking
OWASP LA – SharePoint Hacking – 22Feb2012 – Slides.PDF
InfoSec World 2016 – RFIDiggity – Pentester Guide to Hacking HF/NFC and UHF...
InfoSec World 2013 – W4 – Using Google to Find Vulnerabilities in Your IT Env...
DEFCON 20 (2012) – Tenacious Diggity – 29July2012 – Slides.PDF
SpellCheckV2 Rules
Smarter Home Invasion With ZigDiggity
Ghost in the Browser: Broad-Scale Espionage with Bitsquatting
Ferris Bueller’s Guide to Abuse Domain Permutations
Check Your Privilege (Escalation)
Introduction to Linux Privilege Escalation Methods
Penetration Testing Resource Guide
Network Penetration Testing Toolkit - Nmap, Netcat, and Metasploit Basics
How Perceptual Analysis Helps Bug Hunters
Getting Buzzed on Buzzwords: Using Cloud & Big Data to Pentest at Scale
Evolving Cyber Adversary Simulation: How Red Teaming Benefits Organizations
ASU Cybersecurity Symposium - Breaking Into a Career of Breaking In
CactusCon 2018 - Anatomy of an AppSec Program
Preparing a Next Generation IT Strategy
Lord of the Bing: Taking Back Search Engine Hacking From Google and Bing
Pulp Google Hacking

Recently uploaded (20)

PDF
How to Make Money in the Metaverse_ Top Strategies for Beginners.pdf
PDF
Designing Intelligence for the Shop Floor.pdf
PPTX
Operating system designcfffgfgggggggvggggggggg
PDF
AutoCAD Professional Crack 2025 With License Key
PDF
Wondershare Filmora 15 Crack With Activation Key [2025
PPTX
Monitoring Stack: Grafana, Loki & Promtail
PDF
Nekopoi APK 2025 free lastest update
PPTX
Advanced SystemCare Ultimate Crack + Portable (2025)
PDF
Adobe Premiere Pro 2025 (v24.5.0.057) Crack free
PDF
Internet Downloader Manager (IDM) Crack 6.42 Build 42 Updates Latest 2025
PDF
Salesforce Agentforce AI Implementation.pdf
PDF
iTop VPN Free 5.6.0.5262 Crack latest version 2025
PPTX
Weekly report ppt - harsh dattuprasad patel.pptx
DOCX
Greta — No-Code AI for Building Full-Stack Web & Mobile Apps
PPTX
Patient Appointment Booking in Odoo with online payment
PDF
Autodesk AutoCAD Crack Free Download 2025
PDF
Adobe Illustrator 28.6 Crack My Vision of Vector Design
PDF
Download FL Studio Crack Latest version 2025 ?
PDF
iTop VPN Crack Latest Version Full Key 2025
PPTX
Embracing Complexity in Serverless! GOTO Serverless Bengaluru
How to Make Money in the Metaverse_ Top Strategies for Beginners.pdf
Designing Intelligence for the Shop Floor.pdf
Operating system designcfffgfgggggggvggggggggg
AutoCAD Professional Crack 2025 With License Key
Wondershare Filmora 15 Crack With Activation Key [2025
Monitoring Stack: Grafana, Loki & Promtail
Nekopoi APK 2025 free lastest update
Advanced SystemCare Ultimate Crack + Portable (2025)
Adobe Premiere Pro 2025 (v24.5.0.057) Crack free
Internet Downloader Manager (IDM) Crack 6.42 Build 42 Updates Latest 2025
Salesforce Agentforce AI Implementation.pdf
iTop VPN Free 5.6.0.5262 Crack latest version 2025
Weekly report ppt - harsh dattuprasad patel.pptx
Greta — No-Code AI for Building Full-Stack Web & Mobile Apps
Patient Appointment Booking in Odoo with online payment
Autodesk AutoCAD Crack Free Download 2025
Adobe Illustrator 28.6 Crack My Vision of Vector Design
Download FL Studio Crack Latest version 2025 ?
iTop VPN Crack Latest Version Full Key 2025
Embracing Complexity in Serverless! GOTO Serverless Bengaluru

Hacking Exposed EBS Volumes

  • 1. HACKING EXPOSED AWS EBS VOLUMES BY BEN MORRIS MORE KEYS THAN THE JANITOR
  • 2. • No post-exploitation was performed. • Everything sensitive discussed in this talk was gathered from the EBS volumes themselves, which are publicly available. • Metadata stored has been anonymized. I don’t want your secrets, and I delete them after marking them as valid or expired. • I’m releasing the tool in two weeks to give companies a chance to pull up their pants. Disclaimer (Hello FBI)
  • 3. WHAT IS AWS EBS? https://aws.amazon.com/ebs/ Virtual hard disks in the cloud Usually private
  • 5. HOW CAN THIS HAPPEN? AWS dashboard has a Permissions tab Once a volume’s here, it’s compromised
  • 7. { “UserId”: “AIDA[REDACTED]”, “Account”: “[REDACTED]”, “Arn”: “arn:aws:iam::[REDACTED]:user/robot” } DISK A - I AM ROBOT Valid AWS key inside of a path: /var/aws/userdata.config
  • 8. Detective Work Leads us to a SaaS Company Tracking ISIL Social Media Border Interdiction Robot’s Keys Exposed DISK A - I AM ROBOT
  • 9. DISK B - w00t w00t Found AWS Keys in a Docker File Ran Some Golang Binary
  • 10. root@ip-172-31-0-0:~# aws sts get-caller-identity { “UserId”: “AIDA[REDACTED]”, “Account”: “[REDACTED]”, “Arn”: “arn:aws:iam::[REDACTED]:user/root” } Could result in in total compromise of the AWS account DISK B - w00t w00t
  • 11. DISK C - HAROLD & BOTNET GO TO WHITE CASTLE
  • 12. root@ip-172-31-17-203:~# aws sts get-caller-identity { “Account”: “[REDACTED]”, “UserId”: “AIDA[REDACTED]”, “Arn”: “arn:aws:iam::[REDACTED]:user/kumar” } DISK C - HAROLD & BOTNET GO TO WHITE CASTLE
  • 13. DISK C - HAROLD & BOTNET GO TO WHITE CASTLE Large Software Company Does Work For: Salesforce Apple FIS
  • 14. • Leaked Source Code: -- Government contractors -- Large tech companies • SSH Private Keys -- Major businesses -- IoT companies • PII (Emails and Passwords) -- SQL files containing tens of thousands of records, including email and hashed passwords • Wordpress Installations -- Password hashes,API tokens, etc. • VPN Creds -- OpenVPN connection files • AWS Keys, Google OAuth Tokens, Email Passwords -- Something called “SurveillanceApp” WALL OF SHEEP
  • 15. HOW DID I FIND ALL THIS?
  • 16. Exploitation process is simple on the surface 01: Pick an exposed snapshot 02: Attach the volume to your EC2 instance 03: Search the disk for secrets ...but there’s just way too much data! JUNK IN THE TRUNK
  • 17. ARCHITECTURE AWS EBS API SQS Master Determines if Snapshot is a Candidate Query for Public Snapshots SECRETS DB us-east-2 Worker us-east-1 Worker us-west-2 Worker
  • 19. Tons of Hidden Failure Points Metadata URL Failure Mounting Disks Filesystem Issues 02 THE “AWS BUTTERFLY EFFECT”
  • 21. Have Tests for Your Code AWS butterfly effect is real AWS Will Return Errors you Don’t Expect Ex: Metadata URL can fail! Design for Multi-Region Up Front LESSONS LEARNED
  • 23. • If you find a disk that is: -- Unencrypted -- Public -- Contains sensitive information 01. Take down the snapshot 02. Rotate any creds on it 03. Investigate how you got here EXPOSED DISK DISCOVERED Check your AWS environment: https://github.com/bishopfox/dufflebag “Coming Soon...in two weeks”
  • 24. MORE LOOT • Passwords -- My favorite: nug!L0v3r • Captured the Flag -- root@ip-172-31-0-0:~# cat /mnt/snap-0489 716372dc4b8c3/1/home/ec2-user/.flag_here -- flag::NSSCloudHackLabFLAG53::6a55505df2550 fb680b1e0b23df42293fd099cf9ac5d7ae94ef0b938 • Bitcoin Miners -- wallet.dat • SSH Private Keys -- Lots of Windows disks
  • 25. CONCLUSIONS 50 CONFIRMED EXPOSURES Manually validated in one AWS region ~750-1,250 TOTAL EXPOSURES Estimated across all AWS regions WIDE-RANGING INDUSTRIES IMPACTED Government contractors, software, healthcare, etc. TOTAL COST: $300 + R&D Time
  • 26. THANK YOU! SPECIAL THANKS TO Dan Petro, Jake Miller, Cici Tran Zach Glick at Amazon for the great responsible disclosure process (Hi Mom, Hi Dad, Hi Nick)