Hacking Layer 2 - Enthernet Switcher Hacking Countermeasures.

1© 2002, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.l2-security-bh.ppt
Hacking Layer 2: Fun with
Ethernet Switches
Sean Convery, Cisco Systems
sean@cisco.com

Agenda
¥ Layer 2 Attack Landscape
¥ Specific Attacks and Countermeasures (Cisco
and @Stake Testing)Ñhttp://www.atstake.com
MAC Attacks
VLAN ÒHoppingÓ Attacks
ARP Attacks
Spanning Tree Attacks
Layer 2 Port Authentication
Other Attacks
¥ Summary and Case Study

Caveats
¥ All attacks and mitigation techniques assume
a switched Ethernet network running IP
If shared Ethernet access is used (WLAN, Hub, etc.)
most of these attacks get much easier
If you arenÕt using Ethernet as your L2 protocol, some
of these attacks may not work, but you may be
vulnerable to different ones JJJJ
¥ Attacks in the ÒtheoreticalÓ category can move
to the practical in a matter of days
¥ All testing was done on Cisco equipment,
Ethernet switch attack resilience varies widely
from vendor to vendor
¥ This is not a comprehensive talk on
configuring Ethernet switches for security; the
focus is on L2 attacks and their mitigation

Host B
Why Worry about Layer 2 Security?
Host A
Physical LinksPhysical Links
MAC AddressesMAC Addresses
IP AddressesIP Addresses
Protocols/PortsProtocols/Ports
Application StreamApplication Stream
OSI Was Built to Allow Different Layers to Work without Knowledge of Each Other
ApplicationApplication
PresentationPresentation
SessionSession
TransportTransport
NetworkNetwork
Data LinkData Link
PhysicalPhysical
SessionSession
TransportTransport
NetworkNetwork
Data LinkData Link
PhysicalPhysical

The Domino Effect
¥ Unfortunately this means if one layer is hacked, communications are
compromised without the other layers being aware of the problem
¥ Security is only as strong as your weakest link
¥ When it comes to networking, layer 2 can be a VERY weak link
Physical LinksPhysical Links
MAC AddressesMAC Addresses
IP AddressesIP Addresses
Protocols/PortsProtocols/Ports
Application StreamApplication Stream
SessionSession
TransportTransport
NetworkNetwork
Data LinkData Link
PhysicalPhysical
SessionSession
TransportTransport
NetworkNetwork
Data LinkData Link
PhysicalPhysical
Initial CompromiseInitial Compromise
CompromisedCompromised

NetOPS/SecOPS, WhoÕs Problem Is It?
¥ I handle security
issues at L3 and
above
¥ I have no idea if we
are using VLANs
¥ Why would I care
what the network
guy does with the
switch?
¥ I ask Netops for a
segment, they give
me ports and
addresses
¥ I handle security
issues at L3 and
above
¥ I have no idea if we
are using VLANs
¥ Why would I care
what the network
guy does with the
switch?
¥ I ask Netops for a
segment, they give
me ports and
addresses
Most NetOPSMost NetOPS Most SecOPSMost SecOPS
¥ What is your stance
on L2 security
issues?
¥ Do you use VLANs
often?
¥ Do you ever put
different security
levels on the same
switch using
VLANs?
¥ What is the process
for allocating
addresses for
segments?
Questions:Questions:
¥ There are L2
Security issues?
¥ I use VLANs all
the time
¥ Routing in and out
of the same switch
is OK by me! ThatÕs
what VLANs are for
¥ The security guy
asks me for a new
segment, I create a
VLAN and assign
him an address
space
¥ There are L2
Security issues?
¥ I use VLANs all
the time
¥ Routing in and out
of the same switch
is OK by me! ThatÕs
what VLANs are for
¥ The security guy
asks me for a new
segment, I create a
VLAN and assign
him an address
space

The Numbers from CSI/FBI

MAC Attacks

MAC Address/CAM Table Review
1234.5678.9ABC1234.5678.9ABC
0000.0cXX.XXXX0000.0cXX.XXXX
First 24 bits = Manufacture Code
Assigned by IEEE
XXXX.XX00.0001XXXX.XX00.0001
Second 24 bits = Specific Interface,
Assigned by Manufacture
FFFF.FFFF.FFFFFFFF.FFFF.FFFF
All FÕs = Broadcast
48 Bit Hexadecimal (Base16) Unique Layer Two Address
¥ CAM Table stands for Content Addressable Memory
¥ The CAM Table stores information such as MAC addresses
available on physical ports with their associated VLAN
parameters
¥ CAM Tables have a fixed size

Normal CAM Behaviour 1/3
MAC A
MAC B
MAC C
Port 1
Port 2
Port 3
A
->B
A->B
B UnknownÉ
Flood the Frame
I
See Traffic
to B !
A->B
MAC Port
A 1
C 3
MAC Port
A 1
C 3

B
->A
A Is on Port 1
Learn:
B Is on Port 2
B->A
MAC A
MAC B
MAC C
Port 1
MAC Port
A 1
C 3
MAC Port
A 1
C 3
Port 2
Port 3
B 2B 2

A->B
A
->B
B Is on Port 2
I Do Not See
Traffic to B !
MAC A
MAC B
MAC C
Port 1
MAC Port
A 1
C 3
MAC Port
A 1
C 3
Port 2
Port 3
B 2B 2

CAM Overflow 1/3
¥ Theoretical attack until May 1999
¥ macof tool since May 1999
About 100 lines of perl from Ian Vitek
Later ported to C by Dug Song for ÒdsniffÓ
¥ Based on CAM TableÕs limited size

CAM Overflow 2/3
X->?
X Is on Port 3
Y Is on Port 3
Y->?
MAC A
MAC B
MAC C
Port 1
MAC Port
A 1
B 2
C 3
MAC Port
A 1
B 2
C 3
Port 2
Port 3
MAC Port
X 3
B 2
C 3
MAC Port
X 3
B 2
C 3
MAC Port
X 3
Y 3
C 3
MAC Port
X 3
Y 3
C 3

CAM Overflow 3/3
MAC A
MAC B
MAC C
Port 1
Port 2
Port 3
A
->B
A->B
B UnknownÉ
Flood the Frame
I
See Traffic
to B !
A->B
MAC Port
X 3
Y 3
C 3
MAC Port
X 3
Y 3
C 3

Catalyst CAM Tables
¥ Catalyst switches use hash to place MAC in CAM table
1
2
3
.
.
16,000
1
2
3
.
.
16,000
AA BB CC
DD EE FF GG
LL MM NN OO PP QQ RR SS
HH
II
JJ KK
¥ 63 bits of source (MAC, VLAN, misc) creates a 17 bit hash value
If the value is the same there are 8 buckets to place CAM entries, if all 8 are
filled the packet is flooded
T
Flooded!
T
Flooded!

MAC Flooding Switches with Macof
¥ [root@attack-lnx dsniff-2.3]# ./macof
¥ b5:cf:65:4b:d5:59 2c:01:12:7d:bd:36 0.0.0.0.4707 > 0.0.0.0.28005: S 106321318:106321318(0) win 512
¥ 68:2a:55:6c:1c:1c bb:33:bb:4d:c2:db 0.0.0.0.44367 > 0.0.0.0.60982: S 480589777:480589777(0) win 512
¥ 1e:95:26:5e:ab:4f d7:80:6f:2e:aa:89 0.0.0.0.42809 > 0.0.0.0.39934: S 1814866876:1814866876(0) win 512
¥ 51:b5:4a:7a:03:b3 70:a9:c3:24:db:2d 0.0.0.0.41274 > 0.0.0.0.31780: S 527694740:527694740(0) win 512
¥ 51:75:2e:22:c6:31 91:a1:c1:77:f6:18 0.0.0.0.36396 > 0.0.0.0.15064: S 1297621419:1297621419(0) win 512
¥ 7b:fc:69:5b:47:e2 e7:65:66:4c:2b:87 0.0.0.0.45053 > 0.0.0.0.4908: S 976491935:976491935(0) win 512
¥ 19:14:72:73:6f:ff 8d:ba:5c:40:be:d5 0.0.0.0.867 > 0.0.0.0.20101: S 287657898:287657898(0) win 512
¥ 63:c8:58:03:4e:f8 82:b6:ae:19:0f:e5 0.0.0.0.58843 > 0.0.0.0.40817: S 1693135783:1693135783(0) win 512
¥ 33:d7:e0:2a:77:70 48:96:df:20:61:b4 0.0.0.0.26678 > 0.0.0.0.42913: S 1128100617:1128100617(0) win 512
¥ f2:7f:96:6f:d1:bd c6:15:b3:21:72:6a 0.0.0.0.53021 > 0.0.0.0.5876: S 570265931:570265931(0) win 512
¥ 22:6a:3c:4b:05:7f 1a:78:22:30:90:85 0.0.0.0.58185 > 0.0.0.0.51696: S 1813802199:1813802199(0) win 512
¥ f6:60:da:3d:07:5b 3d:db:16:11:f9:55 0.0.0.0.63763 > 0.0.0.0.63390: S 1108461959:1108461959(0) win 512
¥ bc:fd:c0:17:52:95 8d:c1:76:0d:8f:b5 0.0.0.0.55865 > 0.0.0.0.20361: S 309609994:309609994(0) win 512
¥ bb:c9:48:4c:06:2e 37:12:e8:19:93:4e 0.0.0.0.1618 > 0.0.0.0.9653: S 1580205491:1580205491(0) win 512
¥ e6:23:b5:47:46:e7 78:11:e3:72:05:44 0.0.0.0.18351 > 0.0.0.0.3189: S 217057268:217057268(0) win 512
¥ c9:89:97:4b:62:2a c3:4a:a8:48:64:a4 0.0.0.0.23021 > 0.0.0.0.14891: S 1200820794:1200820794(0) win 512
¥ 56:30:ac:0b:d0:ef 1a:11:57:4f:22:68 0.0.0.0.61942 > 0.0.0.0.17591: S 1535090777:1535090777(0) win 512

CAM Table Full!
¥ Dsniff (macof) can generate 155,000 MAC entries on a
switch per minute
¥ Assuming a perfect hash function, the CAM table will be
completely filled after 131,052 (approx. 16,000 x 8) entries
Since hash isnÕt perfect it actually takes 70 seconds to fill the
CAM table
¥ Once table is full, traffic without a CAM entry floods on the
local VLAN, but NOT existing traffic with an existing CAM
entry
¥ This attack will also fill CAM tables of adjacent switches
CAT6506 (enable) sho cam count dynamic
Total Matching CAM Entries = 131052
10.1.1.22 -> (broadcast) ARP C Who is 10.1.1.1, 10.1.1.1 ?
10.1.1.22 -> (broadcast) ARP C Who is 10.1.1.19, 10.1.1.19 ?
10.1.1.26 -> 10.1.1.25 ICMP Echo request (ID: 256 Sequence number: 7424) ßßßß OOPS
10.1.1.25 -> 10.1.1.26 ICMP Echo reply (ID: 256 Sequence number: 7424) ßßßß OOPS
Snoop output on non-SPAN port 10.1.1.50Snoop output on non-SPAN port 10.1.1.50

MAC Flooding Attack Mitigation
¥ Port Security
Capabilities are dependant on the platform
Allows you to specify MAC addresses for each port, or
to learn a certain number of MAC addresses per port
Upon detection of an invalid MAC the switch can be
configured to block only the offending MAC or just shut
down the port
Port security prevents macof from flooding the CAM
table
http://cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/cat5000/rel_5_4/config/sec_port.htm

¥ Beware management burden and performance hit
¥ Lots of platform specific options besides just ÒON/OFFÓ
Port Security Details
2002 Apr 03 15:40:32 %SECURITY-1-PORTSHUTDOWN:Port 3/21 shutdown due to no space
Available in Cat 29XX, 4K, 5K, and 6K in CatOS 5.2; 29/3500XL in
11.2(8)SA; 2950 in 12.0(5.2)WC(1); 3550 in 12.1(4)EA1
CatOS> (enable) set port security mod/ports... [enable | disable]
[mac_addr] [age {age_time}] [maximum {num_ of_mac}] [shutdown
{shutdown_time}] [violation{shutdown | restrict}]
IOS(config-if)# port security [action {shutdown | trap} | max-mac-
count addresses]
¥ MAC Tables do not have unlimited size (platform
dependant)
¥ ÒRestrictÓ option may fail under macof load and disable
the port, shutdown option is more appropriate

VLAN ÒHoppingÓ Attacks

Trunk Port Refresher
¥ Trunk ports have access to all VLANs by default
¥ Used to route traffic for multiple VLANs across the
same physical link (generally used between switches)
¥ Encapsulation can be 802.1Q or ISL
Trunk Port

Cisco Switching Control Protocols
¥ Used to negotiate trunk status, exchange VLAN information, etc.
¥ The majority use an IEEE 802.3 w/802.2 SNAP encapsulation
Includes LLC 0xAAAA03 (SNAP), and the Cisco OUI 0x00000C
Most use multicast destination addresses
Usually a variation on 0100.0ccc.cccc
Source address is derived from a bank of available addresses
included in an EPROM on the chassis
SNAP Protocol Type varies and will be included through the rest of
the talk.
¥ CDP and VTP (two common Cisco control protocols) are passed
over VLAN 1 only. If VLAN 1 is cleared from a trunk, although no
user data is transmitted or received, the switch continues to pass
some control protocols on VLAN 1.
For this reason (and the fact that VLAN 1 can not be deleted) donÕt
use it if you donÕt need to.
Lots of detail: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/473/103.html

For the Detail Oriented: 802.3 w/802.2 SNAP
If you like this sort of thing: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/105/encheat.html
¥ DST MAC: Generally a variant of 0100.0ccc.cccc
¥ SRC MAC: Pulled from a pool in the switch EPROM
¥ 802.2 LLC Fields
DSAP:AA + SSAP:AA + CNTRL:03 = SNAP
¥ 802.2 SNAP Fields
Org Code: 0x00000c (Cisco)
Protocol Type: Varies

Dynamic Trunk Protocol (DTP)
¥ What is DTP?
Automates ISL/802.1Q trunk
configuration
Operates between switches
Does not operate on routers
Not supported on 2900XL or 3500XL
¥ DTP synchronizes the trunking
mode on link ends
¥ DTP state on ISL/1Q trunking
port can be set to ÒAutoÓ, ÒOnÓ,
ÒOffÓ, ÒDesirableÓ, or ÒNon-
NegotiateÓ
Dynamic
Trunk
Protocol
0x2004SNAP Proto
0100.0ccc.ccccDST MAC

Basic VLAN Hopping Attack
¥ A station can spoof as a switch with ISL or 802.1Q signaling (DTP
signaling is usually required as well, or a rogue DTP speaking switch)
¥ The station is then member of all VLANs
¥ Requires a trunking favorable setting on the port (the SANS paper is
two years old)
http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/vlan.htm
Trunk Port
Trunk Port

Double Encapsulated 802.1q VLAN
Hopping Attack
¥ Send double encapsulated 802.1Q frames
¥ Switch performs only one level of decapsulation
¥ Unidirectional traffic only
¥ Works even if trunk ports are set to off
Attacker
Note: Only Works if Trunk Has the
Same Native VLAN as the Attacker
Note: Only Works if Trunk Has the
Same Native VLAN as the Attacker
Victim
802.1q, 802.1q
802.1q, Frame
Strip off First,
and Send
Back out
Frame

Double Encap 802.1Q Ethereal Capture
Outer Tag, Attacker VLAN
Inner Tag, Victim VLAN

Disabling Auto-Trunking
¥ Defaults change depending on switch;
always check:
From the Cisco docs: ÒThe default mode is
dependent on the platformÉÓ
To check from the CLI:
CatOS> (enable) set trunk <mod/port> off
IOS(config-if)#switchport mode access
CatOS> (enable) show trunk [mod|mod/port]
IOS# show interface type number switchport

Security Best Practices
for VLANs and Trunking
¥ Always use a dedicated VLAN ID for all trunk
ports
¥ Disable unused ports and put them in an unused
VLAN
¥ Be paranoid: Do not use VLAN 1 for anything
¥ Set all user ports to non-trunking
(DTP Off)

ARP Attacks

ARP Refresher
¥ An ARP request message
should be placed in a frame
and broadcast to all
computers on the network
¥ Each computer receives the
request and examines the
IP address
¥ The computer mentioned in
the request sends a
response; all other
computers process and
discard the request without
sending a response
V X Y ZW
V X Y ZW
V X ZW Y

Gratuitous ARP
¥ Gratuitous ARP is used by hosts to ÒannounceÓ their
IP address to the local network and avoid duplicate
IP addresses on the network; routers and other
network hardware may use cache information gained
from gratuitous ARPs
¥ Gratuitous ARP is a broadcast packet (like an ARP
request)
¥ HOST W: Hey everyone IÕm host W and my IP
Address is 1.2.3.4 and my MAC address is
12:34:56:78:9A:BC
V X ZW Y

Misuse of Gratuitous ARP
¥ ARP has no security or ownership of IP or MAC
addresses
¥ What if we did the following?
¥ Host W broadcasts IÕm 1.2.3.1 with MAC
12:34:56:78:9A:BC
¥ (Wait 5 seconds)
¥ Host W broadcasts IÕm 1.2.3.1 with MAC
12:34:56:78:9A:BC
1.2.3.0/24
Host W
.4
.1
Host Y
.2
Host X
.3

A Test in the Lab
¥ Host X and Y will likely ignore the message unless they
currently have an ARP table entry for 1.2.3.1
¥ When host Y requests the MAC of 1.2.3.1 the real router
will reply and communications will work until host W
sends a gratuitous ARP again
¥ Even a static ARP entry for 1.2.3.1 on Y will get
overwritten by the Gratuitous ARP on some OSs
(NT4,WIN2K for sure)
1.2.3.0/24
Host W
.4
.1
Host Y
.2
Host X
.3

Dug Song, Author of dsniff
DsniffÑA Collection of Tools to Do:
¥ ARP spoofing
¥ MAC flooding
¥ Selective sniffing
¥ SSH/SSL interception
www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff

C:>test
C:>arp -d 10.1.1.1
C:>ping -n 1 10.1.1.1
Pinging 10.1.1.1 with 32 bytes of data:
Reply from 10.1.1.1: bytes=32 time<10ms TTL=255
C:>arp -a
Interface: 10.1.1.26 on Interface 2
Internet Address Physical Address Type
10.1.1.1 00-04-4e-f2-d8-01 dynamic
10.1.1.25 00-10-83-34-29-72 dynamic
C:>_
C:>test
C:>arp -d 10.1.1.1
C:>ping -n 1 10.1.1.1
Pinging 10.1.1.1 with 32 bytes of data:
C:>arp -a
10.1.1.1 00-04-4e-f2-d8-01 dynamic
10.1.1.25 00-10-83-34-29-72 dynamic
C:>arp -a
10.1.1.1 00-10-83-34-29-72 dynamic
10.1.1.25 00-10-83-34-29-72 dynamic
Arpspoof in Action
[root@attack-lnx dsniff-2.3]# ./arpspoof 10.1.1.1
0:4:43:f2:d8:1 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0806 42: arp reply
10.1.1.1 is-at 0:4:4e:f2:d8:1
10.1.1.1 is-at 0:4:4e:f2:d8:1
10.1.1.1 is-at 0:4:4e:f2:d8:1
10.1.1.1 is-at 0:4:4e:f2:d8:1u

More on Arpspoof
¥ All traffic now flows through machine running
dsniff in a half-duplex manner
Not quite a sniffer but fairly close
¥ Port security doesnÕt help
¥ Note that attack could be generated in the
opposite direction by spoofing the destination
host when the router sends its ARP request
¥ Attack could be more selective and just spoof
one victim

Selective Sniffing
¥ Once the dsniff box has started the arpspoof
process, the magic begins:
Supports More than 30 Standardized/Proprietary Protocols:
FTP, Telnet, SMTP, HTTP, POP, poppass, NNTP, IMAP, SNMP, LDAP, Rlogin,
RIP, OSPF, PPTP MS-CHAP, NFS, YP/NIS, SOCKS, X11, CVS, IRC, AIM, ICQ,
Napster, PostgreSQL, Meeting Maker, Citrix ICA, Symantec pcAnywhere, NAI
Sniffer, Microsoft SMB, Oracle SQL*Net, Sybase et Microsoft SQL
[root@attack-lnx dsniff-2.3]# ./dsniff -c
dsniff: listening on eth0
-----------------
07/17/01 10:09:48 tcp 10.1.1.26.1126 -> wwwin-abc.cisco.com.80 (http)
GET /SERVICE/Paging/page/ HTTP/1.1
Host: wwwin-abc.cisco.com
Authorization: Basic c2NvdlghV9UNMRH4lejDmaA== [myuser:mypassword]

SSL/SSH Interception
¥ Using dnsspoof all web sites can resolve
to the dsniff host IP address:
¥ Once that happens you can proxy all web
connections through the dsniff host
C:>ping www.amazon.com
Pinging www.amazon.com [10.1.1.25] with 32 bytes of data:

¥ Using dsniff (webmitm) most SSL sessions can
be intercepted and bogus certificate credentials
can be presented

¥ Upon inspection
they will look
invalid but they
would likely fool
most users
invalidinvalid

Dsniff evolves: Ettercap
¥ Similar to dsniff though not as many protocols
supported for sniffing
¥ Can ARP spoof both sides of a session to
achieve full-duplex sniffing
¥ Allows command insertion into persistent TCP
sessions
¥ Menu driven interface
¥ http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/

Can It Get Much Easier?

Promiscuous
Port
Promiscuous
Port
Community
ÔAÕ
Community
ÔBÕ
Isolated
Ports
Primary VLAN
Community VLAN
Community VLAN
Isolated VLAN
Only One Subnet!
xx xx xx xx
ARP Spoof Mitigation: Private VLANs
¥ PVLANs isolate traffic in
specific communities to
create distinct ÒnetworksÓ
within a normal VLAN
¥ Note: Most inter-host
communication is disabled
with PVLANs turned on
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/cat6000/sw_7_1/conf_gd/vlans.htm#xtocid854519

All PVLANs Are Not Created Equal
¥ On CAT 4K, 6K they are called Private VLANs
¥ On CAT 2K, 3K they are called Private VLAN edge or port
protected
¥ CAT 4K,6K PVLANs support the following extra features:
Sticky ARP to mitigate default gateway attacks
ARP Entries do not age out
Changing ARP bindings requires manual intervention
PVLANs spanning multiple switches
Community Ports
¥ PVLANs are only compatible with Port Security on Cat 4K
and 6K

Private VLAN Configuration
¥ Available on: Cat 6K with CatOS 5.4(1); Cat 4K with CatOS 6.2; (no
native IOS support); Cat6K IOS with12.1(11b)E and Cat4K IOS with
12.1(8a)EW; config can be a bit trickey (CatOS shown):
¥ Available as private VLAN edge (no community port support) on:
29/3500XL with 12.0(5)XU or later; 2950 with 12.0(5.2)WC(1); 3550 with
12.1(4)EA1
IOS(config-if)#port protected
Any port without this command entered is
promiscuous
CatOS> (enable) set vlan vlan_num pvlan-type primary
CatOS> (enable) set vlan vlan_num pvlan-type {isolated |
community}
CatOS> (enable) set pvlan primary_vlan_num {isolated_vlan_num |
community_vlan_num} mod/port
CatOS> (enable) set pvlan mapping primary_vlan_num
{isolated_vlan_num | community_vlan_num} mod/ports

CatOS PVLAN Configuration Example
bh-2002 (enable) set vlan 41 pvlan primary
VTP advertisements transmitting temporarily stopped,and will resume after the
command finishes. Vlan 41 configuration successful
bh-2002 (enable) show pvlan
Primary Secondary Secondary-Type Ports
------- --------- ---------------- ------------
41 - -
bh-2002 (enable) set vlan 42 pvlan isolated
VTP advertisements transmitting temporarily stopped,and will resume after the
command finishes. Vlan 42 configuration successful
bh-2002 (enable) set pvlan 41 42 3/9-10
Successfully set the following ports to Private Vlan 41,42:3/9-10
bh-2002 (enable) set pvlan mapping 41 42 3/35
Successfully set mapping between 41 and 42 on 3/35

More ARP Spoof Mitigation
¥ Some IDS systems will watch for an unusually
high amount of ARP traffic
¥ ARPWatch is a freely available tool that will track
IP/MAC address pairings
¥ Consider static ARP for critical routers and hosts
(beware the administrative pain)
¥ An ARP ÒFirewallÓ feature is in development at
Cisco for initial deployment on our higher-end
switches

Spanning Tree Attacks

Spanning Tree Basics
STP is very simple. Messages are sent using Bridge Protocol Data
Units (BPDUs). Basic messages include: configuration,
topology change notification/acknowledgment (TCN/TCA); most
have no ÒpayloadÓ
Avoiding loops ensures broadcast traffic does not become storms
XX
A Switch Is
Elected as Root
Root selection is
based on the lowest
configured priority
of any switch 0-
65535
FFFF
F
FF
BB
F
FF
A ÔTree-LikeÕ
Loop-Free Topology
Is Established from
the perspective of
the root bridge
FF
A
RootRoot
B
STP Purpose: To maintain loop-free topologies in a
redundant Layer 2 infrastructure

Spanning Tree Attacks and Methods
¥ Standard 802.1d STP takes 30-45
seconds to deal with a failure or
Root bridge change (nice DoS)
Generally only devices affected by the
failure notice the issue
PortFast and UplinkFast can greatly
improve this
¥ Sending BPDUs from the attacker
can force these changes and create
a DoS condition on the network
¥ As a link with macof: the TCN
message will result in the CAM table
aging all entries in 15 seconds if
they do not communicate (the
default is 300 seconds)
¥ Testing using brconfig on OpenBSD
was easily able to create the DoS
condition. Depending on the
topology it could also yield more
packets available for the attacker

Spanning Tree Attack Example 1/2
¥ Send BPDU messages to become
root bridge
Attacker
Access Switches
RootRoot
FF
FF
FF
FF
XX
BB
FF
STP
STP

BB
FF
Spanning Tree Attack Example 2/2
¥ Send BPDU messages to become
root bridge
Attacker
Access Switches
RootRoot
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
RootRoot
BB
XX
The attacker then sees frames he
shouldnÕt
MITM, DoS, etc. all possible
Any attack is very sensitive to
the original topology, trunking,
PVST, etc.
Although STP takes link speed
into consideration, it is always
done from the perspective of the
root bridge. Taking a Gb
backbone to half-duplex 10 Mb
was verified
Requires attacker is dual homed to
two different switches (with a hub,
it can be done with just one
interface on the attacking host)

Applied Knowledge: Summary Attack
¥ Goal: see traffic on the backbone but
interesting hosts have static ARP
entries and are very chatty (macof will
likely never steal their CAM entry)
¥ Step 1: MAC flood access switch
¥ Step 2: Run bridging software
(brconfig) on attacking host; advertise
as a priority zero bridge
GE
FE FE
STP
BB
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
RootRoot
BB
XX
Access
Switch
RootRoot
Attacker becomes root bridge
Spanning Tree recalculates
GE backbone becomes FE LLLL
CAM table on access switch is
full (from macof); there is no
room at the inn for the chatty
servers. Traffic is flooded

STP Attack Mitigation
¥ DonÕt disable STP, introducing a loop would become another attack
¥ BPDU Guard
Disables ports using portfast upon detection of a BPDU message on the port
Globally enabled on all ports running portfast
Available in CatOS 5.4.1 for Cat 2K, 4K, 5K, and 6K; 12.0XE for native IOS 6K;
12.1(8a)EW for 4K Sup III; 12.1(4)EA1 for 3550; 12.1(6)EA2 for 2950
¥ Root Guard
Disables ports who would become the root bridge due to their BPDU
advertisement
Configured on a per port basis
Available in CatOS 6.1.1 for Cat 29XX, 4K, 5K, and 6K; 12.0(7) XE for native IOS 6K,
12.1(8a)EW for 4K Sup III; 29/3500XL in 12.0(5)XU; 3550 in 12.1(4)EA1; 2950 in
12.1(6)EA2
CatOS> (enable)set spantree portfast bpdu-guard enable
IOS(config)#spanning-tree portfast bpduguard
CatOS> (enable) set spantree guard root 1/1
IOS(config)#spanning-tree guard root (or rootguard)

VLAN Trunking Protocol (VTP)
¥ Used to distribute VLAN configuration among switches
¥ VTP is used only over trunk ports
¥ VTP can cause more problems than it solves, consider if it
is needed
¥ If needed, use the VTP MD5 digest:
CatOS> (enable) set vtp [domain domain_name] [mode
{client | server | transparent | off}] [passwd
passwd][pruningÊ{enable | disable}] [v2 {enable |
disable}]
IOS(config)#vtp password password-value
0x2003SNAP Proto

Potential VTP Attacks
¥ After becoming a trunk
port, an attacker could
send VTP messages as a
server with no VLANs
configured. All VLANs
would be deleted across
the entire VTP domain
¥ Disabling VTP:
CatOS> (enable) set vtp mode transparent | off
IOS(config)#vtp mode transparent

Layer 2 Port Authentication

Dynamic VLAN Access Ports
¥ VLAN assignment based on MAC address or HTTP Auth (URT)
is possible with a VLAN Management Policy Server (VMPS)
¥ Requires VLAN to MAC database which is downloaded via TFTP
to the VMPS server
¥ VMPS uses VLAN Query Protocol (VQP) which is
unauthenticated and runs over UDP
¥ Can restrict certain VLANs to certain physical ports
¥ During access violation, switch can send either an "access
denied" response or shutdown the port (depends on
configuration)
¥ Server and client
Available in Cat 29XX, 4K, 5K, and 6K in CatOS 5.2
¥ Client only
Available in 3550 and 2950 in 12.1(4)EA1; 29/3500XL in 11.2(8)SA4

VMPS Architecture
VMPS
Database
VMPS
Server
VMPS
Client
TFTP
Query
Reply
All VMPS traffic:
¥ Clear text
¥ No authentication
¥ UDP based (spoofing trivial)

VMPS/VQP Attacks
¥ No public domain tools today (Ethereal doesnÕt even decode)
¥ VQP/VMPS not frequently used due to administrative burden
¥ Possible attacks include DoS (prevent login) or Impersonation (Join
an unauthorized VLAN)
VQP Query

VMPS/VQP Attack Mitigation
¥ Consider sending VQP messages Out-of-Band (OOB)
¥ If you have the administrative resources to deploy VMPS,
you probably have the resources to closely monitor its
security
VQP Response

802.1x/EAP Switch Authentication
¥ 802.1x and EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) can
authenticate a device before allowing access to a switch
and can assign a VLAN after authentication
EAP allows different authentication types to use the same format
(TLS, MD5, OTP)
¥ Works between the supplicant (client) and the
authenticator (network device)
¥ Maintains backend communication to an authentication
(RADIUS) server
¥ The authenticator (switch) becomes the middleman for
relaying EAP received in 802.1x packets to an
authentication server by using RADIUS to carry the EAP
information
¥ Available on Cat 2900,4K,6K in CatOS 6.2; Cat 3550 in
12.1(4)EA1; Cat 2950 in 12.1(6)EA2

802.1X Port Authentication
Request ID
Actual Authentication Conversation Is Between Client and Auth Server Using EAP;
the Switch Is the Middleman, but Is Aware of WhatÕs Going on
Actual Authentication Conversation Is Between Client and Auth Server Using EAP;
the Switch Is the Middleman, but Is Aware of WhatÕs Going on
Send ID/Password Forward Credentials to ACS Server
Authentication SuccessfulAccept
802.1x RADIUS

Other Attacks

Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP)
¥ Runs at Layer 2 and allows Cisco devices
to chat with one another
¥ Can be used to learn sensible information
about the CDP sender (IP address,
software version, router model É)
¥ CDP is in the clear and unauthenticated
¥ Consider disabling CDP, or being very
selective in its use in security sensitive
environments (backbone vs. user port
may be a good distinction)
¥ Note: there was a reason Cisco developed
CDP, some Cisco apps make use of it!
CatOS> (enable) set cdp disable
<mod>/<port> | all
IOS(config)#no cdp run
IOS(config-if)#no cdp enable
0x2000SNAP
Proto

CDP Attacks
¥ Besides the information gathering benefit CDP offers an
attacker, there was a vulnerability in CDP that allowed
Cisco devices to run out of memory and potentially crash
if you sent it tons of bogus CDP packets
¥ If you need to run CDP, be sure to use IOS code with
minimum version numbers: 12.2(3.6)B, 12.2(4.1)S,
12.2(3.6)PB, 12.2(3.6)T, 12.1(10.1), 12.2(3.6) or CatOS code
6.3, 5.5, or 7.1 and later
¥ Problem was due to improper memory allocation for the
CDP process (basically there was no upper limit)
¥ Discovered by FX @ Phenolit
¥ For more information:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cdp_issue.shtml
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/139491

DHCP Starvation Attacks
¥ Anyplace where macof works, you can DoS a
network by requesting all of the available DHCP
addresses
¥ With or without the DoS, an attacker could use a
rogue DHCP server to provide addresses to clients
¥ Since DHCP responses include DNS servers and
default gateway entries, guess where the attacker
would point these unsuspecting users? JJJJ
¥ All the MITM attacks are now possible

DHCP Starvation Attack Mitigation
¥ Same techniques that mitigate CAM flooding, can mitigate DHCP
starvation but not the Rogue DHCP server (from the DHCP RFC
2131):
ÒThe client collects DHCPOFFER messages over a period of time, selects one DHCPOFFER
message from the (possibly many) incoming DHCPOFFER messages (e.g., the first
DHCPOFFER message or the DHCPOFFER message from the previously used server) and
extracts the server address from the 'server identifier' option in the DHCPOFFER
message. The time over which the client collects messages and the mechanism used to
select one DHCPOFFER are implementation dependent.Ó
¥ RFC 3118 ÒAuthentication for DHCP MessagesÓ will help, but has yet
to be implemented
¥ Consider using multiple DHCP servers for the different security
zones of your network
¥ DHCP Option 82 on the 3550 can help:
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/c3550/1219ea1/3550
scg/swdhcp82.htm
¥ Cisco is developing a DHCP ÒfirewallÓ for initial implementation in
our higher-end switches

Private VLAN Attacks 1/2
PVLANs Work
Drop Packet
Attacker
Mac:A IP:1
S:A1 D:B2
Victim
Mac:B IP:2
Promiscuous Port
Isolated Port
Router
Mac:C IP:3
XXXXXXXX

Attacker
Mac:A IP:1
Victim
Mac:B IP:2
Promiscuous Port
Isolated Port
Private VLAN Attacks 2/2
¥ Only allows unidirectional traffic (Victim will ARP for A and fail)
¥ If both hosts were compromised, setting static ARP entries for each
other via the router will allow bi-directional traffic
¥ Most firewalls will not forward the packet like a router
¥ Note: this is not a PVLAN vulnerability as it enforced the rules!
S:A1 D:C2
PVLANs Work
Forward Packet
S:A1 D:C2
Routers Route:
Forward Packet
S:A1 D:B2
S:A1 D:B2
Intended PVLAN Security Is Bypassed
Router
Mac:C IP:3

PVLAN Attack Mitigation
¥ Setup ACL on ingress router port:
IOS(config)#access-l 101 deny ip
localsubnet lsubmask localsubnet lsubmask
log
IOS(config)#access-l 101 permit ip any any
IOS(config-if)#ip access-group 101 in
¥ All known PVLAN exploits will now fail
¥ VLAN ACL (VACL) could also be used

Multicast Brute-Force Failover Analysis
¥ Send random Ethernet multicast frames to a
switch interface attempting to get frames to
another VLAN
M
-cast
Nice Try

Random Frame Stress Attack
¥ Send random frames to a switch interface
attempting to get frames to another VLAN
Nice Try
Fram
e

IP Telephony Considerations
¥ Most IP Telephony deployments use a distinct VLAN for
voice vs. data traffic
Done because of QoS and security considerations
Voice VLAN is called an ÒauxiliaryÓ VLAN and is set on the
phone via a CDP message (trunking can still be disabled)
All mentioned attack mitigation features work fine except
PVLANs and 802.1X which do not yet support aux VLANs
IP Telephony currently does not support confidentiality. Use the
techniques discussed in this presentation to mitigate the effects
of tools like Vomit. http://vomit.xtdnet.nl
04:16:06.652765 802.1Q vid 987 pri 0 1:0:c:cc:cc:cd > 0:8:e3:cf:1a:dd sap aa ui/C len=39
04:16:07.095781 0:8:e3:cf:1a:dd > 1:0:c:cc:cc:cd sap aa ui/C len=39
Tcpdump Output

Switch Management
¥ Management can be your weakest link
All the great mitigation techniques we talked about arenÕt worth much if the
attacker telnets into your switch and disables them
¥ Most of the network management protocols we know and love
are insecure (syslog, SNMP, TFTP, Telnet, FTP, etc.)
¥ Consider secure variants of these protocols as they become
available (SSH, SCP, SSL, OTP etc.), where impossible, consider
out of band (OOB) management
Put the management VLAN into a dedicated non-standard VLAN where
nothing but management traffic resides
Consider physically back-hauling this interface to your management
network
¥ When OOB management is not possible, at least limit access to
the management protocols using the Òset ip permitÓ lists on the
management protocols
¥ SSH is available on Cat 6K with CatOS 6.1 and Cat 4K/29XXG
with CatOS 6.3

Summary and Case Study

Layer 2 Security Best Practices 1/2
¥ Manage switches in as secure a manner as possible
(SSH, OOB, permit lists, etc.)
¥ Always use a dedicated VLAN ID for all trunk ports
¥ Be paranoid: do not use VLAN 1 for anything
¥ Set all user ports to non trunking
¥ Deploy port-security where possible for user ports
¥ Selectively use SNMP and treat community strings
like root passwords
¥ Have a plan for the ARP security issues in your
network

Layer 2 Security Best Practices 2/2
¥ Enable STP attack mitigation (BPDU Guard, Root Guard)
¥ Use private VLANs where appropriate to further divide L2
networks
¥ Use MD5 authentication for VTP
¥ Use CDP only where necessary
¥ Disable all unused ports and put them in an unused VLAN
¥ Consider 802.1X for the future
All of the Preceding Features Are Dependant on
Your Own Security Policy
All of the Preceding Features Are Dependant on
Your Own Security Policy

A Relevant Case Study
¥ Do you have a part of your network that looks like this?
Outside Inside
Internet Internal
vlan007 vlan008
¥ While it is technically feasible to make this ÒsecureÓ, consider the
ramifications:
What happens if the switch is compromised?
Does SECOPS control the VLAN settings on the switch? (likely not)
This means you now have NETOPS folks taking actions that could adversely affect
security
Realize your security perimeter now includes the switch
Security PerimeterSecurity Perimeter

A More Secure Alternative
Outside Inside
Internet Internal
New Security PerimeterNew Security Perimeter

Lessons Learned
¥ Carefully consider any time you must
count on VLANs to operate in a
security role
If properly configured, our testing did not
discover a method of VLAN Hopping using
Cisco switches
Pay close attention to the configuration
Understand the organizational implications
¥ Evaluate your security policy while
considering the other issues raised in
this session
Is there room for improvement?
What campus risks are acceptable based
on your policy?
¥ Deploy, where appropriate, L2
security best practices

Further Reading
¥ SAFE Blueprints
http://www.cisco.com/go/safe
¥ Improving Security on Cisco Routers
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/21.html
¥ Links in this presentation:
Port security:
http://cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/cat5000/rel_5_4/config/sec_port.htm
Switch Control Protocols: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/473/103.html
Ethernet Encapsulation Info: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/105/encheat.html
SANS VLAN paper (out of date):
http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/vlan.htm
Dsniff homepage: http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff
Ettercap homepage: http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/
PVLAN / VACL Design: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/473/90.shtml
PVLAN details:
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/cat6000/sw_7_1/conf_gd/vlans.
htm#xtocid854519
CDP vulnerability: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cdp_issue.shtml
DHCP Option 82:
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/c3550/1219ea1/3550scg/swdhcp
82.htm

Hacking Layer 2 - Enthernet Switcher Hacking Countermeasures.

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