Handbook-for-Value-Based-Billing-Engagements

Handbook for
value-based billing
engagements

ACC gratefully acknowledges
Kathryn Kirmayer and Matt Laws of Crowell & Moring
for contributing this valuable resource.

Overview............................................................................................1
Fixed (or Flat) Fees.............................................................................3
Fixed Fee with Collar..........................................................................7
Reverse Contingent Fees ...................................................................11
Success Fees.......................................................................................15
Performance-Based Holdbacks...........................................................19
Table of Contents
Copyright © 2014 Crowell & Moring and Association of Corporate Counsel
1/21/2015

1
The demand for value-based billing options presents in-house counsel and
their outside law firms with an opportunity to use the pricing of legal services to
better allocate risks and align incentives in ways that best suit the client’s goals for
a particular case or portfolio of work. Doing so requires an understanding of how
each fee structure shifts financial risks between the client and outside counsel,
and how this potentially affects the law firm’s staffing and case management.
Properly structured and implemented, value-based billing can nurture a long-term
partnership built on the creation of value for both client and law firm.
In the following pages we outline five value-based fee structures that are
increasingly being used by law departments: (1) fixed or flat fees; (2) fixed fees
with collars; (3) reverse contingent fees; (4) success fees; and (5) performance-
based holdbacks. Each of these basic fee structures allocates risk and affects law
firm incentives in different ways. We outline the incentives created by each fee
structure, and provide our recommendations of where each fee structure can be
used most effectively. Additionally, we provide sample language illustrating how
these fee structures can be adapted and tailored to specific engagements.
The fee structures covered here by no means represent the universe of value-
based billing. Rather, they should be seen as building blocks that can be combined
and sequenced in different ways. Combining different elements can give in-house
counsel additional flexibility and options for designing the optimal fee structure for
each engagement or relationship.
We hope these materials will help you to develop increased value and lasting
partnerships with your outside counsel.
Guide to Value-Based Billing

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I. HOW THEY WORK
A. Basic Structure
■■ At the outset of a matter, the client and the law firm agree on a fixed (or flat; we use the
two terms interchangeably in this handbook) fee to cover the cost of a defined scope of
legal work, instead of hourly billing.
■■ The fixed fee is established based on a mutually agreed upon scope of work,
and on shared projections of what the work should cost and the matter’s value
to the client.
■■ The fixed fee can be set in a variety of ways, including (1) as a periodic payment
(monthly, quarterly, annually); (2) per “life of matter”; (3) per each phase or defined
subset of work in a matter (e.g., motions to dismiss, discovery, dispositive motions);
or (4) for a portfolio of matters.
B. Considerations for Client
■■ The client eliminates risk of unpredictable legal costs due to expected or unexpected
fluctuations in the amount of lawyer time needed to handle the matter or group of
matters.
■■ The client assumes the risk of giving the law firm a “windfall” in the event the matter
can be resolved for much less effort than anticipated in arriving at the fixed fee (but the
fee presumably reflects that risk in the “what is it worth” assessment).
■■ The client has an incentive to expand the number of matters under the fixed fee, to
mitigate the risk of budgeting inaccuracies by diversifying the portfolio.
C. Considerations for Law Firm
■■ The law firm has greater incentive to staff matters as leanly as possible to achieve the
client’s objective, because the law firm profits are correlated directly with how well it
minimizes costs. Similarly, the law firm has a greater incentive to manage the case and
make strategic decisions that resolve the case using less aggregate attorney time.
Fixed (or flat) Fees

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■■ The law firm bears the downside risk in the event the matter (or portfolio of matters)
requires more effort than expected, making it unprofitable for the firm.
■■ The law firm may expand its relationship with and representation of the client through
the use of portfolio pricing.
D. Considerations for Both
■■ A clear statement of assumptions about the scope of work covered by the fee,
and how the project will be staffed and handled by the law firm, is critical to avoid
misunderstandings and tensions once underway.
■■ The value created by the law firm’s increased efficiency should be shared between the
client and the law firm over time. Avoid unsustainable, zero-sum engagements.
II. when THEY WORK
A. Best Uses
■■ Fixed fees are well-suited for a large portfolio of similar matters. By paying a fixed fee for
a portfolio of matters, the client and law firm can diversify the risk of under-budgeting or
over-budgeting that is otherwise inherent in any single matter.
Fixed fees are also well-suited for phase-based billing, because it is easier to assess the work required
for discrete phases of litigation than it is to estimate at the outset the total investment needed to
resolve the entire case. Over or under estimates in one phase can be offset in other phases.
■■ Fixed fees are easiest to use on matters with which both the client and law firm are
already familiar, which involve common issues and a common life cycle, reducing
variability in costs.
§§ For example, product liability litigation typically involves a large number of cases
with the same basic set of issues over a long period of time, and for which in-
house counsel needs to ensure a predictable level of legal spend. Using a fixed
fee for the entire portfolio leads to predictable costs and promotes efficient case
management and strategy, while the repeat nature of the litigation minimizes the
risk of inaccurate forecasting of costs.
B. Less Effective Uses
■■ Especially in matters requiring significant judgment and ongoing strategic decision-
making, fixed fees can be risky when used by a law firm and client that do not have
experience and comfort with each other’s expertise, work habits, and expectations.

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Fixed fees succeed in an environment of clear and open communication, trust, shared
risk, and loyalty.
■■ When combined with “shadow billing” (in which the law firm also provides bills
calculated on an hourly-rate basis for comparison purposes), the law firm incentives
can become perverse. Also, the inevitability of determining who “won” and who “lost”
under the flat fee arrangement undercuts the premise of the value-based agreement,
and retrenches reliance on hourly-based costs as reliable and appropriate.
■■ Used solely as a device to obtain the lowest price (as in an auction or RFP environment),
quality of service and ultimately results may suffer.
■■ Fixed fees require the support of senior leadership at both law firm and client, as even
the most thoughtful fixed fee arrangement can result in significant and unexpected
economic benefit or hardship to either the firm or the client.
III. SAMPLE ENGAGEMENT TERMS
Work-Based Fixed Fee – One Payment
We have agreed that we will perform the work described above for a flat fee of $xx. On a matter
such as this, we prefer to staff a small team of attorneys in order to increase efficiency. I will take the
lead on this matter, accompanied by a senior associate/counsel, one or two junior associates and a
paralegal. In the event this matter proceeds beyond the preliminary analysis described above, we will
want to discuss potential fee arrangements for any further phases of work on this matter.
Time-Based Fixed Fee – Installments
For the period of March, 2015 – January, 2016, [client] will pay [law firm] a flat fee of $xx million,
payable in eleven installments. The initial five payments will be in the amount of $aa, the subsequent
five payments in the amount of $bb, and a final payment of $cc will be submitted on or before January
31, 2016. The scope of work covered by the flat fee is described in the attached work plan. Expenses,
expert fees and vendor costs are outside the scope of this fixed fee agreement and will be billed
monthly on a pass through basis.
If developments in the litigation cause [law firm’s] work to expand outside the scope of the work plan
or contract, [client] and [law firm] will renegotiate the flat fee.
Portfolio Fixed Fee
This letter is a proposal for a fixed fee arrangement for counseling on global privacy matters between
[client] and [law firm]. To that end, we propose an arrangement whereby [client] would be able to call
upon [law firm] on an as-needed basis for rapid responses to spot global privacy counseling issues, a
concept that we believe will provide a cost-effective arrangement that encourages utilization of [law
firm’s] resources:

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1. The agreement would cover general counseling on global privacy matters (“Covered Matters”).
2. For its services in connection with Covered Matters, [law firm] would be paid a flat fee in monthly
installments of $aa.
In addition to the payment of fees provided for in this agreement, [client] would be responsible for
reasonable expenses and disbursements, if any, in accordance with the guidelines set forth in our
prior agreement.
3. To the extent that the value of [law firm’s] time for any single global privacy counseling matter
exceeds $bb (based on [law firm’s] standard rates), or by mutual agreement of [client] and [law
firm], a separate matter would be opened. If [client] elects to retain [law firm] for any such new
matters, fees for those matters would either be billed pursuant to our prior agreement or we can
negotiate a new arrangement specific to that matter.

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Fixed Fee with Collars
I. HOW THEY WORK
A. Basic Structure
■■ The client and law firm agree to a fixed fee, as well as a collar that is set as a percentage
of the fixed fee.
■■ Some level of shadow billing is employed to track the value of time actually spent (at
agreed hourly rates) against the fixed fee.
■■ If fees, as reflected in the shadow bills exceed the fixed fee by the amount of the collar,
then the client pays a percentage of the over-run. If less than the collar, the law firm
pays back a percentage of the savings to the client.
■■ The fixed fee aspect enhances the predictability of the legal spend and minimizes the
risk of unpredictable costs. It also gives client an opportunity to “practice” flat fee
pricing with less risk of an unexpected result.
■■ The collar does shift some of the risk of cost overrun back to the client (as compared to
a pure fixed fee), but the risk is smaller when compared to standard hourly billing. The
collar also protects the client (to some degree) against underworking by the firm once
the fixed fee has been reached.
■■ The collar retains the incentive for the law firm to work efficiently, while ensuring that
the law firm will not receive a “windfall.”
■■ The collar mitigates fixed fee risks. By allowing some true-up, the law firm bears less
risk of imperfect calculation of fee and unpredictability of costs, and so has more
incentive to move away from straight hourly billing. It is a good “starter” arrangement
for firms trying out flat fee pricing.
■■ The collar also gives the law firm an incentive to manage the case to the needs of

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the matter, not to the fee. The fixed fee makes overkill unprofitable, but the collar
provides some protection to the firm if the needs of the case require more effort than
expected.
■■ The collar enables the firm to give the client reassurance against a “windfall” situation.
■■ The fee structure focuses the conversation on “what should be done to achieve
objectives” in order to set the initial fee; collars act as buffers in the event there are
unexpected developments in either direction.
■■ Both the size of the collar (representing the risk assumed by each side) and the
percentage of rates to be paid outside the collar can be adjusted to insure against an
agreed level of inequity, but to retain the primary incentives for efficiency.
■■ The need for shadow billing can create perverse incentives, potentially sets up a
“winner/loser” environment, and eliminates one of the attractive features of a flat fee
arrangement (no hourly bill preparation or review).
II. when THEY WORK

A. Best Uses
■■ Where the matter is new in type or the scope of the matter is particularly hard to
define or predict, the collar structure mitigates the effects of fixed fees on the risk
borne by the law firm and the incentives with respect to managing the litigation.
■■ Collars can be an effective way to transition the client-law firm relationship away from
hourly billing toward fixed fees, while providing interim protection against “mistakes.”
■■ Administering the collar requires a commitment by the client and the law firm to the
true-up process. Where the motivation for a fixed fee is driven by a desire to minimize
the time and attention needed from in-house counsel on the billing process, the
administrative costs of collars may be a deterrent.
■■ Collar arrangements require the use of shadow billing, and shadow billing may
undercut the law firm’s incentive to maximize efficiency. It also continues to tie
the client and the law firm to the concept that fees resulting from an hourly rate
arrangement reflect the “real” or appropriate cost.

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We would like to present to [client] a flat fee proposal, effective January 1, 2015, to encompass all
Labor & Employment and Privacy matters throughout the United States. We estimate that the total
billings for [client’s] work for 2014 in this regard will be in the range of $xx million. This proposal is
to provide a flat fee for 2015 that is 10% less than the actual 2014 spend, subject to the following
principles:
1. The proposed flat fee is premised on a shared risk/shared reward principle. We would thus
propose that there be a 15% “collar” around the flat fee. If we are very successful in driving
down total legal costs (as measured by the agreed blended hourly rates and the hours spent),
[law firm] would be rewarded by receiving all the savings within the 15% lower collar, and would
then share in an additional 50% of the savings below the bottom collar amount. For example, if
the 2015 flat fee is $zz, and the actual 2015 spend is $aa, [client] would still pay the full flat fee
of $zz. If the actual spend were to be much lower, for example $bb, [client] would pay $cc (85%
of the $zz flat fee, equaling $dd, plus 50% of the difference between $dd and $bb). Conversely,
[law firm] shares the risk on the upside -- if the actual spend is $ee, for example, [client] would
still pay only $zz million. If the actual spend is likely to exceed the upper collar, the parties would
agree to review the reasons for that outcome, and could agree on an appropriate resolution. In
principle, however, we would envision that [client] would pay only 50% of the agreed blended
hourly rates, solely on the hours above the upper collar. That is, [law firm] would fully absorb the
first 15% of overage within the fixed fee proposal.
2. The fee proposal is premised on [client] retaining [law firm] at a flat fee of $ff to provide and
institute our compliance advice intended to reduce the source of litigation, as well as any other
areas designated by mutual agreement to reduce the outside counsel spend.
3. All expenses will be invoiced monthly and due on receipt of invoice.

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I. HOW THEY WORK
A. Basic Structure
■■ The fee is structured similarly to standard contingency fees used for recovery work,
except that the contingent fee is based on a percentage of the amount saved for the
client in the matter vs. a recovery amount.
■■ The client and law firm must agree in advance on the “fair value” of the exposure the
client faces if it loses the case, as well as the costs of full litigation.
■■ The reverse contingency fee is set as a percentage of the difference between the
value of the estimated exposure and the amount, if any, the client ultimately pays in
damages or settlement, plus avoided legal costs.
■■ A reverse contingency fee can be used alone or in conjunction with either discounted
hourly rates or a fixed fee.
■■ Like a standard contingency fee, the reverse contingency shifts some of the downside
risk of the litigation to the law firm, which can profit from the matter only if it obtains
an excellent result for the client. Thus, the reverse contingency aligns the client’s
and law firm’s incentives in defense cases in ways that are not possible with standard
hourly billing.
■■ A reverse contingency allows the client to demonstrate to the law firm the impact of
the litigation, both in terms of exposure and legal costs, to the client’s business. This,
in turn, can encourage a stronger partnership between the law firm and client, and
more effective management of the litigation by the law firm, because the law firm
better understands the litigation in its broader business context.
■■ The law firm has stronger financial incentives to achieve the best possible result
possible for the client, taking into account both the exposure on the claims and the
costs of defense.
Reverse Contingent Fees

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■■ The law firm has the incentive to staff and pursue the litigation in a more streamlined
and targeted manner, because the law firm’s margins increase the more it minimizes
costs while still achieving a successful result.
■■ The law firm will be less motivated to litigate for litigation’s sake, and more motivated
to pursue settlement or non-traditional litigation strategies that minimize impact of
litigation on the client’s bottom line.
II. when THEY WORK
A. Best Uses
■■ Reverse contingency fees are well-suited for large, sophisticated matters where the
client needs the best possible result, but is under pressure to minimize the total cost
of litigation. For example, they are well-suited to antitrust defense or IP litigation
where the client may perceive little merit to the underlying claim, but faces large
potential exposure and the likelihood of protracted and expensive litigation.
■■ Reverse contingency fees work best where the law firm and the client have a
preexisting relationship and the law firm understands the client’s business. This
allows for the client and law firm to more easily reach a common understanding of the
potential impact of the litigation and the basis for the reverse contingency.
■■ Because reverse contingency fees put a substantial amount of downside risk on the
law firm, and most defense-oriented law firms typically are not comfortable with the
economics of contingent fees, the reverse contingency model may be a better sell for
the law firm if combined with other fee arrangements that produce some interim cash
flow not tied to results.
■■ Reverse contingency fees are difficult to implement for matters where it will be
difficult to quantify the effect of a successful result on the client’s balance sheet or
income statement.
■■ A reverse contingency may be difficult to implement and a tough sell for management
because of the challenges of funding the contingency fee. Unlike a standard
contingency fee, there is no new source of revenue (like a settlement or judgment)
which can be used to fund the fee award at the conclusion of the litigation.

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Reverse Contingency with Fixed Fee
Fixed Fee: [Law firm] will be paid a fixed fee of $xx, regardless of additional discovery, post-hearing
briefs, or other procedural steps in the arbitration that are presently not known. Beyond the fixed
fee, [law firm] will continue to invoice [client] for costs.
Reverse Contingency: In the event, and at the time, of a final decision or settlement, [client] would
pay [law firm] a guaranteed bonus in addition to the amount earned under the fixed fee. The
amount of the guaranteed bonus would be determined as follows:
5% of the exposure amount that is avoided ($10 million total exposure determined at outset of
case). For example, if [client] only has to pay 1$ million then [law firm] will earn 5% of the $9
million avoided ($450,000).

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I. HOW THEY WORK
A. Basic Structure
■■ Client and outside counsel first define what results – interim or final – will constitute
a “success,” and defined bonuses are awarded for successes achieved. Successes
may include an early resolution at or below a particular total cost, achieving a desired
schedule, narrowing or avoiding discovery, winning a dispositive motion, or reducing
overall economic cost of the case below a certain agreed upon threshold.
■■ The law firm may also reduce its regular fee (whether hourly or flat), as a price for
sharing in the potential upside, and to reflect that an outcome that meets no definition
of success does not earn full fees. Alternatively, an explicit “broken deal discount” can be
established, so that if the transaction does not close successfully, or the matter is lost or
otherwise “fails,” a percentage of the fee otherwise earned is forfeited to the client.
■■ The defined successes, and defined failures, are often matters within the law firm’s ability to
influence, but not always. Sometimes the relationship between law firm and client supports
an “in it together” investment approach in which the law firm’s fortunes follow the client,
regardless of the firms ability to influence the outcome.
■■ Reduces case expense where the law firm is unable to deliver a successful outcome.
■■ At the outset, focuses on defining what the client’s objectives – business and legal –
are for the matter, so there are early, clear metrics against which the law firm’s
performance is measured.
■■ Forces early case/matter assessment; helps manage expectations and encourages
candid advice.
■■ Higher legal spend occurs only where the law firm delivers measurable value.
■■ Provides specific rewards for successful outcomes to align law firm incentives with
the client’s pre-determined metrics of success.
Success Fees

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■■ The law firm can realize premium returns.
■■ Rewards creative solutions that may be discouraged through pure hourly engagements
(under which the law firm is not rewarded for high value/low fee outcome).
■■ This arrangement requires substantial thought and communication at the outset of the
engagement. Ideally, business stakeholders are also included in designing the success-fee
triggers.
II. when THEY WORK
A. Best Uses
■■ Where the matter involves complex issues and uncertain levels of investment, such that
front-end collaboration on client goals sharply focuses the effort.
■■ Where creativity and quality of outside counsel will be a key component to achieving
success, as defined.
■■ Where “success” may not mean there is substantial incremental value created.
■■ Where degree of contribution by outside counsel to the successful outcome is
difficult to assess.
Transactional Fixed Fee by Phase with Success Bonus
We have agreed to represent [client] on a fixed fee by phase basis for the transaction detailed
previously which includes the phases set forth below. Each phase will be billed in full at the
commencement of the phase. If anything arises which falls outside of the detailed scope, it shall not
be a part of this agreement and must be separately negotiated by [client] and [firm]. We have also
included a success fee alongside our discounted fixed fees to further align our interests and share in
the inherent risks and rewards.
Phase 1 – Analysis, structure, initial diligence and assistance with identifying various
areas of due diligence - $aa

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Phase 2 – Drafting and negotiation of main and ancillary agreements - $bb
§§ Firm would be responsible for drafting all transaction documents,
including a definitive Purchase Agreement
§§ Two rounds of negotiation and two turns of the Purchase Agreement
§§ Negotiate other transaction documents
Phase 3 – Full due diligence including preparation of due diligence reports and
specialist review - $cc
§§ The diligence review will be staffed with the required experts from
the various disciplines, such as tax, intellectual property, employment,
benefits, etc.
Phase 4 – Preparation for, completion of documentation to execution and closing - $dd
§§ Finalize all agreements and prepare necessary consents and resolution for signing
§§ Closing
Total Fixed Fee: $xx
Success Fee
If the transaction closes, [firm] will receive a 10% bonus (measured on flat fee).
Litigation Fixed Fee by Phase with Success Bonus
[Client] will pay for [firm’s] services pursuant to a multi-phase fixed fee, with an additional success fee
component.
Fixed Fees
Phase 1: Case Assessment & Initial Pleadings: $aa
Phase 2: Discovery: $bb
Phase 3: Motion for Summary Judgment: $cc
Phase 4: Trial: $dd
The flat fee for each phase will be paid in installments, according to the schedule set forth below.
Success Fee
Success benchmarks and associated potential success fees are identified below. It is assumed that
earlier successes are worth more than later successes, both for business reasons and because they
avoid greater legal expense. [Firm] does not want to claim success for a result that our efforts did not
facilitate, so where that might be the case, [firm] will defer to [client’s] judgment.

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Resolution
Commercial resolution prior to
service of Complaint
(if facilitated, in [client’s] judgment, by our
inputs and efforts to set up the case for defense)
Case dismissed on 12(b)(6) motion
(and upheld on appeal)
Case dismissed on a
Motion for Summary Judgment
(and upheld on appeal)
Success Fee
$A to $B
(sliding scale, in [client’s] discretion,
based on our contribution)
$C
$D to $E
(sliding scale, in [client’s] discretion,
based on our contribution)

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I. HOW THEY WORK
A. Basic Structure
■■ A holdback is not a stand-alone fee structure, but an overlay on traditional hourly
billing or fixed fees.
■■ At the outset of the relationship, the client and the law firm agree on a set of
performance metrics against which the law firm will be measured. Often these are law
firm service-related, rather than (or in addition to) outcome related.
■■ A percentage of the fee is “held back” by the client (or by the firm). The law firm and the
client meet at regular intervals to assess the law firm’s performance against the metrics
and the holdback amount is paid to the law firm based on this evaluation.
■■ A holdback can be used in connection with a specific matter or for part or all of the client’s
relationship with the law firm.
■■ A holdback is broader and more flexible than a contingency fee or a success fee. The
holdback can be assessed on the basis of a successful outcome, efficient resolution,
effective use of cost-saving measures, contribution toward client’s business objectives,
service excellence, “client delight,” or any combination of these or other criteria.
■■ Holdbacks encourage outside counsel to share in the downside risks of a matter, with the
potential to participate in the upside. The client, in turn, is better protected against cost
overruns and incurring large costs for unsuccessful outcomes.
■■ Holdbacks can make more cost-neutral the decision between retaining a higher-rate firm,
but one better equipped for the matter, versus a lower-rate, but less experienced firm.
The holdback allows the client to demand that the higher-rate firm prove that its higher
rates are justified by the expertise and experience it offers. Justifies its rates through
result-oriented expertise.
■■ Holdbacks allow the client to hold the law firm accountable on a regular basis through
periodic reviews. Holdbacks also encourage the client to re-evaluate the ways in which
Performance-Based Holdbacks

20
law firms create value for the business and determine the best ways for measuring
that value.
■■ Holdbacks can promote a better working relationship between in-house and outside
counsel.
■■ Rather than arguing over fees, in-house and outside counsel engage in a regular
dialogue about how the law firm is creating value.
■■ A holdback creates a penalty for the perceived drawbacks of the hourly billing model,
such as overstaffing or overworking certain tasks.
■■ A holdback creates incentives similar to a success fee, but offers the law firm more
downside protection and is thus more adaptable to the economic structure of large
law firms.
■■ The attorneys managing the matter are encouraged to actively manage the matter in
ways that most align with the client’s broader objectives.
■■ The attorneys managing the matter are encouraged to actively understand the client’s
business and how their work fits with the client’s larger business objectives. When
used across a portfolio of work, holdbacks encourage the firm to develop a stronger
overall partnership with the client than under the traditional hourly billing model.
■■ Ultimately, holdbacks are intended to focus the law firm on developing highly satisfied
clients, who are willing to acknowledge when value has been created by outside
counsel.
■■ Both the law firm and the client must feel comfortable giving and receiving feedback,
including subjective feedback.
■■ If and when it is fairly earned, the client must be ready, willing and able to pay the law
firm the holdback. An upfront conversation about any practical or political limitations
on making such payments in the future may drive towards a lower holdback amount
or different holdback criteria.

21
II. when THEY WORK
A. Best Uses
■■ Holdbacks require commitment on the part of the client and the law firm to an
ongoing dialogue regarding the law firm’s performance and whether it is meeting
the client’s objectives. This commitment can be a substantial investment in time, so
holdbacks are better suited for large matters, or portfolios of matters, that justify this
investment.
■■ Holdbacks work best where the client and the law firm have an ongoing relationship,
making it easier for the client and law firm to define mutually-acceptable performance
criteria, and for the law firm to trust the client to be fair.
■■ Building a bonus into the holdback, (e.g., 15% holdback, with a potential 5% bonus
over and above the holdback amount if certain criteria are met) can further encourage
the law firm to commit to the process of defining and evaluating performance and
value.

■■ There will be some matters for which holdbacks are ill-suited because of the difficulty
of defining the performance metrics.
■■ Holdbacks may not be appropriate for relatively small matters, because the size of the
engagement or relationship does not justify the investment by in-house and outside
counsel in the periodic performance evaluations.
Holdback for Entire Relationship
We propose a firm-wide fee structure for all 2015 legal work done on or after February 1, 2015 that
provides a 10% discount and 10% holdback applied to our standard hourly rates.
The 10% of fees would be held back – along with the 10% applied discount – from each bill. We
would then work with you to define objectives which would potentially entitle us to a return of some
or all of the 10% holdback. Of course, if we were unsuccessful in achieving these objectives, you
would keep the 10%. The discount is premised on the prompt payment of billing statements. Our
proposal introduces a “risk/reward” component to our relationship. Overall, our goal is to develop
a fee structure which (1) is financially attractive to [client], (2) creates incentives to attract our best
lawyers to this work, (3) injects a risk/reward component into the relationship that further aligns us
on key objectives, and (4) is easy to administer across a range of matters.

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We have discussed how our performance will be evaluated and your concern that holdback
determinations may create the potential for disputes between [law firm] and [client], particularly
since some number of objectives will have a subjective component. To make certain that there
is never a dispute about whether [law firm] should or should not receive some or all of the 10%
holdback, [law firm] agrees that such determination will be entirely up to [client], in its sole
discretion. We propose to develop objectives for our existing work over the next 60 days. Additional
objectives would be added if our work evolves and expands over time. Finally, we propose that
we address the extent to which [law firm] should receive some or all of the holdback after this rate
agreement has been in effect for a full year.
Holdback for Single Litigation
We would like to propose a value-based billing arrangement (VBB) pursuant to which [law firm]
would be responsible for bringing to a resolution the claims in the litigation. This memorandum
outlines an approach that we think would address [client’s] key business and cost objectives for the
case. We are happy to discuss other approaches, as well.
■■ [Law firm] will invoice [client] 85% of the total value of time recorded. The remaining
15% will be deemed the “holdback amount.”
■■ [Law firm] will have the opportunity to earn, and receive payment of the full holdback
amount at the discretion of [client].
■■ [Law firm] will also have the opportunity to earn, and receive payment of, a
performance bonus of up to ten percent (10%) over and above the holdback amount,
again at the discretion of [client].
■■ Whether [law firm] earns back all or some of the holdback amount or performance
bonus for this matter shall be determined based on [client’s] assessment of [law
firm’s] performance against established criteria, such as quality, results, creativity,
efficiency and cost-consciousness, and utilization of internal [client] resources. The
criteria shall be established in advance but, by way of example, a performance bonus
might be warranted if we dispose of the case on summary judgment and/or obtain a
satisfactory mediated settlement that advances [client’s] business objectives.
■■ Holdback determinations will be made each year by a date certain (e.g., at the end of
[client’s] fiscal year, at the end of the calendar year) or at the conclusion of the matter,
whichever comes first.

Handbook-for-Value-Based-Billing-Engagements

Handbook-for-Value-Based-Billing-Engagements

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