IMF, PERU SELECT ISSUES

© 2009 International Monetary Fund February 2009
IMF Country Report No. 09/41
Peru: Selected Issues
This Selected Issues paper for Peru was prepared by a staff team of the International Monetary Fund as
background documentation for the periodic consultation with the member country. It is based on the
information available at the time it was completed on January 14, 2009. The views expressed in this
document are those of the staff team and do not necessarily reflect the views of the government of Peru
or the Executive Board of the IMF.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
PERU
Selected Issues
Prepared by Luis Breuer, Mercedes García-Escribano, María González, and Juan Alonso
Peschiera (all WHD), Daniel Leigh (FAD), and Giancarlo Gasha (MCM)
Approved by the Western Hemisphere Department
January 14, 2009
Contents Page
I. Macroeconomic Stability and the Role of Fiscal Policy ........................................................3
II. Disentangling the Motives for Foreign Exchange Intervention in Peru................................8
A. A Look at the Motives for Intervention Over the Broader Horizon .........................9
B. Recent Evolution of the Foreign Exchange Intervention Function.........................13
C. Conclusion...............................................................................................................14
Technical Appendix.................................................................................................................15
III. Credit Growth: Anatomy and Policy Responses ...............................................................18
A. Anatomy of the Recent Credit Expansion...............................................................18
B. Is There a Credit Boom? .........................................................................................20
C. The Policy Responses to Address Rapid Credit Growth.........................................22
IV. Regional Disparities and Public Transfers ........................................................................30
A. Poverty Alleviation, Regional Disparities and the Decentralization Process .........30
B. The Equalization Role of Intergovernmental Transfers in Peru .............................31
C. Some Further Reforms for Consideration...............................................................37
D. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................39
Annex 1. Peru: Distribution of Equalization and Shared-Transfers ........................................41
Annex 2. Regression Results ...................................................................................................42
V. Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities in a Dollarized Economy....................................................47
A. Public Sector ...........................................................................................................48
B. Banking Sector........................................................................................................49
C. Corporate Sector......................................................................................................50
D. Household Sector....................................................................................................51

2
Tables
II. 1. Variable and Data Description.................................................................................16
III. 1. Macroeconomic Policy Response............................................................................25
2. Prudential and Supervisory Policy Response ..........................................................26
IV. 1. Evolution of Poverty Rates, 2005–07......................................................................31
2. Current Revenue Sources of Subnational Governments, 2007................................32
A1. Regression of Change in Poverty Rate on Central Government
Transfers—Full Sample...............................................................................................42
A2. Impact of Poverty Rates on the Effective Use of Transfers—Full Sample ..........43
A3. Regression of Change in Poverty Rate on Central Government
Transfers—Reduced Sample .......................................................................................44
A4. Impact of Poverty Rates on the Effective Use of Transfers—Reduced Sample...45
V. 1. Bank Loans and Dollarization Coeffecient per Economic Sector ...........................49
2. Banking Sector Stress Test to Currency-Related Risks...........................................50
3. Consumer and Mortgage Loans...............................................................................51
Figures
I. 1. Government Revenue, Expenditure, and Fiscal Impulse, 2004–08...........................3
2. Raw-Materials Demand Shock and Fiscal Policy Cyclicality...................................6
II. 1. Foreign Exchange Intervention and Nominal Exchange Rate...................................8
2. Intervention Response Due to Smoothing and Precautionary Motives ...................10
3. Foreign Exchange Intervention and Precautionary Motive .....................................11
4. Autonomy and Persistence of Intervention..............................................................12
5. Impact of Inflation Surprises ...................................................................................12
6. Intervention Response Due to Smoothing Motive...................................................13
7. Precautionary: NIR Deviations from Benchmark....................................................14
III. 1. Financial Sector Indicators ......................................................................................19
2. Is There a Credit Boom in Peru? Total Credit.........................................................21
3. Credit Cycles in Domestic Currency by Type of Institution ...................................23
4. Credit Cycle in Foreign Currency by Type of Institution........................................24
IV. 1. Peru: Allocation by Department of Intergovernmental Transfers, 2007 .................40

3
I. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY 1
1. During the recent years of strong growth and high commodity prices, the
Peruvian authorities have conducted a prudent fiscal policy, maintaining a broadly
neutral fiscal stance. During 2004–08, while the revenue-to-GDP ratio increased
3.7 percentage points, the expenditure ratio rose only 0.9 percentage points (Figure 1).
Expenditure control focused on current spending, and coincided with increasing government
investment aimed at enhancing public access to infrastructure and social services. Overall,
during 2004–08, the estimated fiscal impulse, measured as a structural balance loosening,
averaged -0.2 percent of GDP, i.e., a broadly neutral fiscal stance.2
Fiscal policy has also
outperformed budgets approved by Congress, owing to higher-than-anticipated revenue, as
well as the need to limit inflationary pressures. For instance, .in 2008, the balanced budget
approved by Congress would have implied a procyclical fiscal impulse, as measured by the
change in the estimated structural balance, of about 3 percent of GDP. However, in response
to rising inflation, the authorities announced in April an operative target for the fiscal surplus
of 2 percent of GDP, which is currently expected to be the outturn.
Figure 1. Government Revenue, Expenditure, and Fiscal Impulse, 2004–08
(Percent of GDP)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenue Expenditure
-0.3
-0.1
-1.2
-0.5
1.2
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Fiscal Impulse
Source: Peruvian authorities and IMF staff estimates.
2. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of a neutral fiscal stance in minimizing the
impact of shocks on the economy. In particular, the analysis assesses how macroeconomic
stability compares under a neutral fiscal stance and alternative strategies, such as a balance-
budget approach. The paper also considers how the stabilizing properties of a neutral stance
can be affected by errors in estimating potential revenue levels. This question is particularly
relevant in an economy experiencing structural change, with a large informal sector, and
when international commodity prices fluctuate widely.
1
Prepared by Daniel Leigh.
2
A neutral fiscal stance is defined as no change in the structural fiscal balance (Lema and Moreno, 2008).

4
3. The analytical framework is provided by the Global Integrated Monetary and
Fiscal Model (GIMF). The model used here is a 2-country version of GIMF (Peru and the
rest of the world) that shares many features with general equilibrium models introduced in
central banks around the world. A key addition has been a model for the commodities sector,
with commodity output modeled as an endowment. Commodity prices fluctuate with shocks
to foreign industrial demand for these goods. The resulting swings in commodity prices
generate fluctuations in government revenues. The model’s fiscal transmission mechanism is
based on multiple non-Ricardian features. The structural parameters regarding household
preferences and firm technology are set following Kumhof and Laxton (2007), who
calibrated GIMF for the case of Chile and the rest of the world.
4. Fiscal policy in the model includes a target for the fiscal surplus. To reduce
volatility from the business cycle and commodity-price shocks, the fiscal surplus is allowed
to change with deviations of tax and commodity revenues from their trend levels. For the
purpose of this paper, the fiscal rule is expressed as:
t t t t
t t
t
t
fbal x x
d d
gdp gdp gdp
τ τ
φ
∗ ∗
∗ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛−
= + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞−
⎟
⎠
(1)
where
t
t
gdp
fbal
is the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio. If the response parameter d = 0, the fiscal
balance is kept equal to at all times, regardless of the economy’s cyclical position and all
deviations of revenues from their trend levels are spent. Such an approach, defined here as a
“balanced budget” approach, is procyclical. As the response parameter increases, a greater
share of the cyclical excess revenue is saved. A neutral fiscal stance involves setting d equal
to one. Such an approach corresponds to a structural fiscal rule (as implemented in Chile).
The adjustment of fiscal policy in the model occurs through lump-sum transfers to all
households, which are adjusted to achieve the desired fiscal surplus. The model is calibrated
to Peru’s historical fiscal performance. The steady-state fiscal balance, , is set equal to
zero.
∗
φ
∗
φ
3
To investigate the role of errors in estimating potential revenues, the analysis modifies
the fiscal reaction to include perceptions of potential revenues that may deviate persistently
from the true potential revenues.
3
The results regarding the short-run stabilizing properties fiscal policies are robust to alternative values for the
steady-state fiscal balance .
∗
φ

5
5. The key results are the following:
• In the context of persistently high commodity prices, Peru’s broadly neutral
fiscal stance has contributed substantially to macroeconomic stability compared
to a balanced-budget approach. Following a balanced budget approach, as in the
case of the 2008 budget, or running a fiscal deficit, as implied by the 2007 budget,
would have destabilized output and inflation, contributed to a real appreciation of the
currency and potential Dutch disease” effects, and raised the burden on monetary
policy in addressing inflation. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 reports the dynamics
of GDP, inflation, interest rates, real exchange rates, and the current account
following an increase in the foreign demand that raises the price of commodities by
50 percent. The shock raises domestic income, and results in an improvement in the
external current account balance, leading to an increase in domestic demand.
Monetary policy tightens in response to the higher associated inflation, inducing a
real appreciation of the currency. A neutral fiscal stance implies that a larger
proportion of the revenue increase is saved, and that smaller interest rate increases are
required to stabilize inflation. The smaller interest rate increases also reduce the
degree of currency appreciation, and imply less crowding out of private investment
and exports in the noncommodity sector. By contrast, a balanced-budget approach
implies a procyclical increase in spending that stimulates aggregate demand, and
implies the need for more monetary tightening to address inflation.
• The superiority of a neutral fiscal stance over a balanced-budget approach is
robust to the inclusion of misperceptions regarding potential revenue levels. In
particular, the analysis suggests that a neutral fiscal stance offers greater
macroeconomic stability than a balanced-budget approach even in the presence of
misperception shocks, unless the severity of misperceptions is implausibly high.
• Going forward, institutional reform to ensure the continuation of this prudent
performance in an environment of volatile commodity prices is warranted. In
particular, the adoption of a structural-balance rule would formalize the broadly
neutral stance followed in recent years, provide a medium-term anchor for fiscal
policy, and strengthen the credibility of fiscal policy by ensuring a balanced budget
over the economic cycle. To alleviate concerns on assessing the stage of the economic
cycle, the authorities could consider establishing independent expert panels as in
Chile (OECD, 2006).

6
Figure 2. Raw-Materials Demand Shock and Fiscal Policy Cyclicality
(Deviation from Steady State Baseline)
0 20 40
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
GDP
0 20 40
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Inflation
0 20 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Nominal Interest Rate
0 20 40
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Real Exchange Rate
0 20 40
-1
0
1
2
3
4
CA Balance/GDP
0 20 40
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Fiscal Balance/GDP
Quarters
Percentagepoints
d
d=1, structural-balance
d=0, budget-balance
d=1, structural-balance
d=0, budget-balance
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Source: GIMF simulations. Note: d=0 corresponds to a balance-budget approach, while d=1
corresponds to a neutral stance/structural-balance approach. The lines become lighter as the
policy approach moves from d=0 to d=1.

7
References
Kumhof, Michael, and Douglas Laxton, 2007, “Chile’s Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule: A
Model-based Evaluation,” Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. ---.
Lema, Rubén, and Eduardo Moreno, 2008, “Metodología de Cálculo del Resultado
Estructural,” Notas de Estudios del BCRP, No. 51, September 22, 2008.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006, “Budgeting in Chile,”
OECD Journal on Budgeting, Volume 4 Issue 2.

8
II. DISENTANGLING THE MOTIVES FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION IN PERU4
6. Since the inception of its inflation-targeting framework (ITF) in 2003, Peru’s
central bank has frequently intervened in the foreign exchange market. While ITFs are
often associated with the implementation of flexible exchange rate regimes, Peru’s ITF has
been designed to allow the central bank to respond to the risks posed by the still high
financial dollarization, including those generated by drastic exchange rate swings on the
economy’s balance sheets. In particular, intervention policy has sought both“...the
moderation of excessive exchange rate volatility [...] and maintaining a high level of central
bank international reserves (NIR)” (Armas and Grippa, 2006, pp. 4), including against the
backdrop of high and sustained capital inflows recorded in the last few years.
7. The central bank’s focus o
exchange rate smoothing has bee
documented empirically. In
particular, Humala and Rodriguez
(2008) have emphasized the
presence of a smoothing motive for
the period 1994–2007, with their
evidence suggesting that foreign
exchange intervention in Peru has
been induced both by a volatility-
reducing goal as well as an intention
to moderate the deviations of the
exchange rate from its trend.
n
n
5
Source: Banco Central de la Republica del Peru.
Figure 1: Foreign Exchange Intervention and Nominal Exchange Rate
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1-Feb-01
15May01
23-Aug-01
5-Dec-01
15-Mar-02
27-Jun-02
10-Oct-02
21-Jan-03
2May03
12-Aug-03
19-Nov-03
1-Mar-04
16-Jun-04
28-Sep-04
11-Jan-05
22-Apr-05
4-Aug-05
14-Nov-05
21-Feb-06
5-Jun-06
14-Sep-06
26-Dec-06
4-Apr-07
17-Jul-07
25-Oct-07
5-Feb-08
21-May-08
2-Sep-08
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.7
3.9
Central Bank Intervention (as a share of market
turnover)
Nominal exchange rate (PEN/US$, right axis)
Full-Fledged Inflation
Targeting RegimeTransition Period
8. This paper looks further into the central bank’s intervention policy from an
empirical perspective. It seeks to differentiate between the authorities’ intention to smooth
exchange rate movements from the explicit intention to accumulate reserves purely due to
precautionary reasons. In particular, the paper studies the evolution in the relative weight of
such motives in the intervention function since the inception of the inflation targeting regime
and at detail over the past 18 months.
9. The findings suggest that while a smoothing motive for intervention
predominated in the last few years, the importance of the precautionary motive has been
increasing. Peru’s inflation targeting period has been characterized by large and significant
parameters indicating a strong tendency to moderate exchange rate fluctuations, although this
4
This paper was prepared by Maria Gonzalez.
5
Arena y Tuesta (1999) have also shown that foreign exchange rate intervention was geared toward reducing
exchange rate volatility during the 1990s, prior to the implementation of the inflation targeting regime.

9
has declined over the last year. In contrast, the expected impact of the precautionary motive
on the intervention function has gained strength—reflecting first the authorities’ intention to
accumulate a reserve buffer in the context of large capital inflows, and later their use of such
buffer as global uncertainties heightened.
10. The paper presents several estimations of the central bank’s implicit foreign
exchange intervention function. The model is estimated with daily data between
January 2001 to late September 2008, building over a widely known specification of the
intervention function (see Appendix). This allows to differentiate empirically for the
importance of the smoothing motive from the precautionary motive in the central bank’s
intervention decisions:
• The estimation includes three simultaneous definitions of the smoothing motive:
first, limiting the speed of the exchange rate change from day to day; second,
moderating the exchange rate deviation from a trend (given by the 90-day moving
average), and third, reducing exchange rate volatility (measured as the GARCH-based
conditional variance).6
• The precautionary motive is measured as the gap between the level of the net
international reserves relative to an implicit “optimal” reserve benchmark. Such
a benchmark is assumed to equal the total of public external debt plus dollarized
deposits in the previous quarter (Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006; Batini and
Peschiera, 2007).7
• A measure on inflation news is also introduced, to control econometrically for
foreign exchange intervention aimed at supporting the inflation target.
11. The exercise relies on standard estimation techniques. In particular, the model is
estimated through ordinary least-squares (Galati and Disyatat, 2007) to gauge the impact of
the potential motives over the authorities’ intervention in the foreign exchange market (see
Appendix for a description of the expected signs on estimated coefficients). 8
A. A Look at the Motives for Intervention Over the Broader Horizon
12. A first estimation gauges the parameters of the intervention function over the
inflation targeting period. Specifically, the model is estimated for each year of the full-
6
Estimates based on the 90-day moving standard deviation do not alter the thrust of the results presented here.
7
Estimates based on alternative optimal reserve benchmarks measured as: (1) the 90-day moving average of
NIR; and (2) the daily level of bank obligations in US dollars subject to reserve requirements (TOSE) are
available upon request and do not alter our conclusions.
8
Estimates based on a PROBIT model allows us to verify for the robustness of our estimates, and are available.

10
fledged inflation targeting framework in 2004–08 as well as the transition year (2003) to test
for structural changes in the parameters of the intervention function.9
13. The results suggest that:
• The smoothing motive has generally dominated the intervention function over the
whole inflation targeting period. The central bank has generally attempted to
moderate large deviations of the exchange rate from its 90-day trend during the
inflation targeting period, although in 2007 it has also focused on mitigating the
acceleration of the exchange rate and exchange rate volatility (Figure 2, charts 1–3).
Results also hint at a reduced importance of the smoothing motive in 2008, and
greater tolerance for flexibility.
Figure 2: Intervention Response due to Smoothing and Precautionary Motives 1/ 2/ 3/
Smoothing: One-Day Acceleration
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2003 (T) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Smoothing: Deviation from Trend
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
2003 (T) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Smoothing: Exchange-Rate Volatility
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
2003 (T) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: Author's estimates
1/ OLS estimation, based on White-heteroskedasticity-robust confidence intervals, at 95 percent of confidence.
2/ Based on a measure of volatility equal to the conditional variance derived from a GARCH (1,1) model.
3/ Based on optimal reserves defined as the total of public external debt plus dollarized deposits in the previous quarter (Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006).
Precautionary: NIR Deviation from Benchmark
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2003 (T) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
9
The stages of implementation are described in Armas and Grippa (2006) and Rossini and Vega (2007).

11
• The precautionary
motive has gained
relevance in the last
two years. The
desire to accumulate
a comfortable level
of reserves—
equivalent at least to
the level of public
external debt plus
US-dollar
denominated deposits
in the banking
system—became
statistically
significant in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 2, chart 4). These results suggest the authorities’
greater comfort in selling foreign exchange since mid-2008, as the central bank’s
reserve buffer exceeded the estimated optimal level (Figure 3).10
• The central bank’s intervention on any certain day is positively correlated to
intervention in the previous day, generating “intervention episodes.” This
“degree of persistence” was positive and statistically significant throughout 2003–08,
explaining the clustering observed in the intervention data. The constant of the
regression in the intervention function reflects the level of the central bank’s
“autonomous” intervention in the market—that is, the intervention that cannot be
attributed to the authorities’ smoothing or precautionary motives. However, such
“autonomous intervention” has not been statistically significant during most of the
period under analysis (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Foreign Exchange Intervention and Precautionary Motive
Source: Banco Central de la Republica del Peru.
-120
-70
-20
30
80
2-Jan-03
10-Apr-03
22-Jul-03
31-Oct-03
11-Feb-04
28May04
9-Sep-04
22-Dec-04
5-Apr-05
14-Jul-05
25-Oct-05
2-Feb-06
17May06
25-Aug-06
5-Dec-06
16-Mar-07
27-Jun-07
5-Oct-07
17-Jan-08
28-Apr-08
13-Aug-08
Central Bank Intervention (as a share of market turnover)
Deviation of NIR from Optimal Reserve Level (as a share of Optimal Reserve level)
10
The estimated regression coefficient for the precautionary motive in 2006 is significant but with an
unexpected positive sign, reflecting an increased reduction in the level of reserves when these were still below
the benchmark given by public external debt and dollarized deposits.

12
Figure 4: Autonomy and Persistence of Intervention 1/
1/ OLS estimation, based on White-heteroskedasticity-robust confidence intervals, at 95 percent of confidence.
Autonomous Level of Intervention (Constant)
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
2003 (T) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Persistence (Lagged Intervention)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
2003 (T) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
• The “inflation news” have
not generally had an
impact on the level of
intervention, confirming
that Peru’s ITF enjoys a
high level of credibility.
Generally, if the central
bank’s Taylor-type rule is
regarded as credible and
effective, there would be no
need to use foreign exchange
intervention to assist
inflation reach its official
target. This is consistent with estimating statistically insignificant coefficients for the
impact of inflation news on the level of foreign-exchange intervention, as it occurs
largely throughout the sample period (Figure 5). However, estimates also indicate that
in 2007 there was a statistically significant effect of inflation surprises on foreign
exchange intervention. This suggests that the central bank expected to raise its own
policy rate ITF whenever inflation exceeded expectations, and was aware that such a
policy decision would trigger further capital inflows. This effect, while still attesting
to the credibility of the ITF, also hints at a weakening of monetary policy
independence during 2007, as the high levels of global liquidity exacerbated the
response of capital inflows to exchange rate differentials.
1/ OLS estimation, based on White-heteroskedasticity-robust
confidence intervals, at 95 percent of confidence.
Figure 5: Impact of Inflation Surprises
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
2003 (T) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

13
B. Recent Evolution of the Foreign Exchange Intervention Function
14. Recursive model’s estimates for the past two years confirm above’s results:11
• The importance of the smoothing motive has diminished, but remains significant
in the context of rising global uncertainties. The magnitude of all of the
coefficients of the implicit intervention function linked to the smoothing motive
declined in recent months, suggesting that intervention is responding less than before
to exchange rate movements, and that the central bank is tolerating greater flexibility
(Figure 6). However, some of these coefficients—particularly those linked to the
deviation of the exchange rate from its trend, and to the exchange rate volatility—
have become statistically significant since the Summer of 2008, suggesting that while
the central bank has greater tolerance toward exchange rate fluctuations, it continues
to moderate them, in light of the risks posed by the deterioration in the global
environment.
Figure 6: Intervention Response Due to Smoothing Motive 1/ 2/
Smoothing: One-Day Acceleration
0
20
40
60
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
28-
Feb-
07
10-
Apr-
07
18-
may-
7
26-
Jun-
07
3-
Aug-
07
12-
Sep-
07
22-
Oct-
07
29-
Nov-
07
9-
Jan-
08
15-
Feb-
08
27-
Mar-
08
6-
May-
08
18-
Jun-
08
25-
Jul-
08
5-
Sep-
08
Smoothing: Deviation from Trend
-5
5
15
25
-45
-35
-25
-15
28-
Feb-
07
11-
Apr-
07
22-
may-
7
2-
Jul-
07
9-
Aug-
07
19-
Sep-
07
30-
Oct-
07
10-
Dec-
07
21-
Jan-
08
28-
Feb-
08
10-
Apr-
08
27-
May-
08
4-
Jul-
08
15-
Aug-
08
25-
Sep-
08
Smoothing: Volatility (1)
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
28-
Feb-
07
11-
Apr-
07
22-
may-
7
2-
Jul-
07
9-
Aug-
07
19-
Sep-
07
30-
Oct-
07
10-
Dec-
07
21-
Jan-
08
28-
Feb-
08
10-
Apr-
08
27-
May-
08
4-
Jul-
08
15-
Aug-
08
25-
Sep-
08
Smoothing: Volatility (2)
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
12-
Dec-
07
2-
Jan-
08
21-
Jan-
08
7-
Feb-
08
26-
Feb-
08
14-
Mar-
08
4-
Apr-
08
23-
Apr-
08
13-
May-
08
5-
Jun-
08
24-
Jun-
08
11-
Jul-
08
1-
Aug-
08
20-
Aug-
08
9-
Sep-
08
11
The estimation covers September 2006 to September 2008, with a rolling 126-day sample window.

14
• The precautionary motive has
remained largely significant in
the past two years. Estimates
indicate a tendency to build the
reserve buffer throughout 2007,
at the peak of the capital
inflows. At the same time, there
is evidence that the
desaccumulation of reserves
became more comfortable as the
existing buffer rose relative to it
benchmark level, and since the
developments in global capital
markets after mid-2008.
1/ OLS estimation, based on White-heteroskedasticity-robust
confidence intervals, at 95 percent of confidence.
Figure 7. Precautionary: NIR Deviations from Benchmark
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
28-
Feb-
07
11-
Apr-
07
22-
may-
7
2-
Jul-
07
9-
Aug-
07
19-
Sep-
07
30-
Oct-
07
10-
Dec-
07
21-
Jan-
08
28-
Feb-
08
10-
Apr-
08
27-
May-
08
4-
Jul-
08
15-
Aug-
08
25-
Sep-
08
C. Conclusion
15. Peru’s high dollarization, its need to rebuild reserves, and the presence of large
capital inflows have been important factors driving foreign exchange intervention.
Evidence suggests that the authorities have frequently chosen to smooth the exchange rate
movements to mitigate risks of sharp relative price adjustments that could stress the
economy’s balance sheets. Moreover, they have also become focused about maintaining a
robust reserve buffer against contingencies that might emerge from external shocks—
particularly given the uncertain global environment.
16. The results also suggest that greater exchange rate flexibility has accompanied
the intervention policy. In particular, estimates indicate that the authorities have balanced
the heightened uncertainties in the international financial system by intervening somewhat
less heavily to smooth the exchange rate path and moderate exchange rate volatility, thus
allowing for a more rapid adjustment of the exchange rate to market conditions.

15
Technical Appendix
17. The paper presents a battery of estimations of the central bank’s foreign
exchange intervention function. We estimate the model for daily data during the period
January 2001 to late September 2008, building over a general specification of the
intervention function widely used in the literature (Gersl and Holub, 2006):
t
i
t
K
i
i
j
X
N
εθ ++
⎪⎭⎪⎩ ⎥⎦⎢⎣
∑=
=
1
1
tI
tNews
)ln( 1−Δ te
tt
N
j
ttttt DevNIRVol
e
eeNewsII
t
φγγγββα ++
⎪
⎬
⎫⎪
⎨
⎧
⎥
⎤
⎢
⎡
−+Δ+++= ∑ −−−−−
−
1131211211
)ln(
)ln()ln(
Where:
• is the amount of central bank intervention as a share of the foreign exchange
interbank market turnover;
• represents the surprise on monthly inflation relative to survey data;
• and
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
− ∑=
−
−
N
j
j
t
N
e
e
t
1
1
)ln(
)
tVol
tDevNIR
ln( represent, respectively, the central bank’s
concern due to the one-day acceleration of the exchange rate and its deviation from a
trend (given by its N-day moving average), where N=90 days;
• reflects the degree of exchange rate volatility. For robustness, this is measured
both as a simple N-day moving exchange-rate standard deviation and as a conditional
variance derived from a simple GARCH model—both definitions are tested
separately;
• denotes the difference of NIR from its desired precautionary level. For
robustness, we test separately for the gap of NIR relative to the daily level of
dollarized deposits, and to an “optimal” reserve benchmark given by the sum of
public external debt and US dollar-denominated deposits in the banking system
(Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006; Batini and Peschiera, 2007), the N-day moving average
of NIR, and the daily level of bank US-dollar denominated obligations subject to
reserve requirements (TOSE).

Table 1. Variable and Data Description
16
Expected CoefficientsVariable Name Measure
OLS PROBIT
tI Persistence Lagged foreign exchange intervention (US$ million) as a share of the volume traded in the
interbank foreign exchange market (US$ million)
PROBIT estimated on a dummy that takes a value of 1 when the absolute value of intervention
is different from 0.
Source: BCRP.
+,— +
)ln( 1−Δ te (Lagged)
Acceleration
One-day change in spot rate, in percent; an appreciation has a negative sign.
PROBIT estimated on the absolute value
Source: BCRP.
— +
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
− ∑=
−
−
N
j
j
t
N
e
e
t
1
1
)ln(
)ln(
(Lagged) Deviation
of exchange rate
from reference
level
Deviation of the log of the exchange rate from its N=90-day moving average, in percent. For an
appreciating exchange rate this variable will exhibit a negative sign.
Source: author’s calculations, with BCRP data on the exchange rate.
— +
tVol Exchange rate
volatility
N=90-day moving standard deviation of the exchange rate.
Conditional variance derived from a simple GARCH (1,1) model.
Source: author’s calculations, with BCRP data on the exchange rate.
+ +
tDevNIR Deviation of NIR
from optimal
reference level
Difference of the central bank’s NIR to the sum of public external debt and dollarized
deposits in the preceding quarter, as a share of the total external public debt plus
dollarized deposits of the previous quarter.
Difference of the central bank’s NIR to their N-day moving average, as a share of the
average
Difference of the central bank’s NIR relative to the daily total of banking system obligations
in US dollars subject to reserve requirements (TOSE), as a share of the TOSE.
Source: author’s calculations, based on BCRP data on daily net international reserves, daily
TOSE and quarterly public external debt and dollarized deposits.
— +
tNews Inflation News Surprise in monthly Inflation relative to Bloomberg’s Survey expectation
Source: BCRP and Bloomberg
0 0
Other Controls Day of the Week
(4), Post-Holiday
Dummy variables +,— +,—

17
References
Arena, Marco and P. Tuesta (1999), “El objetivo de la intervención del banco central: el
nivel del tipo de cambio, la reducción de la volatilidad cambiaria, o ambos? Un
análisis de la experiencia peruana 1991–1998,” Banco Central de Reserva del Perú,
Revista de Estudios Económicos 5, December.
Armas, Adrián and F. Grippa (2006), “Targeting Inflation in a Dollarised Economy: The
Peruvian Experience” in “Financial Dollarization: The Policy Agenda,” International
Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Batini, Nicoletta and J. Peschiera (2007), “What is the Optimal Level of International
Reserves for Peru?” International Monetary Fund, Draft.
Disyatat, Piti and G. Galati (2007), “The Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Intervention in
Emerging Market Countries: Evidence from the Czech Koruna” in Journal of
International Money and Finance 26.
Gersl, Adam and T. Holub (2006), “Foreign Exchange Interventions Under Inflation
Targeting: The Czech Experience,” Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 24, No. 4,
October.
Guimaraes, Roberto and C. Karacadag (2006), “The Empirics of Foreign Exchange
Intervention in Emerging Markets: Mexico and Turkey” in “Official Foreign
Exchange Intervention” by S. Ishii, et al, International Monetary Fund, Occasional
Paper 249.
Humala, Alberto and G. Rodríguez (2008), Foreign Exchange Intervention and Exchange
Rate Volatility in Peru,” Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, draft working paper,
April.
Jeanne, Olivier and R. Ranciere (2006), “The Optimal Level of International Reserves for
Emerging Market Countries: Formulas and Applications,” International Monetary
Fund Working Paper WP/06/229, June.
Kamil, Herman (2008), “Is Central Bank Intervention Effective Under Inflation Targeting
Regimes? The Case of Colombia,” International Monetary Fund, Working Paper
WP/08/08, April.
Rossini, Renzo and M. Vega (2007) “El mecanismo de transmisión de la política monetaria
en un entorno de dolarización financiera: El caso del Perú entre 1996 y 2006,”
Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, D.T. No. 2007–17, November.

18
III. CREDIT GROWTH: ANATOMY AND POLICY RESPONSES12
A. Anatomy of the Recent Credit Expansion
18. The Peruvian economy has experienced several pronounced credit cycles over
the past decades. The hyperinflationary experience of the late 1980s virtually eliminated
credit from the economy, while the financial stress and economic contraction of the
late 1990s and early 2000s led to a sharp fall in the ratio of credit to GDP and per capita
credit. The legacy of the hyperinflationary experience of the late 1980s continues to influence
the financial sector in Peru, as dollarization of bank deposits and credit remains high,
although decreasing in recent years (Figure 1). Financial deepening is low compared to the
level of other emerging countries, with domestic capital markets yet to develop significantly,
as commercial banks remain the main providers of credit.
19. In the current expansionary credit cycle, initiated in 2004, domestic currency
loans have grown faster than those in foreign currency. Credit growth has recovered
strongly since 2004, although it still remains below previous peaks in the mid 1970s (in per
capita terms) and in the late 1990s (in relation to GDP). In particular, the growth of credit in
domestic currency has recovered more strongly for consumer loans and medium-sized firms,
helping to reduce the still high level of credit dollarization.
20. Much of these developments reflect a combination of strengthened confidence in
the local currency and financial innovation.13
Clients that previously had access only to
informal credit markets are increasingly participating in the formal banking sector, including
in the export-oriented agricultural sector. At the same time, there have been entrants to the
consumer loan business, most notably foreign banks with new technologies and business
models, including some linked to large retail stores. Banks have also significantly expanded
their credit card business and introduced payroll-linked loans. As a result, bank loan
portfolios have changed significantly since 2004, with consumer loans increasing their
participation in total loans by about 10 percentage points.
21. The latest period of credit expansion has taken place in the context of a
strengthened financial sector, including an improvement in the quality of banks’ loan
portfolios. The strong economic expansion since the early 2000s, combined with improved
prudential regulation and supervision and banks’ risk management, have been reflected in a
decline in nonperforming loans and higher provisions. The credit expansion has been led by
large banks and microfinance institutions, with the most dynamic segments being loans in
12
Prepared by L. Breuer, G. Gasha and J.A. Peschiera.
13
Current statistics are likely to overstate consumer lending and understate credit to medium-sized firms, as
some firm owners take personal lines of credit and use credit cards for working and investment capital, which is
currently classified as consumer loans. The SBS has established new categories of loans to better differentiate
these loans.

19
Figure 1. Peru: Financial Sector Indicators
Credit cycles have been characterized by
pronounced booms and busts.
Banking system credit to the private sector
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Credit/GDP (lhs)
Real per capita credit 1/ (rhs)
1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
1/ Total credit measured in soles deflated by Lima's CPI.
Peru’s bank credit to GDP ratio is low
compared to other emerging economies.
Banking system credit to the private sector 1/
(% GDP)
21%
29%
68%
26%
14%
24%
12%
14%
44%
74%
40%
18%
21%
24%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela
1/ Banking survey, Domestic Credit, Claims on private sector.
2001 2007
Consumption loans have grown faster than
other types of loans
Banking system credit by type of loan
(yearly change, last 12m)
-15%
-5%
5%
15%
25%
35%
45%
55%
Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06 Oct-07 Oct-08
Commercial
Mortgages
Microfinance
Consumption
Sources: SBS, BCRP; and staff estimates.
Financial dollarization is high, but falling
despite a recent increase in dollar deposits.
Banking system dollarization ratios
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
Credit
Deposits
45%
Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06 Oct-07 Oct-08
In recent years, loans in domestic currency
have exceeded those in foreign currency.
Banking system credit to the private sector by currency
(yearly change in real terms)
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Oct-04 Apr-05 Oct-05 Apr-06 Oct-06 Apr-07 Oct-07 Apr-08 Oct-08
1/ Real credit in soles measured in soles. 2/ Real credit in dollars measured in dollars. 3/ Real credit
in soles measured in soles plus real credit in dollars measured in soles using a fixed exchange rate.
Soles 1/
Dollars 2/
Total 3/
The expansion in the number of bank debtors
signals financial deepening.
Banking system credit
(number of debtors, thousands 1/)
286 346 403 490
619
1,676
1,939
2,372
3,345
4,222
55 67 77 91 104
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2/
1/ A single debtor may be counted more than once if he has debts with more than one institution. 2/
October 2008.
Commercial and Microfinance
Consumer
Mortgage

20
domestic currency for consumption and microenterprises, as well as foreign currency
denominated mortgage loans.
Dec-03 Oct-08 Dec-03 Oct-08 Dec-03 Oct-08
Solvency
Overall leverage 1/ 7.5 8.4 6.2 5.2 6.0 5.3
Total liabilities / Social Capital and Reserves 10.7 17.6 8.2 6.5 7.5 7.0
Asset Quality
NPL/Equity (%) 33.4 9.0 19.9 20.8 52.4 23.5
Provisions / NPL (%) 141.1 263.1 148.5 142.3 128.2 136.3
Profitability
ROE (%) 10.8 30.7 31.9 24.6 8.0 13.7
ROA (%) 1.1 2.6 5.0 4.2 1.0 2.10.0
Liquidity
Liquidity ratio in domestc currency (%) 32.9 36.0 23.9 19.9 18.0 23.8
Liquidity ratio in foreign currency (%) 43.9 53.9 37.9 40.6 31.6 62.2
Cash / Demand Deposits in domestic currency 0.27 0.39 na na na na
Banks Cajas Municipales Cajas Rurales
Peru: Financial Indicators of the Lending Institutions
Cash / Demand deposits in foreign currency 2.3 2.3 na na na na
Source: SBS
1/ Data as of September 2008
B. Is There a Credit Boom?
22. The presence of a credit boom in Peru is assessed using the methodology
developed by Mendoza and Terrones’ (2008).14
A Hoddrick-Prescott filter is applied to
monthly data of real credit (in logarithms), from January 1992 to October 2008, to determine
the trend and standard deviation of the cyclical component of each series.15
A credit boom is
then identified when the cyclical component of credit exceeds a threshold of 1.75 standard
deviations, which covers 95 percent of the credit cycle episodes.
23. The results of this analysis suggest that while financial system credit has
decelerated recently, the growth of bank credit has been accelerating toward a “boom
threshold” in recent months (Figure 2). The growth of financial system credit—which
comprises banking activity and pension funds’ financial investments—entered into a boom
in 2007, and then decelerated markedly, reflecting the sharp fall in the value of managed
assets in response to the sharp fall in stock prices that began in mid 2007. Bank credit
approached the threshold in mid-2007, but this process moderated as the central bank
increased reserve requirements and its policy interest rate, and the Superintendency of Banks
tightened prudential regulations.
14
This follows the procedure described in Mendoza and Terrones’ (2008).
15
We only report results starting in January 2000 given data limitations in earlier periods.

21
Figure 2. Is There a Credit Boom in Peru? Total Credit
Banking system credit continues to display
hefty rates of growth, approaching the boom
threshold...
The financial system credit’s cycle seems to
be moderating down pulled by the drop in
asset prices.
Banking System Credit
(logarithm of real credit vs HP bands)
10.9
11.0
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
HP Trend
Boom threshold
Financial system credit
11.4
11.5
11.6
11.7
11.8
HP Trend
Boom threshold
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06 Oct-07 Oct-08
LogCredit
11.0
11.1
11.2
11.3
LogCredit
Mid-sized banks are growing closer to their
trend…
…as large banks continue to expand
aggressively but below the boom signal.
Large Banks Credit 1/
10.1
10.3
10.5
10.7
10.9
11.1
1/ Includes BCP, BBVA, Scotiabank and Interbank.
LogCredit
HP Trend
Boom threshold
Medium Banks Credit 1/
8.0
8.2
8.4
8.6
8.8
9.0
1/ Includes BIF, MiBanco, Financiero and Citibank.
LogCredit
HP Trend
Boom threshold
Cajas Municipales and Rurales appear to
have a relatively stable growth path.
…while small banks’ credit growth seems to
lag the market.
Small Banks Credit 1/
6.6
6.8
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
7.8
8.0
1/ Includes Falabella, Ripley and Comercio.
LogCredit
HP Trend
Boom threshold
Cajas Municipales and Rurales Credit
6.6
7.1
7.6
8.1
8.6
LogCredit
HP Trend
Boom threshold
Sources: SBS, BCRP; and staff estimates.

22
24. The rapid expansion of bank credit has been driven by the largest institutions.
The application of the methodology to large, medium and small banks shows that all these
institutions display robust growth, with the largest banks showing a positive deviation from
their trend, but still below the boom threshold. 16
At the same time, credit by the medium
sized and small banks appears to be growing along their trend. Overall, credit growth by
microfinance institutions (cajas municipales and rurales) shows no evidence of boom. A
decomposition by currency suggests that both credit in Nuevo Soles and U.S. dollars remain
below the boom threshold; however, credit in Nuevo Soles by microfinance institutions has
accelerated toward the boom threshold (Figures 3 and 4).
C. The Policy Responses to Address Rapid Credit Growth
8. While credit growth remains strong, macroeconomic policies and prudential
regulations can moderate its pace while allowing for financial deepening.17
Macro
policies, including monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, affect credit by influencing its
price, while prudential policies (regulatory and supervisory) can make lending decisions
more or less expensive by affecting banks capital, liquidity and provisioning requirements, or
by influencing its supply through, for example, loan-to-value ratios.
9. A number of measures have been implemented to moderate the still high growth
of credit, while limiting the potentially negative effects of the global financial crisis
(Tables 1 and 2). Over most of the past year, policies have aimed at moderating the rapid
rates of credit growth. However, in recent months, policies have continued to aim at
moderating rapid credit growth, while at the same time ensuring adequate levels of liquidity
in the financial system to avoid a sharp contraction of credit. The main measures
implemented by the authorities include:
Monetary Policy. Starting in mid-2007, the central bank tightened monetary policy
by raising reserve requirement in domestic and foreign currency and policy interest
rates. Since September 2007 there has been a gradual unwinding of higher reserve
requirements and increased provision of central bank liquidity to banks.
Exchange Rate Policy. In recent years, the central bank had allowed for gradually
increasing foreign exchange flexibility while aiming to protect financial stability
given the still high level of dollarization. In recent months, however, greater central
bank intervention has limited exchange rate volatility, while allowing a gradual shift
of financial assets into U.S. dollars, in line with the experience of other countries.
16
We excluded from this analysis several small banks that entered the market in 2007 and 2008.
17
See Hilbers et al. (2005) for a comprehensive review of policy options.

23
Figure 3. Credit Cycles in Domestic Currency by Type of Institution
Financial system credit in soles has slowed
down significantly after a brief boom phase
in 2007.
Banks’ credit in soles remains strong, but far
from the boom threshold…
Banking System Credit in soles
(deviation from HP trend)
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Boom threshold
Financial system credit in soles
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Cycle
Boom threshold
-0.15
-0.10
Cycle
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
Volatility in medium banks’ credit in soles
seems to have fallen significantly in recent
years…
…reflecting mostly developments among large
banks.
Large Banks Credit in soles
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Boom threshold
Cycle
Medium Banks Credit in soles
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Cycle
Boom threshold
The Cajas’ credit in soles is much closer to the
boom threshold.
...and small banks’ credit in soles has
moderated.
Small Banks Credit in soles
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Cycle
Boom threshold
Cajas Municipales and Rurales Credit in soles
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Cycle
Boom threshold

24
Figure 4. Credit Cycle in Foreign Currency by Type of Institution
Overall financial system credit in US dollars
has also moderated in the last months.
Financial system credit in US dollars
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Cycle
Boom threshold
-0.10
Large banks still display robust rates of
growth...
Large Banks Credit in US dollars
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Boom threshold
Cycle
…a trend also observed for small banks.
Small Banks Credit in US dollars
-0.3
-0.2
-0.2
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
Cycle
Boom threshold
Banks’ credit in US dollars has also remained
below the boom threshold.
Ba
(dev
nking System Credit in US dollars
iation from HP trend)
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
Cycle
Boom threshold
-0.10
id-sized banks’ credit in dollars isM
rebounding after a deceleration in
early 2008…
Medium Banks Credit i
n US dollars
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Cycle
Boom threshold
he Cajas seem to be cutting their exposureT
to dollar denominated credit.
Cajas Municipales and Rurales Credit in US dollar
s
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Cycle
Boom threshold

25
Table 1. Peru Macroeconomic Policy Response
Measure Impact Limitations Peru
I. Fiscal Policy
• Tightening/easing
fiscal policy
• Help adjust
expansionary
pressures
• May be difficult in the short
run
• Limited room if fiscal
position already tight, or if
there is a need to
compensate for the
deceleration of activity in the
private sector
• Prudent fiscal position
maintained to minimize
fiscal impulse. There may
be scope for further
tightening to support
monetary policy.
• However, there may be a
need reconsider further
tightening if the global
financial crises hit harder
than expected
II. Monetary Policy
• Adjusting interest
rates
• Reduce/increasing
liquidity in the
system
• Face constraints depending
on the monetary regime, and
conditions (e.g.,
dollarization).
• May induce further capital
inflows, exacerbating credit
growth
• BCRP has increased
interest rates in the last
months. However,
intense competition
among banks has limited
the pass through to
lending rates.
• Reserve
requirements
(change in level,
eligible assets and
liability base).
• Induce more/less
demand for
reserves.
• Increase in levels
may be useful in
one-off sterilization
of excess liquidity
• Tax on financial
intermediation potentially
reversing financial
deepening
• May require continuous
changes to close loopholes
• High administrative costs
• Relatively more effective for
the dollarized part of the
aggregates.
• BCRP increased reserve
requirements in
early 2008 to mitigate the
negative effect of
speculative short-term
inflows.
• However, the central
bank has reduced
reserve requirements
recently to accommodate
liquidity needs in the
financial system in light of
the global financial crisis.
• Liquid assets
requirements,
statutory liquidity
ratios
• Could complicate
rapid lending
• Negative impact on financial
instruments development
• High administrative costs
(e.g., monitoring)
• Higher costs of capital may
induce excessive risk taking
• Liquidity requirements
are strict. However, there
may be scope to tighten
requirements for
microfinance institutions
(e.g., minimum holding of
BCRP instruments?)
III. Exchange Rate Policy
• Increasing flexibility
of exchange rate
• May reduce inflows
by reducing
predictability
• May be associated with
greater exchange rate
volatility, thus having
negative balance sheet and
competitiveness effects, in
particular in shallow markets
• BCRP has allowed
increased flexibility, but
has also limited
excessive volatility in light
of the still high levels of
dollarization

26
Table 2. Peru Prudential and Supervisory Policy Response
Measure Impact Limitations Peru
I. Prudential Measures
• Higher/differentiated
capital requirements
or risks weights based
on loan type, maturity
and currency
composition of credit;
incorporation of
market and other risks
in capital requirements
• Help reduce total
lending
• Enhance resiliency of
banks’ capital base
against adverse
shocks
• May not be effective in
countries where capital
requirements are already
high
• Regulations may get overly
complicated and
enforcement cumbersome,
undermining the
effectiveness
• General Banking Law
amended in
June 2008 to align
capital requirements to
Basel II, including for
credit and market
risks; minimum capital
requirement increased
from 9.1 percent to
11.5 percent
• Tighter/differentiated
eligibility, loan
classification and
provisioning
requirements (e.g., for
consumer, mortgage
loans)
• Help reduce lending
by limiting its size,
increasing
provisioning resources
• Enhance resiliency to
shocks
• Help avoid risks in
market behavior
• May not be effective in
countries where they are
already high
• May affect profitability and
risk disintermediation
• Regulations may get overly
complicated and
enforcement cumbersome,
undermining the
effectiveness
• May raise the risk of
borrowers switching to
alternative credit sources
• SBS has been
tightening loan
classification and
provisioning
requirements for
different types of
loans: forex loans
(unhedged borrowers)
in 2006, consumer
loans in 2007
and 2008. A new
framework for assets
classification and
provisioning
requirements aligned
with Basel II will also
enter into effect
in 2010.
• Tightening net open
positions
• Limit exposure to
direct and indirect
forex risks
• Need to be accompanied
by regulations against
indirect credit risks
• Forex risks are limited
by a maximum net
short position of
10 percent of capital.
• Procyclical
provisioning
• Help build provisions
during the business
cycle, and smooth its
volatility.
• It is inconsistent with some
IAS
• SBS recently issued
regulations requiring
additional generic
provisions starting in
December 2008 to
account for the
economic expansion
of the last years.
II. Supervisory Measures
• More intensive on/off-
site surveillance
• Provide systemic tool
for assessing risks
• May require significant
resources
• In the last years SBS
has increased the
number and scope of
inspections.
• Use stress testing • Provide a systemic
market based tool
• Needs continued upgrade,
and training of supervisors
and banks
• Banks are required to
present stress tests
every quarter. SBS
conducts stress test
regularly, and staff is
constantly trained
• Increase coordination
with supervisors of
nonbank entities
• Help monitor risks in
the entire system
• None. • CONASEV and SBS
have signed MOU.

27
Prudential Regulation and Supervision. Prudential measures have been
strengthened to minimize credit and market risks in the financial system. The
Superintendency of Banks has approved the following norms:
Foreign currency induced credit risk. Banks are required to constitute
additional provisions—1 percent on the entire portfolio in dollars—if
“unhedged” borrowers are not properly identified, or adequate provisions
have not been already established for foreign currency loans.
Consumer loans. Banks are required to consider in their lending decisions
the overall exposure of borrowers with the entire financial system. Banks
have to provision at least 20 percent of the “unused” part of any type of
consumer lines—including credit card lines and revolving credit.
Capital requirements and minimum capitalization ratios. In line with
Basel II, capital requirements for all types of risks, including credit,
market and operational risks have been introduced. In addition, the
minimum capitalization ratio have been increased from the current
9.1 percent to 11.5 percent—a schedule of implementation have been
established until December 2010.
Asset classification and provisioning requirements. Information and asset
classification requirements have been tightened, and provisioning rates
have been increased.
Procyclical provisions. A novel framework for procyclical provisions has
been introduced (see Box 1 for a detailed description).
Enhanced supervision. SBS has increased the number of on-site
inspections, in particular in medium and small banks, and microfinance
institutions. For off-site inspections, banks are now required to present, at
least once every quarter, detailed stress tests of credit, market, and
liquidity risks.
11. While the policy response has been appropriate and comprehensive, additional
measures could be considered. The authorities used a broad range of policy tools and were
quick to react to a rapidly deteriorating international environment. As the prospects for the
international economy remain uncertain, and thus, its impact on Peru, the authorities could
consider the following measures:
• Preserving a broadly neutral fiscal stance would allow monetary policy to be the first line
of defense against the impact of the global slowdown.
• Continue to prioritize the reduction and simplification of reserve requirements. Some
international experiences—such as those in Brazil and Chile—suggest that complex

28
Box 1. Procyclical Provisions
The Peruvian authorities issued in November 2008 a regulation requiring financial institutions to
constitute procyclical provisions. The main characteristics of the new requirements are as follows:
Procyclical Provisioning Rates. The following provisioning rates will be applied to all performing
loans whenever the procyclical rule is activated, in addition to the generic provisioning rules already in
place:
Type of Credit Generic Rate Procyclical Rate
Corporate 0.70% 0.45%
Microfinance 1.00% 0.50%
Consumption 1.00% 1.00%
Mortgage 0.70% 0.40%
Thresholds activating and deactivating Procyclical Provisions. The procyclical provisioning will be
activated whenever one of the following scenarios occurs:
(i) The average of the y-o-y GDP growth of the last 30 months reaches a threshold of 5 percent or more.
(ii) The average of the y-o-y GDP growth of the last 30 months is already above 5 percent, and the
average of the y-o-y GDP growth of the last 12 months is higher in 2 percent to this same indicator one
year before.
(iii) The average of the y-o-y GDP growth of the last 30 months is already above 5 percent, and the rule
has been deactivated by rule (b) below for 18 months.
The rule will be deactivated whenever one of the following occurs:
(i) The average of the y-o-y GDP growth of the last 30 months moves from a level above 5 percent to
one below it.
(ii) The average of the y-o-y GDP growth of the last 12 months is 4 percent lower than the value of this
average one year before.
Additional General Considerations: (i) The moving averages will be computed using monthly
information of the y-o-y GDP growth as calculated by the Central Bank of Peru; (ii) The procyclical
provisions cannot be reverted in any case; and (iii) When deactivated the buffer built by the constitution
of the procyclical provisions can be reallocated to specific provision for nonperforming loans if needed.
reserve requirements frameworks introduce distortions and tend to be circumvented if
implemented for a long period of time.
• Further strengthen supervision, including of microfinance institutions. The authorities
need to closely monitor developments in this segment, in particular given the observed
weaknesses in the management of credit and market risks of these institutions.
• Closely supervise consumer and microenterprises portfolios of banks and microfinance
institutions, including by requiring the weakest institutions to increase their capital, as
needed, to build buffers to face potential shocks derived from the global financial crisis.

29
References
Hilbers, P.; Otker-Rober, I.; Pazarbasioglu, C.; and Johnsen, G., “Assessing and Managing
Rapid Credit Growth and the Role of Supervisory and Prudential Policies,” IMF
Working Paper, WP/05/151.
Mendoza, E. and Terrones, M., “An anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence from Macro
Aggregates and Micro Data,” NBER Working Paper, W14049.

30
IV. REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND PUBLIC TRANSFERS18
25. This chapter discusses the impact of the current system of intergovernmental
transfers on poverty in Peru, and discusses options for enhancing the system based on
international practice. The current system of intergovernmental transfers in Peru embeds a
limited equalization component, as some transfers are allocated taking into consideration the
expenditure needs of the local population, while others—particularly those associated to
natural resources—accrue only to mineral or hydrocarbon producing regions. This chapter
finds that while equalization transfers could help addressing local poverty, those related to
natural resources seem to have had limited impact on poverty, possibly owing to their
earmarking or budget under-execution. The government has implemented several initiatives
in recent years to enhance the effectiveness of equalization instruments. This chapter
describes options for further enhancing and enlarging the existing equalization instruments.
A. Poverty Alleviation, Regional Disparities and the Decentralization Process
Peru: Evolution of Poverty Rates Across Departments (in percent)
5
15
25
35
45
55
65
75
85
95
Tum
besTacna
M
adre
de
D
ios
Ica
Lim
a
y
C
allao
Arequipa
M
oquegua
Lam
bayeque
La
Libertad
Junín
San
M
artínC
uscoÁncashU
cayaliPiura
Am
azonas
Apurím
acPasco
Ayacucho
C
ajam
arcaLoreto
PunoH
uánuco
H
uancavelica
2005
2006
2007
Source: INEI based on ENAHO.
26. The significant reduction in poverty across Peru has taken place along with
persistent and even growing regional disparities. Poverty declined by about 9.4 percentage
points in Peru during 2005–07, but the gains have not been evenly distributed. Urban, Selva
and Coast areas benefited more than Rural and Sierra areas from the reduction (Table 1).
Most departments experienced a
decline in their poverty figures
during the period 2005–07.
However, regional inequality has
not been reduced (or may even
have increased), according to
statistical measures of inequality.
Relative mean deviation and
Gini coefficients for poverty
rates increased from 0.16 and
0.22, respectively in 2005 to 0.18
and 0.25, respectively in 2007.
Poverty continues to be the
highest in Huancavelica, and
higher in the Sierra and Selva
than in the coast.
18
Prepared by Mercedes García-Escribano.

31
Table 1. Peru: Evolution of Poverty Rates, 2005–07
(in percent)
2005 2006 2007 2005-06 2006-07 2005-07
Area
Urban 36.8 31.2 25.7 -5.6 -5.5 -11.1
Rural 70.9 69.3 64.6 -1.6 -4.7 -6.3
Natural region
Coast 34.2 28.7 22.6 -5.5 -6.1 -11.6
Sierra 65.6 63.4 60.1 -2.2 -3.3 -5.5
Selva 60.3 56.6 48.4 -3.7 -8.2 -11.9
Total 48.7 44.5 39.3 -4.2 -5.2 -9.4
changes
27. Continuing regional disparities are a challenge to the success of the poverty
alleviation and decentralization process. Regional disparities reflect very different
economic endowments and economic structures, which in turn impact on the departments’
revenue bases and capabilities to respond to differential spending needs of the population.
Unless regional disparities are taken into consideration in the decentralization design, and in
particular, in the intergovernmental system of transfers, subnational governments will not be
able to provide similar access to public services across the country and the decentralization
process may result in growing socio-economic imbalances. Acknowledging these challenges,
the legal framework of the current Peruvian decentralization process, which started in 2003,
states that decentralization should tackle poverty, guarantee access to basic public services
across all the country, and lead to a more equal country from an economic and social
perspective. 19,20
B. The Equalization Role of Intergovernmental Transfers in Peru
The current system of transfers
28. Subnational governments rely heavily on transfers to finance their expenditures.
The resources of local governments include local revenues and transfers from the central
government. Transfers amounted to about 77 percent of local current revenues in 2007, and
include shared-revenues (such as for natural resources like canon, which predate the existing
decentralization initiative), specific project transfers (for example, for social programs such
as Vaso de Leche) and equalization transfers, such as FONCOMUN (Table 2). Local
governments may also borrow in the domestic or international capital markets subject to the
19
There was a renewed interest in decentralized governance with the election of the Toledo administration in
2002 to better address the sizable geographical income disparities. President García in 2006 also decided to
move forward the decentralization process and launched a “shock descentralizador” to accelerate the transfer of
functions to subnational governments.
20
Framework Decentralization Law of 2002 (Law No. 27783).

32
fiscal rules established in the legislation.21
Regional governments are also highly dependent
on central government transfers, as no taxes have been created to fund their expenditures.
Table 2. Peru: Current Revenue Sources of Subnational Governments, 2007
(million of soles) (percentage)
Local governments
local revenues 1/ 2,687 23
transfers
shared-revenues 2/ 5,473 46
other transfers 3/ 3,646 31
Total 11,806 100
Regional governments
local revenues 1/ 553 5
transfers
shared-revenues 2/ 2,009 17
other transfers 3/ 9,029 78
Total 11,591 100
1/ Taxes, nontax revenues and contributions. Nontax revenues
include fees, fines, and revenues from the sale of goods and services
2/ Canon, derechos de vigencia, renta de aduanas.
3/ Foncomún, FONCOR, Vaso de Leche, and other transfers.
29. Some transfers have an equalizing role, while others respond to resource
endowments. The Regional Compensation Fund (FONCOR) and the Municipal
Compensation Fund (FONCOMUN) are distributed to regional and local governments,
respectively, according to population, poverty and unmet basic needs (Annex 1). To better
target FONCOR transfers to regional needs, the authorities modified the methodology
in 2007 and again in 2008, as explained below, for calculating the coefficients used for
distributing transfers under FONCOR. Others, such as those associated to natural resources
(canon and royalties), accrue exclusively to producing and surrounding areas.22
30. While increasing in recent years, natural resource transfers may have led to
rising regional disparities. Natural resource transfers have experienced a significant
increase in recent years due both to the proliferation of new mining projects, as well as
higher commodity prices. Canon and mining royalty amounted to nearly 2 percent of GDP
in 2007, compared to about 0.2 percentage points of GDP in 2001, exceeding the increase
experienced by equalization transfers during the same period.23
21
Fiscal Decentralization Law of 2004 (Decree Law 955).
22
However, within the provinces and regional governments, natural resource transfers tend to be distributed
taking into consideration some of the needs of the local population.
23
Equalization transfers increased by 0.3 percentage points of GDP during 2001–07.

33
Evolution of Equalizing and Natural-Resource Transfers,
2001–07 (million soles)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
FONCOMUN and FONCOR
Canon and mining royalty
By Department: Equalizing and Natural-Resource Transfers,
2001–07 (million soles)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Am
azonasÁncashApurím
acArequipaAyacucho
C
ajam
arca
C
usco
H
uancavelicaH
uánuco
Ica
Junín
La
Libertad
Lam
bayeque
Lim
a
y
C
allao
Loreto
M
adre
de
D
ios
M
oquegua
Pasco
Piura
Puno
San
M
artín
TacnaTum
besU
cayali
Canon and mining royalty 2001
Canon and mining royalty 2007
FONCOMUN and FONCOR 2001
FONCOMUN and FONCOR 2007
Impact of transfers on poverty
31. Equalization transfers seem to have reduced poverty in recent years. A
regression of the change in poverty rates between 2005–07 on a range of per capita transfers
received by each department during 2005–06 suggests that equalization transfers had helped
reduce poverty.24,25
Results show that FONCOMUN transfers helped lowering extreme
24
A negative coefficient would indicate that departments receiving more of this kind of transfer experienced
bigger declines in poverty rates.
25
We also include as explanatory variable the GDP growth of the department over the period 2005–06 to
control for differences in growth rates across departments. The average growth in Peru is captured in the
constant term. The analysis is also replicated for extreme poverty as dependent variable.

34
poverty, while the rest of the transfers, including canon, did not lead to a significant decline
in poverty (Table 1 in Annex 2).26
The negative coefficient on the constant indicates that the
improvement in macroeconomic performance—particularly economic growth—across Peru
helped lowering poverty.
32. The empirical analysis also confirms that poor regions have been less effective in
using equalization transfers. The initial poverty rate and interaction terms between the
transfer variables and initial poverty rates are added in the regression as explanatory
variables. A positive coefficient on the interaction variables would indicate that departments
with higher poverty rates were less effective in the use of that type of transfer. Results in
Table 2b (Annex 2) suggest that areas with higher rates of extreme poverty were less
effective in using FONCOR, FONCOMUN and other specific transfers.27
This result could
be explained by the fact that poor subnational governments are more likely to face publ
financial management limitations.
ic
33. Several factors could have driven the lack of impact of canon transfers on
poverty rates. Earmarking of natural resource transfers to capital spending was extensive
during the period under evaluation.28
Earmarking could have resulted in an under-execution
of canon due to the limited capacity of subnational governments to undertake the steps
required for the formulation and approval of investment projects aiming to guarantee that
investment projects meet some standards. The decentralization of the National System of
Public Investment (SNIP), as well as the establishment of technical assistance regional
offices (see below) will likely lead to an increase in capital spending at the subnational level.
Government’s response
34. The government has taken important measures in recent years to better target
transfers. These measures include the modifications to the FONCOR coefficients, the
opening of Technical Assistance offices for public investment in the regions, and the creation
26
The results are robust to excluding the three subnational governments with the highest nonresponse rates in
the ENAHO 2005 (i.e, Lima and Callao, Apurímac and Piura) from the regression sample (Table 3). When
excluding these three observations, the coefficient on FONCOMUN continues to be negative although it is not
statistically significant for explaining the decline in extreme poverty (Table 3b). Moreover, when poverty
change is the dependent variable, the coefficients on the variables FONCOMUN, and FONCOMUN and
FONCOR have the correct negative sign (Table 3a).
27
The interaction terms between extreme poverty and transfers continue to be statistically significant and
correctly signed when excluding Lima and Callao, Apurímac and Piura from the sample (Table 4b). Further, in
contrast to using the full sample, the coefficients on FONCOMUN and FONCOR become negative in Table 4a
and the impact of other transfers becomes statistically significant in explaining the decline in poverty.
28
Earmarking of canon has been eased. In particular, the 2009 budget allows using up to 20 percent of canon
transfers for infrastructure maintenance.

35
Peru: Execution Rates of Investment Financed with Canon and Renta de
aduanas by Regional Governments, 2007
0
25
50
75
100
Ayacucho
Lam
bayeque
PiuraTum
besArequipaApurím
acUcayali
Huancavelica
La
Libertad
M
unicipality
ofLim
a
Puno
Loreto
M
oqueguaHuánuco
Cusco
Pasco
Cajam
arca
IcaC
allaoÁncash
Tacna
Junín
Am
azonas
San
M
artín
M
adre
de
D
ios
Source. Boletín de Transparencia Fiscal.
of the Regional and Local Investment Fund (Fondo de Promoción a la Inversión Pública
Regional y Local, FONIPREL). In particular:
• The allocation of FONCOR changed in 2007 and again in 2008—with effect
in 2008 and 2009, respectively—to make it more equalizing. There was a concern
that FONCOR did not closely match unmet basic needs, for example, in the cases of
Huancavelica, Huánuco, Madre de Dios, Amazonas, San Martin, Ayacucho and
Apurímac.29
The new formulas take into consideration the gap between regional
needs (which are a function of population, poverty, geographical location, and a
performance indicator related to the execution of investment projects) and shared-
transfers that the region receives (including canon and royalties).
• With the decentralization of the SNIP, twenty-four technical assistance regional
offices have been established. Regional offices were opened to provide support to
subnational governments in the formulation and approval of investment projects with
the aim of preserving the quality of public investment.
• FONIPREL has successfully allocated its resources according to subnational
government needs. FONIPREL was created in October 2007 and started its
operations in 2008 to help address infrastructure disparities across Peru. Subnational
governments bid for FONIPREL resources to cofinance social and investment
projects, with the amount of cofinancing in the range 50–90 percent depending on
29
Informe Anual sobre el proceso de descentralización (2008).

36
population needs and FONCOR transfers.30
The 2008 budget allocated S./
650 millions to the fund and the 2009 budget raised the resources of FONIPREL by
S./ 1,567 million.
Coefficients for FONCOR Distribution, 2007–09
(Departments sorted by poverty in 2007)
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
H
uancavelicaApurím
ac
Ayacucho
PunoH
uánuco
C
ajam
arca
PascoC
usco
Am
azonasLoreto
PiuraUcayali
San
M
artín
JunínÁncash
Lam
bayeque
La
Libertad
M
oqueguaArequipa
Tacna
Lim
a
y
C
allaoTum
bes
M
adre
de
Dios
Ica
2007
2008
2009
FONIPREL in 2007 (soles per capita) 1/
(Departments sorted by poverty in 2007)
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
HuancavelicaApurím
ac
Ayacucho
PunoHuánuco
Cajam
arca
Pasco
Cusco
Am
azonas
Loreto
PiuraUcayali
San
M
artín
JunínÁncash
Lam
bayeque
La
Libertad
M
oqueguaArequipa
Tacna
Lim
a
y
CallaoTum
bes
M
adre
de
D
ios
Ica
1/The total amount of FONIPREL resources assigned during 2007 to specific
subnational government projects was S./ 377 million soles.
30
Cofinancing increases with higher unmet population needs—proxied by malnutrition, female illiteracy and
lack of access to water, sewage, and electrification—and lower FONCOR transfers.

37
C. Some Further Reforms for Consideration31
35. There exists scope for further enhancing and enlarging the current equalization
instruments. An equalization system should ensure that subnational governments can
provide similar level of public services at a comparable level of tax-effort. Therefore, an
equalization scheme should aim at filling the gap between expenditure needs, revenue
capacities, and other central government transfers (such as special purpose transfers).32
36. An increasing number of countries are putting in place a fiscal equalization
scheme with allocation coefficients based on an integrated approach. In contrast to the
current system in Peru, an integrated approach focuses on expenditure needs and revenue
capacities in determining fiscal equalization transfers. Examples of countries with an
integrated equalization transfer are Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Korea, the United
Kingdom, China, and Ethiopia. An integrated approach presents considerable advantages
since it allocates transfers in a manner that promotes equity and efficiency. Schemes
determined only by revenue-capacities would be efficient, but may not be equitable since
they would favor subnational governments with lower costs for providing public services. On
the other hand, ignoring revenue capacities would penalize those subnational governments
that have made greater efforts at enhancing their capacity to tax locally.
37. Establishing an integrated equalization scheme is complex. There may be different
views concerning the role of the public sector in the provision of services; the specification
of a “standard” across subnational governments; and differences in perception concerning the
interests of subnational governments and the central government. Nationwide average per-
capita expenditures and tax rates are usually used to proxy the standard levels of expenditures
and revenues.33
But even averages may pose difficulties. Canada uses a five-province
31
This section follows E. Ahmad and R. Thomas (1997).
32
, where FG stands for the fiscal gap for a subnational government, i; E for subnational
government’s expenditure needs; R stands for revenue capacities; and TR for other central government transfers.
The relative size of the fiscal gap for a subnational government determines its share of the pool of resources for
redistribution under the equalization scheme. Revenue capacity would capture the effort of a subnational
government to raise revenues from its own-tax revenues and fees.
iiii TRREFG −−=
33
Assuming that the revenue base of a subnational government i is proportional to its GDP, the revenue
capacity could be calculated as
∑∑=
i
i
i
iii GDPORGDPR
where OR stands for own-revenues. The expenditure needs for i, E, could be calculated as
∑=
j
jj
ii GIE
where Ij
is the index of relative need for the expenditure category j and Gj
is total expenditure in j accross
subnational governments. Expenditure categories could include education and health. The index of relative need
(continued)

38
standard, excluding the wealthier provinces with a concentration of natural resources. The
reason is that using an average standard across all the provinces would lead to a level of
equalization transfers that could pose macroeconomic difficulties for the central government.
In a poor country, the average level of expenditures may be too low in relation to acceptable
norms for local expenditures.34
In this case, the central government could use supplementary
special-purpose transfers to provide for the perceived needs subject to the central
government’s own revenues and borrowing constraints.
38. In addition to the allocation coefficients, the success of a transfer system depends
on the pool of resources to be distributed. The total pool of resources could be formula
driven as in Canada, Germany, or Mexico, or arbitrarily determined by the central
government. The use of formulas provides clarity for determining the exact amount of
transfers. Volatility of revenues should also be avoided, thus, it is an argument against
assigning natural resource revenues to subnational governments.
39. A full reform of the intergovernmental transfer system, including the natural
resource transfers, may be difficult to implement without widespread political
consensus. Political difficulties led some countries to follow a gradual approach to reform
their equalization systems. Mexico, for example, approved a reform to the intergovernmental
transfer system in 2007 that included a hold harmless provision. Such a provision converted
the amount of the transfer in the year preceding the reform into a lump-sum fixed in nominal
terms, and applied the new allocation coefficients to the increases in the pot of resources to
be distributed. In other words, in each year following the reform, each Mexican state would
receive a fixed payment equal in nominal terms to the total transfer from federal government
in the year preceding the reform; plus a transfer of additional funds based on the new
distribution formula.
40. Public financial management considerations are also key to address regional
disparities. Limited capacity to effectively use public resources could result, as explained
above, in transfers not having a major impact on the social and economic development of the
recipient region. Thus, reforms to the intergovernmental transfer system cannot be
disentangled from efforts to enhancing the public financial management capacity of
subnational governments.
for each of the expenditure categories could be calculated using social indicators, such as infant mortality rate,
share of population in schooling age, and share of population over 65 (Ahmad, E. et al. 2007).
34
When limited information on expenditures is available, the share of expenditure needs, E, could be derived by
assigning equal weights to a simple population share and the inverse per capita income share.

39
D. Conclusion
Although there is scope to enhance the system of intergovernmental transfers in Peru,
political and capacity constraints may limit reform options. To address this, Peru could
follow the gradual approach with a hold harmless provision followed by other countries such
as Mexico to ensure that the reform is politically viable as no subnational government would
lose from the reform. Also, the public financial management constraints of subnational
governments have to be taken into consideration to guarantee the effective use of transferred
resources. Key steps include improving the execution capacity of subnational governments,
which could be achieved by strengthening the capacity of the technical assistance offices at
the local level to assist local government or by further involving the private sector. The
generation of timely and comparable information of subnational government finances, which
would enable local jurisdictions to be judged against one another, is also a key step to
engender accountability in the use of transfers.

40
Figure 1. Peru: Allocation by Department of Intergovernmental Transfers, 2007
(soles per capita)
Equalizing transfers (FONCOMUN and FONCOR)
a. Sorted by poverty rates b. Sorted by income per capita
0
H
uancavelicaApurím
ac
Ayacucho
PunoHuánuco
C
ajam
arca
Pasco
C
usco
Am
azonas
Loreto
PiuraU
cayali
San
M
artín
JunínÁncash
Lam
bayeque
La
Lib
ertad
M
oqueguaArequipa
Tacna
Lim
a
y
CallaoTum
bes
M
adre
de
D
io
s
Ica
50
100
150
200
250
300
equalizing transfers
FONCOMUN
0
M
oquegua
Pasco
Tacna
Lim
a
y
C
allaoÁncashArequipa
M
adre
de
D
io
s
Ica
La
Lib
ertad
Piura
Junín
Cusco
LoretoTum
besU
cayali
Lam
bayeque
C
ajam
arca
H
uancavelica
Puno
San
M
artín
Am
azonas
AyacuchoH
uánucoApurím
ac
50
100
150
200
250
300
equalizing transfers
FONCOMUN
Natural resource transfers (canon and mining royalties)
a. Sorted by poverty rates b. Sorted by income per capita
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
H
uancavelicaApurím
acAyacucho
PunoH
uánuco
C
aja
m
arca
Pasco
C
usco
Am
azonas
Loreto
PiuraU
cayali
San
M
artín
JunínÁncash
Lam
bayeque
La
Lib
ertad
M
oqueguaArequipa
Tacna
Lim
a
y
C
allaoTum
bes
M
adre
de
D
ios
Ica
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
M
oquegua
P
asco
Tacna
Lim
a
y
C
allaoÁncashArequipa
M
adre
de
D
ios
Ica
La
Lib
ertad
Piura
JunínC
usco
LoretoTum
besU
cayali
Lam
bayeque
C
aja
m
arca
H
uancavelica
Puno
S
an
M
artín
Am
azonasAyacuchoH
uánucoApurím
ac
Note. Data source INEI. Poverty rates for 2007; income per capita constructed with the
income in 2006 and population in 2007.

41
Annex 1. Peru: Distribution of Equalization and Shared-Transfers
Origin Use Distribution
Equalization transfers
Regional
Compensation
Fund (FONCOR)
Privatization, concession
receipts and ordinary
resources of the treasury.
Earmarked to capital
expenditures.
The formula was changed in 2008
to make the allocation more
equalizing. Now, it takes into
consideration population, poverty
rate, unmet basic needs,
geographical location, and
performance indicator related to the
execution of investment projects.
Municipal
Compensation
Fund
(FONCOMUN)
Collections from the tax for
the promotion of
municipalities (2 percentage
points VAT surcharge).
Financing either
capital or current
expenditures.
Takes into consideration poverty
rate, population, infant mortality
and gaps in meeting basic needs.
Natural resource shared-transfers
Mining royalty 100 percent of the mining
royalty
Financing or
cofinancing of
productive investment
that promotes
sustainable economic
development.
5 percent to research
at universities.
Producing areas
Canon 50 percent of the income tax
collections of extractive
industries. Depending on the
sector, it also includes
royalties, a percentage of
service contract fee, or
a percentage of the value of
production.
Investment projects
with regional or local
impact. 20 percent to
universities and
research. Up
to 20 percent to
infrastructure
maintenance and to
the selection of
investment project.
Producing areas. The allocation
has been changed several times;
the most recent change was
approved in 2005.
Camisea
development
fund (FOCAM)
25 percent of the gas royalties
from the fields 88 and 56 net
of canon and other
deductions.
Financing economic
and social
investment,
infrastructure
maintenance, and
environmental
protection. 10 percent
to universities.
Areas crossed by the gas pipes.
Distribution takes into account the
pipe length, population, and unmet
basic needs.
Other shared-transfers
Rentas de
aduanas
2 percent of the custom duty Areas where the custom are
located.
Note. The table does not reflect the Intergovernmental fund for the decentralization (FIDE), the Investment Fund
for the development of Ancash (FIDA), and the recently created Regional Investment Fund.

42
Annex 2. Regression Results
Table A1. Regression of Change in Poverty Rate on
Central Government Transfers—Full Sample
(Dependent variable: change in poverty rates between 2005-07 in department i )
a. Poverty rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(canon) 0.63 0.6 0.63 0.51
(1.31) (1.10) (1.19) (0.94)
log(foncomun+foncor) 1.11 0.79
(0.38) (0.23)
log(foncomun) 0.82 0.67
(0.27) (0.21)
log(foncor) 0.8
(0.72)
log(other transfers) -0.29 -0.1 0.01 -0.65
(0.28) (0.07) (0.01) (0.45)
growth PIB per capita -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04
(0.68) (0.36) (0.31) (0.44) (0.13) (0.52) (0.56) (0.39)
Constant -9.91 -13.5 -11.76 -10.31 -5.76 -13.53 -13.46 -9.63
(3.94)*** (0.85) (0.73) (2.40)** (0.89) (0.84) (0.80) (1.29)
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.11
b. Extreme poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(canon) 0.17 0.54 0.36 0.28
(0.33) (1.02) (0.71) (0.48)
log(foncomun+foncor) -3.18 -6.07
(1.11) (1.81)*
log(foncomun) -5.2 -6.02
(1.80)* (1.99)*
log(foncor) 0.41
(0.36)
log(other transfers) 0.58 1.93 1.22 0.83
(0.54) (1.53) (1.12) (0.54)
growth PIB per capita 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.05 0 0.01 0.03
(0.76) (1.10) (1.04) (0.80) (0.54) (0.04) (0.13) (0.26)
Constant -6.33 11.66 21.6 -7.11 -9.07 14.01 17.38 -11
(2.39)** (0.74) (1.41) (1.62) (1.39) (0.90) (1.09) (1.39)
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.2 0.22 0.06
Other transfers comprise derechos de vigencia, aduanas,
recursos ordinarios, and other central government transfers.
All transfers to departments are expressed in per capita terms and deflated (2003=100).
Note. Other transfers comprise derechos de vigencia, aduanas,
recursos ordinarios, and other central government transfers.
All transfers to departments are expressed in per capita terms and deflated (2003=100).

43
Table A2. Impact of Poverty Rates on the Effective
Use of Transfers—Full Sample
a. Poverty rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(canon) 1.00 -0.08
(0.65) (0.04)
log(canon)*poverty 2005 -0.01 0.01
(0.30) (0.34)
log(foncomun+foncor) -2.25 3.80
(0.29) (0.35)
log(foncomun+foncor)*poverty 2005 0.12 0.01
(0.76) (0.05)
log(foncomun) 1.04
(0.11)
log(foncomun)* poverty 2005 0.12
(0.66)
log(foncor) 0.38
(0.12)
log(foncor)*poverty 2005 0.01
(0.14)
log(other transfers) -3.00
(1.13)
log(other transfers)*poverty 2005 0.06
(1.11)
growth PIB per capita -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06
(0.41) (0.13) (0.23) (0.29) (0.14) (0.42)
poverty 2005 0.00 -0.78 -0.77 -0.09 -0.43 -0.76
(0.03) (0.84) (0.80) (0.32) (1.24) (0.72)
Constant -10.10 9.45 -6.28 -6.19 15.26 7.04
(1.16) (0.22) (0.13) (0.48) (0.84) (0.15)
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.25
b. Extreme poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(canon) -0.12 -0.09
(0.17) (0.14)
log(canon)*extreme poverty 2005 0.02 0.04
(0.55) (1.07)
(0.55) (0.53)
log(foncomun+foncor)*extreme poverty 2005 0.29 0.02
(2.20)** (0.08)
log(foncomun) -0.15
(0.04)
log(foncomun)*extreme poverty 2005 0.31
(2.03)*
log(foncor) -0.95
(0.81)
log(foncor)*extreme poverty 2005 0.10
(1.96)*
(1.35)
log(other transfers)*extreme poverty 2005 0.12
(2.30)**
growth PIB per capita 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.06 -0.01
(1.12) (1.70) (2.03)* (1.19) (0.81) (0.05)
extreme poverty 2005 -0.25 -1.86 -1.93 -0.58 -0.98 -1.48
(1.50) (2.43)** (2.26)** (2.68)** (2.74)** (1.73)
Constant -1.38 7.83 -0.15 2.15 10.18 1.76
(0.37) (0.49) (0.01) (0.45) (1.20) (0.10)
R-squared 0.38 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.60
Note. See table 2.

44
Table A3. Regression of Change in Poverty Rate on
Central Government Transfers—Reduced Sample 1/
a. Poverty rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(canon) 0.65 0.62 0.55 0.51
(1.33) (1.15) (1.03) (0.94)
(0.70) (0.62)
(0.66) (0.65)
log(foncor) -0.16
(0.11)
log(other transfers) -1.1 -0.41 -0.74 -1.03
(0.98) (0.32) (0.62) (0.68)
growth PIB per capita -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
(0.78) (0.29) (0.41) (0.37) (0.12) (0.37) (0.29) (0.23)
Constant -9.52 7.89 6.16 -6.35 -0.43 7.44 8.26 -5.21
(3.65)*** (0.37) (0.31) (1.08) (0.06) (0.35) (0.38) (0.62)
Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.12
b. Extreme poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(canon) 0.23 0.55 0.37 0.31
(0.41) (0.94) (0.66) (0.51)
(0.84) (1.35)
(1.63) (1.56)
log(foncor) 1.61
(1.02)
log(other transfers) 0.91 1.91 1.13 0.61
(0.74) (1.37) (0.90) (0.36)
growth PIB per capita 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0 0.02 0.03
(0.74) (1.03) (0.95) (0.69) (0.42) (0.03) (0.15) (0.23)
Constant -6.73 13.49 27.58 -11.85 -11.23 14.32 18.93 -15.01
(2.28)** (0.59) (1.34) (1.91)* (1.48) (0.62) (0.82) (1.62)
Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.19 0.21 0.11
Note. See Table 1.
1/ The sample excludes Lima and Callao, Apurímac and Piura because of their high nonresponse
rates in ENAHO 2005.

45
Table A4. Impact of Poverty Rates on the Effective
Use of Transfers—Reduced Sample
a. Poverty rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(canon) 0.23 0.24
(0.14) (0.12)
log(canon)*poverty 2005 0.01 0.01
(0.21) (0.18)
(1.07) (0.53)
log(foncomun+foncor)*poverty 2005 0.21 0.14
(1.11) (0.55)
log(foncomun) -4.90
(0.38)
log(foncomun)* poverty 2005 0.15
(0.70)
log(foncor) -6.69
(1.38)
log(foncor)*poverty 2005 0.11
(1.31)
(1.76)*
log(other transfers)*poverty 2005 0.07
(1.40)
growth PIB per capita -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03
(0.54) (0.03) (0.07) (0.26) (0.18) (0.18)
poverty 2005 -0.09 -1.23 -0.89 -0.54 -0.56 -1.35
(0.56) (1.18) (0.79) (1.51) (1.61) (1.18)
Constant -4.44 57.09 23.43 25.08 28.33 62.32
(0.48) (1.01) (0.36) (1.20) (1.53) (1.04)
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.26 0.35
b. Extreme poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(canon) -0.14 -0.02
(0.18) (0.03)
log(canon)*extreme poverty 2005 0.02 0.04
(0.58) (0.86)
(0.82) (0.10)
log(foncomun+foncor)*extreme poverty 2005 0.33 0.05
(2.07)* (0.19)
log(foncomun) -0.55
(0.10)
log(foncomun)*extreme poverty 2005 0.31
(1.77)*
log(foncor) -3.77
(1.54)
log(foncor)*extreme poverty 2005 0.18
(2.24)**
(1.55)
log(other transfers)*extreme poverty 2005 0.15
(2.34)**
growth PIB per capita 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.00
(1.01) (1.64) (1.85)* (1.23) (0.73) (0.03)
extreme poverty 2005 -0.28 -2.12 -1.96 -0.94 -1.17 -1.73
(1.42) (2.27)** (1.98)* (2.67)** (2.70)** (1.61)
Constant -1.10 20.39 2.06 14.53 15.70 12.64
(0.25) (0.79) (0.07) (1.38) (1.45) (0.44)
R-squared 0.38 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.62
Note. See Table 3.

46
References
Ahmad, E. et al. 2007. “Why Focus on Spending Needs Factors? The Political Economy of
Fiscal Transfer Reforms in Mexico” International Monetary Fund Working Paper
WP/07/252.
Ahmad, E. and Thomas, R. eds., 1997. “Types of Transfers—A General Formulation.”
Financing Decentralized Expenditures. An International Comparison of Grants
Cheltenhan, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
INEI, 2007. Informe técnico: La pobreza en el Perú en el año 2007.
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda. Boletín de Transparencia Fiscal 78, December 2007.
Secretaría de Descentralización, 2008. Informe Anual sobre el proceso de
descentralización.

47
V. BALANCE SHEET VULNERABILITIES IN A DOLLARIZED ECONOMY35
41. Peru’s balance sheets have shown significant resilience to global financial
turmoil over the last decade. In 2000–01, Peru weathered well the global shocks that
adversely affected other Latin
American countries, with the
economy remaining stable and even
achieving robust growth, even though
it ranked as one of the most d
in the region.
Real GDP in selected Latin American countries
(1995=100)
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Peru
Uruguay
Source: International Financial Statistics and staff's calculations.
ollarized
alance
36
As shown by
Rosenberg et al (2005), much of this
resilience hinged from the central
bank’s reserve buffer, which helped
contain external rollover risks and
avoid the negative expectations that
could cause self-fulfilling bank runs.
42. In more recent years, Peru’s international investment position has continued to
strengthen significantly. Between end-2005 and end-September in 2008, the economy’s net
international liabilities fell from 33 percent of GDP (US$26.3 billion) to 23 percent of GDP
(US$29 billion). The improvement was, however, not uniform across all sectors—with the
combined public sector turning from a net liability position of about 10¼ percent of GDP
into a net asset position of 12½ percent of GDP, while private positions recorded some
increase in their net liabilities.
43. This note examines the evolution of the balance sheets in different sectors. It
shows that while some important vulnerabilities are still present, most sectors have continued
to post improvements in their b
sheets, including through the
strengthening of their net foreign
currency and net-short term
positions. Nonetheless, it is also
apparent that the very significant
international reserve buffer built by
the central bank in recent years
continues to play a crucial role in
ensuring the overall resilience of the
Peruvian economy.
Peru: International Investment Position
(In US$ million)
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
2000:Q4 2005:Q4 2008:Q3 2000:Q4 2005:Q4 2008:Q3
Assets Liabilities
Reserves
Financial
Sector
Other
FDI
Equity
Public
Sector
MLT
Private
Sector
Short Term
Source: Peruvian authorities and staff's calculations.
35
Prepared by Maria Gonzalez.
36
In 2001, Peru ranked as the third most dollarized economies in Latin America, behind Bolivia and Uruguay.

48
A. Public Sector
44. The public sector balance
sheet gained much resilience in
recent years. The authorities’
strategy has involved active public
debt reductions of over
US$3.5 billion, including through
two pre-payments of Brady bonds
in 2007–08. As a result, total public
debt fell from 37¾ percent of GDP
in 2005 to 23¾ percent of GDP in
September 2008; the average
maturity of public debt has risen to
around 11½ years, and the share of
foreign-currency denominated debt declined from 75 percent in 2005 to around 60 percent.
Moreover, the combined public sector has become a net external creditor since mid-2007,
overcoming its long-standing currency mismatch. At the same time, traditional external and
financial vulnerability indicators suggest that Peru’s rising reserve buffer has strengthened
the economy’s shield against temporary external and financial sector shocks.
Peru: Net International Position - Combined Public Sector
(In US$ million)
-2000
3000
8000
13000
18000
23000
28000
33000
38000
Mar-06
Jun-06
Sep-06
Dec-06
Mar-07
Jun-07
Sep-07
Dec-07
Mar-08
Jun-08
Sep-08
Short-Term Liabilities
Medium and Long-Term Liabilities
International Reserves
Source: Peruvian authorities and staff's estimates.
45. Nonetheless, some vulnerabilities remain—mainly related to a potential
emergence of contingent liabilities in the financial sector. In particular, risks stem mostly
from the liabilities that, for example, could be generated in the case of a large systemic shock
in the banking system, which held
some US$16.7 billion in foreign
currency deposits as of mid-
November 2008.37
Under this
hypothetical case, the central
government would be responsible to
cover the US dollar-denominated
deposits legally protected under the
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF)—
amounting to about US$9.2 billion—
especially as the DIF’s resources
currently stand only at about
2 percent of total insured deposits.
Peru. External and Financial Vulnerability Indicators 1/ 2/
(in percent)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Proj
Official Reserves/Short Term Debt
Official Reserves/(Short
Term Debt+FX
Deposits+Adjusted CA
Balance)
Source: Peruvian authorities and staff estimates.
1/ Short-term debt evaluated at residual maturities
2/ Current Account balance adjusted by 0.75*FDI, and set equal to zero when in surplus.
Official Reserves/FX Deposits
37
This amount corresponds to about half of the banking system’s broad money.

49
B. Banking Sector
46. Peru’s high
dollarization has long posed
important risks to the
banking system, but these
are well-covered by central
bank’s reserves. The natural
mismatch between the banks’
short-term FX liabilities and
their FX short-term assets has
risen moderately in nominal
terms—by US$3.7 billion—
over the last three years.
However, bank’s reserve
deposits at the central bank,
along with the central bank’s
own net foreign position provide more than sufficient coverage to these liabilities. Moreover,
the banking sector has become significantly less dollarized in recent years, particularly in the
case of sectors without natural hedges (such as consumption and services). The share of
foreign-currency denominated loans over total loans has remained have remained stable only
for over 4 percent of the total portfolio—allocated to highly-hedged sectors (such as mining).
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
2005 2008 (Nov) 2005 2008 (Nov)
Peru: Liquid Dollar Assets Versus Bank's Short-Term Dollar Liabilities
(In millions of US dollars)
Source: Peruvian Authorities and staff's estimates.
Assets Liabilities
Banks'
Liquid FX
Assets
Banks'
Deposits at
Central Bank
Central Bank's
Foreign Position
Public Sector
Deposits
Banks'
Short-Term
FX
Liabilities
Non-financial
sector dollar
deposits in
Banks
Type of Loan
Total
Dollarization
coefficient (in
percent)
Total
Dollarization
coefficient (in
percent)
Total
Dollarization
coefficient (in
percent)
Commercial and to Microenterprises 30.3 82 30.9 74 62.6 66
Primary Sector 2.2 93 2.5 86 3.3 78
Mining 2.4 95 2.1 95 4.2 97
Manufacturing 8.5 86 10.0 81 18.0 70
Construction 1.1 80 0.8 85 2.0 76
Commerce 6.7 71 6.0 62 13.7 58
Services 8.0 81 8.9 68 19.5 61
Other 1.4 75 0.6 55 1.8 49
Mortgages 3.6 95 6.5 96 10.3 71
2001
Table 1. Peru: Bank Loans and Dollarization Coefficient per Economic Sector
In millions of Nuevos Soles, unless otherwise indicated
2008 1/2005
Consumption 3.2 51 6.3 32 17.2 19
Source: Peruvian authorities and staff estimates.
1/ As of end-November.

50
47. The banking sector’s balance sheet has also gained resilience against currency-
related shocks. While total credit dollarization remains high at 56 percent, the ongoing de-
dollarization process has contributed to a reduction of the foreign-exchange induced credit
risk, particularly that stemming from unhedged borrowers. Relative to 2005, banks have also
become more resilient to a depreciation of the local currency. However, with banks having
reduced their net foreign exchange asset position in US dollars since 2007, a depreciation
event would have a slightly higher negative impact on the system’s capitalization than it
would have had a year ago.
2005 FSAP
Update 1/
June 2007 August 2008 2005 FSAP
Update 1/
June 2007 August 2008
Initial Banking System CAR 13.5 12.1 12.4 13.5 12.1 12.4
New Banking System CAR 11.8 12.0 12.2 9.9 10.2 11.2
Change in CAR (in percent) -12.6 -0.8 -1.5 -26.7 -15.7 -9.9
Memorandum Items
Share of Loans in Foreign Currency (percent) 75.7 65.0 58.9
Net Foreign Exchange Open Position / Capital 24.2 28.6 10.8
Stress Scenario 2/
Source: Staff Estimates
1/ Data as of December 2004.
2/ Both the 2005 FSAP Update and the SBS methodology determined the 20 percent depreciation by the 99 percent confidence
level of the normalized distribution of the monthly changes in the exchange rate in the period January 1997 to December 2004,
and January 1991 to February 2006 respectively.
Market Exchange Rate Risk Foreign-Exchange Induced Credit Risk
20 percent depreciation
Table 2. Peru: Banking sector stress test to currency-related risks 1/ 2/
C. Corporate Sector
48. In the nonfinancial
corporate sector, the
average firm has
significantly improved its
net foreign position in
recent years, particularly
at the short-end. Available
data on a sample of over
120 nonfinancial sector
corporates38
suggest that the
average firm’s negative net
foreign liability position
narrowed by about
US$19 billion b
and 2006, while the average short term position turned into net assets in the same period.
Peru: Corporate Sector - Net Foreign Position of the Average Firm
(In US$ million)
(35)
(30)
(25)
(20)
(15)
(10)
(5)
-
5
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: Economatica and staff calculations (see Kamil, 2008).
Total FX assets - Total FX liabilities
FX Long-Term Assets - FX Long-Term Liabilities
FX Short-Term Assets -
FX Short-Term Liabilities
etween 2000
38
This analysis is based on data provided by Kamil, Herman, 2008, "A New Database on the Currency and
Maturity Composition of Firms' Balance Sheets in Latin America: 1992-2007," (unpublished: Washington:
International Monetary Fund).

51
This accompanied a more general tendency to de-leverage, in both local and foreign
currencies.
49. Improvements were reflected both for corporates in the exporting and
nonexporting sectors. Owing to its natural hedges, the average exporting firm presented
both smaller net foreign currency liabilities and short-term currency liabilities than the
nonexporting sector. Nonetheless, the average firm in both types of sector significantly
reduced its net liability position between 2000 and 2006—and both types of firms had turned
their net short-term liability positions into net short-term asset position by 2005–06, thus
significantly reducing their overall exposure to exchange-rate related shocks.
Peru: Export Sector - Net Foreign Position of the Average Firm
(In US$ million)
(160)
(140)
(120)
(100)
(80)
(60)
(40)
(20)
-
20
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Net Foreign Currency Position
Net Short-Term Foreign Currency Position
Peru: Non-Export Sector - Net Foreign Position of the Average Firm
(In US$ million)
(160)
(140)
(120)
(100)
(80)
(60)
(40)
(20)
-
20
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Net Foreign Currency
Position
Net Short-Term Foreign Currency Position
D. Household Sector
50. At the household level, foreign-currency exposures emerge from the presence of
consumer and mortgage c
approximate the pattern of
household indebtedness
suggests that foreign-currency
exposures have declined
consistently since the
beginning of the decade. I
particular, nonhedged
borrowers have moved towa
debt in local currency,
the total level of indebtedness
per household has risen
redit in US dollars. Using consumer and mortgage loan data to
n
rd
although
.
Loans
Mortgage
2001 33,284 185,913 3,390,328 5.6 101.9
2005 66,555 274,734 6,196,406 4.1 93.1
2008 1/ 104,791 2,973,401 7,323,359 28.4 69.9
Consumer
2001 1,154,317 1,560,580 1,638,868 1.4 1.4
2005 1,938,821 4,269,238 2,008,523 2.2 1.0
2008 1/ 4,277,283 13,940,206 3,273,927 3.3 0.8
Source: Peruvian authorities and staff calculations
1/ As of end-November.
Total LoansNumber of
Debtors
Table 3. Peru: Consumer and Mortgage Loans
(In thousands of Soles, unless otherwise indicated)
Local
Currency
Foreign
Currency
Loan per Capita
Local
Currency
Foreign
Currency

52
51. A recent assessment by the Peruvian authorities suggest that the vulnerability of
households’ balance sheets to exchange-rate shocks is contained. Stress tests on
mortgage-market debtors based on end-2006 data suggest that a depreciation 20 percent of
the Nuevo Sol could raise the amortization burden on low-income household by 5–
6 percentage points—to about 35 percent, a still manageable level.

53
References
Banco Central de la Republica del Peru (2008), “Dolarización de los Créditos Hipotecarios”
en Reporte de Inflación, Enero del 2008, Lima, pp. 114–16.
Billmeier, Andreas, and J. Mathisen (2006), “Analyzing Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities in a
Dollarized Economy: The Case of Georgia,” International Monetary Fund,
WP/06/173, Washington DC.
Kamil, Herman (2008), “A New Database on the Currency and Maturity Composition of
Firms’ Balance Sheets in Latin America: 1992–2007,” International Monetary Fund,
unpublished, Washington DC.
Lima, Juan Manuel, E. Montes, C. Varela and J. Wiegand (2006), “Sectoral Balance Sheet
Mismatches and Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities for Colombia, 1996–2003,”
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