Implementing the ibm system storage san32 b e4 encryption switch - sg247922

Front cover

Implementing the IBM
System Storage SAN32B-E4
Encryption Switch
Enforce data confidentiality using
fabric-based encryption

Centralize administration of
data-at-rest encryption services

Reduce operational costs
and simplify management

Jon Tate
Uwe Dubberke
Michael Engelbrecht

ibm.com/redbooks

International Technical Support Organization

Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4
Encryption Switch

March 2011

SG24-7922-00

Note: Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on page v.

First Edition (March 2011)

This edition applies to Data Center Fabric Manager v10.4.1 and Fabric Operating System v6.4, and Tivoli Key
Lifecycle Manager v2.0.

© Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2011. All rights reserved.
Note to U.S. Government Users Restricted Rights -- Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule
Contract with IBM Corp.

Contents

Notices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v
Trademarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
The team who wrote this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Now you can become a published author, too! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Comments welcome. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Stay connected to IBM Redbooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Chapter 1. Introduction to SAN Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Threats and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Why do we need SAN security? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Need for encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3.1 Symmetric key encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.2 Asymmetric key encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.3 Digital certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.4 Encryption algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 IBM encryption products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Chapter 2. b-type family high-performance encryption for data-at-rest products . . . . 7
2.1 IBM System Storage encryption family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.1 SAN32B-E4(2498-E32). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 Hardware components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3 Front panel connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.4 Rear of switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.5 Standard and optional features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 IBM SAN Director Encryption Blades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 FC Encryption Blade Hardware components and features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Capabilities and limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2 Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.3 Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.4 Re-keying operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Product applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chapter 3. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager interaction with IBM encryption switch . . . 25
3.1 TKLM overview and the need for a key management tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.1 Why TKLM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager components and resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Basic installation of TKLM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.1 Consideration before the first set up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.2 Setting up the IBM encryption switch using the CLI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Chapter 4. Implementation and setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Installation of the encryption switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1.1 Physical installation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1.2 Firmware update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.3 DCFM for encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1.4 Encryption center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2011. All rights reserved. iii

4.1.5 Pre-implementation requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1.6 Initial checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Adding a second switch to the same encryption group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.1 Connecting the encryption engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.1 Encrypting a single path disk LUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.2 Encrypting a multi-path disk LUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4 Configuring high availability HA encryption engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4.1 High Availability (HA) cluster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.2 HA cluster configuration rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.3 Configuring an HA cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Chapter 5. Deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.1 Single fabric deployment with single encryption switch and single path . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Single fabric deployment with single encryption switch and dual path . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3 Single fabric deployment with HA cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Single fabric deployment with DEK cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5 Dual fabric deployment with two HA clusters and one DEK cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 Multiple paths, DEK cluster, no HA cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.7 Deployment with FCIP extension switches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.8 Data mirroring deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.9 VMware ESX server with one HBA per guest OS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.9.1 VMware ESX server with a shared port between two guest OS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.10 Deployment using the Smart Card reader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.10.1 Registering authentication cards from a card reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.10.2 Registering authentication cards from the database. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.10.3 De-registering an authentication card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.10.4 Using authentication cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.10.5 Enabling or disabling the system card requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.10.6 Registering system cards from a card reader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.10.7 De-registering a system card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.10.8 Tracking Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.10.9 Editing Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Related publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
IBM Redbooks publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Other resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Referenced web sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Help from IBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

iv Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch

Notices

This information was developed for products and services offered in the U.S.A.

IBM may not offer the products, services, or features discussed in this document in other countries. Consult
your local IBM representative for information on the products and services currently available in your area. Any
reference to an IBM product, program, or service is not intended to state or imply that only that IBM product,
program, or service may be used. Any functionally equivalent product, program, or service that does not
infringe any IBM intellectual property right may be used instead. However, it is the user's responsibility to
evaluate and verify the operation of any non-IBM product, program, or service.

IBM may have patents or pending patent applications covering subject matter described in this document. The
furnishing of this document does not give you any license to these patents. You can send license inquiries, in
writing, to:
IBM Director of Licensing, IBM Corporation, North Castle Drive, Armonk, NY 10504-1785 U.S.A.

The following paragraph does not apply to the United Kingdom or any other country where such
provisions are inconsistent with local law: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
PROVIDES THIS PUBLICATION "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF NON-INFRINGEMENT,
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Some states do not allow disclaimer of
express or implied warranties in certain transactions, therefore, this statement may not apply to you.

This information could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically made
to the information herein; these changes will be incorporated in new editions of the publication. IBM may make
improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described in this publication at any time
without notice.

Any references in this information to non-IBM Web sites are provided for convenience only and do not in any
manner serve as an endorsement of those Web sites. The materials at those Web sites are not part of the
materials for this IBM product and use of those Web sites is at your own risk.

IBM may use or distribute any of the information you supply in any way it believes appropriate without incurring
any obligation to you.

Information concerning non-IBM products was obtained from the suppliers of those products, their published
announcements or other publicly available sources. IBM has not tested those products and cannot confirm the
accuracy of performance, compatibility or any other claims related to non-IBM products. Questions on the
capabilities of non-IBM products should be addressed to the suppliers of those products.

This information contains examples of data and reports used in daily business operations. To illustrate them
as completely as possible, the examples include the names of individuals, companies, brands, and products.
All of these names are fictitious and any similarity to the names and addresses used by an actual business
enterprise is entirely coincidental.

COPYRIGHT LICENSE:

This information contains sample application programs in source language, which illustrate programming
techniques on various operating platforms. You may copy, modify, and distribute these sample programs in
any form without payment to IBM, for the purposes of developing, using, marketing or distributing application
programs conforming to the application programming interface for the operating platform for which the sample
programs are written. These examples have not been thoroughly tested under all conditions. IBM, therefore,
cannot guarantee or imply reliability, serviceability, or function of these programs.

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2011. All rights reserved. v

Trademarks
IBM, the IBM logo, and ibm.com are trademarks or registered trademarks of International Business Machines
Corporation in the United States, other countries, or both. These and other IBM trademarked terms are
marked on their first occurrence in this information with the appropriate symbol (® or ™), indicating US
registered or common law trademarks owned by IBM at the time this information was published. Such
trademarks may also be registered or common law trademarks in other countries. A current list of IBM
trademarks is available on the Web at http://www.ibm.com/legal/copytrade.shtml

The following terms are trademarks of the International Business Machines Corporation in the United States,
other countries, or both:
AIX® RACF® Tivoli®
DB2® Redbooks® TotalStorage®
DS8000® Redbooks (logo) ® WebSphere®
IBM® System Storage® z/OS®

The following terms are trademarks of other companies:

Java, and all Java-based trademarks are trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States, other
countries, or both.

Microsoft, Windows, and the Windows logo are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States,
other countries, or both.

UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group in the United States and other countries.

Linux is a trademark of Linus Torvalds in the United States, other countries, or both.

Other company, product, or service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.

vi Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch

Preface

This IBM® Redbooks® publication covers the IBM System Storage® SAN32B-E4 Encryption
Switch, which is a high-performance stand-alone device designed to protect data-at-rest in
mission-critical environments. In addition to helping IT organizations achieve compliance with
regulatory mandates and meeting industry standards for data confidentiality, the SAN32B-E4
Encryption Switch also protects them against potential litigation and liability following a
reported breach.

Data is one of the most highly valued resources in a competitive business environment.
Protecting that data, controlling access to it, and verifying its authenticity while maintaining its
availability are priorities in our security-conscious world. Increasing regulatory requirements
also drive the need for adequate data security. Encryption is a powerful and widely used
technology that helps protect data from loss and inadvertent or deliberate compromise.

In the context of data center fabric security, IBM provides advanced encryption services for
Storage Area Networks (SANs) with the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch.
The switch is a high-speed, highly reliable hardware device that delivers fabric-based
encryption services to protect data assets either selectively or on a comprehensive basis. The
8 Gbps SAN32B-E4 Fibre Channel Encryption Switch scales nondisruptively, providing from
48 up to 96 Gbps of encryption processing power to meet the needs of the most demanding
environments with flexible, on-demand performance. It also provides compression services at
speeds up to 48 Gbps for tape storage systems. Moreover, it is tightly integrated with one of
the industry-leading, enterprise-class key management systems, the IBM Tivoli® Key
Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), which can scale to support key life-cycle services across
distributed environments.

The team who wrote this book
This book was produced by a team of specialists from around the world working at the
International Technical Support Organization, San Jose Center.

Jon Tate is a Project Manager for IBM System Storage SAN Solutions at the International
Technical Support Organization, San Jose Center. Before joining the ITSO in 1999, he
worked in the IBM Technical Support Center, providing Level 2 support for IBM storage
products. Jon has 24 years of experience in storage software and management, services,
and support, and is both an IBM Certified IT Specialist and an IBM SAN Certified Specialist.
He is also the UK Chairman of the Storage Networking Industry Association.

Uwe Dubberke is an IBM Certified Specialist for High End Disk Solutions who works as a
field specialist (RDS) for DASD and SAN products in IBM Germany. Since starting in 1990 at
IBM, he has been responsible for several high-end customers as an Account CE. He has also
worked as an SE and since 1999 he has been a virtual member of the EMEA Central Region
Hardware Support Center in Mainz. Since 2005 he has also been a virtual member of the
SAN Support Group in Mainz. He holds a degree in Electrical Engineering with a
specialization in communications engineering from the University of Applied Sciences of
Gelsenkirchen (Germany). Uwe has co-authored other Redbooks on the DS8000® and SSD.

Michael Engelbrecht is a Senior SSR in IBM Global Technical Services, MTS. He has
worked with IBM for 29 years. For the last nine years he has worked for the Hardware Field
Support team for SSA Sub-Saharan Africa. Before that he was a Networking Specialist with

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2011. All rights reserved. vii

many years of networking experience and a large range of networking equipment,
specializing in ATM and Frame relay. He is currently a member of the VFE team for CEE and
MEA on all RMSS products, and regional support for all SAN products for Sub-Saharan
Africa.

Thanks to the following people for their contributions to this project:
Sangam Racherla
Lori Bideaux
International Technical Support Organization, San Jose Center

Doris Konieczny
IBM Storage Systems Group

A special mention must go to Brocade for their unparalleled support of this residency in terms
of equipment and support:
Jim Baldyga
Mansi Botadra
Yong Choi
Silviano Gaona
Jason Russo
Brian Steffler
Marcus Thordal
Steven Tong
Brocade Communications Systems

Now you can become a published author, too!
Here's an opportunity to spotlight your skills, grow your career, and become a published
author—all at the same time! Join an ITSO residency project and help write a book in your
area of expertise, while honing your experience using leading-edge technologies. Your efforts
will help to increase product acceptance and customer satisfaction, as you expand your
network of technical contacts and relationships. Residencies run from two to six weeks in
length, and you can participate either in person or as a remote resident working from your
home base.

Find out more about the residency program, browse the residency index, and apply online at:
ibm.com/redbooks/residencies.html

Comments welcome
Your comments are important to us!

We want our books to be as helpful as possible. Send us your comments about this book or
other IBM Redbooks publications in one of the following ways:
Use the online Contact us review Redbooks form found at:
ibm.com/redbooks
Send your comments in an email to:
redbooks@us.ibm.com

viii Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch

Mail your comments to:
IBM Corporation, International Technical Support Organization
Dept. HYTD Mail Station P099
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601-5400

Stay connected to IBM Redbooks
Find us on Facebook:
http://www.facebook.com/IBMRedbooks
Follow us on Twitter:
http://twitter.com/ibmredbooks
Look for us on LinkedIn:
http://www.linkedin.com/groups?home=&gid=2130806
Explore new Redbooks publications, residencies, and workshops with the IBM Redbooks
weekly newsletter:
https://www.redbooks.ibm.com/Redbooks.nsf/subscribe?OpenForm
Stay current on recent Redbooks publications with RSS Feeds:
http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/rss.html

Preface ix

x Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch

1

Chapter 1. Introduction to SAN Encryption
In this chapter we introduce the need for SAN security with a short focus on SAN encryption.
We will describe the different types of encryption, and provide an overview of the IBM SAN
products available for encryption.

© Copyright IBM Corp. 2011. All rights reserved. 1

1.1 Threats and security
A Fibre Channel threat in its simplest form is anything that can harm your SAN. An IT security
threat is anything that can harm your IT assets. There are various types of threats to your IT
assets:
Disasters: Earthquake, flood, hurricane, thunderstorm, tornado, fire, terrorism, war, and so
on.
Technology: Viruses, trojans, worms, spyware, botnets, rootkits, spam, denial of service
attacks, and so on.
Human: Hackers, industrial espionage, cyber-terrorists, criminals, disgruntled employees,
carelessness, lack of training, lack of security, and so on.

There are many more threats in addition to these that must be taken into account, so you
have to protect against a variety of external and internal threats. Therefore security is
extremely important for your IT assets and especially for your data.

1.2 Why do we need SAN security?
Over the last few years, the SAN environment has grown dramatically. Although each
organization has its own unique perspective on the subject of SAN security, certain issues are
common to all groups. Some people immediately understand the need for SAN security and
recognize any holes in their IT security strategy. At the other extreme, others simply believe
that there is no need to address SAN security at all. Several misconceptions have developed
from the early days of the SAN, which unfortunately have become integrated and accepted
into normal IT business and are now perceived as fact.

Specific examples of these misconceptions include:
SANs are inherently secure because they are in a closed, physically protected
environment.
The Fibre Channel protocol is not well known by hackers and there are almost no avenues
available to attack FC fabrics.
You cannot “sniff” optical fiber without cutting it first and causing disruption.
Even if fiber-optic cables could be sniffed, there are so many protocol layers, file systems,
and database formats that the data would not be legible in any case.
Even if fiber-optic cables could be sniffed, the amount of data to capture is simply too large
to capture realistically and it would require expensive equipment to do so.
If the switches already come with built-in security features, why should I be concerned with
implementing security features in the SAN?

You cannot be certain these misconceptions were not involved in the design of your SAN
environment. There is always a risk that unpredictable things can happen to your SAN, so you
need to consider how to protect your SAN and your data.

1.3 Need for encryption
In this section we describe basic encryption, cryptographic terms, and ideas on how you can
protect your data. Encryption is one of the simple ways as to how you can secure your data. If
the data is stolen, lost, or acquired in any way, it cannot be read without the encryption key.

2 Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch

Encryption has been used to exchange information in a secure and confidential way for many
centuries. Encryption transforms data that is unprotected (plain or clear text) into encrypted
data, or ciphertext, by using a key. It is difficult to “break” ciphertext to change it back to clear
text without the associated encryption key.

There are generally two methods of encryption available:
Symmetric key encryption
Asymmetric key encryption

1.3.1 Symmetric key encryption
Symmetric key encryption uses identical keys, or keys that can be related through a simple
transformation, for encryption and decryption. This is the oldest and best-known technique.

Symmetric key encryption algorithms are significantly faster than asymmetric encryption
algorithms, which makes symmetric encryption an ideal candidate for encrypting large
amounts of data. Depending on the key sizes (128, 160, 192, 224, and 256 bits) you can
make the symmetric key encryption safer. The most popular and respected algorithm are
AES, Blowfish, CAST5, IDEA, RC4, Serpent, TDES and Twofish. Speed and short key length
are the advantages of symmetric encryption.

Figure 1-1 shows an example of how encryption and decryption works. In this scenario, both
Jannis and Levin are aware of the private key they use to perform encryption and decryption.
However, if anyone gains knowledge of this key, they would be able to transform the ciphertext
back to plain text. If you want to preserve confidentiality, you must protect your key and keep it
in a safe place.

Chapter 1. Introduction to SAN Encryption 3

Levin

Plain text Encrypt

A private key only known
by Levin and Jannis

6EB69570
08E03CE4

Plain text Decrypt

Jannis A private key only known
by Levin and Jannis

Figure 1-1 Symmetric key encryption

1.3.2 Asymmetric key encryption
The asymmetric key encryption method uses key pairs for encrypting and decrypting data.
One key is used to encrypt the data, and the other key is used to decrypt the data. Because
the key that is used for encrypting plain text cannot be used for decrypting it, this key does not
have to be kept a secret. It can be widely shared and is therefore called a public key. Anyone
who wants to send secure data to a person can use its public key. The receiving person then
uses its private key to decrypt the plain text. The private key is the corresponding half of the
public-private key pair and must always be kept a secret. It is also called public-private key
encryption or public key encryption.

Well-known examples of asymmetric key algorithms are RSA, Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC), and ElGamal. Currently the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm is
the most widely used public key technique.

Figure 1-2 gives you an idea of how asymmetric key encryption works. Levin is aware of
Jannis’ public key and can encrypt his plain text with this public key. He can send the
encrypted data over the net to Jannis, who able to decrypt this plain text using her secret
private key.


Figure 1-2 Asymmetric key encryption

1.3.3 Digital certificates
If you are using one of these encryption methods, you must also be certain that the person or
machine you are to is the correct one. When you initially receive someone's public key for the
first time, how do you know that this individual is really who the person they claim to be? If
“spoofing” someone's identity is so easy, how do you knowingly exchange public keys? The
answer is to use a digital certificate. A digital certificate is a digital document issued by a
trusted institution that vouches for the identity and key ownership of an individual: it
guarantees authenticity and integrity.

There are trusted institutions all over the world that generate trusted certificates. We will use
this kind of mechanism also for the first time using a certificate generated by our switch. For
more details see Chapter 3, “Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager interaction with IBM encryption
switch” on page 25.

1.3.4 Encryption algorithm
After you have decided that encryption is a must, you must also be aware that there are
several encryption schemes to choose from. The most popular encryption algorithms in use
today include the following:
3DES
DES
AES
RSA
ECC
Diffie-Hellmann
DSA
SHA

Chapter 1. Introduction to SAN Encryption 5

Note: The SAN32B-E4 Encryption switch and the FC Encryption Blades use AES256.
AES256 uses 256 bits for encryption. AES256 is also a standard announced from the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

To get more information about the details of IBM System Storage Data Encryption refer to
IBM System Storage Data Encryption, SG24-7797.

1.4 IBM encryption products
IBM offers several types of solutions to encrypt your data.The IBM System Storage family
features the following products for use with SAN High-Performance Encryption for
Data-at-Rest:
IBM TotalStorage® SAN32B-E4 (2498-E32) Encryption Switch
FC Encryption Blades for the IBM TotalStorage SAN768B (2499-384) Director
FC Encryption Blades for the IBM TotalStorage SAN384B (2499-192) Director

In addition, for your key management you must have TKLM (Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager)
Version 2.0 or later installed to use these products. TKLM manages the large number of
symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, and certificates in the enterprise environment. We discuss
TKLM in Chapter 3, “Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager interaction with IBM encryption switch” on
page 25.

In addition IBM also offers these other products to encrypt your data:
DS8000 with encryption
DS5000 with encryption
Tape with encryption (LTO)

For more information about encryption, refer to these books:
IBM System Storage Tape Encryption Solutions, SG24-7320
IBM System Storage Open Systems Tape Encryption Solutions, SG24-7907
IBM System Storage DS8700 Disk Encryption, REDP-4500


2

Chapter 2. b-type family high-performance
encryption for data-at-rest
products
This chapter introduces the storage area network (SAN) encryption products found in the IBM
System Storage family of SAN products. We examine the hardware and software
characteristics of the products, and list possible product applications. Current capabilities and
limitations of the products are listed together with interoperability information.

It is beyond the scope of this book to cover all the common aspects and features of the IBM
System Storage family of SAN products. Only concepts and features relevant to SAN
encryption for data at rest are covered in depth. For more detailed information about general
aspects of the IBM System Storage family, refer to Implementing an IBM/Brocade SAN with 8
Gbps Directors and Switches, SG24-6116.


2.1 IBM System Storage encryption family
The IBM System Storage family features the following products for use with SAN
High-Performance Encryption for Data-at-Rest:
IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 2498-E32
FC Encryption Blades for the IBM System Storage SAN768B (2499-384) director
FC Encryption Blades for the IBM System Storage SAN384B (2499-192) director

Note: The features and capabilities listed in this chapter assume Fabric OS v6.4.1.

2.1.1 SAN32B-E4(2498-E32)
IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch is a high performance 32 port
auto-sensing 8 Gbps Fibre Channel switch with data encryption, decryption, and
compression features.

This is a SAN fabric solution that has the capability of encrypting data-at-rest for
heterogeneous disk LUNs, tape drives, and virtual tape libraries. The encrypting of the data,
is done using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit algorithms.

The encryption and decryption engines provide in-line encryption services with up to 96 Gbps
throughput for disk I/O (mix of ciphertext and clear text traffic) and up to 48 Gbps throughput
for tape I/O (mix of ciphertext and clear text traffic).

The SAN32B-E4 shown in Figure 2-1 is a 2U form factor for a standard 19 inch rack mount.

Figure 2-1 SAN32B-E4

Management is provided by using the same integrated management tools as the rest of the
IBM System Storage b-type family. This approach allows simple installation, configuration,
and everyday administration.

2.1.2 Hardware components
The SAN32B-E4 provides 8 Gbps high-speed FC ports for excellent performance. In addition,
it has hot-swapable, redundant power supplies and fans that provide for high availability. We
discuss these hardware components in the following sections.

Fibre Channel ports
The Encryption Switch has 32 FC ports, numbered 0 - 31, with the top row of ports numbering
0 - 15 and the bottom row numbering 16-31 as shown in Figure 2-2 on page 9. The FC ports
support universal (F/FL/E/EX/M) port configurations with full duplex, auto-sensing of 1, 2, 4,
and 8 Gbps port speeds. This can be set to fixed port speed: speed matching between 1, 2, 4,
and 8 Gbps ports.


Figure 2-2 Port layout

A number of hot-pluggable 8 Gbps SFP’s (small form-factor pluggable) are available for
installation into the FC ports on the switch.These are 8 Gbps SW, 10 Km LW, and 25 km ELW.
There is a LED above each FC port that displays green, amber, or off to the indicate the
operational status of each port, as shown in Figure 2-3.

Note: The switch only supports 4 and 8 Gbps Brocade branded SFPs.

Figure 2-3 Port LED

Table 2-1 shows the meaning of the port status LED.

Table 2-1 Port LED status
LED Color Status of port

No light No light or signal carrier (SFP or cable) detected

Slow flashing green (flashing in two-second Port is online but segmented because of a
intervals) loopback cable or incompatible switch connection

Fast flashing green (flashing in half-second Port is online and an internal loopback diagnostic
intervals) test is running

Flickering green (steady with random flashes) Port is online and frames are flowing through the
port

Steady green Port is online (connected to external device) but
has no traffic

Slow flashing amber (flashing in two-second Port is disabled (because of diagnostics or the
intervals) portDisable command)

Fast flashing amber (flashing in half-second Port is faulty. Check the management interface
intervals) and the error log for details on the cause of status

Steady amber (for more than five seconds) Port is receiving light or signal carrier, but is not
yet online

Chapter 2. b-type family high-performance encryption for data-at-rest products 9

2.1.3 Front panel connections
The front panel connections are shown in Figure 2-4 and described in the next section.

Figure 2-4 Front panel connections

Gigabit Ethernet ports
The two redundant Gigabit Ethernet (GE) ports, labeled GE1 and GE2, are used for
clustering interconnection and re-key, and data encryption key (DEK) synchronization within
cluster.

A maximum of two SANB32-E4, SAN768B, or SAN384B encryption blades can be in an HA
Cluster by configuring these ports.

Serial management port
The serial management port is used for initial device configuration, such as setting the
management IP address using a terminal emulation utility (for example, HyperTerminal in
Microsoft® Windows®). After setting the IP address, you can use the Ethernet management
port for all further configuration tasks. Apart from setting the IP address, the serial port is not
intended for normal management and maintenance tasks. However, it can be used for switch
recovery in case Ethernet management access is lost.

A serial cable with RJ-45 connectors and an RJ-45-to-DB9 converter are supplied with the
switch.

Ethernet management port
The 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port is intended for connection to the management network and is
the primary point of access for managing the router and the connection to the Tivoli Key
Lifecycle Manager (TKLM) management system for key management. The port
auto-negotiates the speed and can be connected to either an Ethernet hub/switch or a
workstation through a standard twisted pair cable (attachment to a workstation requires a
cross-over cable). The port has two LEDs, indicating the link status and speed.

Through the Ethernet port, you can connect to the management IP address for either
command-line interface (CLI) or graphical user interface (GUI) management. CLI access is
available using Telnet or Secure Shell (SSH) and GUI management access is available
through a web browser. Management through the Fabric Manager application is also
possible.


USB port
One USB port is available on the front panel for system log file downloads or firmware
upgrades.

Smart cards
There is a smart card slot available on the front panel and is used for master key recovery,
quorum authorization, and system recovery operations.

2.1.4 Rear of switch
Figure 2-5 shows the rear of the switch and is discussed in the next section.

Figure 2-5 SAN32B-E4 rear panel

Power supplies
The SAN32B-E4 contains two redundant, hot-pluggable power supplies. The power supplies
use separate power cords for increased availability. Each power supply is equipped with a
power switch, a status LED, a captive screw, and a handle for easy removal and replacement.

Cooling fans
Three cooling fan assemblies provide redundant cooling. Each fan assembly contains two
fans, for a total of six fans. Each fan assembly contains a status LED, a captive screw, and a
handle. The fans provide non-port to port side airflow

2.1.5 Standard and optional features
The SAN32B-E4 comes with the following standard features:
Web Tools
Advanced zoning
Fabric Watch
FC Extended Fabrics support
Hardware-based data compression prior to encryption
AES256-XTS/ECB block cipher for disk encryption (IEEE 1619-compliant)
Encryption and data compression for disk and tape with a maximum 48 Gbps crypto and
compression
Dynamic Path Selection
Long Distance support
Integrated with Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM) management system for Key
management
Common Fabric OS with existing entry to enterprise platforms

The following features are optional and require an additional license:
Advanced Performance Monitoring
ISL Trunking
Adaptive Networking


Integrated Routing
Encryption Performance Upgrade

Web Tools
Web Tools is a comprehensive set of management tools that use a web browser interface. To
launch the Web Tools, simply navigate to the management IP address using a supported
browser. Through Web Tools, you can upgrade, configure, and manage the SAN32B-E4.

To fully manage the encryption services, DCFM is required. A key advantage of the
SAN32B-E4 encryption product is that it can be managed through IBM System Storage Data
Center Fabric Manager to provide a single, centralized management point for the entire
Storage Area Network (SAN) infrastructure, including data security services.

Advanced Zoning
Advanced Zoning provides hardware-enforced access control over fabric resources to prevent
unauthorized access. Zone membership can be specified at the port, AL-PA, and WWN
levels. It also simplifies heterogeneous storage management.

Fabric Watch
Fabric Watch tracks a variety of SAN fabric elements, events, and counters. Monitoring
fabric-wide events, ports, transceivers, and environmental parameters permits early fault
detection, and isolation and performance measurement. Fabric Watch lets administrators
define how often to measure each switch and fabric element, and specify notification
thresholds. Event notification is possible through either simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP),
simple network management protocol (SNMP), or UNIX® syslog daemon.

FC Extended Fabrics support
The Extended Fabrics feature provides native FC connectivity over distances of up to 500
kilometers. Extended Fabrics is ideal for deploying single, distributed fabrics over dark fiber or
dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) based network connections. These
extended distance connections use standard switch ports that provide E_Port or EX_Port
interconnectivity over extended long wave transceivers (SFPs), Fibre Channel repeaters, and
DWDM devices. When Extended Fabrics is installed, E_Ports can be configured with a large
pool of buffer credits. The enhanced switch buffers help ensure that data transfer can occur at
near full bandwidth to efficiently utilize the long-distance connection.

Hardware-based data compression prior to encryption
Data is compressed by the encryption switch prior to encryption in transit to tape and storage
in encrypted format.

AES256-XTS/ECB block cipher for disk encryption (IEEE
1619-compliant)
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the Rijndael encryption algorithm accepted in 2000
with keys available in 128, 192, and 256 bits. The SANB32-E4 uses 1.1 x 1077 possible
256-bit keys. An XEX (Xor-Encrypt-Xor) encryption mode with tweak and ciphertext stealing,
XTS (Xor-Encrypt-Stealing) is used for disk encryption. This encryption method doesn’t
change the size of the data. Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) Streaming Cipher is used for tape
encryption.

Encryption and data compression services for disk and tape
Encryption processing power is scalable, and can be increased by purchasing and installing
an encryption performance license. The SAN32B-E4 Switch has a standard capacity of 48


Gbps of encryption processing power. Additional encryption processing power can be added
for disk I/O by purchasing and installing a Disk Advanced Encryption Performance license.

Dynamic Path Selection
Dynamic Path Selection (DPS) is also known as Exchange-based routing. DPS is where
exchanges or communication between end-devices in a fabric are assigned to egress ports in
ratios proportional to the potential bandwidth of the ISL or trunk group. When there are
multiple paths to a destination, the input traffic will be distributed across the paths in
proportion to the bandwidth available on each of the paths. This improves utilization of the
available paths, reducing the possibility of congestion on the paths. Every time there is a
change in the network (which changes the available paths), the input traffic can be
redistributed across the available paths.

The Extended Fabric feature achieves long distance connections by allocating more frame
buffers for Fibre Channel traffic. Long distance connections require more frame buffers than
regular ISL connections. The greater the distance level of a ISL long distance connection, the
more frame buffers are required.

Integrated with Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager
The SAN32B-E4 is certified for use with Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM). TKLM serves
keys at the time of use to allow for centralized storage of key material in a secure location. It
supports multiple protocols for key serving, and manages certificates, symmetric keys, and
asymmetric keys. Users can also centrally create, import, distribute, back up, archive, and
manage the life cycle of the keys and certificates.

Advanced Performance Monitoring
The Advanced Performance Monitoring feature identifies end-to-end bandwidth usage and
provides useful information for capacity planning. In addition to capacity planning, it can also
be effectively used for troubleshooting.

ISL Trunking
The ISL trunking feature enables FC frames to be efficiently load balanced across multiple
physical ISL connections, while preserving in-order delivery. Up to eight 8 Gbps links can be
combined to set up a single logical ISL connection with up to 64 Gbps throughput per trunk.
Like other 8 Gbps IBM products, trunking is implemented masterless, meaning that a failure
on any of the links in the trunk does not cause disruptions to traffic or the fabric.

Similar trunking capabilities are also available on inter-fabric links (IFLs) going from EX_Ports
on a router to the same edge fabric. As with ISL trunking, up to eight 8 Gbps IFLs can be
combined into a single logical IFL for a maximum throughput of 64 Gbps per trunk. IFL trunks
are not masterless, and if the master link fails the trunk will be taken off for a short period of
time for re configuration.

Together with fabric shortest path first (FSPF) enhancements such as Traffic Isolation (TI)
zones and dynamic load sharing (DLS), ISL and IFL trunking provide the best possible use of
all paths in the metaSAN.

Adaptive Networking
Adaptive Networking Services extends the fabric intelligence to the application, enabling
fabric-wide application service level monitoring and management that automatically reacts to
changes in virtual server workloads. The fabric is able to dynamically allocate shared
resources as changes occur in the data flows between virtual servers and virtual storage. If


congestion occurs (or is predicted), the fabric can adjust bandwidth and other resources
according to defined service levels, helping to ensure that higher-priority workloads receive
the resources they need. Adaptive networking introduces the following new services:
Fabric QoS: Enables granular allocation of fabric resources to applications based on the
relative importance of the application as defined by the assigned QoS. When applications
become dynamic, the QoS priority must follow the applications as they move between
physical server and fabric connections. Brocade virtual channel technology enables
Adaptive Networking Services to monitor resource usage, detect and predict congestion in
the data path, and dynamically adjust resources to avoid congestion based on the QoS
priority.
Traffic management services: Provide congestion management to support application
service levels. They can also provide automatic ingress rate limiting and advanced
queuing algorithms to remove congestion and dedicate bandwidth to specific applications.
Fabric dynamic profiling services: Provide end-to-end analysis of individual application
data flows and resource usage, supplying in-depth information about the impact on overall
fabric performance. These services identify points of congestion, and monitor and report
on numerous statistics counters for physical resource utilization. This information is useful
for provisioning, capacity planning, and end-to-end fault isolation tools that simplify fabric
management.
Policy management services: Prevent buffer credit exhaustion (buffer credits provide fabric
flow control) and detect under-utilized shared physical resources, reclaiming them or
reallocating them to optimize application flow according to defined policies.

Integrated Routing
Integrated Routing allows 8 Gbps ports to be configured as EX_Ports supporting Fibre
Channel routing. Using 8 Gbps ports for Fibre Channel routing provides double the bandwidth
for each FCR connection when connected to another 8-Gbps-capable port.

Encryption Performance Upgrade
Encryption processing power is scalable, and can be increased by purchasing and installing
an encryption performance license. The SABN32B-E4 Switch and IBM Encryption Blade
have a standard capacity of 48 Gbps of encryption processing power. Additional encryption
processing power can be added for disk I/O by purchasing and installing a Encryption
Performance license. When the performance upgrade license is applied, encryption
processing power of up to 96 Gbps is available for disk encryption.

The encryption performance licenses are added just like any other Fabric OS feature license.
After the license is added, the SAN32B-E4, or the SAN768B or SAN384B with encryption
blades installed, must be rebooted for the license to take effect.


2.2 IBM SAN Director Encryption Blades
IBM System Storage SAN768B (2499-384) and the SAN384B (2499-192) directors are
designed to meet the highest performance and availability demands, in a modular, high
density single chassis design. With no single point of failure on active components, these
directors provide larger data centers with high throughput and high availability.

These directors integrate a passive switch backplane with expansion slots open for various
types of blade modules. The two center slots contain the two redundant control processor
(CP) blades. The SAN768B and SAN384B have an additional two slots for redundant core
switching blades, leaving eight or four slots open respectively for a user-configurable selection
of blades.

The IBM System Storage SAN Switch family supports FC connectivity for servers and
storage. SAN768B and SAN384B systems with Encryption Blades require the following
software to be installed:
Fabric Operating System v6.4.1, or later
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM) v2.0 or later

Figure 1-6 shows the SAN768B and SAN256B directors with various blades installed.

Figure 2-6 SAN768B (2499-384) directors

Figure 2-7 on page 16 shows the SAN384B director with optional 48-port FC blades installed.


Figure 2-7 SAN384B (2499-192)

SAN768B and SAN384B directors can be populated with optional encryption blade FC 3895.

Key advantages of the Encryption Blade solution include:
The ability to encrypt data at wire speed
Central management of storage and fabric-based security resources
Multi-vendor storage system and fabric support
Transparent, online encryption of cleartext LUNs and rekeying of encrypted LUNs
without disruption
Data compression and integrity authentication for tape backup
Simplified, nondisruptive installation and configuration

SAN768B and SAN384B systems can have up to four Encryption Blades installed. Figure 2-8
shows the FC Encryption Blade.

Figure 2-8 FC Encryption Blade

2.2.1 FC Encryption Blade Hardware components and features
The features of the FC Encryption Blade are as follows:
Encryption and data compression/decompression on blade
Maximum 96 Gbps encryption bandwidth and 48 Gbps of compression
Supported in both the SAN768B and SAN384B chassis
Sixteen 8 Gbps front-end user ports
2 GbE ports for out-of-band cluster HA interconnect


One smart card slot for master key recovery, quorum authorization, and system recovery
operations
Power consumption of 235 watts
Data cryptographic and data compression capabilities
A1:1 subscription at 16 ports
Auto-sensing Link Speeds at 1, 2, 4, and 8 Gbps
ISL Trunking that provides 64 Gbps trunks (eight ports @ 8 Gbps each)
Dynamic Path Selection optimizes performance and load balancing
Disk Encryption Performance Upgrade through chassis License Key
Integrated with industry leading key management systems
Integrated Routing available on every port
End-to-end path performance monitoring
Common Fabric OS with existing entry to enterprise platforms
Supports 4 and 8 Gbps Brocade SFPs

All FC ports on the FC encryption Blade can be used to form IFLs, and the ports on the FC
port blades can then be used for interconnecting the switches in the backbone fabric. Besides
optimizing the router port usage, this approach allows for the creation of dedicated
high-performance backbones with high inter-switch bandwidth.

Note: The IBM Encryption Switch and Encryption Blade have a standard capacity of 48
Gbps of encryption processing power. Additional encryption processing power of up to 96
Gbps power can be added for disk I/O by purchasing and installing a Encryption
Performance license.

2.3 Capabilities and limitations
This section examines the specific limitations of the configurations and functions of IBM
System Storage b-type Encryption products. The limitations are based on the capabilities of
the current hardware and operating system version, and are subject to change. A best
practice is to always check the current values in the interoperability matrix for your SAN router
product. You can find the matrix on the IBM support website:
http://www.ibm.com/servers/storage/support/san/

2.3.1 Interoperability
An interoperability matrix is the best source for compatibility and interoperability information
for a particular SAN switch or multiprotocol router. Always obtain the latest information for all
products included in the solution that you plan to implement prior to implementation.

For the most up-to-date information, see the IBM support website at:
http://www.ibm.com/servers/storage/support/san/

If you cannot find the required information, ask your IBM representative to help you obtain the
information.

Note: At the IBM support website, each product has a published interoperability matrix
that indicates the IBM tested-firmware levels at the time the document was published.
Although you might find that later versions are available for download, these levels are fully
tested and supported by IBM.


Note: The minimum supported Fabric OS version on an SAN256B -E4 with the Encryption
Blade installed, and the SAN32B-E4 is version 6.4.1.

2.3.2 Scalability
In Table 2-2 we show the physical configurable scalability information for FOS 6.4.1.

Table 2-2 Physical limits
Configuration Supported v6.4.1

Maximum number of defined LUNS per EE 16000

Maximum number of defined LUNS per max EG size 8000

Maximum LUN size 16 TB

Maximum number of VTs per EE 256

Maximum number of VTs per max EG size 1024

Maximum number of VIs per EE 1024

Maximum number of VIs per max EG size 1024

Maximum number of VT/VI’s per EE in an N_port configuration 254

Maimum number of Physical targets per EE 256

Maimum number of Physical targets per max EG size 1024

Maimum number of physical initiators per EE 256

Maimum number of physical initiators per max EG size 1024

Maximum number of encryption blades per chassis 4

Maximum number of EE’s per HA cluster 2

Maximum number of EE’s per fabric No limit

Maximum number of paths from host to target through an EE No limit

Maximum number of nodes in an EG 4

Maximum number of tape pools per EG 4096

2.3.3 Management
In Table 2-3 we show the TKLM management scalability information for FOS 6.4.1

Table 2-3 Key Management

Maximum number of key vaults per EE/EG 2

Maximum number of data encryption keys (DEK) per EE 64000

Maximum number of data encryption keys (DEK) per EG 64000

Maximum number of EE/EG per key vault No limit



Maximum number of DEK’s per key value No limit

2.3.4 Re-keying operations
Table 2-4 shows TKLM re-keying scalability information for FOS 6.4.1

Table 2-4 Re-keying operations

Maximum number of concurrent active re-key sessions 160
per target or initiator

Maximum number of concurent active re-key sessions per 10
EE

2.4 Product applications
In this section, we show the positioning of the encryption switch in a SAN fabric. This is a
basic overview with various common uses. We will discuss more detailed scenarios later in
this book.

Single Fabric
Figure 2-9 on page 20 shows a single fabric scenario using the SAN32B-E4. This can also be
done using the blade within a DCX switch.


Figure 2-9 Single fabric encryption

Figure 2-9 shows a basic configuration with a single encryption switch providing encryption
between one host and one storage device

During a write operation the data traffic is redirected by the encryption switch to a virtual
initiator port (VT1). The switch then encrypts the data using a key from the TKLM server and
sends the encrypted data to the target using the virtual target port (VT1). During a read
operation the data is read into the switch using the VT1 port, decrypted, and sent to the host
using the VI1 port.

Single fabric HA cluster
Figure 2-10 on page 21 shows a single fabric in a High Availability HA configuration with two
SAN32B-E4. This can also be done using the blade within a DCX switch.


Figure 2-10 Single fabric HA cluster

Figure 2-10 shows an encryption deployment in a single fabric with two paths between a host
and a target.device. Two encryption switches are required: one for each target path. Cluster
encryption switches can be in active-active mode or active-standby. Data traffic will use only
one switch. If there is a failure of the switch in use, traffic will be redirected through the other
switch. Read and write operations are performed to the virtual target and initiators where
encryption and decryption is performed.

The two encryption switches provide a redundant encryption path to the target devices. The
encryption switches are interconnected through a dedicated cluster LAN. The Ge1 and Ge0
gigabit Ethernet ports on each of these switches are attached to this LAN. This LAN
connection provides the communication needed to distribute and synchronize configuration
information, and enable the two switches to act as a high availability (HA) cluster, providing
automatic failover if one of the switches fails or is taken out of service.

This configuration forms a data encryption key (DEK) cluster between encryption switches for
both target paths. The DEK cluster handles the target/host path failover along with the failure
of either encryption switch.


Dual Fabric
Figure 2-11 shows a configuration with a DEK cluster with multiple paths to the same target
device. There is one encryption switch in each fabric.

Figure 2-11 Dual Fabric

In this configuration there are two separate fabrics with four paths to each target device: two
in each fabric. There are two encryption switches: one in each fabric (no HA cluster). There is
one data encryption key (DEK) cluster and one encryption group.

Because the same encryption keys are used on both fabrics, either fabric is able to perform
both read and write operations performing encryption and decryption utilizing either virtual
target/initiator 1 or 2 (VT1/VI1 or VT2/VI2).


Dual Fabric HA Cluster
Figure 2-12 shows a dual fabric in a High Availability HA configuration. This can also be done
using blades within a DCX switch or a mix of blades and SAN32B-E4 switches.

Figure 2-12 Dual fabric HA cluster

Two paths to the target device are shown: one in each fabric. The host also has a path to
each fabric. There are two encryption switches in each fabric, interconnected through a
dedicated cluster LAN. The Ge1 and Ge0 gigabit Ethernet ports on each of these switches
are attached to this LAN.

The encryption switches in each fabric act as a high availability cluster, providing automatic
failover for the encryption path between the host and target in both fabrics. All four encryption
switches provide an encryption path to the same LUN, and use the same DEK for that LUN,
forming a DEK cluster. The two switches in each core act as a high availability (HA) cluster,
providing automatic failover if one of the switches fails or is taken out of service


3

Chapter 3. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager
interaction with IBM encryption
switch
This chapter will provide you information about Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM). We will
explain how TKLM and the encryption switch work together and how to set up TKLM.


3.1 TKLM overview and the need for a key management tool
Due to the nature, security, and accessibility of encryption, data that is encrypted is
dependent on the security of, and accessibility to, the decryption key. The disclosure of a
decryption key to an unauthorized agent (individual person or system component) creates a
security exposure in that the unauthorized agent would also have access to the ciphertext
that is generated with the associated encryption key.

In addition, if all copies of the decryption key are lost (whether intentionally or accidentally),
no feasible way exists to decrypt the associated ciphertext, and the data contained in the
ciphertext is said to have been cryptographically erased. If the only copies of certain data that
exists is cryptographically erased, then access to that data has been permanently lost for all
practical purposes.

Therefore the security and accessibility characteristics of encrypted data can create
considerations for you that do not exist with storage devices that do not contain encrypted
data. Encryption key material must be kept secure from disclosure, or use by any agent that
does not have authority to it. At the same time, it must be accessible to any agent that has
both the authority and the requirement to gain access.

Two considerations are important in this context:
Key security
To preserve the security of encryption keys, the implementation must ensure that no one
individual (system or person) has access to all the information required to determine the
encryption key.
Key availability
To preserve the access to encryption keys, redundancy can be provided by having multiple
independent key servers that have redundant communication paths to encrypting devices.
This ensures that the backup of each key server’s data is maintained. Failure of any one
key server or any one network will not prevent devices from obtaining access to the data
keys needed to provide access to the data.

The sensitivity of possessing and maintaining encryption keys, and the complexity of
managing the number of encryption keys in a typical environment, results in a client
requirement for a key server. A key server is integrated with encrypting products to resolve
most of the security and usability issues associated with key management for encrypted
devices. However, you must still be sufficiently aware of how these products interact in order
to provide appropriate management of the computer environment

Note: Be aware that even with a key server, generally at least one encryption key, normally
called the master key (MK), must be maintained manually. For example, this is the key that
manages access to all other encryption keys: a key that encrypts the data used by the key
server to exchange keys.

3.1.1 Why TKLM?
In your enterprise, a large number of symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, and certificates can
exist. All of these keys and certificates have to be managed.

Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager provides you with a simplified key management solution that is
easy to install, deploy, and manage. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager allows you to create,
backup, and manage the keys and certificates that your enterprise uses. Through its


graphical and command line interfaces you can manage symmetric keys, asymmetric keys,
and certificates.

The Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager product is an application that performs key management
tasks for the following IBM encryption-enabled hardware:
Disk systems:
– IBM System Storage DS5000 series
– IBM System Storage DS8000 series
Tape drives
– IBM System Storage TS1130 Model E06 and Model EU6 Tape Drive
– IBM System Storage TS1120 Model E05 Tape Drive
– IBM System Storage Linear Tape-Open (LTO) Ultrium Generation 4 Tape Drive
Encryption switch
– SAN32B-E4 (2498-E32)
– FC Encryption Blades

Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager provides, protects, stores, and maintains encryption keys that
are used to encrypt information being written to, and decrypt information being read from any
of these products. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager operates on the following supported operating
systems:
AIX® 5.3 and AIX 6.1: 64-bit
Red Hat Enterprise Linux® AS V4.0 x86: 32-bit
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server V9.0 and V10 x86: 32-bit
Sun Server Solaris 10 Sparc: 64-bit
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2: x86: 32-bit
z/OS® V1 Release 9 or later
Fix Pack 1 added the additional platform support:
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 32-bit
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 64-bit (32-bit mode application)
Solaris 9 SPARC 64-bit
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 64-bit (32-bit mode application)
Windows Server 2003 64-bit (32-bit mode application)
Windows Server 2008 32-bit
Windows Server 2008 64-bit (32-bit mode application)

Note: The new IBM TotalStorage SAN32B-E4 (2498-E32) and IBM FC Encryption Blades
must be used with TKLM V2.0 or later.

Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager is designed to be a shared resource deployed in several
locations within an enterprise. It is capable of serving numerous IBM encryption-enabled
hardware devices, regardless of where those devices reside.

Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager provides the following functions:
Key serving with life cycle management using a graphical user interface and a
commandline interface.
Support for the new IBM SAN encryption switch products SAN32B-E4 (2498-E32) and
IBM FC Encryption Blades.
Support for encryption-enabled IBM System Storage TS1100 Family Tape Drives (3592
tape drives).
Support for IBM Systems Storage Linear Tape-Open (LTO) Ultrium Generation 4
TapeDrives.
Support for the DS8000 Storage Controller (IBM System Storage DS8000 Turbo drive)
Backup and recovery to protect your keys and certificates.
Notification on expiration of certificates.

Chapter 3. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager interaction with IBM encryption switch 27

Audit records to allow you to track the encryption of your data.
Support for RACF® and ICSF protected keystores.
Auto roll-over of key groups and certificates. This capability applies to 3592 and LTO
drives; it does not apply to DS8000.
Provides key life-cycle management function that allows a user to define when a new key
group should be used with LTO drives or new certificates with 3592 drives.

3.2 Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager components and resources
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager does not perform any cryptographic operations, such as
generating encryption keys, and it does not provide storage for keys and certificates. In
addition to the key serving function, the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager also performs the
following functions, which can be used for IBM encryption-enabled devices:
Life cycle functions:
– Notification of certificate expiration through the Tivoli Integrated Portal
– Automated rotation of certificates
– Automated rotation of groups of keys
Usability features:
– Graphical user interface (GUI) provided
– Initial configuration wizards
– Migration wizards
Integrated backup and restore of Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager files
– Only one button required to create and restore a single backup, which is packaged as a
.jar file

To perform these tasks, Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager relies on external components. The
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager solution includes the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager server, an
IBM embedded WebSphere® Application Server, and a database server (IBM DB2®).

The solution also incorporates the Tivoli Integrated Portal installation manager, which
provides easy to use installation for Windows, Linux, AIX, and Solaris.

In Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager, the drive table, key group, and metadata are all kept in DB2
tables. The Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager DB2 tables enable the user to search and query that
information more easily. Note that the keystore, configuration file, audit log, and debug log are
still flat files.

Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager relies on the following resources:
Configuration file
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager has an editable configuration file with additional configuration
parameters that is not offered in the GUI. The file can be text-edited, but the preferred
method is modifying the file through the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager command-line
interface (CLI).
Java™ security keystore
The keystore is defined as part of the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) and an element
of the Java Security components, which are, in turn, part of the Java Runtime
Environment. A keystore holds the certificates and keys (or pointers to the certificates and
keys) used by Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager to perform cryptographic operations. A
keystore can be either hardware-based or software-based.
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager supports several types of Java keystores, offering a variety of
operational characteristics to meet your needs. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager on open


systems supports the JCEKS keystore. This keystore supports both CLEAR key
symmetric keys, and CLEAR key asymmetric keys.
Cryptographic services
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager uses the IBM Java Security components for its cryptographic
capabilities. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager does not provide cryptographic capabilities and
therefore does not require, nor is allowed to obtain, FIPS 140-2 certification. However,
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager takes advantage of the cryptographic capabilities of the IBM
Java Virtual Machine in the IBM Java Cryptographic Extension component and allows the
selection and use of the IBMJCEFIPS cryptographic provider, which has a FIPS
140-2level 1 certification.

3.3 Basic installation of TKLM
TKLM can run on various operating systems. Depending on the operating systems, there are
many installation scenarios available. It is beyond the scope of this book to cover all those
permutations and we will not cover the installation of TKLM here. For installation information
refer to IBM System Storage Data Encryption, SG24-7797.

In our scenario we will be using TKLM running on a Windows 2003 64 bit version server.

When the installation of TKLM is complete you can go on to set up the switch and TKLM to
provide the keys for the encryption switch.

There are steps that have to be done only once during the configuration of the TKLM server,
and there are steps which are needed every time you configure a new client, or when a new
client certificate is generated.

Important: Make sure that the time on the TKLM server is the same as on the IBM
Encryption Switch or on the chassis of the Encryption Blade. A variation between the two
can cause the TLS (Transport Layer Security) connectivity to fail. The switch will fail with
the state: Failed authentication.

Important: Both the primary and secondary key vaults should be registered before
exporting the master key (MK) or encrypting LUNs. If the secondary key vault is registered
after encryption is done for some of the LUNs, then the key database of the primary TKLM
server should be backed up and restored on the secondary TKLM server before registering
the secondary TKLM server on the switch.

3.3.1 Consideration before the first set up
First check the date and time on the switch and compare it with the time on your TKLM
servers.

Note: The best practice is to use an NTP server to keep date and time in synchronization
across the entire enterprise.

The IBM Encryption Switch or Blade can be managed by either the CLI or the GUI using
DCFM. We will show the basic setup of the encryption switches using the CLI.


You must perform a series of steps to initialize the IBM Encryption Switch or Blade that is
expected to perform encryption as a Groupleader (GL) within the fabric.

All configuration on the switch using the CLI is done with the command: cryptocfg.

Note: To configure the switch you have to logon to it as user Admin or SecurityAdmin. Both
have the necessary permissions to use the setup commands.

To get help about the syntax of command use the command cryptocfg --help as shown in
Example 3-1.

Example 3-1 cryptocfg --help
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --help
Usage: cryptocfg
--help -nodecfg:
Display the synopsis of node parameter configuration.
--help -groupcfg:
Display the synopsis of group parameter configuration.
--help -hacluster:
Display the synopsis of hacluster parameter configuration.
--help -devicecfg:
Display the synopsis of device container parameter configuration.
--help -transcfg:
Display the synopsis of transaction management.
--help -decommission:
Display the synopsis of decommissioning a lun.

To get more help about other parameters, for example, issue cryptocfg --help --nodecfg
as shown in Example 3-2.

Example 3-2 cryptocfg --help -nodecfg
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --help -nodecfg
Usage: cryptocfg
--help -nodecfg:
Display the synopsis of node parameter configuration.
--initnode:
Initialize the node for configuration of encryption options.
--initEE [<slotnumber>]:
Initialize the specified encryption engine.
--regEE [<slotnumber>]:
Register a previously initialized encryption blade.
--setEE [<slotnumber>] -routing <shared | partitioned>:
Set encryption routing policy.
--reg -membernode <member node WWN> <member node certfile> <IP addr>:
Register a member node with the system.
--reg -groupleader <group leader WWN> <group leader certfile> <IP addr>:
Register a group leader node with the system.
--dereg -membernode <member node WWN>:
Deregister a member node with the system.
--reg -systemcard [<slotnumber>] <cert label> <certfile>:
Register a system card with the system.
--dereg -systemcard [<slotnumber>]:
Deregister a system card with the system.


--dhchallenge <vault IP addr>:
Generates the Diffie-Hellman challenge passed from the
EE to the specified NetApp LKM.
--dhresponse <vault IP addr>:
Accepts the LKM Diffie-Hellman response from the NetApp
LKM and generates the Link Key on the specified EE.
--disableEE [<slotnumber>]:
This command reboots the Mace switch or power cycle the Lance blade in
case
of chassis system.
--enableEE [<slotnumber>]:
Enables the system to perform encryption.
--zeroizeEE [<slotnumber>]:
Zeroize all critical security parameter.
--import -scp <local name> <host IP> <host username> <host path>:
Import a file from an external host via scp.
--import -usb <dest filename> <source filename>:
Import a file from a mounted USB storage device.
--export -scp [-dhchallenge <vault IP addr> | -currentMK | -KACcert | -KACcsr |
-CPcert] <host IP> <host username> <host path>:
Export a specified file to an external host via scp.
--export -usb [-dhchallenge <vault IP addr> | -currentMK | -KACcert | -KACcsr |
-CPcert] <dest filename>:
Export a specified file to a mounted USB storage device.
--delete -file <file name>:
Delete a file previously imported to the switch.
--show -nodecerts:
Display all authorization lists certificates for Cluster Members,
Key Vaults, CP certificate and local EE certificates.
--show -file -all:
Display the files that are imported or to be exported.
--show -localEE:
Display status of EEs on the local node.
--rebalance [slot_num]:
Rebalance containers and initiators per EE

3.3.2 Setting up the IBM encryption switch using the CLI
In our example we will setup a SAN32B-E4 switch.

Note: Enter a slotnumber when you are using a Blade instead of a Switch.

Note: If you plan to use more than one encryption switch, connect all encryption switches
going on the same dedicated LAN as described in Chapter 4, “Implementation and setup”
on page 55.

Log in to the switch that will become the groupleader as Admin or SecurityAdmin and perform
the following steps.


Initializing the IBM encryption engines
Take care with the date and time and compare it with the TKLM servers by using the
command date. If they are not the same, they will need to be adjusted so they are.

Note: The initialization process overwrites any authentication data and certificates that
reside on the node and the security processor (SP). If this is not a first-time initialization,
make sure to export the master key (MK) by running cryptocfg --exportmasterkey and
cryptocfg –export -scp --currentMK before running --initEE.

The --initnode parameter will initialize the node and will overwrite all old existing
authentication data on the node.

1. Zeroize all critical security parameters on the switch by entering the cryptocfg
--zeroizeEE command as shown in Example 3-3. The switch will reboot.

Example 3-3 cryptocfg --zeroizeEE
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --zeroizeEE
This action will zeroize all critical security parameters.
Any decommissioned keyids in the EG will also be deleted.
Following the zeroizing of this EE, the switch/blade will be rebooted.
ARE YOU SURE (yes, y, no, n): [no] yes
Operation succeeded.
Rebooting...

2. Initialize the node by entering the cryptocfg --initnode command as shown in
Example 3-4. Successful execution generates the following security parameters and
certificates:
– Node CP certificate
– Key Archive Client (KAC) certificate
The Key Archive Client (KAC) certificate will be transferred to the TKLM server to
authorize the switch on the TKLM server.

Example 3-4 cryptocfg --initnode
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --initnode
This will overwrite all identification and authentication data
sh: rm: command not found

3. Now you have to generate the encryption group using cryptocfg --create -encgroup
<user defined name> as shown in Example 3-5. The name can be up to 15 characters
long and include alphanumeric characters and underscores. White space, hyphens, and
other special characters are not permitted. This encryption switch will now become the
Groupleader (GL).

Example 3-5 cryptocfg --create -encgroup IBMGroup
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --create -encgroup IBMGroup
Encryption group create status: Operation Succeeded.


4. Configure the type of keyvault to TKLM with cryptocfg --set -keyvault <key store> as
shown in Example 3-6. This parameter has no default. This operand is required.

Example 3-6 cryptocfg --set -keyvault TKLM
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --set -keyvault TKLM
Set key vault status: Operation Succeeded.

5. You can now check if all parameters are set correctly by using cryptocfg --show
-groupcfg as shown in Example 3-7. As you can see there is no primary or secondary key
vault defined at the moment.

Example 3-7 cryptocfg --show -groupcfg
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -groupcfg
Encryption Group Name: IBMGroup
Failback mode: Auto
Replication mode: Disabled
Heartbeat misses: 3
Heartbeat timeout: 2
Key Vault Type: TKLM
System Card: Disabled

Primary Key Vault not configured
Secondary Key Vault not configured

Additional Primary Key Vault Information::
Additional configuration parameters not available

Additional Secondary Key Vault Information:
Additional configuration parameters not available

Encryption Node (Key Vault Client) Information:
Node KAC Certificate Validity: N/A
Time of Day on the Switch: N/A
Client SDK Version: N/A
Client Username: N/A
Client Usergroup: N/A
Connection Timeout: N/A
Response Timeout: N/A
Connection Idle Timeout: N/A

Authentication Quorum Size: 0
Authentication Cards not configured

NODE LIST
Total Number of defined nodes: 1
Group Leader Node Name: 10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10
Encryption Group state: CLUSTER_STATE_CONVERGED
Crypto Device Config state: In Sync
Encryption Group Config state: In Sync

Node Name IP address Role
10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10 10.18.235.54 GroupLeader (current node)
EE Slot: 0
SP state: Waiting for enableEE


6. Now export the KAC certificate from the IBM encryption switch to an Linux host using the
command cryptocfg --export -scp -KACcert <host IP> <ssh username>
<location/certificate name.der> as shown in Example 3-8. The <host IP> is the IP
address of the Linux host. You need the username of this host and also the password to
log in during the transfer. The certificate name is user defined. It must end with the .der
extension.

Note: Be sure to use a Linux host and be aware that you transfer the data in binary mode.
On the host that you are transferring the file to be aware that scp is running.

Example 3-8 cryptocfg --export -scp
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --export -scp -KACcert 10.18.228.36 root
/root/certfromsw/IBMsan321.der
### Get FN </etc/fabos/mace/kac_cert.der> ###
root@10.18.228.36's password:

Establishing a default key store and define a device group on TKLM
The next task is to define a default key store and device group using the following steps:
7. Log on to the TKLM server using the credentials as TKLMAdmin as shown in Figure 3-1
on page 35.


Figure 3-1 TKLM logon

8. If you are using TKLM for the first time you will need to generate a Default Key Store.
As you see in Figure 3-2 on page 36, type a path or leave the default for the default key
store. Enter the password and press the OK button. Retype the password when prompted.

Note: Be aware that we do not cover any maintenance tasks which must be done on the
TKLM server. However you should perform backups and keep your passwords secret.


Figure 3-2 Master key store

9. Create a Device Group with name BRCD_ENCRYPTOR and with the device family LTO.

Note: The Device Group maybe defined by default in your TKLM server.

As you see in Figure 3-3 on page 37 check this by selecting: Device Group under
Advanced Configuration on the left. If it is not defined, do it now by using Create.
Choose the group with the name BRCD_ENCRYPTOR and the device family LTO.


Figure 3-3 Device Group definition

10.Now define a device in the Device Group with the name BRCD_ENCRYPTOR. Click the
Welcome link in the left section. Select the group under the drop-down menu in the Key
and Device Management section Figure 3-4 on page 38 and click the GO button.


Figure 3-4 Selection of defining a device

11.As Figure 3-5 on page 39 shows, proceed to Step 2: Identify Drives. Select the default
setting and then click Add. The Add Tape Drive window displays.


Figure 3-5 Adding a device part 1

12.In the Add Tape Drive window as shown in Figure 3-6 on page 40, type in 00Brcd_DevID as
the device serial number and click Add Tape Device to add the device.


Figure 3-6 Adding a device part 2

Creating a self-signed certificate for TKLM
Now you have to generate a self-signed certificate for the TKLM server which will be
transferred to the encryption switch which will become the groupleader (GL):
13.Select Configuration in the left section as shown in Figure 3-7 on page 41.


Figure 3-7 TKLM certificate generation

14.Click SSL/KMP and type a certificate label name in the key store and a description. To
generate the certificate click OK. The name of the label is user defined. Provide a
meaningful name and description.

Note: Reboot the TKLM server after you have generated the server certificate as
mentioned on the bottom of the window to make the new configuration active. See
Figure 3-8 on page 42.


Figure 3-8 Warning to reboot the TKLM server

15.After the TKLM server is rebooted you can check the presence of the self-signed
certificate of the TKLM server as shown in Figure 3-9 on page 43 by selecting Server
Certificates on the left pane. You will see that this certificate is now In Use for this TKLM
server.


Figure 3-9 Administer Server Certificates

Importing the IBM encryption switch KAC certificate to TKLM
Now we import the KAC certificate from every encryption switch:
16.Select Client Device Certificate on the left pane and click Import  SSL/KMIP
Certificate as shown in Figure 3-10 on page 44.


Figure 3-10 Import a certificate of a encryption switch

17.Type a name for the certificate and select the location on your server where you saved it
before. This should be a meaningful name.

Important: Select the option Allow the server to trust this certificate and
communicate with the associated client device. This will make sure that the TKLM
server trusts the encryption switch.

18.To get the key stored in the key store, click Import as shown in Figure 3-11 on page 45.


Figure 3-11 Import a certificate of a encryption switch

19.Perform steps 6 and 16-18 for every encryption switch in that encryption group. You will
get more details on how to add a second switch in Chapter 4, “Implementation and setup”
on page 55.

Exporting the TKLM self-signed server certificate
You can now logoff from this TKLM server. In the next steps you will transfer the TKLM
self-signed certificate to the switch.
20.Open the CLI on the TKLM server. You can do it depending on the host where you
installed the TKLM server. For Windows open a command line window.
For a Windows based installation enter the following command:
<installed directory>ibmtivolitiptklmV2binwsadmin.bat -username TKLMAdmin
-password <password> -lang jython


21.Log on to the TKLM server using the credentials of TKLMAdmin. In Example 3-9 we show
this.

Example 3-9 Logon to TKLM via cli
C:Documents and SettingsAdministrator>c:ibmtivolitiptklmV2binwsadmin.bat
-username TKLMAdmin -password passw0rd -lang jython
WASX7209I: Connected to process "server1" on node TIPNode using SOAP connector;
The type of process is: UnManagedProcess
WASX7031I: For help, enter: "print Help.help()"

Note: For Linux you have to enter: <installed
directory>/IBM/tivoli/tiptklmV2/bin/wsadmin.sh -username TKLMAdmin -password
<password> -lang jython.

22.Check if the certificate for the encryption switch is there by using print
AdminTask.tklmCertList('[]') as shown in Example 3-10. You will see all the
certificates that are stored in the TKLM key store.

Note: Check that all the certificates needed are in the key state active.

Example 3-10 Listing of all certificates
wsadmin>print AdminTask.tklmCertList('[]')
CTGKM0001I Command succeeded.
uuid = CERTIFICATE-0c4c4c90-5f14-474e-8e8b-2a5588af77a7
alias = tklm151
key store name = defaultKeyStore
key state = ACTIVE
issuer name = CN=CA from TKLM server 151
subject name = CN=CA from TKLM server 151
creation date = 10/20/10 11:16:45 PM PDT
expiration date = 10/19/13 11:16:45 PM PDT
serial number = 698604589870

uuid = CERTIFICATE-3367a1aa-be78-4366-b9ae-cf069470496e
alias = switch1
key store name = defaultKeyStore
key state = ACTIVE
issuer name =OU=TechnicalSupport,O=BRCD,L=SanJose,
ST=CA,C=US,CN=kac.000000051e541710
subject name = OU=Technical Support,O=BRCD,L=SanJose,
ST=CA,C=US,CN=kac.000000051e541710
creation date = 10/21/10 4:05:28 PM PDT
expiration date = 10/17/25 11:43:00 AM PDT
serial number = 15257271311336579047

23.Export the TKLM self-signed certificate out of the TKLM key store. The listing will contain
the uuid (Universally Unique Identifier) for all the certificates. Use the uuid of the TKLM
server certificate to export the TKLM server certificate from the database to the file
system. Use the following command: print AdminTask.tklmCertExport('[-uuid <UUID
of the certificate>-fileName <filename> -format DER]') as shown in Example 3-11.


Note: The server certificate must be in DER format, so be sure .der is appended to the file
name.

Example 3-11 Export of the self-signed certificate of the TKLM server
wsadmin>print AdminTask.tklmCertExport('[-uuid CERTIFICATE-0c4c4c90-5f14-474e-8e
8b-2a5588af77a7 -fileName c:/certfromTKLM/tklm151.der -format DER]')
CTGKM0001I Command succeeded.
c:/certfromTKLM/tklm151.der

You can now exit the wsaadmin command line interface.

Note: If you do not enter a full file name in the command before you will find the file by
default under:

Windows: <installed directory>ibmtivolitiptklmV2productstklm

Linux: <installed directory>/ibm/tivoli/tiptklmV2/products/tklm/

Importing and registering the TKLM self-signed certificate
Transfer the file to a Linux host as you did before with the encryption switch certificate file.

Note: Ensure that the FTP transfer mode is set to binary to export the TKLM certificate.

After that you have to import the file to the group leader (GL) node that is managed by the
TKLM server.
24.Run the command cryptocfg --import -scp <cert file name> <host IP> <host user>
<host file path> as shown in Example 3-12. The <host IP> is the IP address of the Linux
host. You need the username of this host and also the password to log in during the
transfer. The <cert file> name is a user defined name.

Example 3-12 Import of the TKLM certificate in the GL switch
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --import -scp tklmsan321.der 10.18.228.36 root
/root/certfromtklm/tklm151.der
Available Space:24576
Make sure your file size is not greater than 24576.
The switch will be unstable or the operation will fail if you exceed this limit.
Do you want to proceed?
Administrator@10.18.228.36's password:

25.Register the primary TKLM server in the group leader switch by running the command
cryptocfg --reg -keyvault <cert label> <TKLM cert file> <TKLM keyvault IP>
primary/secondary as shown in Example 3-13 on page 48. The <cert label> is a
meaningful user defined name that represents the primary TKLM server in the group
leader switch.


Example 3-13 cryptocfg --reg -keyvault
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --reg -keyvault TKLMIBM1 tklm151.der 10.18.228.151
primary
Register key vault status: Operation Succeeded.

26.Check the registration of the primary TKLM server by running the command cryptocfg
--show -groupcfg as in Example 3-14. You will see the state: connected and also server
information of the TKLM server.

Failback mode: Auto
Heartbeat misses: 3

Primary Key Vault:
IP address: 10.18.228.151
Certificate ID: CA
Certificate label: TKLMIBM1
State: Connected
Type: TKLM

Secondary Key Vault not configured

Key Vault/CA Certificate Validity: Yes
Port for Key Vault Connection: 5696
Time of Day on Key Server: N/A
Server SDK Version: TKLM 2.0.0.0 KMIP 1.0 BUILD 201

Preparing the secondary TKLM server
You now have to configure the secondary TKLM server.
27.Set up the TKLM server as described in steps 10 through 20. Again, take care that the
date and time on this TKLM server is the same as on the other TKLM server and the
switches.
28.After you have imported the self-signed certificate of the secondary TKLM server to the
group leader, register the secondary TLKM server using the command cryptocfg --reg
-keyvault <cert label> <TKLM cert file> <TKLM keyvault IP> primary/ secondary as
shown in Example 3-15. Give the secondary TKLM server a meaningful name.

Example 3-15 Registration of the secondary TKLM server
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --reg -keyvault TKLMIBM2 tklmsan80.der 10.18.229.80
secondary
Register key vault status: Operation Succeeded.


29.Run the command cryptocfg --show -groupcfg as shown in Example 3-16 to make sure
that both TKLM servers are connected and ready for use. Look for the message Key Vault
configuration and connectivity checks successful, ready for key operations. You
can see in the last line of the output that the security processor (SP) is now waiting for
initialization:

Failback mode: Auto
Heartbeat misses: 3

Primary Key Vault:
IP address: 10.18.228.151
Certificate ID: Cert.
State: Connected
Type: TKLM

Secondary Key Vault:
IP address: 10.18.229.80
State: Connected
Type: TKLM



Node KAC Certificate Validity: Yes
Time of Day on the Switch: 2010-10-23 14:14:27
Connection Timeout: 10 seconds
Response Timeout: 10 seconds

Key Vault configuration and connectivity checks successful, ready for key
operations.



NODE LIST

EE Slot: 0
SP state: Waiting for initEE

Note: Both the primary and secondary key vaults should be registered before exporting
the master key (MK) or encrypting LUNs. If the secondary key vault is registered after
encryption is done for some of the LUNs, then the key database should be backed up and
restored on the secondary TKLM from the primary TKLM already registered before
registering the secondary TKLM.

Initializing the IBM encryption engines
The next step is to initialize the encryption engine using the following steps:
30.Run the cryptocfg --initEE command as shown in Example 3-17. This step generates
critical security parameters and certificates in the cryptomodule’s security processor (SP).
The control processor (CP) and the security processor (SP) perform a certificate
exchange to register the respective authorization data.

Example 3-17 cryptocfg --initEE
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --initEE
This will overwrite previously generated identification and authentication data

31.Register the encryption engine (EE) by running the cryptocfg --regEE command as
shown in Example 3-18. This step registers the encryption engine (EE) with the CP or
chassis. Successful execution results in a certificate exchange between the encryption
engine and the CP through the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards)
boundary.

Example 3-18 cryptocfg --regEE
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --regEE
Now you can enable the encryption engine with cryptocfg --enableEE.
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --enableEE
Operation succeeded

Generating and backing up the master key
Next, generate a master key on the groupleader, and export it to a secure backup location so
that it can be restored, if necessary.


Note: Be aware that you have to generate and export the master key (MK) before you can
start using the encryption switch. The master key is used to encrypt the data encryption
keys (DEK) for transmission to and from TKLM.

The backup location can be the TKLM server, a local file, or a secure external SCP-capable
host. All three options are shown in the following procedure.

Note: Note that the IBM encryption switch provides the additional option of backing up the
master key (MK) to system cards.

32.Generate the master key (MK) by running the command cryptocfg --genmasterkey as
shown in Example 3-19.

Example 3-19 Generate MK
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --genmasterkey
Master key generated. The master key must be exported before further operations
are performed.

33.Now you have to backup the master key (MK) by using one of the three methods. To
backup to the TKLM server run cryptocfg --exportmasterkey as shown in
Example 3-20.

Note: Take note of the passphrase each time you use it. You will need the passphrase to
restore the master key (MK) back to the system.

Example 3-20 1.Methods (backup to TKLM server)
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --exportmasterkey
Enter passphrase:

Confirm passphrase:

Master key exported. Key ID: a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38

To backup the MK to a file, run cryptocfg --exportmasterkey -file as shown in
Example 3-21.

Example 3-21 Methods (backup to a file)
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --exportmasterkey -file
Enter passphrase:

Confirm passphrase:

Master key file generated.

To backup the file to a scp capable host, run cryptocfg --export -scp -currentMK <IP
address host> <user host> <user defined file name> as shown in Example 3-22.

Example 3-22 3. Methods (backup to a file on a scp-capable server)
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --export -scp -currentMK 10.18.228.36 root TKLMIBM.mk


34.Check the current state of the security processor (SP) by running cryptocfg --show
-groupmember -all as shown in Example 3-23. You will see that the SP is now online and
ready for use.

Example 3-23 SP state
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -groupmember -all

NODE LIST

Node Name: 10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10 (current node)
State: DEF_NODE_STATE_DISCOVERED
Role: GroupLeader
IP Address: 10.18.235.54
Certificate: 10.18.235.54_my_cp_cert.pem
Current Master Key State: Saved
Current Master KeyID: a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38
Alternate Master Key State: Not configured
Alternate Master KeyID: 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00

EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online
Current Master KeyID: a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38
Alternate Master KeyID: 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00
No HA cluster membership

35.(Optional) For added security, you can generate a second master key (MK). The first
master key will then become the alternate master key. But you have to generate and
export the MK again for that. Run cryptocfg --genmasterkey and cryptocfg
--exportmasterkey as shown in Example 3-24.

Example 3-24
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --genmasterkey
Master key generated. The master key must be exported before further operations
are performed.
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --exportmasterkey
Enter passphrase:

Confirm passphrase:

Master key exported. Key ID: aa:1e:5c:8d:f3:8d:69:21:15:c2:15:16:cb:04:14:f4

36.When you check with the command cryptocfg --show -groupmember -all as shown in
Example 3-25, you can see that both master keys (MK) are available and saved.

Example 3-25 Listing of group members
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -groupmember -all


NODE LIST

Role: GroupLeader
IP Address: 10.18.235.54
Current Master KeyID: aa:1e:5c:8d:f3:8d:69:21:15:c2:15:16:cb:04:14:f4
Alternate Master Key State: Saved
Alternate Master KeyID: a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38

EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online
Current Master KeyID: aa:1e:5c:8d:f3:8d:69:21:15:c2:15:16:cb:04:14:f4
Alternate Master KeyID: a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38

In this state you are now able to add a second encryption switch to the group. To add a new
member to the group, refer to Chapter 4, “Implementation and setup” on page 55.


4

Chapter 4. Implementation and setup
In this chapter we will cover basic setup and configuration of the SAN32B-E4, and the
Encryption Blade for the SAN768B and SAN384B. We will configure the Encryption switch in
a single path and multi-path mode, and set up a single fabric high availability environment.


4.1 Installation of the encryption switch
The SAN32B-E4 is a stand-alone SAN switch that can be connected into a fabric using ISL
links and trunks. You can configure this switch as a remote stand-alone Fibre Channel switch
with full encryption for Data-at-Rest. The SAN768B and SAN384B Encryption Blades are
managed as any other blade within the director. In our example we will set up a SAN32B-E4.

When connecting a SAN32B-E4 within a larger fabric, only use the switch ports on the
SAN32B-E4 for ISL trunk links to provide maximum bandwidth for encryption.

4.1.1 Physical installation
After the switch has been installed and powered up you will need to set an IP address for
management, and connectivity to the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM) server.

After the IP address is set, as shown in Example 4-1, all further configuration must be done
using DCFM.

Example 4-1 ipaddrset
SANB24-E4-1:admin> ipaddrset
Ethernet IP Address [10.18.235.54]:10.18.235.54
Ethernet Subnetmask [255.255.255.0]:255.255.255.0
Gateway IP Address [10.18.235.1]:10.18.235.1
DHCP [Off]:off
SANB24-E4-1:admin>

All switches, TKLM servers, and the DCFM server should be synchronised by a central NTP
clock server. Obtain the IP address of the NTP server and configure this on the switch with
the command tsClockServer [ipaddr [; ipaddr...]] as shown in Example 4-2.

Example 4-2 tsClockServer
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> tsClockServer 10.18.228.36
Updating Clock Server configuration...done.
Updated with the NTP servers
SAN32B-E4-2:admin>

Ensure the switch or blade is available by connecting to the switch and using Web Tools. You
can update the switch name, and other administrative properties using Web Tools.

Figure 4-1 on page 57 shows an Encryption Blade powered up and ready for configuration.


Figure 4-1 SAN384B with Encryption Blade

Figure 4-2 shows the Web Tools display for a newly installed SAN32B-E4 switch.

Figure 4-2 SAN32B-E4 Web Tools

Chapter 4. Implementation and setup 57

After the physical installation of the SAN32B-E4 is completed, the first step should be to
ensure your switch is merged into the existing fabric. After this is complete, use DCFM for all
further configuration.

Figure 4-3 shows a new merged SAN32B-E4 in DCFM.

Figure 4-3 DCFM with SAN32B-E4-1 merged into fabric

Note: For a first time fabric merge it might be necessary to set the default zone to all
access using the device’s Web Tools. The switch cannot merge into a fabric due to a zone
conflict if this is not done.

Prior to configuring encryption ensure the following pre-requisites are complete:
1. Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM) v2.0 or later is required for the IBM encryption
solution. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, “Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager
interaction with IBM encryption switch” on page 25.
2. Fabric Operating System v6.4.1 or later is required.


4.1.2 Firmware update
To upgrade the switch to 6.4.1 or later, you might need to perform more than one upgrade. If
your switch is at version 6.1 then you will have to first upgrade from version 6.1 to version 6.2,
and then to version 6.3 before going to version 6.4.
1. In our example we need to upgrade the switch to 6.4.1. Use DCFM and select the
Firmware management option as shown in Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4 DCFM Firmware Management

2. From the firmware management window select Repository and ensure that 6.4.1 is in the
firmware repository. If it is not, select the upload option and follow the window options to
place 6.4.1 into the firmware repository as shown in Figure 4-5 on page 60.


Figure 4-5 Firmware repository

When ready, you will now have the latest supported version in your firmware repository. If you
need to perform multiple upgrades, place all the required versions into the repository ready for
the upgrades. To update your firmware, perform the following steps:
1. Select the Download at the top of the frame, and then select the switch and new
firmware version as shown in Figure 4-6, then click the Download button.

Figure 4-6 Firmware download


2. Click Yes in the warning window to continue as shown in Figure 4-7.

Figure 4-7 DCFM firmware warning

The download will start and the progress can be monitored from the firmware
management window as shown in Figure 4-8.

Figure 4-8 Firmware progress window

After the process is completed, if the switch is a SAN32B-E4, it will reboot and you will see
the completion message as shown in Figure 4-9.

Figure 4-9 Download completed.

4.1.3 DCFM for encryption
DCFM is used for management of the Encryption Switch as with other SAN b-type products.

User setup
The Management application provides three pre-configured roles that can be set up for
various levels of user encryption management. These roles are set under the user admin, and
can be added to a existing or new user profile along with other roles as required as shown in


Figure 4-10 Encryption user roles

User roles
Uses can obtain privileges based on the roles defined in a resource group. Each group is
assigned different privileges, roles, and fabrics. A user can only belong to one resource group
at any time.

The DFCM application provides three pre-configured roles:

Storage encryption configuration
This user role grants the following read and write functions and access controls from the
Encryption Center window:
Launch the Encryption Center window
View switch, group, or engine properties
View the Encryption Group Properties Security tab
View encryption targets, hosts, and LUNs
View LUN-centric view
View all re-key sessions
Add/remove paths and edit LUN configuration on LUN-centric view
Rebalance encryption engines
Edit smart card
Create a new encryption group or add a switch to an existing encryption group
Edit group engine properties (except for the Security tab)
Add targets
Select encryption targets and LUNs to be encrypted or edit LUN encryption settings
Edit encryption target hosts configuration


Storage encryption key operations
View the Encryption Group Properties Security tab
Initiate manual LUN re-keying
Enable and disable an encryption engine
Zeroize an encryption engine
Restore a master key
Edit key vault credentials

Storage encryption security
Create a master key
Backup a master key
View and modify settings on the Encryption Group Properties Security tab (quorum size,
authentication cards list and system card requirement)
Establish link keys for TKLM key managers

4.1.4 Encryption center
Configuration action on the Encryption Switch is done using the Encryption Manager. To open
Encryption Manager, click Configure  Encryption as shown in Figure 4-11 on page 64.


Figure 4-11 DFCM encryption manager option

The Encryption Center is then displayed showing all Encryption Switches that are discovered
by DCFM and their status, as shown in Figure 4-12.

Figure 4-12 Encryption Center

As can be seen in Figure 4-12 the Encryption Switch, a SAN384B Encryption Blade in slot 7,
is fully operational, and the status of this switch can be checked by selecting the switch and


clicking Switch  Properties. The full status of this switch will be displayed as shown in
Figure 4-13.

Figure 4-13 Properties

The state shown of the SAN384B Encryption Blade in Figure 4-13 is after the TKLM
configuration is completed and keys have been exchanged and registered on both the TKLM
server and the encryption engine.

Note: The setup of the TKLM servers to the encryption group leader is detailed in
Chapter 3, “Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager interaction with IBM encryption switch” on
page 25.

4.1.5 Pre-implementation requirements
Prior to installing the switch for the first time, you should have a detailed configuration plan in
place and available for reference. The encryption setup will assume the following are already
completed:
A plan in place to organize encryption devices into encryption groups.
If redundancy and high availability are required then this should be addressed and
planned for prior to implementation.
High availability (HA) clusters of two Encryption Switches or Blades to provide fail over
support.
All switches in the planned encryption group are interconnected on an I/O synch LAN.


The management ports on all encryption nodes have a LAN connection to the SAN
Management program, and are available for discovery.
A supported key management appliance is connected on the same LAN as the encryption
nodes and the SAN Management program.
An external host is available on the LAN to facilitate certificate exchange.
Key management system (key vault) certificates have been obtained and stored in a
known location.

Note: The setup and configuration of the encryption certificates, and key management
using Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM) server and the configuring of the switches to
connect to the TKLM server are discussed in Chapter 3, “Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager

4.1.6 Initial checks
Before adding targets and initiators to the encryption engine (EE), perform the following
checks.

Verify connectivity status
First, verify if the connection to the TKLM servers, both primary and backup, are working.
Issue the cryptocfg --show -groupcfg command to display the status as shown in
Example 4-3.

Failback mode: Auto
Heartbeat misses: 3

Primary Key Vault:
IP address: 10.18.228.151
State: Connected
Type: TKLM

IP address: 10.18.229.80
State: Connected
Type: TKLM





operations.


NODE LIST

EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online

SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

Make sure the primary key vault and secondary key vault state is Connected. The SP state
must be Online. If the SP state is not online, the master key might not be present or the SP is
not enabled.

Verify Master Key
Issue the cryptocfg --show -groupmember <node WWN> command as shown in Example 4-4.

Example 4-4 cryptocfg --show -groupmember <node WWN>
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -groupmember 10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10

Role: GroupLeader
IP Address: 10.18.235.54


Current Master KeyID:
aa:1e:5c:8d:f3:8d:69:21:15:c2:15:16:cb:04:14:f4
Alternate Master Key State: Saved
Alternate Master KeyID:
a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38

EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online
aa:1e:5c:8d:f3:8d:69:21:15:c2:15:16:cb:04:14:f4
a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

The master key state should be saved. If the output shows primary Master Key State as Not
configured as shown in Example 4-5, the master key will need to be generated.

Example 4-5 Master Key State Not configured
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -groupmember 10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10

Role: GroupLeader
IP Address: 10.18.235.54
Current Master Key State: Not configured
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00
Alternate Master Key State: Not configured
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00

EE Slot: 0
SP state: Operational; Need Valid KEK
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

Master key creation and setup is described in Chapter 3, “Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager

4.2 Adding a second switch to the same encryption group
Adding a second encryption switch to an encryption group is described in the following
section. The best way to do this is by using the CLI of the switches. The process requires a


Secure Copy server, or an SSH server. The best SSH server is a Linux or AIX server. If a
Windows SSH server is used, make sure the default mode of file transfer is binary.

In our example we will add a SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch to an existing fabric that already
contains an operational Encryption Blade within a SAN384B switch, as shown in Figure 4-14.

Figure 4-14 Add new EE

4.2.1 Connecting the encryption engine
The new encryption device needs to be connected into the fabric using standard processes,
either by installing the blade into the chassis and waiting for the switch to become ready or, as
with our example, by installing another external SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch into the
existing fabric using ISL or Trunk links.

This new switch will show up on Encryption Center as no group defined, as shown in
Figure 4-15.

Figure 4-15 Encryption enter new switch


Connect to dedicated LAN
All encryption engines in the same encryption group must be interconnected through a
dedicated local area network (LAN), preferably on the same subnet and on the same VLAN
using the GbE ports on the Encryption Switch or Blade. The two GbE ports of each member
node (Eth0 and Eth1) should be connected to the same IP Network, the same subnet, and
the same VLAN. Configure the GbE ports (I/O sync links) with an IP address for the eth0
Ethernet interface, and also configure a gateway for these I/O sync links.

Figure 4-16 shows an example of multiple encryption engines connecting to a dedicated LAN.

Figure 4-16 Dedicated LAN

GE0 and GE1 ports connect Encryption Switches and Blades to other Encryption Switches
and Blades. These two ports are bonded together as a single virtual network interface. Only
one IP address should be used. The ports provide link layer redundancy, and are collectively
referred to as the cluster link.

Note: Do not confuse the Gigabit Ethernet ports with the management and console ports,
which are also RJ45 ports located close to the gigabit Ethernet ports.

Both ports (GE0 and GE1) of each Encryption Switch or Blade must be connected to the
same IP network, and the same subnet. Static IP addresses should be assigned. VLANs
should not be used, and DHCP should not be used.

Configuring the interconnection network
Configure the interconnection network by performing the following steps:
1. Log into the switch as Admin or FabricAdmin.
2. Configure the IP address using the ipaddrset command. Only Ge0 needs to be
configured.

Note: Configure the existing switch first for connectivity to the dedicated LAN.

Always use ipaddrset -eth0 to configure the address. If an address is assigned to ge1
(-eth1), it is accepted and stored, but it is ignored. Only IPv4 addresses are supported for


cluster links. Configure a static IP address and gateway address for the bonded interface as
shown in Example 4-6.

Example 4-6 ipaddress set up switch
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> ipaddrset -eth0 --add 172.31.1.1/24
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> ipaddrset -gate --add 172.31.1.5

Special consideration for blades
For SAN768B and SAN384B Encryption Blades, the slot number must also be included in the
ipaddrset command as shown in Example 4-7.

Example 4-7 ipaddress set up blade
SAN384B:admin > ipaddrset -slot 7 -eth0 --add 172.31.1.3
SAN384B:admin > ipaddrset -slot 7 -gate --add 172.31.1.5

There are additional considerations if Blades are removed and replaced, or moved to a
different slot. On chassis-based systems, IP addresses are assigned to the slot rather than
the Blade, and are saved in non-volatile storage on the control processor Blades. IP
addresses can be assigned even if no Blade is present. If a SAN768B and SAN384B
Encryption Blade is installed in a slot that was previously configured for a different type of
blade with two IP ports (an FC4-16E blade, for example), the Encryption Blade will be
assigned the address specified for -eth0 in that slot.

To be sure the correct IP addresses are assigned, use the ipaddrshow command to display
the IP address assignments as shown in Example 4-8.

Example 4-8 ipaddress show output
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> ipaddrshow -eth0
Ethernet IP Address: 10.18.235.54
Ethernet Subnetmask: 255.255.255.0
Gateway IP Address: 10.18.235.1
DHCP: Off
eth0: 192.168.1.1/24
IPv6 Autoconfiguration Enabled: Yes
Local IPv6 Addresses:
IPv6 Gateways:192.168.1.5
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

Attention: The IP address of the cluster link should be configured before enabling the
encryption engine for encryption. If the IP address is configured after the encryption engine
is enabled for encryption, or if the IP address of the cluster link ports is modified after
encryption engine is enabled for encryption, the Encryption Switch will have to be
rebooted, and the Encryption Blade will have to be powered off and powered on with the
slotpoweroff and slotpoweron command, for the IP address configuration to take effect.
Failure to do so will result in Re-Key operation not starting in the encryption group or high
availability (HA) cluster.

The command cryptocfg --show -localEE will display the status of this link, as shown in
Example 4-9.

Example 4-9 Status of link
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --show -localEE


EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online
aa:1e:5c:8d:f3:8d:69:21:15:c2:15:16:cb:04:14:f4
a3:42:de:95:a8:2d:f8:5f:8b:3e:d8:f6:b7:07:ef:38
HA Cluster Membership: HAC1
EE Attributes:
Link IP Addr : 192.168.1.2
Link GW IP Addr : 0.0.0.0
Link Net Mask : 255.255.255.0
Link MAC Addr : 00:05:1e:54:16:4f
Link MTU : 1500
Link State : UP
Media Type : MEDIA NOT DEFINED
Rebalance Recommended: NO
System Card : Disabled
System Card Label :
System Card CID :
Remote EE Reachability :
Node WWN/Slot EE IP Addr EE State IO Link
State
10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10/0 192.168.1.1 EE_STATE_ONLINE
Reachable
SAN32B-E4-2:admin>

Initialise the new node
The new node to be added to the Encryption Group must first be initialized with the cryptocfg
--initnode command, as show in Example 4-10

Example 4-10 initnode
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --initnode
This will overwrite all identification and authentication data
ARE YOU SURE (yes, y, no, n): [no] y
SAN32B-E4-2:admin>

Import DER certificate to TKLM server
Follow the TKLM section detailing the Importing the Encryption Switch certificate to TKLM
servers. Refer to Chapter 3, “Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager interaction with IBM encryption
switch” on page 25 for information.

Export the new node certificate
Export the new nodes CP certificate to an SSH host. Give the certificate file a name with a
.pem extension. Use the command cryptocfg --export -scp –CPcert <SSH host IP> <user
id>./<file path>/<filename>.pem> as shown in Example 4-11 on page 73.


Example 4-11 export scp
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --export -scp -CPcert 10.18.228.36 root
./san32Be42_2.pem
SAN32B-E4-2:admin>

Import the certificate
The new node has exported the CP certificate to the SSH server, and now that certificate
needs to be imported into the groupleader (GL) node. This is done from the already running
group leader node using the cryptocfg --import -scp <filename.pem> <SSH host IP>
<user id>./<file path>/<filename>.pem command, as shown in Example 4-12.

Example 4-12 Import certificate
IBM_SAN384B_27:admin> cryptocfg --import -scp san32Be42_2.pem 10.18.228.36 root
./san32Be42_2.pem
Available Space:4096
Make sure your file size is not greater than 4096.
The switch will be unstable or the operation will fail if you exceed this limit.
Do you want to procceed?
IBM_SAN384B_27:admin>

Note: This command is run from the groupleader node, not the new node.

Register certificate
The newly imported CP certificate now needs to be registered to the groupleader node. This
is done from the groupleader node with the command cryptocfg --reg –membernode <member
node WWN> <member node certfile> <IP addr> as shown in Example 4-13.

Example 4-13 Register new membernode
IBM_SAN384B_27:admin> cryptocfg --reg -membernode 10:00:00:05:1e:54:16:53
san32Be42_2.pem 10.18.235.56

Note: The member node WWN can be obtained from the new node by running the
switchshow command on the new node.

Reboot member node
A reboot of the new node is required, as shown in Example 4-14.

Example 4-14 reboot
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> reboot
Warning: This command would cause the switch to reboot
and result in traffic disruption.
Are you sure you want to reboot the switch [y/n]?y
Broadcast message from root (pts/0) Sat Oct 23 00:47:29 2010...
The system is going down for reboot NOW !!


SAN32B-E4-2:admin>

For a SAN32B-E4 switch, run the reboot command. For an Encryption Blade in the SAN768B
and SAN384B, perform a slotpoweroff <slot number> command, followed by a slotpoweron
<slot number>.

Note: The SAN768B and SAN384B switch blade, or SAB32B-E4, will be rebooted a few
times during this process. ensure that the FC ports on these blades or switches are not
being used for live operations.

Enable the new encryption engine (EE)
The following steps need to be followed to bring the new node online to the encryption group.
These commands are run from the new encryption engine.

Clear the EE
Use the cryptocfg --zeroizeEE command on a SAN32B-E4 or the cryptocfg --zeroizeEE
<slot number> command on the Encryption blade in the SAN768B and SAN384B,
Example 4-15 shows this in a SAN32B-E4.

Example 4-15 zeroizeEE
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --zeroizeEE
This action will zeroize all critical security parameters.
Any decommissioned keyids in the EG will also be deleted.
Following the zeroizing of this EE, the switch/blade will be rebooted.

Rebooting...

This command will reboot the blade or switch.

Initialize the member node
After the Encryption Blade or switch is back online, initialize the new node with the cryptocfg
--initEE command or cryptocfg --regEE<slot>, as shown in Example 4-16.

Example 4-16 initEE
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --initEE
This will overwrite previously generated identification and authentication data
SAN32B-E4-2:admin>

Register the member node
The new node now needs to be registered with the group leader. Run the cryptocfg --regEE
or cryptocfg --regEE<slot> command, as shown in Example 4-17.

Example 4-17 regEE
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --regEE
SAN32B-E4-2:admin>


Enable the member node
The final node configuration step is to enable the encryption engine encryption services. The
cryptocfg --enableEE or cryptocfg --enableEE <slot> is used to enable the new node to
the group leader as shown in Example 4-18.

Example 4-18 enableEE
SAN32B-E4-2:admin> cryptocfg --enableEE
Operation succeeded
SAN32B-E4-2:admin>

Check status
Check the status of the encryption group to ensure the correct state. From the command line
this is done using the cryptocfg --show -groupcfg command as shown in Example 4-19.
This command must be run from both the group leader or new member, and should show the
same output.

Example 4-19 groupcfg
IBM_SAN384B_27:admin> cryptocfg --show -groupcfg
Encryption Group Name: IBMENC
Failback mode: Auto
Heartbeat misses: 3

Primary Key Vault:
IP address: 10.18.228.151
State: Connected
Type: TKLM

IP address: 10.18.229.80
State: Connected
Type: TKLM




operations.
NODE LIST
Group Leader Node Name: 10:00:00:05:1e:94:3a:00

10:00:00:05:1e:94:3a:00 10.18.228.27 GroupLeader (current node)
EE Slot: 7
SP state: Online

10:00:00:05:1e:54:16:53 10.18.235.56 MemberNode
EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online

Both the group leader and new node should show Online.

Using DCFM, you will see both nodes in the encryption center as Online as shown in
Figure 4-17 on page 77. This completes adding a node into the existing encryption group. All
further configuration of initiators and targets can be managed by using DCFM.


Figure 4-17 New node added

4.3 Concepts
We will show how to configure a number of separate solutions and explain some concepts
around these solutions.

4.3.1 Encrypting a single path disk LUN
In our example we have two disk LUNs set up to two targets. Figure 4-18 shows the
configuration we will set up for disk encryption.

Figure 4-18 Disk LUN encryption


LUN and Zone creation
The first step was to create two LUNs for encryption, as shown in Figure 4-19. Existing LUNs
can also be used. For this example we set up two new LUNs, called, Encryption1 of 30GB on
LUN 1 and Encryption2 of 35GB on LUN 2. These LUNs are mapped to two servers to be
used for the scenario.

Figure 4-19 LUN creation

Using DCFM, two new zones are created to enable connectivity from the two servers to the
disk subsystem. As shown in Figure 4-20, the zones are added to the zoneset and then
activated.

Figure 4-20 Zone add


Target wizard
On the encryption center, select the encryption engine you want to use for encrypting the disk
LUNs. We selected the Encryption Blade in slot 7 of our SABN384B director.
1. Select the encryption engine you want to use and click Engine  Targets as show in
Figure 4-21.

Figure 4-21 Target selection

2. From the next window shown in Figure 4-22, click the Add button.

Figure 4-22 Add target

3. The encryption wizard opens, as shown in Figure 4-23 on page 80. Click the Next button
to continue.


Figure 4-23 Encryption wizard start

4. On the next window, select the required encryption engine and press the Next button, as
shown in Figure 4-24.

Figure 4-24 Encryption wizard engine selection

5. Select the target for encryption. There will be a list of all targets in the name server
database. Scroll down to the target required, then select the type of target, in our example
a disk, and press the Next button, as shown in Figure 4-25 on page 81.


Figure 4-25 Encryption wizard target selection

6. Select all hosts connecting to this target from the Hosts in fabric section and add them to
the Selected hosts section as shown in Figure 4-26.

Figure 4-26 Encryption wizard host selection

7. Create the encryption container and give the container a name, as shown in Figure 4-27
on page 82.


Figure 4-27 Encryption wizard container

A crypto target container is a configuration of virtual devices created for each target port
hosted on a SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch or Encryption Blade. The container holds the
configuration information for a single target, including the associated hosts and LUN
settings.
A crypto target container interfaces between the encryption engine, the external storage
devices (targets), and the initiators (hosts) that can access the storage devices through
the target ports. Virtual devices redirect the traffic between host and target/LUN to
encryption engines so they can perform cryptographic operations.

Note: An encryption engine can host more than one container for each target, but you
should only host one container per engine.

8. The next window confirms the correct host information, as show in Figure 4-28 on
page 83. Press the Next button to confirm.


Figure 4-28 Encryption wizard confirmation

The window in Figure 4-29 appears while the wizard configures the target host information
selected.

Figure 4-29 Configuring

Confirmation that the virtual target and virtual initiators are configured is displayed on the
next window as shown in Figure 4-30.

Figure 4-30 VT VI confirmation


Virtual target and virtual initiators are required to redirect data to the encryption engine.

Virtual targets: (VT)
Any given physical target port is hosted on one Encryption Switch or blade. If the target
LUN is accessible from multiple target ports, each target port is hosted on a separate
Encryption Switch or blade. There is a one-to-one mapping between virtual target and
physical target to the fabric whose LUNs are being enabled for cryptographic operations.
A virtual target is a logical device that acts a as a substitute for a physical host when data
is being transferred with a physical target

Virtual initiators: (VI)
For each physical host configured to access a given physical target LUN, a virtual initiator
(VI) is generated on the Encryption Switch or blade that hosts the target port. If a physical
host has access to multiple targets hosted on separate Encryption Switches or blades, you
must configure one virtual initiator on each Encryption Switch or blade that is hosting one
of the targets. The mapping between physical host and virtual initiator in a fabric is
one-to-n, where n is the number of Encryption Switches or blades that are hosting targets.
A virtual target is a logical device that acts as a substitute for a physical target LUN and
transfers data to a physical host.
Figure 4-31 shows the relationship between a VI and a VT, and a physical target and an
initiator.

Figure 4-31 Vi and VT

9. The window shown in Figure 4-32 on page 85 is then displayed. Follow the instructions on
this window to create zones as shown in the text of this window and click the Finish
button.


Figure 4-32 Final wizard window

10.The wizard takes you back to the target configuration window. Select your new
configuration and click the Commit button as shown in Figure 4-33.

Figure 4-33 Target final commit

11.You will get a DCFM encryption message as shown in Figure 4-34 on page 86. Confirm
your configuration changes. Click the Yes button. The new Redirection Zone will be
generated and the existing Redirection zones will be recreated.


Figure 4-34 Redirection zone creation

Redirection zones
The encryption device creates the frame redirection zone automatically that consists of host,
target, virtual target, and virtual initiator in the backbone fabric when the target and host are
configured on the encryption device. They are used by the Encryption Switch to set up host to
target encryption by using the virtual initiator ports and virtual target ports as already
explained. Redirection zones enable frame redirection to the virtual initiators and virtual
targets.

With redirection zones the name server sends out RSCN to both the host and target. When
the host and target query the name server, the WWN of the physical device stays the same
but the PID is replaced with the Virtual initiator or target. This means that the zoning remains
the same and the data is redirected and encrypted by the redirection zone as shown in
Figure 4-35.

Figure 4-35 Redirection Zone

12.Perform a zone activate of the existing zoneset to bring the redirection zones into the zone
database, as shown in Figure 4-36 on page 87. No manual zone creation is required for
the redirection zones to be created, only a zoneset activate is required.

Note: Wait until the redirection zones are present in the activated zone configuration.
These zones will automatically become active under the r_e_d_i_r_c_fg zoneset.


Figure 4-36 Zoneset activate

LUN wizard
13.From the Encryption Center, select the engine with the configured target and click
Engine  Disk LUNs as shown in Figure 4-37 on page 88.


Figure 4-37 LUN setup

14.From the Encryption disk LUN view menu shown in Figure 4-38, click the Add button to
open the LUN wizard.

Figure 4-38 Encryption disk LUN view

15.Select the disk target port that has a configured container and click the Next button as
shown in Figure 4-39 on page 89.


Figure 4-39 Add new path

16.Select the initiator ports you want configured to this LUN as shown in Figure 4-40. Use the
Ctrl key to select more than one initiator.

Figure 4-40 Initiator

DCFM will scan for all LUNs associated with this target, and will show the status as shown
in Figure 4-41.

Figure 4-41 Discovering LUNs


After the LUNs have been discovered you will be presented with all LUNs configured to
these targets as shown in Figure 4-42. Select the disk LUNs associated with your hosts
and for which you want encryption enabled, then click the Finish button.

Figure 4-42 LUN selection

17.The encryption disk LUN view window is now displayed with all configured LUNs and
targets. This window displays the status of these LUNs and encryption status as shown in
Figure 4-43.

Figure 4-43 Encryption Disk LUN view

To complete the initial configuration click the OK button to commit the final configuration.
Figure 4-44 on page 91 will be displayed while the configuration is performed.


Figure 4-44 Committing

Attention: Upon commit, the hosts lose access to all LUNs until the LUNs are explicitly
added to the crypto target containers.

Note: Configuring and changing the LUNs and Targets is disruptive and should not be
done while running live data.

18.The default encryption mode is clear text, which means no encryption is running. To
enable encryption on your LUN’s, select the required engine from the encryption center
and then Engine  Disk LUNs from the drop-down menu as seen in Figure 4-37 on
page 88. This will open the disk LUN menu as shown in Figure 4-45.

Figure 4-45 Disk LUN

19.The encryption policy can be selected from this menu. Here you can enable or disable a
LUN for encryption. The following are the valid values:
– Clear text: Encryption is disabled. This is the default setting.
– Native encryption: The LUN is enabled to perform encryption.
– DF_compatible: Not used in the IBM solution
This is shown in Figure 4-46 on page 92.


Figure 4-46 Encryption format

20.From the same menu, you can decide what to do if there is existing data on a LUN. The
enable option comes on by default if encryption is selected. You might decide to not
encrypt existing data by selecting the disabled option, as shown in Figure 4-47.

Figure 4-47 Existing Data

21.You might also select not to encrypt a LUN as shown in the example in Figure 4-47, only
the first LUN has been selected for encryption and the second has been left as clear text.

Note: Selecting to encrypt existing data can result in performance degradation while the
existing data is encrypted.

22.Click the OK button to process your selection.


23.The wizard will process the changes and you will see the window as shown in Figure 4-48.
Confirm your action by clicking the Yes button.

Figure 4-48 Confirmation

After the operation is completed you should get the message shown in Figure 4-49.

Figure 4-49 Successful completion of LUN

Monitor the state of the LUNs using the Encryption Disk LUN View window as shown in
Figure 4-50.

Figure 4-50 Monitoring LUN ‘s

Finally the encryption status of the LUN will become encryption enabled and the initial
encryption setup is completed, as shown in Figure 4-51 on page 94. The LUN is now
encrypted. All data written to the LUN will now be encrypted and all data read from the
LUN will be decrypted.


Figure 4-51 LUN encrypted

To enable additional LUNs, repeat the steps beginning in 4.3.2, “Encrypting a multi-path disk
LUN” on page 95 for each LUN. Once this process is completed, you will see all LUNs listed
as encryption enabled as shown in Figure 4-52.

Figure 4-52 All LUNs encrypted

This completes encrypting LUNs using a single path.


4.3.2 Encrypting a multi-path disk LUN
In the sections that follow we will show how to encrypt a multi-path disk LUN.

Dual HB to dual controller
In our example we have a multi-path disk LUN set connecting to a initiator, with two HBAs and
a multi-path driver installed. Figure 4-53 shows the configuration we will set up for disk
encryption for multi-path.

Figure 4-53 Multi-path disk encryption

This configuration involves a dual HBA to a dual path controller with a number of LUN’s
configured. A single LUN can be accessed over multiple paths. A multi-path LUN is
discovered and configured on multiple crypto target containers located on the same
Encryption Switch or Blade or on separate Encryption Switches or Blades.

Instructions for multi-path configuration
When configuring a LUN with multiple paths, there is a increased risk of ending up with
potentially catastrophic scenarios where different policies exist for each path of the LUN, or a
situation where one path ends up being exposed through the Encryption Switch and the other
path has direct access to the device from a host outside the secured realm of the encryption
platform.

Failure to follow proper configuration procedures for multi-path LUNs results in data
corruption. To avoid the risk of data corruption, it is of utmost importance that you observe the
following rules when configuring multi-path LUNs:
1. During the initiator-target zoning phase, complete in sequence all zoning for ALL hosts
that should gain access to the targets before committing the zoning configuration.
2. Complete the crypto target container configuration for ALL target ports in sequence and
add the hosts that should gain access to these ports before committing the container
configuration.

Attention: Upon commit, the hosts will lose access to all LUNs until the LUNs are explicitly
added to the crypto target containers. This is not a concurrent process.


3. When configuring the LUNs, the same LUN policies must be configured for ALL paths of
ALL LUNs. Failure to configure all LUN paths with the same LUN policies results in data
corruption.

LUN setup and zoning
Perform the following steps to set up and zone the LUNs.
1. Create four zones, each with a single initiator and target. In this case we will set up four
new zones, and zone each HBA to a disk controller and activate the change, shown in
Figure 4-54.

Figure 4-54 Zone set up

2. Next we set up LUNs on the disk subsysytem and map them to our host as shown in
Figure 4-55. In our example we used IBM Storage Manager.

Figure 4-55 Mapped DASD LUN to HBA


3. Check the server to make sure that all paths and disks are available. For example when
we display the disk devices on windows device manager you will find multiple devices and
also a single multi-path device disk for each LUN created. Because we created three
LUNs, we have three multi-path devices, as shown in Figure 4-56.

Figure 4-56 Device manger

4. Check all LUNS are connected and ready for use to the operating system as shown in
Figure 4-57. We see all three LUNs are online and in use by the operating system.

Figure 4-57 Disk manager r

Note: Do not attempt to configure encryption if there are any missing paths or the disk
LUN’s are not available and ready on the host.


Target wizard multi-path
The setup of targets follows the same procedure as the single LUN setup. See “Target wizard”
on page 79. Perform the following steps in the wizard:
1. Select the encryption engine, and then the first initiator WWN.
2. At the Select Hosts option, select both host ports attached to this initiator and add them to
the Selected Hosts box as shown in Figure 4-58.

Figure 4-58 host selection for multi-path

3. Input your container name and then confirming your entries. The first new container will be
configured in the encryption targets view as shown in Figure 4-59.

Figure 4-59 Encryption targets with first of the initiators configured

4. Select the Add button to open the wizard and add the second initiator using steps 1
through 3. When this is completed you will have both the new containers showing in the
encryption targets view, as shown in Figure 4-60 on page 99.


Figure 4-60 Encryption targets with second of the initiators configured

5. Click the Commit button to confirm the configuration and then Close to exit. The two new
containers will show up on the encryption center as online targets of the engine where
they were configured, as shown in Figure 4-61.

Figure 4-61 Encryption center with two targets in dual path

Ensure all zoning is correct before proceeding with the LUN setup. Wait until the redirection
zone appears in the zoneset database, as shown in Figure 4-62. Also make sure that all disk
paths are still operating and available to the host.

Figure 4-62 Redirection zones for multi-path


LUN wizard multi-path
Setting up a multi-path LUN configuration is similar to single path:
1. Select the engine that the targets were configured on and open the Encryption Disk LUN
View window.
2. Select the storage array where the targets have been configured from the Storage Array
menu as shown in Figure 4-63.

Figure 4-63 Storage array selection

3. Open the LUN wizard from the Encryption Disk LUN View by selecting the Add button.
4. Select the first target port from the Add Target Port window as shown in Figure 4-64 and
click the Next button.

Figure 4-64 Add target multi-path

5. From the Select Initiator Port window, select all initiator ports and click the Next button as
shown in Figure 4-65 on page 101.


Figure 4-65 Initiator Port multi-path

6. From the Select LUN window, where all the LUN’s configured to these hosts are
displayed, select all the LUNs that you require to be encrypted as shown in Figure 4-66,
and click the Finish button.

Figure 4-66 Select LUN multi-path

This completes the setup for the first initiator port, you will be presented with the
Encrypted Disk LUN view showing your configuration so far, shown in Figure 4-67 on
page 102.


Figure 4-67 Disk LUN view multi-path first initiator

7. Repeat steps 1 through 6 by selecting the Add button to add all initiator ports. After this is
completed you will see all LUNS for all initiator and target paths, as shown in Figure 4-68.

Figure 4-68 Disk LUN view multiple path all initiators

8. Click the OK button to commit the configuration and this will close the disk LUN view.

Attention: Upon commit, the hosts lose access to all LUNs until the LUNs are explicitly
added to the crypto target containers.

Monitor the disk LUN status on the encryption Disk LUN view window, and wait until the
state shows as Clear Text on all paths and LUNs before proceeding, as shown in


Figure 4-69 Clear text status on multiple path LUNs

9. After the LUN status is correct, enable encryption by selecting Native Compression, as
shown in Figure 4-70, and then clicking the OK button.

Note: If the LUN has no data, select the Disable encrypting existing data option. This
will stop the EE from re-keying the whole disk and reduce the time taken to perform first
time encryption.

Note: Perform first time encryption on one LUN at a time because this process is resource
intensive and can cause performance degradation on the host until completed.

Figure 4-70 Native compression on multiple path

This process will perform a first time encryption of the LUN. In a first time encryption
operation, clear text data is read from a LUN, encrypted with the current key, and written back
to the same LUN at the same logical block address (LBA) location. This process effectively
encrypts the LUN and is referred to as “in-place encryption”. The size of the LUN and
workload will affect the time required for this first time encryption.


Monitor the first time encryption process on the Encryption Disk LUN View window, and
when all paths show as Encryption enabled and a Key id is exchanged, as shown in
Figure 4-71, then the initial process is complete and the LUN is encrypted.

Figure 4-71 Encrypted LUNs in multi-path

This completes encryption of a multi-path configuration.

4.4 Configuring high availability HA encryption engine
In this section we will discuss high availability features and setup. The HA configuration
provides redundancy in case of an encryption engine failure, Figure 4-72 shows an HA
configuration.

Figure 4-72 Encryption switch in HA configuration


4.4.1 High Availability (HA) cluster
An HA cluster consists of two encryption engines configured to host the same crypto targets
and to provide Active/Standby fail over, and fail back capabilities in a single fabric. Fail over is
automatic (not configurable). Fail back occurs automatically by default, but is configurable
with a manual fail back option. All encryption engines in an encryption group share the same
data encryption key (DEK) for a disk or tape LUN.

An HA cluster has the following limitations:
The encryption engines that are part of an HA cluster must belong to the same encryption
group and be part of the same fabric.
An HA cluster cannot span fabrics, and therefore it cannot provide fail over/fail back
capability within a fabric transparent to host MPIO software.

Note: The CLI does not allow creation of an HA cluster if the node is not configured in the
encryption group.

4.4.2 HA cluster configuration rules
The following rules apply when configuring an HA cluster:
All HA cluster configuration and related operations must be performed on the group
leader.
Cluster links must be configured before creating an HA cluster.
Configuration changes must be committed before they take effect. Any operation related to
an HA cluster that is performed without a commit operation will not survive across switch
reboots, power cycles, CP fail over, and HA reboots.
The HA cluster configuration should be completed before you configure storage devices
for encryption.
The two encryption engines in the HA cluster must belong to two separate nodes for true
redundancy. This is always the case for SAN32B-E4 switches, but is not true if two
Encryption Blades in the same SAN768B and SAN384B chassis are configured in the
same HA cluster.
In Fabric OS version 6.4.1 and later releases, HA cluster creation is blocked when
encryption engines belonging to Encryption Blades in the same SAN768B and SAN384B
director are specified.

4.4.3 Configuring an HA cluster
Prior to starting the HA configuration, ensure that the Encryption Switches are all in the same
group. Our configuration will create a HA group between two SAN32B-E4 switches, as shown
in Figure 4-73 on page 106.


Figure 4-73 HA cluster configuration

Pre HA configuration steps
Connect the Encryption Switches into the same group where it will perform the HA function.
This can be done by following the process in section 4.2, “Adding a second switch to the
same encryption group” on page 68,. Check that all switches are in the same group and
connected to the TKLM servers by issuing the cryptocfg --show -groupcfg command from
both switches as shown in Example 4-20, and make sure that the TKLM state is connected
and both nodes are online.

Example 4-20 cryptocfg for HA pre configuration check
IBM_SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -groupcfg
Encryption Group Name: IBMENC
Failback mode: Auto
Heartbeat misses: 3
Primary Key Vault:
IP address: 10.18.228.151
State: Connected
Type: TKLM
IP address: 10.18.229.80
State: Connected
Type: TKLM


Authentication Cards:
Certificate ID / label : qc.4250420d0204847e /
Markus:Mustermann:qc.4250420d0204847e
Certificate ID / label : qc.4250420d02047878 /
Claudia:Changer:qc.4250420d02047878
NODE LIST
EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online
10:00:00:05:1e:54:16:53 10.18.235.56 MemberNode
EE Slot: 0
SP state: Online
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

The two encryption engines shown in Example 4-20 on page 106 are in the correct state to
create an HA configuration.

Configuring HA
Perform the following steps to configure the HA cluster. Configuration of an HA cluster must
be done from the group leader.
1. Log on to the group leader switch as Admin or SecurityAdmin.
2. Run the cryptocfg --create -hacluster <HA name> command. In Example 4-21, the HA
cluster HAC1 was created.

Example 4-21 Create HA group
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --create -hacluster HAC1


SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

3. Add the first cluster into the group with the cryptocfg --add -haclustermember <HA name>
<cluster WWN> <slot> command as shown in Example 4-22.

Note: The slot number is required if using an Encryption Blade.

Example 4-22 Add first cluster
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --add -haclustermember HAC1 10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10
Slot Local/
EE Node WWN Number Remote
10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10 0 Local
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

4. Add the second cluster into the group with the cryptocfg --add -haclustermember <HA
name> <cluster WWN> <slot> command as shown in Example 4-23.

Example 4-23 Add second cluster
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --add -haclustermember HAC1 10:00:00:05:1e:54:16:53
Slot Local/
EE Node WWN Number Remote
10:00:00:05:1e:54:16:53 0 Remote
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

5. Display the status of the newly created HA cluster with the cryptocfg --show -hacluster
-all as shown in Example 4-24.

Example 4-24 HA cluster before commit
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -hacluster -all
Number of HA Clusters: 1
HA cluster name: HAC1 - 2 EE entries
Status: Defined
HAC State: Converged
WWN Slot Number Status
10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10 0 Online
10:00:00:05:1e:54:16:53 0 Online
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

6. At this stage the configuration has been done but is not operational. This can be seen from
the previous output as the status is in a Defined state. If the configuration is correct, run a
cryptocfg --commit command to commit the configuration as shown in Example 4-25.

Example 4-25 HA commit
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --commit
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

The status will now change to committed, as shown in Example 4-26 on page 109.


Example 4-26 HA committed
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --show -hacluster HAC1
HA cluster name: HAC1 - 2 EE entries
Status: Committed
HAC State: Converged
WWN Slot Number Status
10:00:00:05:1e:54:17:10 0 Online
10:00:00:05:1e:54:16:53 0 Online
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

If you use DCFM, the status of these two switches will shown as belonging to an HA group as
shown in Figure 4-74.

Figure 4-74 DCFM with HA cluster

HA policy configuration
A number of HA policies can be set for the HA cluster configuration.

Failback policy
The failback policy can be set to automatic or manual failback mode.

The automatic failback mode provides a policy where failback occurs automatically within an
HA cluster when an Encryption Switch or blade that failed earlier has been restored or
replaced. The Automatic failback mode is the default mode.

The manual failback mode provides a policy where fallback must be initiated manually when
an Encryption Switch or blade that failed earlier has been restored or replaced.

Use the command is cryptocfg --set -failbackmode auto | manual to change this setting
as shown in Example 4-27 on page 110.


Example 4-27 set failbackmode
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --set -failbackmode auto
Set failback policy status: Operation Succeeded.
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

Heartbeat misses
The heartbeat misses value sets the number of heartbeat misses allowed in a node that is
part of an encryption group before the node is declared unreachable and the standby takes
over. The default value is 3. The range is 1-15 in integer increments only. This is set by the
cryptocfg --set --hbmisses value command, as shown in Example 4-28.

Example 4-28 Set heartbeat misses
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --set --hbmisses 5
Set heartbeat miss status: Operation Succeeded.
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

Heartbeat time-out
The heartbeat time-out value sets the time-out value for the heartbeat in seconds. The default
value is 2 seconds. Valid values are integers in the range between 1 and 30 seconds.

The relationship between heartbeat misses and heartbeat time-out determines the total
amount of time allowed before a node is declared unreachable. If a switch does not sense a
heartbeat within the heartbeat time-out value, it is counts as a heartbeat miss. The default
values result in a total time of 6 seconds (time-out value of two seconds times three misses).
A total time of 6 to 10 seconds is recommended. A smaller value might cause a node to be
declared unreachable prematurely, whereas a larger value could result in a node not being
detected as down in an efficient manner.

This is set using the ryptocfg --set -hbtimeout value command as shown in
Example 4-29.

Example 4-29 Set heartbeat timeout
SAN32B-E4-1:admin> cryptocfg --set -hbtimeout 3
Set heartbeat timeout status: Operation Succeeded.
SAN32B-E4-1:admin>

Note: The total time-out of a node cannot be more than 28 seconds. The CLI will prevent
this by refusing a value exceeding the rule.


5

Chapter 5. Deployment scenarios
In this chapter we show several deployment scenarios and explain some considerations to
take into account during deployment. We will also show how the Smart Card can be used,
along with useful hints, tips, and explanations.

In this chapter we will show you some possible scenarios and also an overview of how the
encryption switch is being purposed in these cases.


5.1 Single fabric deployment with single encryption switch and
single path
Single fabric deployment with a single encryption switch and single paths from host to target
is the most basic setup, and applies if you have only one host and one target with a single
path connection from the host to the storage LUN. In this case all best practice rules of the
modern SAN design are ignored/ However, this is a good example to show how the
encryption switch works.

As you see in Figure 5-1 on page 113 there is one target (T1) and one host (I1). Zone the
host (I1) and target (T1) together before configuring them for encryption. Configuring a
host/target pair for encryption will create a redirection zone to redirect the host-target traffic
through the encryption engine. Redirection zones can only be created if the host and target
are already zoned. If the host and target are not already zoned, you can still configure them
for encryption, but you will need to zone the host and target together, and then create the
redirection zones as a separate step using the commit command. During the configuration for
encryption you put the target (T1) and the host port (I1) in a crypto targetcrypto target
container (CTC). The container holds the configuration information for a single target,
including associated hosts and LUN settings.

When you have completed the configuration and the host (I1) writes data to the target (T1),
the data frame will be redirected to the encryption engine (EE). At the EE a key is generated
and written to the TKLM servers (key vault). When this process is compete, the data will be
encrypted with this key and the encrypted data will be written to the target (T1).

When you read the data the opposite occurs. The encrypted data is read from the target and
sent to the encryption engine where it is decrypted with the DEK and then sent to the host in
clear text.


Figure 5-1 Single fabric with single path

5.2 Single fabric deployment with single encryption switch and
dual path
Figure 5-2 on page 114 shows a basic configuration with a single encryption switch providing
encryption between one host and one storage device over the following two paths:
Host port 1 (I1) to target port 1 (T1), redirected through CTC T1
Host port 2 (I2) to target port 2 (T2), redirected through CTC T2.

Host port 1 is zoned with target port 1, and host port 2 is zoned with target port 2 to enable
the redirection zoning needed to redirect traffic to the correct CTC. Both CTC are now able to
build data encryption key (DEK) clusters, because they use the same DEK for encryption.

A DEK cluster is by definition a cluster where all other encryption devices share the same
data encryption keys. This is an encryption group. An encryption group contains several

Chapter 5. Deployment scenarios 113

encryption devices, with one encryption device designated as the groupleader. The
groupleader is responsible for functions such as the distribution of the configuration to the
other members of the group, authenticating with the key vaults, and configuring CTCs.

Figure 5-2 Single fabric with dual path to host and storage

5.3 Single fabric deployment with HA cluster
In an HA cluster you must have two encryption switches connected in one fabric. As
Figure 5-3 on page 115 shows, our scenario has a single fabric with dual core directors and
edge switches in a core-edge topology.


Figure 5-3 Single fabric HA cluster


The two encryption switches provide a redundant encryption path to the target devices. The
encryption switches are interconnected through a dedicated private LAN. The Ge1 and Ge0
gigabit Ethernet ports on each of these switches are attached to this dedicated private LAN.
This LAN connection provides the communication between both switches needed to distribute
and synchronize configuration information. The two switches act as a high availability (HA)
cluster, providing automatic failover if one of the switches fails or when one of them is taken
out for service. How to form an HA cluster is shown in Chapter 4, “Implementation and setup”
on page 55.

5.4 Single fabric deployment with DEK cluster
In Figure 5-4 on page 117 shows a single fabric with two paths between a host and a target
device. The two encryption switches are required to build a data encryption key (DEK) cluster
with the following configuration definition:
Host port 1 (I1) is defined with target port 1 (T1) in one crypto target container (CTC 1)
Host port 2 (I2) is defined with target port 1 (T2) in one crypto target container (CTC 2)

CTC 1 is located in encryption switch 1 and CTC 2 is located in encryption switch 2. Both
encryption switches belong to the same encryption group, This forms a DEK cluster between
both switches. The DEK cluster handles the target/host path failover along with the failure of
either encryption switch.


Figure 5-4 Single fabric shown with DEK cluster


5.5 Dual fabric deployment with two HA clusters and one DEK
cluster
In the next scenario we will show a dual fabric with an HA and a DEK cluster. All switches are
interconnected in one management LAN (not shown for clarity). This means that both the
TKLM server and the DCFM server are connected to this LAN and are up and running. All
four Encryption switches are connected to the dedicated private LAN. In Figure 5-5 you can
see that both fabrics have dual core directors with edge switches in a highly redundant
core-edge design.

Figure 5-5 Dual fabric with HA and DEK cluster with single path from host and target

The configuration details are:
Two fabrics.
Two paths to the target device (T1 and T2), one path in each fabric.
Two pathes to the host (I1 and I2), one path in each fabric.


Host port 1 (I1) is zoned to target port 1 (T1) in CTC 1 located on encryption switch 1.
There are four Brocade encryption switches organized in HA clusters. HA cluster 1 is in
fabric 1, and HA cluster 2 is in fabric 2.
There is one DEK cluster, and one encryption group.

Encryption switches 1 and 3 act as a high availability cluster in fabric 1 and encryption
switches 2 and 4 act as a high availability cluster in fabric 2. In both configurations the HA
cluster provides, in case of an encryption switch error, an automatic failover. In addition there
is a redundant path if an entire fabric, fabric 1 or fabric 2, has a problem.

5.6 Multiple paths, DEK cluster, no HA cluster
Figure 5-6 on page 120 shows a dual fabric configuration but with no HA cluster. All switches,
both TKLM servers, and the DCFM server are interconnected on one management LAN (not
shown for clarity).

The configuration details are the following:
Two fabrics.
Four paths to the target device, two paths in each fabric.
Two host ports, one in each fabric:
– Host port 1 (I1) is zoned to target port 1 (T1) in CTC 1 in fabric 1.
– Host port 1 (I1) is also zoned to target port 2 (T2) in CTC 2 in fabric 1.
– Host port 2 (I2) is zoned to target port 3 (T3) in CTC3 in fabric 2.
– Host port 2 (I2) is also zoned to target port 4 (T4) in CTC 4 in fabric 2.
Two encryption switches, one in each fabric (no HA cluster).
One DEK Cluster and one encryption group.


Figure 5-6 Two fabrics with no HA and DEK cluster

In case of failure there is still enough redundancy to maintain access from the host to the
target.

5.7 Deployment with FCIP extension switches
In Figure 5-7 on page 121 we show how to use the encryption switch in a configuration with
extension switches or blades within a DCX, DCX-4S, or 48000 chassis to enable long
distance connections.


Figure 5-7 FCIP deployment

Note: Disable data compression on FCIP links that might carry encrypted traffic to avoid
potential performance issues because compression of encrypted data might not yield the
desired compression ratio. Tape pipelining and fastwrite should also be disabled on the
FCIP link if it is transporting encrypted traffic.

In our example the host is using the remote target for remote data mirroring and backup
across the FCIP link. If the encryption services are enabled for the host and the remote
target, the encryption switch can take clear text from the host and send ciphertext over the
FCIP link. For FCIP on the extension switch, this traffic is same as rest of the FCIP traffic
between any two FCIP end points. The traffic is encrypted traffic. FCIP provides a data
compression option. Data compression should not be enabled on the FCIP link. If
compression is enabled on FCIP link, encrypted traffic going through FCIP compression
might not provide the best compression ratio.


5.8 Data mirroring deployment
Figure 5-8 on page 123 shows a data mirroring deployment. In this configuration, the host
only knows about target1 and LUN 1, and the I/O path to target 1 and LUN 1. When data is
sent to target 1, it is written to LUN1, and then sent on to LUN2 for replication. Target1 acts as
an initiator to enable the replication I/O path to LUN 2. When an encryption switch is added to
the configuration, it introduces another virtual target and LUN, and a virtual initiator in the I/O
path in front of target1. The virtual target and LUN provided by the encryption switch is
mapped to target 1 and LUN1. Data is encrypted and the encrypted data is sent to target 1,
written to LUN1, and replicated on LUN2. Only one DEK is used to create the ciphertext
written to both LUNs. A key ID is stored in metadata written to both LUNs. If possible, the
metadata is written to every block with the LBA range of 1 to 16. This ensures that the
encryption engine will be able to retrieve the correct DEK from the key vault when retrieving
data from either LUN 1 or LUN 2.


Figure 5-8 Data Mirror deployment

5.9 VMware ESX server with one HBA per guest OS
VMware ESX servers can host multiple guest operating systems. A guest operating system
(OS) can have its own physical HBA port connection, or it can use a virtual port and share a
physical HBA port with other guest operating systems.

Figure 5-9 on page 125 shows a VMware ESX server with two guest operating systems (OS)
where each guest accesses a fabric over separate host ports. There are two paths to a target
storage device:
Host port 1 to target port 1, redirected through CTC T1.
Host port 2 to target port 2, redirected through CTC T2.


Host port 1 is zoned with target port 1, and host port 2 is zoned with target port 2. This zoning
enables the redirection zoning needed to redirect traffic to the correct CTC: CTC 1 with T1 or
CTC 2 with T2.


Figure 5-9 ESX server with one HBA per guest OS


5.9.1 VMware ESX server with a shared port between two guest OS
You can also configure a VMware ESX server with two guest operating systems that share
one port to access a fabric. To enable this, both guests are assigned a virtual port. There are
two paths to a target storage device:
Virtual host port 1, through the shared host port, to target port 1, redirected through CTC
T1.
Virtual host port 2, through the shared host port, to target port 2, redirected through CTC
T2.

In this case, the virtual host port 1 is zoned with target port 1, and the virtual host port 2 is
zoned with target port 2. This zoning enable the redirection zoning that is needed to redirect
traffic to the correct CTC: CTC 1 with T1 and CTC 2 with T2.

5.10 Deployment using the Smart Card reader
Smart Cards are credit card-sized cards that contain a CPU and persistent memory. Smart
Cards can be used as security devices.

Smart Cards can be used on the encryption switch to do the following:
Control user access to the Management application security administrator roles
Control activation of encryption engines
Securely store backup copies of master keys

The authentication card
When the Smart Card is used as a authentication, one or more authentication cards must be
read by a card reader attached to a Management application PC to enable certain security
sensitive operations. These include the following:
Master key generation, backup, and restore operations
Replacement of authentication card certificates
Enabling and disabling the use of system cards
Changing the quorum size for authentication cards

The system card
You can use the Smart Cards as system cards. These are cards that can be used to control
activation of encryption engines. Encryption switches and blades have a card reader that
enables the use of a system card. System cards discourage theft of encryption switches or
blades by requiring the use of a system card at the switch or blade to enable the encryption
engine. When the switch or blade is powered off, the encryption engine will not work without
first inserting a system card into its card reader. If someone removes a switch or blade with
the intent of accessing the encryption engine, it will function as an ordinary FC switch or blade
when it is powered up, but use of the encryption engine is denied.

The Smart Card as master key store
The use of Smart Cards provides the highest level of security. When Smart Cards are used
for master key backup, you have the option to split the master key write over up to five cards.
This cards can be kept and stored by up to five individuals, and all are needed to restore the
master key.

The number of cards depend how many card you want to define. You define the number of
card by selecting the number of quorum size.


You must have Admin or SecurityAdmin user privileges to activate, register, and configure
Smart Cards.

Note: For using the Smart Cards you must have DCFM installed. To get the cards ready for
use, you must have a card reader connected and installed on the management PC where
the DCFM server is installed.

Note: Not all remote connection programs will support the usage of a Smart Card reader.
Therefore, connect direct to the management PC where you use DCFM and the Smart
Card reader.

Important: The actual number of authentication cards registered is always one more than
the quorum size, so if you set the quorum size to two, for example, you will need to register
at least three cards in the subsequent steps. The maximum of quorum size is five. In this
case you need six cards.

Smart Card readers provide a plug-and-play interface to read and write to a Smart Card. The
following Smart Card readers are supported:
GemPlus GemPC USB
http://www.gemalto.com/readers/index.html
SCM MicrosystemsSCR331
http://www.scmmicro.com/security/view_product_en.php?PID=2

5.10.1 Registering authentication cards from a card reader
You can register an authentication card or a set of authentication cards from a card reader
connected to the management PC. Therefore the cards must be physically available.
Authentication cards can be registered during encryption group or member configuration
when running the configuration wizard. They can be registered using the following procedure:
1. From the DCFM main menu click Configure  Encryption. The Encryption Center
window displays.
2. Select an encryption group, and click Group  Security. As you see in Figure 5-10 on
page 128 you have options in the Encryption Group Properties Security tab.


Figure 5-10 Security tab

3. On the Encryption Group Properties select the number of quorum which are needed to
authorize the action. Bear in mind that you must have one card more than the number you
enter
4. Select Register from card reader. The Add Authentication Card window is displayed.
5. Insert a blank card in the card reader connected to the management PC. Wait until the
card serial number is displayed. Fill out the necessary information such as first name, last
name, any notes, and the password. See Figure 5-11 on page 129.


Figure 5-11 Add authentication card

6. Press OK. A card key pair is now generated. This will take 1-2 minutes. A message box
will indicate that the card is now initialized and ready for use. Click OK. The card is added
to the Registered System Cards table on the System Cards window.
7. Repeat steps 4 through 6 for each card you want to register.
8. Click OK to exit the Encryption Group Properties Security tab.

5.10.2 Registering authentication cards from the database
You can also register Smart Cards that are already in the database:
window displays.
2. Select an encryption group, and click Group  Security.
3. Select Register from Archive. The Authentication Cards window displays, showing a list
of Smart Cards in the database.
4. Select the card from the table and click OK. Wait for the confirmation window indicating
initialization is done.
5. Click OK. The card is added to the Registered Authentication Cards table.
6. Click OK to leave the Encryption Group Properties tab.


5.10.3 De-registering an authentication card
Authentication cards can be removed from the database, and the switch by de-registering
them. Use the following procedure to de-register an authentication card:
window displays.
3. Select a card and select Deregister (see Figure 5-10 on page 128). A confirmation box
will appear.
4. Click Yes to confirm de-registration. The card will be removed from the Registered
Authentication Cards table.

5.10.4 Using authentication cards
You can select the number of quorum authentication cards that can grant access to the
following actions:
Backup Master Key
Restore Master Key
Create Master Key.
Replacement of authentication card certificates
Enabling and disabling the use of system cards
Changing the quorum size for authentication cards

To authenticate using a quorum of authentication cards, perform the following steps:
window displays.
3. Select the action you want to perform such as a backup of the master key. The
Authenticate window is displayed.
4. Obtain the number of cards required, as directed by the instructions on the window. The
currently registered cards and the assigned owners are listed in the table near the bottom
of the window. Insert the first card, and wait for the ID to appear in the Card ID field. Enter
the assigned password. See Figure 5-12 on page 131.


Figure 5-12 Authenticate an action

5. Click Authenticate. Wait for the confirmation window,
6. Click OK.
7. Repeat steps 4 through 6 for each card until the quorum is reached.
8. Click OK when the last card is inserted. The action is now authorized.
9. When the action is complete, click OK to leave the Encryption Group Properties tab.

5.10.5 Enabling or disabling the system card requirement
If you want to use a system card to control activation of an encryption engine on a switch as
explained before, you must enable the system card requirement. You can use the following
procedure to enable or disable the system card requirement:
1. Click Configure  Encryption from the main menu bar.
1. From the Encryption Center select an encryption group and click Group  Security
from the menu bar.
2. The Encryption Group Properties tab is displayed. Set System Cards to Required (see
Figure 5-10 on page 128) to require the use of a system card to control activation of an
encryption engine. If System Cards is set to Not Required, the encryption engine
activates without the need to read a system card first. An information message will appear
to show how you can activate a card for that option.
3. Click OK.


5.10.6 Registering system cards from a card reader
If you have enabled the need for a system card under 5.10.5, “Enabling or disabling the
system card requirement” on page 131, you can register one or more cards using the
following procedure:
1. Click Configure  Encryption from the main menu bar. The Encryption Center window
displays.
2. Select the switch from the Encryption Devices table and click Switch  System Card.
The System Card window is displayed as shown in Figure 5-13.

Figure 5-13 System card

3. Select the engine under Registered System Cards and click Register from Card Reader.
4. The Register System Card box will appear. Insert a Smart Card into the card reader. Be
sure to wait for the card serial number to appear and then enter card assignment
information, as directed. See Figure 5-14.

Figure 5-14 Register a system card


5. Click OK. A card key pair is now generated. This will take 1-2 minutes. A message box will
indicate that the card is now initialized and ready for use.
6. Click OK The card is added to the Registered System Cards table on the System Cards
window. Store the card in a secure location not in the proximity of the switch or blade.
7. Click OKto leave the System Card dialog.

5.10.7 De-registering a system card
The need for system cards can be removed by de-registering it. Use the following procedure
to de-register a system card.
1. Click Configure  Encryption from the main menu bar. The Encryption Center window
displays.
2. Select the switch from the Encryption Devices table and click Switch  System Card
from the menu task bar. The System Card window is displayed.
3. Select the engine under Registered System Cards and click Deregister.
4. A message box will appear stating you have to agree to remove the selected system card.
Click Yes
5. The card will disappear from the Registered System Cards table. Click OK After that this
card is no longer registered as system card. You still have to switch off the need of a
system card on the security tab (see Figure 5-10 on page 128) if you do not want this. See
5.10.5, “Enabling or disabling the system card requirement” on page 131.

5.10.8 Tracking Smart Cards
Use the Smart Card Tracking window to track Smart Card details. To access the Smart Card
Tracking window, perform the following steps:
1. Click Configure  Encryption from the main menu bar.
2. From the Encryption Center select an encryption group. Click Smart Card  Smart Card
Tracking from the menu bar. Now the Smart Card tracking window appears as shown in
Figure 5-15.

Figure 5-15 Tracking Smart Card


3. Select a card and click Delete when you want to delete it.

Note: The delete option appears only for recovery cards.

Note: Deleting Smart Cards from the Management application database keeps the Smart
Cards table at a manageable size, but does not invalidate the Smart Card. The Smart Card
can still be used. You must de-register a Smart Card to invalidate its use.

You can also generate a list of Smart Card and save it as a .csv or .html file.

5.10.9 Editing Smart Cards
To add more information or detail to a Smart Card you can use the connected Smart Card
reader to the management PC:
1. From the Encryption Center select Smart Card  Edit Smartto get access to the
connected Smart Card.
2. Make any changes you want to the Smart Card as shown in Figure 5-16. You can also
change the password here. Be aware that this option will work only after you have
registered the first Smart Card. See 5.10.6, “Registering system cards from a card reader”
on page 132.

Figure 5-16 Edit Smart Card


Related publications

The publications listed in this section are considered particularly suitable for a more detailed
discussion of the topics covered in this book.

IBM Redbooks publications
For information about ordering these publications, see “Help from IBM” on page 136. Note
that some of the documents that we reference here might be available in softcopy only.
Introduction to Storage Area Networks, SG24-5470
IBM TotalStorage: SAN Product, Design, and Optimization Guide, SG24-6384
Implementing an IBM/Brocade SAN with 8 Gbps Directors and Switches, SG24-6116
IBM System Storage/Brocade Multiprotocol Routing: An Introduction and Implementation,
SG24-7544
FICON Implementation Guide, SG24-6497

Other resources
These publications are also relevant as further information sources:
Fabric OS Administrator’s Guide, 53-1000448
Secure Fabric OS Administrator’s Guide, 53-1000244

Referenced web sites
These web sites are also relevant as further information sources:
IBM System Storage hardware, software, and solutions:
http://www.storage.ibm.com
IBM System Storage, Storage Area Network:
http://www.storage.ibm.com/snetwork/index.html
Brocade:
http://www.brocade.com
Finisar:
http://www.finisar.com
Veritas:
http://www.veritas.com
Tivoli:
http://www.tivoli.com
JNI:
http://www.Jni.com


IEEE:
http://www.ieee.org
Storage Networking Industry Association:
http://www.snia.org
SCSI Trade Association:
http://www.scsita.org
Internet Engineering Task Force:
http://www.ietf.org
American National Standards Institute:
http://www.ansi.org
Technical Committee T10:
http://www.t10.org
Technical Committee T11:
http://www.t11.org

Help from IBM
IBM Support and downloads
ibm.com/support

IBM Global Services
ibm.com/services


Index
communication paths 26
Numerics compression 8, 11–12, 16
2005-R04 8 compression ratio 121
2498-E32 8 confidential 3
2499-192 8, 15 configuration 55
2499-384 8, 15 configuration file 28
configuration tasks 10
A configuring an HA cluster 105
Adaptive Networking 11 configuring encryption 58
Adaptive Networking Services 13–14 configuring HA 107
Advanced Encryption Standard 8, 12 congestion 14
Advanced Performance Monitoring 11–13 congestion management 14
advanced zoning 11–12 connections 10
AES 3, 8, 12 container 81
AES256 6 control processor 15, 50
all access 58 converter 10
applications 19 cooling fan 11
asymmetric 13 core-edge 114, 118
asymmetric encryption algorithms 3 CP 15, 50
asymmetric key algorithms 4 Create Master Key 130
asymmetric key encryption 3–4 crypto target container 82, 91
asymmetric keys 6, 26 cryptographic services 29
attack 2 cryptographically erased 26
authentication card 126–127 cryptomodule’s security processor 50
authenticity 5
automatic failback mode 109 D
automatic failover 21, 23, 116, 119 data compression 121
data corruption 95
B data encryption 8
Backup Master Key 130 data encryption key 10, 21–22, 105, 113, 116
bandwidth 12–14 data mirroring deployment 122
basic setup 55 data-at-rest 8, 56
binary 69 database 2
blades 71 DCFM for encryption 61
blank card 128 decompression 16
block cipher 11 decryption 8, 26
Blowfish 3 decryption key 26
buffer credits 12, 14 dedicated LAN 70
buffers 12–13 default encryption mode 91
default mode 69
default zone 58
C DEK 10, 21–22, 105, 113
card key pair 133 DEK cluster 21, 113, 116
card reader 127 deployment scenarios 111
CAST5 3 DER certificate 72
certificate label name 41 De-registering 130
certificates 6, 13, 26, 72 device group 34
ciphertext 3, 8, 26, 121 Diffie-Hellman 4
ciphertext stealing 12 digital certificates 5
clear text 3, 8, 16, 91, 121 digital document 5
clusters 113 disabling 121
commit 90 disk 96
commit command 112 disk encryption 11
common uses 19 distance 13


DLS 13 file systems 2
DPS 13 firmware repository 60
dual controller 95 firmware update 59
dual core 114 firmware upgrades 11
dual fabric 22–23 flow control 14
Dual fabric deployment 118 frame buffers 13
Dual HB 95 frame redirection zone 86
dual path 113 front panel connections 10
DWDM 12 FSPF 13
dynamic load sharing 13
Dynamic Path Selection 11, 13
dynamic profiling services 14 G
Galois/Counter Mode 12
GbE ports 10
E GCM 12
ECC 4 GL 30, 40, 73
edge switches 114 granular allocation 14
egress 13 groupleader 30, 40, 50, 73, 114
ElGamal 4 guest operating systems 123
Elliptic curve cryptography 4
encrypted data 3
encrypted format 12 H
encrypted traffic 121 HA cluster 105
encryption 1 HA policy configuration 109
encryption algorithm 5 hackers 2
Encryption Blade 16 hardware components 8
encryption container 81 harm 2
encryption device 86 heartbeat misses 110
encryption engine 66, 69, 71, 74, 80, 112 heartbeat time-out 110
encryption engines 32, 50, 70 high availability cluster 23, 119
encryption group 75, 113, 116 high availability HA encryption engine 104
Encryption Group Properties 128 higher-priority 14
encryption key 3, 26 High-Performance Encryption for Data-at-Rest 8
encryption management 61 hosts 81
encryption path 23 HyperTerminal 10
encryption performance license 14
Encryption Performance Upgrade 12, 14 I
encryption policy 91 IBM Encryption Products 6
encryption processing power 13–14 IBM SAN Director Encryption Blades 15
encryption products 7 IBM TotalStorage b-type family routing products 7
encryption setup 65 IDEA 3
encryption switch 25 identical keys 3
error 119 Identify Drives 38
Ethernet management port 10 IFL trunks 13
event notification 12 Import Certificate 73
Exchange-based routing 13 initial device configuration 10
Extended Fabric feature 13 initiators 66
Extended Fabrics 12 in-line encryption 8
in-order delivery 13
F in-place encryption 103
Fabric QoS 14 installation of the Encryption Switch 56
fabric shortest path first 13 Integrated Routing 12, 14, 17
Fabric Watch 11–12 integrity 5
failback policy 109 inter-fabric links 13
fan assembly 11 interoperability matrix 17
fastwrite 121 ISL 13
fault isolation 14 ISL Trunking 13
FC Extended Fabrics 11 ISL trunking 11
FCIP activation 12
Fibre Channel ports 8


J O
Java Cryptography Extension 28 operational status 9
Java Runtime Environment 28 ory 59
JCE 28

P
K passive switch backplane 15
KAC certificate 34, 43 passphrase 51
key 3 performance degradation 92
Key and Device Management 37 performance issues 121
key availability 26 physical target port 84
key management 6, 10 plain 3
key management tool 26 port status LED 9
key security 26 power supplies 11
key server 26 pre-requisites 58
key sizes 3 primary key vault 67
key store 34, 41, 44 private key 4
key vault 112 protocol layers 2
keystore 28 public key 4
keystores 28 public key encryption 4
public-private key 4

L
limitations 17 Q
link layer redundancy 70 QoS priority 14
log file downloads 11 quorum authorization 11
logical ISL connection 13 quorum of authentication cards 130
Long Distance support 11, 13 quorum size 126–127, 130
long-distance connection 12
LUN setup 96
LUN wizard 87, 100 R
LUN wizard multi-path 100 RC4 3
read operation 20
recovery operations 11
M Redbooks Web site viii
maintenance tasks 10 redirect traffic 124
management 10 redirection zone 112
management network 10 redirection zones 85–86
manual failback mode 109 redistributed 13
master key 26, 29, 50 redundant 118
master key backup 126 redundant encryption 21
master key recovery 11 redundant encryption path 116
master key state 68 Register Certificate 73
master key store 126 register Smart Cards 129
masterless 13 Registered System Cards 133
maximum bandwidth 56 registering authentication cards 129
member node 74 re-keying 19
MK 26, 29 resource group 62
multi-path 55 resource usage 14
multi-path configuration 95 Restore Master Key 130
multi-path disk LUN 95 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 4
multiple encryption engines 70 RSA 4

N S
name server database 80 SAN04B-R 8
National Institute of Standards and Technology 6 SAN256B -E4 18
native encryption 91 SAN32B-E4 8, 18–19
new node 72 SAN384B 8, 15
NIST 6 SAN768B 8, 15
NTP server 29 scalability 18

Index 139

scenarios 19 TKLM configuration 65
secondary key vault 67 TKLM management scalability 18
secure 3, 13 TKLM overview 26
secure backup 50 TKLM re-keying scalability 19
Secure Copy server 69 TKLM server 48, 65
security 1 TLS 29
security exposure 26 Traffic Isolation 13
self-signed certificate 40, 42 traffic management services 14
serial cable 10 Transport Layer Security 29
serial management port 10 trunk group 13
Serpent 3 tweak 12
service level monitoring 13 Twofish 3
service levels 14
shared port 126
simple mail transfer protocol 12 U
simple network management protocol 12 unauthorized agent 26
simplified key management solution 26 unprotected 3
single encryption switch 112 upgrade the switch 59
single fabric deployment 112 USB port 11
single fabric HA cluster 20 user roles 62
single path 55 using authentication cards 130
single path connection 112
single path disk LUN 77 V
single paths 112 Verify Master Key 67
single point of failure 15 versions 60
Smart Card 111, 126 VI 84
smart card 11, 17 virtual channel technology 14
Smart Card Tracking 133 virtual devices 82
SMTP 12 virtual initiator port 20
sniff 2 virtual initiators 84
sniffed 2 virtual network interface 70
SNMP 12 virtual port 123
SP 50 virtual target port 20
SP state 67 virtual targets 84
SSH server 69 VMware ESX 123
status LED 11 VT 84
storage encryption configuration 62
storage encryption key operations 63
Storage encryption security 63 W
switch recovery 10 Web Tools 11–12
symmetric 6, 13 wire speed 16
symmetric key encryption 3 write operation 20
symmetric keys 26
syslog daemon 12
system card 126
Z
zone conflict 58
system card requirement 131
zoneset database 99
system cards from a card reader 132
zoning 96

T
tape encryption 12
tape pipelining 121
target for encryption 80
target port 82
target wizard multi-path 98
targets 66
TDES 3
threat 2
TI 13
Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager 6, 10, 13, 25, 56
TKLM 6, 10, 13, 25, 56


Implementing the IBM System
Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption
Switch
Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch
Implementing the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch
(0.2”spine)
0.17”<->0.473”
90<->249 pages

Switch
Switch

Back cover ®

Implementing the IBM
System Storage SAN32B-E4
Encryption Switch ®

Enforce data This IBM Redbooks publication covers the IBM System Storage
SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch, which is a high-performance INTERNATIONAL
confidentiality using
stand-alone device designed to protect data-at-rest in TECHNICAL
fabric-based mission-critical environments. In addition to helping IT SUPPORT
encryption organizations achieve compliance with regulatory mandates and
meeting industry standards for data confidentiality, the ORGANIZATION
SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch also protects them against
Centralize potential litigation and liability following a reported breach.
administration of
data-at-rest Data is one of the most highly valued resources in a competitive
business environment. Protecting that data, controlling access to BUILDING TECHNICAL
encryption services it, and verifying its authenticity while maintaining its availability are INFORMATION BASED ON
priorities in our security-conscious world. Increasing regulatory
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
Reduce operational requirements also drive the need for adequate data security.
costs and simplify Encryption is a powerful and widely used technology that helps
protect data from loss and inadvertent or deliberate compromise. IBM Redbooks are developed
management by the IBM International
In the context of data center fabric security, IBM provides Technical Support
advanced encryption services for Storage Area Networks (SANs) Organization. Experts from
with the IBM System Storage SAN32B-E4 Encryption Switch. The IBM, Customers and Partners
switch is a high-speed, highly reliable hardware device that from around the world create
delivers fabric-based encryption services to protect data assets timely technical information
either selectively or on a comprehensive basis. The 8 Gbps based on realistic scenarios.
SAN32B-E4 Fibre Channel Encryption Switch scales Specific recommendations
nondisruptively, providing from 48 up to 96 Gbps of encryption are provided to help you
processing power to meet the needs of the most demanding implement IT solutions more
environments with flexible, on-demand performance. It also effectively in your
provides compression services at speeds up to 48 Gbps for tape environment.
storage systems. Moreover, it is tightly integrated with one of the
industry-leading, enterprise-class key management systems, the
IBM Tivoli® Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), which can scale to
support key life-cycle services across distributed environments. For more information:
ibm.com/redbooks

SG24-7922-00 ISBN 0738435295

Implementing the ibm system storage san32 b e4 encryption switch - sg247922

More Related Content

What's hot (18)

Similar to Implementing the ibm system storage san32 b e4 encryption switch - sg247922 (20)

More from Banking at Ho Chi Minh city (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

Implementing the ibm system storage san32 b e4 encryption switch - sg247922