Internship diary by ronak

Internship Diary
National Law School of India University, Bangalore

UNDER THE GUIDANCE& SUPERVISION OF

Justice Dipak Misra
(Supreme Court of India)

Submittedto:Submittedby:
J. Dipak MisraRonakKaranpuria1
Supreme Court of India NLSIU, Bangalore
st
1 Year LL.M. (Business Law)

1
e-mail: ronak.karanpuria@gmail.com,
Ph: +91-9829328537(Udaipur), 0294-2460774, +91-7411217916(Bangalore)
Add: 35-Ekling colony sec-3 HiranMagri, Udaipur (Raj.)

» Day 1: Date: 1th Feb 2013
Introduced to the work that is carried by judges interns andfunctioning of library and e-library
in the Judge‟s library by office staff atthe Supreme court.
Describe how to effectively research through various journals, books, concerned departments
& various software like SCC, Manupatra etc.

In House databases like:

JUDIS
-Judgment Information System
SUPLIS
- Case Indexing
SUPLIB
- Legal Articles
LEGIS
- Legislation of Acts
Catalogue
- Online Public Access Catalog(OPAC)

Directed to meet Lordship DipakMisra J.

» Day 2: Date: 2nd Feb 2013
Case Study :Hardevinder Singh v. Paramjit Singh & others
Facts: Suit for possession of land to the extent of the share filed in trial court based on land
being ancestral, joint Hindu possession, the said WILL is null & void. Trial court gives
finding that the said WILL is devoid of any merit & order that the land is ancestral property.
On an appeal by beneficiaries of WILL, the learned appellate judge holds that the
predecessor-in-interest of the parties to the suit, was not ancestral, but self-acquired and,
hence, he was competent to alienate the same in any manner as he liked; that WILL was
validly executed and that the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge on that score was
unsustainable. On the account of the settlement b/w appellant& the plaintiff, the trial order
was set aside. But Defendant no.5 filed an appeal before the High Court under Sec-100
C.P.C. which held that the appeal is not maintainable.

Facts in Issue:
1. Whether defendant No. 5 cannot be regarded as an aggrieved party to assail the
impugned decree invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the
Code?
2. Whether appeal could lie against a mere finding for the simple reason that the Code does
not provide for such an appeal?
3. Whether regular second appeal could be filed by the defendant No. 5 where the suit has
been dismissed by virtue of the dislodging of the decree of the first appellate court?
4. Whether the finding would operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceeding?

Principal involved:
Three situations have been adverted in Order 41 Rule 22.

Category No. 1 dealswith the impugned decree which is partly in favour ofthe appellant and
partly in favour of the respondent.Dealing with such a situation, the Bench observedthat in
such a case, it is necessary for the respondentto file an appeal or take cross-objection against
thatpart of the decree which is against him if he seeks toget rid of the same though he is
entitled to supportthat part of the decree which is in his favour withouttaking any cross-
objection.
In respect of two othercategories which deal with a decree entirely in favourof the respondent
though an issue had been decidedagainst him or a decree entirely in favour of therespondent
where all the issues had been answeredin his favour but there is a finding in the
judgmentwhich goes against him, in the pre-amendmentstage, he could not take any cross-
objection as hewas not a person aggrieved by the decree.
But post-amendment,read in the light of explanation to sub-rule (1), though it is still not
necessary for therespondent to take any cross-objection layingchallenge to any finding
adverse to him as thedecree is entirely in his favour, yet he may supportthe decree without
cross-objection. It gives him theright to take a cross-objection to a finding recordedagainst
him either while answering an issue or whiledealing with an issue. It is apt to note that after
theamendment to the Code, if the appeal standswithdrawn or dismissed for default, the
crossobjectiontaken to a finding by the respondent wouldstill be adjudicated upon on merits
which remedy wasnot available to the respondent under theunamended Code.

Held:
Though the High Court has referred to the said pronouncement, yet it has not applied the ratio
correctly to the facts. In the present case, as we find, the plaintiff claiming to be a co-sharer
filed the suit and challenged the will. The defendant No. 5, the brother of the plaintiff,
supported his case. In an appeal at the instance of the defendant Nos. 1 to 4, the judgment and
decree was overturned. The plaintiff entered into asettlement with the contesting defendants
who had preferred the appeal. Such a decree, we are disposed to think, prejudicially affects
the defendant No. 5 and, therefore, he could have preferred an appeal. The same having been
unsettled, the benefit accrued in his favour became extinct.

» Day 3: Date: 3rd Feb 2013
Case study :Parbin Ali and Another v.State of Assam
Appeal directedagainst the judgment of conviction and order of sentencepassed by the
Guwahati High Court whereby the DivisionBench of the High Court gave the stamp of
approval to theconviction recorded by the learned Additional SessionsJudge, Silchar under
Section302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”) andorder of sentence sentencing
the accused-appellants toimprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, indefault, to
suffer further rigorous imprisonment for onemonth.
Fact in issue:
1. Issue ofacceptability of oral dying declaration?
2. Death wascaused due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of theante mortem injuries
in the abdomen caused by sharpweapon and homicidal in nature?
3. Whether delay in filing FIR is suspicious?
4. Whether such aperson receiving certain injuries would be in a position tospeak or not
has not been brought out anywhere in theevidence?
Held:Having said that the discrepancies which have beenbrought out are not material, we
may address to the issueof delay in lodging of the F.I.R. It is perceptible from theevidence
that the father-in-law of the deceased had goneto the police station and lodged the ezahar

and,thereafter, an FIR was lodged. The learned trial Judge hasanalyzed the said aspect in an
extremely careful andcautious manner and on a closer scrutiny; we find that theanalysis made
by him is impeccable. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we conclude andhold that the appeal
is sans substratum and, accordingly,the same has to pave the path of dismissal which
wedirect.

The Two-Judge bench comprising Lordship K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.& Lordship Dipak
Misra, J.held in court room 10,proceeding commences as follows:

Judgment delivered by Dipak Misra, J in criminal appeal in case of Gopal Singh v.State of
Uttarakhand preferred by Special Leave, the appellant calls into question the legal
substantiality of the judgment of conviction and order of sentences passed by the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital whereby the learned Single Judge has set aside the conviction
under Sections 307 and 380 of IPC the but maintained the conviction and sentence under
Section 324 of theIPC passed by the learned Sessions Judge where punishment of 3 years
rigorous imprisonment is given.
Held: Injuries are not ofsuch nature to convict under Sec- 307 IPC, as stated by a doctor but
has mentionedthat there is no fracture and only a muscle injury. Theweapon used fits into the
description as provided underSection 324 of IPC, parties are neighbors and there isnothing on
record to show that the appellant had anycriminal antecedents. We think it appropriate that
inthe obtaining factual score, the sentence of rigorousimprisonment of one year under Section
324 of IPC wouldbe adequate. That apart, we are inclined to direct that theappellants shall
pay a sum of Rs. 20,000/- towardscompensation as envisaged under Section 357 (3) of
theCode to the victim.

Miscellaneous matters, generally related for directions and office report, adjourned matters
and fresh matters mostly related to delay in filling SLP or Ex-party stay or order or seek
permission to file additional matters. Around 70 matters are listed today, some of them which
are crucial for the understanding of proceeding in Hon‟ble court are as follows:
1. In a matter related to 498-A IPC matter were referred to the Ranchi mediation center
where appellant is praying to seek transfer,
2. In matter connected to quashing of complaint under Sec-482 Cr.p.c. read with Art.32
before Supreme Court and under Art. 226 before High Court where such pray was
dismissed, but here learned counsel raised the issue that wife has file complaint in sec-
346, 323 & 379IPC which was completely malafide, based on false allegations, require
re-examination, as FIR & closure report has already been filed, the Hon‟ble courtallows
the matter.
3. In matter of cheque under NI act an important legal question is raised that whether all the
five ingredients of sec- 138 of NI act, took place at different places will create
independently a cause of action in different places. Ingredients of NI act, 1881 as
follows:

a) Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a
banker
b) For payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account
c) For the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability,
d) Is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing
to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds
the amount arranged to be paid from that account
e) By an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have
committed an offense and shall, If all such activity like contract, transaction, bank
of drawer, bank of receiver, breach of contract, notice, principal place of drawer
etc. is different at places whether to create independently different jurisdiction,
however matter is adjourned.
4. In a matter, regarding reservation benefits to Ad-hoc post, the Hon‟ble court simply
says such principal of reservation can‟t be applied in Ad-Hoc post, matter dismissed.
5. In a matter, raised by the learned counsel, where the attentionof Hon‟ble court is
addressed regarding the constitutionality of definition of juveniles which ultravires the
constitution. Based on fixation of age, gravity of crime, society, what causes the
juvenile to do such offence & whether what are the criteria of creating age for fixation
of crime. However the matter was adjourned for non- miscellaneous day.

Research question:
There is 15-20 year delay in trial, accused is partly responsible for the delay, whether the
accused can come to quash the proceedings of the trial court under Sec- 482 cr.p.c & Art. 226
before High Court & Art. 32 before the Supreme Court raising plea of his violation of
fundamental rights of speedy trial?

Researcher first analyses the concept of speedy trial as used in U.S. courts as well as in India,
and also the nature & ambit of Sec-482 cr.p.c & powers given under Art. 226 to High Court
& under Art. 32 to Supreme court.

Smith v. Hooey, 393 US 374 (1969), Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972)Strunk v.
United States, 412 US 434 (1973)Norman Lorenzo BRADEN v. Walter T. CAPPS,
Warden, and State of Alabama2 where it is held that a defendant in federal prison charged
with a Texas state crime was denied the right to a speedy trialwhen Texas still had not
prosecuted him for the crime after seven years. Held that the case must bethrown out. In
another case it held that violation of the speedy trial clause must be decided on a case-by-case
basis, taking intoaccount four factors:
1) Length of delay
2) Reason for delay;
3)Whether and when the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial;
4) Degree of harm to thedefendant caused by delay.
Held that a defendant in custody on different charges maintains the Sixth Amendment right to
a speedytrial on new charges. The Court threw the case out after a 279 day wait.

2
517 F.2d 221

Misra, J.held in court room 10, proceeding commences as follows:

Judgment delivered by Dipak Misra, J.in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP in case
University of Rajasthan and another v. PremLataAgarwal&Anr
Facts: Where the case is related to confer benefit of pension under the University Pension
Regulations, 1990in matter of Ad-Hoc employees. High court considers them as regular
employees and order the University to pass on the benefits, aggrieved by this order
University preferred the appeal where appeals are allowed.
Held: In as we perceive, the High Court has proceeded on the basis that their services have
to be treated as regular. Once it is not regular service, theinfrastructure collapses as a
consequence of which the superstructure is bound to founder and, hence, the distinction made
by the High Court is flawed the orders passed by the High Court are set aside.

Regular matters are listed, some of them which are crucial tounderstanding the proceeding in
Hon‟ble court are as follows:
1. Offence was established under Sec-143, 323, 342 IPC. Should the benefit of offender act
be given to him? If yes then why?
2. A matter related to the Work of defense act, 1903 in which appellant party claiming that
their area is not located inside the restricted zone where the army depot was established,
while govt. stand is that by the issue of circular they come under the restricted zone,
actually this case fall due to the suo-moto action taken by the Punjab Haryana High court
based on marriage hall had been established near the border near Army depot which
might affect the security of the nation. The Hon‟ble court came to conclusion that it is
necessary to understand what is “crest” & “outer parapet” as denoted in the Sec-7 of the
aforesaid act.A number of issues raised about the procedural requirement that authorities
had to performed failing which whether said notification lapsed is also under scrutiny?
Whether it is a pick &choose policy? As in this matter compensation is not an issue.

Yesterday the work given the Hon‟ble Lordship is to understand the scope & application of
Sec-482 Cr.p.c under Art. 226,227 in HC and under Sec-32 in Supreme Court where delay is
caused in trial and to quash the proceedings of the trial court, while examining in the lieu that
accused was partly involved in causing the delay.
The report is submitted by the researcher.

Misra, J.held in court room 10, regular matters are listed, proceeding commences as follows:
Judgment delivered by K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP in case
State of Kerala and others v. President, Parent Teacher Assn. SNVUP and others.
Facts:Whetherthe High Court was justified in directing the Secretary, GeneralEducation
Department of the State of Kerala to get theverification of the actual students‟ strength in all
the aided schools in the State with the assistance of the police and to takeappropriate action
regardingschool authorities who had made bogus admissions andmade wrong recording of

attendance which led to the irregularand illegal fixation of staff strength of the school& the
State exchequer incurs heavy financial burden by way of pay and allowances.

Held:We are, however, of the view that theinvestigation by the police with regard to the
verification of theschool admission, register etc., particularly with regard to theadmissions of
the students in the aided schools will give a wrongsignal even to the students studying in the
school and thepresence of the police itself is not conducive to the academicatmosphere of the
schools. In such circumstances, we areinclined to set aside the directions given by the Two-
Judge bench forpolice intervention for verification of the students‟ strength in allthe aided
schools.

Regular matters are listed, some of them which are crucial to understanding the proceeding in
1. In a criminal matter offence in Sec- 489(b) & 489(c) related to counterfeit currency,
charged had not been framed in trial court & accused were facing jail time for long 3
years, in an appeal before High court under Sec-482 cr.p.c. The high court did not quash
the proceedings in case of delay as it caused prejudice to the rights of the accused,
however Hon‟ble court hereby direct to hear the matter expeditiously as possible.
2. In “work of defense act” case, the matter again listed for hearing, learned counsel raised
several issues like regarding the statutory lapse by concerned authorities and raise a
contention due to such lapse such restrictions cannot permissible. In which scope and
application of Sec-3, 7 & 9 of aforesaid act was contented by learned counsel.Again the
matter is revolving around the word “crest” & “outer parapet”. However the matter
adjourned.

Research Question:
To understand the scope & application of the word “crest” and “outer parapet” in the sense in
Works of Defense act, 1903 were under section-7 under the heading “Restriction” of said act,
the phrase used is “crest of the outer parapet of the work”?
Researcher undergone through various journals, books and dictionary like “The 1911 Classic
Encyclopedia”, “Merriam Webster Dictionary”, “Glossaryof Terms3for Interpreting
Tennessee‟s Civil War Era Military Sites”, “U.S. Military4 History , L series, No.13, May
15, 1943”, under which the terms were explained.Based on which report is submitted by
the researcher.


Judgment delivered by K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.in Criminal Appeal arising out of
judgment of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in caseGurvail Singh @ Gala & Another v.
The state of Punjab where HC dismissed the appeal matter connected with Sec-302, 34 IPC
where death sentence was confirmed.

3
www.artcirclelibrary.info/Reference/civilwar/Glossary.pdf
4
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/wwIIspec/number13.pdf

Facts: Accused caused death of four persons and nature of injuries they have inflicted, in
front of PW1, whose son, daughter-in-law and two grandchildren were murdered related to a
property dispute.
Held:In this case, the Hon‟ble courtconsiders various aspects of “rarest of rare principles” in
light of judicial precedents in awarding death sentence. Wherein court held considering the
totality of the facts and circumstances of this case we hold that imposition of the death
sentence on the appellants was not warranted but while awarding life imprisonment to the
appellants, we hold that they must serve a minimum of thirty years in jail without remission.
The sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by theHigh Court is modified as
above. Appeal partly allowed.

1. In the matter, the person was issued caste certificate in the undivided State of Bihar, after
the division of the State of Bihar into State of Jharkhand, the person comes in the new
area, the issue is whether creation of new statecreates or extinguish the rights of people
in that state? As in this matter, candidate pastes certain state exam where he/she was
called to producea caste certificate issued by new state(Jharkhand), whether such
creation of new state affects its special right granted by statute, like reservation. As the
caste certificate issued by authority from Bihar is not accepted by authorities in
Jaharkhand, whether such activities arepermitted in the eye of law? The question asked
by the Hon‟ble court whether appellant ever approached to the concerned authorities in
the state of Jharkhand. Another is whether is it the duty of the state to tell public by way
of notification or clarification to show that certain persons may lose their reserved status?
Whether bifurcation of the statecreates or extinguish vested rights of the people?
However the matter is postponed.
2. In the matter, under Sec-498A, cruelty whether a continuing offence? If not? Which
court has the jurisdiction to try the case? As matter alleged by learned counsel is that
cruelty occur over the phone so cause of action arose to the one who actually heard at the
end place. However the case is transferred to mediation center.
3. It is the famous case, a pandal fire case that occurred in 2006, question at issue is
whether the state or the contractor or the concerned officers who are liable for such
incident, whom to fasten with how much monetary liability to pay the total amount to the
victims and the family members of deceased. As in this case a trial is pending for last 6
years, that is the action against concerned officers. A number of issues raised by the
state, that the Hon‟ble Court has to consider the Uphar Cinema case, give their judgment
or order in the light of aforesaid followed the decision, whereby deciding to fix upto 25%
liability on the state to pay to the concerned victims while contractor who are without
necessary approval, faulty construction of fixation(tent or pandal)& wrong practice liable
for such heinous burning resulting in death of around 65 persons.


The Two-Judge bench comprising Lordship G.S. Singhvi, J.& Lordship Dipak Misra,
J.held in court room 6, proceeding commences as follows:

1. A transfer petition is filed to transfer the case from Delhi to Greater Noida, however
Hon‟ble court simply asked what is the exact distance between Delhi &Greater Noida,
which is just 65km, court hereby concluded to decline to interfere and dismiss the
petition.
2. Mostly around30-40 matters related to transfer petition & to condone the delay are
dismissed.
3. Court come to the knowledge that false affidavit was filed by the police, as the concerned
person was already available before police but police did not examine such person, as per
the story by police that the concerned person is absconding from investigation, court took
the cognizance and asked the state that false affidavit by a police inspector, why
shouldn‟t the court take action under Sec- 197 IPC?
4. In a criminal matter, which is a large scale riot, where 88 accused were alleged to
perform or involve in such riot, 60 accused were absconding, participation is not of a
specific nature, no clear allegation with respect to anybody, hence the Hon‟ble court
direct the petitioners to be released on bail.

Research Question:
To understand the scope of “per incuriam” doctrine and how it has been utilized by common
law courts in England and U.S. and how it has been enunciated by Supreme court of India by
understanding the application of “per incuriam” doctrine?

Researcher today anaylzed the doctrine as per the concept applied by courts in India in cases
like Philip Jeyasingh v. The Joint Registrar5,RashmiRekhaThatoi&Anrv.s State of
Orissa &Ors, SibnathKoley And Ors. v. State Of West Bengal And Ors, Official
Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others6where it is concluded that the decisions of the Court of
Appeal upon questions of law must be followed by Divisional Courts and Courts of first
instance, and as a general rule, are binding on the Court of Appeal until a contrary
determination has been arrived at by the House of Lords.

Continue to do research on the topic “per incuriam”. Since the doctrine emerged from the
English law, the researcher feel to continue it research on the relevant topic to understand its
scope and applicability of English law. The relevant doctrine is fundamentally similarly
applied in India as in the courts by England. But for the consideration the following landmark
decision in cases like In London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council7,

5
(1992) 2 MLJ 309
6
(2008) 10 SCC 1
7
(1898) AC 375

Young v Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited8,Morelle Ltd v Wakeling9 Duke v
Reliance Systems Ltd10,Cassell& Co Ltd v Broome11.The Court of Appeal is bound to
follow its own decisions and those of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and the "full" court is
in the same position in this respect as a division of the court consisting of three members.
The only exceptions to this rule are: -
(1.) The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it
will follow;
(2.) The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not expressly
overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand by a decision of the House of Lords;
(3.) The court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision
was given „per incuriam‟ , e.g., where a statute or a rule having statutory effect which would
have affected the decision was not brought to the attention of the earlier court.
Submitted the research report on topic “per incuriam”.

Today the Hon‟ble court sit to hear the miscellaneous matters, generally related for directions
and office report, adjourned matters and fresh matters mostly related to delay in filling SLP
or Ex-party stay or order or seek permission to file additional matters. Around 70 matters are
listed today, some of them which are crucial for the understanding of proceeding in Hon‟ble
court are as follows:
1. Petitioner alleges in a criminal matter that his request to investigate the matter by CBCID
or CBI was rejected by High Court as in this matter the accused is connected in some
way to Comissioner due to which it is impossible to have the police impartial who
working under him, however such requested is rejected by the Supreme Court, saying
that it is not a ground to transfer such cases to CBI.
2. In a matter, learned counsel allege that the accused has already undergone his main
imprisonment & also the imprisonment for which he had not paid the fine, already gone
more than 2 years to be released from jail, the court directed the standing counsel to
release that person from jail.
3. In a civil matter, suit for possession of land, petitioner is not made parties to the suit, the
court order that his rights are reserved even if the decree is granted.
4. In a matter, Sec-420 IPC ,learned counsel contended that it is not a matter of fraud and
made an argument that here agreement was made to run a business, which was failed, to
re-continue he needed money, that is not a case of fraud or cheating , although
chargesheet has been filed. Court order not to interfere here, asked the party to face the
trail.
5. In a case, where fraud by educational institution to get an approval from AICTE, incident
took place about 12 years ago, learned counsel from educational institution alleges that it
is a misconception and they are not govern by new said notification, however court ask
to clarify what action who had taken against your concerned officer who allege to
involve in corrupt practices, AICTE counsel contended that chargesheet has been filed
against some corrupt officers & asked to take action & to reject the petition. However the
matter is adjourned.The court asked to file counter affidavit by AICTE.

8
[1944] 1 KB 718
9
[1955] 1 All ER 708, [1955] 2 QB 379
10
[1987] 2 WLR 1225
11
(No 1)[1972] UKHL 3 (23 February 1972)


Research question:
Whether if the punishment or penalty is altered by law through amendment & maximum
punishment or penalty is unaltered, is it an ex post facto, a law which is violative of art.20(1)?

In doing the research, the researcher come to three case laws, two from U.S. court and
another one is from Indian Courts, which laid down the principles & its application involved
in ex-post facto law, one is Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 380 which laid down four principles
regarding ex-post facto law as said “I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws,
within the words and the intent of the prohibition”:
1. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3. Every law that changes the punishment, andinflicts a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony,
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the
offender.
and the other is Dobert v. Florida (1977) 432 U.S. 282 which says that even if the punishment
or penalty is modified where its maximum limits is unaltered, then it is just a procedural
change and it does not affect the vested rights of accused and it is not violative of Art. 20(1)
of the Indian Constitution.Similarly in SatwantSingh v.The state of Punjab (1960) 2 SCR 89
&Union Of India And Others vs Super Processors (1993) IILLJ 203 Bom HCthat maximum
penalty remains unaltered as this is prescribed by Section 14-B which remains the same.
Therefore, when the exercise of discretion is governed by more rational and generally better
guidelines, such guidelines must be applied from the date when they come into existence.


Judgment delivered by K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.in Civil Appeal against the order of Two-
Judge bench High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench.
Facts:Whether two constables & ASI who have been found guilty can also claim equality of
treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them
are involved in the same incident where ASI was demoted to constable rank while two
constable were suspended in case alleging bribery.
Held:Punishment should not bedisproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-
delinquentswho are parties to the same transaction or incident.The Disciplinary Authority
cannot impose punishment which isdisproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious
offencesand stringent punishment for lesser offences. Consequently, we are inclined to allow
the appeal by setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the appellant
and orders that he be reinstated in service forthwith.

1. Here listed the famous pandal case again, as already discussed, now from state side
learned counsel argued that the organizer plan was defective, they did not take the
mandatory precautionary measures, they even violative the statutory approval necessary
in Electricity act, they even are charged for electricity theft. Now from contractor side,
learned counsel ShriShanti Bhushan, argued that there is no iota of doubt regarding the
said incident, and about the liability of the state, contractor and concerned officers. He
then argued that under Art. 32 the victims are claiming damages, (a) if we are talking of
financial burden, then it is case of tort of negligence causing death and injury where
questions arise is how to fasten the burden on what principal and like how much? He
argued by saying that (i) fire on the account of somebody's negligence (ii) mandatory
duty of not stopping the fire (iii) mandatory duty of not helping the people to escape
from pandal. (b) Another important question was raised by learned counsel is whether
any financial burden can be imposed on the findings of the committee (c) another
question was raised by him that the judicial inquiry report should be set aside as his
clients were not given equal chance to represent themselves before inquiry & hence it
should be set aside.
2. In this matter, Bajaj is an employer, the case filed bylabour alleging unfair labour
practices doing rotational employment policies ofBajajcompany. While the learned
counsel contended that the employee/worker were employed on the basis of project
based, which according to him if the project is complete they were removed from job
until new job arises.The question arises is that (a)whether periodical employment or
rotational employment concerned to be regular employment, (b)whether such
employment create or passes any benefits to workers, (c) whether such practices can be
considered as unfair labour practices. (d) Whether the principle of res judicata applies
here (e) whether the joint memorandum filed in labour court, if yes then what were its
effects?

ResearchWork:
What are“unfair labour practices”under “Industrial Dispute Act, 1947”and to see how
different courts have applied “The Maharashtra Recognition of trade unions & prevention of
UnfairLabour Practices act, 1971”?
Researcher on the basis of available acts& books draft a report on “Concept of Fairness”,
“Background of Unfair Trade Practices”, “Comparison between The Maharashtra
Recognitionof Trade Unions And Prevention Of UnfairLabour Practices Act, 1971 &
Unfair Labour Practices act, 1971” submitted a report which conclude in brief here include
certain para which are crucial for understanding. Report as hereby follows:
„Fairness‟ can be used as a synonym for equitable, reasonable, impartial, just, honest,
balanced, according to the rules, right12. All these synonyms contain a high degree of ethical
and moral notions and consequently so do the notion of fairness.13 As such the notion of

12
See Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practices (1985) 42,and SADWV v Master Diamond
Cutters Association of SA 1982 ILJ 87 (IC)
13
In The Press Corporation 1992 ILJ 391 (A) at 400 C Grosskopf JA in referring to the determination
of unfair labour practices stated: ‘In my view a decision of the court pursuant to these provisions is not
a decision on a question of law in the strict sense of the term. It is the passing of a moral judgment on
a combination offindings of fact and opinions

fairness is not only difficult to define but is also flexible.14 As Baxter points out, fairness is a
concept that is ambiguous and difficult to ascertain.
Authorities cited as follows:H.D. Singh vs Reserve Bank Of India &Ors15, Haryana State
Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mamni16, Union of India and Ors. v.
Ramchander and Anr. (2005) 9 SCC 365which says there in the action on the part of the
employer to terminate the services of an employee on a regular basis and reappoint after a
gap of one or two days was found to be infringing the provisions of Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act. This Court held: In this case the services of the respondent had been
terminated on a regular basis and she had been reappointed after a gap of one or two days.
Such a course of action was adopted by the Appellant with a view to defeat the object of the
Act.


Judgment delivered by Dipak Misra, J.in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP in
caseSurenderKaushik and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. against the order dated
12.10.2012 passed by theTwo-Judge bench of the High Court of Judicature atAllahabad in
Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.15077 of 2012 wherein the High Court has
declinedto quash the FIR No. 442 of 2012 registered at P.S.Civil Lines, Meerut, that has
given rise to Crime No.491 of 2012 for offences punishable under Sections406, 420, 467,
468, 471, 504 and 506 of the IndianPenal Code (for short “the IPC”).
Facts:Whether two FIR can be lodged in the same incident alleging different facts, filed at
different time, or can a counter FIR can be lodged& whether appellants had invoked the
jurisdiction under Article226 of the Constitution for quashment of the FIR ontwo
counts.Whetherthe law prohibit the filing of second FIR?The principle is that person should
not be vexed twice for the same incident.
Held:Court applied the principle that any further complaint by the same complainant or
others against the same accused, subsequent to theregistration of a case, is prohibited under
the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further
complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement onthe facts mentioned in
the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code. This
prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the
accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said
incident.But to say that it is a second FIR relatingto the same cause of action and the same
incidentand there is sameness of occurrence and an attempthas been made to improvise the
case is not correct.Hence, we conclude and hold that the submissionthat the FIR lodged by
the fourth respondent is asecond FIR and is, therefore, liable to be quashed,does not merit
acceptance. Appeal dismissed.

1. In a matter, the question arose is what is the effect of 99 year lease? As the lease expired
on 7/1/1984, the tenant is operating a weaving mill, and by the enforcement of Sick

14
See Cameron, Cheadle and Thompson The New Labour Relations Act (1989) at 139
15
1986 AIR SC 132, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 842
16
MANU/SC/8137/2006 : (2006)IILLJ744SC

Industrial Undertaking act 1985, all the rights, title etc vested in state government as
possessed by the owner. Another question is according to the aforesaid act who is owner,
whether landowner or tenant? As a tenant who is operating a said mill, get the
compensation as decided by authority so question raise by learned council what will
landowner would get, as he has dispossessed from the land, he did not get the
compensation & he is not getting even the rent, in any circumstances he is the actual title
holder of the land. In effect of 99 year lease, what is perpetual lease in the eye of law &
whether it is permanent lease? However the matter is adjourned.
2. In a matter of Aligarh Muslim University, where question in title was in dispute, another
is whether Section 163 of the U.P. Tenancy Act is applicable as stated by Aligarh
Muslim University for recovery of certain land revenue and for ejectment of defendants
on the ground that the plaintiff is Zamindar of the land in dispute and defendants are
occupancy tenants/Hereditary Tenants?The respondent learned counsel further averred in
the objection that the land in dispute Zamindari was abolished on 1.7.1952. Thereafter,
the land in dispute came within the municipal limits of Nagar MahaPalika in 1959.
Defendants acquired Bhumidhar rights of the land in dispute. Application under Section
163 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was not maintainable. Where the Aligarh Muslim
University, specifically pleaded that the Aligarh Muslim University is an Institute of
public utility and was established for public purposes. However the matter is adjourned.

1. In a case related to maintenance, women remarried, husband approach under Art.136
to set aside the maintenance, the court directed the petitioner that to approach a proper
forum, when statutory remedy is provided petitioner should avail the same, as
Sec127(3) Cr.p.c provided the statutory remedy in case the women re-married to
modify or set aside the maintenance, the husband should approach the magistrate
holding the jurisdiction and not by the way of SLP.
2. In a case of cheating, fraud embezzlement, where crores and crores of rupees are
alleged, investigation is not over, bail cannot be granted. Bail denied.
3. Most of the matter is related to transfer, condonation of delay or stay of application or
whether issue notice was received or not?
4. In a case, related to bail, first bail was granted on medical grounds as accused
undergone angioplasty, then another bail is granted during recovery period, then he
surrendered himself, and collector granted parole, again petitioner/accused come
before the Hon‟ble court on medical grounds, here court declined to interfere and
order him to surrender before police and go to jail custody, if in case he need any
medical facilities such can be provided in jail.


Case Study :M/s. Gian Chand & Brothers and Another v. Rattan Lal @ Rattan Singh

Facts: Civil action for recovery of a total sum of Rs 10,45,620/-along with pendentelite and
future interest at @18% per annum. Plaintiff No. 1 is a registered partnership firm carrying
the business of commission agent for sale and purchase of food grains which advances money
to the agriculturists and charge commission on the sale price of the agricultural produce sold
as determined by the market committee. The respondent-defendant(hereinafter referred to as
“the defendant”) had been maintaining regular and long standing current account with the
plaintiffs. A sum of Rs.5,80,000/- stood in the name of the defendant towards outstanding
balance and he had acknowledged the same under his signature in thecorresponding account
entry in the account books of the plaintiffs.
Fact in Issue:
(i) Whether asuit for recovery could be decreed when thepleadings and evidence led by the
plaintiffs were atsubstantial variance;
(ii) Whether the plaintiffs couldbe said to have established its case, particularlywhen the
defendant had denied the factum ofborrowing any sum and the signatures on the
cashbook and no evidence including document/fingerprint expert was led by the
plaintiffs to establish thesignatures of the defendant in the account books;
(iii) Whether it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiffto prove the alleged signatures of the
defendant inthe cash book when they had been disputed; and
(iv) Whether the admission of the defendant could beassumed in the absence of clear and
unambiguousadmission of the party to the litigation.

Held:It is manifest that the signatures are proven by the witnesses and they have been
marked as exhibits without any objection. Thus, there was no plea whatsoever as regards the
denial of signature or anykind of forgery or fraud. The present case is not one such case
where the plaintiffs have chosen not to adduce any evidence. They have examined witnesses,
proven entries in the books of accounts and also proven the acknowledgements duly signed
by the defendant.The defendant, on the contrary, except making abald denial of the
averments, had not statedanything else. That apart, nothing was put to thewitnesses in the
cross-examination when thedocuments were exhibited. He only came with aspacious plea in
his evidence which was not pleaded.Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the
HighCourt has fallen into error in holding that it wasobligatory on the part of the plaintiffs to
examine thehandwriting expert to prove the signatures. Thefinding that the plaintiffs had
failed to discharge theburden is absolutely misconceived in the facts of thecase.


Case Study :Municipal Corporation Rajasthan v. SanjeevSachdeva and others

Fact in Issue:Cases concerned with the interpretation of Section 173-A of the Rajasthan
Municipalities Act 1959, as amended by the Rajasthan Municipalities Amendment Act 1999
(Act No.19 of 1999), which deals with the power of the State Government to allow change in
use of land on payment of conversion charges.
Division bench order: Municipal Corporation is not empowered todemand any amount for
change of use of the land

Held:Amended Section 173-A not only restricts the change of useof land, as the same has
been allotted by the municipality or theState Government, but also put restrictions if the land
has beenallotted by any other local authority. Section 173-A(2) covers thecases which are not
even covered by Section 173-A(1) and bringsin its fold even the change of use of land which
is not inconsonance with the Master Plan. Further Section 173-A(1) (2)and (3) also
contemplates a situation wherein the StateGovernment is entitled to levy conversion charges
if the change in use from one purpose to other purpose. We may, in this respect, also indicate
that, in exercise ofpowers conferred under Section 297 read with Section 173-A ofthe 1959
Act, 2000 Rules were promulgated. Weare of the view that the demand is legal and valid and
inaccordance with the provisions of Section 173-A, as inserted byAmendment Act 19 of 1999
read with 2000 Rules. We are also ofthe view that the Rajasthan High Court has committed
an error inapplying the Judgment of this Court in ParesharSoni’scase(supra) which was
dealing with the un-amended provision ofSection 173-A.

1. In a Bail petition, the reason given is hypertension, the court rejected the argument
contended the learned counsel, not a ground to give bail.
2. Question arose is whether another FIR can be filed for the similar event? Whether it is
mandatory for police to file FIR? In this case, first FIR filed, preliminary investigation
took place, no cognizable offence found out, henceplice file closure report. After 6
month another FIR was filed with identical allegation. Matter adjourned to hear state
response.

The Two-Judge bench comprising Lordship Dattu, J.& Lordship Dipak Misra, J.held in
court room 6, proceeding commences as follows:

Judgment delivered by Dipak Misra, J.The Government of Andhra Pradeshand Others v.
Ch. Gandhi in a civil appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad on theground that the disciplinary authority had imposedtwo major
penalties.
Facts:That disciplinary proceeding under Rule 5 of theRules was initiated against the
respondent, a SeniorAccountant in the Office of the Sub Treasury,Nakrekal, on the charges
that while functioning asthe senior most Accountant in the said office and inchargeof the
strong room keys, he was absent and had notsigned the attendance register in token of his
havingattended the office and also not maintained themovement register as required under the
Rules; thathe had failed to keep the currency chest book in thecurrency chest and not
endorsed every transaction& various other gross irregularities which after enquiry by an
officer i.e. after following the requisite procedure, imposed the penalty of reversion to the
post of Junior Accountant for two years with the stipulation that there would be
postponement of future increments.
Facts in Issue:

1. High Court held that imposition of two penalties and, accordingly, set aside the
punishment which had been concurred with by the tribunal.
2. And another thing in effect found that rule has been amended retrospectively would it
prejudice the accused which permit such punishment where disciplinary proceedings
were started before the amendment?
3. Whether date of the decision is the relevant date to attract the applicability of the rule
amended after the commission of an act?
Held:It would be difficult to say that the employee had the vested right to beimposed a
particular punishment as envisaged under the unamended rules. Once the charges have been
proven, he could have been imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement or removal
from service or dismissal from service. The same being a lesser punishment than the
maximum, in our considered opinion, is imposable and the disciplinary authority has not
committed any error by imposing the said punishment, regard being had to the nature of the
charges. The orders passed by the High Court are set aside and the orderof punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority is restored.

Judgment delivered by Dipak Misra, J.in a matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v.
GirirajDubey in criminal appeal
Fact in issue: High Court impugned order does not remotely reflect any reason, for the High
Court has only stated that the prosecution hasfailed to establish the offence against the
respondent by adducing adequate evidence. It is urged by him that it is obligatory on the part
of the High Court to give reasons while dismissing the application for leave.
Held:The order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter isremitted to the High
Court to pass a cogent and reasoned order relating to grant or refusal of leave.
1. In a matter, land acquisition & compensation. Main issue is whether the landowners are
liable to pay development cost when their land is acquired by government, question of
rate of compensation was decided by collector, then the aggrevied party challenges it to
the High court, High court order the collector to decide it as the market rate is prevailing,
then again aggrevied party reach the Two-Judge bench challenge the order of collector
that rate should be modified from the date of acquisition, but here High court modified
the order but reduce the amount of compensation saying that development cost has to be
bear by landless, as entire area is urbanized, area now cease to become agriculture land
and second point is the interest to be paid from the date of acquisition. Matter as heard by
Hon‟ble court order that land losers are not liable to development cost.
2. Question arose is whether pension can be subject to micro-classification? In this case,
petitioner federation of pensioners association while P2-P23 are pensioners, here SBI
make a request to reconsider the pension scheme to central government which was
denied, however on repeated request by pensioners before govt. , they did not responded.
Here the classification is based on date of retirement. Matter is adjourned for further
hearing.

Research Question:
To analyze and understand the scope and ambit of Sec-50 NDPS Act, 1985 particularlyin
regard to the admissibility of the evidence collected by an investigating officer during a
search and seizure conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act?

Researchercomes across decisions like VijaysinhChandubhaJadejavs State Of Gujarat17 ,
The State Of Punjab vsBaldev Singh), MadanLal And Anr. vs State Of Himachal
Pradesh18, Joseph Fernandez v. State of Goa19, , T.T. Haneefavs State Of Kerala20, State
of Punjab v. Balbir Singh21where divergent opinion were shown by supreme courts as the
punishment under NDPS act is quite high and of serious nature, require relevant
consideration whether sec-50 casts a duty on the empowered officer to `inform' the suspect of
his right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if he so desires
or whether a mere enquiry by the said officer as to whether the suspect would like to be
searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer can be said to be due
compliance with the mandate of the said Section? And whether sec-50 is applicable for the
search of bag,vehicle& premises etc also?
As per concluded by courts from time to time even after amendment under sec-50 that right
under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, by way of a safeguard, has been conferred on the
suspect, viz.to check the misuse of power, to avoid harm to innocent persons and to minimise
the allegations of planting or foisting of false cases by the law enforcement agencies, it would
be imperative on the part of the empowered officer to apprise the person intended to be
searched of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate.
“We have no hesitation in holding that in so far as the obligation of the authorized officer
under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, it is mandatory and
requires a strict compliance. Failure to comply with the provision would render the recovery
of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction if the same is recorded only on the basis
of the recovery of the illicit article from the person of the accused during such search.A bare
reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of personal search of a person. It does
not extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag, or premises. (See Kalama Tumba v.
State of Maharashtra and Anr. , The State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (JT 1999 (4) SC
595), Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana (2001 (3) SCC 28). The language of Section 50 is
implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to search of
premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution
Bench in Baldev Singh's case (supra).

th
» Day 20: Date: 20 Feb 2013

Research Question:
To analyze and understand the scope and requirement of ingredients that should be provento
bring record under conviction under Sec-7 & Sec- 13(1)(d) read with Sec-13(2) under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?

The researcher examined the decisions of various Hon‟ble courts where aforementioned
sections were under scrutiny. In short certain decision which are felt relevant under
consideration are DR.Anup KumarSrivsatava&Anr v. CBI22, C.K. JafferSharief Vs.
State (Through CBI)23, Soma Chakravarthy v State24, TarlochanDev Sharma v. State of
17
[(2011) 1 SCC 609]
18 18
Equivalent citations: AIR 2003 SC 3642, 2003 (2) A 1999( 3 LD Cri 688, 2003 CriLJ 3868
19
2001 (1) SCC p.707
20
Equivalent citations: 2004 CriLJ 2853, 2004 (94) ECC 199, AIR 2004 SC 3316
21
(1994 (3) SCC 299)
22
2012 (11) TMI 953 (DELHI HIGH COURT)
23
(2012) 39 SCD 721
24
2007 (5) SCC 403.

Punjab, 25Kanwarjit Singh Kakkar v. State of Punjab And Anr26, State of Maharashtra
v. DnyaneshwarLaxamanRaoWankhede27, (C.M. GirishBabuvs CBI, Cochin, High
Court of Kerala)28,MadhukarBhaskarrao Joshi vs State Of Maharashtra29, Suraj Mal
Vs. State (Delhi Admn.)30, Trilok Chand Jain vs State Of Delhi31where it is concluded
that
The essential ingredients of Section 7 are that
(i) the person who accepts gratification should be a public servant,
(ii)he should have accepted the gratification for himself and the gratification should be as a
motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to
show, in the exercise of his official function, favour or disfavour to any person or for
rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person.
Insofar as Section13 (1) (d) of the Act is concerned, the essential ingredients are
(i) He should be a public servant
(ii) He should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such
public servant and
(iii) He should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for
any other person. Without any public interest
a) In Section 13(1) (d), the word used is „obtained‟. The Apex Court in the case of C.K.
Damodaran Nair v Govt. of India [(1997) 9 SCC 477] had the occasion to consider the
word „obtained‟ used in Section 5 of PC Act, 1947, which is now Section 13(1)(d) of the
Act of 1988. It was held in para 12 thus: “The position will, however, be different so far
as an offence under Section 5 (1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act is concerned. For
such an offence prosecution has to prove that the accused obtained' the valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise.”
b) That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence u/s. 13(1)(d) is implicit in the words
used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant.That's an
honest though erroneous exercise of power or indecision is not an abuse of power. A
decision, action or instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to the person affected
but it would not be an abuse of power. It must be such an abuse of power which would
render a Councilor unworthy of holding the office of President.
c) The demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for the constitution of an offence
under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In arriving at the
conclusion as to whether all the ingredients of an offence - demand, acceptance and
recovery of the amount of illegal gratification have been satisfied or not.
d) The court took the view that mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the
circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the
substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove
the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to
prove payment of bribes or to show the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing
it to be bribe.

25
(2001) 6 SCC 260:
26
[2011] 6 S.C.R. 895
27
(2010) 2 SCC (Cri.) 385
28
(2009) 3 SCC 779
29
[2000 (8) SCC 571]).
30
[(1979) 4 SCC 725],
31
1977 AIR 666, 1976 SCR (1) 348

The Two-Judge bench comprising Lordship H.L. Dattu, J.& Lordship Dipak Misra, J.held
in court room 6, proceeding commences as follows:

1. In a criminal matter, where offence under Sec-302, read with Sec-148, 149IPC were
found and session court convicted 11 accused while the high court convict 6 accused
while acquit others. The petitioner's main contention was that his injuries were
unexplained by the prosecution, that the main accused and the driver who were driving
the tractors were acquitted, that there is not personal amity between accused and the
deceased, in this incident one person died and two were seriously injured, total 11
accused on a tractor trespass the land cultivating by the victims and the deceased and
carrying lethal weapons hits so hard that one person died on the spot. The statealleges
that although 5 were acquitted because of their actual participation in the incident was
unexplained by the prosecution but their presence was proved. The Hon‟ble court after
hearing rejected the contention alleged by the appellant and found guilty under Sec-302
reads with Sec-149 IPC and rejected the contention to convert the punishment to Sec-
304(II) IPC.
2. In a criminal matter, 10 accused convicted under Sec-302 IPC so they come in appeal,
were both session court a high court punished them under Sec-302 IPC, hear challenges
to convert 302 to 304(II)IPC, alleging the there is a delay in filing FIR, that the incident
took place in dark morning it is difficult to identify the persons. Other than that so many
grounds were raised by the learned counsel but court reject the plea and found all the
accused guilty under Sec-302IPC.
3. In a matter, abetment of suicide case, state allege story is that boy come to girl house and
the threat or intimidated the girl‟s father that he will come by the evening, make ready
your answer when you are about to marry her daughter with him, the question arose
simply whether such threat comes under abetment to suicide? The Hon‟ble courtgives its
answer in negative, that is not a case of abetment in any sense and dismiss the appeal.

» Day 22: Date: 22nd Feb 2013

Judgment delivered by K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.in Civil Appeal in case State of Kerala
and Others v. Kandath Distilleries
Facts in Issue: (1)Whetherthe High Court can issue a Writ of Mandamus under Article 226
ofthe Constitution of India, directing the State to part with its exclusive privilege, in the
matter of granting licence forestablishing distilleries under the Foreign Liquor
(Compounding,Blending and Bottling) Rules, 1975 (for short “1975 Rules”) readwith Section
14 of the Abkari Act (for short “the Act”).(2)Whether exercise of statutory discretion must
bebased on reasonable grounds and cannot lapse into thearbitrariness or caprice anathema to
the rule of law envisaged inArticle 14 of the Constitution
Held: AWrit of Mandamus can be issued in favour of an applicant whoestablishes a legal
right in himself and is issued against anauthority which has a legal duty to perform, but has

failed and/or neglected to do so, but such a legal duty should emanate either inthe discharge
of the public duty or operation of law.

1. In a transfer petition from U.P. to Delhi, contending that there is a threat of life, matter
connected to Sec.138 N.I. Act, 1881 but petitioner contended that there is a gang
involved, extortion can take place, Hon‟ble court rejects the application that it is not a
ground to transfer the case from U.P. to Delhi instead court can grant protection and
order the S.P. of that area to provide necessary protection.
2. In a matter, offence related to Sec-304(II) IPC, the issue is related to bail, trial is going
on, the court denied the bail application, as charges are serious.
3. In a matter, civil matter, the lease is void but the question arose is whether any benefit
should be passed to landless who are cultivating the land, in lower court three suits were
filed, one suit by landless for injunction & possession, one suit by owner for possession,
one suit by a new owner who purchase the land for a possession. However the matter is
adjourned.
4. In a case, the question arose is whether highlighting the answer sheet is ground for
rejection and whether it reveals the identity of the candidate, whether it shows a malafide
intention? As the matter was filed too late, another candidate was already posted in the
advertise post, no vacant seat, even the lower court find discrepancies in the copy, matter
dismissed.
5. In a service matter, the question arose about the right of the ad - hoc employee, in
regularization. Whether a diploma holder who in the tenure of service, if he gain an
additional qualification, or developed any skill can render additional benefits and can be
ground which to be accepted in a new post for the same service. What is regular &
temporary service? However the matter adjourned.
6. In a NDPS matter, petitioner undergoing 5 years RI, in an appeal he allege that he was
falsely implicated in the charges as he was running a dhabha and police in the non
payment of the money alleged by police roped him in such offence, another contention
was that IO was not examined, and he was not holding any bag which alleged to have
him even there is the violation of sec-50 of NDPS act, while state contended that it was a
chance revocery, where patrol police while patrolling found him suspicious and on
checking the bag he holding found 5kg of drugs(herione) another gound that allege by
petitioner is that there is no independent witness. Matter heard by the Hon‟ble court
found that there is the concurrent finding of two courts in the question of law as well as
facts, no need to intervene, matter dismisses.

» Day 23: Date: 23rd Feb 2013

Case Study :ArunBhandariv.State of U.P. and others

Facts:Appellant is an NRI living in Germany while looking for property, came in contact of
respondent no.2 and her husband, who claim to be the owner of the property, agreement was
executed, husband and wife jointly received a sum ofRs.1,05,00,000/- from the appellant
towards partpayment of the sale consideration, on inquiry appellant came to know that the
original allottee has executed a POA in the favour of respondent no 3. On instituting FIR, IO
submits a closure report saying that it is a civil case & no criminal offence has been made
out. Appellant has then fileda protest petition before a Magistrate, which took cognizance of
case, however on representation before S.P. of that area, which transferred the case to another
S.I., it came to know that both the S.I. has colluded and file a closure report, but after seeing
the case diary it seems that offence has been made out. he made an entry to file the charge-
sheetagainst the respondents under Sections 420, 406,567, 468 and 479 of the IPC. At this
stage, theaccused persons again colluded with the previousInvestigating Officer and the
Station House Officerand got the investigation transferred to the previousInvestigating
Officer. However Magistrate took the cognizance of case after filing the protest petition, case
diary & other documents, under Sec 406, 420 IPC.
Session judge: Respondent alleges that it is a matter of breach of contract & not a case of
fraud or cheating, however session judge found that allegations prima facie constituted a
criminal offenceand it could not be said that it was a pure & simpledispute of a civil nature.
High Court:High Court under exercising the jurisdiction under Art. 226/227 quashed the
order passed by the learned CJM taking cognizance of offence under sec-406,420 IPC against
respondent in the exercise of power under sec-190(1)(b) of cr.p.c, saying that there is no
privity of contract between the appellant and respondent no.3 hence offence not made out
against the said respondent.
Held:The entireconduct of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 would showthat a prima facie case is
made out and allegations arethere on record in this regard that they had theintention to cheat
from the stage of negotiation. In view of our aforesaid analysis we allow the appeal,set aside
the order passed by the High Court and directthe Magistrate to proceed in accordance with
law.


Case Study :Vishwanath S/o SitaramAgrawalv.Sau. SarlaVishwanathAgrawal

Facts: Husband files a petition under sec-13(1)(ib) of Hindu Marriage Act,1955 for divorce,
while respondent wife with whim and irrationality reigned in her day-to-daybehaviour and
frequent quarrels became a daily affair,on certain occasionsshe used to hide the keys of the
motorcycle and close the gate sothat the appellant could not go to the office of the factory to
lookafter the business
Facts in issue
a) Before learned single judge:
1. whether the appellant had been able toprove the alleged cruelty;
2. whether he was entitled to takedisadvantage of his own wrong
The learned trial Judgedismissed the application with costs and also dismissed
theapplication of the respondent-wife for grant of permanentalimony.
b) On appeal, appellate court entaileddismissal of the appeal.

c) On second appeal before high court, hold that there wereconcurrent findings of fact and
no substantial question of law was involved. However, the learned single Judge observed
thatthe sons of the parties had grown up and have been married;that the parties had no
intention to patch up the matrimonialdiscord; and that the marriage had been irretrievably
broken butthat could not be considered by the High Court but only by theApex Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution.
Held:The cruelbehaviour of the wife has frozen the emotions and snuffed out thebright
candle of feeling of the husband because he has beentreated as an unperson. Thus, analysed,
it is abundantly clearthat with this mental pain, agony and suffering, the husbandcannot be
asked to put up with the conduct of the wife and tocontinue to live with her. Therefore, he is
entitled to a decree fordivorce.


1. In a criminal matter, under sec-323,324 IPC, as the matter contended by learned
counsel is compoundable offence and compromise had already been taken place,
place on record, allege that the period of punishment should be reduced to the period
already undergone, the Hon‟ble court after hearing the parties reduces the sentence to
period already undergone.
2. In a matter related to approval of diploma course from the State Board, while the
AICTE has already gave them approval, Haryana board of Technical Education
pointing out defects calls that teacher student ration is poor in these colleges and not
upto norms prescribed by the board as pointed out by committee, another is the
faculty appointed is not having adequate experience, however in the light that students
should not suffer for the fraud played the colleges, the Hon‟ble court reject the
contention placed by board while directing the colleges to not to take fees for the
period already undergone by students,reinspection been ordered while the colleges
should remove their defects as soon as possible as pointed out by board for second
shift.
3. In a criminal matter, the bullet while examining patient in government hospital was
missing, case related to sec-201 IPC as alleges by learned counsel, while ward boy
was falsely implicated under sec-302, 34 IPC, also alleging the non-possibility of
removing while during operation he was not present in O.T. . Matter adjourned for
further hearing.
4. In a matter related to grant-in aid, only one grant is offered to particular course in
particular area after having fulfilling the requisite formalities, one college who was
established before date of advertisement not fulfilling requisite get the grant-in aid
even though not fullifiling the 2years experience criteria, while the college who was
established long ago but the course was established after 1 year of date of advt.
claiming benefit of the circular issued by Chief minister, Matter adjourned directing

the government for reconsider both colleges for grant-in aid as the matter is of
exceptional nature.
5. In a matter connected to promotion, based on seniority list here the candidate is
transferred from post to all india radio, for deputation basis and after certain years for
regular pay if the same is transferred to same cadre level, then the period alreadt
undergone in past services should also be consider in new post, however respondent
alleges that our dept. employees were not given promotion showing disrcrimination.
Matter adjourned for further hearing.

Day 26: Date: 26th Feb 2013

Research Work:Femalefoeticide in lieu of PNDT act,

Day 27: Date: 27th Feb 2013

Internship diary by ronak

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