Identifying Why Developing Nations Choose to Democratize
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The document analyzes factors influencing democratization in developing nations, focusing on income inequality's role according to theorists Boix and Ansell & Samuels. Boix posits that lower inequality fosters democratization due to reduced elite fears of redistribution, while Ansell and Samuels argue that rising economic groups demand democracy to protect their newfound wealth. Ultimately, the author concludes that a demand-side approach explains democratization better than a supply-side one.
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(Ansell and Samuels, pg. 27) In a document published on the National Endowment for
Democracy website, September 12, 2003, the NED President, Carl Gershman, wrote “The
second characteristic [of economic growth] is that the variables constitute forms of collective
action at the level of government – the enforcement of contracts, the protection of political and
property rights, and the collection of taxes that can be used for public services. Such actions
constitute important components of democratic governance, which explains why developing
societies have so much to gain by establishing democratic systems.” (NDE 2003) This
organization, whose prowess is to support freedom around the world, bases its organization on
the spread of democracy has a foundation and ideology that reflect the work of Ansell and
Samuels and the causal relationship they describe. The demand-side evaluation, in my opinion,
best models the reasoning behind why developing nations choice to democratize.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5yb3ogjqz2mjtbyhych2-signature-c7ddba5dbf7d1b1a1d0f823d28fbd00e1684df23f66fda45a31c4c54eef1a096-poli-150722160543-lva1-app6892/85/Identifying-Why-Developing-Nations-Choose-to-Democratize-5-320.jpg)
Identifying Why Developing Nations Choose to Democratize
- 1. 1 Brent Hamilton IPEC 4302.001 Professor Bunte September 29, 2014 Writing Assignment One: Identifying Why Developing Nations Choose to Democratize Our society has become increasingly globalized and as a result democratic. With that evaluation one would expect that a connected international community would create an environment optimized for development, growth, and success. A large majority of states, around the world, are democratic but not all are successful and some may even potentially fail. The interest of my analysis is not as to why fragile democracies may fail or why some democracies are more developed than others but rather to analyze the conditions under which a country may democratize to begin with. If we can understand the circumstances at which a nation will become democratic, we may better understand the reason why they may fail or succeed. In particular, I am going to summarize the mechanisms between income inequality and democratization according to Boix (2003) and Ansell and Samuels (2010). Boix first establishes an argument built upon an understanding that econometric studies support that democracy is inextricably linked to economic development. (Boix 2003, pg. 1) Boix provides empirical evidence to support their analysis that democratization arises when “inequality is low” (Boix, 11&12). In other words, democratization is more likely when income is more balanced across a population. Boix’s analysis rest --in part-- that as inequality increases, elites are more fearful of future demands of the poorer majority. (11 & 12) Further, “when inequality is low, the median voter will demand less redistribution.” (11) However, we cannot
- 2. 2 overlook another tier of Boix’s theory, capital mobility, as it will help us understand the reasoning for certain actions as they relate to income inequality. Capital mobility as described by Boix is a vehicle by which we can analyze and predict the emergence of a democratic regime. (12) We are able to do this because capital mobility is an asset that can be “either taxed or expropriated”, (12) and according to Boix, can determine a nation’s reasoning for a demographic transition. Further, Boix explains: As the mobility of capital increases, tax rates necessarily decline since otherwise capital holders would have an incentive to transfer their assets abroad. Similarly, when capital can be easily hidden from the state or when it becomes of a kind that can be used only by its owners, the temptation to confiscate it also declines. (12) So this out-of-sight-out-of-mind evaluation of the mobility of capital leads more favorably towards the likelihood for democracy as “redistributive pressures from non-capital holders decline”, (12) creating a domino effect that leads to diminishing political conflict. Boix talks briefly on income inequality, and its effect on economic modernization. Economic modernization implies a progression or shift from an “economy based largely on fixed assets, such as land, to an economic system based on highly mobile capital.” (13) Additionally, we see an accumulation of human capital which, naturally, is harder to expropriate than physical capital. (13) Finances can easily be moved out of the country or manipulated so domestic threats toward the sustainability of repressive regimes, according to Boix, are not credible. The largest fear Boix says, involves the wealthy elites being forced to secumb to pressure from “future median voters” (13) and their demands for increased taxation (on the wealthy) and higher spending in social programs. Thus his theory suggests that when a regime holds a larger majority of the national
- 3. 3 income over the other, minority, group and cannot maintain authority over them, to protect their assets, the best alternative, in regards to the “cost of toleration”, (11) under a democratic regime, exceeds the cost at which they feel secure under an authoritative, political actors will favor democracy. In other words, when the costs associated with repressing the minority and less wealthy citizens exceed the costs of giving up some of their power, they will opt for a democracy so that they can sustain the wealth they have accrued rather than risk losing it all fighting to retain the current state. “Whenever all sides have no incentive to pursue an exclusionary strategy, democracy is established. If any of them prefers to pursue an authoritarian path, political violence and ultimately a dictatorship prevail”. (8) Ansell and Samuels (2010), have a different approach to explaining how income inequality can lead to democratization. Unlike Boix, Ansell and Samuels state that regime change doesn’t come from autocratic elites’ fear that the poor would expropriate their assets but rather “a function of politically disenfranchised yet rising economic groups’ struggle to obtain credible commitments against expropriation of their income and assets by the autocratic governing elite.” (Ansell and Samuels 2010, pg. 2) Their view is contrary or opposing to the redistributionist approach, like Boix’s hypothesis, that suggest political transitions are primarly a function of intra-elite conflict rather than a function of a small but monolithic elite’s fear of the impoverished multitudes. (2) Ansell and Samuels continue further stating: The more equal the distribution of land, the greater the number of freeholders who fear both taxation and expropriation of their land or money by an autocratic elite. Thus they demand a more representative political system that protects their property rights. (3) They determine that in terms of income inequality, democratization will be more likely to emerge when newly wealthy economic groups accumulate a steadily increasing share of the
- 4. 4 national income. Thus under these conditions, democratization will be associated with higher, not lower, income inequality (3) Essentially, when a once politically disenfranchised group grows wealthier, its incentives to demand at least partial democracy grow because it has, naturally, become more fearful from autocratic expropriation because they now have the resources to credibly threaten autocratic stability. (14) “Land equality combined with income inequality is precisely the scenario that gives rise to greater demands for credible commitments on the part of the state… as ever larger groups of citizens come to hold assets, the will seek insurance against expropriation or violation of contracts.” (27 & 28) We are able to easily distinguish the causal mechanism, according to Ansell and Samuels, as being a process that begins with a group gaining momentum and wealth who then require their newly acquired assets be protected and thus favor a democratic regime. I now wish to take a moment and evaluate and compare the causal mechanism of both Boix and Ansell and Simmons and why I believe one to be more relevant and convincing than the other. Boix’s thesis can be articulated as such: political regime change is driven by autocratic elites’ evaluation of their expected losses from redistribution of income through taxes and social programs; this supply-side development theory is a direct result of an increase in income equality. Boix believes that the reason for democratizing lies in the hands of the wealthy as they have the most options at their disposal to protect their assets while also maintaining power over the community. Ansell and Samuels’ thesis can be summarized as a previously disenfranchised group’s journey to obtain protection against potential abuses from the incumbent elites. This simply is opposite of Boix’s belief and can be attributed to an increase in income inequality. “ Aggregate country wealth does not drive democratization. Rather, the distribution of the fruits of development matters. Equality of landholding plus inequality of income leads to democracy.”
- 5. 5 (Ansell and Samuels, pg. 27) In a document published on the National Endowment for Democracy website, September 12, 2003, the NED President, Carl Gershman, wrote “The second characteristic [of economic growth] is that the variables constitute forms of collective action at the level of government – the enforcement of contracts, the protection of political and property rights, and the collection of taxes that can be used for public services. Such actions constitute important components of democratic governance, which explains why developing societies have so much to gain by establishing democratic systems.” (NDE 2003) This organization, whose prowess is to support freedom around the world, bases its organization on the spread of democracy has a foundation and ideology that reflect the work of Ansell and Samuels and the causal relationship they describe. The demand-side evaluation, in my opinion, best models the reasoning behind why developing nations choice to democratize.
- 6. 6 Works Cited Ansell, Ben and David J Samuels. 2010. “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach.” Comparative Political Studies 43(12):1543–1574. Boix, C. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge University Press. Gershman, Carl. 12 September 2003. “Why the Developing World Needs and Wants Democracy” The National Endowment for Democracy. Web. http://www.ned.org/about/board/meet-our-president/archived-remarks-and-presentations/091203