Isocrates # de romilly (eunoia in isocrates or the political importance of creating good will) bb
- 1. Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will Author(s): Jacqueline de Romilly Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 78 (1958), pp. 92-101 Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/628928 Accessed: 10/09/2008 17:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=hellenic. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org
- 2. EUNOIA IN ISOCRATES OR THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF CREATING GOOD WILL EUNOIA, in Greek, is something more than good will: it means approval, sympathy and readiness to help. Having such meanings, it soon came to be applied to politics in a number of ways, as describing one's feeling towards a person, or a party, or the city-or even another city. And this last instance which is connected with foreign politics, is what we shall here be dealing with. It is what Isocrates himself is most interested in, for out of sixty examples of the word about twenty-five refer specifically to the relations between one city and another city. And it is the meaning that deserves to be studied, particularly among people who like Thucydides. Whether it is o'fos. or Seos, fear, in Thucydides, seems to dominate all relations between the cities of Hellas-and, to begin with, between Athens and other cities: well, eunoia, or good will, is the contrary of fear. That is to say, when Isocrates wants eunoia to rule political life, he wants things to be just the opposite of what they were in the world that Thucydides had described. Indeed, the position he adopts when discussing good will is part of an important controversy that was then being conducted about force and justice, might and right. And so, even if he is not himself a very thrilling writer nor a very intelligent man, it seemed worth while trying to find out how the idea arose both from recent experiments in Greece and from personal tendencies of Isocrates, and how he hoped the notion of eunoia could work in contemporary politics. I I have already mentioned Thucydides; and I think one should always begin with him. For, among other reasons, it is true that, whenever one tries to understand the political ideas that were current in the fourth century, one gets the feeling that everything is more or less to be explained by what the fifth century had experienced. In Thucydides, it is clearly and firmly stated that cities, which ought to have been kept loyal by their own good will, were in fact kept obedient by fear (iii. I2). The eunoia of Greece as a whole, so we are told, is largely on the side of Sparta and against Athens (ii. 8). And Athens knows it; she accepts it, again and again. Diodotos is the only one who wants to make use of the eunoia which democrats in the cities felt towards Athens (iii. 47.2): the others do not care; they just do not believe in eunoia. And when two different views about human life are confronted at Melos, the Athenian view is that eunoia does not mean any more to the Lacedaemonians than it does in Athens (v. Io9: 7r 'E'Xvpov yE Trocs Svvaycwvov- ov TO Evvovv dAA' 'jv Tov 7TroA rpov'Xn). I1EVOLS TWoV Er7TKaAEadvvrTv OalveErat, spyWyv LS oavvatEL In other words, Athens accepts the wager of maintaining her domination against the will of all others. Sparta, on the contrary, knows that this is a good argument for her. The most intelligent of her men, Brasidas, tries to make use of it by visiting the cities and claiming that they should not only feel eunoia towards the Lacedaemonians (iv. II4.4: 7roAAh/iAAov, oaw o8KaCoTepa -Tpaoorovo, ev'vovs av aOtlLf yeveara.); but prove it by some real and genuine co-operation (iv. 87.3: TtS eo/ vco L-,7trpoVLEpa EV, el xlT TTpoaaXOBcreTOe, vrT 7ros v6tpIavXprltla OepozeEvoLtsTrap''AOrlvalovs flAa7TrrwvTrat).1That is to say Sparta could acquire some practical power based on eunoia: in a way, this is the first step leading to the ideal Alcibiades lets Sparta dream about, when he says that the Lacedaemonians could govern Greece by consent (vi. 92.5): EKova7rrs Kal ov 3lla, Kar ev'oltav e -qyrraOe. 1 A different view of this passage is suggested in Gomme, Commentary,ad loc.
- 3. EUNOIA IN ISOCRATES 93 Of course, these ideas are only roughly outlined there. None the less, they have the kind of mathematical precision that everything has in Thucydides. And, if regarded in the light of the way the war ended, such ideas could, undoubtedly, suggest quite a number of reflexions. And so they did. For we find in different authors some very similar criticism about the danger of disregarding eunoia. The first of these ideas is that if one relies on force only and faces universal discontent, he may well come against a coalition of those who seem to be weaker than himself. The Melians suggest it in Thucydides, v. 98; and the idea is to be found both in Plato and Iso- crates. In Plato, Socrates uses it against Callicles and says that the many are stronger than any single man, however strong he may be (Gorgias, 488d). In Isocrates, it should check the imperialist ambitions of Athens; for if she is stronger than any single state, she is weaker than the rest in combination (On the Peace, 134). Therefore, if a city attacks the liberty of other cities, it prepares its own ruin and works for the rival city. And each leading city in its turn-Athens, for instance, or Sparta after her-as it grows too powerful, paves the way for the other's rise. The idea comes out in Thucydides, in the speech delivered by the Athenian envoys at Sparta (i. 75.I; 77.6); and it is to be found both in Xenophon and in Isocrates. In Xenophon, the Thebans remind numerous enemies, when you commanded over the most numerous cities' (Hell. iii. 5.IO). And Isocrates, in the speech On thePeace, shows that sea-power has always been the beginning of all misfortunes: for Athens, who then met with hate, instead of good will (78); for Sparta, whose downfall everybody wished: 'Did we not choose to pursue a policy in consequence of aHellenes? Hellenes? Did not which the Lacedaemonians became masters notofthey,e theof their turn, manage their supremacy so badly that not many years later we again got the upper hand and became the arbiters of their safety? Did not the meddlesomenes s of the partisans of Athens cause the various states to become partisans of Sparta, and did not the insolence of the parsanse ofstates force partisans of tSpartao the Sparta become partisans of Athens?' (I07-8). Therefore, justice seems to be necessary for whoever wants to maintain any kind of te power. The idea is to be found both in Plato and Isocrates; and each of them-one in the and first book of the Republic(35c), the other one in the Panathenaicus one the at the (226)same simile and speaks of this special kind of concord which enables even robbers, brigands and pirates to succeed in their attempts. Critics then say: of course, Isocrates is here recalling Plato.2 I am not so sure that is right. What I feel sure about is that there must have been much discussion, in many places, starting from one and the same origin, and fed by arguments which became conventional, almost classic. And it should be added that this discussion seems to have arisen in connexion with foreign politics. In the Gorgias, when Callicles undertakes to show that, according to the law of nature, the strongest should get more, he only refers to wars, mentioning Xerxes and Darius (483e). And, in a similar, yet still more remarkable way, the passage we just mentioned in the Republic (about the usefulness of concord) starts with the question: 'Tell me, doesn't there exist some state that behaves unjustly, and tries to enslave others or has enslaved them, and holds several of them in slavery?' The Athenian empire, once more, seems to be at the bottom of it all; and reflexion about right seems to have arisen in connexion with might. Therefore, we should not say that in this case-as well as in others which also sound somewhat familiar both in Plato and Isocrates (for instance when they discuss the two meanings of equality or the good and bad kinds of democracy) 3-we can trace any precise 2 Cf, for instance, G. Mathieu, Les ide'es politiques 'Beitrage zu ath. Politik und Publicistik', GGN, d'Isocrate, Paris, 1925, p. i8i. 1910, pp. 158-9 n. i and Wilamowitz, Arist. und 3 Nicocles I4 and Areop. 21, to be compared with Athen, i. p. 72 n. 45 (and the keen remarks ibid., ii. 385 Rep. 558c. For the interpretation, see Wendland, n. 6).
- 4. 94 J. DE ROMILLY affiliation. A general kinship, yes. The memory of things often discussed, probably. But nothing more. Our two authors do seem to answer one another directly when dealing with education; on the question of politics, they are but isolated witnesses, few among many. This will perhaps appear more clearly if we now consider what can be called the positive side of the theory about good will. For all the critical remarks we have seen about the danger of disregarding eunoia lead to a sort of praise of eunoia, which is to be found in several authors. And here I should like to mention, along with Isocrates, both Xenophon and Demosthenes. In a way, all the works of Xenophon are really a description of the good commander, as one whose orders men are willing to obey. Be it a king or a captain, or only the manager of farm or housework, the question always ends in establishing such a system of rewards that eunoia should become natural. This general idea can, of course, have an impact on politics; one should remember Theramenes explaining, in the Hellenica, how silly and irrational were the Thirty, who, by being unjust, necessarily raised hostility against their own government. And one should remember also the way Xenophon explains to Seuthes, in the Anabasis, how much wiser it would be for him to behave in such manner that the Greek troops should have good will towards him. But, on the whole, politics are not his main concern: Xenophon always thinks according to military experience, and the good will he is interested in is of the kind one can find in one's soldiers. Which, I should say, makes things only more interesting, as it shows that, so far as eunoia is concerned, Xenophon owes nothing to Isocrates, or Isocrates to him. Not so with Demosthenes. For, as he fights Philip and seeks arguments against him, Demosthenes does not miss the opportunity of stressing the importance eunoia has in international life. Hence the resemblances one can point out between the second Olynthiac and several works by Isocrates. They have been discussed often enough, and particularly by Mesk,4 although it must be said that every scholar gives a different list for these passages. But there are at least some features which really recur in both authors. Isocrates had said Persia would be easily defeated because there was no energy in its people and no good will in the surrounding countries (Panegyricus, I35, I50): Demosthenes says the same about Philip (Olynth., ii. 7-8, i6). If Persia had such a great influence on the events in Greece, that is only because a small addition to one side can produce great changes (Pan., 139): Demosthenes says the same about Macedonia (ii. I4). And the real reason of Philip's weakness is indeed clearly stated, when Demosthenes refers to the idea of eunoia. For Philip's power, he says, is among those which rest on covetousness and knavery, and will, therefore, collapse; on the contrary, those powers should last that are held together by good will (7rr' evvolas) and in which everybody shares the same interest (ii. 9). And that leads us to his fine declaration in the speech On the Chersonese, when he asks: 'What is a city's wealth, if not her allies, and the trust and good will she meets with': avupHaXovs~, 7rmTtv, evvotav (viii. 66; which is repeated, and also paraphrased, in the fourth Philippic, x. 69,50). Well, nobody ever thought of bringing these last passages in connexion with Isocrates; and I am not suggesting that one should. The phraseology is quite different, and it would not be safe to speak about influences, when we have nothing more precise to start with.5 The only conclusion one can draw from this general affinity is, once again, that the idea was appearing in several ways at one and the same time, each particular author giving it some special direction and form. Among the authors we have just been considering, it is true that Demosthenes seems to be closer to Isocrates than are any others. But we can already find out some difference, even before we look at things more closely. 4 'Demosthenes und Isokrates', WSt xxiii (1901o), Republic,even in some similes (?2I, compared with 209-12. Rep. 556e). ` The second Olynthiac also resembles Plato's
- 5. EUNOIA IN ISOCRATES 95 First, in quantity: although the fourth century was greatly impressed by the danger of disregarding eunoia, yet Isocrates seems to have been more affected than any other by these ideas, for, as we compared several authors to show the existence of this common inspiration, one part of the comparison was always Isocrates: Plato and Isocrates, Xenophon and Isocrates, Demosthenes and Isocrates; every line seems to be leading towards him. But that is not all. For if we quote but one sentence of his about eunoia, we can easily grasp the difference between them in spirit and manner. With Isocrates we find a real and systematic creed, which applies, and can readily be verified, and must therefore be confidently accepted even for the future. Let us quote, for instance, what he says about Timotheos (Antidosis, I22): 'Timotheos realised that men who are afraid hate those who inspire this feeling in them, and that it was due to the friendship of the other cities that Athens rose to great power and prosperity, just as it was due to their hatred that she barely escaped the most disastrous fate. Bearing in mind these facts, he used the power of Athens in order to subdue her enemies, and the force of his own character in order to win the good will of the rest of the world, believing that this is a greater and nobler kind of generalship than to conquer many cities many times in battle.' One can see the difference. We come across isolated suggestions elsewhere, but here we find something absolute, authoritative, peremptory. And to explain such a difference, there is but one explanation: that is, if the fifth-century experiment was like a seed, which developed differently according to the different minds and purposes of people, Isocrates' mind and habits surely offered an especially favourable ground, where it could easily take root and give a particularly rich and substantial harvest. II The reason why Isocrates gave so much importance to the idea of eunoia is the stress he continually lays on opinion, in the widest meaning of the word. I do not mean only that, teaching rhetoric, he had to keep in mind the importance of captatio benevolentiae. I mean that he believes in the importance of persuading people; and he believes that this is nothing artificial. On the contrary, he thinks that this business of persuading people, which of course is the way to success, is closely bound up with sound reflexion and wholesome morals. Opinion, for him, is not only effective: it is legitimate. Opinion being legitimate . . . that does not sound much like Plato. And indeed it is easy to collect a certain number of passages where Isocrates defends the value of doxa, opinion, against empty wishes for an impossible episteme,or science.6 This position of his is what M. Mikkola started with, in his recent book about Isocrates,7 and quite rightly, in my opinion. But he interpreted these passages as if they were intended to express some theory about knowledge and implied some kind of relativism, in the style of Protagoras or even Heraclitus, which they do not. Nothing, I should think, was more remote from Isocrates' mind. He only meant that there did not exist any actual science saying how one should behave, and that it did not matter much, for opinion might very well, in such things, be considered as sufficient. It is not relativism; it is optimism. It shows that Isocrates trusts people's judgment. And so he does. That is why he considers speaking and persuading people as being such an important thing in man's life. Speech, he says in the well-known eulogy which is to be found both in the Nicocles (5-9) and in the Antidosis (253-7), is what all our social life was established by. And how could that be? because it brings people to agreement, and because what people agree about is obviously right-whether we mean right and true ideas, or right and just feelings. Therefore, why not trust opinion? Isocrates is proud to 6 Cf. recently, Ph. Merlan, 'Isocrates, Aristotle and 7 Isokrates, Seine Anschauungen im Lichte seiner Alexander the Great', Historia, iii (I954-5), p. 6o-8I. Schriften, Helsinki, I954.
- 6. 96 J. DE ROMILLY do so, and, criticising the others, he writes (Antidosis, 84): 'They exhort their followers to a kind of virtue and wisdom which is ignored by the rest of the world and is disputed among themselves; I, to a kind which is recognised by all!' Therefore, people's judgment becomes a thing worth considering. And from So'a meaning opinion, we are led to So'a meaning reputation. Because the judgment about them will, on the whole, be sound, the men who want success will try to be approved of- .and this by means of virtue. The orator will choose a theme which deserves approbation and, meditating upon such themes, he will soon feel a good influence 'in all the actions of Ihis life'. And 'it follows, then, that the power to speak well and think right will reward the man who approaches the art of discourse with love of wisdom and love of honour' (notice the two words, >Aouo'awcos qtAoir'4lws). What is more, if one desires success, 'he will Kal ;apply himself above all to establish a most honourable name among his fellow citizens' (Antidosis, 278); the word, here, is EV8OKLtE?Vvan all-important word in Isocrates (where it recurs 87 times), a word which of course means being well considered, but which is nearly the same as producing eunoia. Indeed, the passage ends with a final mention of the power of good will' (Tr7V-r's evvolas Svval-v). This philosophy of opinion, then, makes it clear that, in all matters, eunoia can be a :most legitimate end to aim at. It is founded on valuable opinion and connected with -real merits; therefore, it is stable enough to offer some solid basis for organising things. For it is achieved by virtue and leads to success. And that is how eunoia, in Isocrates, becomes a sort of intermediate notion, joining together ideas which had long been opposed to one another-I mean justice and advantage. Sometimes, when taken in connexion with its causes, eunoia is presented as an honourable aim in itself; sometimes, when taken in connexion with its consequences, it is shown as something useful. And it even enables him to establish a relation between both ideas. For just as his theory about doxa allows him to combine the study of rhetoric with the love of truth (and makes him equally adverse to Plato and to the sophists), just so the theory of eunoia which arises in his confident and trusting mind comes to the happy end that justice and success meet together. Hence the well-known references to the rewards of justice. For, in this well-ordered world, which looks as distinctly parted into two halves as a sentence of his-tE`v here, e' there-it seems one finds all evil and misfortune on one side, all virtue and happiness on the other. The result being that some people blame him for being too much of an idealist in politics, others for considering nothing but practical advantage when speaking about morals. Of course, it should be added that this system of his is not always quite so precise. And the idea of eunoia, as others in Isocrates, remains somewhat loose. I should think he likes them to be so, for that is how he has experienced human things to be. When he speaks about the eunoia of the assembly, naturally to seek it may come very near to the wretched habit of flattering, reproachfully called Xapl4ecOat. And yet he advises Timotheos to seek it: 'For if you please the people in Athens, no matter what you do they will not judge your conduct by the facts, but will construe it in a light favourable to you; and, if you make mistakes, they will overlook them, while, if you succeed, they will exalt your success to the high heaven. For good will has this effect upon all men. But you, while seeking by every means in your power to win for Athens the good will of the rest of the Hellenes, because you recognise its great advantages, nevertheless do not consider that there is any need to secure for yourself the good will of Athens' (Antidosis, I34-5). And when it comes to be the eunoia of a single person, as in the JVicocles, is even more difficult to admit of its legitimacy; and it yet one must seek it (58). But there is one case which seems to fit the system perfectly and where no difficulty seems to arise: that is the case of eunoia in the relations between cities. There, as it is not so easy to use flattery or illusion, and as the only merit is to respect the other's rights, it seems
- 7. EUNOIA IN ISOCRATES 97 natural enough that one should have good will to those who do. Also, as there does not exist any law, but everybody always depends on the actual balance of power, the influence of eunoia can be felt as greater; and history shows it, too, more conspicuously. And so we should not be surprised to see that this profound connexion between justice and advantage has nowhere been so fully developed and thought out as in the beginning of the essay On the Peace-an essay, and a passage, that deal with politics and with foreign politics. Just before this famous analysis comes a mention of the rise and fall of the first Athenian confeder- ation; just after comes a practical conclusion about the policy Athens should follow: the experience Isocrates appeals to in the passage itself is undoubtedly political experience- which indeed makes the utility of eunoia particularly clear. Whether one considers Athens or Sparta, the rise and fall of a hegemony can always be explained by the fact that the leading city either respected justice or ignored it. For the rise is explained by the fact that cities spontaneously accept the other's direction; and Isocrates, remembering the formula Thucydides had used about the beginning of Athens' hegemony (i. 96. i: EKO'VTWV TwV (vdaXwv, cf. i. 75.2) repeats it in two different passages, which, although different in context, both point to good will as being the main cause (Peace, 29-30; Areop., I7). On the other hand, the fall is explained by the fact that this good will is soon replaced by hatred, uxtos. As he says, av-rt 8e Trrs evvolas els ToaoVrov JtUiOS KaTEr(T,tEV. . . (Peace, 28). The same word recurs for the downfall of Athens in ? 82 for the downfall of Sparta in ? Ioo (E'urja70vav), then again for Athens in (pLarO0e?Ev), while in the same paragraph he says of Sparta, for the sake of variety, ? 105 (Lucar0E'vrES), that 'all the rest wanted to destroy her'. So, in that case at least, the system is thorough and methodical: it rests on a sort of demonstration. This demonstration is only made clearer by mentioning, too, the eunoia or good will from the Gods: we find it mentioned twice in Isocrates (Arch., 59; Peace, 33) and once in Demosthenes (ii. 22). But I think that should only be regarded as an additional proof: in fact, Isocrates has too much faith in man to need much the help of Providence. And his belief in man's eunoia furnishes a complete demonstration even without it. That such a demonstration exists is important. I think it would be only fair to Isocrates to remember it, whenever he utters those rather simple statements about the final victory of right or the final reverse which awaits domineering cities (as in the Archidamus,36, or the Plataicus, 25): for the explanation is not given, but it exists, and is a very natural one. And it would be fair, too, not to criticise his policy as losing sight of practical advantages for, even if he does not say so, they are to be understood as going together with moral prestige. The result of moral prestige is, indeed, prosperity. Let us quote On the Peace, I40: 'What a turn for the better should you expect the affairs of our city to take when we enjoy such good will from the rest of the Hellenes ?' Of course, this result might sound a little pedestrian and middle-class, if I may say so. Isocrates speaks, in the next sentence, of wealth and good reputation: those are the new form of power and glory. But then they might also have more stability and poise than the former ideal. Anyhow they take its place and, although reached by opposite means, they are meant to be equivalent. This could be illustrated by considering the way Isocrates uses the word TrpocrayeOaLt in reference to foreign politics. When Thucydides used it with the same reference, he nearly always meant that you came with an army, and, inspiring fear, obliged people to join you. In Isocrates, one wins the cities to one's self by treating them well (-re EOv Eiv), ro and that is the real way of acquiring power. In the Plataicus (40), the Lacedaemonians won them that way; and Athens should do the same: otherwise, 'What reason will you give if war break out again, to justify your demand that the Greeks should join you ?' (rTpocayEaOam). What people in Thucydides wanted to do by the use of force, Isocrates wants to do by the use of good will. It is the same verb, with two opposite means of fulfilling the action. VOL. LXXVIII E
- 8. 98 J. DE ROMILLY Was his a better method? Was it even a possible one? He himself had evolved his theory by contemplating the failure of former policies: why not do the same with his and see-not exactly how it worked, for it did not-but how he thought he could work it out in reality, and how he struggled and fought for it. Indeed, as he never wrote about theory without referring to actual politics and real problems, that could also throw some more light on what he really intended when he presented such a theory. III Propaganda in Isocrates is centred on two ideas, which are, at first, a little difficult to disentangle, I mean ev'vota and o4wovota, good will and concord. Concord, of course, is his one great idea. He celebrates its virtues in nearly all of his works, either thinking of concord within the city or of concord between cities, this being, naturally, the most important thing. Concord among Greeks,united against barbarians,is the well-known theme of the Panegyricus; the idea, and the word, also recur in the but Antidosis (77), in the treatise To Philip (I6; 31; 40; 83; I41) and in the Panathenaicus(42; 77; I3I; I67, not to mention the passages where the idea is stated with different words). In a way, concord is a kind of mutual good will. The Panegyricus shows it, using both ideas together (174): 'We shall enjoy a spirit of concord, and the good will which we shall feel towards each other will be genuine': oovo-rrao1ev Kat Tas- evvotas ar?8 vas pos ' 'r as avrovSOgeopEv. But that also gives us a clue to the difference. When one speaks of concord, one considersany group of people as a whole, whereas good will is generally directed towards one special person or city. When mentioning concord, Isocrates thinks of the action that is to be undertaken by all Greeks together; when speaking about good will, he thinks of the leader: he is addressing him, trying to keep him along the right path, trying to keep him away from imperialism. As a matter of fact, he deals with good will in two periods, first when he addressesimprudent Athens, next when he addressesdangerous Philip. First, Athens. In the Panegyricus, had undoubtedly drawn a picture of what should he be the policy of the leading city, which was to be Athens; but he did not make great use of the idea of eunoia,8 for he was more interested in recommending Athens' merits than preventing her mistakes. But the difficulties the second confederation met with are well known to everybody. Words about eunoia would then seem not to be useless. We find some of them in the Plataicus. Yet, that is no good: although Isocrates backs Timotheos (who, he writes in Antidosis,I22, secured good will for Athens), things get worse and end in the Social War: confronted by that failure, Isocrates turns to Athens, reproaching her for it: that is the discourse On the Peace. Nowhere has he insisted so much on the idea of eunoia. And this explains how the purpose of the discourseis summed up in such startling abstractionsas, at the beginning,'but no such thing can come to pass until you are persuadedthat tranquillityis more advantageous and more profitable than meddlesomeness,justice than injustice....' The whole discourse seems to have no other aim than pondering over that idea, illustrating it by means of past experience, and teaching Athens that she should avoid the vices of tyranny if she wants to avoid its fate. I do not feel one could criticise Isocrates for having changed anything of his former opinions-as does W. Jaeger.9 Isocrates had written in favour of Athens' hegemony and now writes to oppose Athens' tyranny: that is coherent. No man was ever more coherent and obstinate than Isocrates. But what could perhaps be doubted is whether these reproaches against Athens were not a little obsolete. 8 9 Cf. Apartfrom 174, where eunoia and homonoia com- Paideia, iii. I28-9 (English edition). bine, the word ehv,ovgappears in 142, and that is all.
- 9. EUNOIA IN ISOCRATES 99 The Second Confederation was no doubt far from being perfect; but the attacks on Athens were perhaps less due to her tyranny or imperialism than to her weakness; and it does not seem that Isocrates really grasped the importance of the hostilities Athens had to deal with outside the confederation. Anyhow, he did not grasp it in the case of the newly-arising difficulties with Philip, when he wrote, in the beginning of his treatise: 'For do not think that Cersobleptes will wage war with us over the Chersonese or Philip over Amphipolis, when they see that we do not covet any of the possessions of other people. . . .' (22). Poor Isocrates! Perhaps he had pondered too much about past experiences? However, ten years later, he could not be mistaken any more; and, having had to turn to another leader, he also had to present him with the eunoia-argument: and we find him giving similar advice, about the same Amphi- polis, only, this time, to Philip. And he wants to persuade him 'that the friendship of our city would be worth more to you than the revenues which you derive from Amphipolis' (To Philip, 5). And on it goes with eunoia. Of course, Demosthenes knew better, for in the speech Against Aristocrates(xxiii. I I I) he mentions as a natural thing the fact that Philip, although it would have been wiser of him to give up Amphipolis and win Athens' friendship, did just the contrary, because of ambition. And whether or not this shows a trace of Isocratic ideas in Demosthenes,10 it undoubtedly helps us to see the difference between them. However, the question of Amphipolis is but a detail in a more general advice, which is now given to Philip; and this advice is interesting in itself-the more so as Isocrates does not give it just in the same way as he did to Athens. The first difference is that he does not seem any longer to be interested in all cities equally: it is Athens' good will he is speaking about. And that means he has not given up the idea of Athens' importance altogether: she still has a special mission in Greece and does not stand on the same level as the others. And then, another difference: Isocrates does not speak quite as much of the use of good will. Probably Philip's increasing power would have made the idea both unconvincing and unseemly. Isocrates only mentions it in connexion with future enterprises: 'For one must undertake nothing until he finds the Hellenes doing one of two things: either actually sup- porting the undertaking or according it their entire approval' (86: iro3Ax?v evoav; cf. 95). In all other passages of the treatise, he only refers to the beauty of creating eunoia, the nobleness of it, the shame of losing it. And these features are not there by chance, for, some years later, in Isocrates' letter to Philip (Letter ii), we find them again. First, Athens: he gives ten paragraphs (13-23) to the importance of winning her eunoia: 'For you might then more easily keep in subjection those who are now under your sway, if they should have no refuge, and of the barbarians you could more quickly conquer any you should wish'; and he invites him to grasp eagerly 'at a relationship of good will such that you will hold securely not only your present domina- tion, but also without risk acquire another great one'. Then, discretion: he mentions twice the utility of this good will from Athens, especially for future enterprises; but that is all; otherwise we find nothing but the beauty of eunoia again. And it is rather amusing to see in what subtle and skilful way the very conclusion of the letter converts utility into beauty: 'I know not what more I need to say, except this only-that it will be a fine thing for you (KaAo'vemr) to entrust your royal power and your existing prosperity into the keeping of the good will of the Hellenic race' (7rapaKaraaOea'O rj -v 'EEAArvcov T- evvota). And then? and then Philip went on, and the situation, for Isocrates, became somewhat difficult: the argument about eunoia then recedes, and, in the Panathenaicus,Isocrates takes refuge in the less compromising idea of olo'vota; indeed he does refer to the great law of eunoia, but in a rather awkward way, trying to excuse Athens for having neglected it and explaining that it was Sparta's fault (I i6). 10 Mathieu, Philippeet Lettresd Philippe,d Alexandre d Paris, 1924, p. 31. et Antipatros,
- 10. Ioo J. DE ROMILLY Perhaps all that does not mean much. And yet it seems to me that the use Isocrates makes of the argument and of the word brings things out fairly clearly. It enables us to follow a sort of leading thread, showing us the real unity of Isocrates' thought; but it also indicates the way he adjusted it to situations; and among other things it shows with what skill he could stress the importance of Athens even though he accepted Philip's hegemony." But it also shows something else, for it shows the failure, and some of its reasons. Denouncing the danger of disregarding good will, Isocrates addresses first Athens, in a time when she was not powerful enough to find in it her worst danger; and he next addressed Philip, in a time when he was too powerful to fear such a danger. And, after all, even if he had feared it, was it really possible for him to follow Isocrates' advice? Even if experience in the past had shown the danger of disregarding eunoia, it did not follow that one could simply seek it and succeed. Here too, Demosthenes knows better. He does insist on the value of eunoia; but he believes this eunoia is connected with advantage: at least as much as on justice, it rests for him on a community of interests (xiii. 6: -co avnra EV). Perhaps Athens considers justice before all, but that is certainly not what the others do, and least of all Philip (Phil. ii. 12); indeed, Philip is the one who must be per- suaded (Chers. 54 = Phil. iv. 55-6); and perhaps Demosthenes feels a slight irritation towards those who forget it.12 Therefore he does not use the idea of eunoia as an aim for his own policy, but only as an argument against Philip's and as a reason for hope. Finding himself on the weak side, and feeling genuine indignation against Philip, he begins to hope in eunoia, and starts leaving out some of the Thucydidean realism and lucidity which he affected in his first orations. But doing that, he makes the best of the situation, and does not try to change the basis of contemporary policy. That ought to dispose of the alleged influence of Isocrates on the second Olynthiac,or at least show how vague and general it must have been. The difference is more interesting than the influence. And it enables us to grasp how much more unreasonable Isocrates was -unreasonable, that is to say, also, bold, and original, and desperately obstinate in his wish to make, in spite of everything, the political life of his time sounder, safer, and different. Of course, he could but fail. But I should not like to finish with such easy criticism. And I should not like, even, to excuse him with the idea that the policy of Demosthenes, although more realistic, was just as obsolete, and failed just as clearly. Poor Isocrates, I think, should get a better satisfecit. What was wrong with his theory was that he confided too much both in the wisdom of the strongest and in the judgment of the weakest. But if we suppose some international institution, giving some reality to the rights of the weakest and to the meaning of their approval, the idea could make more sense. And in some timid and rather hypocritical way, those institutions did begin to take shape, first in the Second Athenian Confederation, and then in the League of Corinth. To be sure, that was not much; but it was a sign of Isocrates' influence.3 And the same is true for whoever, in modern times, thinks of similar institution, and tries to find some remedy to the old itosg-not perhaps in ev'voLa, but in the more complex notion of safety. Therefore, we owe something to him. In what concerns rhetoric, Isocrates stands half- way between Plato and the sophists; and that makes him look a little silly; but it is on this intermediate position that, through Cicero, was built our modern literary education (at 11 About the limits of this late panhellenism in that the sums extorted from the cities were called Isocrates (whatever it had been before), cf. A. eivolat. Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone, Saggio sulla Storia 13 For the influence of the idea among writers, greca del iv secolo A.C., Firenze, 1934, p. I91-2. cf. M. Miihl, Die politische Idee des Isokrates und die 12 Cf. Chers. 27, the irony towards those who Geschichtsschreibung,i, diss. Wurtzburg, 19I7, which pretend to worry about Greek people in Asia. For shows Ephorus praising Philip and Alexander for the realism in his views, cf. also 25, where he mentions having created good will.
- 11. EUNOIA IN ISOCRATES IOI least in France). It is the same thing in his attitude towards international relations. He stands halfway between the realistic acuteness of Thucydides and the moral intolerance of Plato's city; and this position, which means trying to endow opinion with some practical value and thereby make the world somehow more sensible-this position is not without upholders now. Isocrates, it is true, is not very intelligent; but, all the same, it must be said: we all take after him, in some way or other!14 JACQUELINE DE ROMILLY. Paris. 14 The above paper was written for a lecture tion. I feel particularly grateful to Professor A. W. delivered in London University (May, I957): I Gomme who, very generously, spent much of his time want to thank here both the Professors in this making it less incorrect. The quotations of Isocrates University for having invited me there and the in English are borrowed from G. Norlin's translation, editors of the JHS for having accepted it for publica- in the Loeb Collection.