Jack_Smith_CAPSTONE_Final.docx

Running Head: PRIVATELY OWNED SERVICES IN RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 1
Continuance of critical services provided by the private sector in long-term response and
recoveries in relation to the NIMS process.
Jack R. Smith
Thomas Edison State College
HLS-498-OL009
Dr. Peter Barone
February 22, 2016

Table of Contents
Title Page ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Table of Contents............................................................................................................................ 2
Abstract........................................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter One: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...4
Chapter Two: Literature Review……………………………………………………………….....6
Chapter Three: Methods of Research……………………………………………………………..9
Chapter Four: Findings……………………………………………………...…………..……….11
Chapter Five: Summary and Discussion………………………………….……………………..15
Conclusion………………………...…………………………………………………………….20
References……………………………………………………………………………………….22

Abstract
This paper examined the ways in which scholars in the field of emergency management as well
as professionals in the field of emergency management view the roles of emergency managers in
working with private sector operators of critical infrastructure in relation to the response and
recovery during long-term events. The methodology for this study was a review of professional
papers, journal articles, emergency management plans and exercises, after action reviews and
reports, textbooks and scholarly research on the subject. Special emphasis was placed on those
documents that dealt with longer term operations covering larger areas (i.e. greater than 72 hours
and over several counties to many states). The findings were that scholars in the field of
emergency management have well documented the roles of private infrastructure operators and
government emergency managers in all phases of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) process. Additionally, emergency management professionals at all levels do not apply
the lessons learned from those scholars, to include those studies conducted after disasters.. The
conclusion reached was that it is known by scholars in the field of emergency management what
the role of emergency management agencies should be when working with private infrastructure
providers, and that is much the same as would be done with any governmental agency or
volunteer organizations. The perceptions of those emergency management agencies however is
much different, and that is that, except as noted with the power companies, do not see a role in
those private infrastructure providers in either the planning for or actual response and recovery
operations.

Chapter One
Introduction
This paper will examine the issues pertaining to the perceptions of scholars and experts in
the field of Emergency Management in regards to the necessity of continuance of critical
services provided by the private sector in long-term response and recoveries in relation to the
NIMS process. Fisher (n.d.) discusses how in 2009 the state of Kentucky was paralyzed by an ice
storm, which severely impacted the ability of many Kentuckians to obtain food and fuel, and also
had a severe impact on the transportation and communications sectors, all of which are operated
and maintained by the private sector. As a result of this, the Wisconsin Department of
Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection division have categorized those as critical
resources, and Fisher states “The absence of these critical resources resulted in a compromised
food distribution system.”
Similarly in a report prepared by ICF International (2014) for the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority, it was noted that in long duration events where the
electrical distribution system is disrupted, it will limit the ability of the fuel distributors to
transport, deliver and dispense transportation and heating fuel to the points of sale. An in 2012, a
derecho caused widespread power outages for millions of customers, and also due to a failure of
a communications systems provider a loss of 911 emergency call services throughout much of
Virginia for several days (Federal Communications Commission 2013), and also to
communications systems in general.
Scholars and experts discuss common systems that would be considered “critical” for any
community in a long-term response and recovery operation, and many of these are privately
operated and not normally an integral part of the planning process within the National Incident

Management System. As Miskel (2006) notes, “until electricity is restored, recovery cannot
begin”. This paper will discuss known how scholars and experts in the field of emergency
management view the role of the private sector operators in insuring the continuance of
operations of their privately held critical infrastructure.

Chapter Two
Literature Review
James F. Miskel (2006) states that “Utility and telecommunications companies play an even
more important role in disaster relief” as compared to insurance companies and other for-profit
corporations, and that “until electricity is restored, recovery cannot begin”. He goes on to detail
how these private sector agencies respond to disasters by bringing in assistance from other
related companies across North America. He continues by detailing the way that the federal
government responds to the same disasters and discussing that private sector, for-profit
companies plan and respond in ways that support their “selfish” interests. (pp 18-21). Miskel
goes on to detail how in the wake of Hurricane Katrina parts of New Orleans were without
power six months after the hurricane (p 99).
Christa J. Fisher in her study conducted for the State of Wisconsin (n.d.) discusses that
food and fuel are critical infrastructure. Her study used three disasters as points of reference in
how various government agencies and volunteer organizations active in disasters (VOADs) and
private citizens worked through disasters with durations of up to or in some cases exceeding one
month. She details how Wisconsin studied those disasters and determined that four resources are
essential to food distribution: power, communications, transportation and fuel (Fisher, n.d).
Keith Stammer as quoted by Adam Stone (2013) in referring to the loss of power and water
supplies in the wake of Hurricane Sandy said that “In the short term, people generally had
enough food, clothing, batteries, medicine and such for anywhere from 72 to 96 hours”. Stone
went on to state that it took weeks to recover. He then put forth the question as to what would
have happened had those week stretched to months or more, or reached a much larger area.
Garry Briese was also quoted by Stone in regards to such loss of critical infrastructure saying

“Everything in our society revolves around the availability of electric power”. Stone also
discussed the social implications of a prolonged loss of electrical services in that “Supermarkets
will be cleaned out in a couple of days. Fresh water will become scarce” (pp 17-22).
The National Research Council (2012) detailed the issues associated with private-sector
vital services. Their report states that “many organizations that provide vital social services such
as water, food, fuel, and communications remain vulnerable to both short- and long-term
interruptions. Indeed, some have become more vulnerable with the widespread use of computer
technology. For example, years ago telephones received their power over the same lines that
carried the voice signals. In ordinary situations an interruption of telephone service for a few
hours or even a few days is an inconvenience. However, in an extended interruption telephone
and communications services during a major disaster…, lives may be lost if the public is unable
to call 911, or if other emergency communications are disrupted” (p 82).
The Federal Communications Commission’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
(2013) detailed the loss of 911 communications as a result of the failure of private sector
operated and maintained systems due to the loss of primary and backup power. According to the
report, “Seventy-seven 9-1-1 call centers (also known as “Public Safety Answering Points” or
“PSAPs”) serving more than 3.6 million people in six states lost some degree of connectivity,
including vital information on the location of 9-1-1 calls, mostly due to service provider network
problems”. The report goes on to discuss that these were in large part avoidable (p 1).
ICF International (2014) details that Superstorm Sandy caused extensive damage to the
petroleum supply infrastructure, in that “Flooding and power outages shut refineries and
numerous bulk terminals in the New York Harbor area and some facilities remained shut for
weeks after the storm had passed” (p 20).

Conclusion
There have been many studies and reports detailing the need for cooperation between
various levels of government and private sector service providers, and most discuss the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) (Homeland Security, 2008) or the National Response
Framework (NRF) (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011). In doing so, a common
theme is the way in which the private sector service providers plan for and work with the state
and local emergency management agencies and their roles in long-term response and recovery
operations.

Chapter Three
Research Method
In an article written by Fisher (n.d.), and The National Research Council’s (2012) report on
Terrorism and Electric Power Distribution System, and the Federal Communications
Commission Homeland Security Bureau’s report following the 2012 Derecho (2012), it was
discussed that the response to widespread critical infrastructure disruptions is complicated as
much of the critical infrastructure is in the hands of private, for-profit, individuals or
corporations, and as such is not normally addressed in plans for response and recover operations
prepared by emergency management agencies in the same manner as infrastructure that is in the
control of government agencies. This paper will examine this by examining two questions.
Question one: How do scholars in the field of Emergency Management perceive the role of
the local government in working with private critical infrastructure in the planning and
coordinating during response and recovery operations?
Question two: How do experts in the Emergency Management field perceive the role of the
local government in working with private critical infrastructure in the planning and coordinating
during response and recovery operations?
This research was conducted using qualitative research. Qualitative research, while not
able to put numerical data to great use, is more adaptable to studies of perceptions of individuals
or groups, and is also able to more closely examine individual cases or instances of an event,
such as studies conducted after an earthquake, hurricane or other natural disaster. Quantitative
research is better suited to statistical studies, such as demographics, income distribution, etc. It is
less capable of determining the “why” of an event, but more able to describe the “who”.

Quantitative research also requires careful development of an instrument, usually in the form of a
survey, in order to have a sample that would represent the whole. As this research focuses on
response and recovery in the wake of a large-scale event, which would occur infrequently,
Qualitative Methods are best suited to this study as it deals with the perceptions of individuals
(Neuman et al., 2005; Joyner et al 2013, pp. 72-80).
In the conduct of the research for this paper, cases studied were limited to those conducted
after the attacks of September 11, 2001 as there were many changes to the emergency
management systems as a whole (United States. Department of Homeland Security. United
States. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p.3). The cases were selected from
publications of researchers within educational institutions, government agencies and policy
institutes (“think tanks”), as well as state and local level government emergency management
agencies across the United States in order to prevent any regional bias that may have resulted due
to the nature of weather and geologic phenomenon (i.e. earthquake in the west, hurricanes in the
east, etc.).

Chapter Four
This study was conducted to determine the viewpoints of both scholars and emergency
management professionals with regards to privately owned and operated infrastructure in long
term disaster response and recovery planning and operations.
Findings
The questions asked by this paper are one: How do scholars in the field of Emergency
Management perceive the role of the local government in working with private critical
infrastructure in the planning and coordinating during response and recovery operations and,
how do experts in the Emergency Management field perceive the role of the local government in
working with private critical infrastructure in the planning and coordinating during response and
recovery operations?
This was a qualitative study, using existing research, case studies, textbooks, journals and
other scholarly works as the basis for the first question. For the question as related to the
perceptions of emergency management professionals, government and private case studies of
response and recovery operations, after-action reports, emergency management plans, exercises,
magazine articles and other sources were used to determine how these professionals actually plan
and execute their response and recovery operations, with particular interest paid to the privately
held infrastructure. Only documents relating to post 9/11 incidents and planning were considered
due to the many changes in emergency management after that event.
For the first question, that of how scholars view privately operated critical infrastructure in
relation to the response and recoveries of long term disruptions, Miskel (2006) answers the
question best, and the other documents echo, that the response system is a composite of public
and private sector (both for-profit and not for profit) components that should work together in

order to provide a response capability. He also details how often the federal government
response is often the least important component and instead the majority of the effort will fall on
the state and local governments in concert with the private sector. Miskel details that some of the
key privately operated infrastructure is the electrical generation and distribution system as well
as the telecommunications systems upon which the entire response will rely, going on to say that
“Clearly, until electricity is restored, recovery cannot begin” (pp 1-3, 17-19).
In the study by Fisher (n.d.) she detailed the issues that may arise with privately operated
infrastructure, particularly in smaller communities, and the cooperation that should occur,
particularly in areas where the emergency services are dependent on those services for their
operations. Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission’s Homeland Security Bureau
(2013) found that in the 2012 Derecho, the loss of power to critical privately operated
communications nodes caused a loss in public service communications, which delayed response
time and in some cases may have directly contributed to the loss of lives (pp 1-4), and the same
was found in analysis of the situation reports (SITREPs) on the Virginia Department of
Emergency Management’s website detailing the response and recovery on a daily basis (Virginia
Department of Emergency Management, 2015).
In regards to the second question, that of how the privately owned critical infrastructure is
viewed by those in the emergency management field, the documentation was less clear. The
National Incident Management System (United States. Department of Homeland Security.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008) tasks the Department of
Homeland Security with developing a policy to protect “critical infrastructure and key resources
(CIKR)”. It also details that the private sector plays an important role, particularly in regards to
the delivery of goods and services (pp. 10-11, 15-16), and this is echoed in the National

Emergency Communications Plan (United States. Department of Homeland Security, 2014, pp.
10-13).
Particular attention was paid to reviewing documents such as plans and training exercises
for areas known to have been affected in recent long-term infrastructure disruptions. It was
thought that those areas would be most likely to have made changes to their emergency
operations to more closely follow the NIMS/NRF process when it comes to the involvement of
the private operators. The Greene County, Virginia Office of Emergency Management’s All-
Hazards Emergency Operations Plan was selected as that county was one of many affected by
the 2012 Derecho, and in the following year a severe ice-storm which also caused long-term
infrastructure disruptions. West Virginia was similarly selected for its involvement in the same
disasters, along with the 2009 ice-storm that struck Kentucky. The exercises developed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the State of Wisconsin’s document with exercises,
planning and after-action reviews, and the Clark County Nevada Emergency Operations Plan
(Greene County Virginia, 2005; West Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management, 2016; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011; Wisconsin Department of
Military Affairs, Division of Emergency Management, 2010; Clark County, NV, 2011).
Evidence of the rolls private sector critical infrastructure and the emergency management
professionals at the state and local level was sought, including reviews of plans from the Virginia
Department of Emergency Management including guidance provided to the local governments,
the State of Alabama Emergency Operations Plan with guidance to local governments, the State
of New York’s Emergency Planning Guide For Community Officials, and several other selected
from throughout the United States (Virginia Department of Emergency Management, 2015;
Virginia Department of Emergency Management, 2016; Alabama Emergency Management

Agency, 2012; New York State Emergency Management Office & New York State Emergency
Management Association, 2008).
Summary
The study examined how scholars in the field of Emergency Management perceive the
role of the local government in working with private critical infrastructure in the planning and
coordinating during response and recovery operations, by reviewing texts as written on the
subject, with emphasis placed on post 9/11 incidents. Evidence indicating a consensus of opinion
on what level of involvement of state and local government in working with privately operated
critical infrastructure was sought, especially those in electrical generation and distribution, fuel
distribution, especially along the distribution and retail chain, food distribution and retail
operations, and the transportation sectors. For the professionals in the field of Emergency
Management, the same evidence was sought, but the documentation differed in that
documentation that would reflect their planning for and responses to long-term privately
operated infrastructure disruptions, such as plans, exercises and after-action reports was
reviewed.

Chapter Five
Introduction
As previously discussed, this paper examined the issues pertaining to the perceptions of
scholars and experts in the field of Emergency Management in regards to the necessity of
continuance of critical services provided by the private sector in long-term response and
recoveries in relation to the NIMS process.
Miskel (2006) stated that “until electricity is restored, recovery cannot begin”, and Fisher
(n.d.) similarly discussed how privately owned and operated infrastructure, particularly in the
fields of electricity, fuel (especially as used for transport and emergency power generation),
transportation and communications play a crucial role in food distribution. Also, the Federal
Communication Commission’s (FCC) Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (2013)
conducted a study in the wake of the 2012 Derecho where many of the same observations were
made, particularly from the aspect of a systems failure (Miskel 2006, pp 18-21; Fisher, n.d.; FCC
2013).
The major sections of this chapter will summarize the results of this paper and discuss their
implications.
Statement of Problem
This paper examined the issues related to the privately owned and operated critical
infrastructure by asking two question:
Question one: How do scholars in the field of Emergency Management perceive the role of
the local government in working with private critical infrastructure in the planning and
coordinating during response and recovery operations?
Question two: How do experts in the Emergency Management field perceive the role of the

local government in working with private critical infrastructure in the planning and coordinating
during response and recovery operations?
Review of Methodology
The research was conducted by using qualitative methods, relying on reviews of literature
from scholars in the field of homeland security and emergency management in order to answer
the first question, and reviews of after action reviews, exercise plans, emergency operations and
recovery plans, as well as any other documents as produced by practitioners in the field of
emergency management for the second question. Documents were sought from both perspectives
for the same events wherever possible, with particular focus being placed on events that occurred
after scholarly research was conducted for certain events. These documents were analyzed to
determine how the particular individual(s) viewed the role of privately held infrastructure
operators in conjunction with the roles of emergency management professionals from the manner
in which their documents discussed those roles.
Summary of Results
For the first question, that of how scholars in the field of emergency management view the
roles of private infrastructure operators and emergency management professionals, there were
many cases which were discussed. The first of these is the role of private infrastructure in the
process as a whole. Miskel (2006) describes this role several times throughout his book in
reference to Hurricanes Katrina and Hugo, as well as the response process as a whole, discussing
the importance of planning and coordinating in order to restore essential services as quickly as
possible (pp 1-3, 17-19). Fisher (n.d.) in her study of disasters to strike Kentucky similarly
determined the importance of private infrastructure operators and the government emergency
managers working closely together, discussing that they are now intertwined in ways that just a

few short years ago would not have necessarily been the case. She described how, because a
local government did not have its own fuel supply, was reliant on commercial fuel vendors who
were left inoperable due to the lack of electricity to operate the pumps and could not provide fuel
to the emergency vehicles of the county, directly impacting the governmental response to the
emergency.
Several papers discussed how failure in the privately held infrastructure as well as failures
for cooperative planning between governmental planners and those private infrastructure
operators can have serious consequences, and thus the need to work closely in all phases of
emergency management. In the FCC’s 2013 report (FCC, 2013) situations were described where
the Public Service Access Points (PSAP), which are where 9-1-1 calls are routed to be
dispatched out, went down during the 2012 Derecho because the private company who operated
the communications system experienced multiple failures in their backup power systems, thus
causing the loss of 9-1-1 service to wide areas. There were no contingency plans on the part of
the private company to have either an alternative power supply brought online, nor did the local
governments have an emergency plan in progress to either have a backup communications
system provided by another vendor, nor a plan to bring in emergency power to the PSAP. As a
result, lives were lost and other responses were hindered or delayed (FCC, 2013).
Many of these issues were discussed at length in chapters Six through Eight of The
National Resource Council of The National Academies’ (National Resource Council) report on
Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System (National Resource Council, 2012). While the
reports focus was on a terrorist attack on the national power grid, the cases studied in the
development of the report were actual incidents such as hurricanes, ice-storms, and cascading
power failures and the subsequent response and recovery operations. Again, the findings were

that there needs to be strong cooperation in the emergency management planning and response
process (pp 55-90).
In regards to the second question, that of how professionals in the field of emergency
management perceive their roles in working with the private sector critical infrastructure
providers, the results were quite different. In reviewing emergency management plans, exercises,
after action reports and other documents from a variety of emergency management agencies
throughout the United States, what was found was a lack of cooperative planning between the
government emergency management professionals and those private infrastructure providers.
What was found was instead a reliance on the federal government to intervene rather than to
have robust plans in place. In one particular instance which is indicative of the planning by the
majority of emergency management offices, Greene County, VA, which was affected by the
2012 Derecho and the 2009 ice storms studied by Fisher (n.d.), the plans have remained stagnant
and, although they lost power and use of their PSAP during the 2012 Derecho (FCC, 2013;
VDEM, 2016), there has been no change in how the plan would address these issues. The same
was found throughout the profession. Even in the State of Wisconsin’s exercise dealing with
long term power outage (Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs, Division of Emergency
Management, 2010) there was little mention of any plans or contingencies where cooperation
between the public and private sector, other than those roles in FEMA’s emergency support
functions (ESF), primarily that of mass care in ESF-6, were even addressed. Working to mitigate
the risks at the service provider or providing for alternative systems was not referenced.
Relationship to Research in the Field
The many studies conducted in the post-9-11 world of emergency management have
looked at how the various systems that society relies upon are interconnected, and how a failure

of one system can have an impact far beyond what may have been the case twenty years ago.
This paper validated the research as conducted by Fisher (n.d.), the Federal Communications
Commission (2013), the National Research Council (2012), and further reinforced Miskel’s
studies on public/private infrastructure (2006). The various studies, while differing in details, did
come to similar conclusions and found much the same as was found during the research for this
paper.
Discussion of Results
It is significant to note that as our technologies become more advanced, and in many ways
make our lives more efficient, this comes at a cost. The very technology that makes easy
payment for services possible, the credit card terminal, is also a weak spot in that this relies on
electricity, provided by a private company, and telephone or data communication, also provided
by a private company. The cost savings that public service agencies obtain by using private fuel
companies rather than operating their own fuel points is a risk because these fuel companies,
usually commercial gas stations, frequently have no back up power systems to operate the fuel
pumps. Loss of power to grocery stores and pharmacies can force people who would otherwise
be able to shelter in place to move into emergency shelters or hospitals.
The privately held infrastructure plays an important, and ever increasing role in the daily
operations of the necessities of life. What was found was that as technology plays a larger part in
society, many of the essential components of that society become more and more reliant upon
this technology, nearly all of which are in the private sector. The risks increase each time a part
is added to the way in which we do daily business, and the emergency management field is not
keeping pace with the technologies.

Conclusions
This paper examined the perceptions of scholars and experts in the field of Emergency
Management in regards to the necessity of continuance of critical services provided by the
private sector in long-term response and recoveries in relation to the NIMS process. What was
found was that scholars have thoroughly examined this issue and found that there is great
necessity in continuing the operation of those critical services, with most agreeing that hospitals,
food distribution, fuel, transportation, communications and most importantly, electricity are the
main private sector functions which would be considered critical infrastructure. There was also a
consensus that emergency management agencies at each level of government, city, county, state
and in some cases federal, should work with those private infrastructure providers in order to
insure continuity of operations, an effective response and a speedy recovery.
For the roles that emergency management professionals perceive for themselves in relation
to this private infrastructure, the findings were quite different. From the lack of planning in the
majority of documents reviewed as published by emergency managers and emergency
management agencies, it was evident that there is a perception among these that in the event of a
large-scale disruption of services that the federal government will provide all those services.
With the exception of power companies, there was seen virtually no attempts to work with those
infrastructure providers as a partner in either the planning process, exercises or during actual
events.
The conclusion is that it is known by scholars in the field of emergency management what
the role of emergency management agencies should be when working with private infrastructure
providers, and that is much the same as would be done with any governmental agency or
volunteer organizations. The perceptions of those emergency management agencies however is

much different, and that is that, except as noted with the power companies, do not see a role in
those private infrastructure providers in either the planning for or actual response and recovery
operations.

References
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