Make Profit with UI-Redressing

                                    AMol NAik
                http://amolnaik4.blogspot.com
Agenda
   UI-Redressing
   Server-Side Mitigations
   How to make Profit?
   What to Target?
   Tools to Hack
   CSS Basics
   Exploitation Techniques
   Conclusion
UI-Redressing
    Change User Interface in browser
    Victim clicks button on attacker site
    He/she actually clicking button on Vulnerable site




Source: http://www.imperva.com/resources/glossary/clickjacking_ui-redressing.html
UI-Redressing
   Mostly neglected by vendors
       Why? – Need user interaction
       Browser dependancy


   Impact:
       Same as CSRF
       One click – GONE!!
       Bypass CSRF protections
       Exploit “Self-XSS”
       Cross-domain Content Extraction
Server-Side Mitigations
   X-Frame-Options
       Response Header
       Supported by most of the latest browsers

       Two possible values to use:
           DENY
               The page cannot be displayed in a frame, regardless of the site
                attempting to do so


           SAMEORIGIN
               The page can only be displayed in a frame on the same origin as the
                page itself.
Server-Side Mitigations
    Frame Bursting Code
        JavaScript
        Ensures the current frame is the most top level window




Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking
How to make Profit?
   Bug Bounties
       Google
         Pays from $500 to $3133.7
         XSS, CSRF are prime focus
         Name will be listed in Google Security Hall of Fame
        http://www.google.com/about/corporate/company/halloffame.html


       Facebook
         Starting from $500
         XSS, CSRF, Open Redirect, Database Injection
         Name will be listed in Facebook WhiteHat
        http://www.facebook.com/whitehat
What to Target?

   CSRF protected actions

   Pages with tokens

   Self-XSS
Tools to Hack
   Browser
       I use
   Add-ons
       Clickjacking Defense – Declarative Security
           Created by Aditya k Sood
           Check for “X-Frame-Options”



       Firebug
           Many uses
           CSS editing On-the-Fly
CSS Basics
   Opacity
       Set Transparency for the element
   Top, Left
       Negative values shift elements out of the browser window
   Position
       Specifies the type of positioning method used for an
        element
           Static (default) - The box is a normal box. The 'top', 'right',
            'bottom', and 'left' properties do not apply.
           Relative - The box's position is calculated according to the
            normal flow
           Absolute - The box's position is specified with the 'top', 'right',
            'bottom', and 'left' properties
           Fixed - The box's position is calculated according to the
            'absolute' model, but in addition, the box is fixed.
Exploitation Techniques
Exploitation Techniques
   Action with Single Click
       Technique: Simple Clickjacking
       Ex: Remove Google Books
Exploitation Techniques
   Action with 2 user clicks
       Technique: Fake Arithmetic Captcha
       Ex: Remove Google Orkut Service
Exploitation Techniques
   Single CSRF token
       Technique: Fake Captcha with SVG Masking
       Cross-Domain Content Extraction
       Ex: Facebook XHR
Exploitation Techniques
   Multiple CSRF tokens in source
       Technique: Drag-n-Drop with “view-source”
       Cross-Domain Content Extraction
       Ex: Facebook PoC
Exploitation Techniques
   Self-XSS Exploitation
       Technique: Drag-n-Drop
       Ex: Google Code XSS
Conclusion
   Profit & Fame
   Most of the sites didn’t implement protections
   Firefox still supports for “view-source” scheme
   Attack technique depends on target
   Imagination is only the limitation
References
   https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking
   http://ui-redressing.mniemietz.de/uiRedressing.pdf
   http://html5sec.org/
   http://blog.kotowicz.net/2011/07/cross-domain-
    content-extraction-with.html
   http://www.blog.fortitsecurity.com/2011/09/facebook-
    graph-api-access-token.html
   http://www.w3.org/TR/CSS2/visuren.html#positioning
    -scheme
Questions




            http://twitter.com/amolnaik4

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Make profit with UI-Redressing attacks.

  • 1. Make Profit with UI-Redressing AMol NAik http://amolnaik4.blogspot.com
  • 2. Agenda  UI-Redressing  Server-Side Mitigations  How to make Profit?  What to Target?  Tools to Hack  CSS Basics  Exploitation Techniques  Conclusion
  • 3. UI-Redressing  Change User Interface in browser  Victim clicks button on attacker site  He/she actually clicking button on Vulnerable site Source: http://www.imperva.com/resources/glossary/clickjacking_ui-redressing.html
  • 4. UI-Redressing  Mostly neglected by vendors  Why? – Need user interaction  Browser dependancy  Impact:  Same as CSRF  One click – GONE!!  Bypass CSRF protections  Exploit “Self-XSS”  Cross-domain Content Extraction
  • 5. Server-Side Mitigations  X-Frame-Options  Response Header  Supported by most of the latest browsers  Two possible values to use:  DENY  The page cannot be displayed in a frame, regardless of the site attempting to do so  SAMEORIGIN  The page can only be displayed in a frame on the same origin as the page itself.
  • 6. Server-Side Mitigations  Frame Bursting Code  JavaScript  Ensures the current frame is the most top level window Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking
  • 7. How to make Profit?  Bug Bounties  Google  Pays from $500 to $3133.7  XSS, CSRF are prime focus  Name will be listed in Google Security Hall of Fame http://www.google.com/about/corporate/company/halloffame.html  Facebook  Starting from $500  XSS, CSRF, Open Redirect, Database Injection  Name will be listed in Facebook WhiteHat http://www.facebook.com/whitehat
  • 8. What to Target?  CSRF protected actions  Pages with tokens  Self-XSS
  • 9. Tools to Hack  Browser  I use  Add-ons  Clickjacking Defense – Declarative Security  Created by Aditya k Sood  Check for “X-Frame-Options”  Firebug  Many uses  CSS editing On-the-Fly
  • 10. CSS Basics  Opacity  Set Transparency for the element  Top, Left  Negative values shift elements out of the browser window  Position  Specifies the type of positioning method used for an element  Static (default) - The box is a normal box. The 'top', 'right', 'bottom', and 'left' properties do not apply.  Relative - The box's position is calculated according to the normal flow  Absolute - The box's position is specified with the 'top', 'right', 'bottom', and 'left' properties  Fixed - The box's position is calculated according to the 'absolute' model, but in addition, the box is fixed.
  • 12. Exploitation Techniques  Action with Single Click  Technique: Simple Clickjacking  Ex: Remove Google Books
  • 13. Exploitation Techniques  Action with 2 user clicks  Technique: Fake Arithmetic Captcha  Ex: Remove Google Orkut Service
  • 14. Exploitation Techniques  Single CSRF token  Technique: Fake Captcha with SVG Masking  Cross-Domain Content Extraction  Ex: Facebook XHR
  • 15. Exploitation Techniques  Multiple CSRF tokens in source  Technique: Drag-n-Drop with “view-source”  Cross-Domain Content Extraction  Ex: Facebook PoC
  • 16. Exploitation Techniques  Self-XSS Exploitation  Technique: Drag-n-Drop  Ex: Google Code XSS
  • 17. Conclusion  Profit & Fame  Most of the sites didn’t implement protections  Firefox still supports for “view-source” scheme  Attack technique depends on target  Imagination is only the limitation
  • 18. References  https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking  http://ui-redressing.mniemietz.de/uiRedressing.pdf  http://html5sec.org/  http://blog.kotowicz.net/2011/07/cross-domain- content-extraction-with.html  http://www.blog.fortitsecurity.com/2011/09/facebook- graph-api-access-token.html  http://www.w3.org/TR/CSS2/visuren.html#positioning -scheme
  • 19. Questions http://twitter.com/amolnaik4