managing_info

Ingrid A. Lehmann
Managing
PUBLIC
INFORMATION
in a Mediation Process

PMToolkit_Lehmann FINAL.indd 2 1/26/09 4:02:20 PM

Managing Public Information

United States Institute of Peace
Washington, D.C.
Ingrid A. Lehmann
Managing
PUBLIC
INFORMATION

The Peacemaker’s Toolkit Series Editors: A. Heather Coyne and Nigel Quinney
The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect
views of the United States Institute of Peace.
United States Institute of Peace
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Washington, DC 20036-3011
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© 2009 by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace.
All rights reserved.
First published 2009
To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials for course use, contact Copyright
Clearance Center at www.copyright.com.
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National
Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI Z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Lehmann, Ingrid A., 1948-
Managing public information in a mediation process / Ingrid A. Lehmann.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-60127-041-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Mediation, International. 2. Communication in international relations. I. Title.
JZ6045.L44 2008
341.5’2--dc22
2008046531

Contents
Introduction....................................................................................................... 5
Step 1: Analyze the Information Environment ........................................... 11
Step 2: Plan Early for Information Needs .................................................... 19
Step 3: Design a Public Information Strategy.............................................. 25
Step 4: Implement a Communication Program.......................................... 29
Step 5: Engage Civil Society........................................................................... 37
Step 6: Monitor, Evaluate, and Assess........................................................... 43
Conclusion....................................................................................................... 47
Notes................................................................................................................. 49
Acknowledgments .......................................................................................... 52
About the Author ........................................................................................... 53
About the Institute.......................................................................................... 54

55
Introduction
Traditional diplomacy has tended to eschew media and public exposure.
Diplomats and negotiators of the old school prefer to conduct their business
in private settings out of the public limelight. While such confidentiality of
negotiations is highly prized by most peacemakers, keeping things quiet
and behind the scenes has become increasingly difficult.
There are several reasons for this. The “information revolution” of
the 1990s drastically changed the process of conveying and receiving
information: news is now reported from all corners of the world around
the clock and in real time by electronic media. Another aspect of this
apparent openness is the increased use of a variety of information tools
by the parties to a conflict. In the past, governments generally had a
monopoly on information in times of crisis and war. Today, however,
nonstate actors, including the antagonists, have access to information
channels and frequently use them effectively. Indeed, information has
itself become a field of conflict. To some extent, then, the electronic
media have helped to level the playing field by making easy-to-use
information technology available to all conflict parties. In dealing with
these new information challenges, concepts such as media diplomacy,
public diplomacy, information warfare, and Internet war have evolved
and have provided tools that are employed by growing numbers of
interlocutors in peace and in war.
Those who aim to make peace in international conflicts need then to
be cognizant of the information aspects of their efforts at negotiation and
mediation, and must develop strategies to communicate with a variety of
public audiences interested in and affected by the negotiations. Local
populations are those most directly concerned by violent conflict and
usually stand to gain from the results of peace negotiations, but they are
often left out of the information loop. As a consequence, local people are

6
Peacemaker’s Toolkit
frequently ill-informed and easily misinformed—sometimes deliberately
so—about the purposes of a third-party intervention.
The international community’s knowledge of the history, origins,
and perpetrators of such conflicts is usually scanty and not always
factually correct.1
Furthermore, in war zones fast-paced events require
frequent information updates to stay on top of developments. Very few
people are able to follow these swift changes. Journalists covering the
conflict must try to do so, but they often fall victim to what BBC
presenter Nik Gowing has termed the “3Fs”: first, fast, but flawed.
Communication is an art form, but information strategies and
practices can be learned by those who must plan an information
campaign to convey messages to publics in foreign settings. Effective
professional communication can help to
➤ gain support for peaceful avenues of managing and resolving an
international dispute, locally, regionally, and internationally;
➤ promote an informed understanding of the peace process in the area
of conflict;
➤ maintain support for the peacemakers at their own base (i.e., in the
capital or place where their headquarters is located)—such
sustenance is vital for continued funding as well as enduring support
in international political arenas, such as the UN Security Council;
➤ gain the backing of allies and friends of the peacemakers, both
governmental and non-governmental, who are expected to play a
positive role in helping resolve the conflict at hand and who may not
always see eye-to-eye with the primary negotiator;2
➤ unify the presentation of the image of the peacemaker and the
messages projected by his or her team and other collaborators—
often those deployed in such settings have only vague ideas why they
are in the theater of conflict and what their main goals are;
➤ counteract divisive strategies that may be employed by the conflicting
parties or combatants and thus increase the leverage of the third-
party mediator vis-à-vis possible spoilers of the peace process;
➤ help transform the postsettlement media landscape in the area of
conflict by encouraging freedom of expression and transparency of

7
Introduction
the political environment, and by assisting in the development of new
media and information channels in the peacebuilding phase, if
deemed necessary.
This handbook sets out six steps and numerous tasks that can be
undertaken by mediators and their information teams prior to embarking
on negotiations, as well as during and after peace negotiations.
➤ Step 1 is to thoroughly analyze the information environment in the
area of conflict, carefully assessing the main media and civil society
actors and the influence they wield.
➤ Step 2 is to plan early for public information tasks and develop a
structure (a well-trained staff, a network of allies, etc.) for
information management so that the campaign can swing into
action as soon as the mediation begins.
➤ Step 3 involves designing an information campaign that will support the
mediation, bearing in mind strategic communication needs.
➤ Step 4 is to implement the information campaign locally and
internationally, matching target audiences with information products
on selected issues. Most tasks will focus on the theater of operations and
will involve using all available tools, including radio, television and
video, print production, and web-based services. Crisis management in
the area of conflict is also an important tool in the information
campaign.
➤ Step 5 is to engage civil society and develop partnership relationships
with non-governmental actors.
➤ Step 6 is to evaluate and assess the information tasks by monitoring
the media and surveying local public opinion. After-action reports
will assist in the continuing learning process and should be shared
with other peacemakers.
These steps form a continuum, and some of them, such as step 5, can
and should be performed throughout the mediation process.
The mediation process is itself part of a larger process made up of
phases that form a continuum, from prenegotiation to negotiation,
agreement to implementation and beyond. These phases are often
overlapping, recursive, or simultaneous. Nonetheless, mediators tend to

8
be busiest during—rather than after—the negotiation of an agreement,
and this handbook is written with that phase chiefly in mind.
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process is designed to
help mediators identify areas where they may need more research or
preparation, as well as options and strategies relevant to the particular case
on which they are working. Examples (in italics in the text) from past
mediation efforts are provided to illustrate how various strategies have
played out in practice and how various factors have facilitated or impeded
the mediator’s work. These examples are drawn from a wide variety of
mediation efforts and are intended to be of use to mediators involved in
an equally broad range of situations. Some mediators may represent the
United Nations or a regional organization, others may work for a third-
party government, and others may be serving in a private or semi-private
capacity. Some may be heading UN peace missions, others may be working
concurrently with such missions, and others may be operating at the
request of one or both of the conflicted parties. The guidance contained
here is intended to be appropriate to most, if not all, of these situations.
The Peacemaker’s Toolkit
This handbook is part of the series The Peacemaker’s Toolkit, which is being
published by the United States Institute of Peace. The first in the series,
Managing a Mediation Process by Amy L. Smith and David R. Smock, offers, as
its title indicates, an overview of the mediation process, and may be read in
conjunction with Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process.
For twenty-five years, the United States Institute of Peace has supported
the work of mediators through research, training programs, workshops,
and publications designed to discover and disseminate the keys to effective
mediation. The Institute—mandated by the U.S. Congress to help prevent,
manage, and resolve international conflict through nonviolent means—
conceived The Peacemaker’s Toolkit as a way of combining its accumulated
expertise with that of other organizations active in the field of mediation. Most
publications in the series are produced jointly by the Institute and a partner
organization. All publications are carefully reviewed before publication by
highly experienced mediators to ensure that the final product will be a useful
and reliable resource for practitioners.

9
Introduction
The Online Version
There is an online version of The Peacemaker’s Toolkit that presents not only the
text of this handbook but also connects readers to a vast web of information.
Links in the online version give readers immediate access to a considerable
variety of publications, news reports, directories, and other sources of data
regarding ongoing mediation initiatives, case studies, theoretical frameworks,
and education and training. These links enable the online Toolkit to serve as a
“you are here”map to the larger literature available on mediation. The online
version can be accessed at http://www.usip.org/mediation/tools_resources/
index.html#toolkit.

10
The Mediator and the Media-Opinion-Policy Loop
This diagram describes an interactive, iterative loop that begins when a crisis
occurs somewhere in the world. The media cover the crisis with varying
degrees of accuracy and completeness, and that coverage influences the
formation of public opinion on the crisis. That opinion impacts the reaction of
governments and intergovernmental organizations. It may become a driving
force for international policy on the crisis. But the public may also ignore the
crisis, as governments and intergovernmental organizations tend initially
to downplay crises. However, the initial response to the crisis will influence
the effectiveness of the operation that may be launched. Early inaction, for
example, usually exacts a price in terms of criticism of the inadequacy of the
response; that criticism then generates further news and reenters the loop.
The mediator is interested in and influenced by all phases of the loop; he or
she must be engaged everywhere and anywhere.
Adapted from Ingrid A. Lehmann, Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire
(London: Cass, 1999).
Public
Opinion
Informs/Focuses
Media
Reporting
Generates
News
CRISIS!
The
Mediator
Ignores
Issue
Demands
Action
Policy Pressures;
Governments, Regional
Organizations
Downplays
Crisis
Launches
Operation

1111
Step One
Analyze the Information Environment
The first step in managing public information in a mediation process is
to analyze the information infrastructure in the theater of conflict.
Conflicts, whether international or intrastate, often involve more than
two parties, and the mediator must identify each of these and determine
their capacities to shape or to be influenced by the information
environment.
In addition, if neighboring countries or external actors play a critical
role in the evolution and settlement prospects of a conflict, the analysis
needs to be extended at an early stage to the political and media
landscape of those neighboring countries. Cases in point are the conflicts
in the Great Lakes region of Africa, involving the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, or the conflicts in Western
Africa engaging the neighboring countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
the Ivory Coast. Those conflicts have led to the deployment of seven
different UN peacekeeping and political missions in a decade.
The following five analytical tasks need to be undertaken by the
peacemaker’s team as soon as possible to assess the information
environment in the area of operation.
Identify Parties to the Conflict and Their Support
Mechanisms
➤ Who and what are the main parties to the conflict? What are their
political support systems and their relative acceptance among the
wider public? If available, public opinion surveys will be useful for
this analysis; if not, pre-deployment trips can serve as informal
survey missions.

12
➤ What is the level of civic engagement? An important indicator
for the level of civic engagement is the roles played by local
institutions such as churches, temples, and mosques and the
existence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Which of
those are likely to support the peace process? What are their means
of communication?
➤ Civic, religious, political, and business leaders with the greatest
standing and credibility in the country should be identified with a
view to contacting them to gauge their attitude toward the peace
process and the possibility of enlisting their support.
➤ Do the political parties or other interlocutors have their own media?
Are propagandistic or hate media active? Who supports them? Who
listens to them?
➤ How do rumors spread? If the country has no significant independent
media or is a rumor-based society such as Haiti, where information
travels by word of mouth, the main carriers of rumors need to be
identified.
Evaluate the Information Infrastructure in
the Area of Conflict
This is the most important nuts-and-bolts pre-planning assessment that
needs to be carried out in the country. All available resources, including
human intelligence as well as library- and Internet-based research tools,
must be employed in conducting this assessment.
The mediator must evaluate the information infrastructure from two
angles: the population as a whole and the role of the media in particular.
Assess Various Aspects of Communicating with the Population
➤ Literacy and Education: What literacy rates does the country
have? What is the level and quality of schooling? Are females
educated differently from men, and do they have different literacy
rates that would indicate that a different information strategy is
needed for them? Are any (other) key communal groups educated
separately and/or differently from the norm? Does the country

13
Step 1: Analyze the Information Environment
possess institutions of higher learning? Is the country’s elite being
trained in-country or abroad? Do the different ethnic groups send
their children to separate schools?
➤ Languages: Determine which languages are in use in the population.
If a multitude of languages are in use, as is often the case in Africa, is
there a lingua franca spoken and understood by all?
In the case of the UN operation in Namibia in 1989, Afrikaans
was determined to be that language, but it was used by the UN
information program only in the beginning, as it was soon agreed
that English would be the future language of independent Namibia.
Still, the information program had to be prepared for the use of
eleven different languages.
➤ Technology: Is most or much of the country electrified? Which parts
are not? The answers to these questions will determine the balance
between the use of high-tech and low-tech media. Do “white spots”
(areas where the electricity supply is unreliable or nonexistent and
where cell phones cannot be used) exist? Determine whether any of
these constraints disproportionately affect key target groups for an
information campaign (such as rebel groups or internally displaced
persons).
Assess the Media and Their Role in the Conflict
➤ Research the main media in the area of conflict:
❯ Print: Identify newspapers and magazines, their readership and
political orientation.
❯ Radio: Assess the availability of radio sets and identify news-
relevant programs and the most popular programs.
❯ Television: Determine access to local and international channels
by the population, and assess the size and composition of the
audiences for those channels.
❯ Internet: Determine the number of people with regular access
to the Internet and their general level of computer skills.
➤ Have there been prior instances of ethnic hatred and violence in
which local media have played a role? If yes, the media must be
monitored before the mediator’s team is deployed.

14
In the case of Rwanda, which is one of the most researched case
studies ex post facto, it was known that Radio Television Mille Collines
was actively spreading hate propaganda, but no acceptable tools to
counteract this propaganda were devised. A UN radio station became
active only eighteen months after the peace operation was deployed—
too late to be effective in countering hate messages. Rwandan
journalists who had fomented the ethnic hatred that led to the
genocide were later convicted in an international criminal court.
Determine the Role of the Host Country in the
Information Environment
Early on, it is important to analyze the roles that the host country or
countries play in shaping the information space. When one or more
governments are parties to a conflict, asymmetries in access to
information resources (e.g., access to airwaves or to printing supplies)
are likely to exist. An unprincipled host will often influence the process
unduly, usually by controlling media reporting or by denying the
negotiating partner media access. Such governments may also seek to
discredit the mediator or even the entire peace process when it suits
them to do so. The mediator must be alert to such moves and prepared to
react to safeguard the integrity of the mission.
Robust mission leadership is usually required to deal with host
country spoilers of the peace process.
In the case of the United Nations Transitional Administration in
Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) in 1996–97, the UN special representative
Jacques Klein managed to project an image of strength in a lawless
region of the Balkans. He set up a strong public affairs program that,
among its other achievements, produced three-hour radio programs on
Radio Vukovar and set up information stalls in a weekly street market
open to both ethnic groups.
In Darfur, the international community continues to be severely
tested on all fronts, including that of the free flow of information.
Radio broadcasts by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
were part of the Status of Forces Agreement, but the government of
Sudan has erected successive administrative and other hurdles to the

15
reception of UNMIS radio in Darfur and the north of Sudan. The
Darfur Lifeline radio station, operated by the BBC World Service Trust,
managed to broadcast in the region in 2006, and Radio Miraya, run
jointly by the United Nations and the Swiss Foundation Hirondelle
operates in part of the area, but the work of journalists is inhibited by
the Sudanese government and frequent arrests have produced an
atmosphere of fear and intimidation.
Under such circumstances, the mediator should encourage—publicly
or privately—the UN Security Council and the major powers to bring
political pressure to bear on the government or governments concerned.
At the same time, the mediator should seek to use the international wire
services and media based in neighboring countries or run by expatriates
to ensure that the mission’s message is heard within the country despite
government efforts to muffle the mission.
Assess the Coverage by International News Media
Media reporting of international conflicts tends to be highly selective and
subject to change over time.
In Rwanda, during the genocide in 1994, very few international
journalists reported about the country. In early 2008, by contrast, while
Kofi Annan mediated in the crisis in Kenya, hundreds of international
media organizations covered the negotiations.
News media tend to focus on conflicts that are accessible and occur in
areas with a relatively good infrastructure for reporting and broadcasting.
This leaves many smaller, less accessible areas of the world outside the scope
of international coverage. Peace talks are frequently covered for a few days,
but if negotiations drag on or hostilities resume, media will lose interest and
the conflict will become one of the many “forgotten wars.” There is also the
problem of “conflict fatigue,” which can set in when conflict cycles repeat
themselves in countries considered to have little strategic interest, or when
the international presence is curtailed, such as in Somalia in the 1990s as
that country drifted into a state of failure and hopelessness.
In the period leading up to the mediation effort, it is advisable to conduct
a survey of current and recent media coverage of the conflict at hand:

16
➤ Which media in what countries report on the conflict on a regular
basis? Who are the journalists most knowledgeable and engaged
with the issues? Are the media who report regularly influential in
shaping opinion among key stakeholders?
➤ Do these news media employ international correspondents or do
they rely on local stringers? Over the years, there has been a
significant reduction in the continuous presence of international
correspondents in a given theatre. As a consequence, international
media have come to place greater reliance on well-informed local
journalists, whose influence in shaping international coverage has
correspondingly increased. Mediators often focus on international
media, but if the mediator neglects local reporters, the mission may
experience problems with its coverage not only in the local but also
in the international media.
➤ Are local or international bloggers active in and around the area of
conflict? Who are they and where are they based? Bloggers have
become an increasingly influential phenomenon in international
politics. Some have organized community-based peace initiatives;
others have spread false rumors and been manipulated by political
parties, as was seen in the postelection conflict in Kenya in early
2008.3
News media in neighboring countries may also play important roles
and are often accessible to people in the area of conflict; they must
therefore be monitored as closely as possible.
Assess the Influence of Expatriate Communities
Expatriate communities often play an important role in fomenting or
resolving conflict, and it is therefore important to judge their impact on
the information infrastructure in the area of conflict.
It was reported in early 2008 that the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka
receive between 80 and 90 percent of their budget through donations
from Tamil exiles.4
In other conflicts, diaspora support has been
important in the post-conflict stage, especially with respect to
reconstruction and resettlement. In Kosovo, for instance, while the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had assisted some

17
75,000 refugees to return by the end of 1999, 800,000 had returned on
their own, largely financed by their diaspora.
It is important to identify players in the respective expatriate
communities who might influence the decision-making process of their
ethnic or national groups in the area of conflict. Expatriates sometimes
own and operate media in their home country and contact should
therefore be made with them to assess their potential roles in the peace
process. In some cases, expatriate-owned media have helped the
mediator reach audiences not only within diaspora populations but also
within the country itself. The power of expatriates to shape public
opinion in the area of conflict through interviews, statements, op-ed
articles, blogs, and mobile phone messages can be significant, even when
they are operating off-shore.
In Somalia, exiled Somalis in neighboring countries were influential
in relaying messages to their compatriots inside the country who had few
other information sources.

19
Step two
Plan Early for Information Needs
In the past, public information has often been treated as an afterthought
by international negotiators, so that whatever information work has
eventually been undertaken has been too little, too late, undermining
the prospects of managing public information effectively.
This lack of planning was prevalent in most of the UN operations in
the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of UNTAES in 1996–98. This
latter organization benefited from the lessons learned during the earlier
experiences of the ill-fated UN operations in Croatia and Bosnia and
had a strong information campaign from the outset.
A different case, but calamitous from a public relations perspective,
was that of the 2004 UN negotiations on Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriot
and Turkish-Cypriot communities held separate referenda on the
United Nations’ “Annan plan” in April of that year. The Greek Cypriot
population rejected the plan by a margin of three to one following a
massive campaign in the sensationalist Greek Cypriot press. The United
Nations was unable to counter this campaign, and questions arose
about the wisdom of agreeing to a referendum on a peace plan under
such unfavorable circumstances.
To reduce the risk of encountering similar problems, the mediator
should begin planning for public information tasks as soon as he or she
is appointed, making communication a central part of the peacemaking
strategy from the outset. Early efforts to develop a structure for the
management of public information will pay dividends later on.
If the peacemaking mission is part of a larger peacekeeping mission
authorized by the UN Security Council, it would be helpful to have an
information mandate included in the authorization. In smaller, less
formal mediation exercises, the resources of the UN Secretariat are not

20
available. Nevertheless, plans can and should be made to prepare for
basic information tasks.
Ideally, the structure for the management of information will include
a carefully selected and well-trained information team, a mediator able
to act as spokesperson for the mission, a means of determining the
information infrastructure and logistical needs in the conflict area, a
network of contacts with potential allies, and facilities for conflict
management. Whether all of these elements can be incorporated into the
management structure will depend on a number of factors, including the
size and duration of the mediation effort, funding, staffing, and logistics.
Select and Train an Information Team
➤ At a minimum, the mission’s information team should include a
spokesperson and an information assistant. The mediator must
personally select the spokesperson and a relationship of confidence
should exist throughout the mediation effort between them. Once
selected, the spokesperson should be included in all political and
strategy meetings of the mediator’s inner circle.
➤ Spokespeople and information staff ideally should be trained and
ready for deployment when the mediator arrives in theater, even
though this is often not the case in practice. It is therefore desirable to
scout and select people who have previous field experience and entice
them to join the team. Knowledge of the main languages in use in the
country is an obvious basic requirement, but not one that is easy to fill.
➤ In cases where no one on the mediator’s team speaks the major
language(s), reliable translators or local journalists must be
recruited in advance.
Before the first Canadian contingent was deployed to Haiti in
1994, the soldiers and police had extensive contacts with the large
Haitian community in Quebec. These expatriate Haitians were
invaluable in training and planning for the mission: teaching
Francophone Canadians to speak Creole and advising them on
a wide range of social, cultural, and historical issues.
When recruiting local staff, it should be borne in mind that local

21
Step 2: Plan Early for Information Needs
people may be politically motivated in a way that is
counterproductive to the mediation process.
➤ It is essential that mission staff is briefed by the mediator about the
mission’s goals and intended outcome so that all team members can
speak with one voice.
➤ To support the head of the peacemaking team, staff could be asked to
brainstorm how they, in a realistic best-case scenario, would wish
the peacemaking effort to be perceived in the country and abroad.
PreparetheMediatortoActasSpokespersonfortheMission
➤ If the mediator is personally inexperienced or unskilled in dealing
with the media, he or she should consider undergoing media training.
➤ The mediator is the most visible person for the mission and will
usually make all policy statements in person. However, should the
mediation team decide to float a trial balloon or make a sensitive
announcement, it may be advisable to let a spokesperson do so on
behalf of the mediator.
➤ When the mission has a message that it wants the media to cover,
the media pay attention because of the content of the message,
because of the identity of the message bearer, or because of both.
The strongest message bearer is the mediator, and thus he or she
should deliver those messages that the mission deems most
important. However, the mediator must be careful not to become
overexposed in the media’s eyes; overexposure may undercut the
mediator’s ability to attract attention even for newsworthy
announcements.
➤ To help the mediator gain the information high ground, the press
team should inform news channels from abroad about the mandate,
as well as about timetables and expected outcomes of the
peacemaking mission.
When another attempt at mediation in the Darfur conflict was
made by the United Nations and the African Union in October
2007 in Sirte, Libya, the Sudanese interlocutors had already set the
tone of the meeting and influenced media reporting in a way

22
disadvantageous to the negotiating process. The mediators never
got their message across as the Sudanese side appeared to control
the regional media and the stories emanating from them. By
contrast, in March 2008, prior to another round of direct talks
between the two parties to the Cyprus conflict, the secretary-
general’s special representative Michael Moller sought to prepare
the ground by arguing publicly that solving the Cyprus problem
would not only increase security but also “make economic sense”
by providing great commercial opportunities for both sides.
Conduct Advance Surveys
➤ Information specialists must be included in advance planning
sessions. If possible, a survey mission to the area of operation should
be undertaken to provide firsthand knowledge of the information
infrastructure and environment in the country.
➤ Equipment and logistics to conduct an in-country information
campaign may be available for sale or rent in the theater of conflict.
If they are not, arrangements must be made to procure them
elsewhere and transport them to the theater ahead of time. This is
usually a major logistical undertaking, especially if complex
equipment, such as for radio operations or major print production
and distribution, is involved. All avenues for local production should
therefore be explored beforehand.
Choose Allies
Impartial collaborators should be sought out to inform local audiences of
the mediator’s intentions before the arrival of the mediator in the theater
of conflict. They could help gain popular acceptance of both the
negotiation process and its eventual results, including likely agreements.
Individuals who might be contacted include religious leaders, women’s
groups, trade unionists, lawyers, and community activists. Some
negotiators have also sought the help of celebrities, such as musicians,
actors, and other personalities from the field of entertainment.
In the non-governmental community engaged in international

23
Step 2: Plan Early for Information Needs
conflict resolution, emphasis is increasingly placed on the value of
creating and working with informal networks of likeminded
professionals. Furthermore, some NGOs such as Search for Common
Ground have had remarkable success in reaching people directly through
unconventional means—such as children’s plays, soap operas, and reality
shows—programs that require considerable knowledge of the local
information environment and long-term engagement in the country.5
Arrange Facilities for Crisis Management
Early on, thought should be given to the need for crisis management in
case hostile propaganda or destabilizing events (such as a resumption of
fighting or large refugee flows) threaten the peace process or endanger the
mission. For example, if a particular ethnic group in the area of conflict is
being manipulated by a hostile party and if there is incitement to violence,
special information efforts should be directed at that target group in its
own language, using the fastest means of communication. Email alerts
and text (or SMS) messaging have proven useful in such cases.

25
Step three
Design a Public Information Strategy
After conducting an initial assessment of the information environment
and developing a structure for information management, the team
should outline an information strategy for approval by the mediator and
his or her political advisers. In the case of a low-key mission modeled on
the more traditional approach of “quiet diplomacy,” the spokesperson or
information team accompanying the mediator will need to monitor the
press and other expressions of public opinion in the country and
neighboring countries. Should critical or negative press reporting of the
mediator’s work be detected, the team should immediately launch a more
proactive information campaign.
All foreign interventions, even if not of a military nature, tend to fuel
speculations, suspicions, misperceptions, and attempts at political
manipulation. If the peacemaker’s team is not prepared for deliberate
misrepresentations of its work by the propagandistic media in conflict
areas, it may literally be left speechless when the interveners are accused
of political or personal transgressions and local public opinion turns
against the foreign presence.
To avoid being caught unprepared, the information team should
undertake each of the following tasks.
Develop a Strategic Approach to Communication
The peacemaking team should by now have thought through the
mediation’s overall goals and options, which should be clearly defined in
easily understandable language. These goals will in turn determine the
varying themes of the peacemaking mission. Themes can also be derived
from the work of humanitarian agencies already operating in the

26
country and which may be providing food and emergency assistance,
assisting returnees or internally displaced people, or carrying out
inoculation campaigns.
At this stage, experienced information officers should be relied on
to develop creative communication strategies for the consideration by
the head of the mission. This is a time to think big but then to assess
realistically what will be feasible given staff and resources. While
maintaining a positive approach to the mediation’s overall chances of
success, the team might also find it useful to use game play and sce-
nario planning to think through different, possibly negative, scenarios
for the mission.
Identify Target Audiences
In order to design an information strategy to communicate the mission’s
purpose, one needs to identify the main audiences and actors one wishes
to reach. The following audiences could be considered:
➤ international media
➤ international public opinion
➤ regional media (in countries adjacent to or affected by the conflict
zone)
➤ local media
➤ local opinion leaders
➤ parties to the conflict
➤ partner organizations such as aid and refugee agencies, international
military and police forces, and representatives of NGOs and
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
➤ mission-internal audiences such as international staff and local staff
(interpreters, drivers, etc.)

27
Step 3: Design a Public Information Strategy
Design Multi-audience Information Products
While the information needs of journalists, NGOs, and the general
public may differ, several general information products could be designed
for multi-audience communication. Basic information tools that nearly
all missions will need are websites and newsletters that state the main
goals of the mediation effort, and flyers and news updates that chronicle
and explain ongoing developments.
Communicate the Mission’s Public Identity
An overarching goal is to establish and maintain credibility for the
mediator’s team and allow the mission to speak with one voice. This is
important not only for controlling the image of the peacemaker but also
for gaining and maintaining public support of the peace process as a whole.
How the third-party mediator is viewed will affect his or her leverage in
negotiations. Support for the peacemaker can increase with visibility and
positive communication of the mission’s goals. In larger operations, such as
UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, a corporate identity program
has been successfully used to improve public perceptions.
Avoid Creating Unrealistic Expectations
High-profile mediation will generate keen media attention and, as a
result, public expectations in the country may be very high: refugees
expect to return home, internally displaced people want to reoccupy
their residences, prisoners hope to be released, former combatants expect
civilian jobs, justice is sought for violators of human rights, international
aid is expected to rebuild the infrastructure, and so forth. Such
expectations are often unrealistic in the short term and may become the
cause of misunderstandings and misperceptions of what the peacemakers
can deliver in the near future. When these hopes are dashed, the third-
party mediator may be blamed: scapegoating can be a convenient
recourse for spoilers. This poses an information dilemma for the
mediator, who should try to keep expectations of what can be achieved
realistic, without underplaying the mediator’s own role and possibilities.

28
When it comes to managing expectations, local journalists—with
their local knowledge and credibility—can be valuable allies.
Internews trained journalists in northern Uganda with the goal of
bridging the gap between the official peace negotiations and the people
most affected by the conflict. Internews identified fifteen small radio
stations in northern Uganda and trained their journalists to provide
vital information to their listeners about the peace talks, the situation
in the internally displaced camps, and conditions in areas where people
displaced by the conflict were expected to start a new life.
Don’t Neglect Mission-Internal Opinion
Through their own interactions with local people and international
partners, staff members can be the most convincing ambassadors for a
mediation effort, or, if misinformed, can hurt the process. Internal
communication can be improved by holding regular information
meetings and inclusive strategy sessions, as well as by circulating mission
updates in newsletters and email alerts.

29
Step four
Implement a Communication Program
Anticipate Logistical Problems
By the time peacemakers have set up shop in the area of operations, they
should have received most of their equipment for the start-up phase and be
able to move around the country for firsthand encounters in the mission
area. If they are dealing with an underdeveloped and remote part of the
world, mediators may discover that many items necessary for effective
information operations may still be missing and may need to be acquired
locally or from abroad. UN mission spokespersons have repeatedly
encountered such difficulties in the start-up phase and are often able to
work only because they use equipment they brought along themselves.6
In the UN mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, the chief of
public information had to buy essential equipment in Thailand using
his personal funds. In many UN information centers in rural parts of
Namibia, furniture and basic items of office equipment were missing
when the centers first opened.
At start-up time, all other units of the peacemaking team are usually
also strapped for resources. Moreover, as a former head of public
information of the UN mission in Sudan reported, public information
needs are often considered by administrators as secondary to the
mission’s main role, or, as he put it, as “an annoying side-show.”
Identify Key Themes
Building on the preparatory work done in steps 2 and 3, key substantive
issues emanating from the mediation effort should now be identified and

30
treated as prime themes for the information program. Themes might
include acceptance of peace negotiations as such, the role of interim
accords, the meaning of cease-fire lines, the need for a separation of
forces, demobilization of combatants, establishment of secure
environments, repatriation and acceptance of returnees, promoting and
enforcing respect for human rights, reconciliation measures, and the
administration of justice.
Match Issue-Oriented Themes with Target Audiences
Once the priority themes have been identified, the information team
should begin to refine these themes and see which messages can best
communicate which themes to the target audiences judged to be
important to the mission’s goals. Themes thus can become the mission’s
messages, which will be adjusted over time and as circumstances change.
Some organizations review and, if necessary, revise their main messages
on a daily basis. In developing messages suitable for the target audiences,
cultural frames of reference should be borne in mind. It is also advisable
to test the messages before they are widely disseminated by soliciting
opinions from individuals who know the local political culture and who
can advise on the messages’ suitability for targeted information
campaigns.
Work with Journalists
Media organizations and their representatives will probably be identified
as a key target group by the mediator. Depending on the length of time
for which the peacemaking team will be in the conflict area, a local press
center should be set up near the mediator’s headquarters. This center
could consist of just a couple of rooms in a hotel, or it might be a larger,
more elaborate facility with a press briefing room with a public address
system, a display area for press releases and other handouts for the media,
and a work space for journalists.
The best way to reach reporters is through personal contacts. It will
help greatly if the spokesperson is personally known to the journalists
covering the conflict for the major media outlets. Media liaison officers
or information assistants should offer journalists help in getting stories

31
Step 4: Implement a Communication Program
out about the mission. Among the most frequently used tools in media
liaison are holding regular press briefings, arranging interviews with
specialists from the mediator’s staff, and organizing press visits to show
peacemaking activities in the field. Locally recruited information
officers (see step 2) should help in making and maintaining contacts
with local reporters, who are often the only ones consistently covering
the negotiations.
Brief, up-to-date, and factual information bulletins or press releases
will be the most suitable communication tools, combined with person-to-
person contacts by the press team. Consideration should also be given to
granting individual journalists special access to the mediator and the
opportunity to accompany him or her during the mediator’s daily
activities and when traveling.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan provided such access to a number
of journalists, among them James Traub of the New York Times and
Stanley Meisler, a writer who had been a correspondent for the Los
Angeles Times.8
Such an arrangement presupposes a special
relationship of confidence and trust.
Use Appropriate Forms of Communication
Radio
If a prime target audience is radio listeners, as will be the case in many
African countries, it is vital that, if the peacemaking organization does
not have its own radio station in the country, it must have guaranteed
access to the local radio stations. This is often a problem if the government
concerned refuses access to the airwaves or limits or controls such access.
This was the case in 1992 when the Croatian government refused to
allow the UN Protection Force access to its airwaves. As noted earlier,
despite agreeing to UN radio broadcasts in UNMIS’s Status of Forces
Agreement, the government of Sudan has sought to prevent programs
being heard in Darfur. More positively, in Burundi, Search for Common
Ground has been supporting multiethnic reporting through Studio
Ijambo, a radio studio that brings together Hutu and Tutsi journalists
to jointly produce programs.

32
While most non-governmental peacemakers do not have the funds
or the know-how to operate their own radio programs, they should be
able to approach UN or other international radio producers with
newsworthy stories and get them broadcast on UN radio where it is in
place, such as it was at different times in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Burundi, Sudan, and Sierra Leone.
Television
In many underdeveloped regions of the world, access by peacemakers to
local television channels may be fraught with difficulties, as television is
often state-controlled and politically “sanitized” and thus rarely a
vibrant medium for public debate.
In Kosovo, which for a long time was under UN administration, it
was decided that UN Television would be, for a while, an important
additional information outlet for the international community working
in Kosovo; the results were mixed.9
Regional and international television reporters will usually cover
peacemaking efforts only at key moments (e.g., the mediator’s arrival,
the initial negotiations, the announcement of election results, and the
mediator’s departure). Because producing regular television programs
is expensive and poses professional and technological challenges, it is
usually not an option for smaller mediation efforts. However, Search
for Common Ground has had some success with a locally produced
television series in Nigeria, “The Station,” which looks at issues such
as child soldiers and street children.
Print Production
In low-tech missions, specific hard-copy information products need to be
developed and distributed by the peacemaker’s team. Ideally, these are
produced on location. Alternatively, if no production facilities exist in the
country or are inaccessible to the mediator’s staff, items such as flyers,
handouts, and posters can be produced by the home organization and
shipped to the theater of operations. Press releases are best produced in
country by the spokesperson’s office in all languages needed to reach
media and NGOs. Production in the local languages should also be done
in theater, following recruitment of local information staff and translators.

33
An assessment will have been made in the planning phase as to
whether sophisticated graphics and visuals are needed to communicate
information to illiterate or semiliterate audiences. The graphic design
work for these visuals may have to be prepared before deployment and
requires the services of a professional graphic designer with knowledge
and understanding of the culture of the country of operations. A graphic
designer should then either accompany the mediator’s team for a certain
time or should be identified and hired locally.
The UN Secretariat calculated in its after-action assessment of the
Namibia operation that a total of 590,000 information items were
produced and distributed in its one-year deployment in Namibia, in
all languages of the country.
Web-Based Information Services and New Technologies
For the outside world, websites are a crucial first entry point to gain
information about a peacekeeping or peacemaking effort. Most UN
peacekeeping and political missions now have their own websites, which
are maintained by the Department of Public Information in New York,
with input received from the missions. A very useful site for peacemakers
is www.unpeacemaker.org, a service provided by the UN Department of
Political Affairs. In addition, informative sites are maintained by the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, such as www.
reliefweb.int, which provides coverage of humanitarian emergencies, and
www.unsudanig.org (United Nations Sudan Information Gateway), which
serves the information needs of the humanitarian community in Sudan.
It is advisable that peacemakers use their headquarters’ technical
facilities to post updates about the mission’s activities on a daily basis. For
this and other reasons, a back-stopping information officer should be
assigned to liaise with mission information staff and to receive and
distribute their news items.
Considering that wireless communications are now often the first
forms of information infrastructure established in areas emerging from
conflict, many humanitarian and peacekeeping missions have recently
used mobile phones and services such as SMS messaging to get
information to journalists and NGOs in environments where physical
mobility is difficult due to security concerns.

34
Mobile Communication Tools
In remote areas where access to electricity or electronic media is limited,
mobile media campaigns have also sometimes relied on videos or radio
streaming over the Internet. International peacemakers have used
vehicles equipped with satellite Internet communications and with
radios, video recorders, or laptops to reach information-starved or
misinformed populations. Less high-tech methods, such as pamphlet
distribution by vehicles and announcements delivered through bullhorns
on trucks, have also proved useful in many missions. In other cases,
illiterate audiences have been reached through street theater
performances and the physical presence of information officers speaking
at village gatherings, markets, or town hall meetings.
Monitor Local and International Media
Media monitoring is a routine, although labor-intensive, activity that
can be assigned to well-briefed junior staff members with good language
skills. The main local and international media should be monitored on a
24/7 basis, as the public image of the mission may suddenly shift and
turn against the mediator with adverse press coverage. Monitoring
should also cover online services, activist groups, and bloggers, where
they exist.
Depending on the size and skills of the information team, corrective
measures should be taken when media reporting has been inaccurate,
such as letters to the editor and calls to journalists; if serious cases of
malicious distortion and hate propaganda occur, the top mediator should
quickly lodge complaints.
Kosovo provides an example: In March 2004, after five years of
close mentoring of local media capacities and capabilities by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
exaggerated and unfounded reports by local media turned a
relatively minor incident into three days of uncontrolled violence
that claimed nineteen lives, left nine hundred injured and four
thousand homeless, and destroyed eight hundred homes and thirty
religious buildings.

35
Counter Rumors and Manage Crises
Peacemakers may be faced with sudden adverse publicity and should
prepare themselves for that eventuality. Hostile parties and combatants
cannot be depended upon to provide a friendly and supportive
environment in which to operate information campaigns. Some UN
missions have established a “rumor-busting 24-hour hotline” to counter
misperceptions about the mission, but such initiatives are labor-intensive
and not always feasible. There is also a tendency on the part of some
heads of mission to ignore rumors and factually incorrect reporting in
the hope that they will go away. This has often proven illusory, as, for
example, in the case of the UN operation in the former Yugoslavia, where
the local Croatian press had alleged that the UN maintained brothels;
these stories were not countered and continued to circulate in the
international media (the secretary-general was even asked about the
allegation months later on an official visit to Japan).
Things may also change rapidly because of evolving circumstances
or unforeseen events.
The spokeswoman for the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs in
Afghanistan, who together with one local staff member used to handle a
few media requests every week, suddenly found herself in September
2001 inundated with media queries from hundreds, even thousands
of journalists a day, when international media attention shifted to
Afghanistan and Pakistan following the attacks of 9/11.
When crises threaten to overwhelm already overstretched
capabilities, local media can provide invaluable support, especially if
local journalists have been trained in the arts of conflict resolution.
When angry citizens looted UN food stores at a small town in conflict-
ridden Southern Sudan in 2007, a radio reporting team newly trained by
Internews helped defuse tensions through their timely and effective coverage of
the issue. Although the Nhomlaau FM reporters had begun running the station
just a few hours earlier, they were able to provide essential information to the
community, inviting World Food Program staff on the air to discuss the issue,
as well as giving a voice to the police, other local authorities, and relevant
international NGOs. The team was one of the first local-language community
radio stations to be set up in a remote part of Sudan.

36
Problems and challenges cannot be expected to appear sequentially.
Rather, problems will often erupt in a nonlinear but interrelated manner.
Managing separate but related crises simultaneously will be a severe test
for the peacemaker’s mission; staying “on message” during such times
will be most difficult. In such cases, the political experience and
judgment of the mediator will be called upon.

37
Step five
Engage Civil Society
Civil society actors are the mediator’s most important potential allies
in the process of peacemaking. Community and religious leaders,
political and environmental activists, trade unionists and business
leaders, and women’s organizations are among the opinion makers
who shape attitudes in most societies. As discussed in steps 1 and 2,
opinion leaders and respected individuals should be contacted early
on, as they are influential in shaping public opinion about the
peacemaking mission.
Developing contacts and maintaining active engagement with local
emerging leaders can be very important, especially over the long term.
When UN Secretariat officials under Martti Ahtisaari first went to
the territory of South-West Africa (now Namibia) in the mid-1970s, a
number of individuals approached the UN survey mission’s staff
because they felt that the United Nations was the best bet for the future
of the country. Among them were young opposition lawyers who, by the
time of the country’s transition to independence fourteen years later,
had become leaders of political parties; in 1990 one of them became the
country’s first Supreme Court Justice.
Adopt an Inclusive Approach
As Conciliation Resources’ Accord Programme outlines, the
involvement in the peace process of people outside of the combatant
groups encourages a wider sense of ownership of the process and gives
greater public legitimacy to the negotiation of political accords.10
Not
only can an inclusive approach lead to greater acceptance of peace
agreements, but it can also help broaden the participation of societal

38
actors in the politics of their country, an important step toward
developing “popular sovereignty.”
This process could be seen at work in the aftermath of the war in
Lebanon in 2006, when large numbers of young Lebanese decided to
reclaim their country and actively engaged themselves in Lebanese
politics.
Some peacemakers who are new to another country’s political and social
environment may not feel comfortable contacting people in strange settings
or may lack the necessary language skills to do so. In many countries, such as
Somalia or Iraq, the security situation is so precarious that direct civil society
contacts are nearly impossible. In such cases, telephone, cell phone, email, or
web contacts are preferable, depending on which connectivity exists and is
the most reliable. Social and political networking has become an increasingly
important aspect of computer-based-communication and, provided that the
technology works in the conflict area, can be used by the peacemakers to
engage with activists and support networks.11
Reach out to NGOs
Unfortunately, many mediation and peacekeeping missions do not have
a good record in dealing with local or international NGOs in areas of
conflict. A 2007 study by a staff member of the United Nations Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) diagnosed a continuing “partnership
gap” between peacekeepers and locals and presented recommendations for
narrowing the gap.12
In the past, some UN missions felt the need for a “community
relations office” to repair damaged relations between the local
community and the peacekeepers, as during the operation in Cambodia,
or to settle financial claims, as in the UN mission in Cyprus, where car
accidents and their effects had to be dealt with on an ongoing basis.
The mediator should consider direct engagement with civil society
activists and NGOs. Adding NGO Briefings for representatives of civil
society to the standard array of press briefings for reporters gives the
mediator a chance to interact directly with leaders who otherwise may
have limited access to the formal mediation process. While these groups
may not produce regular media materials, they do communicate with

39
Step 5: Engage Civil Society
extensive networks and may be influential in shaping public opinion.
NGO Briefings provide a forum for civil society to feed questions,
concerns, and ideas back to the mediation team. Most importantly, such
meetings would send a message from the mediation team that civil
society is an important constituency in the peace process, even if it does
not have a formal seat at the negotiation table.
Find Allies among Civic and Peace Journalists
As the major international news media are frequently absent from the
scene of small wars and civil conflicts, alternative journalists and civic
activists may be potential allies for mediators in getting their message
heard. Amateurs equipped with video cameras and cell phone–cameras
have often become witnesses and “journalists-for-a-day” in little-known
conflict zones. This development has increased transparency, in that
citizens who witness events can broadcast them to a wider public. In
some instances, such as human rights violations, this transparency
can help the mediator by giving him or her the opportunity to raise
associated issues with the host country. By the same token, however, the
growing transparency of all aspects of public life can also backfire on the
mediator and his or her team if their own politically sensitive activities
are exposed on the Internet or in the local media, possibly impacting
the mediation team’s work and public image.
The concept of “civic journalism”13
has gained favor with many
activists around the world but is, for good reason, critically eyed by
professional journalists and others. Challenges to the traditional media,
which primarily report crises and wars, have also been posed by critics
who ask questions about the conflict from the “peace perspective.”
Reporting for Peace conducts training that encourages journalists
to redefine who and what is newsworthy—to move beyond the “body
count” style of war reporting and to identify the ‘hidden’ stories about
peacebuilding initiatives that are often ignored by mainstream media.
After a Reporting for Peace training in the conflict-ridden region of
Poso, Indonesia, a senior government official who saw the broadsheet
produced by the participants said, “If only there had been something
like this newspaper a few months ago, we might not have experienced
the tragedy of the Poso violence.”

40
Some universities and conflict training institutes have introduced
courses in “peace journalism” 14
and “conflict-sensitive journalism” 15
into their curricula. Mediators could explore with their press teams to
contact peace activists and their allies in the alternative media and tap
their resources as channels for the mediation effort.
Shape the Media Space
Analyzing the media in conflict areas can also lead to the conclusion that
the media environment is so rife with ethnic hatred and sectarian strife
that alternative media need to be created.16
In the aftermath of the 1994
genocide in Rwanda and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in which
local media played a major role in inciting mass violence, peacemakers
decided that those media had been so destructive and were now so
discredited that new, independent media needed to be established. Such
intervention in the media space of sovereign territories is a major and
risky undertaking that requires far-reaching political authority of the
kind that IGOs such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the
OSCE have mustered only in a few countries and for limited periods of
time. The discussion of the advisability (and legality) of international
intervention in the media landscape of countries emerging from conflict
arises whenever new cases of media intervention are proposed.17
In Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, IGOs in
cooperation with NGOs and private foundations have taken steps
to influence and shape the media space in conflict areas. The Open
Broadcast Network in Bosnia had significant impact on the media
landscape of that country. The OSCE even created a special position
in 1997, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, whose basic
task is to assist participating states in furthering independent and
pluralistic media and who has frequently spoken out on violations
of press freedom.
Build Local Capacities
Building and strengthening indigenous capacities is a major challenge in
a post-conflict society. Providing the right degree of guidance, taking
corrective action when necessary, and ensuring no harm is done are

41
Step 5: Engage Civil Society
matters of some delicacy. One must respect but not overrate local
capacities, especially as attempts by outsiders to shape or reshape social
structures and cultural norms are limited, as experiences in Somalia,
Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown.
In other cases, such as the Philippine Facilitation Project conducted
by the United States Institute of Peace from 2003 to 2007, considerable
efforts were made to engage educators, journalists, and politicians in
the peace process. A training program in conflict management involved
a coalition of NGOs working to monitor the cease-fire and foster
grassroots peacebuilding between religious communities.18
Sometimes, international intervention in the local media space can
be of a much more modest kind, consisting, for instance, of exhortations
for the existing local media to do a better job of supporting an ongoing
peace effort.
Following Kofi Annan’s mediation in the Kenyan conflict, a senior
member of his team appealed to the Kenyan media in Nairobi to hold
political leaders accountable on the power-sharing agreement reached
in early 2008. Speaking to reporters at a roundtable organized by
Internews, Martin Griffiths, political advisor to Annan, told senior
journalists that the country’s media have a special responsibility to find
ways of ensuring that the deal works and bringing the people of Kenya
into the process.
An important element in capacity building is the training of
journalists and other information professionals in countries emerging
from conflict. The UN Mission in Sudan maintains that it has trained
two hundred journalists since 2004, most of them on the job. The UN
Mission in Cambodia also trained journalists, but when the mission was
withdrawn from the country prematurely, political pressures on
journalists quickly increased, and the struggle over press freedom in
Cambodia is still ongoing.
Some NGOs have come to the conclusion that the training of
journalists may be less effective in conflict regions, because training does
not necessarily alter the journalists’ professional conduct. These NGOs
see greater merit in helping journalists form discussion groups and
communities that focus on peacebuilding techniques in their
professional work.19

42
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting supported the
development of the Cross Caucasus Journalism Network, whose aim is
to build journalistic connections throughout the Caucasus. Journalists
from the territories of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-
Karabakh meet regularly to collaborate with each other as well as
to share information with journalists from Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Russia.
Show Respect
In the past, incidents have occurred in which international mediators
and peacekeepers have not shown respect for local norms and cultural
preferences. For the international mediator, it is important to be aware of
and to understand local efforts at peacemaking and resolving conflict, to
draw on those experiences, and to acknowledge them publicly when
appropriate. Linking the mediator’s own activities and plans to efforts
that have been made locally to address issues of war and peace sends
positive messages to the community. At the same time, historical and
cultural sensitivities of the different ethnic communities must be borne
in mind, such as dates of remembrance or religious holidays, border
issues, or sensitivities over names of countries or territories, colors, and
symbols. Showing respect also encourages self-respect among the people
in the country, creating a positive, enabling environment for a society
emerging from conflict.

43
Step six
Monitor, Evaluate, and Assess
At regular intervals in the course of the peacemaking mission, the goals
and implementation of the information campaign will need to be
reviewed. Several useful tools and techniques have been developed over
the years by the United Nations and by non-governmental peacemakers
to asses their own impact in the field.
Assess Media Coverage
As discussed in step 4, constant monitoring of local, regional, and
international media is essential, as press coverage is one of the prime ways
to assess how the mediation effort is presented to the public. Given the
agenda-setting and agenda-building functions of media, reporting must be
monitored to judge its impact on the perceptions, expectations, and
aspirations of politicians and citizens—and, indeed, of journalists. Media
resonance and reception studies usually require professional analysis by
communication scientists skilled in quantitative analysis, and it is likely
that the mediator’s team will not have the time or resources available to
carry out such scientific studies. Common sense, however, should be
sufficient to allow the team to deduce from the frequency (or absence) and
tone of media reporting on particular issues if there will be an impact on
the prevailing opinion in the country concerned and what that impact will
likely be.
Survey Local Public Opinion
Surveys are the best way to find out what the local public thinks of the
mission. They can be carried out either informally by members of the

44
mission or—and preferably—by professional opinion pollsters. If funds
are available, professional surveys should be conducted at various stages
of the mission.
Such vox populi have been undertaken on behalf of DPKO since
2004, in part as a result of severe criticism of the behavior of UN
peacekeepers, particularly in Africa.20
In the case of Burundi, for
example, large majorities of Burundians believed that the United
Nations had performed well in respect of the 2005 elections, but did not
feel the peacekeepers had treated the Burundian public with respect.
High marks were given to the UN-run Radio ONUB, which people felt
was an important point of communication.
Local public opinion surveys have usually been conducted at the end of
international missions in the country. It would be preferable, however, if
they were also conducted much earlier, even prior to a mission’s deployment.
Adjust Messages
The information gained from media monitoring and opinion surveys will
allow peacemakers to reassess where they stand at a given point in time.
In addition, new developments will occur in the course of the mission.
Messages propagated by the information team will need to be adjusted or
substantially changed to suit new priorities and changing requirements.
Over time, conflict dynamics may evolve and impact the information
environment. For example, when a conflict becomes protracted, the
messages employed by the mediator should change. Specific events such
as new peace talks, return of refugees, or preparing for elections usually
dictate the messages broadcast by the peacemakers. Decisions as to how
to adjust messages should always be taken after thorough discussion and
close consultation between the information team and the political
leadership. The mediator’s team may also feel compelled to change its
messages in response to crises (e.g., following attacks on the mediator in
the press or when spoilers try to destabilize the peace process). Such
crises should lead not to a complete change of course by the mediator but
to a reassessment of the situation in the light of the mediator’s own goals
and the strategic approach that was agreed upon in step 3.

45
Step 6: Monitor, Evaluate, and Assess
Produce After-Action Reports
When a peacekeeping or peacemaking mission concludes or a major
actor, such as the mission spokesperson, leaves the area, an end-of-
mission assessment should be conducted. Such assessments are often not
performed by smaller organizations, but the DPKO now requires its
senior managers to prepare after-action reports, which have become
useful tools for analysis by the Best Practices Section of the DPKO. An
after-action report in the information field will typically include an
evaluation of what tasks have been performed well from the
communications’ perspective and what measures have not worked, so
that lessons can be drawn for future missions. After-action reports are
also useful because they can be circulated to other organizations and
future mediators who can not only build on the experiences of their
predecessors but also, and more importantly, maintain existing networks
for information exchange.

47
Conclusion
Our discussion of the six steps recommended for managing public
information in a mediation effort shows that communication is an
essential element of peacemaking today. Ignoring it will sooner or later
exact a price in terms of distorted and negative perceptions of the
peacemaking effort, both locally and internationally.
Following the initial analysis outlined in steps 1 and 2, those
heading a peacemaking team may decide that a smaller public relations
and media effort will be sufficient. Alternatively, they may see the need
for a larger effort. While every peacemaking mission will need at least a
spokesperson and media analyst, some larger peacekeeping missions
have employed hundreds of information staff and had million-dollar
budgets at their disposal. In the latter case, information campaigns have
been regarded as significant “force multipliers,” but their effectiveness
has depended on a variety of political and military factors.
Endeavors at peacemaking have in the past had many commu-
nication challenges for which they were not always prepared or which
they could not execute professionally. Those missions then lost
significant leverage in the area of conflict; their own image and that of
their sponsoring organization have often suffered as a consequence.
Usually, this has involved a combination of policy and communication
failures, as in Bosnia when the United Nations carried out ill-conceived
measures such as the creation of “safe areas” in Srebrenica and other
enclaves, or when the Security Council reduced the number of UN
peacekeepers in Rwanda at the peak of the genocide. Political and
military policy failures of this sort are, in many ways, no-win situations
from a communications perspective. Nevertheless, in each case,
communication, or the lack of it, exacerbated the policy failure and
negatively impacted the international image of the United Nations for
many years.

48
Some public relations professionals believe that perceptions of
others can be controlled by clever advertising campaigns. While this
may be true in the commercial field, experience in international
environments has shown repeatedly that the social and political
dynamics in a society emerging from conflict follow their own rules.
These are often hard for outsiders to comprehend and even harder to
work with, as irrational behavior by parties to the conflict can pose
extreme challenges for the international community. Furthermore,
international actors may also hold different perceptions of events,
roles, and the intentions of interlocutors.
A proactive public information campaign, while making use of
some of the tools of the public relations profession, should guard
against an openly manipulative approach, which is unlikely to work
and may well backfire. As the six steps suggested in this handbook
indicate, successful public information campaigns in conflict
environments are usually the result of professionally planned but
transparent communication tasks that require the hard work of
dedicated peacemakers and good luck.

49
Notes
1. For instance, Jan Eliasson, the UN secretary-general’s envoy for Darfur, has
pointed out that there is much confusion internationally about the Darfur
negotiations and the separate North-South Sudanese peace process. Silvio
Waisbord, “News Coverage of the Darfur Conflict: A Conversation with Jan
Eliasson, United Nations Special Envoy to Darfur,” International Journal of
Press/Politics 13 (Winter 2008): 75–80.
2. See Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends,
and the Resolution of Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2007).
3. Angelique Haugerud, “Kenya: Spaces of Hope,” Open Democracy, http://
www.opendemocracy.net/node/35633 (accessed January 25, 2008).
4. Rudiger Falksohn and Padma Rai, “Tamil Tigers Exploit Exiles Abroad to
Fund Insurgency,” Spiegel Online, February 14, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,druck-535316,00.html.
5. Shira Loewenberg and Bent Norby Bonde, eds., Media in Conflict Prevention
and Peacebuilding Strategies (Bonn, Germany: Deutsche Welle, 2007), http://
www.dw-gmf.de/download/Media_In_Conflict_Prevention.pdf, outlines
the results of a conference held in Bonn in 2007.
6. There are several instruction manuals issued by the UN Secretariat on the
practical arrangements suggested to their information officers. See United
Nations Department of Public Information in cooperation with the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Policy and Guidance for Public
Information in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, July 2006; United
Nations Department of Information, “Public Information and Media
Relations in United Nations Peace Operations: Guidance to Special
Representatives of the Secretary-General,” DPI/2354, September 2004; and
UN Peacemaker, Operational Guidance Note: Addressing the Media in Peace
Processes and Agreements (United Nations Department of Political Affairs,
October 2006), http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=939.
7. Search for Common Ground, Extending the Reach of Peace-Builders: A Media
Outreach Guide for Dialogue and Reconciliation Practitioners (March 2007), 7
http://www.sfcg.org/documents/phiengedia.pdf.

50
8. Traub and Meisler wrote comparatively favorable books about Annan:
James Traub, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of
American Power (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), and Stanley Meisler, Kofi
Annan: A Man of Peace in a World of War (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2007).
9. Shira Loewenberg, United Nations Media Strategy: Recommendations for
Improvement in Peacekeeping Operations—Case Study: UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (August 2006), http://pbpu.unlb.org/
pbps/Library/UN%20Media%20FINAL%2014%20August%202006.pdf.
10. Conciliation Resources—An International Service for Conflict
Transformation, Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking:
Principles to Guide Policy and Practice (presented at an International Peace
Academy forum, New York, February 12, 2003), http://www.c-r.org/
our-work/practice-policy/owning-process.php.
11. Rebecca Linder, Wikis, Webs, and Network: Creating Connections for
Conflict-Prone Settings, CSIS Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, October 2006), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/
pubs/061018_pcr_creatingconnections.pdf.
12. Comfort Lamptey, Engaging Civil Society in Peacekeeping (August 2007),
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Engaging%
20Civil%20Society%20in%20Peacekeeping.pdf.
13. For more on the nature and potential of civic journalism, see the website of
the Pew Center for Civic Journalism, www.civicjournalism.org.
14. Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, Peace Journalism (London: Hawthorn
Press, 2005).
15. Ross Howard, Conflict Sensitive Journalism (Copenhagen: International
Media Support, 2004), http://www.i-m-s.dk/files/publications/IMS_CSJ_
Handbook.pdf.
16. Kemal Kurspahic, Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).
17. Monroe E. Price and Mark Thompson, eds., Forging Peace: Intervention,
Human Rights and the Management of Media Space (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2002).

18. See G. Eugene Martin and Astrid S. Tuminez, Toward Peace in the Southern
Philippines: A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation
Project, 2003–2007, Special Report no. 202 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace, February 2008), http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/sr202.html.
19. Francis Rolt, “The Radio for Peacebuilding Project, Sub-Saharan Africa,
2004–2007,” in Loewenberg and Bonde, eds., Media in Conflict Prevention
and Peacebuilding Strategies, 62–64.
20. Public opinion surveys have been externally commissioned on the work of
UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. They can be found at www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/lessons.
Notes
51

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the staff of the Peacekeeping Best
Practices Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and the Mediation Support Unit of the Department of
Political Affairs, as well as the staff of the Peace and Security Section of
the Department of Public Information for the information and
perspectives that they shared with her in the early stages of preparing this
handbook.
The author, together with the editors of The Peacemaker’s Toolkit
series, A. Heather Coyne and Nigel Quinney, also gratefully
acknowledges the valuable contributions and guidance provided by the
attendees at an experts’ meeting held in April 2008 at the United States
Institute of Peace. The participants included James Arbuckle, Vladimir
Bratic, Paul Hare, Soren Jessen-Petersen, Ian Larsen, Susan Manuel,
Kelvin Ong, Lisa Schirch, Julie Schmidt, Ivan Sigal, Janos Tisovszky, and
John Windmueller. Susan Manuel, Ivan Sigal, Janos Tisovsky, Laura
Stein-Lindamood, and Anamika Nelson also kindly contributed
additional material subsequent to the meeting. Cheryl Simmons and
David Smock from the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for
Mediation and Conflict Resolution played crucial roles not only in the
meeting but also in other facets of this project.

53
About the Author
Ingrid A. Lehmann is the author of Peacekeeping and Public
Information: Caught in the Crossfire (London: Cass, 1999) and many
articles on issues of international political communication. She is a
practitioner who worked in the United Nations Secretariat for over
twenty-five years, including service in the Department of Public
Information and in two UN peacekeeping missions. She has an MA in
history from the University of Minnesota and an MA and a doctorate in
political science from the University of Berlin. In 1993–94 she was a
fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University; in
1996–97 she was a researcher at Yale University’s UN Studies Program;
and in 2004 she was a fellow at Harvard University’s Shorenstein Center
on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. She now lives near Salzburg,
Austria, where she has been teaching in the Department of
Communication Science of the University of Salzburg since 2003. Her
email address is ingleh@aol.com.

About the Institute
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan
institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help
prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding,
and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital
worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge,
skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding
projects around the globe.
Chairman of the Board: J. Robinson West
Vice Chairman: María Otero
President: Richard H. Solomon
Acting Executive Vice President: Michael Graham
Board of Directors
J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C.
George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The
George Washington University
Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American University
Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies,
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC
Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist
Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International
Relations, Stanford University
Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, World Institute on Disability
Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor, George Mason School of Law

Ron Silver, Founder and President, The Creative Coalition
Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute
Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights
Membersexofficio
Robert M. Gates, Department of Defense
David J. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
Frances C. Wilson, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps, President,
National Defense University

Those who mediate international conflicts must communicate publicly with a wide
variety of audiences, from governments and rebel forces to local and international
media, NGOs and IGOs, divided communities and diasporas.
Managing Public Information in a Mediation Process helps mediators identify
and develop the resources and strategies they need to reach these audiences. It
highlights essential information tasks and functions, discusses key challenges and
opportunities, and provides expert guidance on effective approaches. Examples
from past mediations illustrate how various strategies have played out in practice.
The handbook sets out six steps that can be undertaken by mediators and their
information teams before, during, and after peace negotiations:
● Analyze the Information Environment
● Plan Early for Information Needs
● Design a Public Information Strategy
United States
Institute of Peace Press
1200 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
www.usip.org
Managing Public Information
Following ManagingaMediationProcess, this volume is the second handbook in the
Peacemaker’s Toolkit series. Each handbook addresses a particular facet of the work
of mediating violent conflicts, including such topics as negotiating with terrorists,
constitution making, assessing and enhancing ripeness, and Track-II peacemaking.
● Implement a Communication Program
● Engage Civil Society
● Monitor, Evaluate, and Assess

managing_info

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