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12
C H A P T E
R

The Open Economy Revisited:

the Mundell-Fleming Model
and the Exchange-Rate
 MACROECONOMICS SIXTH EDITION
Regime
          N. GREGORY MANKIW
      PowerPoint® Slides by Ron Cronovich
              © 2008 Worth Publishers, all rights reserved
In this chapter, you will learn…

 the Mundell-Fleming model
  (IS-LM for the small open economy)
 causes and effects of interest rate differentials
 arguments for fixed vs. floating exchange rates
 how to derive the aggregate demand curve for a
  small open economy



CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 2
The Mundell-Fleming model

 Key assumption:
  Small open economy with perfect capital mobility.
      r = r*
 Goods market equilibrium – the IS* curve:
       Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e )

   where
   e = nominal exchange rate
     = foreign currency per unit domestic currency

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited               slide 3
The IS* curve: Goods market eq’m
         Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e )


 The IS* curve is drawn             e
 for a given value of r*.
 Intuition for the slope:
 ↓ e ⇒ ↑ NX ⇒ ↑ Y

                                                      IS*
                                                            Y


CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                       slide 4
The LM* curve: Money market eq’m
                    M P = L ( r * ,Y )
The LM* curve
                                    e    LM*
 is drawn for a given
   value of r*.
 is vertical because:
   given r*, there is
   only one value of Y
   that equates money
   demand with supply,                         Y
   regardless of e.
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited          slide 5
Equilibrium in the Mundell-Fleming
       model
  Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e )
  M P = L ( r * ,Y )
                                    e          LM*


                equilibrium
                exchange
                   rate

                                                     IS*
                     equilibrium                           Y
                       level of
                      income
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                      slide 6
Floating & fixed exchange rates

 In a system of floating exchange rates,
  e is allowed to fluctuate in response to changing
  economic conditions.
 In contrast, under fixed exchange rates,
  the central bank trades domestic for foreign
  currency at a predetermined price.
 Next, policy analysis –
   first, in a floating exchange rate system
   then, in a fixed exchange rate system
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited            slide 7
Fiscal policy under floating
       exchange rates
   Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e )
  M P = L ( r * ,Y )
                                    e           LM 1*
At any given value of e,          e2

a fiscal expansion                e1
increases Y,
                                                          I S 2*
shifting IS* to the right.
Results:
                                                        I S 1*
   ∆e > 0, ∆Y = 0                                                Y
                                                Y1

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                            slide 8
Lessons about fiscal policy

 In a small open economy with perfect capital
  mobility, fiscal policy cannot affect real GDP.
 “Crowding out”
    closed economy:
     Fiscal policy crowds out investment by causing
     the interest rate to rise.
    small open economy:
     Fiscal policy crowds out net exports by causing
     the exchange rate to appreciate.
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited               slide 9
Monetary policy under floating
       exchange rates
   Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e )
  M P = L ( r * ,Y )
                                    e           LM 1* LM 2*
An increase in M
shifts LM* right
because Y must rise
                                  e1
to restore eq’m in
the money market.                 e2
Results:                                                      I S 1*
                                                                       Y
    ∆e < 0, ∆Y > 0                               Y1 Y2

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                                  slide 10
Lessons about monetary policy
 Monetary policy affects output by affecting
  the components of aggregate demand:
       closed economy: ↑M ⇒ ↓r ⇒ ↑I ⇒ ↑Y
  small open economy: ↑M ⇒ ↓e ⇒ ↑NX ⇒ ↑Y

 Expansionary mon. policy does not raise world
  agg. demand, it merely shifts demand from
  foreign to domestic products.
  So, the increases in domestic income and
  employment are at the expense of losses abroad.

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 11
Trade policy under floating
       exchange rates
   Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e )
  M P = L ( r * ,Y )
                                    e           LM 1*
At any given value of e,
a tariff or quota reduces         e2
imports, increases NX,
                                  e1
and shifts IS* to the right.
                                                          I S 2*
Results:
                                                        I S 1*
    ∆e > 0, ∆Y = 0                                               Y
                                                Y1

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                            slide 12
Lessons about trade policy

 Import restrictions cannot reduce a trade deficit.
 Even though NX is unchanged, there is less
  trade:
    the trade restriction reduces imports.
    the exchange rate appreciation reduces
     exports.
 Less trade means fewer “gains from trade.”


CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 13
Lessons about trade policy,               cont.


 Import restrictions on specific products save jobs
  in the domestic industries that produce those
  products, but destroy jobs in export-producing
  sectors.
 Hence, import restrictions fail to increase total
  employment.
 Also, import restrictions create “sectoral shifts,”
  which cause frictional unemployment.

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                 slide 14
Fixed exchange rates
 Under fixed exchange rates, the central bank
  stands ready to buy or sell the domestic currency
  for foreign currency at a predetermined rate.
 In the Mundell-Fleming model, the central bank
  shifts the LM* curve as required to keep e at its
  preannounced rate.
 This system fixes the nominal exchange rate.
  In the long run, when prices are flexible,
  the real exchange rate can move even if the
  nominal rate is fixed.
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                 slide 15
Fiscal policy under fixed exchange
       rates

Under floating rates,
Under floating rates,
 Under floating rates,
a fiscalpolicy is ineffective
 fiscal expansion
fiscal policy is ineffective        e   LM 1* LM 2*
would raise e.output.
at changing output.
 at changing
To keepfixed rates,
         e from rising,
 Under fixed rates,
 Under
the central bank very
                  must
 fiscal policy is very
 fiscal policy is
sell domesticchanging            e1
 effective at currency,
 effective at changing
which increases M
 output.                                              I S 2*
 output.
and shifts LM* right.                                 I S 1*
Results:                                                       Y
                                         Y1 Y2
    ∆e = 0, ∆Y > 0
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                          slide 16
Monetary policy under fixed
       exchange rates
An increase in Mrates,
 Under floating would
 Under floating rates,
shift LM* right andis
 monetary policy is
 monetary policy reduce e.
                               e        LM 1* LM 2*
 very effective at
 very effective at
To prevent the fall in e,
the central output.
 changing bank must
 changing output.
buy domestic rates,
 Under fixed currency,
 Under fixed rates,
which reduces M and
 monetary policy cannot
 monetary policy cannot      e1
shifts LM* to affect output.
 be used back left.
 be used to affect output.
Results:                                              I S 1*
                                                               Y
    ∆e = 0, ∆Y = 0                       Y1

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                          slide 17
Trade policy under fixed exchange
        rates
Under floating rates,
 Under floating rates,
  A restriction on imports
import restrictions
 import restrictions
  puts upward pressure on e.
do not affect Y or NX.
 do not affect Y or NX.             e   LM 1* LM 2*
  To keep e from rising,
Under fixed rates,
 Under fixed rates,
  the central bank must
import restrictions
 import restrictions
  sell domestic currency,
increase Y andMNX.
 increase Y and NX.
  which increases                e1
But, theseLM* right.
 But, shifts gains come
  and these gains come
at the expense of other                               I S 2*
at the expense of other
countries: the policy
  Results:
countries: the policy                                 I S 1*
merely shifts demand from                                      Y
merely shifts demand from
     ∆e = 0, ∆Y > 0                      Y1 Y2
foreign to domestic goods.
foreign to domestic goods.
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                          slide 18
Summary of policy effects in the
       Mundell-Fleming model

                        type of exchange rate regime:

                        floating             fixed
                        impact on:

   Policy               Y      e        NX   Y       e   NX

   fiscal expansion     0      ↑        ↓    ↑       0   0

   mon. expansion       ↑      ↓        ↑    0       0   0

   import restriction   0      ↑        0    ↑       0   ↑

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                         slide 19
Interest-rate differentials

Two reasons why r may differ from r*
  country risk: The risk that the country’s borrowers
   will default on their loan repayments because of
   political or economic turmoil.
   Lenders require a higher interest rate to
   compensate them for this risk.
  expected exchange rate changes: If a country’s
   exchange rate is expected to fall, then its borrowers
   must pay a higher interest rate to compensate
   lenders for the expected currency depreciation.

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                slide 20
Differentials in the M-F model
                     r = r * +θ
where θ (Greek letter “theta”) is a risk premium,
assumed exogenous.
Substitute the expression for r into the
IS* and LM* equations:
       Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * + θ ) + G + NX ( e )

                   M P = L ( r * + θ ,Y )


CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                   slide 21
The effects of an increase in θ

IS* shifts left, because
↑θ ⇒ ↑r ⇒ ↓I                        e   LM 1* LM 2*
LM* shifts right, because
                                  e1
↑θ ⇒ ↑r ⇒ ↓(M/P)d,
so Y must rise to restore
money market eq’m.                e2                    I S 1*
Results:                                              I S 2*
∆e < 0, ∆Y > 0                                               Y
                                         Y1 Y2

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                      slide 22
The effects of an increase in θ

 The fall in e is intuitive:
  An increase in country risk or an expected
  depreciation makes holding the country’s currency
  less attractive.
      Note: an expected depreciation is a
      self-fulfilling prophecy.
 The increase in Y occurs because
    the boost in NX (from the depreciation)
    is greater than the fall in I (from the rise in r ).

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                      slide 23
Why income might not rise

 The central bank may try to prevent the
  depreciation by reducing the money supply.
 The depreciation might boost the price of
  imports enough to increase the price level
  (which would reduce the real money supply).
 Consumers might respond to the increased risk
  by holding more money.
Each of the above would shift LM* leftward.

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited           slide 24
CASE STUDY:
                                   The Mexican peso crisis
                              35
U.S. Cents per Mexican Peso




                              30


                              25


                              20


                              15


                              10
                              7/10/94   8/29/94   10/18/94   12/7/94   1/26/95   3/17/95   5/6/95


CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                                                          slide 25
CASE STUDY:
                                   The Mexican peso crisis
                              35
U.S. Cents per Mexican Peso




                              30


                              25


                              20


                              15


                              10
                              7/10/94   8/29/94   10/18/94   12/7/94   1/26/95   3/17/95   5/6/95


    CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                                                      slide 26
The Peso crisis didn’t just hurt
       Mexico
 U.S. goods more expensive to Mexicans
   U.S. firms lost revenue
   Hundreds of bankruptcies along
     U.S.-Mexican border
 Mexican assets worth less in dollars
   Reduced wealth of millions of U.S. citizens



CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 27
Understanding the crisis
 In the early 1990s, Mexico was an attractive place
  for foreign investment.
 During 1994, political developments caused an
  increase in Mexico’s risk premium (θ ):
    peasant uprising in Chiapas
    assassination of leading presidential candidate
 Another factor:
  The Federal Reserve raised U.S. interest rates
  several times during 1994 to prevent U.S. inflation.
   (∆r* > 0)
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited              slide 28
Understanding the crisis

 These events put downward pressure on the
  peso.
 Mexico’s central bank had repeatedly promised
  foreign investors that it would not allow the peso’s
  value to fall,
  so it bought pesos and sold dollars to
  “prop up” the peso exchange rate.
 Doing this requires that Mexico’s central bank
  have adequate reserves of dollars.
  Did it?
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited               slide 29
Dollar reserves of Mexico’s central
       bank

    December 1993 ……………… $28 billion
    December 1993 ……………… $28 billion
    August 17, 1994 ……………… $17 billion
    August 17, 1994 ……………… $17 billion
    December 1, 1994 …………… $ 9 billion
    December 1, 1994 …………… $ 9 billion
    December 15, 1994 ………… $ 7 billion
    December 15, 1994 ………… $ 7 billion


    During 1994, Mexico’s central bank hid the
    fact that its reserves were being depleted.

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 30
 the disaster 
 Dec. 20: Mexico devalues the peso by 13%
     (fixes e at 25 cents instead of 29 cents)
 Investors are SHOCKED! – they had no idea
  Mexico was running out of reserves.
 ↑ θ , investors dump their Mexican assets and
  pull their capital out of Mexico.
 Dec. 22: central bank’s reserves nearly gone.
  It abandons the fixed rate and lets e float.
 In a week, e falls another 30%.
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 31
The rescue package

 1995: U.S. & IMF set up $50b line of credit to
  provide loan guarantees to Mexico’s govt.
 This helped restore confidence in Mexico,
  reduced the risk premium.
 After a hard recession in 1995, Mexico began a
  strong recovery from the crisis.




CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited              slide 32
CASE STUDY:
       The Southeast Asian crisis 1997-
       98
 Problems in the banking system eroded
  international confidence in SE Asian economies.
 Risk premiums and interest rates rose.
 Stock prices fell as foreign investors sold assets
  and pulled their capital out.
 Falling stock prices reduced the value of collateral
  used for bank loans, increasing default rates,
  which exacerbated the crisis.
 Capital outflows depressed exchange rates.
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                  slide 33
Data on the SE Asian crisis
                                            nominal GDP
              exchange rate stock market
              % change from % change from
                                             % change
               7/97 to 1/98  7/97 to 1/98
                                              1997-98
 Indonesia    -59.4%            -32.6%      -16.2%
Japan         -12.0%            -18.2%      -4.3%
Malaysia      -36.4%            -43.8%      -6.8%
Singapore     -15.6%            -36.0%      -0.1%
S. Korea      -47.5%            -21.9%      -7.3%
Taiwan        -14.6%            -19.7%             n.a.
Thailand             -48.3%     -25.6%         -1.2%
U.S.          n.a.              2.7%        2.3%
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                     slide 34
Floating vs. fixed exchange rates

Argument for floating rates:
  allows monetary policy to be used to pursue other
   goals (stable growth, low inflation).

Arguments for fixed rates:
  avoids uncertainty and volatility, making
   international transactions easier.
  disciplines monetary policy to prevent excessive
   money growth & hyperinflation.

CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 35
The Impossible Trinity

A nation cannot have free
capital flows, independent         Free capital
monetary policy, and a                flows
fixed exchange rate
simultaneously.            Option 1             Option 2
                               (U.S.)              (Hong Kong)
A nation must choose
one side of this
triangle and
                  Independent                         Fixed
give up the                             Option 3
                    monetary                        exchange
opposite             policy
                                        (China)
corner.                                                rate
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                    slide 36
CASE STUDY:
       The Chinese Currency
       Controversy
 1995-2005: China fixed its exchange rate at 8.28
  yuan per dollar, and restricted capital flows.
 Many observers believed that the yuan was
  significantly undervalued, as China was
  accumulating large dollar reserves.
 U.S. producers complained that China’s cheap
  yuan gave Chinese producers an unfair advantage.
 President Bush asked China to let its currency float;
  Others in the U.S. wanted tariffs on Chinese goods.
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited              slide 37
CASE STUDY:
       The Chinese Currency
       Controversy
 If China lets the yuan float, it may indeed
  appreciate.
 However, if China also allows greater capital
  mobility, then Chinese citizens may start moving
  their savings abroad.
 Such capital outflows could cause the yuan to
  depreciate rather than appreciate.



CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited             slide 38
Mundell-Fleming and the AD curve

 So far in M-F model, P has been fixed.
 Next: to derive the AD curve, consider the impact of
  a change in P in the M-F model.
 We now write the M-F equations as:
     ( IS* )   Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NXε )
                                                   (

    ( LM* )    M P = L ( r * ,Y )
        (Earlier in this chapter, P was fixed, so we
      could write NX as a function of e instead of ε .)
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                    slide 39
Deriving the AD curve
                                ε       LM*(P2 ) LM*(P1 )
Why AD curve has
                                ε2
negative slope:
                                ε1
↑P ⇒ ↓(M/P)
                                                        IS*
      ⇒ LM shifts left                     Y2    Y1         Y
                                P
      ⇒ ↑ε
                               P2
      ⇒ ↓NX                    P1
      ⇒ ↓Y                                              AD
                                           Y2    Y1         Y
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                           slide 40
From the short run to the long run
                                ε       LM*(P1 ) LM*(P2 )
If Y1 < Y ,
then there is                   ε1
downward pressure               ε2
on prices.                                              IS*
Over time, P will                          Y1    Y          Y
                                P               LRAS
move down, causing
  (M/P )↑                      P1                       SRAS1
   ε↓                          P2                       SRAS2
   NX ↑                                                 AD
   Y↑                                      Y1    Y          Y
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited                           slide 41
Large: Between small and
       closed
 Many countries – including the U.S. – are neither
  closed nor small open economies.
 A large open economy is between the polar
  cases of closed & small open.
 Consider a monetary expansion:
   Like in a closed economy,
     ∆M > 0 ⇒ ↓r ⇒ ↑I (though not as much)
    Like in a small open economy,
     ∆M > 0 ⇒ ↓ε ⇒ ↑NX (though not as much)
CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited           slide 42
Chapter Summary

1. Mundell-Fleming model
    the IS-LM model for a small open economy.
    takes P as given.
    can show how policies and shocks affect income
     and the exchange rate.
2. Fiscal policy
    affects income under fixed exchange rates, but not
     under floating exchange rates.



CHAPTER 12   The Open Economy Revisited               slide 43
Chapter Summary

3. Monetary policy
    affects income under floating exchange rates.
    under fixed exchange rates, monetary policy is not
     available to affect output.
4. Interest rate differentials
    exist if investors require a risk premium to hold a
     country’s assets.
    An increase in this risk premium raises domestic
     interest rates and causes the country’s exchange
     rate to depreciate.

CHAPTER 12   The Open Economy Revisited                    slide 44
Chapter Summary

5. Fixed vs. floating exchange rates
    Under floating rates, monetary policy is available for
     can purposes other than maintaining exchange rate
     stability.
    Fixed exchange rates reduce some of the
     uncertainty in international transactions.




CHAPTER 12   The Open Economy Revisited                 slide 45

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  • 1. 12 C H A P T E R The Open Economy Revisited: the Mundell-Fleming Model and the Exchange-Rate MACROECONOMICS SIXTH EDITION Regime N. GREGORY MANKIW PowerPoint® Slides by Ron Cronovich © 2008 Worth Publishers, all rights reserved
  • 2. In this chapter, you will learn…  the Mundell-Fleming model (IS-LM for the small open economy)  causes and effects of interest rate differentials  arguments for fixed vs. floating exchange rates  how to derive the aggregate demand curve for a small open economy CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 2
  • 3. The Mundell-Fleming model  Key assumption: Small open economy with perfect capital mobility. r = r*  Goods market equilibrium – the IS* curve: Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e ) where e = nominal exchange rate = foreign currency per unit domestic currency CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 3
  • 4. The IS* curve: Goods market eq’m Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e ) The IS* curve is drawn e for a given value of r*. Intuition for the slope: ↓ e ⇒ ↑ NX ⇒ ↑ Y IS* Y CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 4
  • 5. The LM* curve: Money market eq’m M P = L ( r * ,Y ) The LM* curve e LM*  is drawn for a given value of r*.  is vertical because: given r*, there is only one value of Y that equates money demand with supply, Y regardless of e. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 5
  • 6. Equilibrium in the Mundell-Fleming model Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e ) M P = L ( r * ,Y ) e LM* equilibrium exchange rate IS* equilibrium Y level of income CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 6
  • 7. Floating & fixed exchange rates  In a system of floating exchange rates, e is allowed to fluctuate in response to changing economic conditions.  In contrast, under fixed exchange rates, the central bank trades domestic for foreign currency at a predetermined price.  Next, policy analysis –  first, in a floating exchange rate system  then, in a fixed exchange rate system CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 7
  • 8. Fiscal policy under floating exchange rates Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e ) M P = L ( r * ,Y ) e LM 1* At any given value of e, e2 a fiscal expansion e1 increases Y, I S 2* shifting IS* to the right. Results: I S 1* ∆e > 0, ∆Y = 0 Y Y1 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 8
  • 9. Lessons about fiscal policy  In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, fiscal policy cannot affect real GDP.  “Crowding out”  closed economy: Fiscal policy crowds out investment by causing the interest rate to rise.  small open economy: Fiscal policy crowds out net exports by causing the exchange rate to appreciate. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 9
  • 10. Monetary policy under floating exchange rates Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e ) M P = L ( r * ,Y ) e LM 1* LM 2* An increase in M shifts LM* right because Y must rise e1 to restore eq’m in the money market. e2 Results: I S 1* Y ∆e < 0, ∆Y > 0 Y1 Y2 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 10
  • 11. Lessons about monetary policy  Monetary policy affects output by affecting the components of aggregate demand: closed economy: ↑M ⇒ ↓r ⇒ ↑I ⇒ ↑Y small open economy: ↑M ⇒ ↓e ⇒ ↑NX ⇒ ↑Y  Expansionary mon. policy does not raise world agg. demand, it merely shifts demand from foreign to domestic products. So, the increases in domestic income and employment are at the expense of losses abroad. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 11
  • 12. Trade policy under floating exchange rates Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NX ( e ) M P = L ( r * ,Y ) e LM 1* At any given value of e, a tariff or quota reduces e2 imports, increases NX, e1 and shifts IS* to the right. I S 2* Results: I S 1* ∆e > 0, ∆Y = 0 Y Y1 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 12
  • 13. Lessons about trade policy  Import restrictions cannot reduce a trade deficit.  Even though NX is unchanged, there is less trade:  the trade restriction reduces imports.  the exchange rate appreciation reduces exports.  Less trade means fewer “gains from trade.” CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 13
  • 14. Lessons about trade policy, cont.  Import restrictions on specific products save jobs in the domestic industries that produce those products, but destroy jobs in export-producing sectors.  Hence, import restrictions fail to increase total employment.  Also, import restrictions create “sectoral shifts,” which cause frictional unemployment. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 14
  • 15. Fixed exchange rates  Under fixed exchange rates, the central bank stands ready to buy or sell the domestic currency for foreign currency at a predetermined rate.  In the Mundell-Fleming model, the central bank shifts the LM* curve as required to keep e at its preannounced rate.  This system fixes the nominal exchange rate. In the long run, when prices are flexible, the real exchange rate can move even if the nominal rate is fixed. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 15
  • 16. Fiscal policy under fixed exchange rates Under floating rates, Under floating rates, Under floating rates, a fiscalpolicy is ineffective fiscal expansion fiscal policy is ineffective e LM 1* LM 2* would raise e.output. at changing output. at changing To keepfixed rates, e from rising, Under fixed rates, Under the central bank very must fiscal policy is very fiscal policy is sell domesticchanging e1 effective at currency, effective at changing which increases M output. I S 2* output. and shifts LM* right. I S 1* Results: Y Y1 Y2 ∆e = 0, ∆Y > 0 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 16
  • 17. Monetary policy under fixed exchange rates An increase in Mrates, Under floating would Under floating rates, shift LM* right andis monetary policy is monetary policy reduce e. e LM 1* LM 2* very effective at very effective at To prevent the fall in e, the central output. changing bank must changing output. buy domestic rates, Under fixed currency, Under fixed rates, which reduces M and monetary policy cannot monetary policy cannot e1 shifts LM* to affect output. be used back left. be used to affect output. Results: I S 1* Y ∆e = 0, ∆Y = 0 Y1 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 17
  • 18. Trade policy under fixed exchange rates Under floating rates, Under floating rates, A restriction on imports import restrictions import restrictions puts upward pressure on e. do not affect Y or NX. do not affect Y or NX. e LM 1* LM 2* To keep e from rising, Under fixed rates, Under fixed rates, the central bank must import restrictions import restrictions sell domestic currency, increase Y andMNX. increase Y and NX. which increases e1 But, theseLM* right. But, shifts gains come and these gains come at the expense of other I S 2* at the expense of other countries: the policy Results: countries: the policy I S 1* merely shifts demand from Y merely shifts demand from ∆e = 0, ∆Y > 0 Y1 Y2 foreign to domestic goods. foreign to domestic goods. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 18
  • 19. Summary of policy effects in the Mundell-Fleming model type of exchange rate regime: floating fixed impact on: Policy Y e NX Y e NX fiscal expansion 0 ↑ ↓ ↑ 0 0 mon. expansion ↑ ↓ ↑ 0 0 0 import restriction 0 ↑ 0 ↑ 0 ↑ CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 19
  • 20. Interest-rate differentials Two reasons why r may differ from r*  country risk: The risk that the country’s borrowers will default on their loan repayments because of political or economic turmoil. Lenders require a higher interest rate to compensate them for this risk.  expected exchange rate changes: If a country’s exchange rate is expected to fall, then its borrowers must pay a higher interest rate to compensate lenders for the expected currency depreciation. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 20
  • 21. Differentials in the M-F model r = r * +θ where θ (Greek letter “theta”) is a risk premium, assumed exogenous. Substitute the expression for r into the IS* and LM* equations: Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * + θ ) + G + NX ( e ) M P = L ( r * + θ ,Y ) CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 21
  • 22. The effects of an increase in θ IS* shifts left, because ↑θ ⇒ ↑r ⇒ ↓I e LM 1* LM 2* LM* shifts right, because e1 ↑θ ⇒ ↑r ⇒ ↓(M/P)d, so Y must rise to restore money market eq’m. e2 I S 1* Results: I S 2* ∆e < 0, ∆Y > 0 Y Y1 Y2 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 22
  • 23. The effects of an increase in θ  The fall in e is intuitive: An increase in country risk or an expected depreciation makes holding the country’s currency less attractive. Note: an expected depreciation is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The increase in Y occurs because the boost in NX (from the depreciation) is greater than the fall in I (from the rise in r ). CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 23
  • 24. Why income might not rise  The central bank may try to prevent the depreciation by reducing the money supply.  The depreciation might boost the price of imports enough to increase the price level (which would reduce the real money supply).  Consumers might respond to the increased risk by holding more money. Each of the above would shift LM* leftward. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 24
  • 25. CASE STUDY: The Mexican peso crisis 35 U.S. Cents per Mexican Peso 30 25 20 15 10 7/10/94 8/29/94 10/18/94 12/7/94 1/26/95 3/17/95 5/6/95 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 25
  • 26. CASE STUDY: The Mexican peso crisis 35 U.S. Cents per Mexican Peso 30 25 20 15 10 7/10/94 8/29/94 10/18/94 12/7/94 1/26/95 3/17/95 5/6/95 CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 26
  • 27. The Peso crisis didn’t just hurt Mexico  U.S. goods more expensive to Mexicans  U.S. firms lost revenue  Hundreds of bankruptcies along U.S.-Mexican border  Mexican assets worth less in dollars  Reduced wealth of millions of U.S. citizens CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 27
  • 28. Understanding the crisis  In the early 1990s, Mexico was an attractive place for foreign investment.  During 1994, political developments caused an increase in Mexico’s risk premium (θ ):  peasant uprising in Chiapas  assassination of leading presidential candidate  Another factor: The Federal Reserve raised U.S. interest rates several times during 1994 to prevent U.S. inflation. (∆r* > 0) CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 28
  • 29. Understanding the crisis  These events put downward pressure on the peso.  Mexico’s central bank had repeatedly promised foreign investors that it would not allow the peso’s value to fall, so it bought pesos and sold dollars to “prop up” the peso exchange rate.  Doing this requires that Mexico’s central bank have adequate reserves of dollars. Did it? CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 29
  • 30. Dollar reserves of Mexico’s central bank December 1993 ……………… $28 billion December 1993 ……………… $28 billion August 17, 1994 ……………… $17 billion August 17, 1994 ……………… $17 billion December 1, 1994 …………… $ 9 billion December 1, 1994 …………… $ 9 billion December 15, 1994 ………… $ 7 billion December 15, 1994 ………… $ 7 billion During 1994, Mexico’s central bank hid the fact that its reserves were being depleted. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 30
  • 31.  the disaster   Dec. 20: Mexico devalues the peso by 13% (fixes e at 25 cents instead of 29 cents)  Investors are SHOCKED! – they had no idea Mexico was running out of reserves.  ↑ θ , investors dump their Mexican assets and pull their capital out of Mexico.  Dec. 22: central bank’s reserves nearly gone. It abandons the fixed rate and lets e float.  In a week, e falls another 30%. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 31
  • 32. The rescue package  1995: U.S. & IMF set up $50b line of credit to provide loan guarantees to Mexico’s govt.  This helped restore confidence in Mexico, reduced the risk premium.  After a hard recession in 1995, Mexico began a strong recovery from the crisis. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 32
  • 33. CASE STUDY: The Southeast Asian crisis 1997- 98  Problems in the banking system eroded international confidence in SE Asian economies.  Risk premiums and interest rates rose.  Stock prices fell as foreign investors sold assets and pulled their capital out.  Falling stock prices reduced the value of collateral used for bank loans, increasing default rates, which exacerbated the crisis.  Capital outflows depressed exchange rates. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 33
  • 34. Data on the SE Asian crisis nominal GDP exchange rate stock market % change from % change from % change 7/97 to 1/98 7/97 to 1/98 1997-98 Indonesia -59.4% -32.6% -16.2% Japan -12.0% -18.2% -4.3% Malaysia -36.4% -43.8% -6.8% Singapore -15.6% -36.0% -0.1% S. Korea -47.5% -21.9% -7.3% Taiwan -14.6% -19.7% n.a. Thailand -48.3% -25.6% -1.2% U.S. n.a. 2.7% 2.3% CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 34
  • 35. Floating vs. fixed exchange rates Argument for floating rates:  allows monetary policy to be used to pursue other goals (stable growth, low inflation). Arguments for fixed rates:  avoids uncertainty and volatility, making international transactions easier.  disciplines monetary policy to prevent excessive money growth & hyperinflation. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 35
  • 36. The Impossible Trinity A nation cannot have free capital flows, independent Free capital monetary policy, and a flows fixed exchange rate simultaneously. Option 1 Option 2 (U.S.) (Hong Kong) A nation must choose one side of this triangle and Independent Fixed give up the Option 3 monetary exchange opposite policy (China) corner. rate CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 36
  • 37. CASE STUDY: The Chinese Currency Controversy  1995-2005: China fixed its exchange rate at 8.28 yuan per dollar, and restricted capital flows.  Many observers believed that the yuan was significantly undervalued, as China was accumulating large dollar reserves.  U.S. producers complained that China’s cheap yuan gave Chinese producers an unfair advantage.  President Bush asked China to let its currency float; Others in the U.S. wanted tariffs on Chinese goods. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 37
  • 38. CASE STUDY: The Chinese Currency Controversy  If China lets the yuan float, it may indeed appreciate.  However, if China also allows greater capital mobility, then Chinese citizens may start moving their savings abroad.  Such capital outflows could cause the yuan to depreciate rather than appreciate. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 38
  • 39. Mundell-Fleming and the AD curve  So far in M-F model, P has been fixed.  Next: to derive the AD curve, consider the impact of a change in P in the M-F model.  We now write the M-F equations as: ( IS* ) Y = C ( Y − T ) + I ( r * ) + G + NXε ) ( ( LM* ) M P = L ( r * ,Y ) (Earlier in this chapter, P was fixed, so we could write NX as a function of e instead of ε .) CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 39
  • 40. Deriving the AD curve ε LM*(P2 ) LM*(P1 ) Why AD curve has ε2 negative slope: ε1 ↑P ⇒ ↓(M/P) IS* ⇒ LM shifts left Y2 Y1 Y P ⇒ ↑ε P2 ⇒ ↓NX P1 ⇒ ↓Y AD Y2 Y1 Y CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 40
  • 41. From the short run to the long run ε LM*(P1 ) LM*(P2 ) If Y1 < Y , then there is ε1 downward pressure ε2 on prices. IS* Over time, P will Y1 Y Y P LRAS move down, causing (M/P )↑ P1 SRAS1 ε↓ P2 SRAS2 NX ↑ AD Y↑ Y1 Y Y CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 41
  • 42. Large: Between small and closed  Many countries – including the U.S. – are neither closed nor small open economies.  A large open economy is between the polar cases of closed & small open.  Consider a monetary expansion:  Like in a closed economy, ∆M > 0 ⇒ ↓r ⇒ ↑I (though not as much)  Like in a small open economy, ∆M > 0 ⇒ ↓ε ⇒ ↑NX (though not as much) CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 42
  • 43. Chapter Summary 1. Mundell-Fleming model  the IS-LM model for a small open economy.  takes P as given.  can show how policies and shocks affect income and the exchange rate. 2. Fiscal policy  affects income under fixed exchange rates, but not under floating exchange rates. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 43
  • 44. Chapter Summary 3. Monetary policy  affects income under floating exchange rates.  under fixed exchange rates, monetary policy is not available to affect output. 4. Interest rate differentials  exist if investors require a risk premium to hold a country’s assets.  An increase in this risk premium raises domestic interest rates and causes the country’s exchange rate to depreciate. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 44
  • 45. Chapter Summary 5. Fixed vs. floating exchange rates  Under floating rates, monetary policy is available for can purposes other than maintaining exchange rate stability.  Fixed exchange rates reduce some of the uncertainty in international transactions. CHAPTER 12 The Open Economy Revisited slide 45

Editor's Notes

  • #2: Chapter 12 covers a lot of material. First, it develops the Mundell-Fleming open-economy IS-LM model for a small open economy with perfect capital mobility. The model is used to analyze the effects of fiscal, monetary, and trade policy under floating and flexible exchange rates. Then, the chapter explores interest rate differentials, or risk premia that arise due to country risk or expected changes in exchange rates. The Mundell-Fleming model is used to analyze the effects of a change in the risk premium. The 1994-95 Mexican Peso Crisis is an important real-world example of this. The chapter summarizes the debate over fixed vs. floating exchange rates. Following that discussion, the Mundell-Fleming model is used to derive the aggregate demand curve for a small open economy. And finally, the chapter discusses how the results it derives would be different in a large open economy. To reinforce this material, I strongly recommend you to allow a bit of class time for a few in-class exercises (I’ve suggested several in the lecture notes accompanying some of the slides in this presentation), and that you assign a homework consisting of several of the end-of-chapter “Questions for Review” and “Problems and Applications” in the textbook.
  • #4: In this and the following sections (in which we analyze policies with the M-F model), we assume the price level is fixed ---just as we did when we first used the closed economy IS-LM model to do policy analysis in chapter 11. As we learned in chapter 5, NX depends on the real exchange rate. However, with price levels fixed, the real &amp; nominal exchange rates move together. So, for simplicity, we write NX as a function of the nominal exchange rate here. (At the end of this chapter, when we use M-F to derive the aggregate demand curve, we go back to writing NX as a function of the real exchange rate, because the nominal &amp; real exchange rates may behave differently when the price level is changing.) Chapter 5 introduced the notation r* for the world interest rate, and explained why r = r* in a small open economy with perfect capital mobility. Perfect capital mobility means that there are no restrictions on the international flow of financial capital: the country’s residents can borrow or lend as much as they wish in the world financial markets; and because the country is small, the amount its residents borrow or lend in the world financial market has no impact on the world interest rate. Chapter 5 also explained why net exports depend negatively on the exchange rate.
  • #5: Again, “eq’m” is an abbreviation for “equilibrium.” The text (p.337) shows how the Keynesian Cross can be used to derive the IS* curve. Suggestion: Before continuing, ask your students to figure out what happens to this IS* curve if taxes are reduced. Answer : The IS* curve shifts rightward (i.e., upward). Explanation : Start at any point on the initial IS* curve. At this point, initially, Y = C + I + G + NX. Now cut taxes. At the initial value of Y, disposable income is higher, causing consumption to be higher. Other things equal, the goods market is out of whack: C + I + G + NX &gt; Y. An increase in Y (of just the right amount) would restore equilibrium. Hence, each value of e is associated with a larger value of Y. OR, a decrease in NX of just the right amount would restore equilibrium at the initial value of Y. But the decrease in NX requires an increase in e. Hence, each value of Y is associated with a higher value of e. Rationale : Doing this exercise now will break up your lecture, and will prepare students for the fiscal policy experiment that is coming up in just a few slides.
  • #6: The text (p.316) shows how the LM curve in (Y,r) space, together with the fixed r*, determines the value of Y at which the LM* curve here is vertical. Suggestion: Before continuing, ask your students to figure out what happens to this LM* curve if the money supply is increased. Answer : LM* shifts to the right. Explanation : The equation for the LM* curve is: M/P = L(r*, Y) P is fixed, r* is exogenous, the central bank sets M, then Y must adjust to equate money demand (L) with money supply (M/P). Now, if M is raised, then money demand must rise to restore equilibrium (remember: P is fixed). A fall in r would cause money demand to rise, but in a small open economy, r = r* is exogenous. Hence, the only way to restore equilibrium is for Y to rise. Rationale : Doing this exercise now will break up your lecture, and will prepare students for the monetary policy experiment that is coming up in just a few slides.
  • #9: Intuition for the shift in IS*: At a given value of e (and hence NX), an increase in G causes an increase in the value of Y that equates planned expenditure with actual expenditure. Intuition for the results: As we learned in earlier chapters, a fiscal expansion puts upward pressure on the country’s interest rate. In a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, as soon as the domestic interest rate rises even the tiniest bit about the world rate, tons of foreign (financial) capital will flow in to take advantage of the rate difference. But in order for foreigners to buy these U.S. bonds, they must first acquire U.S. dollars. Hence, the capital inflows cause an increase in foreign demand for dollars in the foreign exchange market, causing the dollar to appreciate. This appreciation makes exports more expensive to foreigners, and imports cheaper to people at home, and thus causes NX to fall. The fall in NX offsets the effect of the fiscal expansion. How do we know that  Y = 0? Because maintaining equilibrium in the money market requires that Y be unchanged: the fiscal expansion does not affect either the real money supply (M/P) or the world interest rate (because this economy is “small”). Hence, any change in income would throw the money market out of whack. So, the exchange rate has to rise until NX has fallen enough to perfectly offset the expansionary impact of the fiscal policy on output.
  • #11: Suggestion : Treat this experiment as an in-class exercise. Display the graph with the initial equilibrium. Then give students 2-3 minutes to use the model to determine the effects of an increase in M on e and Y. Intuition for the rightward LM* shift: At the initial (r*,Y), an increase in M throws the money market out of whack. To restore equilibrium, either Y must rise or the interest rate must fall, or some combination of the two. In a small open economy, though, the interest rate cannot fall. So Y must rise to restore equilibrium in the money market. Intuition for the results: Initially, the increase in the money supply puts downward pressure on the interest rate. (In a closed economy, the interest rate would fall.) Because the economy is small and open, when the interest rate tries to fall below r*, savers send their loanable funds to the world financial market. This capital outflow causes the exchange rate to fall, which causes NX --- and hence Y --- to increase.
  • #12: Suggestion: Before revealing the text on this slide, ask students to take out a piece of paper and answer this question: “Contrast the way in which monetary policy affects output in the closed economy with the small open economy.” Or something to that effect.
  • #13: Intuition for results: At the initial exchange rate, the tariff or quota shifts domestic residents’ demand from foreign to domestic goods. The reduction in their demand for foreign goods causes a corresponding reduction in the supply of the country’s currency in the foreign exchange market. This causes the exchange rate to rise. The appreciation reduces NX, offsetting the import restriction’s initial expansion of NX. How do we know that the effect of the appreciation on NX exactly cancels out the effect of the import restriction on NX? There is only one value of Y that allows the money market to clear; since Y, C, I, and G are all unchanged, NX = Y-(C+I+G) must also be unchanged. Or looking at it differently: As we learned in chapter 5, the accounting identities say that NX = S - I. The import restriction does not affect S or I, so it cannot affect the equilibrium value of NX.
  • #15: Import restrictions cause a sectoral shift, a shift in demand from export-producing sectors to import-competing sectors. As we learned in chapter 6, sectoral shifts contribute to the natural rate of unemployment, because displaced workers in declining sectors take time to be matched with appropriate jobs in other sectors.
  • #18: The monetary expansion puts downward pressure on the exchange rate. To prevent it from falling, the central bank starts buying domestic currency in greater quantities to “prop up” the value of the currency in foreign exchange markets. This buying removes domestic currency from circulation, causing the money supply to fall, which shifts the LM* curve back. Another way of looking at it: To keep the exchange rate fixed, the central bank must use monetary policy to shift LM* as required so that the intersection of LM* and IS* always occurs at the desired exchange rate. Unless the IS* curve shifts right (an experiment we are not considering now), the central bank simply cannot increase the money supply.
  • #19: Suggestion: Assign this experiment as an in-class exercise. Give students 3 minutes to work on it before displaying the answer on the screen.
  • #20: Table 12-1 on p.351. (“M-F” = “Mundell-Fleming”) This table makes it easy to see that the effects of policies depend very much on whether exchange rates are fixed or flexible.
  • #22: The first equation says that a country’s interest rate equals the world interest rate plus a risk premium (whose size depends on investors’ perceptions of the political &amp; economic risk of holding that country’s assets and on the expected rate of depreciation or appreciation of the country’s currency. We can now use the M-F model to analyze the effects of a change in the risk premium. The next few slides present this analysis, then discuss an important real-world example (the Mexican peso crisis).
  • #23: Intuition: If prospective lenders expect the country’s currency to depreciation, or if they perceive that the country’s assets are especially risky, then they will demand that borrowers in that country pay them a higher interest rate (over and above r*). The higher interest rate reduces investment and shifts the IS* curve to the left. But it also lowers money demand, so income must rise to restore money market equilibrium. Why does the exchange rate fall? The increase in the risk premium causes foreign investors to sell some of their holdings of domestic assets and pull their ‘loanable funds’ out of the country. The capital outflow causes an increase in the supply of domestic currency in the foreign exchange market, which causes the fall in the exchange rate. Or, in simpler terms, an increase in country risk or an expected depreciation makes holding the country’s currency less desirable.
  • #25: The result that income rises when the risk premium rises seems counter-intuitive and inaccurate. This slide explains why the increase in the risk premium may cause other things to occur that prevent income from rising, and may even cause income to fall.
  • #26: Mexico’s central bank had maintained a fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar at about 29 cents per peso.
  • #27: In the week before Christmas 1994, the central bank abandoned the fixed exchange rate, allowing the peso’s value to “float.” In just one week, the peso lost nearly 40% of its value, and fell further during the following months.
  • #28: The purpose of this slide is to motivate the topic. Even though this occurred in another country some years ago, it was very important for the U.S. The parents of many of your students probably held Mexican assets (indirectly through mutual funds in their 401k accounts and pension funds, which viewed Mexico very favorably prior to the crisis) and took losses when the crisis occurred.
  • #29: When the last line displays, it might be helpful to note that, from Mexico’s viewpoint, the U.S. interest rate is r*.
  • #30: We have already seen why an increase in a country’s risk premium causes its exchange rate to fall. One could also use the M-F model to show that an increase in r* also causes the exchange rate to fall. The intuition is as follows: An increase in foreign interest rates causes capital outflows: investors shift some of their funds out of the country to take advantage of higher returns abroad. This capital outflow causes the exchange rate to fall as it implies an increase in the supply of the country’s currency in the foreign exchange market.
  • #31: Defending the peso in the face of large capital outflows was draining the reserves of Mexico’s central bank. (August 17, 1994 was the date of the presidential election.) Ask your students if they can figure out why Mexico’s central bank didn’t tell anybody it was running out of reserves. The answer: If people had known that the reserves were dwindling, then they would also have known that the central bank would soon have to devalue or abandon the fixed exchange rate altogether. They would have expected the peso to fall, which would have caused a further increase in Mexico’s risk premium, which would have put even more downward pressure on Mexico’s exchange rate and made it even harder for the central bank to “defend the peso.” Source (not only for the data on this slide, but some of the other information in this case study): Washington Post National Weekly Edition, pp8‑9, Feb 20‑26 1995, various issues of The Economist in Jan &amp; Feb &apos;95.
  • #33: The case study on pp.353-355 gives more detail on the peso crisis.
  • #34: This and the following slide correspond to the case study on pp.355-356.
  • #37: This slide corresponds to new material in the 6 th edition, on pp.359-360. “Option 1” is allowing free capital flows and maintaining independent monetary policy, but giving up a fixed exchange rate. An example of a country that chooses this option is the United States. “Option 2” is allowing free capital flows keeping a fixed exchange rate, but giving up independent monetary policy. A country that chooses this option is Hong Kong. “Option 3” is keeping monetary policy independent, yet fixing the exchange rate. Doing this requires limiting capital flows. An example of a country that practices this option is China.
  • #38: This slide corresponds to new material in the 6 th edition, on pp.360-361.
  • #39: This slide corresponds to new material in the 6 th edition, on pp.360-361.
  • #40: Net exports really depend on the real exchange rate, not the nominal exchange rate. Earlier in the chapter, we wrote NX as a function of the nominal rate, because the price level was assumed fixed, so the nominal &amp; real rates always moved together. But now, with the price level changing also, we need to write NX as a function of the real exchange rate.
  • #41: Like figure 12-13 on p.362, except here we are showing what happens to Y when P increases (not falls). The derivation of the open economy AD curve is very similar to that of the closed economy AD curve (see chapter 11).
  • #42: Figure 12-14 on p.363. Suggestion : Have your students draw the two panels of the diagram on this screen, with the economy in an initial equilibrium with output equal to its natural rate. Then, have them use their diagrams to analyze the short-run and long-run effects of a negative IS* shock.
  • #43: For more details, see the Appendix to chapter 12 (not included in this PowerPoint presentation).