Master Scriptie FINAL2

The Ferghana Valley: A Ticking Bomb?
Conflict Potential and the Role of Youth in the Ferghana Valley
Simone de Bruijn, November 2011

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The Ferghana Valley: A Ticking Bomb?
Conflict Potential and the Role of Youth in the Ferghana Valley
This master’s thesis is submitted for the completion of the Master Human Geography:
Conflicts, Territories and Identities
Name: Simone de Bruijn
Student number: 4078667
Supervisor: Dr. H.W. Bomert
Radboud University Nijmegen
Internship: OSCE Academy, Bishkek
Utrecht, November 2011
Cover photos (by Simone de Bruijn)
Upper photo: overview of Osh from the Suleyman mountain
Lower photo left: Destroyed building in Osh
Lower photo right: Children in destroyed Uzbek neighbourhood in Osh

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Preface
At the moment I read about the Ferghana Valley for the first time, I was so attracted to it that I had
to do something with it. How to realize? Making it the subject of my master’s thesis.
Now, more than one year later, I am very happy that I realized my research. Looking at the process
that I went through I can say that I incredibly raised my knowledge about the valley. One year ago I
could only dream about the region, now I know the valley because I have been there and I talked to
many people living in the region.
The process of writing a master’s thesis and doing research was very instructive: brainstorming and
defining the topic, organizing an internship at the OSCE Academy, realizing my trip to Kyrgyzstan,
setting up contacts, conducting research and in the end finalizing my thesis.
Especially the research in Kyrgyzstan was very useful and interesting. Just by being there I already
gained a lot more insight than I could have ever done in the Netherlands. By walking through conflict
affected areas I could have a good feeling of the impact of the conflict, which is still hard to imagine
for an outsider.
My research would not have been the same if I did not have met the next organizations and persons
in Kyrgyzstan – which I sometimes just bumped into accidentally. For my stay in Bishkek, first of all I
want to thank the OSCE Academy, by providing me a computer at their office. Besides, the fact that I
did research at the OSCE Academy opened many doors for me. Furthermore, my research in Bishkek
would have never been the same if I had not met Payam Foroughi, a colleague at the OSCE Academy.
From the first time I met him, he invited me to his interviews where I could ask my questions. Even
when I was not there, he asked my questions for me. Also I want to thank his assistant Aizada, who
put so much effort in realizing interviews with important persons, and was very successful in getting
a foot in the door. I already miss our traditional Chalap drinking moments after each interview.
For my time in Osh I want to thank Freek, Dorothé, Mira and Aron, for giving me a Dutch home in
which I was totally free to do what I wanted to do. I really enjoyed having conversations about my
research and international development in general, and I admire what you are doing. I enjoyed the
warmth in your family and the regular eating and drinking moments on the tushuks in the garden.
Thanks for your hospitality and for being so understanding if I was not home for a few days in a row
because of the many interviews I had.
My research in Osh would not have been the same if I had not bumped into James Kitson, who did
research to the same topic. We teamed up and together managed to arrange many interesting
interviews in a very short period of time. The fact that we worked together really made me
motivated even more.
Furthermore I would like to thank Julia, Olga, Bektour, people from AIESEC and all international
people for making my life comfortable, arranging an apartment and inviting me for social activities.
In the Netherlands, I want to thank my supervisor Bert Bomert, for his useful comments. Also many
thanks to my parents, who were sometimes maybe a bit worried and who made my trip to
Kyrgyzstan – and my whole study - financially possible.
Simone de Bruijn
November, 2011

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Summary
This study analyses the conflict potential and the role of youth in the Ferghana Valley at the borders
of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. A specific approach is taken on Kyrgyzstan and the case-
study of Osh, where a conflict broke out in June 2010 in which the majority of the perpetrators were
young people. The Ferghana Valley and Osh specifically are analysed in this research through ethnic,
socio-economic and political theoretical lenses.
The Ferghana Valley is an interesting region because of its many ingredients which can lead to
conflict. First of all, because the valley is situated in a border region, there are cross-border issues
which increase the risk on conflict. This can be traced back to the time of the Soviet Union, in which
Stalin drew the lines of the Ferghana Valley as a “one-armed-alcoholic”: borders intertwined and
convoluted crossing ethnicities, natural resources and water sources. These artificial borders
belonged to the divide-and-rule policy: leaving ethnicities on the wrong side of the border would
cause ethnic tensions so that the Soviet Union could easily control the region.
The borders became problematic with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tensions increased about
access to undemarcated land and water resources, which often unfolded themselves along ethnic
lines. Furthermore, the region as a whole went into decline. With the hardening of the borders,
economic exchange became difficult and cross-border collective farms had to close down. Villages
were split in half by a border fence, so that it was unable for people to visit their relatives on the
other side of the border.
Other border issues which increases the instability in the region nowadays are drug trafficking and
Islam extremism. Both have found their way to the region because of its peripheral location, low
government control and bad socio-economic conditions. The valley is a safe haven for criminal
groups and Islamic militant group to perform their duties. They also find support amongst the
population: as the socio-economic conditions are bad people are searching for alternative ways to
earn money, especially young people because they suffer the most from unemployment.
Furthermore, as the people are dissatisfied with their government, it is also an alternative way to
oppose the government and to find a secure safety net.
The three countries’ ethnic, socio-economic and political conditions are of big influence on conflict
potential in the Ferghana Valley. All countries have ethnic minorities, of which Kyrgyzstan has the
most. The geographical distribution of these minority groups is such that the majority of them live in
the Ferghana Valley, one of the most densely populated parts of Central Asia. Together with the fact
that the valley is separated from the rest of the country by a huge range of mountains, the minority
groups live in the periphery far away from the capitals. As the governments in Central Asia are
characterized by nationalism, they do not pay particular interest to the Ferghana Valley. This causes a
big regional division between the Ferghana Valley and the rest of the country in terms of socio-
economic conditions, and as the Ferghana Valley is a densely populated area with different ethnic
groups, this can lead to tensions and grievances between them.
Looking at the socio-economic conditions, they are worst in respectively Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. Unemployment is high, especially amongst young people. The greed theory implies that
when socio-economic conditions are bad, the chances on conflict occur. Therefore conflict would be
most likely in Tajikistan. However, as Tajikistan has already seen a civil war the people there are so-
called tired of conflict. In Kyrgyzstan a conflict in Osh in June 2010 broke out, while Uzbekistan has
not seen a conflict yet. However, this should not only be ascribed to the socio-economic conditions,
but also the political situation in each country.
Looking at the governments in the countries, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are at the moment
characterized by authoritarian regimes while Kyrgyzstan has just seen a revolution and is now ruling
under an interim-government. Kyrgyzstan is the most open and ‘democratic’ country: it is a country
in between autocracy and democracy and it has a semi-repressive regime. These aspects make it
happen that people are able to mobilize to protests, however, as effective routes for political
participation are still blocked, this can result into violence. In contrast, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
opposition is extremely suppressed. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan is a state in transition compared with

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Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. After the deposing of president Bakiyev in April 2010, an interim
government took over the power which was hastily formed and which could not control the country.
It introduced a new constitution, in which the power of the president was constrained and a new
semi-parliamentary system was introduced. In October 2010 parliamentary elections were held,
which showed the enormous division in the country: five parties made it to parliament with none of
them having the majority.
Because no new strong power took over the power in Kyrgyzstan after April 2010, a power vacuum
was created. This led to the ethnic violence in the South of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, which caused
more than 400 deaths, about 2000 wounded and hundreds of thousands displaced. Although the
violence unfolded itself along ethnic lines, it is not the case that the main reason for the conflict was
ethnicity. Ethnicity did play a role, but on the other hand ethnicities lived in peace before for
decades. Underlying causes had activated the feelings of ethnicity.
The bad socio-economic conditions in Osh were one of these causes. First of all, unemployment is
high, especially amongst young people. As they have nothing to do and they do not have any
prospect to look out to, it was easy to mobilize them to take part in the violence. Indeed, the
majority of the participators in the violence were under thirty years old who live at the bottom of
society. Furthermore, the bad socio-economic situation unfolded itself along ethnic lines. Uzbeks
were running the good businesses in Osh, which caused envy amongst Kyrgyz, because an ethnic
minority were having the good jobs in a Kyrgyz country. As a reaction Kyrgyz were starting to fill the
tier above them; they dominated the jobs in the local government and the police. This caused again
envy and feelings of social exclusion amongst Uzbeks. An ethnic division in the working class was thus
created which caused feelings of inequality. These feelings were one of the reasons why the violence
occurred along ethnic lines.
However, the convergence of feelings into violence can only occur in a certain political situation.
With the overthrow of the nationalistic president Bakiyev, Uzbeks took their chance to express
wishes for minority rights. The statements were interpreted by Kyrgyz as threats to their interest.
They did not understand why the Uzbeks were requesting so much as they already had the
wealthiest businesses in Osh. The tensions between the ethnicities increased and rumours about
Uzbeks requesting autonomy made the Kyrgyz scared and angry.
Politicians were making use of this situation after the overthrow of Bakiyev. Political elites wanted to
gain a large and strong support base and an easy to do this was to focus on feelings of nationalism
and ethnicity. Especially young people are sensitive for this because they are like a sponge: they are
easy to influence. The political struggle that was going on in the country quickly took an ethnic focus
in which tensions increased. Together with the fact that the interim-government could not control
the situation the conflict occurred. Other issues which contributed to the conflict in Osh were the
drugs business, third forces, media and the police.
The conflict in Osh led to a situation nowadays which is characterized by a greater division within
society, tensions and fear. Many perpetrators still walk around freely and the law enforcement
bodies are characterized by discrimination. More Uzbeks than Kyrgyz have been punished, while at
the same time the majority of the victims were Uzbeks. People are still waiting for justice.
A lot should be done in order to prevent a new conflict to break out. On the one hand the situation
might belong to the transition phase a country goes through; on the other hand conflicts like what
happened in Osh can be prevented to a great extent by focussing on youth, cross-community
building and income generating activities.
This research has shown that conflicts should be analysed by combining different theoretical
approaches. A conflict should be regarded as a process, which not only affects the society as a whole,
but which is also rooted in society. Furthermore it is important to take into account the specific
history and context of a region. In the Ferghana Valley these characteristics are for a great extent
determined by the history of the Soviet Union. The role of youth with regard to conflicts should not
be underestimated. As the Ferghana Valley is one of the most densely populated parts of the
Ferghana Valley with a majority of people under the age of 30, young people are very important to

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take into account. Especially because they are the ones who suffer the most from unemployment
and they are the easiest to influence when it comes to ethnic feelings. Conflict potential increases
because of this large group of young people. They want to have prospects for the future but they do
not have anything to look out for.

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Preface 3
Summary 4
Table of Content 7
1. Introduction 9
1.1 Research goal and questions 9
1.2 Societal relevance 11
1.3 Scientific relevance 12
1.4 Methodology and structure 13
2. Theoretical framework: conflicts, causes and the role of young people 17
2.1 General terms: (violent) intra- and inter-state conflicts 17
2.1.1 Definitions of conflict 17
2.1.2 Intrastate and interstate conflicts 17
2.1.3 When can violent incidents be regarded as a conflict? 18
2.2 Ethnic conflict 19
2.2.1 Primordialist view 19
2.2.2 Constructivist view 20
2.3 Greed or grievance? Socio-economic conditions and inequality 21
2.3.1 Greed: socio-economic conditions 21
2.3.2 Grievances: inequality 22
2.4 The political situation 23
2.4.1 State transition and democratisation 23
2.4.2 Degree of democracy and repressiveness 23
2.4.3 State strength 24
2.5 The role of young people in conflict 25
2.5.1 Negative role of youth in conflict 26
2.5.2 Positive role of youth in conflict 26
3. The Ferghana Valley: history, context and cross-border issues 28
3.1 History: the decisive divide-and-rule policy 28
3.2 Cross-border issues in the Ferghana Valley 30
3.2.1 Border disputes 30
3.2.2 Islamic extremism 32
3.2.3 Drug trafficking 32
3.3 History and context of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 33
3.3.1 Kyrgyzstan 37
3.3.2 Uzbekistan 39
3.3.3 Tajikistan 40
3.4 Conclusion 42
4. Case-study: conflict causes and the role of youth in Osh 43
4.1 The June 1990 and June 2010 events 43
4.2 Ethnic conflict? 44
4.3 Socio-economic conditions 46
4.4 The political situation 47
4.5 Other issues (drugs, third forces, media & rumours, police) 49
4.5.1 Drugs 49
4.5.2 Third forces 49
4.5.3 Media & rumours 50

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4.5.4 Police 51
4.6 The role of youth 51
4.7 Conclusion 52
5. Conflict potential and prevention 54
5.1 Conflict potential 54
5.2 Conflict prevention 55
6. Conclusion 58
6.1 Answering of the central question 58
6.2 Recommendations 59
Literature 61
Appendix 1: Prepared interview question 66

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1. Introduction
During my internship at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Turkey in the Spring of 2010, I became
interested in the so-called “Turkic world”, a region which stretches from western China all the way
towards Turkey. The languages spoken in this region belong to the Turkic language family, just as
some cultural traditions. When I read a book from Hugh Pope about the Turkic world, called the Sons
of the Conquerors - The Rise of the Turkic World, I also read about the Ferghana Valley. I was
attracted by this valley because of its many characteristics: different ethnicities, densely populated,
complex borders, territorial disputes, natural resources, water disputes, Islamist extremism, fertile
grounds, depressing socio-economic conditions, authoritarian leaders and weak regimes. When I was
reading the book a revolution in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 took place. This event was followed a few
months later by an ethnic conflict in the valley to which I was so attracted: the Ferghana Valley.
In this chapter the basic facts of the research will be presented. The research goal and questions,
societal and scientific relevance, methodology and structure will be explained.
1.1 Research goal and questions
The research focuses on the Ferghana Valley, which is as said before a complex region of which some
characteristics can be seen in map 1.1.
Map 1.1: Land issues and population density in Ferghana Valley, Central Asia
Reference: UNEP, 2010

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Taking the characteristics into account, it seems that the Ferghana Valley has all the ingredients to
lead to a large scale conflict comparable with the Balkans or the Caucasus (Deen & Bouyjou, 2006).
Indeed, the region has seen many disturbances. To name just a few: the conflict between Uzbek and
Kyrgyz in Uzgen (Kyrgyzstan) in 1990; the protests and killings in Andijan (Uzbekistan) in 2005; and
the ethnic conflict between Uzbek and Kyrgyz people in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) in 2010. However, the
region is still relatively stable, no large scale conflict has broken out (yet) (Deen & Bouyjou, 2006;
Peimani, 2009). Still, it is important to keep an eye on this region. Very recently, the president of
Kyrgyzstan, Roza Otunbayeva, declared that she is worried about the developments in the Ferghana
Valley and that international attention is needed. This statement indicates fragility in and worries
about the region (NRC Handelsblad, 2011).
These characteristics and the past unrests in the region make the Ferghana Valley an interesting
research topic in the field of conflict studies. The research goal is to establish a valuable conflict
potential map for the Ferghana Valley. In order to make the project practically feasible the research
has been focused on the case-study of Osh in which a conflict took place in June 2010, as will be
explained more in-depth later on. In order to make the project more useful for society, the role of
young local people will be taken into account. Young people formed the majority of participators in
the violence in Osh, which indicates that they are an important group when it comes to conflict.
Analysing why they took part in the conflict gives insight in their problems, which can then be solved.
The conflict potential map will provide insights in the key aspects and causes of the problems.
Insights are necessary in order to address the main problems. On the basis of the main problems
conflict prevention tools can be selected. For example, when ethnic diversity appears to be the main
problem, cross-community projects could be used as a prevention tool.
The research goal leads to the following research question of the thesis:
“What is the conflict potential of the Ferghana Valley and what is the role of young local people on
this?”
When analysing conflicts, it is always important to take the history and the context of a region into
account. Because we are dealing with a region covering three countries, it is also important to pay
attention to cross-border issues. Drugs traffickers, border disputes and radical groups determine
everyday life in the border areas of the Ferghana Valley. Therefore the first two sub-questions are:
- Which cross-border issues are important for conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley?
- To what extent are the history and context of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan of
importance for the conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley?
As said before, the Ferghana Valley is a large region which spreads out over the territory of three
different countries. Because of practical, financial and safety issues it has not been possible to
conduct research in all three countries. Therefore the primary data have been collected in
Kyrgyzstan, the most accessible, open and safest country in the region. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are
more difficult to do research in, due to a repressive regimes and the more conservative religion. This
is why the main research has been focused on Kyrgyzstan and specifically on Osh, the place where a
conflict broke out in June 2010. Therefore Osh will be the case study of this research.
To determine the conflict potential, theories on ethnicity, socio-economic circumstances and the
political situation as causes for conflict will be used. These will be explained more in depth in the next
chapter. Related to these theories, the following sub-questions have been formulated:
- To what extent is ethnic diversity of influence for the conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley?

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- To what extent are socio-economic conditions of influence for the conflict potential in the
Ferghana Valley?
- To what extent is the political situation of influence for the conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley?
These sub questions will be answered by analysing the situations of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan and by the specific case-study of Osh.
In order to answer the second part of the central question, the next sub-question has been
formulated:
- What was the role of young local people during the unrest in Osh in June 2010?
This question will be answered by first analysing theories on youth and conflict, after which the
theories will be applied on the case study in Osh. Osh will be taken into account and not the
Ferghana Valley as a whole because Osh has just experienced violence.
Answering these sub-questions will lead to the final answer to the central question. In the end the
analysis and findings will result in conflict prevention focus areas. Recommendations for further
research will arise from the research; for example on specific conflict prevention tools including
young people in the Ferghana Valley.
1.2 Societal relevance
The direct societal problems which trigger this research project are the recent events in the Ferghana
Valley and the neighbouring countries (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan): The 1990 conflict
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Uzgen; the 1999 bombings in Tashkent; the incursion of IMU (Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan) fighters in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000; the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan
in 2005; the on-going protests against the Kyrgyz government in the years after the revolution; the
Andijan incident in Uzbekistan in 2005; the skirmishes on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border in May 2006;
another overthrow of the government in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010; and the ethnic violence between
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh in June 2010. These are the most important of the many disturbances in
the region. Besides, everyday life is characterized by tensions at the borders and by drugs traffickers
(Peimani, 2009; Passon & Temirkulov, 2004, p. ii).
More generally speaking, some overall societal problems of the Ferghana Valley can be distinguished.
These are the ethnic distribution of the Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks over the three countries;
authoritarian and weak political states; and poor social and economic conditions which are
specifically affecting young people.
The thesis can contribute to solving the societal problems by gaining insight into the current
situation. Given the fact that the unrests in Osh in June 2010 are very recent, not much research on
this topic has been done yet, especially on this specific case-study. The developments last Summer
shed a new light on the situation in the Ferghana Valley. Therefore, a better understanding of the
situation can help in preventing future conflicts. Furthermore, by including the role of young people,
more insight will be gained into an important group in society.
Eventually the people living in the Ferghana Valley will benefit the most from the results of this
research. They are in need of a peaceful and stable situation. More specifically, this project can help
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and other organizations in the region implementing projects
and programs in the Ferghana Valley – and Osh more specifically – to bring peace and stability. Policy
makers, the governments, international organizations and NGOs need analyses in order to make the

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right choices in their policy and plans. This is only possible when it is known what the people and the
region need.
1.3 Scientific relevance
With regard to the scientific relevance, this thesis aims at contributing to the common accumulation
of knowledge in the field of causes of violence and conflict, conflict potential and conflict prevention.
Conflicts have been explained from different perspectives. Some of the most well-known theories are
those which explain conflicts from either ethnic differences, socio-economic circumstances or the
political situation. This thesis will combine these theories, because I believe a conflict cannot be
explained by just one side of the coin. A conflict occurs because of many aspects which are
interrelated.
In the Ferghana Valley, conflicts occurred between different ethnic groups, mainly between Kyrgyz,
Uzbeks and Tajiks. Therefore it is important to consider theories on ethnic conflict. These theories
can be divided in two groups: the primordialists and the constructivists. The primordialists see
ethnicity as a natural given, while constructivists see ethnicity as socially constructed. Because it is
important to know why the violence has occurred and what the potential for ethnic violence is, we
should know the underlying causes (Rubenstein & Crocker, 1994).
It is not likely that ethnic violence occurred just because of ethnic differences (which would be the
primordialist point of view). Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks have been living for ages in peace in the
Ferghana Valley; only since a few decades ethnic tensions have emerged. In other words, there
should be underlying causes and other forces, which relates to the constructivists’ point of view. The
constructivists say that ethnicity is important, but it should be activated in order to be a root for
conflict (Eriksen, 1993).
Some of these other forces can be socio-economic circumstances. The Ferghana Valley is
characterized by bad socio-economic conditions and a high unemployment rate. People could
therefore choose for violence because there are no alternatives. To rebel and to loot would be an
attractive outcome. People would do well out of war. Also the violence in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010
was characterized by looting. Markets and shops were plundered, and the violence stopped when
there was nothing to loot anymore (Schwirtz, 2010; Sanghera, 2010; interview 1). However, although
these socio-economic circumstances might have played an important role, there is also a link to
ethnicity.
A link between ethnicity and socio-economic conditions can be found in the concept of horizontal
equality. This link can be found in grievances and the relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970).
Theories based on grievance argue that inequality is the basis of rebellion and that if socio-economic
inequality is high, then violent conflict will occur. Economic inequality produces discontent among
groups in a society and is largely regarded as a cause for rebellion and violence (Gurr, 1970; Schock,
1996, p. 99). More specifically, ethnic divisions can also be used for a division in the working class. An
example of this is where jobs with higher statuses tend to be reserved for members of the dominant
culture, whereas members of minority cultures tend to occupy lower positions (Schock, 1996, p.
103).
In the Ferghana Valley this situation can also be distinguished. Since the independence of Kyrgyzstan
in 1991, many Kyrgyz people moved to Osh, a city with traditionally many Uzbek citizens. With the
immigration of more Kyrgyz into Osh, the competition for jobs and land became fiercer. Uzbeks
mainly filled the middle niche jobs, like shop-keepers, craftsmen and businessmen. The Kyrgyz mainly
filled the tier above – in government positions – and under them (Megoran, 2010; Sanghera, 2010).

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As can be seen, also the political situation1
is important here: the government decided that the
Kyrgyz should fill the jobs in national banks, state enterprises and local governments. With the
government being corrupt and partial, the feelings of inequality and dissatisfaction increased.
But the political situation is also important in another way: people should find opportunities to rebel,
and this depends on the political situation of a country. The political situation can be described by
the level of repressiveness and the level of democracy of a country. Semi-democracies are unstable,
because they are partly open yet somewhat repressive: a combination that invites protests, rebellion
and other forms of civil violence. This has a close relation with Schock’s (1996) analysis of semi-
repressive regimes. In semi-repressive regimes there are opportunities to organize and mobilize the
opposition, but political participation is blocked. The only effective choice then left is violence.
This thesis will contribute to the existing scientific knowledge by combining these three aspects and
by applying these to the Ferghana Valley. As seen above, the different aspects primarily exist in
different theories; however, I think they cannot be separated from each other. Instead, all these
aspects are highly interrelated. By combining these theories, more insight in conflict potential can be
reached. To what extent the aspects are of influence in the Ferghana Valley and Osh will determine
the conflict potential.
By taking into account the role of young local people, a specific approach is taken to include an
important group of the total population. Furthermore it should be analysed why so many young
people played a crucial role in the violence in Osh. Young people can be regarded as the future of a
country and therefore an analysis which takes the role of young people into account can yield
interesting outcomes. The role of young people is often influenced by their circumstances: do they
have access to education? Are there enough job opportunities? Are there facilities like leisure
centres? By looking at the role of this group, a more accurate conflict potential map can be made
(Najibullah, 2003).
Furthermore, the Ferghana Valley is a relatively new region in the field of conflict studies. As each
conflict is context dependent, the research will contribute to the small (but increasing) amount of
literature on the Ferghana Valley which is available at the moment.
1.4 Methodology and structure
The project made use of several research techniques with the aim to provide an inclusive overview of
the conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley and specifically Osh, the role of young local people and
possible conflict prevention tools. The methodology used is qualitative based on literature, primary
data (participant observation and in-depth interviews) and secondary data (documents from NGOs
and international organizations). This part will explain the choices made for the methodology and
structure.
Sources
The sources used are literature, primary data (interviews and participant observation) and secondary
data (documents).
The theoretical framework is mainly based on literature retrieved from different libraries (Radboud
University Nijmegen; Utrecht University; OSCE Academy). Furthermore, secondary data is used in the
theoretical framework; these are mainly documents from NGOs or international organizations which
use theoretical definitions in their documents.
1
The term political situation is chosen instead of political context, in order to avoid confusion with the part
about history and context of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

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In order to map the conflict potential of the Ferghana Valley, different sources were used. Firstly,
secondary data were used. NGOs and international organizations have done various research and
projects in the Ferghana Valley and they have documented these. These documents are useful to see
what has already been done in the Ferghana Valley. These documents were gathered from official
websites of organizations and by contacting different organizations. These data have been used
because when doing research it is always useful not only to have a look at other research conducted
before, but also to use it by comparing it with and support your own results.
Second, two kinds of primary data were used to do research on the case study, of which the first one
was participant observation. A part of the research consisted of an internship at the OSCE Academy
in Bishkek. Therefore I lived in Kyrgyzstan for ten weeks. I established many contacts with people in
Kyrgyzstan who were willing to involve me in there social lives. By living in Bishkek and Osh and by
careful participant observation I gained more insight in my research topic. Although participant
observation was more an additional part in the research, it was very useful. It would not have been
possible writing this master’s thesis without having been there. While being somewhere you can use
all your senses in order to get a feeling of a situation. In this way I could experience myself how
public life was in Osh by making use of the bazaar, public transport, parks and other leisure facilities.
On the other hand, in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted. I have chosen for this
method because of several reasons, of which the first reason is personal. For my bachelor thesis I did
quantitative research, which I enjoyed because of the concrete results. However, I missed an in-
depth analysis in this and the ‘stories behind’. During an internship at the embassy of the
Netherlands in Turkey I conducted research to Turkish presence in Africa, for which I did qualitative
research by interviewing African diplomats. I enjoyed this more than quantitative research because
of the interesting talks and anecdotes while I could still find overlapping stories and results. There I
found out that qualitative research suits me better because of the personal approach.
Another reason for this method is that it fits best to the research. As the main goal of the research is
to map the conflict potential and the role of youth in the Ferghana Valley, experts can provide the
most comprehensive information in order to get a complete view. This complete view is necessary
because of the many aspects this thesis includes (ethnicity, socio-economic, political, history,
context, cross-border issues, young people). A good understanding of the region is thus only possible
with a deep analysis. So interviews with experts and other knowledgeable persons would be more
useful than for example a survey amongst ordinary people, which are in general less educated and
less knowledgeable, especially in Osh.
The last reason for this method is that it was more (financially and timely) feasible than quantitative
research. In order to do quantitative research I would have had to make the surveys in Russian,
Kyrgyz and Uzbek (languages I do not speak). Furthermore in order to conduct the surveys I would
have needed many research assistants, which was financially impossible. Furthermore, the tensions
amongst some parts of the populations are very high and they do not like foreigners being involved
in their conflict. As a foreign researcher you can also be regarded as partial and as one of those
foreigners being involved in the conflict. You should first build trust in order to conduct the surveys,
which takes a lot of time. As I was on my own in Kyrgyzstan for ‘just’ ten weeks, it was better
achievable to do qualitative research by interviewing experts who were willing to talk and which you
did not have to convince first.
The respondents in this qualitative research were persons from NGOs and international
organizations, politicians, students, journalists and other persons with a relation to the topic. The
interviews conducted were analysed with the program MaxQDA. This is a qualitative data analysis
computer program for researchers working with non-numerical and unstructured data (i.e.
interviews). The program allows researchers to classify, sort and arrange information and examine
relationships. The program was used in order to quickly find and sort specific themes in the 43
interviews conducted. The themes were related to the theoretical framework and the research:

15
conflict potential and prevention, cross-border issues, ethnicity, socio-economic conditions, the
political situation and youth. It was thus mainly a tool in order to search through and select in the 43
interviews.
Contacts were established mainly through a snowball method. I established contacts and conducted
interviews with the following organizations, both in Bishkek and Osh:
International organizations: UN, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, UNOCHA, OHCHR, EU Delegation, OSCE, US
Embassy, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, ICCO, ACTED,
Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, Oxus International, International Resources Group
Local organizations: Coalition for Democracy & Civil Society, Independent Human Rights Group,
Advocacy Centre on Human Rights, Solomona, Youth Human Rights Group, Central Asian New
Market Institute, New Eurasia, Foundation for Tolerance International, Development and
Cooperation in Central Asia, Committee for Human Rights, IRET, Youth of Osh, Mehr Shavkat, Kloop
Media Foundation, Kylym Shamy.
As can be noticed from the names in the list, some organizations have a specific approach towards
youth. Also organizations with a wider orientation often had specific programmes targeting youth. In
this way I was able to get information about the role of youth in the conflict. In addition to
organizations, I also had formal interviews and informal conversations with students, other young
people, members of parliament, the police, friends and colleagues. I made social contacts with young
people in Kyrgyzstan via social media and universities. With the use of Facebook I was able to join
groups like “Students in Kyrgyzstan” and “Aiesec”. I attended some of their meetings through which
friendships were built. I also went to some universities and approached some students there to have
a talk. In total I conducted forty official interviews, I attended three official roundtables and I had
many informal talks on the topic. A list of the attended roundtables and conducted interviews
together with the detailed texts can be found in the separate Appendix, “Attended roundtables &
conducted interviews”.
As said before, I only conducted research in Kyrgyzstan, which led to the case-study about Osh. The
information gathered about Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is only based on secondary data.
Due to this choice the research is biased towards Kyrgyzstan and the view of the respondents who
live in Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstan’s population is a mix of ethnicities. The largest ethnic group
are the Kyrgyz (69%) and the second largest group are the Uzbeks who are mainly living in the South
(14,5%). Other ethnic groups are Russians (9,0%) and small minorities including Tajiks (1,1%). So it is
important to notice that there is a difference when talking about ‘people in Kyrgyzstan’ and ‘Kyrgyz’.
People in Kyrgyzstan also include Uzbeks, Russians and other minorities. Beforehand I tried to get a
good representation of the population. However, when I was in Kyrgyzstan I noticed that the points
of view from the organizations were relatively neutral. This can definitely be said for the
international organizations, which all strive for neutrality. But also with the local organizations I
noticed neutrality. This can be ascribed to the fact that these organizations are all working on peace
and human rights. They want stability regardless of the ethnicity of one person. They are not busy
with blaming one or another, but focus on making the society stable again. Therefore I did not focus
that much on interviewing as many Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, although I interviewed organizations both
with Kyrgyz and Uzbek backgrounds. Only in a few cases the respondents were very biased. Ironically
those were the persons who viewed themselves as being neutral, but always ended up blaming only
one party in the conflict. Most of the time interviewees did not even want to talk about who started
the conflict. On the one hand this indicates that the respondents wanted to be neutral, but it also
points to the fact that the topic is still sensitive. The people whom I talked to did not want to
generalize or to distinguish between groups, instead, they wanted to focus on other core problems
which created the conflict.

16
In case I would have chosen to do quantitative research amongst the local population, the ethnic
representation would have been very important. This is because the local population is in general
much more partial, because they just came out of the conflict and they still suffer from feelings of
hatred and tensions. However, by focussing on experts this was less relevant.
Still, although not regarded as a huge problem, the biased point of view will be considered by being
careful when drawing conclusions. It can be said beforehand that further research should be
conducted including the Uzbek and Tajik points of view in order to create more generalized and
objective conclusions. However, the more than forty interviews conducted in Kyrgyzstan provide
inside information about the Ferghana Valley and give – together with the theories and secondary
data - a good overview of the situation there.
Interviews
The interviews were in-depth but semi-structured; this means that I tried to get as much detailed
information as possible, but I also tried to make the interviews semi-structured by preparing specific
questions. The questions which were asked were determined from the theoretical framework and
secondary data. Specific questions were necessary in order to answer the sub-questions.
The analysis was done on the basis of the answers given. From the interviews it became clear which
aspects are the most important for unrest in the Ferghana Valley and Osh and which aspects are the
most important for a possible conflict.
The interview questions (see Appendix 1) were beforehand set up in a specific way. Although each
group of questions may seem the same, they were set up in such a way and order that every first
question is the most open and objective one. It depended on the answer the respondent gave if it
was necessary to ask the next question, et cetera. This was done in order to prevent pushing the
respondent in a certain (subjective) direction. For example: I presume that there are problems in the
Ferghana Valley, but maybe the respondent would not even regard it as problems. Therefore I firstly
asked about the situation before talking about problems.
Although I prepared the questions in advance, in practice in many cases it turned out into a different
interview. I experienced this as positive and more in-depth, because in the cases that I conducted the
interviews as prepared, the answers received were short and superficial. In the cases where I was not
able to ask all my questions, answers were very profound and interesting, which were much more
valuable than possible answers on my prepared questions. Often I came up with different relevant
questions while the interview was on-going.
Half of the interviews I conducted in English and the other half of the interviews I used a translator
who could translate from Russian, Kyrgyz or Uzbek to English. To some extent I experienced this as
less efficient, as more time was lost to translation. On the other hand during the interview I had time
to read through my questions again and think more in-depth about which question to ask next.
Structure
The thesis starts with the theoretical framework in Chapter 2. This chapter discusses the theories on
conflict analysis. These theories are theories on ethnicity and conflict, greed, grievances and the
political situation. Furthermore, theories about the role of young people in conflict will be discussed.
Chapter 3 focuses on the region of the Ferghana Valley. In this chapter the relevant history and
context of the region will be explained, including the surrounding countries of the Ferghana Valley
(i.e. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan).
Chapter 4 will look in depth at the conflict causes and the role of young people during the June 2010
events in Osh. Chapter 5 will discuss the conflict potential and prevention focus areas.
In the end a conclusion will be drawn.

17
2. Theoretical framework: Conflicts, causes and the role of young people
This chapter discusses theories of conflict causes by ethnic differences, socio-economic conditions
and the political situation. On the basis of these combined theories it is possible to analyse the
conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley and Osh, which will be dealt with in the following chapters.
In the last part of this chapter theories on the role of youth in conflict will be discussed.
2.1 General terms: (violent) intra- and inter-state conflicts
Before starting to write about the causes of conflicts, it is first and foremost important to get a clear
idea what is meant with conflict.
2.1.1 Definitions of conflict
There are different definitions of conflict. According to Miall et al (1999, p. 20) a conflict is “the
pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups”. Mitchell (1981, p. 17) goes a step further by giving
the following definition: “Any situation in which two or more entities or ‘parties’ (however defined or
structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals”. Mitchell’s definition covers
more, by saying that parties perceive that they have incompatible goals. So in order for a conflict to
occur, there do not per se need to be incompatible goals, but parties need to perceive it.
Also in Osh people perceive that they have incompatible goals. Uzbeks want more minority rights,
while Kyrgyz want their nationality and economic situation to be protected, without threats from
Uzbeks. In their eyes these are incompatible goals, while in fact the goals are not necessarily
incompatible. There are different economic and political options to fulfil both goals; however, people
should be open for dialogue and concessions.
Dialogue and concessions brings us to the next point: a missing dimension in the definition is that it is
unknown whether the parties can solve their problems without violence. Therefore it is good to look
at Goodhand & Hulme (1999, p. 14), who give the following definition of a conflict:
“Conflict is a struggle between individuals or collectivities, over values or claims to status, power and
scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values or claims over
those others”. However, they state that this definition is simplistic and holds a negative connotation
including physical violence. Conflict can also be regarded as a positive happening, as “normal norms
of social interaction which may contribute to maintenance, development, change and overall stability
of entities” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 14). A conflict can become violent when “society cannot
represent, manage or resolve its different interests in a productive manner, thus initiating a
degenerative or destructive cycle of physical violence” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 14). So not only
(perceived) incompatible goals are a precondition, also the role of society is determinative for violent
conflict and its potential.
This was also the case in Osh, in which the government could not manage and resolve the different
perceived incompatible goals. So the society, to a great extent determined by the political situation,
was unable to prevent the conflict.
2.1.2 Intrastate and interstate conflicts
The nature of conflicts has changed over the years. For a long time war was mainly regarded as a
confrontation between states. War was a continuation of international politics by other means; it
belonged to the field of international relations (Cramer, 2002, p. 53). Wars took place between

18
nation-states and there were clear-cut national armies. Often a war had a precise beginning (e.g. by a
declaration of a state) and a formal ending (Gold, 2010).
However, during the last century, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the world has seen a
growth of intrastate conflicts instead of interstate conflicts. Intrastate wars are often more complex
and protracted because they do not have a clear distinction between war and peace. In other words,
there is no precise beginning or formal ending. Furthermore, the parties are not always visible;
intrastate wars are characterized by child soldiers, rebel armies, guerrilla groups and global terrorist
networks. Compared to interstate wars, they are not funded by the state, but sustained by outside
assistance (diaspora groups, criminal mafia) and the parallel economy (drug trafficking, diamonds
trade). Furthermore, the conflicts are characterized by more suffering and casualties under civilians,
which could also be a consequence of new technologies (Gold, 2010; Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p.
13-14; Cramer, 2006, p. 77).
So the most important difference is that an intrastate conflict is not between states, but between
groups or parties within a state. Nowadays identity groups are at the core of contemporary conflicts.
This is often a consequence of failed or weak states, in which the state is unable to control its
territory; other parties then take over the power, which was also the case in Osh (Cramer, 2006, p.
53; Gold, 2010).
It is important to make this distinction because both types of conflict are possible in the Ferghana
Valley. The most common are the conflicts between groups within a state. The conflict in Osh can
also be categorized as an intrastate conflict. Ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks groups, not the state,
were fighting against each other within Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore there were rumours that other third
parties like militant groups were involved. Most certainly they were funded by the criminal mafia
which is involved in drug trafficking, a huge economy in Osh.
On the other hand an interstate conflict is also possible because there are still disputes about
undemarcated borders between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
2.1.3 When can violent incidents be regarded as a conflict?
But when is a violent event or incident an official conflict in the international and academic debate?
And were the events in Osh ‘just’ riots or was it a conflict? And has the Ferghana Valley already seen
conflicts?
Different criteria are used in different international databases of conflicts. Often numerical criteria
are used like the number of battle-related deaths. According to the Correlates of War project (COW)
an event is a conflict when there are more than 1,000 deaths related to the conflict in one year.
However, the University of Uppsala uses at least 25 battle deaths in one year. So there are different
criteria possible. Another point to add is that it is also important to look at the total population, so it
is possible to say something about the percentage of the population which is involved in the conflict
(Cramer, 2006, p. 59/60).
According to international jurisprudence (ICTY, 1995; ICC; underlining added): “An armed conflict will
exist whenever there is resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state.
Internal disturbances and tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence […] are
generally excluded from the notion of armed conflict. In order to distinguish internal conflict from
mere internal unrest, tensions or banditry, international humanitarian law imposes measures of
duration, potency and design. The armed conflict must be prolonged and assume at least a minimum
level of both intensity and organization. Further […] the armed group must exercise control over part
of the territory”.

19
Applying these numbers and definitions to what happened in Osh in June 2010, it can be said that
the incidents cannot be regarded as an armed conflict. Officially ‘only’ 470 people were killed2
in a
period of five to six days (KIC, 2011). Furthermore, although the conflict was intense and highly
violent, the duration of the conflict cannot be regarded as prolonged (KIC, 2011, p. 48). The unrest in
June 2010 can better be regarded as internal disturbances and tensions. These included acts of
serious violence and riots (KIC, 2011, p. 48). Also the Ferghana Valley as a whole has not experienced
an official conflict, neither intrastate conflict nor interstate conflict between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
and / or Tajikistan. Although no official conflict, in this thesis I will refer to the Osh events also as
conflict because of linguistic reasons. Also people in Kyrgyzstan themselves talk about the
happenings in Osh as a conflict or even as war.
So it can be said that no official conflict has broken out yet, but it cannot be denied that the region
has seen serious violations, riots and other acts of violence often between ethnic groups. Therefore I
will now take a look at theories about conflict causes and ethnicity, socio-economic conditions and
the political situation.
2.2 Ethnic conflict
To explain conflict by ethnic differences is a popular topic in the war causation theories nowadays
(Gilley, 2004). This is no surprise, since after the end of the Cold War the world has seen many
‘ethnic’ conflicts. To name just a few: Tutsi’s and Hutus in Rwanda; Abkhazians and South-Ossetians
in Georgia; Turks and Kurds in Turkey. And not to forget the case-study of this thesis: Kyrgyz and
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. But what is ethnicity? According to Gilley (2004, p. 1158):
“[…] that part of a person’s identity which is drawn from one or more ‘markers’ like race, religion,
shared history, region, social symbols or language. It is distinct from that part of a person’s identity
that comes from, say, personal moral doctrine, economic status, civic affiliations or personal history”.
Most of the academics state that an ethnic group is a community or communal group. Ethnic groups
are larger than social formations such as family and clans or face-to-face groups such as
neighbourhoods. Also, a family or neighbourhood can exist out of different ethnic groups.
However, there is discussion about the question whether this communal bond is given by nature or
whether it is imagined, created through social action. This is the difference between the primordialist
and constructivist point of view and it is decisive when analysing conflicts.
2.2.1 Primordialist view
The primordialists see ethnicity as a ‘given’: people are born with it and so you cannot choose it.
Cultural features are a cultural given and a natural affinity. Ethnic groups are fixed; they are based on
irrational bonds based on kinship, blood, race, language, religion, social practices and culture. It is a
personal property acquired by birth.
Because ethnic groups are fixed, different ethnicities can be seen everywhere in the world: the world
exists of different traditions, cultures, religions, norms and values (Baumann, 1999, p. 59; Fox, 2005,
p. 449; Oberschall, 2000, p. 982).
Furthermore, the world exists of inequalities. Mostly these inequalities run parallel with different
ethnicities mentioned before. In other words, inequalities are caused by different ethnicities,
because different ethnicities exist just because they are there. These inequalities cause conflicts
between different ethnicities. Clashes and conflicts between ethnicities and cultures are thus
2
Although many people told me more than 1,000 people were killed; however there is no evidence for this.

20
unavoidable (Baumann, 1999, p. 61-62). The primordialists thus see ethnic differences as the main
driving forces for conflicts, which are very hard – or even impossible – to overcome.
2.2.2 Constructivist view
However, the primordialist view received much critique from the constructivists. They argue that
differences in ethnicity do not necessarily lead to clashes. As seen in the past, different ethnicities
lived peacefully together in empires and countries without conflicts between them. Before the war in
Yugoslavia broke out, Bosnians, Serbs and Croats lived peacefully together and there were even
intermarriages. This was – and still is – also the case in the Ferghana Valley. According to the
constructivists, cultural features are not like kinship sentiments, but they are socially constructed and
it is thus possible to change them (Rubenstein & Crocker, 1994, p. 118; Oberschall, 2000, p.
982/983).
Constructivists argue that ethnicity is being viewed as a ‘cogent existential reality’, which is a process
of reification. Reification takes place when an abstract belief or idea is taken for granted as being
real. Something which in fact is not real, is being treated and viewed as real, like ethnicity. According
to the constructivists ethnicity is made by mankind and it is socially constructed (Baumann, 1999, p.
61-63).
Baumann (1999, p. 64) gives a clear example of how ethnicity should be regarded: it can be
compared with wine, which is made of natural ingredients. But these natural ingredients do not
make wine themselves. The ingredients need to be added to each other and they need to ripen. In
the end, a wine will have different flavours depending on a certain context. Also ethnicity exists of
different natural bonds which in themselves do not create ethnicity. It needs economic and political
interests in order to work in everyday life. In addition, it needs social conditions, because the
ethnicity needs to make sense for the people. Furthermore, ethnicity has also different meanings
related to various social settings.
So in other words, ethnicity is a people’s creation based on natural products and not a natural
product of its own (Eriksen, 1993, p. 16; Barth, 1998, p. 15).
So although ethnicity is being viewed by many academics as something absolute and a natural given,
in fact it is not because it is socially constructed (Eriksen, 1993). For the explanation of war this has
consequences, because if ethnicities are constructed, clashes between ethnicities can be avoided.
This is not to say that conflicts between ethnicities will not occur. Culture is a basic need for people,
but it must be ‘activated’ in order to be a root for conflict. This is why ethnicities can live in peace
together as well as fight against each other. This was also the case in Osh where it was first peaceful
and at a sudden moment ethnicities were fighting each other. There should be underlying forces and
reasons which cause increasing tensions and eventually so-called ethnic conflict.
Furthermore, certain aspects must be present in order for an ethnic conflict to occur. One of these
aspects is a core-periphery differential that is characterized by regional differences and growing
nationalism among ethnic groups. Another setting in which ethnic conflict often occurs is in regions
with high industrial development but where political leadership and control over resources are
lacking. Furthermore, it is said that development of uneven national consciousness and cleavages
due to class differences can contribute to the potential of ethnic conflict (Carment, 1994, p. 557).
These aspects can also be found in Osh: the place is situated in the periphery of Kyrgyzstan, which is
characterized by its North-South division. The South is less developed than the North. Because in the
South as a result of worse socio-economic conditions there are class differences between ethnicities.
This leads to increased feelings of nationalism, especially amongst the Kyrgyz living in the South who
think that the Uzbeks are taking the good jobs. The tensions increased during the time of the Soviet
Union which was characterized by high industrial development in which Kyrgyz were forced to move

21
to the urban centres. At certain periods of time when there was a weak political leadership, the
tensions broke out into violence. In Osh this was the case in 1991 and in 2010. In 1991 the Soviet
Union weakened, in 2010 the Bakiyev regime in Kyrgyzstan was overthrown.
Also the Ferghana Valley as a whole is characterized by a core-periphery. Not only in Kyrgyzstan, but
also in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the Ferghana Valley is an isolated part of the country with
differences in economic conditions compared to the rest of the country. Because of its isolation, the
government is often unable to control the situation in the periphery sufficiently.
So ethnic ‘markers’ alone in a conflict do not have to be the basis of calling something an ‘ethnic
conflict’. A clear example is given by Gilley (2004, p. 1158): “When the six countries that share the
Mekong River fight over its use, this is not ‘ethnic conflict’ merely because all sides are ethnically
distinct”. Therefore, critics of the theories of ethnic conflict argue that ethnic conflict is a superficial
description. In order to make the concept of ethnic conflict useful, it should include a causal
explanation, not merely a description of who is fighting whom, like Kyrgyz fighting Uzbeks (Gilley,
2004, p. 1158). There should be underlying structural issues which cause structural deprivation, such
as economic or political issues. Conflicts are large events which consist of heterogeneous
components and causes extended in space and time (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998, p. 446). They consist of
a number of different types of actions, processes, occurrences and events. In this ethnicity can
provide a sense of solidarity which can mobilize people. It is even said that political and economic
interests of states or other actors can furnish the “underlying causes and ongoing issues for most
serious conflicts” (Carment, 1994, p. 552). This can be seen in Kyrgyzstan as well, in which
nationalistic politicians try to gain power by playing the ethnic card – by focussing on the fears of the
‘other’ - to win votes. Ethnic groups are then put against each other which can lead to increasing
tensions and violence, which therefore did not even exist. One can then question if an ethnic war
even exists at all. Maybe it is only a descriptive label for a collection of different issues and
phenomena (Gilley, 2004, p. 1159-1161). Multiple theoretical lenses are necessary in order to
analyse the so-called “ethnic violence” (Gilley, 2004, p. 1159-1161; Brubaker & Laitin, 1998, p. 446).
The next paragraphs deal with those underlying causes by looking through other theoretical lenses.
2.3 Greed or grievance? Socio-economic conditions and inequality
Some academics argue that socio-economic conditions are the main drivers of conflict. The most
well-known theories focusing on these factors are the greed thesis and the grievance thesis.
2.3.1 Greed: socio-economic conditions
In the greed thesis, greed is seen as the most important cause for war and a conflict always has an
economic dimension (Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ginty, 2004, p. 858). Economic
incentives make rebellion and looting possible and there are groups with economic power that tend
to gain from the continuation of the conflict. This theory is rooted in the rational choice paradigm, as
rebels make an individual cost and benefit analysis whether to loot and to take arms (Bulte, 2009, p.
2). Parameters like financial opportunities and social and geographical constraints, but also the
financial capability of the government to provide defence determine the analysis (Collier & Hoeffler,
2004, p. 35).
Indeed, when looking at the on-going conflicts in the world nowadays, it becomes clear that in many
cases economic aspects and looting play an important role: Colombia, Mexico, Congo, Afghanistan,
Sudan, Iraq, et cetera. These are all countries with little financial and job opportunities, which is also
the case for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Furthermore, these are all cases in which drugs,
oil or natural resources are (leading) factors in the conflict. Also in Osh it was said that the conflict
was financed with drugs money from mafia groups. And drug trafficking in general plays an
important role in the Ferghana Valley.

22
Whether or not people start to loot and fight also depends on the context they are living in.
Important aspects are the political situation and the presence of armed groups. If the situation in a
country is characterized by, for example, protests and marches, it will be easier for individuals to
mobilize and to decide whether or not to loot. This is also the case in Kyrgyzstan, a country
characterized by many protests and two revolutions. Also the scale is important; if unemployment in
a region is very high, there will be more young men with bad socio-economic conditions who are
sensitive to be persuaded to take part in violence, which is also the case in the South of Kyrgyzstan.
In other words, looting and participating in violence highly depends on the economic and political
situation in a region (Ginty, 2004, p. 862).
However, discussing the greed thesis leaves out the ethnic aspect, while we are searching for
underlying root causes which can activate feelings of ethnicity. A link between economic conditions
and ethnicity can be found in horizontal inequality and relative deprivation, in other words the
grievance theory.
2.3.2 Grievances: inequality
Grievance is – in contrast to greed – rooted in a behavioural paradigm and emphasized by relative
deprivation, inequality and social exclusion (Bulte, 2009, p. 2). Theories based on grievance argue
that inequality is the basis of rebellion and that if economic inequality is high, then violent conflict
will occur. Economic inequality produces discontent among groups in a society and is largely
regarded as a cause for rebellion. The frustration about inequality leads to aggression and turns into
violence (Gurr, 1970; Schock, 1996, p. 99). This is what also happened in Osh, where Uzbeks had
good jobs and where Kyrgyz started to fill the tier above and under them.
One of the most well-known theories about grievance is the relative deprivation theory of Gurr
(1970). The definition of relative deprivation is the “perceived gap between people’s value
expectations and their value capabilities – that is, the discrepancy between what people think they
ought to get from society and what they believe they will actually obtain” (Schock, 1996, p. 101; Gurr,
1970).
When people feel they cannot obtain what they want, they feel they suffer from inequality. In other
words, the unrealized expectations result in feelings of deprivation (Gurr, 1970, p. 39). These feelings
lead to frustration which may lead again to aggression and violence. This happens mainly with people
who suffer from social exclusion. Also repression of elementary wishes can cause violence. Feelings
of repression develop when “people come to feel that their legitimate aspirations and ideas are
being repressed or perverted” (Gurr, 1970, p. 38).
People who suffer from social exclusion and feelings of deprivation are often ethnic minority groups.
They can be excluded from society. Ethnic divisions can be used for divisions in the working class. An
example of this is where jobs with higher statuses tend to be reserved for members of the dominant
culture, whereas members of minority cultures tend to occupy lower positions (Schock, 1996, p.
103). This is also the case in Osh where Kyrgyz are occupying positions in the government and the
police, while the Uzbeks are running the businesses. At the same time, many Kyrgyz are also filling
the tier under the Uzbeks. So there is envy on both sides: Uzbeks are envy because of the Kyrgyz
having the important positions, and Kyrgyz are envy because of the Uzbeks having wealthy
businesses.
This situation is often influenced by the political situation of a country; an open inclusive democratic
state in which minority rights are protected would be aware of one dominant group occupying the
higher jobs and even stimulate more integration. Therefore the next paragraph will look at theories
on politics and conflict.

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2.4 The political situation
As mentioned before, the political situation of a country can be decisive whether a conflict breaks
out or not. This has to do with state transition, democratization processes, degree of democracy and
repressiveness and state strength.
2.4.1 State transition and democratization
Mansfield & Snyder (1995) argue that there is more chance on violence during a period of
democratization than in a full authoritarian or a full democratic regime. This means that when a state
is changing from an autocracy to a democracy, the state is in transition and this increases the chance
on conflict and war. In a transition period a situation of social change, institutional weakness and
threatened interests arises. In other words: the state is weak. This can produce a political impasse for
getting to democracy: it becomes difficult to form stable political coalitions and to gain sufficient
support for power. Sometimes a power vacuum exists, in which a rebel group can take over the
power (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, p .26). This was also the case in Kyrgyzstan, which is in general
regarded as the most democratic country in Central Asia, but which is far from being a real
democracy. The conflict broke out in the period just after the revolution, which indicates that after
the overthrow of Bakiyev Kyrgyzstan was in transition. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are both
characterized by a more autocratic regime.
Mansfield & Snyder further argue that during a period of democratization, elites will try to mobilize
allies among the mass of people. Therefore they often use ideology in order to create mass support,
which is often nationalism. Nationalism has the advantage of creating a community of interests that
unites elites and masses, and so gaining a strong support base (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, p. 28/29).
In a country with ethnic differences this might happen along the lines of ethnic groups. Nationalism
among ethnic groups is growing, which might lead to increasing awareness of one’s identity and
ethnicity. Conflict can then also take place along the lines of ethnic groups (Carment, 1994, p. 557).
This is what happened in Osh. Because there was space for new political coalitions, new politicians
wanted to gain a strong support base and this was easily done by focusing either on the Uzbeks or on
the Kyrgyz. People are sensitive for one’s nationality or ethnicity, and therefore they are also
sensitive for political elites who are focusing on this: the ethnic card was played in politics.
2.4.2 Degree of democracy and repressiveness
Other academics add to this that not only transition and democratization can explain civil war, but
also the degree of democracy (Hegre et al, 2001, p. 42/43). They state that semi-democracies are
unstable, because they are partly open yet somewhat repressive: a combination that invites protest,
rebellion and other forms of civil violence (Hegre et al, 2001, p. 33). This is close to Schock’s theory
about a semi-repressive political context. This context is conducive to the translation of discontent
into violence, because there are opportunities to organize and mobilize, but effective forms of
routine political participation are blocked. Potentially effective violent protest is thus selected to
oppose the government (Schock, 1996, p. 124/125). This contrasts to fully autocratic or fully
democratic countries. Autocratic regimes will suppress dissidence and protests very effectively, and
developed democracies have the political and institutional facilities for groups to express grievances
and feelings of inequality in a non-violent manner. Stability in a country is necessary for prevention
of violent conflict and maintenance of peace (World Youth Report, 2003, p. 377). This theory might
explain why violence occurred in Kyrgyzstan and not in other Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan. Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has seen a tradition in violent protest to oppose the
governments under Akayev and Bakiyev. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan there is also opposition, but
they are being extremely suppressed by the autocratic regimes under respectively Karimov and
Rahmon, which is why these countries are more ‘stable’.

24
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the degree of democracy in a country relates to the chances of extreme
political violence in that country. The vertical scale indicates the probability of extreme political
violence in percentages; the horizontal scale indicates the level of democracy between -10 and +10.
As the curve shows, the chance on political violence increases when the level of democracy comes
around zero. More general spoken, extreme political violence is most likely to occur (20-25%) when
the level of democracy is between minus five and plus five. Furthermore the curve shows that this is
more likely in ethnically heterogeneous nations than in homogeneous nations. This is because in
heterogeneous nations there are more different interests, which often unfold themselves along
ethnic lines. Besides, in these countries the level of political inclusiveness is often low. This is often
characterized by one ethnic group being dominant in the government. This leads to discontent
among other ethnic groups which increases the chance of violence along ethnic lines.
In the next chapter the levels of democracy of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will be analysed.
Figure 2.1: Impact of levels of democracy on the probability of extreme political violence
Reference: Coming Anarchy, 2006
2.4.3 State strength
Similarly state strength is important when looking at translation of discontent into violence.
In state strength the level of inclusiveness of the political system is important. A high political
inclusiveness can reduce the likelihood of civil war. Inclusiveness can be achieved by applying more
consensual democracies rather than majority systems. Especially in heterogeneous societies with
ethnic differentiation, it is important to achieve high political inclusiveness, so that each ethnic group
is represented (Reynal-Querol, 2004, p. 459-462). If this is not the case, ethnic groups might feel
deprived, especially when the whole governmental system (and maybe even the police and security
system) is dominated by one ethnic group, as was the case in Kyrgyzstan where everything was
dominated by Kyrgyz. Ethnic groups - in the case-study Uzbeks - might feel a sense of exclusion and
failure in the social and political arena, and their aspirations are being denied. Furthermore, a
preference of one ethnic group and other non-democratic operations by the government can lead to
an inequitable distribution of resources and the marginalization of certain groups. All this can cause
ethnic conflict. However, to what extent an ethnic conflict will occur also depends on the structure,
strategy and characteristics of the ethnic groups. But in general it can be said that “most states
experiencing protracted conflict pursue redistributive policies that favour one ethnic group over
another” (Carment, 1994, p. 574) (Carment, 1994, p. 565-6; WYR, 2003, p. 377).

25
Furthermore, it depends on to what extent ethnic groups are geographically separated from each
other. In countries in which ethnicities live intermingled it will be more difficult to separate them
from each other, and therefore it can be more difficult to manage the conflict in the long run
(Carment, 1994, p. 574). This is also the case in the Ferghana Valley where different ethnicities live
intermixed with each other; although on a micro scale there are separate mono-ethnic
neighbourhoods and villages. Besides, ethnic conflict is more common when the state strength
comes into danger. This can happen when a country is characterized by internal pressures, such as a
coup d’etat, a new regime or another kind of power transition (Carment, 1994, p. 573). This was also
the case in Kyrgyzstan, where the conflict broke out a few months after the overthrow of Bakiyev.
In the case the state becomes too weak and one can speak about state failure, the chance of conflict
increases as well. The government is characterized by abuses, extortion and corruption. When the
government feels no responsibility for its citizens, people will have to search for security and social
safety nets themselves. In this case people are often more willing to risk their lives and use violence,
or they join other groups in order to get security (WYR, 2003, p. 377).
In this first part of the theoretical framework the three theoretical lenses of ethnicity, socio-
economic conditions and the political situation were discussed. As already seen in this chapter, these
theories seem highly applicable to the Ferghana Valley and the case-study of Osh. However, a deeper
analytical research is necessary to see if these theories can really be applied. This will be done in the
next chapters about the Ferghana Valley (Chapter 3) and the case-study of Osh (Chapter 4), upon
which the theoretical framework will be reflected. First, the next part of the theoretical framework
will have a closer look at the role of young people in conflict.
2.5 The role of young people in conflict
In conflict prevention addressing the root causes of conflict is very important. Therefore, it is
necessary to pay attention to the population. An important aspect of the local population is the
group of young people, because they are the future of each society. They will be the new leaders in a
few decades. Young people and youth are defined as all people with an age of 30 and below (WYR,
2003, p. 381; Oxus International / IOM, 2011).
Young people in general face many obstacles in the world nowadays. In many regions there are
insufficient opportunities for young people to find a job and earn a living. According to the World
Youth Report (2003, p. 376) of the three billion people earning less than two dollars a day, half of
them live in developing countries and half of them are younger than 24. Furthermore,
unemployment amongst young people is very high. Many finish their education, but cannot find a job
after graduating.
Using young people as a target group is becoming more popular in conflict studies nowadays. More
research is being done regarding youth and conflict (UNDP, 2006). Also the international community
is paying more attention to youth; organizations like UNICEF and UNHCR are setting up projects for
conflict prevention and recovery efforts especially focusing on youth or young adults in the West-
Africa region (UNDP, 2006). Also in Osh I spoke with many organizations which are focussing on
youth by providing them with peace building trainings and setting up youth centres.
Interesting of the topic is that the target group can be regarded in two ways, because the group is
very mouldable. On the one hand youth can be viewed as a threat to peace: they can easily be
mobilized and are sensitive to take part in armed hostilities. On the other hand they can be viewed as
a force to peace: they are a good starting point when using community building as a conflict
resolution tool, because they are easy to mobilize and sensitive for positive changes (UNDP, 2006;
UNDP, 2007; WYR, 2003, p. 371).

26
2.5.1 Negative role of youth in conflict
When talking about youth and their negative role in conflict, identity seems to be an important
aspect. Often young people are motivated to participate in a conflict because of identical reasons. At
young ages people are overloaded (especially in conflict sensitive areas) with stereotypes of the
‘other’. Young people easily internalize concepts of the other laden with negative stereotyping and
negative inter-group attitudes. This process maintains the status quo of the conflict because it
reproduces the material and psychological conditions of the conflict (Hammack, 2010, p. 184).
In a study conducted in 2008 in former Yugoslavia it seemed that youth had more negative attitudes
towards the ‘other’ than their parents. This might be explained by the fact that the parents grew up
in a less divided society. Before the conflict started there were even intermarriages between
different ethnic groups. In addition, young people have less life experience and might be more
rebellious (Hammack, 2010, p. 184).
So the identification process plays an important role in the maintenance of the conflict because of its
reproductive function. People find a legitimate reason in identity to use violence. Violence against
the out-group becomes necessary and justified in order protect the own group, for which young
people feel responsible (Hammack, 2010, p. 185; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007).
Other issues which make youth a problematic group in conflicts is that conflict areas are often
characterized by bad economic conditions: poverty, disease and violence. Once a conflict breaks out,
the situation does not get any better. Conflicts influence social welfare, economic development and
education in a negative way. Unemployment is high and there are not enough opportunities available
for development. Especially youth are affected by this situation; because once they finish school they
cannot find a job. The situation can lead to growing tensions in society which can increase the risk of
violent conflict. It is easier for young people to participate in violence, because often they do not
have other possibilities. In addition young people can also quite easily be mobilized; as seen above
they can be recruited by identity and ideologies to take part in a conflict (WYR, p. 373/376; UNDP,
2007, p. 1).
This is what also happened in Osh. Unemployment is high and hate speech about the ‘other’ (either
the Kyrgyz or the Uzbek) can be heard everywhere. The situation is very nationalistic nowadays.
Young people are more sensitive for this than elderly, because the last ones grew up in the Soviet
Union. This was a less divided society, both in ethnicity as well as in economic status. It was thus not
difficult to mobilize young people to participate in the violence. Indeed, when looking at the Osh
events the majority of the perpetrators were young people (interview 27).
2.5.2 Positive role of youth in conflict
As said before, youth can have a versatile role in conflict because they can also be regarded as a
solution in a conflict. For conflict prevention to be successful it is often crucial to focus on youth.
Focusing on young people may result in long-term benefits. They should be more included in the
policy-making procedures. At the moment they remain highly invisible in public forums to solve and
prevent conflict, while their participation could greatly reduce the likelihood of conflict (WYR, 2003,
p. 379/388).
Young people are necessary to include in order to take future generations and the society as a whole
into account. Especially because youth often take part in the violence, youth communication forums
can be useful in order for them to have a chance to voice their frustrations and to address their main
concerns (WYR, 2003, p. 388)
There are already examples of young people taking initiative and setting up youth networks in order
to prevent conflict and to build peace. Programs of NGOs are set up by youth and they often play an
active role in their communities (WYR, 2003, p. 371/384). A good example of this is the organization

27
“Youth of Osh”, an organization set up by youth for youth and who are stimulating youth to set up its
own projects.
Another aspect which is crucial in a society suffering from conflict is education. Education is
important in changing the mind-set of young people, and in that way also changing the mind-set of
the society as a whole. Through training, workshops, forums and peace-building mediations young
people will learn how to engage in a constructive dialogue, which is necessary for solving a conflict.
By education they can learn how to use other methods for solving a conflict instead of using violence
(WYR, 2003, p. 389).
To end this part on youth in conflict, it is important to note that as in many cases, not only the
society is divided but also parts of the societies are divided. Also amongst young people there are
ones which participate in violence and ones which participate in building peace. Often it is seen in
practice that both youth as a problem and youth as a solution go hand in hand.
In the case-study of Osh in Chapter 4 the role of youth with regards to the conflict will be analysed
based on this theory.

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3. The Ferghana Valley: history, context and cross-border issues
In order to apply the theories discussed in Chapter 2 to the Ferghana Valley, it is important to have a
good analysis about the context of the Ferghana Valley. This chapter gives an overview of the
Ferghana Valley and its cross-border issues and the surrounding countries of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan. In this chapter the next sub-questions will be answered:
- Which cross-border issues are important for conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley?
- To what extent are the history and context of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan of
importance for the conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley?
Also preliminary answers will be given to the three sub-questions with regards to ethnic diversity,
socio-economic conditions and the political situation and its influence on conflict potential in the
Ferghana Valley. These sub-questions will also be answered in the next Chapter about the case-study
of Osh.
3.1 History: the decisive divide-and-rule policy
The Ferghana Valley is situated at the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The region
knows some complex borders and many enclaves. Uzbekistan has 60% of the valley’s territory,
Tajikistan 25% and Kyrgyzstan the remaining 15%. The valley is enclosed by the Kuramin, Chatkal,
Ferghana, Alai and Turkestan mountains. The official administrative provinces in the valley are
Andijan, Ferghana and Namangan in Uzbekistan; Batken, Osh and Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan; and Sogd
in Tajikistan (Slim, 2002). Map 3.1 gives an illustration of this.
Map 3.1: Topography and hydrography of the Ferghana Valley
Reference: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2005

29
The borders around the Ferghana Valley date back to the time of Stalin in the 1920s. He set the
borders on the basis of his divide-and-rule strategy. Stalin drew lines like a “one armed alcoholic”:
the borders intertwined and convoluted. For example, there are several Uzbek enclaves entirely cut
off by Kyrgyzstan (Stephens, 2010; Murray, 2010).
This divide-and-rule strategy was not without reason; the borders were specifically designed so as
not to create prosperous economic, political, cultural and ethnic coherence, especially not in the
Ferghana Valley. The valley was well-known because of its fertile ground and economic prosperity
potential. It could be one of the world’s most productive agricultural regions, because in the Summer
it is fed by the glaciers and mountains surrounding the valley. By drawing lines crossing ethnicities
and natural economic units, distrust and hostility amongst ethnic groups would increase so that
there would be no chance for consolidation of nationalist movements in the economically high
potential valley (Star, 2011). So though it might seem that the three countries are respectively ethnic
homes for Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks, the truth is entirely different. An example of an ethnic mixed
place is Osh, a city which was originally mainly inhabited by Uzbeks, but has been ‘placed’ on the
territory of Kyrgyzstan. Especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a tense situation
between the ethnic groups about access to land, water and jobs (Gleason et al, 2007, p. 7; Stephens,
2010; Murray, 2010; Megoran, 2004, p. 733).
Some analysts even go a step further by saying that the divide-and-rule policy was not only to
prevent an economic prosperous region, but that its main goal was ethnic engineering. The goal of
this would be to foster ethnic inter- and intrastate conflicts. The Soviet policy was to intentionally
create mono-ethnic regions which left large communities of ethnic minorities in each Central Asian
state, leading to ethnic tensions. Ethnic discrimination and territorial claims became part of everyday
life, planting the seeds for conflicts (Peimani, 2009, p. 145).
Whether or not on purpose, ethnic conflicts did take place in the period around the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Towards the end of the 1980s conflicts amongst different ethnic groups emerged in the
Ferghana Valley. The central power of Moscow weakened and Gorbachev introduced his first
reforms. The Soviet Union was weakened and not able to control its own territory anymore. In
Uzbekistan in 1989 fighting erupted between Turkmen and Uzbeks and in Kyrgyzstan between Kyrgyz
and Uzbeks and between Kyrgyz and Tajiks (KIC, 2011, p. 9). Theories about the political situation can
be applied to this. As can be seen, conflicts broke out in a time when there was state transition in the
up run towards the collapse of the Soviet Union. The control weakened which is why it was possible
for people to violate. The fact that the conflicts broke out in this period also gives support to the
constructivist’s view about ethnicities that there should be underlying forces which activate ethnic
conflict. These underlying forces would be tensions about access to land, water and jobs. These
tensions can be translated into violence if the political situation allows it to happen.
The borders became more problematic with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence
of the Central Asian states. The borders drawn by Stalin, which at the time of the Soviet Union did
not have much meaning as with only administrative purposes, suddenly became the international
borders of the new Central Asian countries. Crossing the border all of a sudden became difficult.
Especially Uzbekistan adopted strict border policies. The consequence was that there were many
minority ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Uzbeks living in Osh, suddenly
became an ethnic minority in Kyrgyzstan without a possibility to visit their relatives across the
border. Furthermore, with the independence of the Central Asian states, feelings of nationalism grew
which did not improve the relation with ethnic minorities. This can also be traced back to the theory
about the political situation. In a period of transition and democratization elites will try to mobilize
ordinary people with feelings of nationalism. Nationalism provides the opportunity to unite elites and
masses and to get a strong support base, as was the case when the Central Asian states became
independent (Stephens, 2010; Murray, 2010; Deen & Bouyjou, 2006, p. 1; Megoran, 2004, p. 736).

30
The hardening of the borders had economic consequences for the valley. Suddenly, economic
exchange became difficult or not possible anymore and cross-border collective farms had to close
down. The ordinary flow across the border of people, goods and services disrupted. Unemployment
increased, partly because of the crack down of the network of suppliers and distributors and markets
that used to be spread throughout the Soviet Union. The region fell into an increasing dependency
on subsistence farming, labour migration and drug trafficking. This situation led to a steep decline in
people’s living standards. What once was an economic potential valley now became a valley with bad
economic conditions (Slim, 2002; ICG, 2010, p. 1). As seen in the previous chapter, bad economic
conditions and unemployment increases the chance of tensions and conflict.
The hardening of the borders also caused many problems in the villages in the border regions. Some
villages were split in half by a border fence, sometimes in the middle of a street. In some villages the
border is still disputed and therefore still not demarcated. It does not need much explanation that
villages suffered – and still suffer – from these developments. The communities depended on each
other for decades with regard to trade and public facilities. It has become difficult to visit schools,
mosques and hospitals on the other side of the border. Also resources like water had always been
shared between communities and suddenly belonged to a sovereign foreign state. But also family
relations existed out of people from different villages and communities; suddenly it became difficult
or even impossible to visit them. This situation also led to increasing tensions between ethnic groups
(Deen & Bouyjou, 2006, p. 2; Megoran, 2006, p. 631/636).
Concluding, it can be said that the history of the Ferghana Valley has been very decisive for conflict
potential in the region. The artificial designed borders led to ethnic tensions. Together with economic
decline and the political transformations this led to increased conflict potential.
3.2 Cross-border issues in the Ferghana Valley
As the Ferghana Valley is a border region, there are cross-border issues as in all border regions in the
world. The issues discussed here are border disputes, Islamic extremism and drug trafficking. It will
be analysed to what extent these border issues increase the risk on conflict.
3.2.1 Border disputes
Nowadays there are still territorial and border disputes between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan about the Ferghana Valley. There are disagreements about each country’s share of the
valley and there are parts which are still undemarcated. Also separatist movements are present in
the valley, caused by the many ethnic minorities. In Khojand, a city in Tajikistan with an Uzbek
majority, the Uzbeks threaten to secede from Tajikistan in order to join Uzbekistan. The other way
round, Tajikistan inactively claims the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan (Peimani, 2009,
p. 16/96).
This situation increases the risk on interstate conflict in the valley. Most probably the countries will
try and solve the undemarcated border zones through multilateral or bilateral dialogue and
concessions. However, when this is not possible an interstate conflict can occur (Slim, 2002).
Because of the disputes about the borders at the national level, people at the local level have
disputes about accessible land. Because land is scarce and many spots are undemarcated, everyone
tries to access this land. Arable land is needed for farming, especially in the Ferghana Valley which is
one of the most densely populated parts of Central Asia. Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks are competing for
the land in different parts of the Ferghana Valley, especially in the region of Batken in Kyrgyzstan
(Passon & Temirkulov, 2004, p. iii). This is a good example of an ‘ethnic conflict’ while the cause of

31
the conflict is not because the groups are ethnically distinct. The groups are fighting for access to
land, not because of differences in ethnicity. This relates again to the constructivist’s point of view
that there should be underlying forces to stimulate ethnic conflict.
In addition to land disputes, the disputed borders also cause problems with regards to water. As
indicated with red stars in map 3.2, many water disputes are situated at the borders of the Ferghana
Valley. Many small-scale conflicts occur between neighbours and villages. However, the water issues
also have further growing consequences for the economic situation. The three countries in the
Ferghana Valley are interdependent on each other for their water sources. In addition to this the
water is also used for contrary purposes: where Kyrgyzstan needs water for energy production,
Uzbekistan needs the same water for the irrigation of their cotton. As a consequence of this, the
agricultural production in Uzbekistan fell by 30% in 2000 (Slim, 2002). Water issues thus not only
contribute to intra-state conflict potential, but also to inter-state conflict potential.
Map 3.2: Water issues in the Ferghana Valley
Reference: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2005,

32
So it can be said that border disputes between the three countries of the Ferghana Valley increases
the conflict potential in the region, both intra-state and inter-state conflicts are possible.
3.2.2 Islamic extremism
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Islamic extremism also found its way to the border area of the
Ferghana Valley. Some experts say that radical groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
and Hizb ut-Tahrir find more and more support in the countries surrounding the Ferghana Valley.
Both are pan-Islamic groups which want to create an Islamic state in the historical region of
Turkestan under the rule of the sharia (Slim, 2002).
The increasing popularity can be ascribed to the fact that there is dissatisfaction amongst the
population with their government. As said before, since the collapse of the Soviet Union people
increasingly live in poor conditions and their governments do not offer improvements. As seen in
Chapter 2, when the government feels no responsibility for its citizens, people will have to search for
security and social safety nets themselves. Therefore they seek their salvation in religion and Islamic
groups. It is said that in Osh this is also the case nowadays. After the violence many Uzbeks joined
Islamic groups because they do not have faith in the government of Kyrgyzstan anymore. In order to
guarantee their own security, they will have to search for alternatives which are often Islamic groups.
However, rumours about growing Islamic fundamentalism in the Ferghana Valley remain mainly
guessing and speculations. This is partly because the groups act mainly in underground networks.
Besides, many case studies on Islamic fundamentalism in the valley do not find any proof. People do
have their Islamic values and traditions, but not in such a way that it is worrisome (Passon &
Temirkulov, 2004, p. 10).
For the time being Islamic extremism as such does not lead to conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley. This is because Islamic extremism should be more regarded as opposition towards the
governments. In a case like IMU who is striving for the overthrow of Karimov it can lead to instability.
The increasing popularity finds its roots in disappointment with the government, not in the
convincing ideas of the religion as such. According to the ICG (2001, p. 11): “the [Islamic] insurgency
is a reflection of the economic hardships and discontent affecting a part of the population”. People
want change, and therefore they search for other ways to achieve this change. So again, the bad
economic and political situation in the countries lead to conflict potential, and Islamic groups are
taking advantage of this.
3.2.3 Drug trafficking
Drug trafficking belongs to the daily business in parts of the Ferghana Valley nowadays. Because it is
an illegal business, it is difficult to find out to what extent this has an impact on the situation in the
Ferghana Valley, especially since official data are not available and hard to collect.
Especially the Southern part of the Ferghana Valley plays a role in drug trafficking. Drugs are
transported from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, from which it is brought to Kyrgyzstan via the many
Uzbek enclaves and undemarcated zones. From this part of the valley, the drugs are smuggled to
Uzbekistan, either directly or via Osh (Passon & Temirkulov, 2004, p. 11).
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic decline in the Ferghana Valley, the drug
business has increased. The informal economy is a good alternative for people who cannot find a job
(Slim, 2002). This relates to the greed theory; people make a cost and benefit analysis in order to join
this criminal business. As people do not have many things to lose, it is often an easy decision for
them to participate in drug trafficking.
The criminal business is well visible in the street view nowadays. The money being earned with drugs
leads to a culture of consumption in the valley. Young men in Osh are wearing luxury clothes and are
driving expensive cars. This also leads to increased feelings of inequality amongst the population.
Especially when the business is dominated by a certain ethnic group, the inequalities lead to tensions
between ethnicities. This relates to the grievance theory (Slim, 2002).

33
The drug trafficking also leads in another way to instability. Intense competition is going on between
criminal groups about the ownership of the most important drugs routes (Slim, 2002).
So drug trafficking leads to increased conflict potential in the region. However, again this is also
mainly rooted in the fact that economic conditions are bad. People search for ways to earn money. If
employment was high and the region would experience economic prosperity, it is likely that less
people will be involved in drug trafficking. The trafficking is also rooted in the political situation; the
governments are unwilling or unable to control the situation. A complex network of drug traffickers,
criminal groups, corrupt border guards and political elites has been developed in which people in the
drugs business are free to move.
So border disputes, Islamic extremism and drug trafficking all lead to increased conflict potential in
the Ferghana Valley. However, all the issues are rooted in the bad economic conditions and the weak
or authoritarian political situations in the countries. In the next part the context of the three separate
countries of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will be compared and discussed.
3.3 History and context of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
This part will discuss the history and context of the three countries which share the Ferghana Valley.
There will be specific attention for ethnic, socio-economic and political aspects. Table 3.1 gives an
overview of relevant ethnic, socio-economic and political information about Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan. The information has been put in one table in order to make quick comparisons.
Table 3.1: Information Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan
Population & Ethnicities
Total population 5.477.620 28.540.200 7.373.800
% living in Ferghana Valley 42,4% 26,9% 28,9%
% Ferghana Valley total
state territory 42,2% 4,3% 18,2%
Ethnic majority Kyrgyz: 71,7% Uzbek: 80% Tajik: 79,9%
Ethnic minorities Uzbek: 14,3% Russian: 7,2%
Other: 6,7%
Russian: 5,5% Tajik: 5%
Other: 9,5%
Uzbek: 15,3% Kyrgyz: 1,1%
Other: 3,7%
Socio-economic
conditions
Unemployment (est.) 20% 8% 30%
HDI 0,598 (109) 0,617 (102) 0,580 (112)
Multidimensional poverty
index 0,019 0,008 0,068
Political situation
Level of democracy (-10-
+10) -1 -7 -5
Civil liberties index (1-7) 5 1 3
References: UNDP, 2010; Stat Uzbekistan, 2011; Stat Kyrgyzstan, 2011; Stat Tajikistan, 2008; CIA The World Factbook, 2011;
World Resource Institute, 2008; Slim, 2002; The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2010
The percentages and total numbers speak for themselves and will be analysed later on. The Human
Development Index (HDI) gives an indication based on four indicators: life expectancy at birth, mean
years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and gross national income per capita. A HDI of 1
would indicate very high human development and a HDI of 0 a very low human development. The
figures in brackets show the country’s rank in the world. In comparison, Norway has the highest HDI
in the world of 0,938 and Zimbabwe the lowest with 0,140 (UNDP, 2010; UNDP, 2011a).

34
The multidimensional poverty index indicates to what extent people live in poverty in a country. It is
based on ten indicators: nutrition, child mortality, years of schooling, children enrolled, cooking fuel,
toilet, water, electricity, floors, and assets. The lower the figure, the lower the poverty (UNDP,
2011b).
The level of democracy indicates to what extent a country is an autocratic state (-10) or a democratic
state (+10). The civil liberties index indicates to what extent the population in a country is free in
which 1 is most free and 7 is least free.
The next figures show the population pyramids of respectively Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
These figures give an indication about the percentage of young people living in these countries. As
there is not much official data available, these figures are estimations by the U.S. Census Bureau for
2010. Finding reliable information is difficult, for example, since independence Uzbekistan has not
conducted a census.
Figure 3.1: Population pyramid Kyrgyzstan 2010
Reference: U.S. Census Bureau, 2011
Figure 3.2: Population pyramid Uzbekistan 2010

35
Figure 3.3: Population pyramid Tajikistan 2010
Taking a look at the population pyramids it is striking that all countries have a large young
population. People under the age of thirty form the majority in each country. Tajikistan has the
largest percentage young people under 30. It can be said that young people are an important and
large group in society.
Population & Ethnicity
To start with the population and ethnicity, as can be derived from table 3.1, large parts of the
population of each country live in the Ferghana Valley. This is especially the case for Kyrgyzstan, of
which 42,2% of the total population lives in the Ferghana Valley. But also in the other countries large
amounts of the population live in the valley. This is especially striking for Uzbekistan, as the valley
covers only 4,3% of the total state’s territory. When looking at the population density of Central Asia,
the Ferghana Valley is indeed one of the most densely populated parts. This is illustrated in map 3.3.
Map 3.3: Population density in Central Asia
Reference: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2003

36
All three countries are ethnic heterogeneous countries. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the majority is
about the same percentage. However, Tajikistan has a large Uzbek minority (15,3%) while Uzbekistan
has more smaller minorities (of which the biggest is 5,5%). Kyrgyzstan’s majority is smaller, around
70%, but the country also has a big minority (Uzbeks 14,3%).
The Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz minorities living in these countries all live in the border area of the
Ferghana Valley. Although some also live somewhere else, for example in the capitals, this is such a
small percentage that it is not relevant to take into account. In Kyrgyzstan only 30,000 of the 768,000
Uzbeks do not live in the South. In some cities in the South, they even form the majority (Deen, 2010,
p. 642; ICG, 2010, p. 1).
The fact that large amounts of the population live in the valley makes it a region which cannot be
denied. But at the same time the region is not situated in the cores of the several countries. Instead,
the valley is – in each country – separated from the capital and the core businesses by a huge range
of mountains. In Kyrgyzstan this became clearly evident by the many times people told me about the
‘North-South’ division that exists in Kyrgyzstan (interview 4; 22; 26; 32; 36).
This situation, which can be found in all countries, makes it happen that there are regional
differences between the Ferghana Valley and the rest of the country. Although the large amounts of
people living in the Ferghana Valley, the governments do not see this region as a core region which
they should invest in. A reason for this is the increasing nationalistic feelings that are present in the
countries. The nationalistic governments do not want to invest in a region which has a large ethnic
minority. A consequence of this is that the socio-economic conditions in these regions remain bad
and unemployment remains high. The minorities feel they are excluded from what is decided in the
capital. This can lead to feelings of grievances among ethnic lines.
In general it can be said that the clustering of ethnic minorities in the Ferghana Valley – in which they
often form an almost majority – together with the geographical enclosure of the valley with the rest
of the nationalistic sensitive country can lead to increased conflict potential.
Socio-economic conditions
Looking at the socio-economic conditions of the three countries, it must be said that the
unemployment rate is estimated. The official statistics from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan indicate that
there unemployment is respectively 0,3% and 2%. They are representing rosy images of their
economic conditions. This is not possible as the unemployment rate is very high in the region, with
Tajikistan in the lead followed by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (CIA The World Factbook, 2011a/b; U.S.
Department of State, 2011).
According to Kramer (2008) from the Harvard University, unemployment in Tajikistan has reached
60% in some regions. Especially youth unemployment is high, which can reach as high as 80%.
Surveys conducted in Tajikistan have shown that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the lack of
opportunities: “young people are especially inclined to believe that they will never be able to get a job
they really want” (Kramer, 2008). Furthermore underemployment should be taken into account.
Underemployment is possibly as high as 40% in Tajikistan.
Uzbekistan has a lower unemployment rate than Tajikistan, although much higher than the 0,3% the
official country statistics suggest. The official unemployment rate is estimated around 8% and
underemployment around 25%. Unemployment amongst youth in Uzbekistan would be around 15-
20% (Kramer, 2008; US Department of State, 2011).
Furthermore the migration of many people to Russia has not been taken into account, this count for
all three countries but is the biggest in Tajikistan (interview 12).
Looking at the Human Development Index (2010) and Multidimensional Poverty Index (2010) it can
be noticed that Tajikistan is the poorest country while Uzbekistan is the wealthiest country of the

37
three. In all countries the Ferghana Valley belongs to the poorest part of the country. The valley is at
the bottom of most socio-economic indicators (ICG, 2010, p. 1).
Taking into account the greed theory discussed in Chapter 2, the countries have the socio-economic
conditions which are necessary for violent conflict to occur. If unemployment is high, people will
search for other opportunities. If taking part in violence and looting is an option, people will make a
cost and benefit analysis in order to decide whether to take part in these activities. Looking at table
3.1, it would be most likely that violence would occur in Tajikistan because poverty is the highest.
However, Tajikistan as a country has already suffered from a civil war and is still restoring from it.
People are so-called ‘tired’ of conflict (interview 12).
So ethnic conflict is likely to occur because the economic situation is worse in the Ferghana Valley, in
which ethnic groups live intermingled. If inequalities exist between ethnicities, not only greed but
also grievance can play a role. Conflict will then probably express itself along ethnic lines. In general it
can be argued that in all three countries disappointment with the socio-economic conditions and
chances on grievances along ethnic lines can lead to increased conflict potential.
Political situation
Looking at the information about the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan it is
noticeable – as already partly discussed in Chapter 2 – that Kyrgyzstan is the most democratic and
open country. It has the highest level of democracy and the highest level of civil liberties compared
to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan is the most autocratic and closed country of the three in
which civilians do not have freedom. Looking at the theories discussed in Chapter 2, this suggests
that violence is most likely in Kyrgyzstan, after which respectively Tajikistan and Uzbekistan follow.
The level of democracy in Kyrgyzstan is around -1, a level with a 20% probability on political violence
when taking into account figure 2.1 in Chapter 2. In contrast, the level of democracy in Uzbekistan is
around -7, where the probability of violence is around 10%. Tajikistan has a level of around -5, which
means a probability of violence around 15%. This could be another explanation why violence in
Kyrgyzstan did occur and not in other Central Asian countries (The Economist Intelligence Unit
Limited, 2010).
Because the political situation is very decisive for a conflict to occur, the separate political situations
of each country will be discussed now. Especially Kyrgyzstan will be analysed in depth, because there
a conflict broke out.
3.3.1 Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan is seen as the most democratic country in Central Asia. It is often called the ‘island of
democracy’ in Central Asia. Many people see this as a result from their nomadic traditions: people
are used to be free and therefore they protest when their freedom is being limited; more protesting
takes place compared to other Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan has not had such a strong leader
as in other Central Asian countries. However, the absence of one single authority cannot be regarded
as democracy. There are many centres of power, but they are not democratically in themselves yet
(interview 8).
Since its independence, Kyrgyzstan was ruled by the autocratic leader Akayev until 2005. However,
towards the end of his presidency protests increased. On February 27, 2005, parliamentary elections
were held and according to the opposition groups and the international observers these were far
from fair. As often seen in autocratic countries, only 6 out of the 75 seats were won by the
opposition. Protest and demonstration followed which the government could not stop. The
demonstration spread to the capital and on March 24 demonstrators captured the Kyrgyz
presidential palace: the day of the so-called Tulip Revolution. Akayev fled and Bakiyev (the

38
opposition leader) took over the power. He declared that from that moment on the ‘people’ were in
charge of the government (Peimani, 2009, p. 86; Deen, 2010, p. 641).
However, although it is called the Tulip Revolution, a real radical change did not take place. In fact,
the changes were limited to a replacing of the ruling persons. When looking back, one could argue
that the revolution – and especially the capture of the presidential palace – was too easy and without
reverses. Rumours spread that security forces cooperated with the opposition (including Bakiyev),
mainly consisting of former officials of the Akayev administration. So except from a new president,
there was not a radical change in the political system. The government and the ruling elite were still
characterized by corruption and cronyism, while the rest of the country was characterized by
poverty, economic problems, inequality and human rights abuses (Peimani, 2009, p. 86; Deen, 2010,
p. 641).
This is also an explanation why a conflict did not occur in 2005: there was no real transition. Looking
at the theories discussed in Chapter 2 one might think that conflict should have occurred in 2005,
because of the revolution and the transition the state went through. However, as described above
this was not really the case. The state was not in transition and so a power vacuum did not exist.
Instead, the first revolution of 2005 was just the start of the slow transition the country is going
through now: from autocracy to democracy.
That a radical change did not happen but that the start to transition was given, can be illustrated by
the on-going protests the years following the revolution. Mass street protests occurred from time to
time. These protests show the popular dissatisfaction with the unfulfilled promises of the
government, combined with the bad socio-economic conditions. It is clear that the Kyrgyz
government system suffered from the lack of sustainable popular support and legitimacy. However,
most demonstrations were suppressed or were made impossible, so that there were no real
consequences for the acting government. In other words, protests became more and more possible,
but the autocratic government still had almost everything under control, although losing strength
(Peimani, 2009, p. 86/149).
In April 2010, there were again massive demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan, following the arrests of
opposition leaders and attempts by the government to limit the freedom of expression and media.
Furthermore, food and energy prices were increasing, which had an effect on the society as a whole
and therefore it was easier for the opposition to mobilize the people. On April 15, president Bakiyev
fled the country to Kazakhstan and a new interim-regime led by opposition leader Otunbayeva took
over. However, the interim-regime was hastily formed by a shaky coalition of opposition groups. The
regime faced difficulties with keeping the authority and control over its territory; two months later
ethnic violence broke out in the South of Kyrgyzstan (Deen, 2010, p. 641; interview 43).
That violence broke out can be explained that this time the country was in a transition from an
autocracy to a democracy, more than in 2005. The revolution was not organized as in 2005, but was
started by the people themselves. This is evidenced by the interim president Roza Otunbayeva, who
formed an interim government. In line with her own democratic values Otunbayeva was not
candidate for the presidential elections in October 2011. Furthermore, the interim government
introduced a new constitution, in which the power of the president was constrained and a new semi-
parliamentary system was introduced. Besides it was documented that no single party could have
more than 65 seats in the 120-seats counting parliament. These are all changes which clearly point to
a transition from an autocracy to a democracy. However, the changes and the lack of one strong
leader also led to a situation of institutional weakness and contradicting interests: the state became
weak. That there was no sufficient control led to the fact that other groups could take over the
power in the South of Kyrgyzstan, by which the conflict in Osh could occur, which will be more
discussed in Chapter 4 (Deen, 2010, p. 642).

39
In October 2010 parliamentary elections were held which were relatively quiet and orderly, despite
the fears for unrest. The international community (i.e. the OSCE) even called the elections the most
free and fair elections ever held in one of the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia. A threshold
was maintained that each party needed at least 0,5% of the votes of the number of registered voters
in each of the seven provinces and two big cities. This was done in order to exclude parties with a
solely ethnic or regional base. This is why there is for example no Uzbek party in Kyrgyzstan (Deen,
2010, p. 643).
The results of the elections were very striking. The party Ata-Zhurt won the elections with 8,47% of
the votes. Ata-Zhurt is the main opponent of the interim-government, and is well-known because of
its nationalistic approach and its link with former president Bakiyev. The party is mainly popular
amongst nationalistic Kyrgyz in the South. The socio-democratic party SPDK (Social Democratic Party
of Kyrgyzstan) became second with 7,83% of the votes. This is the party of which Roza Otunbayeva
was member before she became president. The parties Ar-Namys and Respublika got respectively
7,57% and 6,93% of the votes. Both are parties which take a position in the middle: they are not
necessarily pro-interim-government neither against. The fifth party which passed the threshold was
another pro-interim-government party: Ata-Meken with 5,49% of the votes (Deen, 2010, p.
642/643).
Most striking was that Ata-Zhurt won the elections, because the elections took place as a result of
the overthrow of Bakiyev. Looking at the voter turnouts, the turnout was especially high in Osh, the
region in which Ata-Zhurt was very popular amongst the nationalistic Kyrgyz who first supported
Bakiyev. The party used nationalism in order to gain a large support base, in which it was easily
successful in the time after the ethnic violence.
Furthermore, the fact that five parties made it to the parliament shows the enormous diversity,
division and contradicting interests that exist in the country after the revolution and the conflict. This
does not only leave space for nationalistic groups to take their chance, but also for violence to occur.
If a nationalistic party comes into power, there is a probability that there will be a low level of
political inclusiveness. This will leave out ethnic minorities in the government which increases again
feelings of exclusion and grievances which can lead to conflict. Also it can lead to a relapse in the
democratisation process of Kyrgyzstan and a government who is unable to control the different
interests in the country, in other words a weak state.
3.3.2 Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is often seen as the most stable Central Asian country. The relative stability can be
ascribed to the authoritarian regime and the repressive police state. Since its independence,
president Karimov is ruling the country with tight grip and it seems that he will do this till his death.
The government strictly curtails freedom of expression and religion, in which the security services
play an important role. The government is afraid that Islam will take over, and therefore it controls it
strictly. Furthermore human right defenders are constantly threatened and attacked and there is
little to no improvement in this area (Peimani, 2009, p. 6; Pannier, 2010, p. 570; HRW, 2004, p. 5;
interview 16).
Like Kyrgyzstan and other clan-based countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan is also characterized by
nepotism. A good example of this is that the youngest daughter of Karimov is Uzbekistan’s
ambassador to UNESCO, while his oldest daughter is Uzbekistan’s representative to the UN in
Geneva (Pannier, 2010, p. 581).

40
Elections have been held in Uzbekistan, but they have always been undemocratic according to
international organizations. According to the OSCE about the presidential elections in December
2007: “[…the elections] failed to meet many OSCE commitments for democratic elections [...] While
there were four candidates […] the voters were nonetheless left without a real choice as all
contestants publicly endorsed the policies of the incumbent president, Mr. Islam Karimov. Legal and
administrative obstacles prevented political movements representing alternative views from
registering as political parties or initiative groups, thereby precluding them from fielding presidential
candidates” (OSCE, 2008, p. 1). This shows that the country is real autocracy.
However, despite the tight grip, Uzbekistan also suffers from disturbances and irregularities caused
by political opposition. Political opposition in Uzbekistan is mainly present in the Ferghana Valley, the
most geographical separated part of the country. The most well-known anti-government group is the
IMU, as already mentioned earlier in this chapter (Peimani, 2009, p. 6/15; Amnesty International,
2011).
The gravest incident led by the opposition in Uzbekistan took place in the Ferghana Valley. The city of
Andijan experienced a big incident on May 13, 2005. On this day there were popular protests and
violent anti-government activities. The government building and the prison were attacked and
occupied, government security personnel were killed and prisoners were released. There is dispute
about who organized the incident. The Uzbek authorities called the incident a well-calculated
terrorist operation (led by the IMU) during which Uzbek security forces and people were attacked.
On the other hand opposition and human rights groups state that the security forces used violence in
order to stop the unarmed protestors which were demonstrating against the government. However,
these last groups acknowledge that there were also armed opposition groups involved in the
violence, although the majority were peaceful protesters (Peimani, 2009, p. 87/201; Pannier, 2010, p.
570).
After the incident, the Uzbek authorities immediately restored order in Andijan. Tensions and anti-
government groups are still there, but Uzbekistan is keeping a tight grip in which there is almost no
possibility for people to protest. The IMU still plays a big role in the Ferghana Valley, and it is said
that the movement is gaining more support because of the dissatisfaction amongst the population in
the region. As analysed before, also the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley is caused by poverty and
unemployment (Peimani, 2009, p. 88).
In addition to the unrest in the Ferghana Valley, also elsewhere in the country violent anti-
government activities by the IMU have taken place now and then. In 1999, Tashkent (the capital) was
surprised by a series of bombings (Peimani, 2009, p. 6/200). Also in 2009 there were again attacks in
Tashkent and in the Ferghana Valley (Amnesty International, 2011). These attacks show the
vulnerability of the Uzbek state, because if people are not allowed to protest, extremist groups will
show their dissatisfaction by attacks.
However, overall Uzbekistan is stable, ‘thanks to’ Karimov. Therefore the stability in the country
depends on him. He is the one who binds Uzbekistan together. No one can foresee what will happen
if he falls away, although experts talk about serious instability that could spread over whole Central
Asia. But so far as he is alive Uzbekistan remains a strong autocratic state in which there is almost no
chance for protests and violence (Pannier, 2010, p. 572; interview 8).
3.3.3 Tajikistan
Tajikistan is often seen as the most worrisome country in Central Asia. Since its independence from
the Soviet Union it immediately rolled into a civil war which ended in 1997. Since then the country is
characterized as a poor state with a strong leadership under president Rakhmon. Its proximity to

41
Afghanistan makes it a country in which international organizations are mainly focussed on the
border with Afghanistan instead of on the country itself. Some see Tajikistan as the “Yemen” of
Central Asia (interview 12; 16).
The poverty can be mainly ascribed to the civil war. This had a huge impact on society, in a way that
the population can be described as passive. Civil society is not very developed, nor active as
compared to for example Kyrgyzstan. This is partly because of the poor education system. The
human rights notions are poorly understood by the ordinary people, because they simply do not
know what it means. This also counts for the development of political opposition. Furthermore
people are afraid, they had war for a long time and now they want to keep the peace. Therefore they
prefer not to be active in human rights or oppose the government (interview 12; 19).
Another reason for the passiveness of the population is because a large number of the population is
working abroad, mainly in Russia. This is also the case for other Central Asian countries, but not to
such a great extent as in Tajikistan. Also this can be ascribed to the poverty mainly caused by the civil
war. Almost all men between 18 and 35 are working in Russia and sending their money back to their
families in Tajikistan. This also does not contribute to the activeness of the population (interview 42).
Officially Tajikistan holds elections for the presidency and parliament. However, in practice it turns
out that everything is ruled by one dominant party. The People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan
(PDPT) of President Rakhmon has a vast majority in the parliament and president Rakhmon has been
ruling the country already for more than two decades. In the last parliamentary elections of 28
February, 2010, the PDPT won more than 70% of the votes. The OSCE said that the elections “failed
to meet many key OSCE commitments” (The Economist, 2010; BBC, 2010). Just like Uzbekistan, also in
this country there are clear indicators of strong autocracy in which violence is almost impossible.
Furthermore, the leadership under Rakhmon and his government is characterized by corruption and
strong control. In October 2010 the government was criticized by the OSCE for censorship and
repression of the media (Kozhevnikov, 2010; Karimov, 2010). Furthermore, setting up small
businesses is almost impossible. Entrepreneurship is made impossible because corrupt government
officials will come and take the money. This is visible when you compare the street view of the Kyrgyz
capital Bishkek with the Tajik capital Dushanbe. Where in Bishkek one can find drink stands with Kfas
and Tan (local drinks) on almost every corner of the street (photo 3.1), in Dushanbe this is
impossible. In Dushanbe there are only a few stands in total and people even have to share the same
cup (interview 42).
Photo 3.1: Women selling drinks in Bishkek
Reference: Fellowsblog, 2010

42
Because of the strong leadership in combination with the fact that people are tired of conflict, there
is not much opposition in Tajikistan. The biggest opposition is formed – just as in Uzbekistan – by
Islamic radical militant groups. Now and then Tajikistan is surprised by a series of attacks, of which
the latest big attacks were in September 2010. It is said that the Islamic militant groups are
responsible for these attacks (Peimani, 2009; West, 2010). But in general it can be said that the
political situation in Tajikistan makes violent protests and conflicts impossible. People are not happy
with their situation, but they are too tired and unable to change this.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter can be concluded with saying that the history, cross-border issues and the context of
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are of influence for conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley.
The history has been very decisive for conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley. With the artificial
drawing of the borders the stage was set for tensions and conflicts.
First of all, the history caused cross-border issues which brought instability to the region. The
undemarcated border increases the risk on both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Drug trafficking
and Islamic groups also increase the risk on conflict, but these issues are rooted in the bad socio-
economic conditions and the political situation. These aspects led to the emergence of drug
trafficking and Islamic groups, because people have to find alternatives to earn money or to oppose
the government. So drug trafficking and Islamic extremism can be seen as consequences of the bad
economic conditions and the political situation.
The history also set the stage for the context of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The ethnic
composition and geographical separation of the Ferghana Valley are similar in the three countries,
which increases the conflict potential because of regional differences compared to the capitals. The
governments focussed more on promoting nationalistic values instead of paying attention to
minority rights, which resulted in a poorly developed Ferghana Valley.
Also the economic conditions are relatively equal in the three countries with high unemployment
rates. The inequality and feelings of grievances which exist can lead to conflict between ethnic
groups. As poverty is the highest in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, it would be most likely that conflict
break out there. However, a side note should be kept in mind that Tajikistan is still recovering from a
civil war. Indeed, a conflict broke out in Kyrgyzstan. However, as seen in this chapter, this should also
be ascribed to the political situation.
So the ethnic composition and the geographical distribution are pre-conditions for the conflict, not
causes as such. Tensions are activated by bad socio-economic conditions and inequalities, but will
only break out in a certain political situation. Having said this it is explainable why conflict broke out
in Kyrgyzstan, and not (yet) in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan there might be
ethnic tensions, but the government strictly controls outbreaks of possible violence. Conflict
potential exists, but is most likely to break out if the state also goes through a transition phase.
So it can be said that the history, cross-border issues and the context of the three individual
countries contribute to conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley. These aspects resulted and are
rooted in ethnic, socio-economic and political aspects, which themselves also increase the conflict
potential. Mainly intra-state conflicts are possible, but as discussed also inter-state conflicts are a
potential.
As Kyrgyzstan experienced a conflict in June 2010, the next chapter will analyse the case-study of Osh
to which ethnic, socio-economic and political theoretical lenses will be applied.

43
4. Case-study: conflict causes and the role of youth in Osh
In June 2010, Kyrgyzstan experienced violence in its part of the Ferghana Valley, mainly in the city of
Osh. In order to say something about the conflict potential, it is important to know what happened
there exactly. This chapter will first start with a short overview of the happenings in 1990 and 2010,
because also in the 1990s Osh experienced ethnic violence. After this the theories as discussed in
Chapter 2 will be applied to Osh. We will look if the events can be explained by ethnic, socio-
economic or political reasons, or a combination of them. By doing this, the next sub questions will be
answered, which were also already discussed in Chapter 3:
- To what extent is ethnic diversity of influence for the conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley?
- To what extent are socio-economic conditions of influence for the conflict potential in the
Ferghana Valley?
- To what extent is the political situation of influence for the conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley?
This chapter will furthermore take a specific look at the role of youth during the unrest in June 2010
by answering the following sub question:
- What was the role of young local people during the unrest in Osh in June 2010?
During the field research it also became clear, however, that there were other influences on the
events. These will be discussed under “other issues”.
4.1 The June 1990 and June 2010 events
In order to analyse the situation in Osh, it is necessary to give a short overview of what led to the
violence in Osh in 1990 and 2010.
1990
The 1990 Osh events took place in the period just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the
government in Moscow was already weakened.
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided to make Kyrgyz the official language of the Kyrgyz SSR instead of
Russian. This was not accepted by the Uzbeks living in the Kyrgyz SSR (mainly in Osh) and they set up
the organization Adolat. Its main goal was to establish an autonomous Osh Province in which the
Uzbek rights were to be protected. Some activists were more radical by striving for a total separation
from Kyrgyzstan and integration into Uzbekistan. Furthermore, they wanted more representation in
the government of Kyrgyzstan (HRW, 2011, p. 14; KIC, 2011, p. 10).
In May 1990, a Kyrgyz counterpart organization was formed which focused on land scarcity and
economic inequality facing ethnic Kyrgyz. The organization asked for more land for housing for
Kyrgyz, and the Kyrgyz-dominated local government of Osh was more than willing to fulfil these
demands. However, the local government allocated Uzbek-owned land for Kyrgyz housing projects
(HRW, 2011, p. 15).
The land disputes in and around Osh increased, and on June 4 the police needed to restore order
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks who were ready to attack each other. The violence quickly spread
around the region, and was the worst in the city of Uzgen (near Osh). The fighting ended after an
intervention of Soviet troops a few days later (HRW, 2011, p. 15).
During these 1990 events, “more than 300 people were killed, more than 1,000 wounded and over
500 arrested” (HRW, 2011, p. 15). Furthermore, houses and bazars were burned down and looted.
Unrest continued until August and a state of emergency was declared that lasted till November 1990
(HRW, 2011, p. 15).

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After the events little to no attention was paid to what had happened. The government did not
analyse the reasons for the conflict and the issue of ethnicity as a potential problem was denied. In
June 2010 ‘history repeated itself again’ (interview 22).
2010
First of all, the June 2010 events cannot be analysed without taking the April 2010 revolution into
account in which Bakiyev was overthrown. Bakiyev was originally from Jalalabad, his hometown in
the South of Kyrgyzstan where he had a large support base (KIC, 2011, x).
After the revolution and up to the June events, there was already unrest in the South of Kyrgyzstan.
Because of anger amongst the Bakiyev supporters because of the overthrown of Bakiyev, on May 13
they seized interim-government buildings in Osh, Jalalabad and Batken. The next day, the supporters
of the interim-government from Otunbayeva recaptured some buildings. Furthermore, a crowd of
both Kyrgyz and Uzbek marched to Bakiyev’s home town where they set fire to Bakiyev’s houses.
Although it was an ethnically mixed crowd, the supporters of Bakiyev saw it as violence from Uzbeks
against Kyrgyz (KIC, 2011, x).
Tensions and small riots further increased during the month with the police unable to address or
prevent them sufficiently. On the June 10 clashes near the casino sparked further riots near the
dormitory of the Osh University. A rumour emerged that the women dormitory was attacked and
that Kyrgyz students were raped. This rumour, for which no evidence was found, was spread at an
“extraordinary speed” in the Kyrgyz villages in the rural areas. Kyrgyz were mobilized really fast and
they gathered together to go to Osh (KIC, 2011, x).
The official conflict started on June 11 and lasted till June 14. The majority of the houses burnt down
belonged to Uzbeks, as were the majority of the people who were killed. In total over 400 people
were killed, more than 1000 were wounded and hundreds of thousands persons were displaced,
either within Kyrgyzstan or to Uzbekistan (KIC, 2011, p. ii).
It can be said that both conflicts – in 1990 and 2010 – broke out at a time when there was a weak
government because of a transition phase and a regime change. In 1990 as well as in 2010 the
government was in transition and did not have control over its territory. In the 1990s this was the
government of the Soviet Union, in 2010 it was after the collapse of the regime of Bakiyev. A power
vacuum existed in which other groups could take over the power and organize the violence in the
South of Kyrgyzstan. As already seen in the previous Chapter, the theory on the political situation
thus seems to give a useful explanation. However, first we will analyse the 2010 conflict with theories
of ethnicity and socio-economic conditions.
4.2 Ethnic conflict?
In this part the sub-question “To what extent is ethnic diversity of influence for the conflict potential
in the Ferghana Valley?” will be answered.
Immediately after the 2010 events the conflict was portrayed in the media as an ethnic conflict. This
makes sense somehow, as the conflict was mainly between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Also when walking
around Osh, it seems like an ethnic conflict. The destroyed neighbourhoods are all Uzbek. Streets
continue with destroyed and burned houses from Uzbek people. The mixed neighbourhoods are also
remarkable. Two types of houses can be distinguished here: the ones that are destroyed and the
ones that still stand which often show a painted sign which says “Kyrgyz”. Walking around here
makes you believe in the concept of ethnic conflict, because it is so extremely visible.

45
Photo 4.1: Gate which says “Kyrgyz” Photo 4.2: Destroyed Uzbek neighbourhood
Resource: own picture Resource: own picture
Ethnicity does play a role in Osh, the question is to what extent and to what extent it should be called
an ethnic conflict, which implies ethnicity as the cause. The society in Osh has already for a long time
been characterized by a division between ethnicities. This can be seen in the divided
neighbourhoods, for example the Uzbek mahallas, although there are also some mixed
neighbourhoods (KIC, 2011, p. 20). The division in neighbourhoods also results in mono-ethnic
schools (interview 38). From childhood onwards, people experience little integration with the other
ethnicity. In Kyrgyzstan this can be regarded as a problem, as also there is little attention for minority
rights. A consequence of this is that in Uzbek schools they are using teaching material from
Uzbekistan. A story which was told by several interviewees several times: “One girl from this Uzbek
village thinks that our president is the president from Uzbekistan. Because she uses the books of
Uzbek history!” (interview 17). The different languages also cause that people cannot talk to each
other. The Uzbeks want their language to be recognized as an official language, while the Kyrgyz
think that the Uzbeks should learn Kyrgyz because they are living in Kyrgyzstan. Especially young
people suffer from this problem, as the elderly all learned Russian during the Soviet Union and they
can thus communicate with each other (interview 16; 41).
The ethnicities mainly differ in their income generating activities. Kyrgyz always have been traditional
nomads while Uzbeks have always been businessmen. This leads to a different attitude to economic
benefits. An interesting story which was told in an interview: “I was asking what would you do with
100 soms [Kyrgyz currency]? I was asking this question at Kyrgyz and Uzbek schools. Uzbek schools
would say I would buy a hen from this money, and I would get more of them and I could do business.
Because I could sell eggs. Kyrgyz schools were saying we go to a café or to a shop and buy jeans.
These people were from 13 to 18” (interview 15). As this difference in culture clearly has economic
aspects, this difference and its consequences will be discussed more in-depth in the next paragraph
about socio-economic conditions.
However, although there are clear ethnic factors present, it does not mean that ethnicity was the
main cause of the conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, just describing whom is fighting who does not
include a causal explanation.
Regarding ethnicity as the main explanation for the violence in Osh raises many questions. How
come that the different ethnicities lived in peace before and that violence erupted ‘just’ twice since
the last decade? Despite the ethnic differences, some villages in the South of Kyrgyzstan were
characterized by inter-ethnic marriages (interview 38). Furthermore, many stories were told that
during the violence in 2010 Kyrgyz people helped Uzbeks and vice versa (interview 36; 13). They were
giving each other protection (interview 36). If the cause was really ethnicity, this would not have
been very likely.

46
From the research conducted in Osh, soon it became clear that other factors were more important;
however, they almost always have a link to ethnicity. So ethnic diversity is of influence for conflict
potential in Osh, but this cannot be only ascribed to ethnicity as such. Furthermore it must be said
that the conflicts and tensions led to even further increased feelings of ethnicity and nationalism
among Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Ethnic diversity as a factor for conflict potential thus becomes more
important each time something happens. Feelings of hatred increase, because many people have lost
relatives and they blame the ‘other’ for this. This can also be seen nowadays in Osh. The tensions and
lack of trust between the ethnicities even became worse after the conflict, and so the gap between
the ethnicities increased. This relates strongly to the constructivists point of view as discussed in
Chapter 2: there should be other causes which activate feelings of ethnicity which can lead to
conflict. Therefore the socio-economic conditions will be discussed now.
4.3 Socio-economic conditions
As seen in Chapter 2, there are theories which see socio-economic factors as the main drivers behind
conflict. In this part the sub-question “To what extent are socio-economic conditions of influence for
conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley?” will be answered.
As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, when people live in bad economic conditions, they are more willing
to participate in violence because they have nothing to lose. The socio-economic conditions in
Kyrgyzstan, and especially in the villages in the South of Kyrgyzstan, are bad. Unemployment rates
are high, especially amongst young men (interview 36; 13).
That the economic factor was important in the June events can be derived from the fact that the first
thing that happened on June 11 was the looting of the main bazaar by particularly young men. If
people are poor and when they do not have opportunities, they have nothing to lose and in order to
survive they can benefit from a conflict by looting bazaars (KIC, 2011, p. 26). This was the case in Osh
(Schwirtz, 2010):
“In just two days starting on Saturday, looters made off with most of the market’s goods, burning the
rest in a free-for-all that left both Uzbek and Kyrgyz businesses destroyed, witnesses said. Even kiosks
spray-painted with the word “Kyrgyz”, which throughout the city has offered protection to homes and
businesses from Kyrgyz gangs, were not spared. Greed, not ethnic hatred or political machinations,
appeared to be the driving force behind destruction”.
These looting activities can be explained by the greed theory. People – especially young men – were
looting because of their own cost-benefit analysis, regardless of someone’s ethnicity. An officer from
the OSCE Field office in Osh told me: “when people have money in their pockets they won’t be
aggressive, the major problem is not ethnicity but economic” (interview 27). The young men were
easy to mobilize because of unemployment, increased feelings of nationalism and – although no
evidence is available for this – links to the mafia and criminal groups. Mafia is highly developed in
Osh because of the drugs trade. It offers an alternative for legal jobs and therefore people can be
easily mobilized for illegal activities.
However, it is not the economic situation as such that created the violence. The bad economic
conditions in combination with a perceived inequality between the ethnicities explain why it
unfolded along ethnic lines. During the years, a so-called ethnic division was created within the
working class, which can be explained with the grievance theory explained in Chapter 2. In order to
understand this, it is important to have a short look at the history.

47
Traditionally Uzbeks lived in the valleys in the villages while Kyrgyz were nomads living in the
mountains. Uzbeks were businessmen while Kyrgyz were the nomads living on a day-to-day basis.
They were moving from their winter camps to Summer pastures each year. This was fine till the
forced collectivization of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, after which many Kyrgyz moved from the
mountains and settled in the villages in the valleys, for example in Osh. Osh belonged to Kyrgyzstan
but originally it had many Uzbek citizens. With the immigration of more and more Kyrgyz into Osh,
the competition for land and water began. Disputes about resources already unfolded along ethnic
lines, even more so when the population in the cities increased (HRW, 2011, p. 14; Megoran, 2010;
KIC, 2011, p. 20; interview 13; 20).
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the economy declined and the need for jobs
increased. Uzbeks as businessmen mainly filled the middle niche jobs, like shop-keepers and
craftsmen. As the Kyrgyz did not have the qualities to fulfil such jobs, they started to fill the tier
above and under them. On the one hand there was the poor Kyrgyz underclass of unskilled workers
who came to Osh from the rural areas. They even had to work for Uzbek people in for example cafes.
On the other hand there were the rich Kyrgyz elite which filled the top positions in national banks,
state enterprises and local government (Megoran, 2010; Sanghera, 2010; interview 13).
As a consequence of this situation, the Uzbeks felt excluded from the opportunities in the top
positions which became increasingly mono-ethnic. This contributed to a sense of insecurity. The
Kyrgyz, on the other side, felt that the Uzbek were taking all the good jobs and that they had the
wealthiest businesses. The Kyrgyz felt as second class citizens in their own state (Megoran, 2010;
Sanghera, 2010; interview 7). According to a famous human rights activist: “This caused a lot of
frustration because Kyrgyz are the ethnic majority and they had to work for the ethnic minority”
(interview 13). Therefore they also felt it was justified that only Kyrgyz people were occupying the
jobs in the government, not least because they are also living in the Kyrgyz state, not an Uzbek state.
The KIC report notes: “Kyrgyz politicians, even those who were well-disposed towards addressing
minority problems, were not prepared to embrace the Uzbeks as genuinely equal citizens. It is hard
for Kyrgyz to imagine that an Uzbek could be a prime minister or a minister of defence” (KIC, 2011, p.
24).
This analysis shows that the cultural and historical aspects led to a socio-economic situation of
inequality between different ethnic groups. Ethnic divisions can be seen back in the divisions in the
working class. Both groups suffer from feelings of inequality and therefore feelings of deprivation. So
it can be stated that the socio-economic conditions led to grievances which were – and still are – of
huge influence on conflict potential in Osh. However, the conversion of these feelings into violence is
to a large extent determined by the political situation in a country.
4.4 The political situation
The political context is important because it contributes to the understanding if and how discontent
turns into violence. In this part the sub-question “To what extent is the political situation of influence
for the conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley?” will be answered.
There would be few people who would say that the conflict in Osh was totally disjunctive from the
political situation in Kyrgyzstan. The fact that the conflict happened two months after the April
Revolution, make almost all people convinced that it was not an ethnic conflict, but a political conflict
(interview 6; 10; 11; 16; 17; 18; 19; 22; 27; 37). Therefore we will now look at the political situation
from the April Revolution onwards how this contributed to the conflict in Osh.
When Bakiyev came to power in 2005, he immediately started his pro-Kyrgyzification campaign. As a
Kyrgyz from Jalalabad, he had especially a large support base amongst strong nationalistic Kyrgyz in
the South of Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev quickly put an end to the advantages gained by Uzbeks in the South.

48
There was little to no attention for minority rights. The level of political inclusiveness in Kyrgyzstan
was low during the Bakiyev years; the Uzbeks were underrepresented. As said before, Uzbeks felt
deprived because the government system was dominated by Kyrgyz. They suffered from exclusion.
There was simply no attention for ethnic issues (interview 7; 16; 19; 22).
With the overthrow of Bakiyev in April 2010, Kyrgyzstan went through a phase of transition in which
a power vacuum was created with contradicting interests in the society. Everyone wanted to take
advantage of the revolution and several groups were struggling for power, because there was a
break-down of the rule of law (interview 10; 11). Three groups could be distinguished in the South:
the interim-government of president Otunbayeva, the nationalistic Kyrgyz supporters of former
president Bakiyev and the representatives of the Uzbek community. The interim-government took an
approach with more attention for ethnic minorities, and therefore it sought support by the Uzbek
community. The Uzbek community was stimulated by the government to express its wishes
(interview 18; 22; KIC, 2011, p. 13-14).
Representatives of the Uzbek community took their chances and made statements about the need
for Uzbek participation in politics, because during Bakiyev’s rule they were underrepresented.
Uzbeks were asking for issues like “renaming of the state to the “Republic of Kyrgyzstan”, recognition
of Uzbek as a regional language in the areas of compact Uzbek settlement, an increase in
representation in power and law-enforcement bodies […] and the removal of limits on use of the
Uzbek language” (KIC, 2011, p. 22). Although never called for by the Uzbeks representatives,
rumours were spread that Uzbeks were also requesting autonomy: “[…] if 10 Uzbeks said they
wanted autonomy, the Kyrgyz interpreted it as all Uzbeks want to have autonomy” (interview 19; 37).
Nationalistic Kyrgyz saw the statements of the Uzbek representatives as a threat to their interests,
especially because their president was overthrown. They did not understand why the Uzbeks were
requesting so much, as the Uzbeks already had the wealthy businesses in the South. The situation
contributed to the tensions between the ethnicities in the run-up to the June events, especially the
rumours about autonomy made the Kyrgyz scared and angry (KIC, 2011, p. 13-14, 16; interview 18).
The situation contributed to the fusion of politics and ethnicity in the South of Kyrgyzstan. Playing on
people’s feeling of ethnicity is an easy way to gain a strong support base within a short period of
time, especially in the South of Kyrgyzstan in which tensions between ethnicities existed (interview
5). According to an interviewee of the Youth Human Rights Group (interview 14): “[…] non-competent
politicians were making ethnical statements […]” in order to gain support. The ‘other’ was seen as a
threat, and therefore it was easy for political leaders to promise to protect their own ethnicity
(interview 18). “It was a political struggle […] that quickly led to ethnic aspects” (interview 16). This
also explains why Ata-Zhurt won the parliamentary elections in October 2010, as seen in the previous
chapter.
Besides the specific period of time after the April revolution, in general the degree of democracy in
Kyrgyzstan also made the conflict possible. As seen in Chapter 3, Kyrgyzstan scores the level –1 on a
scale of –10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy), which indicates a semi-democracy (Hegre et al, 2001).
Kyrgyzstan is often seen as an “island of democracy” in Central Asia. People can say what they want
without being suppressed by the government. People have the freedom to organize and mobilize. At
the same time, it is difficult for people to really participate in politics. Politics in Kyrgyzstan are
characterized by corruption and nepotism. People with money and the right connections call the
shots. So Kyrgyzstan is not an autocratic state which suppresses dissidence and protests, and it also
not a democracy with facilities for Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the South to express their grievances. This
situation resulted in violence.

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So the political situation was decisive for the violence in Osh. All the political ingredients were
present in Kyrgyzstan: a state in transition from autocracy to democracy, a power vacuum after the
revolution, politics along ethnic lines, a semi-repressive government in which mobiliziation is possible
but political participation is blocked, an inbetween level of democray and a low level of political
inclusiveness. The interim-regime after the April Revolution was weak and unable to control its own
territory. So it can be stated that the political situation is of very high importance for conflict
potential.
As analysed so far it can be concluded that socio-economic conditions and the political situation
together led to the conflict in Osh, which quickly unfolded itself along ethnic lines.
4.5 Other issues (drugs, third forces, media & rumors, police)
Besides the issues mentioned before and in the theory, other issues were also of high influence that
led to the conflict in Osh. Some of these issues involve cross-border issues which have been already
discussed in Chapter 3, including drugs and third forces like criminal groups. Other issues which have
not been discussed yet are media & rumours and the police.
4.5.1 Drugs
Because of its proximity to Afghanistan, the Ferghana Valley serves as a route for drugs from
Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. The UN has even identified Osh as Central Asia’s most important
drug trafficking center (KIC, 2011, p. 23).
It is difficult to find out to what extent the drugs business influenced the June events. A
representative of the Head of State Service on Drug Control recently called the drug trafficking an
“alarming situation”, because of its increase after the April and June events: “its financing of
destabilizing forces and corruption have only worsened since the events of June 2010” (KIC, 2011, p.
23).
Certainly drug trafficking has a big influence on society and it is related to the mafia, government and
businesses. It is not without reason that Bakiyev closed the only organization dealing with the drug
trafficking problem. After the closure, the trafficking flourished even further and mafia groups were
strengthened. Besides adding to more instability around Osh, it is also most certain that some events
related to the conflict has been realized with drugs money, for example the distribution of weapons
(KIC, 2011, p. 23; Deen, 2010, p. 642).
After the April revolution, the power in the South of Kyrgyzstan was in the hands of criminals. The
government bodies were so weak that they could not control the actions of the mafia and criminal
groups. They could carry out their activities without being obstructed by the government. As the
criminal groups mostly consist out of nationalistic Kyrgyz, including former state officials and
supporters of Bakiyev, they mainly targeted Uzbek businesses. In this way they wanted to scare the
Uzbeks and to retain power. This made the situation between the ethnicities also more tense
(interview 10; 11).
4.5.2 Third forces
During many interviews, people noticed that the conflict was not spontaneous, but that it was partly
organized. So-called third forces would have provoked the conflict, which made use of the deep
feelings of both ethnicities (interview 18; 21; 26; 27; 36).
According to a member of parliament, she cannot believe that people – even if they hated each other
very much – would “kill each other with such cruelty”. No one wanted the conflict to happen. There
was knowledge how to “cut heads and bodies” in a professional way. The professionalism and

50
organization with which there was looted, burned and killed point to some kind of coordination and
provocation of a third force (interview 21).
Again it is difficult to determine to what extent the conflict was spontaneous and to what extent it
was organized. But there are incidences that contribute to the reliability that third forces were
involved. In May, when the situation in the South of Kyrgyzstan was already destabilizing, there was a
telephone conversation between the brother and son of former president Bakiyev. The security
services intercepted this conversation and publicly released it on May 19. In this phone call the two
men were talking about hiring 500 criminals to create unrest (KIC, 2011, p. 21; interview 21).
According to a member of parliament, when referring to this phone call: “And cynical he [the son of
Bakiyev] said that the police would run from one place to another to try and resolve the problems, but
they wouldn’t be able to. And of course he was promising a lot of money, and he was asking his uncle
to find these type of criminal people and people who could coordinate it […] And third forces are also
those who didn’t want to change the political system. They didn’t want us to change Kyrgyzstan at all,
they prefer to have relations with one dictator [Bakiyev] and it’s more comfortable for them, they can
get anything they want” (interview 21).
Many people speculate that the third forces were the mafia and criminal groups mentioned before.
Since they wanted to keep Bakiyev in power, they would benefit from more tensions between
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. More tensions would lead to increased feelings of nationalism amongst Kyrgyz in
the South, which would mean more supporters for Bakiyev-minded nationalistic people. More
supporters would mean more votes in the next elections. Indeed, during the parliamentary elections
in October 2010 the biggest party was Ata-Zhurt, as discussed before. This makes many people think
that the violence was organized for political reasons.
4.5.3 Media & rumours
Many people in Kyrgyzstan say that the information spread by media and rumours were very
important in the up-run to the June events (interview 2). Many rumours were spread by media and
word of mouth which were never verified, but they were taken for granted.
The ‘problem’ with media in Kyrgyzstan is that there is no censorship. Media can write what they
want, even reports which are not true. A lot of hate speech is spread by media. This kind of
information provokes people (interview 18; 43).
An example of this was a national Kyrgyz TV channel which aired a report about the burnt houses of
former president Bakiyev in Jalalabad. The Kyrgyz journalist told that the other proponents were
burning down the houses. On the basis of this information more tension was created in society
(interview 18).
Examples of rumours were rumours about Kyrgyz students who were raped by Uzbek men and
rumours about people being closed-up in a mosque which was set on fire. These rumours were never
verified. However, they were legitimate reasons for people to take up arms and to defend their own
ethnicity (interview 18).
Another rumour was about a controversial book which was going to be set on fire in the street
together with large protests. The rumour was spread, but no one has seen this event happening and
there are not even videos about it on Youtube. Apparently the protest did not take place, but the
rumour was already spread and caused hatred (interview 7).
Also rumours about Uzbeks taking over power were making Kyrgyz angry. There were even talks that
the Uzbeks already appointed a president and several ministers. This made especially the
marginalized nationalistic people in mono-ethnic villages angry (interview 22; 37).

51
So many rumours were spread which were not based on anything and which led to the escalation of
the situation. Everyday new rumours were spread and this increased the tensions. Also nowadays
tensions are still high and society is still characterized by rumours. In November 2010, there was an
explosion in the bazaar, soon the rumour was spread that the conflict had started again (interview 7;
19; 28).
4.5.4 Police
The police also contributed to the tensions in the South of Kyrgyzstan. The police has become more
and more separated from the government. In Kyrgyzstan there are huge problems with the police,
because they are immensely characterized by corruption. Almost all policemen make extra money of
their job. An often said saying in Kyrgyzstan: “The police is your biggest enemy”. Policemen make
money with bribes and they falsify facts in order to get money (interview 20).
In addition, the police is very discriminative. Almost all police men are Kyrgyz, and in the up-run to
the June events the discrimination against Uzbeks was getting worse. Policemen were only stopping
Uzbek people and taking bribes of them. When the conflict broke out, this got worse and the police
was violating the law. Instead of providing security to people, they pushed the conflict forward. That
is why people also felt the need themselves to take up arms, in order to provide for their own
security which they did not receive from the police (interview 2; 8; 20).
4.6 The role of youth
After having discussed which factors are of influence on the conflict potential in Osh, it is now time to
look at the role of youth in the conflict. The next sub-question will be answered in this paragraph:
“What was the role of young local people during the unrest in Osh in June 2010?”
About 90% of the participators in the violence in Osh were under the age of 35. There is no need for
further explanation that young people then can be regarded as a problematic group with regard to
violence and conflict potential. However, at the same time they can be regarded as a huge potential
and the future of the country (interview 17; 23; 27; 28).
How come the youth participated this much in the violence? Traditionally the role of elders in society
is very important in Central Asia, leaving young people aside. Young people are not involved in
decision making processes. As they feel they do not have a say in these processes, the only option
left is to participate in violence.
Furthermore, unemployment is very high in Osh, which is mostly affecting young adults, as already
discussed in Chapter 3. It is estimated that only around 35% of young people in the Ferghana Valley
have reliable income-generating activities or stable jobs (Mercy Corps, 2003).
In general it can be said that young people are excluded from part of society in Osh and that they do
not have many things to do in their everyday life, especially when they are unemployed. This is
expressed by frequent fights and disputes between young people from neighbouring – often mono-
ethnic – villages in the South of Kyrgyzstan (Saferworld, 2011).
As discussed in Chapter 2, youth can be easily influenced, in either direction: “youth is like a sponge,
you give something, they will just absorb it” (interview 26). They can be very easily influenced by
rumours, even the ones that followed higher education. They could hate someone without even
knowing the other. Especially nowadays in a divided society like Osh where children go mainly to
mono-ethnic schools, they do not have the chance to come into contact with the other. Elderly
people are often more conciliatory and polite towards the other, because of life experience and
because they know the other better. They are from the time of the Soviet Union, in which everyone
spoke Russian and everyone went to the same schools (interview 31; 33; 36; 38; 43; Mercy Corps,
2003).

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After the June events most all international and local organizations started to focus on youth,
because it was recognized that they were the main problem of the society (interview 34). Besides, as
said before, they can be influenced in either direction. Organizations believe that youth can also be
influenced by positive thoughts, so that they can also bring positive change. As can be seen in Osh,
there is a large group of young people active who are willing to build mutual respect. Many projects
targeting youth and several youth centres were set up by Unicef, Youth of Osh, UNDP, IRET and other
organizations.
Many youth centres were set up in mono-ethnic villages around Osh, because that is where many
young people were mobilized to participate in the conflict. In the rural areas people are poor,
unemployment is high and the people do not know the ‘other’. In the youth centres young people
can come to talk about their problems, to discuss and debate but also to learn computer skills and to
learn English or Russian. Furthermore, the aim of the youth centres is peace building. This is done by
providing trainings in conflict prevention and administration development (interview 26).
However, organizations recognize that the chance is big that youth centres mainly attract youth who
are going to school and are more developed. It is important that also the young people who are living
in the streets and took part in the violence are attracted. Those people are the most worrisome
group, especially since they are characterized by alcoholism and involved in criminality. These are the
ones who joined the June events (interview 26).
Young people had a decisive role in the June events. They were the ones who participated mostly in
the violence as they are easy to influence and they do not have many opportunities. The fact that
youth had a big role can be seen in the many projects set up after the conflict targeting youth. Youth
should be regarded as the future of the country, therefore it is important to pay attention to youth,
because they should be the potential in a positive way (interview 17; 23; 31).
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter analysed how the conflict in Osh in June 2010 could happen by looking through ethnic,
socio-economic and political theoretical lenses. Also other issues were taken into account and the
role of youth during the violence has been analysed. Analysing why a conflict has occurred gives
insight in the conflict potential of a region, by looking at which issues are important.
Although an ethnic conflict, the main reason for the conflict in Osh was not ethnicity. Instead,
different factors which are all interlinked led to the conflict. Socio-economic conditions led to
inequalities and grievances between ethnic groups, and also the political situation in the country
after the revolution in April 2010 quickly took an ethnic approach. Hate speech in media increased
and falsified rumours were spread. It is likely that some people could benefit from this situation for
illegal and political reasons, which is why many people think the violence was provoked.
Furthermore, the political situation influenced the bad socio-economic situation and vice versa. If
there would have been a higher ethnic political inclusiveness, local governments and the police
would have been less discriminative towards Uzbeks which would reduce the tensions. The other
way around, in a time of economic decline with Uzbeks having the best business, feelings of
nationalism amongst Kyrgyz increased which led to a low political inclusiveness with Kyrgyz being
dominant in government structures.
In this analysis young people are very important, because they were the main perpetrators in the
conflict. Unemployment is highest among this group, leaving them in a position to search for illegal
alternatives to survive. They do not have prospects to look out to. Furthermore, they are most
sensitive for feelings of nationalism and ethnicity as they are easy to influence.
So in conclusion it can be said that mainly the socio-economic conditions and the political situation
are of influence for conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley, which both take ethnic features. The

53
role of young people was very important for the unrest in Osh, as they are the so-called victims of
society and therefore they were easy to mobilize to take part in the violence.

54
5. Conflict potential and prevention
In the previous chapter the causes which led to the violence in June 2010 were discussed and this
also indicated to what extent these causes are of influence to conflict potential. Conflict potential is
basically making predictions about the future, which is very difficult. Nevertheless, the situation
nowadays can indicate to what extent there is conflict potential in Osh and in the Ferghana Valley as
a whole. This chapter will give a first answer to the central question: “What is the conflict potential of
the Ferghana Valley and what is the role of young local people on this?”. In the last paragraph conflict
prevention focus areas will be discussed.
5.1 Conflict potential
There are some people who say that the situation in Osh is stable nowadays. People are tired and
exhausted of conflict and they want to go back to normal life. Also when walking around in the city
centre, it is hard to imagine that one year ago Osh was the scene of violence. The bazar is running,
people are walking in the streets, shops and cafes start to (re)open, people make use of public
transport and this is all done ethnically mixed. Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are selling food to each other in the
bazaar: Kyrgyz buy bread from Uzbeks because they simply make the best bread (interview 2; 4; 16;
24; 26; 36).
However, under the surface there are many tensions, and this is what most people say. Just by
walking around in the city centre of Osh as an outsider this is not noticeable. Although I always
wondered when a little fight broke out in the street if it was just two ordinary people or maybe a
Kyrgyz and an Uzbek.
Nowadays life is more separated than before the conflict. Inter-ethnic contact is less than before.
People stay more in their own communities and neighbourhoods. They feel safe in their own houses.
And although people are using public transport again, little fights break out because an Uzbek
women hits a Kyrgyz women per accident or vice versa (interview 16; 17; 28; 37).
The situation today is characterized by fear. People are insecure and they do not know what the
future will bring. This is fuelled by the lack of trust between the ethnic groups and the lack of feelings
of security in the South. Kyrgyz people are afraid of Uzbeks and vice versa. There is little dialogue and
they blame each other for starting the conflict. Especially the feelings among the youth are very
nationalistic. The tense situation is not getting better due to nationalistic politicians, hate speeches in
the media and discrimination and corruption by police men (interview 15; 19; 30).
Another factor which leads to the unstable situation nowadays are the law enforcement bodies. They
are characterized by discrimination and corruption. Besides, many perpetrators still walk around
freely. The majority of the people imprisoned are Uzbeks, while at the same time the majority of the
victims are Uzbeks. Uzbeks feel that they are treated unfair, especially because many Kyrgyz
perpetrators still walk around freely. They feel discriminated and torture has become everyday
practice in the prisons (HRW, 2011; interview 15;19).
Because of the conflict, many people – especially young men – migrated to Russia to find a better life
there, also because unemployment is still high and there are no economic improvements. A
consequence of this is that the marginalized people are left behind. People in Osh are now even
more desperate and poor, because the ‘talented’ people of their society went abroad. As long as the
economic situation does not get better, conflict potential will exist (interview 16).
Furthermore, the international presence has contributed to the tense situation and increased the
conflict potential. As the majority of the people in need were Uzbeks, the humanitarian aid went for

55
a large extent to Uzbeks. They got food and materials and they were helped in reconstructing their
houses. International organizations say that they are impartial, because they help the ones who need
it most. However, in the eyes of the Kyrgyz the international organizations are partial, because they
only help Uzbeks (interview 13; 15; 27).
The international presence is extremely visible in Osh. White jeeps are driving around and in
constructing – mainly Uzbek – areas you can see “UNHCR” stickers everywhere. According to UNHCR
this is part of the visibility (interview 29; 36), however some experts wonder why this visibility is
needed because it “only pisses off the Kyrgyz, which make the situation worse” (interview 33).
Overall it can be argued that there is still conflict potential at the moment in the South of Kyrgyzstan.
The situation still needs to stabilize and this takes time. However, this also depends highly on the
improvements of the socio-economic situation and the political situation. Young people will not be
able to find a job if the socio-economic situation remains bad, and this is especially worrisome
because the majority of the population is under the age of 30. This means that many people are
unemployed, increasing the instability.
5.2 Conflict prevention
As seen in the previous paragraph, the conflict potential in Osh and the Ferghana Valley exists. It is
difficult to predict if a conflict will break out again and if this could be prevented. As often the case
with conflict prevention, the results are difficult to measure. This was also often said by NGOs
already active in Osh before the conflict in June. If they would not have been there, maybe the
conflict in June would have been even bigger and protracted. Interviewees told me what should be
done in order to increase stability. The next aspects are the most told conflict prevention areas by
the interviewees.
Education
As the majority of the participants in the violence were young people, it is important to improve
education. As the schools in the South of Kyrgyzstan are mainly mono-ethnic, young people do not
have a good image of the ‘other’. According to many interviewees I have interviewed, the quality of
education should improve and classes on ethnic-tolerance should be given (interview 17; 20; 34; 36;
37).
In order to provide better education, it is also important that learning materials will be available. If
Kyrgyzstan provide materials for all schools, it would not happen anymore that an Uzbek girl living in
Kyrgyzstan thinks that her president is Karimov (interview 17; 19).
Language
Another important issue for which a solution should be found is language.
The problem in Kyrgyzstan is that there are two official languages: Kyrgyz and Russian. As Russians
are an even smaller minority than the Uzbeks, the Uzbeks also want their language to be an official
language. They feel subordinated compared to the Russians (interview 18; 19). This problem is
specifically present amongst young people, because they experience mostly that they cannot
communicate with the other ethnic group. Elderly people do speak Russian because they grew up in
the Soviet Union.
Reforms must be implemented in order to find a solution for this and to integrate minority rights.
The government could have a look at other countries in which there are similar problems. Examples
are Switzerland with German, France and Italian but also the Netherlands wit Dutch and Frisian.
Media
In order to give right information to people the media should be improved so that hate speeches are
reduced and rumours would not have a chance to spread soon. Media should not be used for

56
nationalistic propaganda anymore, for which young people are very sensitive. There need to be a
complete, true and impartial coverage of news in the South (interview 2; 17; 21; 34).
This is a difficult situation, because on the one hand it is good that there are no restrictions on
media; there is no censorship imposed by the government and there is freedom of media. However,
when this exist in a country where feelings of nationalism and ethnicity increase, the media can be
used to spread hate speech. This is an example of that aspects of democracy do not develop at the
same speed. Freedom of media has been developed, but government institutions and political
inclusiveness still needs democratic improvements.
Concrete prevention tools could include trainings for young journalists. This is already done by Kloop
Media Foundation, which covers independent news and blogs on the situation in Kyrgyzstan in
Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek languages. Furthermore they started the Kloop Online Journalism School
for young people in Kyrgyzstan to become a qualified journalist or blogger. Such initiatives are good
to stimulate independent media (Kloop, 2011; Hivos, 2011).
Government
The government is of very huge importance for the overall situation in Kyrgyzstan. Reforms are
needed in all fields and corruption and nepotism should be cleared out. However, this is not a
process which will occur over night, in order to change the government system – but also the
mindset of the political elite – time is needed. An honest attitude is needed towards all ethnicities.
An equal society should be build and there should be opportunities for people to develop (interview
2; 5; 17; 21).
Police
As the police is now characterized by corruption and bribes, there should be a police reform as well.
In this reform a multi-ethnic approach is needed. The relationship between the police force and the
Uzbek communities should be improved, in order to reduce tensions and discrimination (interview
15; 19; 32; 33). The OSCE already carries out a Police Reform Programme in Kyrgyzstan.
Improve economic conditions
The main problems in the South of Kyrgyzstan are the bad economic conditions and unemployment.
Therefore it is important to stimulate income generating activities and to create jobs. This creates
stability because people have to go to work again. Employment creates stability (interview 4; 21; 29).
In this specific attention should go out to young people, as unemployment is highest amongst them.
Vocational trainings could be given in which young marginalized and uneducated people learn
practical jobs. Also trainings in entrepreneurship can stimulate people to start their own business
which can stimulate economic development.
Trust-building
The conflict in Osh increased the tensions between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks. Horrible things have
been done, people have been killed and many lost their family. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks both blame the
‘other’ for what has been done. The gap that exists now between the ethnicities should be minimized
and they should trust each other again. The gap is specifically present between young people, as they
are less loyal to other ethnicities because they grew up in a more divided society than their parents
did (interview 29).
Trust-building could be done by different type of events. Concerts, sports and other events can bring
ethnicities and young people closer together. People should learn about each other ethnicities by
integrating different cultures (interview 2; 4; 13; 21).
Change focus
At the moment the whole society is being viewed through a lens of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. People should
change this focus and look at the society to haves and have-nots. By keeping on focussing on
ethnicities, people will keep on looking at the society through an ethnic lens. People do not look at

57
each other like persons at the moment, but they look at each other like ‘you’re an Uzbek, you’re a
Kyrgyz’. This should be changed (interview 28; 33).
Provide justice
People are still waiting for justice in Osh. Perpetrators should be punished, both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.
Without justice people can still walk around freely. This can also negatively influence people the next
time a conflict evolves. People will not care about violating because they know they would not be
punished anyway. The law enforcement bodies should put forward the right message by letting know
that the ones who violate the law will be punished, regardless of someone’s ethnicity. At the
moment the court cannot be trusted either (interview 2; 5; 15; 16).
It is not possible to realize all aspects over night. All aspects are idealistic and belong to the
democratisation process Kyrgyzstan is going through right now. Democracies are not build in a snap
and it will probably take decades. However, it is possible for local and international NGOs to focus on
these areas by organizing projects focussing on these topics.

58
6. Conclusion
The research conducted in this master’s thesis analysed the conflict potential and the role of youth in
the Ferghana Valley by looking through ethnic, socio-economic and political theoretical lenses and by
taking into account the specific history, context and cross-border issues in the region. It took a
specific approach towards Kyrgyzstan and the case-study of Osh, a place in which an ethnic conflict
broke out in June 2010.
6.1 Answering of the central question
In this conclusion the central question formulated in Chapter 1 will be answered:
“What is the conflict potential of the Ferghana Valley and what is the role of young local people on
this?”
First of all, the conflict potential has been determined by taking into account ethnic, socio-economic
and political aspects.
Starting with ethnicity, ethnicity is important because often conflicts unfold themselves along ethnic
lines, as was the case in Osh. Therefore the aspect of ethnicity cannot be denied when looking at the
conflict potential. The research has shown that ethnicities are constructed and that feelings of
ethnicities can be activated in certain circumstances. Ethnic diversity as such does not – in first
instance – contribute to conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley. Instead, the geographical
distribution, compositions and proportions of ethnicities first of all lay the foundations for conflict
potential. If these circumstances are good, then feelings of ethnicity can be activated by grievances
and for political purposes, as this research has shown. The longer there is focussed upon the concept
of ethnicity, the more the concept becomes something real. Indeed, nowadays people in Osh view
their city more in terms of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, while before this did not play a significant role.
Especially young people are sensitive for this because they are easy to influence because of little life
experience. In the Ferghana Valley, they grew up in a more divided society than their parents did
which grew up in the Soviet Union in which everyone went to the same school and everyone knew
Russian.
Socio-economic conditions do influence conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley. The region is
characterized by bad socio-economic conditions and unemployment is high, especially amongst
young people. This has two implications: greed and grievances.
First of all people start looking for alternatives to survive, which is rooted in greed. As drug trafficking
is a highly development business and a good alternative, young people often get involved in criminal
groups. The expansion of these groups leads to instability in the region and thus to increasing conflict
potential.
Greed also contributes to conflict potential in another way. When people do not have money, they
become easy to mobilize. As conflicts are characterized by big unrest, marginalized people will take
their chance to loot bazaars, shops and houses. In this way they can at least make profit from
participating in the conflict, fuelling the conflict even further. As unemployment is especially high
amongst young people, they formed the majority of the looters and violators in Osh. Also looking at
conflict potential in general it is likely that if a conflict occurs, young people will form the majority in
it.
Grievances increase ethnic conflict potential more directly. Bad socio-economic conditions in the
Ferghana Valley are characterized by economic inequalities between ethnic groups. These
inequalities lead to feelings of frustration and deprivation which lead again to ethnic tensions. This
causes a greater division in society along ethnic lines, planting the seeds for ethnic conflict. Once the

59
situation is ripe, these are the root causes which can activate the so-called underlying root causes
from the constructivists’ point of view.
If the situation is ripe depends on the political situation in a country, which is highly decisive for a
conflict to break out and which is country dependent. At the moment the political situation in
Kyrgyzstan increases the risk on conflict in the Ferghana Valley, in contrast to Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan where a conflict is less likely. This can be explained by the fact that Kyrgyzstan is a
country in transition characterized by a status in between an autocracy and democracy. In contrast,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are countries with a strong autocratic regime, Uzbekistan even more than
Tajikistan. In these settings conflicts are difficult to occur because unrest is being suppressed by the
government which strictly controls the country. So it can be concluded that the political situation in
Kyrgyzstan increases the conflict potential, while in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan it is less likely that a
conflict will occur. However, as is the case with politics, this can change as soon as the dictator falls
away. In the long-term conflict potential is also high in these two countries. So the political situation
highly influences the chance on conflict.
Another way in which the political situation increases the chance on – more specifically ethnic –
conflict deals with political inclusiveness and nationalism. When ethnic minority groups are excluded
from decision making processes, they feel excluded from society as a whole. This also leads to an
increasing division within society along ethnic lines. Again, once the situation is ripe, conflict can
occur along side ethnic lines. This is the case in the Ferghana Valley, in which the former Soviet Union
countries clearly followed a nationalistic line since their independence, as they had to form a new
country in which was there was little attention for ethnic minorities. Especially young marginalized
people who already have tensions with other ethnic groups are sensitive for this, because they feel
their nation should be protected for the ‘other’.
This research has shown that conflicts and conflict potential should be analysed by combining the
three theoretical approaches, to which possible other theories can be added. Where often research
focuses on one theoretical approach, it is useful when analysing conflicts to take different
perspectives into account. A conflict should be regarded as a process, which not only affects the
society as a whole, but which is also rooted in society. A conflict is not an event in itself.
Furthermore the research has shown that although theoretical frameworks are vey useful, it is also
always important to take into account the conflict’s own specific characteristics. This is also why
there is not a blueprint for each conflict to solve or prevent. The history and context should be taken
into account. In the Ferghana Valley these characteristics are for a great extent determined by the
history of the Soviet Union, which created artificial borders and with them destabilizing cross-border
issues. Furthermore the history paved the way for nationalistic governments, in which there was
little attention for minority rights, contributing to ethnic tensions.
The role of youth with regard to conflicts should not be underestimated. As the Ferghana Valley is
one of the most densely populated parts of the Ferghana Valley with a majority of people under the
age of thirty, young people are very important to take into account. Especially because they are the
ones who suffer the most from unemployment and they are the easiest to influence when it comes
to ethnic feelings and nationalism. Conflict potential increases because of this large group of young
people. They want to have prospects for the future but they do not have anything to look out for.
Therefore it is important that conflict prevention in the Ferghana Valley mainly focus on young
people, which is already being done to a growing extent.
6.2 Recommendations
In this last part of the conclusions some recommendations will be made for further research and
NGOs.

60
Recommendations for further research
This research was not able to make an equal analysis for the Ferghana Valley as a whole, because
research was only conducted in Kyrgyzstan. This is why this thesis focussed more on Kyrgyzstan than
on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
It would be interesting if more research could be done to these two other countries. Interesting
topics would be to what extent opposition groups find support in the Ferghana Valley, and to what
extent they are organized, maybe in the form of Islamic groups. Also research could be done to
feelings of grievances between ethnic groups in these parts of the valley. Furthermore it would be
good if greater insight could be achieved in to what extent criminal groups and drug trafficking
increases the instability in the region. And to what extent they are linked to Islamic militant groups
and political elites.
Also an analysis could be done to young people in the Ferghana Valley. What do they think and how
do they see their future? Also because more and more people are migrating to Russia, especially the
young educated men, leaving their families behind.
Research to these aspects could create more insight in the conflict potential and the role of youth in
the Ferghana Valley. I acknowledge that some of these topics are very sensitive and it is not easy to
do this research in especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Especially in Uzbekistan the government is
very suppressive and has even expelled international NGOs and UN organisations. That is also why I
did not do it myself.
Furthermore, other theoretical frameworks – besides ethnicity, socio-economic and political – could
be taken into account leading to a completer analysis method for conflict areas.
Recommendations for local and international NGOs
The research has shown that many factors are of influence for conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley. For non-governmental organisations it is difficult to do something about the political
situation, therefore they should mainly focus on income-generating activities, cross-community
building and young people. These focus areas could also be combined.
An example would be to realize more vocational trainings, in which young marginalized (uneducated)
people learn practical jobs. Also trainings in entrepreneurship can stimulate people to start their own
business, which will stimulate economic development. Cultural projects can help building bridges
between the ethnic groups.
However, it is important that not only the people who are willing to participate are included, but also
the marginalized people who took part in the violence or who are not interested in the other ethnic
group. Those are the ones who are living in the streets and who are hard to reach. A lot of effort
should be put in targeting those marginalized people, as they are the problem of the society. An
active approach should be taken including local heads who know their communities.
Furthermore, during the research in Kyrgyzstan it became clear that cooperation between NGOs
could be improved. Many NGOs did not have talked to each other before and they were very
interested when I told them that I talked with other organizations. NGOs were very interested in the
activities of other NGOs, but they had not talked to them themselves while they are working on the
same topics and in the same city. So a pro-active attitude amongst international and local NGOs
could result in better cooperation and realizing more successful projects.

61
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Map 3.1
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Map 3.2
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Table 3.1
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Slim, R.M. (2002), “Central Asia: The Ferghana Valley: In the Midst of a Host Crisis”. In: Searching for Peace in Europe and
Eurasia / Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia. [Accessed 16 September 2011]. Available at www:
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2&theme=10&variable_ID=508&action=select_years
Figure 3.1
Nationmaster, Kyrgyzstan, 2010. [Accessed 18 October 2011]. Available at www:
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Figure 3.2
Nationmaster, Uzbekistan, 2010. [Accessed 18 October 2011]. Available at www:
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Figure 3.3
Nationmaster, Tajikistan, 2010. [Accessed 18 October 2011]. Available at www: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ti-
tajikistan/Age-_distribution
Map 3.3
Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal (2003). [Accessed 20 October 2011]. Available at www:
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Photo 3.1
Kiva stories from the field (2010), “10 things you didn’t know about Kyrgyzstan”. [Accessed 26 September 2011]. Available
at www: http://fellowsblog.kiva.org/2010/07/13/10-things-you-didn%E2%80%99t-know-in-kyrgyzstan-%E2%80%93en-
espanol-tambien/
Photo 4.1
Own picture
Photo 4.2
Own picture

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Appendix 1 – Prepared interview questions
How would you describe the situation in the Ferghana Valley at the moment? Are there problems in
the Ferghana Valley? How would you describe the problems in the Ferghana Valley? What do you see
as the main causes for problems in the Ferghana Valley? Is the situation only tense in Osh? What
about other parts?
Possible answers: ethnic differences/economic conditions/political situation/drugs traffickers/border
disputes/religion/other
“To what extent is ethnic diversity of influence for the conflict potential in the Ferghana Valley?”
What are the differences between Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Tajiks in the Ferghana Valley?
Are there inequalities between the different ethnic groups?
Has the relation between the ethnic groups always been so tense?
Do the ethnic differences contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? What are the
prospects for this?
“To what extent are socio-economic conditions of influence for the conflict potential in the
Ferghana Valley?”
What are the socio-economic conditions in the Ferghana Valley?
Do the socio-economic conditions contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? What
are the prospects for this? Are there differences in socio-economic conditions within the Ferghana
Valley?
“To what extent is the political situation of influence for the conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley?”
What is the political situation in the Ferghana Valley and the bordering countries?
Does the political situation contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? What are the
prospects for this?
“To what extent is the history and context of importance for the conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley?”
What incidents have happened before in the Ferghana Valley? Do the past and current incidents still
contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? Is it possible to forget the incidents? What
are the prospects for this? To what extent will the Osh events be an example for other regions within
in the Ferghana Valley?
“To what extent are cross-border problems of importance for the conflict potential in the Ferghana
Valley?”
Are there other problems which can influence the tension in the Ferghana Valley?
Do drugs traffickers contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? What are the
prospects for this?
Do radical groups contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? What are the prospects
for this?
Do border disputes contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? What are the prospects
for this?
Are there other factors which contribute to tension in the Ferghana Valley? If yes, how? What are the
prospects for this?
“What is the role of young local people in the unrest in the Ferghana Valley?”

67
What is the situation of young local people in the Ferghana Valley? Do they have access to
education? Are there enough job opportunities? How do they regard the problems in the Ferghana
Valley? How do they contribute to the problems in the Ferghana Valley?

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