Measuring ATR
Joao Damas
Geoff Huston
@apnic.net
March 2018
September 2017:
The Internet has a problem …
• Instead of evolving to be more flexible and more capable, it appears
that the Internet’s transport is becoming more ossified and more
inflexible in certain aspects
• One of the major issues here is the handling of large IP packets and IP
level packet fragmentation
• We are seeing a number of end-to-end paths on the network that no
longer support the carriage of fragmented IP datagrams
• We are concerned that this number might be getting larger, not
smaller
The Internet has a problem …
• What about the DNS?
• One application that is making increasing use of large UDP packets is the DNS
• This is generally associated with DNSSEC-signed responses (such as “dig
+dnssec DNSKEY org”) but large DNS responses can be generated in other
ways as well (such as “dig . ANY”)
• In the DNS we appear to be relying on the successful transmission of
fragmented UDP packets, but at the same time we see an increasing problem
with the coherence in network and host handling of fragmented IP packets,
particularly in IPv6
Changing the DNS?
• But don’t large DNS transactions use TCP anyway?
• In the original DNS specification only small (smaller than 512 octets)
responses are passed across UDP.
• Larger DNS responses are truncated and the truncation is intended to trigger
the client to re-query using TCP
• EDNS(0) allowed a client to signal a larger truncation size threshold, and
assumes that fragmented DNS is mostly reliable
• But what if it’s not that reliable?
What is “ATR”?
• It stands for “Additional Truncated Response”
Internet draft: draft-song-atr-large-resp-00
September 2017
Linjian (Davey) Song, Beijing Internet Institute
• It’s a hybrid response to noted problems in IPv4 and IPv6 over
handling of large UDP packets and IP fragmentation
• ATR adds an additional response packet to ‘trail’ a fragmented UDP
response
• The additional response is just the original query with the Truncated
bit set, and the sender delays this additional response packet by 10ms
The Intention of ATR
Today:
• If the client cannot receive large truncated responses then it will need
to timeout from the original query,
• Then re-query using more resolvers,
• Timeout on these queries
• Then re-query using a 512 octet EDNS(0) UDP buffersize
• Then get a truncated response
• Then re-query using TCP
The Intention of ATR
Today:
• If the client cannot receive large truncated responses then it will need
to timeout from the original query,
• Then re-query using more resolvers,
• Timeout on these queries
• Then requery using a 512 octet EDNS(0) UDP buffersize
• Then get a truncated response
• Then requery using TCP
within a few ms
ATR
The Intention of ATR
• When a UDP DNS response is fragmented by the server, then the
server will also send a delayed truncated UDP DNS response
The delay is proposed to be 10ms
• If the DNS client receives and reassembles the fragmented UDP
response the ensuing truncated response will be ignored
• If the fragmented response is lost due to fragmentation loss, then the
client will receive the short truncated response
• The truncation setting is intended to trigger the client to re-query
using TCP
ATR Operation
UDP DNS Query
Client Server
ATR Operation
UDP DNS Query
UDP DNS Response
(Fragmented)
Client Server
ATR Operation
UDP DNS Query
UDP DNS Response
(Fragmented)
UDP DNS Response
(Truncated)
10ms
Client Server
ATR Operation
UDP DNS Query
UDP DNS Response
(Fragmented)
UDP DNS Response
(Truncated)
10ms
Client Server
TCP Query and Response
What could possibly go wrong?
• Network level packet re-ordering may cause the shorter truncated
response packet to overtake the fragmented response, causing an
inflated TCP load, and the potential for TCP loss to be triggered
• Not every client DNS system supports using TCP to emit queries
ATR and Resolver Behaviour
Can’t Receive
Fragmented UDP
Can’t Use TCP
How big are each of these pools?
What proportion of users are impacted?
ATR will help
ATR won’t be of use, but it
shouldn’t matter
ATR won’t help
Measuring within the DNS
Query 1: a.b.example.com? to ns.example.com
Answer 1: NS nsb.z.example.com
<discover name servers for z.example.com>
Query 2: nsb.z.example.com to z.example.com
Answer 2: 192.0.2.1
Query 3: a.b.example.com to 192.0.2.1
Answer 3: 10.0.0.1
Query 3 depends on the resolver
successfully receiving answer 2
Experiment Details
• Use 6 tests:
• 2 tests use ATR responses – one is DNS over IPv4, the other is DNS over IPv6
• 2 tests use only truncated responses – IPv4 and IPv6
• 2 tests use large fragmented UDP responses - IPv4 and IPv6
• Use a technique of delegation without glue records (glueless) to
perform the measurement entirely within the DNS
• Performed 55M experiments
Looking at Resolvers
We are looking at resolvers who were passed “Answer 2” to see if they
queried “Query 3”
Protocol Resolvers ATR Large UDP TCP
IPv4 113,087 71.2% 60.1% 79.4%
IPv6 20,878 55.4% 50.0% 55.1%
Looking at Resolvers
We are looking at resolvers who were passed “Answer 2” to see if they
queried “Query 3”
Protocol Resolvers Fail ATR Fail Large UDP Fail TCP
IPv4 113,087 28.8% 39.9% 20.6%
IPv6 20,878 44.6% 50.0% 44.9%
Inversely, lets report on the FAILURE rate of resolvers
Seriously?
• More than one third of the ”visible” IPv4 resolvers are incapable of
receiving a large fragmented packet
• And one half of the ”visible” IPv6 resolvers are incapable of receiving
a large fragmented packet
ASNs of IPv4 Resolvers that do not followup
when given a large UDP Response – Top 10
ASN Use Exp AS Name CC
AS9644 0.78% 447,019 SK Telecom KR
AS701 0.70% 400,798 UUNET - MCI Communications Services US
AS17853 0.62% 357,335 LGTELECOM KR
AS4766 0.59% 340,334 Korea Telecom KR
AS4134 0.47% 267,995 CHINANET-BACKBONE CN
AS31034 0.47% 267,478 ARUBA-ASN IT
AS3786 0.39% 225,296 DACOM Corporation KR
AS36692 0.38% 217,306 OPENDNS - OpenDNS US
AS3215 0.33% 189,810 Orange FR
AS812 0.30% 169,699 ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CA
ASNs of IPv6 Resolvers that do not followup
when given a large UDP Response – Top 10
ASN Use Exp AS Name CC
AS15169 40.60% 10,006,596 Google US
AS5650 0.90% 221,493 Frontier Communications US
AS36692 0.84% 206,143 OpenDNS US
AS812 0.78% 193,073 Rogers Communications Canada CA
AS20057 0.46% 114,440 AT&T Mobility LLC US
AS3352 0.38% 92,925 TELEFONICA_DE_ESPANA ES
AS852 0.35% 85,043 TELUS Communications Inc. CA
AS55644 0.32% 80,032 Idea Cellular Limited IN
AS3320 0.25% 61,938 DTAG Internet service provider operations DE
AS4761 0.24% 60,019 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider ID
ASNs of IPv4 Resolvers that do not followup in TCP
when given a truncated UDP Response – Top 10
ASN Use Exp AS Name CC
AS9299 0.55% 252,653 Philippine Long Distance Telephone PH
AS24560 0.34% 155,908 Bharti Airtel IN
AS3352 0.29% 132,924 TELEFONICA_DE_ESPANA ES
AS9498 0.19% 84,754 BHARTI Airtel IN
AS9121 0.14% 61,879 TTNET TR
AS23944 0.13% 58,102 SKYBroadband PH
AS9644 0.11% 51,750 SK Telecom KR
AS24499 0.11% 51,108 Telenor Pakistan PK
AS3215 0.10% 43,614 Orange FR
AS23700 0.09% 39,697 Fastnet ID
ASNs of IPv6 Resolvers that do not followup in TCP
when given a truncated UDP Response – Top 10
ASN Use Exp AS Name CC
AS15169 4.15% 961,287 Google US
AS21928 1.72% 399,129 T-Mobile USA US
AS7922 1.57% 364,596 Comcast Cable US
AS3352 0.54% 126,146 TELEFONICA_DE_ESPANA ES
AS22773 0.38% 87,723 Cox Communications Inc. US
AS55644 0.35% 80,844 Idea Cellular Limited IN
AS20115 0.31% 71,831 Charter Communications US
AS20057 0.30% 70,518 AT&T Mobility US
AS6713 0.20% 46,196 IAM-AS MA
AS8151 0.20% 45,754 Uninet S.A. de C.V. MX
What’s the impact?
• Failure in the DNS is often masked by having multiple resolvers in the
clients local configuration
• And the distribution of users to visible recursive resolvers is heavily
skewed (10,000 resolvers by IP address handle the DNSqueries of
more than 90% of end users)
• So to assess the impact lets look at the results by counting user level
success / failure to resolve these glueless names
Looking at Users
• Rather than looking at individual resolvers being able to pose
Question 3, lets count:
• A “success” if any resolver can query Question 3 on behalf of the
user
• A “failure” is recorded when no resolver generates a query to
Question 3
Looking at Users - Failure Rates
IPv4
UDP Frag: 12.5%
TCP: 4.0%
ATR 3.9%
IPv6
UDP Frag: 20.8%
TCP: 8.4%
ATR 6.5%
These loss rates are expressed as an estimated percentage of users,
ATR and Resolver Behaviour – IPv4
Can’t Receive
Fragmented UDP
Can’t Use TCP
ATR will help
ATR won’t be of use, but it
shouldn’t matter
ATR won’t help
12.5% 4.0%
8.6% 3.9% 0.1%
ATR and Resolver Behaviour – IPv4 IPv6
Can’t Receive
Fragmented UDP
Can’t Use TCP
ATR will help
ATR won’t be of use, but it
shouldn’t matter
ATR won’t help
12.5% 4.0%
20.8%
14.3% 6.5% 1.9%
8.4%
8.6% 3.9% 0.1%
Net Change in User Failure Rates
IPv4
Fragged UDP Loss: 12.5%
ATR Loss Rate: 3.9%
IPv6
Fragged UDP Loss: 20.5%
ATR Loss Rate: 6.5%
ATR Assessment
• Is this level of benefit worth the additional server and traffic load
when sending large responses?
• Is this load smaller than resolver hunting in response to packet drop?
• It the faster fallback to TCP for large responses a significant benefit?
• Is 10ms ATR delay too short? Would a longer gap reduce response
reordering? Do we care?
• Do we have any better ideas about how to cope with large responses
in the DNS?
Thanks!

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Measuring ATR: IETF 101

  • 1. Measuring ATR Joao Damas Geoff Huston @apnic.net March 2018
  • 3. The Internet has a problem … • Instead of evolving to be more flexible and more capable, it appears that the Internet’s transport is becoming more ossified and more inflexible in certain aspects • One of the major issues here is the handling of large IP packets and IP level packet fragmentation • We are seeing a number of end-to-end paths on the network that no longer support the carriage of fragmented IP datagrams • We are concerned that this number might be getting larger, not smaller
  • 4. The Internet has a problem … • What about the DNS? • One application that is making increasing use of large UDP packets is the DNS • This is generally associated with DNSSEC-signed responses (such as “dig +dnssec DNSKEY org”) but large DNS responses can be generated in other ways as well (such as “dig . ANY”) • In the DNS we appear to be relying on the successful transmission of fragmented UDP packets, but at the same time we see an increasing problem with the coherence in network and host handling of fragmented IP packets, particularly in IPv6
  • 5. Changing the DNS? • But don’t large DNS transactions use TCP anyway? • In the original DNS specification only small (smaller than 512 octets) responses are passed across UDP. • Larger DNS responses are truncated and the truncation is intended to trigger the client to re-query using TCP • EDNS(0) allowed a client to signal a larger truncation size threshold, and assumes that fragmented DNS is mostly reliable • But what if it’s not that reliable?
  • 6. What is “ATR”? • It stands for “Additional Truncated Response” Internet draft: draft-song-atr-large-resp-00 September 2017 Linjian (Davey) Song, Beijing Internet Institute • It’s a hybrid response to noted problems in IPv4 and IPv6 over handling of large UDP packets and IP fragmentation • ATR adds an additional response packet to ‘trail’ a fragmented UDP response • The additional response is just the original query with the Truncated bit set, and the sender delays this additional response packet by 10ms
  • 7. The Intention of ATR Today: • If the client cannot receive large truncated responses then it will need to timeout from the original query, • Then re-query using more resolvers, • Timeout on these queries • Then re-query using a 512 octet EDNS(0) UDP buffersize • Then get a truncated response • Then re-query using TCP
  • 8. The Intention of ATR Today: • If the client cannot receive large truncated responses then it will need to timeout from the original query, • Then re-query using more resolvers, • Timeout on these queries • Then requery using a 512 octet EDNS(0) UDP buffersize • Then get a truncated response • Then requery using TCP within a few ms ATR
  • 9. The Intention of ATR • When a UDP DNS response is fragmented by the server, then the server will also send a delayed truncated UDP DNS response The delay is proposed to be 10ms • If the DNS client receives and reassembles the fragmented UDP response the ensuing truncated response will be ignored • If the fragmented response is lost due to fragmentation loss, then the client will receive the short truncated response • The truncation setting is intended to trigger the client to re-query using TCP
  • 10. ATR Operation UDP DNS Query Client Server
  • 11. ATR Operation UDP DNS Query UDP DNS Response (Fragmented) Client Server
  • 12. ATR Operation UDP DNS Query UDP DNS Response (Fragmented) UDP DNS Response (Truncated) 10ms Client Server
  • 13. ATR Operation UDP DNS Query UDP DNS Response (Fragmented) UDP DNS Response (Truncated) 10ms Client Server TCP Query and Response
  • 14. What could possibly go wrong? • Network level packet re-ordering may cause the shorter truncated response packet to overtake the fragmented response, causing an inflated TCP load, and the potential for TCP loss to be triggered • Not every client DNS system supports using TCP to emit queries
  • 15. ATR and Resolver Behaviour Can’t Receive Fragmented UDP Can’t Use TCP How big are each of these pools? What proportion of users are impacted? ATR will help ATR won’t be of use, but it shouldn’t matter ATR won’t help
  • 16. Measuring within the DNS Query 1: a.b.example.com? to ns.example.com Answer 1: NS nsb.z.example.com <discover name servers for z.example.com> Query 2: nsb.z.example.com to z.example.com Answer 2: 192.0.2.1 Query 3: a.b.example.com to 192.0.2.1 Answer 3: 10.0.0.1 Query 3 depends on the resolver successfully receiving answer 2
  • 17. Experiment Details • Use 6 tests: • 2 tests use ATR responses – one is DNS over IPv4, the other is DNS over IPv6 • 2 tests use only truncated responses – IPv4 and IPv6 • 2 tests use large fragmented UDP responses - IPv4 and IPv6 • Use a technique of delegation without glue records (glueless) to perform the measurement entirely within the DNS • Performed 55M experiments
  • 18. Looking at Resolvers We are looking at resolvers who were passed “Answer 2” to see if they queried “Query 3” Protocol Resolvers ATR Large UDP TCP IPv4 113,087 71.2% 60.1% 79.4% IPv6 20,878 55.4% 50.0% 55.1%
  • 19. Looking at Resolvers We are looking at resolvers who were passed “Answer 2” to see if they queried “Query 3” Protocol Resolvers Fail ATR Fail Large UDP Fail TCP IPv4 113,087 28.8% 39.9% 20.6% IPv6 20,878 44.6% 50.0% 44.9% Inversely, lets report on the FAILURE rate of resolvers
  • 20. Seriously? • More than one third of the ”visible” IPv4 resolvers are incapable of receiving a large fragmented packet • And one half of the ”visible” IPv6 resolvers are incapable of receiving a large fragmented packet
  • 21. ASNs of IPv4 Resolvers that do not followup when given a large UDP Response – Top 10 ASN Use Exp AS Name CC AS9644 0.78% 447,019 SK Telecom KR AS701 0.70% 400,798 UUNET - MCI Communications Services US AS17853 0.62% 357,335 LGTELECOM KR AS4766 0.59% 340,334 Korea Telecom KR AS4134 0.47% 267,995 CHINANET-BACKBONE CN AS31034 0.47% 267,478 ARUBA-ASN IT AS3786 0.39% 225,296 DACOM Corporation KR AS36692 0.38% 217,306 OPENDNS - OpenDNS US AS3215 0.33% 189,810 Orange FR AS812 0.30% 169,699 ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CA
  • 22. ASNs of IPv6 Resolvers that do not followup when given a large UDP Response – Top 10 ASN Use Exp AS Name CC AS15169 40.60% 10,006,596 Google US AS5650 0.90% 221,493 Frontier Communications US AS36692 0.84% 206,143 OpenDNS US AS812 0.78% 193,073 Rogers Communications Canada CA AS20057 0.46% 114,440 AT&T Mobility LLC US AS3352 0.38% 92,925 TELEFONICA_DE_ESPANA ES AS852 0.35% 85,043 TELUS Communications Inc. CA AS55644 0.32% 80,032 Idea Cellular Limited IN AS3320 0.25% 61,938 DTAG Internet service provider operations DE AS4761 0.24% 60,019 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider ID
  • 23. ASNs of IPv4 Resolvers that do not followup in TCP when given a truncated UDP Response – Top 10 ASN Use Exp AS Name CC AS9299 0.55% 252,653 Philippine Long Distance Telephone PH AS24560 0.34% 155,908 Bharti Airtel IN AS3352 0.29% 132,924 TELEFONICA_DE_ESPANA ES AS9498 0.19% 84,754 BHARTI Airtel IN AS9121 0.14% 61,879 TTNET TR AS23944 0.13% 58,102 SKYBroadband PH AS9644 0.11% 51,750 SK Telecom KR AS24499 0.11% 51,108 Telenor Pakistan PK AS3215 0.10% 43,614 Orange FR AS23700 0.09% 39,697 Fastnet ID
  • 24. ASNs of IPv6 Resolvers that do not followup in TCP when given a truncated UDP Response – Top 10 ASN Use Exp AS Name CC AS15169 4.15% 961,287 Google US AS21928 1.72% 399,129 T-Mobile USA US AS7922 1.57% 364,596 Comcast Cable US AS3352 0.54% 126,146 TELEFONICA_DE_ESPANA ES AS22773 0.38% 87,723 Cox Communications Inc. US AS55644 0.35% 80,844 Idea Cellular Limited IN AS20115 0.31% 71,831 Charter Communications US AS20057 0.30% 70,518 AT&T Mobility US AS6713 0.20% 46,196 IAM-AS MA AS8151 0.20% 45,754 Uninet S.A. de C.V. MX
  • 25. What’s the impact? • Failure in the DNS is often masked by having multiple resolvers in the clients local configuration • And the distribution of users to visible recursive resolvers is heavily skewed (10,000 resolvers by IP address handle the DNSqueries of more than 90% of end users) • So to assess the impact lets look at the results by counting user level success / failure to resolve these glueless names
  • 26. Looking at Users • Rather than looking at individual resolvers being able to pose Question 3, lets count: • A “success” if any resolver can query Question 3 on behalf of the user • A “failure” is recorded when no resolver generates a query to Question 3
  • 27. Looking at Users - Failure Rates IPv4 UDP Frag: 12.5% TCP: 4.0% ATR 3.9% IPv6 UDP Frag: 20.8% TCP: 8.4% ATR 6.5% These loss rates are expressed as an estimated percentage of users,
  • 28. ATR and Resolver Behaviour – IPv4 Can’t Receive Fragmented UDP Can’t Use TCP ATR will help ATR won’t be of use, but it shouldn’t matter ATR won’t help 12.5% 4.0% 8.6% 3.9% 0.1%
  • 29. ATR and Resolver Behaviour – IPv4 IPv6 Can’t Receive Fragmented UDP Can’t Use TCP ATR will help ATR won’t be of use, but it shouldn’t matter ATR won’t help 12.5% 4.0% 20.8% 14.3% 6.5% 1.9% 8.4% 8.6% 3.9% 0.1%
  • 30. Net Change in User Failure Rates IPv4 Fragged UDP Loss: 12.5% ATR Loss Rate: 3.9% IPv6 Fragged UDP Loss: 20.5% ATR Loss Rate: 6.5%
  • 31. ATR Assessment • Is this level of benefit worth the additional server and traffic load when sending large responses? • Is this load smaller than resolver hunting in response to packet drop? • It the faster fallback to TCP for large responses a significant benefit? • Is 10ms ATR delay too short? Would a longer gap reduce response reordering? Do we care? • Do we have any better ideas about how to cope with large responses in the DNS?