Mender.io | Securing the Connected Car
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The document discusses the security challenges and opportunities associated with the software-defined car, emphasizing the importance of over-the-air (OTA) updates for addressing vulnerabilities. It highlights examples of security breaches, such as the Fiat Chrysler hack, to illustrate the risks and potential cost savings from effective patching strategies. The document advocates for the use of open-source software to reduce costs and accelerate time-to-market while ensuring adherence to security protocols.
![The best way to respond to hacking?
Fiat Chrysler said exploiting the flaw "required
unique and extensive technical knowledge,
prolonged physical access to a subject vehicle and
extended periods of time to write code" and added
manipulating its software "constitutes criminal
action".
Sources: BBC News, Wired
Straubel [Tesla CTO] credits KeenLabs’
researchers [...] says Tesla will pay
KeenLabs’ team a monetary reward for its
work [...] “They did good work,” Straubel says.
“They helped us find something that’s a
problem we needed to fix. And that’s what we
did.”](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/mender-171213194754/85/Mender-io-Securing-the-Connected-Car-23-320.jpg)
Mender.io | Securing the Connected Car
- 1. Eystein Stenberg CTO Mender.io Securing the Connected Car
- 2. The software defined car 1990 2000 2010 2020 Hardware enabled Software enabled Software defined Telematics Infotainment Connected Assisted driving AutonomousElectronics
- 3. About me ● Eystein Stenberg ○ 7 years in systems security management ○ M. Sc., Computer Science, Cryptography ○ eystein@mender.io ● Mender.io ○ Over-the-air updater for Linux, Yocto Project ○ Open source (Apache License, v2) ○ Dual A/B rootfs layout (client) ○ Remote deployment management (server) ○ Under active development
- 4. Session overview ● Opportunities with the software defined car ● Anatomy of an attack: security risks of the connected car ● The patching problem & solution designs
- 5. Software defined car: New revenue streams ● “Automakers could add up to $27.1B annually from services such as car sharing and more” - Navigant Research ● Tesla ○ An OTA update system allows for easy additional software purchases after buyers drive their cars off the lot ○ Semi-autonomous Autopilot feature allows current Model S owners to add the feature for $2,500 USD when they order the vehicle or they can pay $3,000 USD to upgrade later
- 6. Cost savings by using open source platforms IVI stack Hardware Board support pkg. Operating system Middleware Apps HMI Cost 10% 30% 60% Differentiation Focus on open source here ● Lower layers are expensive and provides no differentiation ● Use open source here to ○ Shorten time-to-market ○ Lower cost ○ Reallocate development to differentiating features OTA updater
- 7. The software defined car requires OTA updates ● Increased software complexity requires more frequent improvements ● “33% of current recalls are for problems that could be fixed OTA” - ABI Research ● “OTA updates will save carmakers $35B in 2022” - IHS Automotive ● Fiat Chrysler hack (next up) required a recall of 1.4 million vehicles that could have been avoided with an OTA update
- 8. Jeep Cherokee hacked in July 2015 ● Presented at Black Hat USA 2015 ○ Charlie Miller ○ Chris Valasek ● Remote exploit giving full control of the car ● Clearly demonstrates physical safety risk ● No way to fix remotely ● 1.4 million cars recalled ● August 2016: Extended to unauthorized ECU update via CAN
- 9. Jeep Cherokee Head Unit with Wifi Wifi hotspot offered as a service ● Cherokee customers can buy wifi subscription as an add-on (~$40/month) ● Connect devices in the car to the car’s wifi to get online (phones, tablets, …) ● Wifi is password protected “Head unit”, “IVI”
- 10. Wifi-based breach: Short-range ● Wifi password based on system time after provisioning ● January 01 2013 00:00 GMT +- 1 minute ● Multimedia system breached due to software vulnerability ● Scope: Control music player/radio/volume and track GPS coordinates when within wifi range Guessable password Software vulnerability
- 11. Cellular-based breach: Country-wide ● Scope: Control music player/radio/volume and track GPS coordinates countrywide ● Can also select a specific Jeep based on its GPS-coordinates Breach Sprint Cellular network Software vulnerability
- 12. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus ● The CAN bus connects ~70 electronic control units (ECUs), including engine control, transmission, airbags, braking ● V850 chip is designed to only read from the CAN bus, to isolate components V850 chip Read-only Diagnostics
- 13. CAN bus ● The head unit can update the firmware of the V850 ● Firmware update authenticity not checked properly V850 chip Full control Malicious firmware update
- 14. Putting it together Lessons ● Wifi hotspot password was predictable ● Remotely accessible service (in head unit) was vulnerable (and not updated) ● Firmware update (for V850) did not have proper authenticity checks ● The only way to fix the vulnerabilities is through a manual update (by customer or dealership) FW update Cellular breach Vulnerability
- 15. More complexity leads to larger attack surface ● 1-25 bugs per 1000 lines of code* ○ Assume that all software components have vulnerabilities ● Rely on well-maintained software and keep it updated ○ Open source vs. proprietary is a red herring ○ Do not build all the software in-house ● Principle of least privilege ● Separation of privilege ● Kerckhoff’s principle *Source: Steve McConnell, Code Complete
- 16. Security patching is done too late 60 days: >90% probability it is exploited 110 days: remediation time avg. 5-10 days: <10% probability it is exploited Source: How the Rise in Non-Targeted Attacks Has Widened the Remediation Gap, Kenna Security
- 17. Why security patching happens too late ● The value is invisible until too late ● Too costly or risky ○ Manual? Too expensive to integrate updater? ○ Requires downtime of production? Risk of breaking production? ● Politics ● How often do you patch? ○ Do you have a way to do it? A process? ○ Often not a core competence and not a priority to develop updater
- 18. Patching connected devices is harder ● No/expensive physical access ○ Need failure management ● Unreliable power ○ What if power disappears in the middle of patching? ● Unreliable (wireless) network connectivity ○ Handle partial downloads ○ Ideally resume downloads in expensive networks like 3G ● Public and insecure (wireless) networks ○ Can someone inject arbitrary code during the update process? ○ Verify authenticity of update
- 19. Generic embedded updater workflow Detect update (secure channel) Download (secure channel) Integrity (e.g. checksum) Authenticate (e.g. signature) DecryptExtract Install Failure recovery (e.g. roll back) Compatibility check Sanity checks Post-install actions Pre-install actions Must-have Environment-specific Choose a strategy
- 20. Choice of update type has tradeoffs Full image Package (opkg, …) tar.gz Docker/Containers Download size Large* Small Small Medium Installation time Long* Short Short Short Rollback Yes (dual partition) Hard Hard Yes Consistency Yes Medium Hard Yes Design impact Bootloader, Partition layout Package manager tar, ... Kernel, docker * Can mitigate with compression or binary diffs
- 21. ● Integrity checking ○ This must be done ○ Easy to implement ● Rollback support ○ This should be a requirement: power loss, installation error, etc. ○ Could be hard depending on update type (tarball, package) ● Phased rollout ○ I.e. don’t deploy update to all devices in one go ○ Most do this to some extent: test & production environments ○ Can be more granular on device population (1%, 10%, 25%, 50%, …) What can go wrong? Strategies to reduce the risk of bricking
- 22. Prepare for securing the software defined car ● Open source software where no differentiation ● Well-maintained software ● Over-the-air updates ● Apply well-known security design principles
- 23. The best way to respond to hacking? Fiat Chrysler said exploiting the flaw "required unique and extensive technical knowledge, prolonged physical access to a subject vehicle and extended periods of time to write code" and added manipulating its software "constitutes criminal action". Sources: BBC News, Wired Straubel [Tesla CTO] credits KeenLabs’ researchers [...] says Tesla will pay KeenLabs’ team a monetary reward for its work [...] “They did good work,” Straubel says. “They helped us find something that’s a problem we needed to fix. And that’s what we did.”