Michael Quinlan: Learning from Failure: Pattern Causes of Fatal Incidents in Mines
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This document summarizes a presentation about identifying pattern causes of fatal mining incidents. It reviewed 24 fatal incidents across 5 countries from 1990-2011. Ten common causal pathways were identified, including failures to maintain safety systems, adequately plan work, assess risks, respond to safety issues raised, and prioritize safety over production. Examining past failures can help improve regulations, inspection practices, and prevent future incidents. Strengthening management systems, risk assessment, auditing, inspection, and worker input are emphasized.
Michael Quinlan: Learning from Failure: Pattern Causes of Fatal Incidents in Mines
- 1. Learning from Failure: Pattern Causes of Fatal Incidents in Mines Mechanical Engineering Safety Seminar 3 August 2016 Michael Quinlan School of Management, UNSW and Business School Middlesex University London
- 2. The presentation content is as follows Background and methods Ten pattern causes in mining Queensland ISHR/SSHR study Observations and some conclusions
- 3. Presentation draws on review of official investigations into 24 fatal incidents and disasters in mine in 5 countries (Australia, New Zealand, USA, UK and Canada) 1990 and 2011. Are the repeat or pattern causes underpinning these events? Five countries with similar regulatory regimes and governance facilitate generalisation as did the number of incidents examined. 15 involved 3 or more deaths while 9 single fatalities (includes 4 fatal mine incidents in Tasmania). Do the causes vary between multiple and single fatality incidents? Most multiple fatality incidents occurred in coal mines (86%) and each incident also killed more on average (11 per incident compared to 6 in metalliferous mines) Also examined multiple fatality incidents in other high hazard work places (shipping, aviation, oil rigs, chemical factories etc) globally to see if same pattern causes found outside mining.
- 4. Failure can be as instructive as success examining series of incidents identifies recurring causes, why systems fail & how to remedy Strategic decision making needs to draw on past while recognising risk of misinterpretation & change Focus on mining but same approach could be used regarding other industries and types of incidents Identified 10 causal pathways to fatal incidents (at least 3 present in virtually all while majority had 5 or more – some had all 10) More thorough the investigation the more pattern causes identified
- 5. DATE LOCATION INCIDENT TYPE FATALITIES 20 SEPTEMBER 1975 KIANGA MINE, QLD EXPLOSION 13 16 JULY 1986 MOURA NO.4, QLD EXPLOSION 12 8 JULY 1994 MOURA NO.2, QLD EXPLOSION 11 14 NOVEMBER 1996 GRETLEY COL.,NSW INRUSH 4 30 OCTOBER 2000 CORNWALL COL.TAS ROCKFALL 1 6 JUNE 2001 RENISON MINE, TAS ROCKFALL 2
- 6. DATE LOCATION INCIDENT TYPE FATALITIES 5 MAY 2003 RENISON MINE, TAS ROCKFALL 1 19 MAY 2004 BHP NEWMAN WA HIT BY MACHINERY 1 25 APRIL 2006 BEACONSFIELD, TAS ROCK FALL 1 (2 TRAPPED) 19 MAY 1992 WESTRAY, CANADA EXPLOSION 26 19 NOVEMBER 2010 PIKE RIVER, NZ EXPLOSION 27 25 SEPTEMBER 2011 GLEISION COL, UK INRUSH 4
- 7. DATE LOCATION INCIDENT TYPE FATALITIES 7 DECEMBER 1992 NO.3 MINE,VI USA EXPLOSION 8 23 SEPTEMBER 2001 NO.5 JWR AL USA EXPLOSION 13 2 JANUARY 2006 SAGO MINE WV USA EXPLOSION 12 20 MAY 2006 DARBY NO.5 KY USA EXPLOSION 5 6 AUGUST 2007 CRANDALL UTAH US FALL OF RIB/FACE 6 5 APRIL 2010 UBB MINE WV USA EXPLOSION 29
- 8. How and some incidents where contributed Failure to provide/maintain plant etc (eg Westray-ventilation/monitoring/roof bolting) Inadequately planned mining methods & failure to revise (Westray, Crandall Canyon) Flawed/misused maps of workings(Gretley) Seal design/flaws (Sago & Moura No.2) Hydro mining and main ventilator UG (Pike River) Note: these are only examples and not exhaustive
- 9. How and some incidents where contributed Failure to respond to trends in atmospheric pressure & methane levels (Westray, Pike River) Failure to respond to or analyse rockfalls (Cornwall, Renison & Beaconsfield) Failure to respond to prior outbursts (Crandall Canyon) Failure to adequately respond to evidence of heating (Moura No.2 -note too two prior disasters) Evidence of abnormal water prior to inrush (Gretley)
- 10. How and some incidents where contributed Failure to assess risk of inrush (Gretley) Failure to properly assess risks prior to authorising entry (Jim Walter Resources/JWR) Failure to do risk assessment following coal outbursts (Crandall Canyon) Failure to undertake comprehensive risk assessment after major rockfall (Beaconsfield/BG) Failure to risk assess hydro mining or UG main ventilator (Pike River)
- 11. How and some incidents where contributed Poor system structures/communication & over- focus on behaviour/minor safety issues (JWR, BG) Inadequate training/procedures (Sago & Darby No.1) Failure to maintain safety critical systems –rock dusting, ventilation, equipment – UBB & Pike R) Poor management of contractors/work re- organisation (Renison, BHPB) Poor hazard/risk management systems & worker feedback mechanisms(BHPB)
- 12. How and some incidents where contributed Failure to audit critical safety processes (eg Moura No.2 management of spontaneous combustion) Failure to adopt audit findings (BG) No proper OHS audit (Pike River)
- 13. How and some incidents where contributed Production pressure/cost cutting compromising safe work practices (Westray, UBB, Pike River) or use of consultants/in-house technical expertise (Renison) Poor financial state of mine putting miners ‘under the pump’ (Westray, Renison) Incentive pay systems encouraging unsafe practices (Westray & Pike River)
- 14. How and some incidents where contributed Insufficient/inadequately trained or supervised inspectors (3 Tas incidents, Sago, Pike River) Poor inspection procedures (Crandall, Darby No.1, JWR) including prior notice (UBB) Inadequate/poorly targeted enforcement (Westray, Gretley, Sago, UBB, Pike River) Flaws in Legislation - standards, reporting requirements, sanctions, worker rights (3 Tas, Pike River, UBB & other US disasters)
- 15. How and some incidents where contributed Evidence of significant level of serious concerns (Cornwall, BG, UBB) worker/supervisors raised concerns but were ignored (Cornwall, BG) Note: this matter seldom seems to be explored in the course of most investigations (BG & UBB exceptional in that interviewed large numbers of miners and even family members)
- 16. How and some incidents where contributed Prolonged/bitter struggle over unionisation (Westray, BG) or non-union mine (UBB) Inadequate input mechanisms (Ctees & HSRs) & poor response to workers raising safety issues (BG, BHPB) Poor management communication processes (Moura No.2) Poor management response to worker, supervisor and union concerns (Pike River)
- 17. How and some incidents where contributed Flaws in emergency procedures, maps or training (Darby No.1, Sago) Poor safety management makes rescue more dangerous (Crandall, BG) Poor inspectorate/Mine Rescue Brigade rescue procedures or resources (Moura No.2, Sago, Crandall) No second egress (Pike River)
- 18. Examined 1165 MI, ISHR & SSHR inspection reports for 19 mines (7 ug & 12 o/c) 1984-2013 (75% since 2000) MI 605 (52%); ISHR 473 (41%); SSHR 50 (4%) Electronic recording and exchange of all inspections, reports etc by MI, SSHR, ISHR very important Also interviewed ISHRs & SSHRs at 13 of mines, and senior mines inspector Both MI & ISHR/SSHR inspections focused on serious hazards (ie fatality risks) >90% of ISHR/SSHR reports dealt with at least one fatality risk (many more than one) Also strong emphasis on HPIs and incident investigation
- 19. 90 100 80 70 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 % At least one Inrush / Fire / explosion Outburst Rockfall Entrapment Machinery Electrocution Falls fatal risk inundation ISHR MI SSHR
- 20. No evidence ISHR/SSHR reports dealt with anything but safety & sparing use of suspension powers (24 SSHR reports & 3 SSHR – all but 1 related to fatal risks/exception was bullying case) 54% of ISHR reports examined documents as well as physical (MI 50% and SSHR around 20%) Evidence of system corrosion at some mines & suspensions to prevent serious incidents – in some cases management suspended operations, other cases MI,ISHR,SSHR Overall good relationship between MI & SSHR & ISHR/strong complementary roles (little disagreement re suspension) Some issues re SSHR presence & management turnover
- 21. Pattern flaws provide reference point for ◦ Assessing regulation/identifying gaps ◦ Informing inspection practices & incident investigation (eg Pike River, Gleision colliery) ◦ Evaluating regulatory regimes Guidance on & auditing of systems and risk assessment Prescription re well known hazards (systems/risk management & prescription balance) Vigorous reporting of any safety critical deviations Strengthening auditing requirements Strengthening regulatory oversight Providing/facilitating meaningful worker input
- 22. These pattern causes help to explain fatal incidents in high hazard workplaces & focusing on them would minimise fatalities Safety ‘culture’ was not a pattern cause rather symptom of failure in OHS management regime and priorities Systems as hierarchies of control that corrode over time & better suited to routine risk? Pattern causes apply to both single fatalities and multiple fatalities (both low frequency/high impact events) Changes to work organisation like subcontracting can weaken Clear lessons in terms regulation but battle to implement these in wealthy democratic countries & largely ignored in newly industrialising countries
- 23. Mining has over 200 years experience to learn from and help other high hazard industries. Must ask why lessons from past failures lost/forgotten or not kept? Qld and NSW learned important lessons from 1990s disasters & since regulatory reforms no disasters notwithstanding industry expansion & adjudged world’s best practice regulation by Pike River RC Reforms recognised number of pattern causes including the need for comprehensive and rigorously audited management of all major hazards, clear requirements re known hazards/controls, well- resourced proactive inspectorate, and strong worker input. Important package as is mutually reinforcing with multiple feedback loops (internal company, inspectors, safety reps/union) to identify failures/ensure constructive dialogue (potential for different views is critical
- 24. Need to remain vigilant about sustaining these key elements and the ever-present risk of corrosion of even robust regimes Actually entering dangerous period ◦ Downturn/job insecurity and industry/corporate restructuring ◦ Length of time since last disaster ◦ Complacency/over-confidence that paperwork systems reflect actual practices ◦ Increased use of subcontractors requires ongoing oversight ◦ Must ensure key roles and ‘eyes’ get trained and encouraged to speak out/identify problems ◦ Queensland study found disturbing incidents where down to very last line of defence but for late intervention Need reactivated attention from all or history will repeat – degree of unease essential
- 25. M. Quinlan (2014), Ten Pathways to Death and Disaster: Learning from fatal incidents in mines and other high hazard workplaces, Federation Press, Sydney. Hopkins, A. & Maslen, S. (2015) Risky rewards: how company bonuses affect safety, Ashgate, Farnham, Surrey. Walters, D. Wadsworth, E. Johnstone, R. & Quinlan, M. (2014) A study of the role of workers’ representatives in health and safety arrangements in coal mines in Queensland, Report prepared with support of the CFMEU,