Monitor: Emerging Markets

Emerging Markets,
Emerging Models
MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL POVERTY
Ashish Karamchandani Michael Kubzansky Paul Frandano
March 2009

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Michael Kubzansky
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Emerging Markets,
Emerging Models
MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL POVERTY

Ashish Karamchandani Michael Kubzansky Paul Frandano
with the assistance of Victoria Barbary, Anamitra Deb, Davis Dyer,
Nishant Lalwani, Varad Pande, and Suchitra Shenoy

Executive Summary ............................................................. 2
Introduction .......................................................................... 8
New Approaches to Low-Income Markets.......................... 16
Business Models That Work .............................................. 34
PAY-PER-USE .................................................................................................. 40
NO FRILLS SERVICE ..........................................................................................47
PARASKILLING ................................................................................................. 55
SHARED CHANNELS .........................................................................................64
CONTRACT PRODUCTION.................................................................................. 77
DEEP PROCUREMENT...................................................................................... 86
DEMAND-LED TRAINING ...................................................................................95

What the Models Teach .................................................... 102
Recommendations and Concluding Thoughts ................... 120
APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF THE INDIA STUDY .............................................. 131

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................ 135

NOTES .................................................................................................... 136

EMERGING MARKETS, EMERGING MODELS 3
Executive Summary

THIS REPORT INVESTIGATES “MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS”
as a means to help those residing at the base of the global income pyramid. An
alternative and complement to traditional government expenditures, aid, and phi-
lanthropy, market-based solutions give low-income people better access to socially
beneficial products and services that genuinely and directly improve the quality of
their lives and livelihoods. In India, for example, such solutions provide or enable:

• Clean drinking water at one-fourth the cost of the least expensive
alternative.

• As much as a 125 percent increase in incomes for small farmers.

• Private education in urban slums that significantly outperforms
the best government schools for about $3 per month.

• Safe, doctor-attended births for a total cost of $40—less than
one-fourth the cost in traditional private hospitals.

Market-based solutions have recently attracted strong interest in the campaign
against global poverty, in part due to the remarkable success of microfinance.
They are relatively new, with an uneven performance record, and there is much yet
to learn about what causes them to succeed or fail. The most successful pass
two tests: they are self-funding, and they operate at sufficient scale to make a
difference to masses of poor people. They also have one salient feature in common:
a business model tailored to the special circumstances of markets at the base of the
income pyramid.

READING BY SOLAR LANTERN
The poor participate daily in markets, whether for livelihoods, food,
social services, or basic products like lamps and stoves. But these
markets are often informal and provide low quality goods and services
at a penalty. Market-based solutions are delivering better outcomes.

© MONITOR COMPANY GROUP L.P 2009
, .

4 EMERGING MARKETS, EMERGING MODELS
Executive Summary

Emerging Markets, Emerging Models is addressed to those organizations and individuals
most concerned with making a real and enduring improvement to the lives of the poor.
We hope entrepreneurs will find much of use on business models that work in
low-income markets and how they work. We hope
“Soft” funding plays an donors and investors will be encouraged to fund
important role in low-end those ventures that have the characteristics and po-
markets and helped many tential to help improve lives and livelihoods at the
of the successful enterprises base of the pyramid. And we hope governments and
examined in this report to aid organizations will recognize the promise of mar-
reach scale — even some ket-based solutions and act to encourage them.
of those started by large
corporations. The report is based on Monitor’s extensive research
into hundreds of market-based solutions around
the world, with a particular focus on India, which is an advanced laboratory of
approaches and an especially fertile source of lessons about performance. The
research is based on dozens of site visits and hundreds of interviews as well as
extensive work in the public record.

Monitor’s findings about the sources of success and failure of market-based solutions
yield important lessons and conclusions:

• While the role of markets in the current global economic crisis
is being reevaluated, market-based solutions in emerging markets
have generated remarkable benefits to low-income people and of-
fer enormous promise to do even more in the future.

• That promise depends on adopting the right business models,
which must be tailored to the particular economic and social
conditions of the poor. Business models that function well when
dealing with affluent and middle-income customers are unlikely to
work as well for low-income markets.

, .

Executive Summary

• As happened in microfinance, new entrants and small enterprises
are more likely than large corporations to lead the development
of market-based solutions in low-end markets. Large companies
have other sizable, appealing opportunities in emerging markets
that are not as challenging to serve. Exceptions will be large en-
terprises that engage poor people as suppliers, as these enterprises
are best-positioned to organize extensive supply chains.

• Noncommercial or “soft” funding plays an important role in
low-end markets and helped many of the successful enterpris-
es examined in this report to reach scale — even some of those
started by large corporations. In some cases soft funding may be
the only way through which specialist business models can be de-
veloped, adapted, and tested.

• Meaningful scale is achieved in different ways but invariably takes
time, especially if large corporations are not involved. Most small
enterprises require at least a decade to reach significant scale. Mar-
ket-based solutions, therefore, are not a quick fix to the causes
and consequences of poverty, though they promise large, endur-
ing benefits.

• The most common mistake among unsuccessful market-based
solutions is to confuse what low-income customers or suppliers
ostensibly need with what they actually want. Many enterprises have
pushed offerings into the market only to see them fail. People
living at the base of the economic pyramid should be seen as
customers and not beneficiaries; they will spend money, or switch
livelihoods, or invest valuable time, only if they calculate the trans-
action will be worth their while.

Emerging Markets, Emerging Models identifies seven business models, tailored to the cir-
cumstances of low-income groups, that we believe have the best chances of success.

, .

Executive Summary

Four business models focus on serving the poor as customers:

• A Pay-Per-Use approach in which consumers pay lower costs for
each use of a group-owned facility, product, or service. This
limits the impact on their cash flow while the sheer numbers of
consumers makes the proposition sufficiently attractive for third-
party providers.

• A pared-down, No Frills service that meets the basic needs of the
poor at ultra-low prices and still generates positive cash flow and
profits through high volume, high asset utilization, and service
specialization.

• Paraskilling, which combines No Frills services with a reengineer-
ing of complex services and processes into a set of disaggregated
simple standardized tasks that can be undertaken by workers with-
out specialized qualification.

• Distribution networks that reach into remote markets via Shared
Channels, piggybacking products and services through existing
customer supply chains, thus enabling poor people to afford and
gain access to socially beneficial goods such as solar lanterns or
efficient kerosene burners.

The remaining three business models devise ways of engaging low-income suppliers
or producers:

• A system of Contract Production that directly involves small-scale
farmers or producers in rural supply chains. The contractor or-
ganizes the supply chain from the top, provides critical inputs,
specifications, training, and credit to its suppliers, and the supplier
provides assured quantities of specialty produce at fair and guar-
anteed prices.

, .

Executive Summary

• A variety of Deep Procurement setups that bypass traditional middle-
men and reach into the base of the economic pyramid, enabling
direct purchases from large networks of low-income producers
and farmers in rural markets and often providing training for
quality and other specifications.

• Demand-Led Training that applies a formal-sector “temp agency”
model to down-market opportunities, with enterprises paying a
third-party to identify, train, and place employees for job openings
at the edges of the formal and informal sectors.

Emerging Markets, Emerging Models offers a range of recommendations for hasten-
ing the growth and success of market-based solutions. Although many of these
models require time to reach scale, funders, investors, policy makers, and — most
importantly — entrepreneurs can act now to smooth the path. They can help enter-
prises overcome common barriers to scale and commercial viability, such as startup
costs, distribution challenges, availability of capital and credit, and the need to orga-
nize solutions at a systems level. Accelerating progress may entail interventions for
smaller enterprises ranging from providing flexible, patient capital, to offering techni-
cal assistance, to addressing regulatory constraints. To encourage larger enterprises
to participate, interested parties can fund new approaches to aggregating suppliers
and customers and provide incentives for existing companies to share networks and
channels. Finally, some steps will help spread the general approach, by cultivating the
complementary field of impact investing, providing rigorous social impact metrics,
developing shared assets that address barriers to scale, or simply asking tougher ques-
tions about what works — and what doesn’t.

The report provides strong evidence that engaging the poor as customers and
suppliers presents an exciting — and significant — opportunity to establish new
paradigms to bring genuine social change in economically sustainable ways.

, .

Introduction

SEVERAL YEARS AGO, Servals, a small company in Chennai, India, intro-
duced a new product it believed would greatly benefit low-income consumers. Most
such consumers cooked on kerosene burners and Servals’ Venus burner used 30
percent less kerosene than conventional models. It also was smaller, safer, required
less cleaning, and lasted more than twice as long in service. In short, it seemed like
a clear winner, delivering significant savings of money and time.

Servals is a for-profit commercial enterprise that serves extremely price-sensitive
customers. It is also a mission-driven company determined to deliver real value
to its clientele. Taking into account the costs of developing the Venus burner as
well as its benefits, it introduced the product for a price about double that of con-
ventional burners, reasoning that it would pay for itself after about two months
because of its superior fuel efficiency.

But sales of the Venus burner fell below expectations in the early stages. The big-
gest problem was distribution, compounded by a comparatively steep price. Servals
couldn’t convince retailers to invest in educating customers about the benefits of
the Venus. As a result, a potentially great product that could have made life better
for many seemed likely to fail because of a flawed business model.

Fortunately, this story has a happy ending. In 2006, Servals reengineered the product,
lowered the price, and, most importantly, improved dealer margins and incentives.
Sales of the Venus burner took off — crossing one million units in 2008 — and it’s

A SELF-HELP GROUP IN ANDHRA PRADESH
Village women meet regularly to manage credit and savings for
purchases of dairy cows and other income-generating assets.

, .

Introduction

WHAT’S IN A NAME?

Readers will note this report contains But our intent isn’t to satisfy a standard
hundreds of references to low-income of political correctness. This report is
persons or groups as “the poor,” “poor keenly concerned to take low-income
people,” “low-income segments,” low- groups seriously as customers or produc-
end markets,” the “base of the pyramid,” ers, suppliers, and workers rather than as
and many other loosely synonymous beneﬁciaries of someone else’s largesse
variations. We recognize each of these or assistance. Our hope throughout is to
terms may displease or dismay someone, move away from typecasts toward a more
somewhere, just as we recognize each nuanced consideration, based on data and
term is thoroughly accepted: low-income actual conversations with potential custom-
people self-identify as “poor,” economics ers and suppliers in low-end markets, of the
professors expound on “low-income seg- lives and livelihoods of poor people and
ments,” economic and social NGOs refer the ways in which these might be improved
to “impoverished peoples,” and so on. through market-based solutions.

now one of the most successful new products of its type in India. And it is materi-
ally improving lives of the rising numbers of low-income people who buy it.

What almost happened to the Venus burner is an all-too-common problem for
companies that develop and market products and services for low-income markets.
Servals thought a superior product would sell itself, thus ignoring business funda-
mentals, in this case failing to think through its distribution model and pricing. A
great product idea married to a noble mission, however, is rarely enough to make
meaningful progress in the face of massive social challenges like improving the lives
and livelihoods of billions worldwide living in impoverished conditions. Success

, .

Introduction

requires business models that work in the particular circumstances of the bottom
of the economic pyramid,1 where consumers and channels to reach them are not
only extremely price-sensitive, but also cut off from news and facts that might help.

In this context, business models that work are those that, when serving the poor as
customers, are responsive to the limitations imposed by small, irregular customer
cash flows and credibly address distribution questions. When engaging low-income
segments as suppliers or producers, a successful business model will attend to the
costs a low-income supplier may face in switching livelihoods, and to the cost of
aggregating and managing large numbers of small suppliers. In this report, we’ve
sought business models that promise to be:

• Profitable or at least self-sustaining without requiring continuous
subsidy (otherwise, they’re merely alternative forms of aid and
dependent on the continuing generosity of donors).

• Scalable and thus able to reach and improve the lives of significant
numbers of poor people (otherwise, the effort is like to trying to
bail the Titanic with a tea cup).

Emerging Markets, Emerging Models is based on extensive re-
A great product idea
search into sustainable business models for helping the
married to a noble mission
poor through “market-based solutions” — our term for us-
is rarely enough to make
ing the formal market economy to help improve lives and meaningful progress in
livelihoods at the base of the economic pyramid. Monitor the face of massive social
surveyed more than 300 market-based initiatives, mostly in challenges like improving
India, an advanced laboratory for enterprises serving low- the lives and livelihoods of
end markets and for what succeeds and what fails in the billions worldwide living in
effort. The research involved scores of site visits and hun- impoverished conditions.
dreds of interviews as well as extensive work in the public
record. In addition, we scoured the globe for other examples
of business models that work at scale, or that promise to
scale, in low-end markets. (See About the Study.)

, .

Introduction

In that process we found many examples of market-based approaches that seemed
promising on the surface but upon further investigation proved not to be commer-
cially viable or scalable. Some that met these two criteria turned out not to engage
low-income segments at all. Given the level of ferment in India and other countries,
we found everything from attempts to bid up the prices farmers receive at auction,
to solar-powered weaving looms, to telemedicine and tele-prescription schemes,
and all manner of efforts in between. From this much larger list of initiatives and
models, we cut through the many that are interesting
We found many examples but lack promise to distill down to a few that have
of market-based approaches high potential.
that seemed promising on
the surface but upon further In all, we identiﬁed seven business models that are
investigation proved not to be self-sustaining and offer the promise to scale in
commercially viable or scalable.
ways that include the poor in markets and improve
the quality of their lives and livelihoods. Four of
these — Pay-Per-Use, No Frills, Paraskilling, and Shared Channels — present practicable
ways of engaging the poor as consumers. Three others — Contract Production, Deep
Procurement, and Demand-led Training — focus on engaging the poor as suppliers,
producers, and workers. To our main text we’ve added brief, boxed descriptions
of relevant initiatives — some successful, some not — from Africa, Southeast Asia,
Latin America, and elsewhere.

This is a vibrant ﬁeld, and other business models will emerge. Some will eventually
reach considerable scale and be self-sustaining. The seven we focus on, however,
promise those results now and can be adapted and emulated by enterprises seeking
to help the poor through market-oriented approaches.

, .

Introduction

This report is organized in four major sections that follow.

• The ﬁrst covers market-based solutions as a promising new
approach to alleviating global poverty.

• The second details the seven business models that work in serving
low-income customers or engaging the poor as suppliers, produc-
ers, and workers.

• The third derives general themes and lessons from the business
models.

• The fourth outlines implications, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions for constituencies most interested in addressing challenges
of global poverty and hastening the spread of market-based
solutions.

Emerging Markets, Emerging Models is addressed to those organizations and individuals
most concerned with making a real and enduring improvement to the lives of the
poor. We hope entrepreneurs will ﬁnd much of use on business models that work
in low-income markets and how they work. We hope donors and investors will be
encouraged to fund those ventures that have the characteristics and potential to help
improve lives and livelihoods at the base of the pyramid. And we hope governments
and aid organizations will recognize the promise of market-based solutions and act
to encourage them.

, .

Introduction

ABOUT THE STUDY
This report is based on a multi-year research proj- difficult than succeeding in small markets.
ect funded by eleven sponsors interested in new Consequently, two fundamental questions guided
approaches to economic development and social our research: 1)Why have so few market-based
change. We are grateful to ICICI Bank, IDFC solutions achieved scale? and 2) What are the
Private Equity, IFC, Omidyar Network, Orient business models — across sectors — that show
Global, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, promise of achieving scale?
PATH, the Rockefeller Foundation, Sir Dorabji
Tata Trust, Swiss Agency for Development and We set about to answer these questions in
Co-operation, and TPI for their support. three phases of work. We began by focus-
ing on India, a pacesetter among emerging
The original project involved a year-long analysis markets, with a high degree of social entre-
carried out by Monitor’s Inclusive Markets prac- preneurship, strong NGOs and entrepreneurs,
tice based in Mumbai, India (www.mim.monitor. general openness to new ways of addressing
com). The starting point was the belief that the development, and a huge addressable market.
“next microfinance” is out there, and that other
market-based approaches may help address We also chose to focus on market-based solu-
pressing issues of poverty and development in a tions that offer “socially beneficial” products and
commercially sustainable fashion. services for poor people as customers. Obvious
categories included education, health care, finan-
Initial investigations in India, the Philippines, cial services, water and sanitation, insurance, clean
South Africa, Brazil, Kenya, and other countries energy, and telecommunications. We also consid-
revealed no shortage of market-based approach- ered products that appear to have less immediate
es that claimed to be profitable or financially benefit but still improve quality of life, such as
self-sustaining. Many seemed exciting, innova- efficient cook stoves, which offer second-order
tive, and groundbreaking. On closer inspection, health and economic advantages — less soot, less
however, we observed that many were strug- time to clean, and less energy consumed.
gling financially and most served a few thousand
people, a drop in the ocean given the millions liv- We ruled out products that might arguably
ing in conditions of extreme poverty. Only a tiny convey second-order social benefits but only
fraction of market-based initiatives have reached tangentially so, or that in many cases had sticker
numbers of people commensurate with the scale prices that rendered them unaffordable to lower
of the problems they aim to address. income segments. We therefore excluded prod-
ucts such as soap, washing powder, shampoo,
We knew from Monitor’s commercial prac- batteries, televisions, motorbikes, and automo-
tice that succeeding at a large scale is far more biles. We arrived at this decision because we did

, .

Introduction

not wish to produce yet another study simply groups involving more than 600 customers and
about marketing to the poor. small producers), evaluation of substitutes, inter-
views with management, interviews and economic
In the first phase, we inventoried more than 160 modeling of competitors, and in-depth discussions
different market-based approaches run by large with participants in the supply chains and value
corporations, small startup enterprises, NGOs, chains from sales forces down through distribu-
and other entities such as cooperatives, govern- tion warehouses. These analyses covered initiatives
ment agencies, and non-bank financial companies. all over India, at different sizes, levels of maturity,
Based on this investigation we identified the most in urban and rural contexts.
promising business models for in-depth inves-
tigation, and over the course of the rest of the In the third phase, we carried out a combination
project we examined an additional 120 distinct of primary and secondary research to identify
examples. (See the Appendix for additional details and analyze comparable market-based solutions
on the study.) in other countries, where we started with over
30 additional examples for investigation from 19
The second phase involved in-depth field research countries. (See map.) These initiatives are both
into 36 initiatives to help validate and generate instructive in themselves and confirm that the
most of the data. These detailed reviews included business models apply independent of geo-
original customer research (both survey and focus graphical context.

Pakistan
Egypt

China
Honduras Laos
Mexico
India Philippines
Nicaragua Ghana
Costa Rica Bangladesh
Brazil Nigeria Malawi
Peru
Uganda Cambodia
South Africa
Kenya

, .

New Approaches to
Low-Income Markets

New Approaches to Low-Income Markets

NEARLY HALF OF THE WORLD lives on less than $2 a day. What most
readers make of this fact is difﬁcult to say, but for each of the 2.6 billion individu-
als living at or below that income level, it points to subsistence or, at best, bare
adequacy.2 And for just under a billion of these, those at the very base of the global
income pyramid, “living” means “only just” as part of the world’s food-insecure,
who literally do not know where their next meals will come from.3

This report is about “market-based solutions” as a means of helping low-income
people to better lives and livelihoods. These can be alternatives or supplements
to the traditional approaches of domestic and foreign assistance programs, phil-
anthropic foundations, and other non-governmental organizations. Although
traditional aid has provided, and continues to provide, relief to millions, global
poverty remains a massive social challenge.

We have no wish to denigrate traditional aid, but we also believe it possible to claim
market-based solutions have signiﬁcant advantages in addressing certain aspects of
global poverty. The full argument might occupy a monograph substantially longer
than the present report. We simply ask that the reader consider recent history in
thinking about what succeeds in actually helping poor people to better lives and
livelihoods, as opposed to providing them immediate but often temporary relief
from the symptoms of poverty. It is scarcely a coincidence that, from 1990 to
2004 — when global GDP grew annually by 2.8 percent — the global percentage of
developing-country inhabitants in absolute poverty declined from 29 percent to 18

GRINDING FLOUR
Among low-income families, food preparation is often laborious and
time-consuming. Today, market-based solutions offer better ways to
simplify traditional chores like cooking or securing clean water.

, .


percent.4 The market-driven economic growth of developing-country GDPs and
the coincident decline in global poverty is perhaps the greatest economic success
story of the modern era.

Below we offer evidence that substantiates the promise of market-based solutions.
For example, several business models help participating suppliers to realize positive
income effects of 10 to 30 percent per year — income that is not a result of redis-
tribution but real and sustainable wealth creation.

We view the promise of market-based solutions as twofold: they actually drive
sustained improvements in people’s lives and livelihoods, because individuals
are making their own choices and taking responsibility for their lives rather than
becoming dependent on aid providers; and this outcome is attained on a more
cost-efficient basis. The solutions promise to be self-sustaining, and the up-front
funding is thus true “capital” rather than an annual outlay for benefit programs.

In sum, we believe market-driven ventures can help those at the base of the global
income pyramid do still better for themselves — even when we recognize the po-
tential “fortune” at the pyramid’s base will certainly be less for purveyors of the
socially beneficial products and services that are the focus of this report. The busi-
ness models presented here offer the possibility of better outcomes for the poor
and financial and social returns for ventures willing to risk the effort.5 These busi-
ness models are grounded in the practical, empirically investigated realities of what
works in low-end markets and what does not.

, .


MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

This may seem an odd time to be touting nent OECD donor countries to sustain
markets as a way of helping the world’s recent levels of foreign assistance will
poor — what with non-stop news of glob- almost certainly decline. There will cer-
al recession, financial meltdown, a “new tainly be pressure to do more with less,
New Deal,” a dramatic reduction in global and do it better.
investment, and the most intense scrutiny
since the Great Depression of the very The private sector has the potential to
role of markets in all economic life. step in and help fill the resulting gap.
From the beginning, businesses in the
And yet. Crisis provides a natural open- large industrial economies have been a
ing for re-examining roads taken and significant part of the development and
envisioning new ways forward. The new poverty-reduction picture, both at home
skepticism of conventional assumptions and abroad. And companies in many
and wisdom on market economies might emerging markets have long engaged the
also be usefully directed at conventional poor on both the supply and demand
views of economic development — in- sides of their operations. As a result,
cluding the respective roles of the those at the base of the pyramid are not
government and private sectors in creat- new to markets; indeed, they’re already
ing growth that actually reduces poverty enmeshed in traditional, mostly informal,
overall, puts the poor on a path to im- overwhelmingly rural, markets and webs
proved livelihoods, and helps promote of trade — even if mostly to their great
sustainable development. disadvantage. Formal, market-driven ef-
forts to sell to and engage the poor might
Moreover, governments will be strapped thus be of great use in the current global
for revenues and sunk in huge deficits. economic environment.
The collective ability of the most promi-

, .


The Poor as Economic Actors

Sound market-based solutions can and should be able to sell goods and services to
the poor or engage them as suppliers on fair terms, with better-quality service and
treatment. Monitor research reaffirms the poor as rational participants in markets
and attentive to their own interests. And as in any market, one size simply will not
fit all. Still, for many in low-income segments, reliable market solutions offer value
and service superior to both private and public options at a cost customers and sup-
pliers will judge for themselves. We’ll never be able to rule out exploitation of poor
people, intended or otherwise, but this risk ought not, in our
People at the base of view, be grounds for discarding, untested, potentially beneficial
the economic pyramid ventures.
are customers with the
power to choose — not We therefore see people at the base of the pyramid as custom-
simply “beneficiaries.” ers with the power to choose — but whose market participation
usually incurs penalties in the form of overcharging, poor
quality, products and services hazardous to their health, and “take-it-or-leave-it”
marketing. We recognize current low-end markets are informal, inefficient, ex-
ploitative, and often dominated by monopolists, quacks, or crooks. And we are
convinced that any compelling effort to serve the poor or engage them as suppliers
and producers must build around discovering or developing new business models.

Thus in the course of our investigations, we’ve continually probed for answers to
three questions:

Who will serve the poor as customers?
Who will engage them as workers or producers?
And how will that service, or that engagement, occur?

, .


One answer to all three questions: market-based solutions based on business mod-
els designed to work at the base of the economic pyramid.

Business Models in Low-End Markets

“A business model performs two important functions,” writes an authority on the
subject, “it creates value, and it captures a portion of that value.”6 Yet the term
“business model” means different things to different people, and here we view
the matter as more nuanced than in many common definitions. Here, we consider
a business model as a particular set of business elements that serve customers or
engage suppliers, producers, or workers in low income segments. We also stipulate
that such models be commercially viable and show potential to achieve large scale.

The microfinance sector represents the best-known commercially-viable effort to
serve low-income groups and a prime example of a successful market-based or
demand-led solution. Modern microfinance began in the 1970s with experimental
programs in Indonesia, Brazil, and Bangladesh7 and took 30 years to develop a
sustainable formula of group credit and joint liability group lending.8 This business
model is actually a combination of at least five different elements:

• No frills products — a simple, single loan product executed at a
group meeting, creating an experience very unlike branch banking
with its buildings, ATMs, teller windows, and, of course, paperwork.

• Small-size products9 — loans much smaller than those available in
commercial banks, with smaller, more frequent installments.

• Group products — joint liability group (JLG) lending products
that can only be used by a group, not individuals.

• Pre-assured demand — JLGs form and guarantee demand in ad-
vance to the microfinance institution (MFI).

, .


• “Paraskilling” — many MFIs train and employ secondary-school
graduates as loan officers to implement simplified lending systems,
instead of college degree holders found in commercial banks.

Microfinance’s proven, robust model continues to expand, even as it has gener-
ated a lively, and at times heated, debate on the tensions between commercial and
social objectives.10

Where the Formal Economy Reaches…and Doesn’t.

The 2004 publication of C. K. Prahalad’s The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid
sparked interest among large corporations in serving low-income people as con-
sumers. Although some large corporations do participate in low-income markets,
especially in industries like telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and fast moving
consumer goods, they have not had to make major adjustments to their business
models to do so. In these industries, big companies tend to have relatively low mar-
ginal costs, with correspondingly high fixed costs. Often, they only need to tweak
their existing offerings down-market.

In telecommunications, for example, India has become one of the world’s fastest
growing markets, with deep penetration into low-income groups accounting for
much of the growth. Business model adaptations required for this added reach
were modest — use of prepaid formats, low-cost handsets, and agent distribution
networks built from scratch. The key, however, was that such innovation built atop
investments and structures long in place: billing platforms, network infrastructure,
and manufacturer relationships for millions of handsets in an industry already well
down the cost curve due to global economies of scale in production.

In sectors with higher marginal costs, larger corporations have tended to steer clear.
They can pick from a range of familiar growth opportunities that are easier to
pursue and don’t require a revamped business model. Hence we observe a palpable

, .


sluggishness of down-market movement in housing, healthcare, banking, and other
industries that offer high potential in low-end markets. Notable exceptions exist,
especially in sectors that directly engage the poor as suppliers and producers (see
below), but substantial obstacles to formal-sector market-oriented solutions remain
in place.

As a result, most low-income people participate primarily in the informal econ-
omy. It is the moneylenders, budget private schools, and mom-and-pop shops in
this sector that serve poor customers daily, and the “non-compliant” textile and
other small informal-sector manufacturers that engage the vast majority of poor
workers. Indeed, textiles, which are produced mostly in the
informal sector, are India’s largest source of manufacturing Some large corporations
jobs — over 35 million in 2006, with two million new jobs do participate in low-
expected to be created annually until 2012. 11 income markets,
especially in industries
The market participation of the poor often comes with like telecommunications,
the infamous “bottom-of-the-pyramid penalty” of higher pharmaceuticals, and fast
costs, lower quality, exploitative business relationships, and moving consumer goods.
usurious terms of credit for the poor.12 Part of the promise
of market-based solutions thus lies in the recognition that market exchanges are not
terra incognita for poor people and that ways of enhancing their informal-sector
interactions exist and can provide improved products and services, with better qual-
ity, and better lives and livelihoods, at lower cost.

Just How Big, Really, is the Opportunity?

There are indeed fortunes to be made in low-end markets, though the sheer size of
the market alone may be a deceptive signal of whether large companies will rush in.13
Examination of two sectors in India, education and water, illuminates the true mag-
nitude of the opportunity and the dynamics of who might be expected to pursue it.

, .


First, absolute market sizing: for the bottom 60 percent of the income distribution,
India’s education market is estimated to be about $5.2 billion, a sizable opportunity
by any measure.14 As points of market comparison, this is about the same size as
the global market for radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) chips in 2007,15 tablet
PCs in 2009,16 network security software and devices in 2007,17 or the anticipated
Chinese market for laser printers in 2010.18 The current health care market for the
same segment in India is about $18 billion.

Exploiting such opportunities, however, is another matter. While India’s low-end
education market is indeed large and attractive, it also is mostly informal and highly
fragmented. Moreover, India’s middle class education market has at least three seg-
ments — professional colleges, standard private schools, and tutoring — that are at
least as large and conventionally easier to develop — and thus presumably more
attractive to potential corporate entrants.19

Education in India: Market Size Comparison (US$B)

8
6.8 7.0

6
5.2 5.0

4

2

0
Bottom Unaided K-12 Private Middle Class
60% “Premium” Professional Tutoring
Private Colleges
Schools

Source: CLSA Asia Paciﬁc Markets:
“Indian Education Sector Outlook” 2008, IFC/WRI “The Next 4 Billion,” 2007

Apart from sheer size is the complexity of operations required to generate revenue in
business models engaging low-income segments, which may be substantially greater
than comparable alternative opportunities in middle class markets. For example,

, .


T.I.M.E. is a successful operator of coaching classes in India, with 175 centers that
help aspiring middle-class applicants with entrance exams to professional schools,
and annual revenue of $30 million. A market-based-solution business model aimed
at poor people would need to manage nearly 15 times the number of centers — al-
most 2,500 budget private schools in lower-income segments — to generate the
same annual revenue.

In India’s water sector, the estimated spending on water for the low income seg-
ments is about $389 million, according to an IFC and World Resources Institute
study. In contrast, the market for bottled water alone — leaving aside markets for
household filtration equipment, water delivery by truck, spending on municipal
utilities, or other middle class water expenditures — is about $400 million.20

In water, the problem of operating complexity is even further magnified. Bisleri,
India’s leading manufacturer and marketer of bottled water, currently operates 50
plants generating over $70 million of revenue.21 To gener-
ate the same revenues that Bisleri produces with 50 plants, The sheer size of the
a market-based enterprise catering to poor people would market alone may be
need to operate more than 17,500 village water plants. a deceptive signal of
whether large companies
In both education and water, the pure scope of activity can will rush in.
be daunting to any large company that may want to en-
ter. The requirement to take on or invent a drastically different business model
with significant operating complexity will, we believe, deter many large companies
from making the attempt. As the education sector suggests, for every perceived op-
portunity in low-end markets, there is often a more conventional, easier-to-exploit
opportunity somewhere else, often in the same sector.

These observations need not be cause for despair. Although market-sizing and
business model adaptation issues may dissuade most large companies from serv-
ing or engaging low-income people, many small or medium enterprises, NGOs,

, .


or purpose-built business models will perceive compelling opportunities to create
both large social returns and reasonable financial ones. Some opportunities, like
community water filtration plants, will likely reach scale as a cluster of enterprises
or operators, as did Indian MFIs, rather than as a single firm. With the right busi-
ness model, the opportunity is considerable, and the result will be better primary
education, or increased access to financial services, or stable livelihoods with strong
income effects.

Whom Can We Expect to Find in These Markets?

Monitor research suggests the majority of ventures entering low-end markets will be
small to medium-sized social enterprises or private firms, and especially those seek-
ing to serve low-income segments as customers. These entities have varying degrees
of capacity, access to capital, and ability to develop or implement a good base-of-
the-pyramid-oriented business model. As a result, they will generally take longer to
reach scale. And in pioneering a novel business model they will generate returns
that are significantly different — as in “smaller” — than those of an average mobile
phone operator or even perhaps an average established microfinance institution.

Although we expect most of the action in market-based solutions to be domi-
nated by small-to-medium enterprises, we nevertheless expect to see expanded
participation by a few large national and multinational companies, especially in high
fixed-cost industries like telecommunications. Where enterprises engage with the
poor as suppliers or producers, Monitor’s research suggests more large companies
are likely to pursue the opportunity. They will often be the preferred entity to orga-
nize solutions from at or near the top of the supply chain. This can be a compelling
proposition for larger entities, given the cost and supply chain advantages that can
be gained from working with groups of dispersed low-income producers.

, .


The Imperative to Scale

Scale is a central concern for market-based solutions intended to serve the poor be-
cause of the sheer magnitude of the problem in many countries. We recognize that
reaching scale is difficult for any enterprise, and even more difficult for one aiming
to serve or engage the poor and do so by providing socially beneficial products and
services and do it in a financially self-sustaining way.

Only a handful of enterprises in low-income markets are commercially viable and
operate at scale, even in a huge potential market like India, with its more than
700 million living at or below the poverty line.22 There and elsewhere, Monitor
investigated many celebrated enterprises, most of which
served at best a few thousand customers or employed a The majority of ventures
few hundred producers. Only a small handful — mostly entering low-end markets
well publicized ones like Grameen Bank and Aravind Eye will be small to medium-
Care — attained a scale sufficient to transform a “business sized social enterprises
model” into a “solution.” or private firms, and
especially those seeking
The challenge of market-based solutions is to imagine to serve low-income
business models that not only create products, services, segments as customers.
and socially beneficial results but will also reach large scale.
Such business models need to be uniquely tailored to the needs of low-income
groups and capable of replication and use by small enterprises, NGOs, and large
corporations alike — and even in some cases, by governments.

Monitor’s view of business-models-as-solutions centers on getting three elements
rightly aligned. First, enterprises must engage those living at the base of the income
pyramid with socially beneficial products and services.23 Second, enterprises must be
viable commercially, which for simplicity we define as a condition in which revenues
cover costs — or, in other words, self-funding or self-sustaining.24 Third, enterprises
must operate — or have demonstrated potential to operate — at large scale.

, .


WHAT IS “SCALE”?

When we say an enterprise operates at “scale” contrast, it is relatively easier to sell hundreds
or is “scalable,” we mean several things. First is of thousands or even millions of products,
simple economics. As scalable enterprises grow, durables, condoms, mobile phone minutes, or
average cost per unit declines and the marginal loans via established channels.
cost of adding another customer is routine,
fast, and simple. Second is simple arithmetic. Finally, it is important to note that scale hap-
The enormous magnitude of global poverty pens in different ways. Some enterprises,
requires solutions that reach billions of people. like Aravind Eye Care or the Grameen Bank,
For that to happen efficiently, discrete individu- scale in the traditional way as a single entity,
al solutions must operate at large scale, reaching adding services to a well-established product
many thousands, preferably millions, of people. line, thereby expanding a receptive customer
base. In other industries, it may be the model
Beyond these basics, we note three additional itself, replicated and repeated, rather than the
considerations. enterprise that goes to scale — the model as
a disruptive “good idea,” reproducing wildly.
Scale is sensitive to national context. In a This happened in microfinance, where entities
huge, populous country like India, Monitor like Grameen Bank gave rise to emulators
defined “scale” as one million customers or that, with the same model, made an indus-
30,000 small suppliers or producers. In an In- try. Indian MFIs have achieved scale both
dian market of 700 million or more potential individually and in clusters of firms, with the
customers, one million is a relatively modest industry as a whole serving more than 14
number. And 30,000 is the median number million mostly poor borrowers. Two hundred
of employees that India’s Forbes Forty largest MFIs account for 90 percent of all lending
format sector employers had on their pay- using an identical joint liability-group business
rolls.23 In a country the size of Rwanda, with model.24 A third route is that of interme-
a population of about 10 million people, that diaries like AMUL, where organizers bring
would equate to one in ten residents, so we together like-minded groups of producers
would look to a lower threshold there. who then partake of a collective benefit. .In
the case of AMUL the organizing entity, the
At the same time, scale is dependent on the Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing (GC-
type of business model. As described above, MMF) Federation Marketing Board, created
scale is more easily reached when serving scale over its 60 year history, incorporating
low-income segments as customers, where the over 13,000 village societies and 2.7 million
relationships tend to be transactional, rather producer-members.25 However, the individual
than in engaging them as suppliers. The world’s members did not become large integrated
largest formal-sector private employers have at dairies — rather, what scaled is the number of
most several hundred thousand employees; in small producers in the network.

, .


Many of the business models investigated in Emerging Markets, Emerging Models were
able to demonstrate two of the three elements, but not all three. And of the missing
elements, scale was most often the one missing.

In our investigation of enterprises that attained scale in low-end markets, we observed
several commonalities — including the varied paths to scale operations — exhibited
by most of our scale exemplars (see Four That Scaled on the following page). These
translated into “lessons about scale” that informed our study of promising market-
based solutions.

1. End-to-End Organization. Each of the scale exemplars invented not just a prod-
uct or approach but an entire business ecosystem encompassing whole value
chains. For example, when Aravind needed lower cost inputs for its entire range
of ophthalmic services, it set up its own lens manufacturing capability. Simi-
larly, AMUL organized its own infrastructure of local and district level milk
federations, chillers, and storage. ITC’s history was somewhat different in that
it entered an existing rural market, albeit one that operated on terms disadvan-
tageous to low-income farmers. ITC’s e-Choupal created an alternative to the
traditional mandi system of rural markets by building its own rural grain collec-
tion infrastructure of hub facilities and village-level kiosks.

2. Focus. The task of organizing an entire value system rather than just a speciﬁc
product becomes hopelessly complex if attempted across multiple products and
services. It is easier to build the value system around a narrow range of products
or services — a business model that recurs in the success stories. All four examples
began as highly specialized enterprises and for the most part remained so as they
scaled up. Their narrow specialization allowed them to reduce cost by exploiting
economies of scale, whether in asset use or in supporting systems, and by allowing
key agents in the chain, often with limited skills, to focus on a limited set of activi-
ties. Over time, the exemplars added some new services to the mix but generally did
so after ﬁrst having achieved scale together with stable supporting systems. More-
over, with operations at scale came hardy distribution channels that attracted the
attention of ventures in search of piggyback distribution possibilities.

, .


Four That Scaled
COMPANY KEY INFORMATION OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGY
• Founded in 1976 Aravind Eye Care provides low-cost surgeries to low-income seg-
ARAVIND EYE CARE
(“LOTUS” IN SANSKRIT)

• 2 million surgeries in ments. Remarkably, although it conducts two-thirds of its surgeries
32 years free of cost, it is a profitable entity.

• 2.7 million patients Aravind’s success lies in its end-to-end, all-inclusive business model,
screened per year which operates very like an assembly-line to ensure low-cost, high-
quality high patient throughput. It screens potential patients in “eye
camps,” provides transport to its hospitals, and deploys paraskilled
professionals at each stage, thereby optimizing the use of “high
skilled” resources — its doctors.
Aravind took decades to reach scale operations: it conducted 125
thousand surgeries in its first decade, 375 thousand in the second, and
1.5 million in the third. The enterprise struggled in its initial decade as
Aravind ironed out the creases in its operating model; its founders had
to make large personal investments of time and money to keep it afloat.

• Founded in 1946 AMUL is the world’s largest dairy cooperative. It is organized by
AMUL
(“PRICELESS” IN SANSKRIT)

• Buys daily from 2.6 12,000 village-level producer societies and district-level dairy unions
small farmers and is managed by an apex cooperative body, the Gujarat Cooperative
Milk Marketing Federation (GCMMF). Amul generates revenues of
• Produces 2.3 billion approximately $1 billion, selling milk through 5 million retail outlets.
liters per year Although Amul has primarily focused on milk, its business mix has
• Took some 4 decades changed to include other high-value-added dairy products, including
to scale yoghurt, buttermilk, cheese, ice-cream, soups, and beverages.
Amul’s journey to scale has been a long-haul — during in its first
decade, it only collected milk from a small district in Gujarat state. The
key constraint to its scaling up has been the cost of — and the time
involved in — setting up the multi-layered cooperative structure. This
is the core of its collection system, with units at the village, district and
state-levels.

, .


COMPANY KEY INFORMATION OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGY
• Founded in early 1990s India’s Microfinance Industry (MFIs) use the same Joint Liability
MICROFINANCE
INDUSTRY

• More than 14 million Group (JLG) model as the storied Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.
borrowers in India The Indian MFIs created their own self-help groups to make small-
today size loans to low-income segments, largely in rural areas. Most MFIs
offered only one product: a small unsecured short term group loan.
• Scaled as an industry in They innovated in order to develop a low cost and scalable distribution
less than 10 years model, for example, by “paraskilling” less educated hires to become
field loan officers.
The scaling up of the MFI industry in India has been relatively rap-
id — it reached significant scale in some 6 years, partly because MFIs
in India effectively transplanted and deployed the JLG business model
already developed and paid for by groundbreakers in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s similar population density and cultural needs allowed
model to be easily transposed. A key inflection point came in 2002,
when ICICI Bank introduced the “Bank partnership model.” MFIs no
longer need to keep lending capital on their balance sheets and can fo-
cus instead on their core strength of distribution and collection — thus
accelerating the industry’s scale-up.

• Founded in 2000 ITC e-Choupal — the name links the Hindi term for “village square”
ITC E-CHOUPAL

• Serves 4 million farm- to “e” for “electronic” — is a deep procurement channel that collects
ers through 6,500 soybean and wheat from farmers in six central Indian states. Its hub
Choupal kiosks and spoke operation consists of village-level e-Choupal kiosks — run
by a local farmer who provides growers with price information — and
• Seven years to scale collection hubs that handle actual procurement, storage and process-
ing. It has begun to leverage its network to “flip the supply chain” and
distribute goods and services to the villages as a shared channel.
ITC e-Choupal has scaled rapidly from modest beginnings as a pilot in
6 villages. Its network now has one of its 6,5000 e-Choupal kiosks per
each 4-6 villages in coverage area. It has some 180 hubs, each of which
service 30-40 Choupal kiosks. Its scale-up was largely a result of the
corporate resources of ITC, which enabled a rapid end-to-end orga-
nization of the rural supply chain. ITC also sought to integrate, rather
than displace, existing middlemen into their system, which helped
minimize resistance from existing rural mandi structures.

, .


Less Diversified MFIs Have Grown the Fastest

SKS
1,500,000
Number of Active Borrowers

1,200,000 Spandana

SHARE
900,000

600,000
BASIX

300,000

0
’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08

Source: Mix Market
Note: BASIX, as a livelihoods company, has a more diversified set of activities than the other MFIs

3. Use of “Soft Funding.” At some point in their growth history, three of the four
exemplars benefited from soft funding — that is, below-market capital or
grants — either directly or indirectly. AMUL, for example, took advantage of a
government program to develop co-operatives and build collection infrastruc-
ture, and most first generation Indian MFIs started as NGOs with grants from
donors and aid agencies. From this we draw a practical lesson: some market-
based solutions may need such funding to get started, address critical barriers,
or scale up.

4. Time to Scale. Not only are there many different roads to scale, but there are
many timelines. The only absolute is to expect no short-term miracles; no

, .


demand-led model targeted at low-income markets is likely to scale in less
than ten years. That said, a subsidiary spin-off a large conglomerate like ITC
e-Choupal, can draw on the parent’s resources to scale up rapidly. As a large, in-
tegrated company rolling out a new procurement system, ITC was able to grow
e-Choupal into a large-scale multi-state presence in just seven years. An orga-
nization that builds on its own from scratch will probably take decades. Scal-
ing methods will vary depending on business and the environment. We would
count any time span short of a decade as remarkable, and anything within the
10- to 15-year range as aggressive but realistic.

In sum, attaining scale is difﬁcult, costly, and time-consuming, especially in impov-
erished areas where basic infrastructure is lacking, solutions must be end-to-end,
and logistical challenges are great. Still, the four exemplars illustrate that market-
based solutions to help poor people can reach scale. The key to success is a robust
business model adapted to the particular conditions of low-end markets.

Most Scale Examples in India Took Well Over Ten Years to Get There

0-5 YEARS 5-10 YEARS >10 YEARS

Janani ITC e-Choupal AMUL
Yeshasvini SERP Aravind Eye Care
Fabindia
not commercially viable Lijjat Papad
commercially viable Sulabh Shouchalya
Ambuja Cement Foundation

, .

Business Models That Work

GETTING THE BUSINESS MODEL RIGHT is a baseline truism for all
enterprises25 but the nature of low-income markets is such that the margin for error
is particularly slim. Monitor’s research sifted through over 270 examples of market-
based solutions, and found many business models that lacked the ability to sustain
themselves, or to serve the poor effectively. However, through the process of in-
vestigation, we identified seven business models that work in this setting — that is,
they are capable of serving or engaging low-income people profitably and at scale.

Most of these models are reasonably mature — such as contract production or de-
mand-led training and placement — with benefits and limitations that are relatively
well understood. Several are newer and are still proving themselves over time, like
the paraskilling model, which has yet to be successfully replicated despite the great
success of its originator, Aravind Eye Care. And some are in-between, where the
idea may be antique — pay-per-use services, for example — but the application new
in the context of an imaginative mix of business model elements.26

Monitor’s approach to exploring demand-led business models has been to cast a
broad net in seeking out those that serve the poor as customers and engage them
as suppliers. Of the initiatives we investigated in India, approximately half revolved
around demand-side commercial activities and half on supply-side production and
labor-related activities.

MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS IN PRACTICE
Market-based solutions using effective business models are mak-
ing a difference in education, agriculture, water purification, health
care, and other sectors.

, .


We do not suppose that the seven business models we’ve settled on are the only
ones that can and do work — indeed, Monitor’s India study identiﬁed several other
potential approaches that looked promising and merit further investigation.27

In the discussion that follows, we have illustrated each business model with a leading
exemple in India and often an accompanying example based elsewhere. However,
behind each of these business models is not just a story, but usually at least four
to six other entities that also exemplify the model in question, and at varying levels
of scale.

The Poor As Customers

Developing products and services for low-income consumers is demanding.
Promising ventures might run aground by mistaking products or services poor
people need — inexpensive irrigation pumps or sanitary water supplies — for things
they genuinely want — such as gold on credit (see What Customers Say). Or by
failing to recognize that for the poor, cash is not only limited but generally only
intermittently available.

Promising ventures might To meet the needs of the poor as customers, en-
run aground by mistaking terprises need to overcome a variety of predictable
products or services poor challenges, starting with understanding those living
people need for things at the base of the pyramid and what they want. Only
they genuinely want. then can enterprises begin to think about devising
ways to improve the choice, quality, and price point
of their offerings. This is often easier said then done: despite markets in India and
South Africa, Brazil, Philippines, and elsewhere that increasingly reach down to
the base of the pyramid, low-income groups ﬁnd good quality products and ser-
vices almost wholly unaffordable. In urban India, for example, a normal birth in
a private clinic costs Rs. 8,000-10,000 ($160-$200) and requires roughly 200-250
percent of an average monthly income.28 A good quality private school for one

, .


WHAT CUSTOMERS SAY low-income customers about the value of
socially beneficial products and services
What Do MFI Borrowers Really Want?
is a significant challenge.
Little data on the buying preferences of What do MFI Borrowers Want to Buy on Credit?
low-income people in India is available.
100%
To gain insights, Monitor conducted
focus groups and interviewed hundreds 80%
of people around the country. A sam-
60%
pling of what we learned from interviews
with microfinance borrowers in Andhra 40%
Pradesh appears in the graph below.
20%
These customers — like most at any
income level — are interested in status 0%
Gold Coins, Fertilizer, Insurance,
symbols, entertainment, and conve- TVs, Livestock, Water lters,
Wardrobes Motorbikes Solar Lanterns
niences. The data suggest that educating
Source: Monitor Focus Groups Andhra Pradesh, Feb. 2008

child would require 20-25 percent of income for an average poor family. As such,
what low-income segments can afford is mostly of the poorest quality — and
sometimes even health-endangering.

Yet despite being exploited in traditional markets, low-income groups are willing to
pay dearly for what they most value, spending surprisingly high shares of scant income
on private health and education services. For the poor as for anyone else, health is a
necessity good. And education, as others have found and Monitor customer research
confirms, is an aspirational good for which the poor will make sacrifices. Indeed, low-
income groups in many countries readily opt for private services over those provided

, .


SOCIAL BENEFIT VS. STICKER PRICE — this — small enterprise, just starting, hasn’t yet
THE NEST AISHWARYA SOLAR LANTERN quite figured out its market and product, and
so on. But in digging a bit deeper, Monitor
A small for-profit entrepreneur in Hyderabad,
learned that the sticker price was the problem.
India, Mr. D.T. Barki — whose self-described
For many low-income customers, a desirable
mission is to “end light poverty in In-
item that might seem objectively affordable
dia” — set up NEST (Noble Energy Solar
still represents a huge up-front commit-
Technologies) Ltd. to fulfill his vision. NEST
ment — a minimum of two weeks’ wages for
assembles and markets solar lanterns to the
many potential buyers.31
rural poor. Its flagship product, the Aishwarya
Solar Lantern, is a three-watt high-efficiency Customers understood with perfect clarity the
compact fluorescent lantern that recharges lantern’s value, but most were simply unable
with a solar battery. The Aishwarya retails for to pay the ticket price or the upfront cost of
about Rs. 1,500 ($30), not including replace- purchasing the lantern. “Who has 1,500 ru-
ment batteries. It is marketed as a substitute pees just to spend on a lamp?” was a common
for unhealthy kerosene lanterns and, count- refrain from people who are used to spending
ing monthly kerosene expenditures, pays for no more than Rs. 400 on kerosene-powered
itself in 2-3 years, depending on usage. On a alternatives. Most rural target customers
cost per lumen basis it is far superior to any have irregular and generally low cash flows,
replacement option. little savings, little access to credit, and — as a
result — short time horizons for payback. A
Yet NEST has sold only some 5,000 units
large percentage of this segment can only af-
per year and about 50,000 since incep-
ford low-cost, low-quality substitutes.
tion in 2001. Several reasons might explain

NEST Lanterns Have Sold Slowly Despite Superior Price/Cost Performance
Comparison of Cost/Lux hr of Various Lighting Technologies

Incandescent 0.74W Flashlight 59.72
(Alkaline Battery)
Candles 28.59

6W Compact Fluorescent Lantern 7.08
(Alkaline Battery)
Simple Kerosene Lamp (Wick) 6.81

Hurricane Kerosene Lamp (Wick) 3.69

NEST Aishwaryia 3W Compact 1.20
Fluorescent Lantern
60W Incandescent Lamp
(Grid-connected) 0.07
15W Compact Fluorescent Lamp
(Grid-connected) 0.04
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
log US$/1,000 lux hours

Source Improved Lighting for Indian Fishing Communities
(Energy and Resources Group Report, 2007); Mills, 2005; Monitor Analysis

, .


for free by government — in India, 80 percent of the lowest income decile pay for
private health care.29 Even in one of India’s poorest states, Bihar, parents earning over
Rs. 3,000 ($60) per month (or $2 per day) are willing to pay more than ten percent of
monthly income to send at least one or more children to private school.30

That said, serving the poor remains difficult, even if they are willing to pay, because
the amounts of what they are able to pay. The actual purchasing power of each
individual customer is small, irregular, and is frequently expensive to tap. Typical
pricing strategies in markets consisting of daily wage earners involve extremely low
price points and small quantities for products that compete for a place in the wage
earner’s daily basket of purchases. This makes the issue of irregular cash flows the
single most critical concern in selling to low-income groups. (See Social Benefit vs.
Sticker Price — The NEST Aishwarya Solar Lantern.)

Many of the models described below aim above all at lowering cost to serve through
innovative practices and adaptations of familiar ones. And by limiting our survey to
socially beneficial products, this issue becomes especially salient, as many such of-
ferings are essentially “push” products and services, entailing some costs to educate
and persuade potential customers.

Business models aiming for the poor as customers must address the primary chal-
lenges of affordability, cost to serve, and matching customer cash flows. Demand-led
ventures seeking to serve the poor as customers will rarely have the luxury of taking
the classic strategic positioning of “high cost-high quality.” To serve the poor, costs
must be relentlessly driven lower.

, .


Pay-Per-Use MODEL 1

CORE MODEL ELEMENTS
In pay-per-use models, customers typically pay for each use instead of owning
an asset. The models share certain features:

• Accommodating terms, in which customers pay as they have cash available
(or may subscribe for a set quantity of product or service) and may collect
the product or service at centralized distribution point or pay surcharge
for delivery. Products can be metered, pre-paid, rented, sold in individual
portions, etc.

• Group infrastructure, which is provided not for individuals or families but
for a larger aggregation— yielding higher efficiency and lower unit costs
than individual assets. Local (village-level) management provides day-to-
day operations of facilities, distribution, accounts, equipment maintenance
(engaging equipment suppliers, repairmen), etc., and a collective local entity
often serves as a means of enforcement (e.g. timely payments).

• Third-party administration, which an external entrepreneur — e.g. an
individual, firm, NGO, village consortium — undertakes to organize and
provide services or products to a low-income market (typically a village or
group of villages), bringing requisite administrative, operational, financial,
marketing expertise/experience/success.

, .


Enterprises that hope for social returns as well as financial ones often develop helpful
low-cost durables and conveniences for the poor — solar lanterns, water filters, treadle
pumps, cook stoves, and the like. Despite the operational imperative to price such items
as low as possible, a product’s most significant barrier to attaining big sales numbers is
often its price. The amount of cash typically available to people in low-end markets is
simply too little for the necessary upfront lump sum payment.
Customers are thus forced to borrow: from family or friends Many offerings
if possible, or from moneylenders at steep rates. are essentially “push”
products and services,
With the rise of microfinance institutions, poor people in entailing some costs to
many areas have more credit options at rates significantly educate and persuade
lower that those of traditional moneylenders. But even cred- potential customers.
it at reasonable rates reduces (through added expense) the
economic benefit of low-cost products, and many potential customers remain wary
as credit for one durable reduces options to take credit for other things like seeds.

The Byrraju Foundation32 provides a good example of a promising pay-per-use oper-
ation in water purification. In India, one typical low-cost business model is to provide
individual activated carbon water filter units to low-income families at costs ranging
from Rs. 900 to 1,500 ($18-$30), with replacement filter cartridges needed every three
to six months at the cost of Rs. 400 ($8). With a monthly cost of Rs. 60-90 at normal
usage rates, this is often too much for families living on Rs. 3,000 or less.

To make clean water available, Byrraju implemented an innovative model centering
on community filtration plants.33 These sell purified water at about half the price of
individual activated carbon water filters, and about a third of the cost of boiled water.
Water is sold in 12-liter containers for Rs. 1.5 ($0.03), which covers the daily clean
water needs of an average household; customers buy the water when they have the
available cash.

, .


Byrraju has built 57 water filtration plants, serving 850,000 people in the southern
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The facilities are then operated and maintained
by a local gram vikas samiti (GVS, Hindi for “village development committee”). The
GVS begins with a short marketing campaign, raising villagers’ awareness of the
benefits of clean water. Afterwards, residents are asked to contribute an amount
equal to about three-quarters of the total RO plant building and equipment costs
of some $15,000. Donors generally come from the wealthiest villagers or non-
residents holding city jobs. Local authorities also typically donate land and access
to a water source. Byrraju completes the package by donating the remaining plant
costs out of external funding.

The GVS runs day-to-day business and employs two village residents as operators
under the supervision of a plant manager and two helpers. Byrraju provides high
level support, including fortnightly laboratory-based water-quality analysis. This
ensures the water quality stays consistent and is a marked improvement on the indi-
vidual filter model, which may often run short of funds
Half of the non-users for new cartridges or overlook cleaning the old ones.
Monitor surveyed preferred
the taste of their unfiltered
Commercial Viability
water, even though they
had sampled the Byrraju Monitor estimates the potential Indian customer base
water several times. for clean, cheap drinking water to be extensive — more
than 100 million families. At the prices charged by
Byrraju, the water meets the critical “low price” criterion: low-income segments
can pay for it. Fifty-three percent of Byrraju water customers have household in-
comes of less than Rs. 2,000 ($40) per month, indicating that the price charged is
affordable even to those earning as little as Rs. 60-70 ($1.30) per day. At this price
point, Monitor’s customer research shows considerations such as taste to be more
significant as barriers to adoption than cost. Half of the non-users Monitor sur-
veyed preferred the taste of their unfiltered water, even though they had sampled
the Byrraju water several times.

, .


WHAT CUSTOMERS SAY

User Perception Non-User Perception
Has Using Byrraju Water Reduced Would You Switch to Byrraju Water
Illness Within Your Household? If It Was Cheaper?
8%
“Yes, if it was
Rs. 0.5 or Less”

37% 32%
“No” “Yes, if it was
63% Rs. 1 or Less” 60%
“Yes” “No, even if it
was free”

Source: Monitor user focus groups and surveys, Andhra Pradesh, April 2008.

Adoption of a Byrraju-type pay-per-use model for water generally occurs more
readily than for use of individual filters. The Byrraju model requires fewer behav-
ioral changes, as consumers do not need to boil or filter the water once they’ve
picked it up; delivery is even available.

And the model is, or can be, self-sustaining and thus commercially viable: if some
500 households buy one 12-liter container per day, the plant will cover its costs.
More than 75 percent of Byrraju’s extant plants are already operationally profitable
(see graph). As penetration levels are typically 20-45 percent — purified water is of-
ten a push product that requires a substantial marketing investment — each Byrraju
plant serves the needs of two or three neighboring villages, as well as the village
where it is situated.

, .


Two-Thirds of Byrraju Plants Are Profitable Without Significant Marketing Effort

100

90

80

70
inancially Pro table
Penetration 60
Rate
(percent of 50
residents
buying 40
water)
30

20
perationally Pro table
10
Loss Making
0
2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000
Village Population

Note: each dot represents one Byrraju plant.

The filtration technology is also proven, low-cost, easy to acquire and repli-
cate, and is thus easily scalable. Indeed, considered as a cluster, the model and
variants are already at scale — four operators in Andhra Pradesh and two in Rajas-
than — both for-profit and non-profit enterprises — are already working the water
filtration market with similar models. Fifty million dollars would capitalize plants
for 10-15 million people. With simple refinements, the model could become com-
mercially sustainable. For example, as other operators do, denser customer bases in
urban and peri-urban areas might be targeted, with better, more extensive market-
ing and awareness campaigns developed. Fortunately, in this model, interests are
aligned — driving utilization up is good for both profitability and public health.

, .


Pay-Per-Use Challenges

Despite operating at scale, and near full commercial viability, these are significant
and center on the issue of driving utilization up, and thus on demand stimulation.
Given that services like clean water, toilets, and other sanitation infrastructure must
be “pushed,” the core issue becomes one of awareness and marketing. The poor
need credible information on the heath benefits of clean water or sanitation — less
than two-thirds of Byrraju-related focus-group participants associated clean water
directly with good health. Monitor research in southern India indicates all users of
Byrraju water switched in the first three months of plant operation, pointing to
the importance of marketing stages. Even so, understanding customer needs and
tradeoffs sufficiently well to increase demand is costly, particularly for social mar-
keters straining for the lowest price point. Other challenges include demonstrating
the model’s economic viability in smaller or poorer villages, selecting locations with
adequate demand, and operating models that are suitable for expansion and that
generate community trust. The model requires electricity, so will not be applica-
ble in all rural villages. And finally, new government-provided infrastructure could
make private-sector enterprises redundant.35

OTHER INDIAN EXAMPLES:

Water: Naandi Foundation, Water Health International, Poorvi Enterprises, Piramal
Foundation; Energy: Biogas Bank; Lighting: S3IDF; ICT: Drishtee, n-Logue, Comat

, .


LIGHTING THE LAO INTERIOR: SUNLABOB a number of lanterns — from 24 to 144,
RURAL ENERGY LTD. depending on village size — and rent the
In Laos, a doctor at a remote village lanterns out. For sizable “public installa-
health care center comments on the tions” like that of the village health care
difference solar power has made to his center discussed above, Sunlabob may
work. “Before we had solar, we had to install a system at the behest — and with
fetch essential medicines and vaccines the funding — of an NGO.
from elsewhere, because we had no way
Sunlabob employs an imaginative, read-
of keeping them cool here. Often people
ily scalable pay-per-use business model
are very ill by the time they reach here so
that makes a proﬁt for Sunlabob and
it could make a difference as to whether
its franchises while producing windfall
they live or die. With solar, we can
socially beneﬁcial results in bringing light
operate at all hours. We used kerosene
to remote Laotian villages. In so do-
lanterns before, but they were dirty and
ing, Sunlabob seems to have solved the
smoky and the light was poor.”
problem that separates those enterprises
The solar energy that lights this village that will succeed in low-end markets
center is provided by Sunlabob Rural from those that will fail: cost to serve.
Energy Ltd., a commercial company Commercial revenue covers all operat-
founded in 2001 to provide renewable ing costs: the least-expensive Sunlabob
energy services to those living in remote PV unit rents for 35,000 Lao Kip ($4.00)
Lao villages.34 Since its establishment, per month; households typically spend
Sunlabob has delivered high-quality 36,000 to 60,000 Kip ($4.20 to $7.00) for
photovoltaic (PV) systems to more than kerosene and will thus save money im-
450 villages serving between 300,00 and mediately by switching to Sunlabob’s PV
400,000 people. It uses an ingenious busi- lanterns. Typical renter households earn
ness model whereby village franchises $20-50 per month and have no access to
rent a solar-recharging station, purchase the power grid.

, .


NO FRILLS SERVICE MODEL 2

CORE MODEL ELEMENTS
No Frills models serve low-income markets by economizing at every stage of
an offering:

• Setup and service, in which the provider reduces or minimizes non-core
capital and expenses to provide “bare bones” service and lower the unit cost
of delivery. Quality is kept sufﬁciently high to provide customer beneﬁts
superior to other options.

• High throughput/high asset utilization in which high customer volume
drives capacity utilization, pushes down unit costs of key human or physical
assets, and provides economies of scale for purchasing, marketing, and
other functions.

• Service specialization, which enables the provider to focus on a limited array of
services, standardize processes and reduce the need for additional procedures
or multi-functional (and thus more expensive) personnel and training.

• Services/protocols, which are highly standardized, documented, routinized,
and easy to deliver for lower-skilled staff.

, .


A strong market exists for quality private-sector service delivery in low-end markets,
ranging from healthcare to education and financial services. In India, the govern-
ment provides many services free at the point of delivery, but most low-income
customers do not trust the state to offer quality services and prefer private-sector
alternatives.36 Even so, few such options are accessible to them. For example, send-
ing two or more children to private school of even modest quality could consume
half an average monthly income.

New business models of low-cost service delivery might thus tap into low-end mar-
kets where aspirational demand is great, the poor are willing to pay, and the existing
providers are also people of little means — a common convergence of circumstances.

One such approach is a highly standardized, specialized, no frills offering that relies
on high volume and low unit costs to reduce prices — a model that has succeeded
in other sectors, including telecommunications. Many successful low-cost mobile
phone services in India, Philippines, and elsewhere are no frills ventures that provide
basic service on a prepaid model, simple yet standardized, and sellable by networks
of agents at reduced delivery costs rather than by experienced telecom employees.

Monitor’s studies in India as well as cases from Kenya and the Philippines,37 how-
ever, indicate “no frills” models can be extended to areas like health and education,
where regulation and certification have traditionally limited practitioners.

LifeSpring Hospitals is a for-profit six-hospital chain of 20-bed facilities founded in
2005 and based in the peri-urban areas around Hyderabad, India, that specializes in
maternal and child health, particularly labor and delivery. It has tailored its approach to
serve its clientele by locating within their community and taking a no frills approach, rec-
ognizing most of its customers will trade off extras for affordable, high quality services.

LifeSpring reduces the cost of private doctor-attended delivery to as low as Rs.
2,000 ($40) for a normal delivery in the general ward and Rs. 7,000 ($140) for ce-

, .


sarean delivery — prices only 20-35 percent of those charged at comparable quality
private hospitals but sufficient for LifeSpring to be profitable. LifeSpring cuts costs
by standardizing its procedures, trimming its expenses, increasing volume, reduc-
ing staff attrition rates, and using a cross-subsidy model for three types of wards,
(general, semi-private, and private). Additionally, it has dramatically increased the
typical hospital use rates of key assets ranging from diagnostic machines to the
obstetricians themselves.

LifeSpring hospitals are thus strictly no frills: no canteens, outsourced pharmacy
and laboratory services, rented rather than purchased properties, old hospital build-
ings rather than new ones. Most beds are in general wards, with basic furnishing
and no air-conditioning. The most expensive equipment is an ultrasound machine.
LifeSpring doctors earn fixed salaries rather than the variable consulting fees of
their private clinic peers. Doctors nevertheless have strong non-monetary incen-
tives — for example, less administrative duties, more clinical practice — to stay.

LifeSpring’s high throughput/high asset use business model is vastly more pro-
ductive than that of its counterparts. Operating theaters accommodate 22-27
procedures each week compared to between four and six in a private clinic. Doctors
undertake 17-26 surgeries per month — four times that of private-clinic doctors.

LifeSpring’s marketing approach is multi-faceted, consisting of its outreach
teams, voucher programs, health camps, and world of mouth. To generate high
patient volume, it targets key decision-makers in maternity matters — husbands
and mothers-in-law — and has a dedicated (and persuasive) community outreach
team that customizes its message depending on whether the woman has had an
institutional delivery before, and if so, where. It also focuses heavily on customer
retention and referrals — even operating a “pull” program that gives every inpa-
tient a voucher, good for one out-patient visit, to distribute to friends and family.
The low-cost outpatient department plays a vital role in attracting mothers by

, .


providing a showcase for services, including women’s health and pediatrics.38 A
visit costs Rs. 50 ($1) in contrast to a private clinic’s Rs. 100-300. Moreover, it
posts a price list outside the hospital, creating consumer awareness and confi-
dence of transactional transparency.

LifeSpring Asset Utilization is More than Five Times That of Comparable Private Clinics

Average Number of Deliveries/Month Cost of Doctor/Patient
120 1.8 1.2–1.8
100–110
100 1.5

80 1.2

Number 60 US$ 0.9

40 0.6

15–20 0.3–0.5
20 0.3

0 0.0
LifeSpring Private Clinic LifeSpring Private Clinic

Source: Lifespring Hospital, Monitor analysis
Note: Private Clinic refers to small 20–30 bed nursing homes, often run by a family.

Specializing solely in inpatient gynecology and obstetrics leads to easy stan-
dardization. LifeSpring has over 90 standard procedures including standardized
surgery kits and clinical protocols. Many are ISO9001-certified, guaranteeing
the quality of hospital procedures. LifeSpring uses a narrow range of drugs and
equipment for large numbers of repeat procedures and thus bulk-purchases stan-
dard equipment and generic medicines. Standardization also enables it to use
Auxiliary Nurse Midwifery nurses (ANMs) in addition to more expensive General
Nurse Midwifery nurses (GNMs) — for maternity services, the skill sets of both
classifications of nurse are the same.39 But because ANMs have a lower level of
qualification, they are less costly to employ than GNMs, whose degrees are more
advanced and expensive to attain.

, .


SIMILAR MODEL, DIFFERENT RESULT: WFMC had 230 clinics but 100 or so
THE WELL-FAMILY MIDWIFE CLINIC clinics have dropped out of the pro-
PARTNERSHIP FOUNDATION
gram in the last three years. Primarily,
The Well-Family Midwife Clinic Part- RMs departed along with their clinics
nership Foundation (WFMC) of the after having received WFMC intellectual
Philippines is a labor-and-delivery-service property and training in providing ser-
model that shares many aspects of vices they can independently sell. Most
LifeSpring’s no frills approach. WFMC of the individual franchises were profit-
has even fewer frills, with doctors on-call able, but the master franchise company
but not on staff, a network of Registered was losing money because of the losses
Midwives (RMs) who own and operate of franchisees, and found it difficult to
their own clinics — now numbering 130, collect the franchise fees. The depar-
often in the home of the midwife, and tures accelerated after the drawdown in
each with a delivery room and a single- 2005 of USAID assistance to the pro-
bed recovery room. The clinics handle gram and its administering NGOs and
10-15 deliveries per month in the coun- the corresponding loss of soft funding
tryside and 40-60 in urban areas from a to capitalize startup clinics.
customer base of some 250-300 women
per clinic. WFMC offers many other ser- The lessons of WFMC are clear and un-
vices, like reproductive health and advice, derscore the model’s central challenges:
but its profitability rises and falls with no frills ventures need to place a pre-
labor and delivery. mium on retention of skilled staff and
maintaining sufficiently high throughput,
WFMC has not been an unalloyed which will improve sustainability and
success, however. As recently as 2005, reduce dependence on external funding.

, .


The LifeSpring model is scalable for obvious reasons: it targets densely-populated
urban and peri-urban areas, offers a value proposition superior to competitors and,
although more expensive than government hospitals, provides superior service, has
an easily defensible — because demonstrably no frills — cost and profit structure,
and is verifiably replicable.

No Frills Challenges

The two most prominent tests for this business model are recruiting, training, and
retaining sufficient numbers of doctors and nurses, and attaining and maintaining
sufficiently high customer volume. Each LifeSpring hospital has only a small num-
ber of doctors — three to six — making the loss of even one a potentially serious
issue. As for the need to ensure high customer throughput (particularly in the initial
phases of a new hospital’s operation), services like healthcare and education typi-
cally rely on word-of-mouth and reputation in low-income markets. Marketing and
sales systems need to generate customers and services must be located in areas with
a high acceptance of institutional delivery; the model cannot afford to bear alone
the cost of convincing low-income women of this basic proposition.


Health: Vaatsalya Hospitals, Dial 1298, Narayana Hrudayalaya Hospitals,
Financial Services: SKS Microfinance, ICT: rural mobile telecommunications

, .


SOCIAL (AND OTHER) FRANCHISING: A BUSINESS MODEL?

Franchising has lately attracted atten- franchising usually involves low-cost, no
tion as a way both to extend services to frills services. ICT kiosks use a pay-per-
the base of the pyramid and to engage use business model. But regardless of
low-income segments in entrepreneurial taxonomy, a franchise needs a compelling
activity. Monitor found examples ranging offering for a low-income clientele. For
from slum pharmacies to ICT kiosks. In social franchisors the challenge is to hit
2007, the term “microfranchise” made a on a commercially viable business model
popular philanthropic blogger’s Top-10 that provides a high-quality, socially ben-
List of “Buzzwords in Philanthropy.” eficial product or service the poor truly
And franchising has a compelling logic: want and will pay for.
managing a franchise, complete with its
central support network, extends the On the whole, although many social
possibility of a head start on success — at franchisees are — or have the potential to
least in theory. be — financially sustainable, few have be-
come commercially viable. Franchisors are
Take the recent burst of global activity in often dependent on remittances of royalty
“social franchising,” which uses franchise fees — which are difficult to collect from
networks to help providers of services franchisees — or on donor funds to keep
or products leverage their offerings into afloat and provide pan-franchise functions
socially beneficial services. To date, most such as quality assurance, training, brand-
social franchising has been donor-led ing, marketing and advertising. Indeed,
in the family planning and reproduc- financial self-sufficiency is often only a
tive health service delivery sector — for secondary objective in many donor-led
example, the Well-Family Midwife Clinic efforts. And many social franchises have
Partnership Foundation (see page 51). But historically been in the least financially
franchising is also expanding into a range viable sectors of public health, such as
of services, from drinking water distribu- family planning and reproductive health.
tors, to voluntary HIV/AIDS treatment Nevertheless, ample experimentation has
services and even TB-related services. allowed social franchisors branch out, with
many aggressively seeking to increase their
Although social franchising — and numbers and basket of services. Oth-
franchising more generally — is often ers have negotiated public-sector service
considered a business model, we see it contracts, formed partnerships with phar-
more as a tool that might help bring an maceutical manufacturers, or obtained
underlying business model to scale. Social commercial loans and private equity.

, .


PARTNERS IN PERU: FRANCHISING WITHOUT THE FEES

One low-cost, no frills health care fran- 20 and 40 percent on the drugs provided,
chise that appears to be self-sustaining a proportion of which goes to the mid-
is RedPlan Salud (RPS) in Peru. RPS wives, and the rest goes to INPPARES
was established in 2002 by a local NGO, in lieu of franchise fees. RPS midwives
INPPARES — with support from take advantage of the NGO’s reputations
USAID, Schering, and Pharmacia — to and affordable branded drugs to attract
improve community access to quality women from low-income households
sexual and reproductive health services to RPS’s low-cost services. RPS thus
and products. Its business model is achieved ﬁnancial sustainability within
similar to franchising, but without the 18 months. By 2007, it was operating in
franchise fees. INPPARES, the franchi- six cities, with 1,127 providers and half
sor, provides RPS midwives with training, a million consultations. The continuing
promotional advice, and brand-name success of RPS, despite the withdrawal
drugs purchased at a discount from of USAID support in 2007, shows that
partnering pharmaceutical companies. social franchising can be economically
INPPARES sells the discounted drugs to viable if commercial considerations are
RPS midwives at a mark-up, which allows fully taken into account.
the NGO to realize a margin of between

, .


Paraskilling MODEL 3

CORE MODEL ELEMENTS
Paraskilling entails all of the elements of No Frills (Model 2) plus:

• Key processes reengineered into smaller, often disaggregated, discrete parts
that can be performed by lower-skilled workers.

• Simplified and codified processes that lower-skilled workers can perform on
a high-volume basis many times per shift or per day.

• Cultivation of a paraprofessional cadre that has less education or skills than
the professionals who customarily perform services. Paraskilling requires
finding suitable staff members who see the business proposition as attractive
and making substantial continuous investment in staff training, and heavy
investment in segmenting the labor market. Retention through promotion or
expansion is generally a key to success.

Paraskilling business models complement the no frills model, which operates in
low-end markets for quality private-sector service delivery such as healthcare, edu-
cation, and financial services. In such industries, wage rates for skilled workers are
generally the greatest fixed costs. Enterprises that require high-skill labor inputs

, .


need to reduce staff costs and maintain quality of service, a sizable challenge in
these markets.

Paraskilling offers a way to reduce the wage bill by disaggregating complex pro-
cesses into simple, routine and standardized tasks. These can then be undertaken by
less skilled workers, with the desired reduction in costs and a simultaneous increase
of volume and throughput.

A pioneer paraskilling enterprise, Ahmedabad-based Gyan Shala (Hindi for “a
school for knowledge/wisdom”) is an NGO provider of primary education to the
poor. Gyan Shala’s 330 one-room schools, located primarily in slum districts, serve
8,000 children whose households earn between Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 6,000 ($40-120)
per month. Gyan Shala schools teach children in grades 1-3 at a monthly cost of $3,
roughly a quarter of the cost of a government school and about a sixth the cost of a
recognized private school. School budgets are often subsidized by third-party funds
to ensure affordability. Most parents pay Rs. 30 ($0.60) per month per student.

Gyan Shala schools provide remarkable performance at uncommonly low cost.
Comparative studies report test results showing Gyan Shala students outperform-
ing students in the best government schools in Gujarat in every category (except
“copying”), even when government-school children tested were a grade above.40

, .


Gyan Shala Students Outperform Public School Children in Every Subject, Except Copying

GS Class III
Vadodara Public Class III

Language Mathematics
100% 100% 94
91
87
80 79
80% 80% 77

65
60% 59 60%
51
46 44
40% 40% 34
30

20% 17 20%
13 14

0% 0%
Copying Reading Writing Complex Addition Multiplication
Comp Sentence
Structure Subtraction Division

Source: Leigh J. Linden, “Complement or Substitute? The Effect of Technology on Student Achievement in India” June 8, 2008, Working
Paper posted to http://www.columbia.edu/~ll2240/Research.htm, accessed January 4, 2009.

The Paraskilling System

These impressive results issue from a radically-engineered teaching methodology
that focuses on learning processes. The senior Gyan Shala team created a teaching
model in which a “master” design and management team of education profession-
als constructs a standardized curriculum and lesson plans, which are supplemented
by extensive learning aids and continuous monitoring of classroom processes for
regular staff feedback. Junior teachers then deliver a total learning package straight
out of highly structured workbooks.

Standardization facilitates teaching by less-skilled individuals. Junior teachers are recruit-
ed from the community in which the school is located. They typically have a high school
education and grade 5 skills in math and language, but lack the formal pedagogical quali-
ﬁcations required of government teachers. Instead, junior teachers are chosen for their
local roots and an appropriate “attitude” toward teaching elementary school students.

, .


Typical Private School Gyan Shala
Organizational Structure Organizational Structure

State Curriculum State and Gyan Shala Curriculum

Design-Management Team
Head Master

Senior Teacher (Field Staff)

Teacher Parents
Junior Teacher Committees

Student Student

Recruits undertake a two-week crash course before they enter the classroom and
are required thereafter to attend a day of formal training every month, with addi-
tional training in the summer and mid-year breaks. Junior teachers are supported
by a senior teacher with whom they have weekly meetings to explain the week’s
curricula and teaching process. Once a week, the senior teacher sits in on classes
to give active support in teaching and hands-on training. Feedback from classroom
observation and student performance is critical: if supervisors
Gyan Shala schools believe practical or curricular improvements will help students
teach children in grades learn better or more quickly, they will mandate changes to les-
1-3 at a monthly cost of son plans or curricula.
$3, roughly a quarter
of the cost of a
Cost Structure
government school.
Paraskilling enables Gyan Shala to lower costs signiﬁcantly. Al-
though the design and management teams are highly-skilled
and command relatively high compensation, their cost is amortized over 300 class-
rooms. Most of the savings on wages are made on the junior teachers, who are paid
Rs. 1,000 ($20) a month for working three hours a day.41

, .


Gyan Shala Schools’ Teaching Costs Are Only 30 Percent of Informal Private Schools
y
6.0
Salary — Teacher

Salary — Field Staff
2.5 Salary — Design and
Management Staff
Salary — Admin
Class Hire and
3.0 Maintenance
US$ 0.8
per month 0.7
0.3 1.3 Staff Training
0.3
0.5 2

0.1 0.5
0.1 0.1
0.1 Field Work
0.1 0.1
0.1 Others3
Gyan Shala Private School

1 Average school surplus (profit) is 25-30 percent of the revenue and school fee per student is often more than the tuition fee, as the monthly
cost per child at a private school. 2 Worksheets and learning aids are provided by GS. 3 Others include fee concessions, unofficial payments.
Note: Typical low-income school is often a private recognized/unrecognized school operating in urban slums and an average monthly fee of
Rs. 150 per child.
Source: GS Annual Report 2007, James Tooley, and Pauline Dixon, Private School Serving the Poor Working Paper: A Study from Delhi,
India, (New Delhi: Centre for Civil Society, 2006); Monitor Interviews and primary research.

As the cost structure (above) shows, Gyan Shala has significantly-higher course
material costs — Rs. 30 per child as against Rs. 3 — than the typical private school.
This is central to the Gyan Shala model, as extensive proprietary course materials
reinforce the lesson and make it possible for junior teachers to succeed. Conversely,
the amount spent on teachers’ wages is less than a third of a private school — Rs.
56 (just over $1) compared to Rs. 105 (just over $2).42

Benefits

The use of local women is advantageous in three ways: local teachers tend to relate
better to their young charges, increasing children’s willingness to learn. Renting
single classrooms rooms in local slums improves accessibility and increases female

, .


enrolment rates, and creates a “smaller size” offering. Moreover, providing junior
teachers with formal employment improves their status within the community and
increases both their earnings and their future earnings potential — a far cry from
their usual alternatives of working as domestics or garment pieceworkers.

By retaining staff Gyan Shala minimizes training costs and keeps overall costs
down. Formal teacher qualiﬁcations are low and the resource pool is wide, increas-
ing the likelihood of recruiting the right people. And as junior teachers grow in
skill, knowledge, and experience, some become senior teachers. Staff turnover is
thus correspondingly low.

Scalability

Demand is high for Gyan Shala schools. Parents generally prefer to send children
to private schools: between 1993 and 2002, 80 percent of new enrollments in ur-
ban India were in the private sector.43 The standardized nature of the model also
makes larger-scale rollouts easier once the course materials, teaching manuals, and
curricula have been created. Indeed, the commercial success of the business ben-
eﬁts from economies of scale. Although Gyan Shala chooses not to operate on a
breakeven basis, interviews with parents earning Rs. 3000/month and up suggest
a strong willingness to pay school fees at a level that would sustain the business
model commercially.

, .


WHAT CUSTOMERS SAY
Gyan Shala Addresses Two of the Top Four Reasons That Girls Drop Out —
School Fees and Distance to School

35 Primary Class I–V
Post-Primary Class VI–X
30

25

20
Percent
15

10

5

0
Needed School Marriage Lack of Lack of
to Earn Fee Child’s Only Girls
Money Interest School
Needed Distance Lack of Lack of Safety
at Home to School Toilets Female
Teacher

Source: Monitor Survey of Bihar parents, July 2008.


Health: Aravind Eye Care, Ambuja Cement Foundation; Financial Services: Spandana;
Education: Pratham

, .


PREMIER PARASKILLER: ARAVIND EYE CARE

After Grameen Bank, Aravind Eye Care room nurse assistants. Paraskilled workers
is perhaps the most celebrated of all en- are also used in the administrative side of
terprises serving the base of the pyramid. the business, in record-keeping, catering,
Its practice of paraskilling is in a most optical implant sales, and so on.
exacting market: for 30 years, Aravind has
provided end-to-end eye-care services, As a result of process reengineering, doc-
screens more than 2.7 million people antors at Aravind are highly productive and
nually, and now performs some 285,000 patient throughput is high. Aravind does
surgeries a year. 2,400 surgeries per doctor per year com-
pared to 300 in standard Indian clinics.
The Aravind business model is built
around process reengineering that disag- As with the No Frills business model,
gregates the entire course of care but is training and retention are critical issues
best illustrated by the surgical eye-care for Aravind. Considerable investment
process. In redesigning the process, goes into training, and to get a sufﬁcient
Aravind minimizes the demands on its return, Aravind needs candidates to suc-
doctors’ time. Instead of a medical profes- ceed as long-term employees. Like Gyan
sional seeing the patient at each step, the Shala and LifeSpring Hospitals, Aravind
doctor attends only to the preliminary looks for educable young women who
examination, ﬁnal diagnosis, and surgery. have an appropriate attitude, for which
The rest is done by paraskilled paramedics, they are tested in writing and interviews.
who are trained to do a range of clini- Dr. G. Natchiar, Aravind’s Director of
cal tasks: ward management, counseling, Human Resources, views a certain type
out-patient care, and serving as operating- of person as an ideal paramedic candi-

, .


date: young women from poor families model is unique: it’s the unique ap-
in rural areas, with average grades, “low plication — across all the elements of
aspirations” and a dose of common paraskilling — in an unusually demanding
sense. Those who fit this bill — particu- business. Most who try to replicate just
larly those with “low aspirations” — are focus on price cross-subsidization, or
unlikely to look for other jobs, prefer to use of low cost labor, or other discrete
remain in their local communities, and particulars of Aravind’s practice, but
on average stay with Aravind for a long not the full package including, especially,
stretch — an average of 10 years once the recruitment and training side of the
past the first year.* When a new facility equation. And, in the end, it’s this in-
opens, more than 30 percent of the staff tensive training requirement that is the
will be experienced paramedics from greatest challenge in implementing a
existing facilities. Aravind focuses in- paraskilling business model.
tensely on retention and is mindful of its * On average about 7-8 percent attrition occurs in the first year as
trainees and employees.
importance given the costs of required
training. Aravind has so far benefited
from a strong culture that builds loyalty.
Its hospitals are also placed in smaller cit-
ies, where competition for staff may be
less than in India’s largest cities.

Given Aravind’s success, the ques-
tion becomes why hasn’t its business
model been replicated? It’s not that the

, .


Shared Channels MODEL 4

CORE MODEL ELEMENTS
Distribution arises repeatedly as an obstacle to scale and business viability for
socially beneficial products, especially those aiming to reach the rural poor.
Shared channels piggybacks the distribution channels of other enterprises, re-
ducing costs and increasing reach through:

• Use of existing distribution platforms, which can be already functioning
channels or networks created for other purposes.

• Increased field force responsibility to carry multiple products from a single
hub deeper into the rural areas.

• Proper incentives to all participants in the distribution chain, including
warehousers, intermediate distributors, and end dealers, so that margins
approach levels competitive with existing products/services sold.

• New alliances to allow specialization by task or capability — e.g., those with
better logistics and fulfillment capability might handle physical delivery,
or a channel can provide group-customer introductions to product-specific
field forces.

, .


Distribution poses key obstacles to scale and viability of enterprises attempting to
reach the poor with socially beneficial products. That’s because the poor are costly
to reach, and there are few direct channels to them. Indeed, a remarkable 97 percent
of India’s retail landscape is in the “unorganized sector.”44 Distribution channels
similar to those that serve middle class customers — networks of wholesale dis-
tributors and a mass of informal kirana shops, grocers,
pharmacies, and other small-scale retailers — extend into Although it may seem
slums and poor rural areas. obvious, creating a
custom channel was the
Although India’s retail sector is changing rapidly, formal
45 single most frequently-
retail outlets target primarily upper income groups in ur- occurring mistake.
ban areas. These channels rarely provide the education or
push needed to vend socially beneficial products such as condoms, water purifiers,
solar lanterns, and insurance down toward the base of the pyramid. As such, it
is imperative — but difficult — to find suitable channels able to reach low-income
customers and also fulfill important customer education or sensitization roles. The
task is made harder by the fact that many socially beneficial products are “push”
products, unfamiliar to the low-income segments and requiring behavior change or
paying for something they formerly received free. Credit is a notable exception, and
its presence can at least create a “pull context,” but cannot solve these problems
alone. And as indicated above, borrowers have distinct preferences for their credit-
enabled purchases.

Not surprisingly, the traditional way of selling socially beneficial products is by
creating a proprietary sales force and — along with after sales, service, and other
primary functions — use it to provide any needed customer education. Although it
may seem obvious, this was the single most frequently occurring mistake the study
found. Custom channels often result in uncompetitive product prices and non-
scalable business models. Because socially beneficial products need to be priced
as low as possible to reach the greatest number of potential customers, expensive

, .


proprietary distribution channels add to ticket price and thus diminish the potential
market. So too do attempts to employ poor people in proprietary distribution chan-
nels as an explicit part of the distribution strategy.46

NEST’s Proprietary Channel adds 23 percent to the product cost

2000

1620

1500 300
1320
100
200
1000
NEST Overheads
450
Labour

500 Lantern

570 Solar Panel

0
Wholesale Price Distribution, Consumer Price
Marketing
and Sales

Source: NEST

New Channels

Recently, an increasing number of new, non-traditional distribution channels that
directly reach the rural poor have reached critical mass in India. These have at-
tracted interest from producers who recognize that sharing channels will increase
market penetration. For example, MFIs now have some 14 million customers and
self-help groups in India now reach some 35 million rural low-income women.47
Agricultural co-ops include more than 230 million farmers, most of them poor.
And several high proﬁle initiatives — from Project Shakti48 of Hindustan Unilever
Limited (HUL) to e-Choupal of ITC — aim to distribute everything from soap, to
cosmetics, to health insurance and other non-traditional products and services.

, .


MFIs strike many producers as an especially attractive channel: most rely on a pro-
prietary direct sales force and offer the appealing synergy of distribution along with
access to credit — in effect, goods plus financing. For example, HUL and several
partners, including ACCESS, a network of NGO-based MFIs in India, have had re-
cent success in distributing HUL’s Pureit filter along with credit in Andhra Pradesh.
HUL initially sold 1,500 units in six months in a pilot phase, and the partnership is
now expanding to Rajasthan and other states.

Even so, several prominent attempt attempts to distribute socially beneficial products
via MFIs — insurance, solar lanterns, and mobile phones, for example — have been
notable disappointments. In general, the MFI channel can handle additional capacity
but needs managing to avoid overstretching its capabilities. Functions such as order
fulfillment or after-sales service are better performed by dedicated sales forces work-
ing with MFI representatives, who are better used mainly as door openers. This type
of hybrid approach might enable a sales force to cover far more territory.

WHAT CUSTOMERS SAY
“I’ve always wanted a phone but
Would you buy the pump if you could didn’t have the money at any one
pay for it with long-term credit?
time—the main reason I bought the
phone from SKS is so I can pay it
13%
“No” back over many weeks.”
- Customer, Andhra Pradesh

87%
“Yes”

Source: Monitor Focus Groups, 2008

, .


Some manufacturers have started experimenting with a class of “semi-rural
organized retail” stores emerging in India and elsewhere. These rural supercent-
ers — such as Hariyali Kisaan Bazaar or ITC’s Choupal Saagar — sell products
ranging from fertilizer and agricultural inputs to small durables and scores of other
items from tie-ins with pharmacies and other sources. Each store has a small field
force to extend its reach deeper into rural areas and is experimenting with product
mix in smaller villages. This channel doesn’t yet reach very far into the base of the
pyramid, but is rich with possibilities.

Shared Existing Channels

India and other countries have experimented with shared distribution via co-oper-
atives. Although co-ops can be difficult to work with, given their many layers and
fragmented decision rights, they are a potentially high-value channel. The South
Indian state of Karnataka, for example, has over 26,000 cooperative societies,
with nearly 19 million members. An insurance provider, Yeshasvini, uses co-ops to
reaches more than a million rural co-op members. The insurance costs about Rs. 10
per person per month and covers over 1,600 surgical procedures, including mater-
nal delivery and outpatient consultation.49

Although the insurance model isn’t commercially viable — it still relies on public
subsidies — early returns on distribution issues from the shared channel were encour-
aging. For Yeshasvini, the co-ops are a platform for access, distribution, customer
education, and collection of premiums, while over 200 hospitals in Karnataka provide
cashless treatment to Yeshasvini members. Shared distribution, however, is not the
sole key to the model: it also aggregates co-op members into a group risk pool that
now has access to good insurance coverage at a reasonable price. As of 2007, some
33,000 people had made claims, and another 200,000 received cashless outpatient care
each year. And of all the potential market-based solutions examined by Monitor, Ye-
shasvini was among the fastest to scale, almost solely because it relied on an existing
co-operative network. It reached its first million customers after just two years.

, .


THE MULTINATIONAL AND THE MFI: THE The FinComún-Grupo Bimbo busi-
GRUPO BIMBO-FINCOMÚN PARTNERSHIP ness model is particularly attractive for
In Mexico, small shop-owners at the its simplicity: FinComún agents go out
base of the pyramid are gaining access to in Bimbo supply trucks, learning from
credit via an innovative channel-sharing driver-deliverymen along the way the
arrangement between a small national payment history of Bimbo customers.
microﬁnancier and a large multinational As the drivers make deliveries, the MFI’s
corporation, in which the MFI does the agents discuss loan programs with Bimbo
piggybacking rather than the other way customers who have good payment
around. In 2002, FinComún, an MFI records. Afterward, shop owners inter-
with some 45,000 customers, entered into ested in FinComún programs can book
an alliance with Grupo Bimbo S.A., the a lengthier meeting. For its part, Grupo
eighth-largest baked goods corporation Bimbo is trimming bad debt, reducing
in the world, whose Mexico distribution the interval in which loans are repaid,
network includes some 450,000 small and successfully offering its clients ac-
retailers — 20 percent of whom regularly cess to credit. The typical loan size can
ask for credit. The partnership allows be quite small — as little as $50 — and,
Bimbo to take advantage of FinComún’s within two years of the partnership, 20
credit expertise while FinComún taps percent of FinComún’s business had
into Bimbo’s channels and product deliv- originated through its Bimbo connection.
ery methodology. The partnership has ample room to scale.

, .


Even under the best of circumstances, it is critical to align incentives correctly
throughout the channel all the way through the final distributor. Although an el-
ementary point, it is consistently overlooked by small-scale enterprises. A telling
example is the experience of Servals, the small manufacturer of cook stoves whose
cautionary tale — and storybook ending — is related in the introduction.

The benefits of a shared channel extend to scale economies in reaching the poor
and increasing the variety of products and services available to them. Shared chan-
nels are clearly scalable, as multiple manufacturers can share the costs of channels
that would otherwise be too expensive for any single producer. India’s success in
rural telecommunications illustrates the point: regulators ordered the major mobile
carriers to share the cost of building rural towers, thereby extending coverage and
providing access to millions of people. No carrier by itself could have generated
enough demand or volume to warrant the investment, but by sharing the cost, rural
service expanded exponentially.50

Challenges Require Imagination

We expect to see continued channel-sharing experimentation in India and else-
where. Creative arrangements may be necessary to bring private actors together.
Many channels that could be shared — for example, those of HUL’s Project Shak-
ti — were designed originally to sell only one firm’s goods. And some channels are
simply not set up to sell products at all. India has an extensive rural and state-owned
banking network, but regulations prohibit its use to sell physical goods.51


Food Security: SERP (rice delivery); Livelihoods: ITC e-Choupal insurance, Moksha Yug
Access; Agriculture: NCDEX/PCOs (futures pricing)

, .


PHILIPPINES’ GLOBE TELECOM: way while dramatically lowering cost.
A HARBINGER OF THINGS TO COME? The venture subsumes within it BPI’s
This report notes that, in addressing wholesale microfinance business and
low-income segments, large corporations focuses on serving large microfinance
will generally avoid high marginal-cost clients that are growing into small-and-
ventures like conventional branch banking medium enterprises. The bet is that the
and that middle-market business models distribution-banking combination will
cannot expect to succeed by simply slim- create sufficient automation and cost re-
ming down for the low-end markets. In duction to establish a profitable business.
the Philippines, however, Globe Telecom For both companies, this is an attempt to
is doing both — but with a twist. leapfrog: the business model allows BPI
to grow through a low-cost distribution
As an established leader in telecommuni- structure and an approach aimed squarely
cations services for low-income Filipinos, at the poor, and it gives Globe further
Globe has already established a strong penetration into financial services with-
understanding of these customers, their out having to build out infrastructure in
needs, and purchasing power. Globe the trade, getting the banking licenses, or
now seeks to build on that foundation, learning banking capabilities.
in tandem with its sister bank, BPI (Bank
of the Philippine Islands). But instead of If proven out in practical results, the
BPI trying to migrate its middle-market Globe-BPI business model might find
model of branch banking to low income itself at the fore of a trend in which
segments, it is joining with Globe to fun- big firms with large fixed cost invest-
damentally reinvent its offer and model ments and a comfort zone in serving
for markets at the base of the pyramid. low income segments — as many tele-
com companies are finding — eventually
The Globe-BPI joint venture is set to branch into other services, leveraging
operate a new microfinance bank that knowledge and assets already in place.
would combine the telecom company’s Indeed, mobile banking is already a “hot
distribution network and mobile com- topic” at CGAP and other places consid-
merce platform with BPI’s banking ering the future of financial services to
technology to serve customers in a new the poor.

, .


THE POOR AS SUPPLIERS, PRODUCERS, WORKERS

India’s ground-realities paint a challenging picture: of the 450 million or so jobs in
India, over 90 percent are in the informal sector. Most of these require relatively
low-skilled labor. Currently, of the more than 200 million households that occupy
the bottom 60 percent of India’s income pyramid, more than two-thirds are in agri-
cultural production, either as landholders, providers of day-labor, or both. A distant
second in the magnitude of employment is the construction sector, followed by
textiles, handicrafts, and labor-intensive sub-sectors of industrial manufacturing.52

Our efforts have focused on business models in these sectors.53 The demand for
low-cost labor in India, already signiﬁcant, had been growing rapidly until the recent
slump. As of mid-2008, construction alone was expected to command 5 million
additional jobs each year; textiles, retail, security, and Special Economic Zone ex-
pansion were each forecasted take up over a million laborers a year. More than ever,
a variety of enterprises — large businesses, third-party intermediaries, and organiz-
ers such as co-operatives — are engaging the poor as suppliers.

The reason why enterprises are increasingly engaging low-income segments as sup-
pliers lies almost wholly with its cost function: their labor is inexpensive and, in
most cases, underpriced. It is abundantly available — in uniform, large chunks for
centralized production (like textile factories or large-scale construction sites) or in
small, incremental pieces for essentially multiplying a household’s productive time
(as in poultry or crafts production). Moreover, low-income workers will generally
underprice — if they price at all — their capital, equipment, and land assets.

Although the growth of the formal economy is giving rise to rural-urban migration,
it will be decades before the balance shifts toward the cities, at least in India or Africa.
Meanwhile, those who would create market-driven business models employing rural
suppliers — now mostly small agricultural producers or dairy farmers — will face a
host of particular challenges, and none more formidable than that of scale.

, .


Monitor investigated over 130 enterprises attempting to engage the poor as sup-
pliers, producers, or workers. Most failed to scale, largely due to a common set of
barriers that are endemic to low-income suppliers, who are generally:

• Dispersed, hard-to-reach, and therefore expensive to aggregate through direct
engagement. In India, more than four-fifths of impoverished people
currently live in remote, rural areas.

• Participants in intermediated, inefficient, and opaque supply chains. Each
level of intermediation amounts to lost value in many segments
along the length of the chain as a result of significant transac-
tion costs and inefficiencies. And because the transmission of
information along these chains is incomplete and obscured,
low-income suppliers are closed off to current market signals; en-
terprises seeking to work with them often experience difficulty
in transmitting direct market signals down the chain, whether on
price, quality, or demand.

• Generally unable to finance the costs involved in switching supply chains.
Getting base-of-the-pyramid suppliers to switch from legacy
crops or traditional occupations to better-value production is dif-
ficult and expensive for a prospective market-driven venture. One
way of promoting a switch is to assist in financing their participa-
tion in new supply chains, which many enterprises are reluctant to
risk, primarily due to the retention problem.

• Often difficult to recruit and retain on terms favorable to the enterprise.
This is particularly so in informal, typically unskilled settings,
where the decisions of low-income suppliers follows short time
horizons and are usually unconstrained by long-term contractual

, .


relationships. The problem of retention is compounded by the
phenomenon of “side-selling” — suppliers trying to increase their
income in the short-term by selling their produce or labor to third
parties — which creates disincentives for firms to invest in train-
ing low-income suppliers.

Moreover, in engaging the poor as suppliers, quality control and standardization
are problematic and contribute significantly to enterprise costs. Quality assurance
becomes more expensive higher in the supply chain, as the cost of returns or re-
working becomes steeper. The enterprise’s commercial interest is thus best served
by building in QA checks as close to bottom of the chain as possible.

The business models we single out here provide imaginative ways to help overcome
these structural hurdles and enlarge opportunities for low-income rural workers.
They also have one thing in common: they all are organized at or near the top of
the supply chain. A frequently recurring development livelihood intervention is to
aggregate producers at the bottom of the supply chain, provide them with bet-
ter information, or build assets in the middle of a given value chain (for instance,
agricultural warehouses or terminal markets). Very few such interventions studied
by the project, however, resulted in significant, scalable effects on livelihoods. Here
more than in any other area we found a number of business models much greater
than the three we see as being viable.

, .


WHAT DOESN’T WORK IN ENGAGING DISTRIBUTED SUPPLIERS: FHEL’S EXPERIENCE

The development world has produced of the Container Corporation of India
a slew of intervention schemes built Ltd. (CONCOR), incorporated in 2006.
around convincing small, marginal ag- Seeing that 30 percent of the fruit and
ricultural producers to switch from low vegetables in India are lost due to poor
value-added products to higher value post harvest management, CONCOR
ones — thus helping producers “jump set up FHEL to build a world-class cold
supply chains” and realize improved storage infrastructure, thereby delivering
incomes. The traditional approach a complete cold-chain logistics solution
proceeds from the recognition that ag- to the stakeholders in this area.
gregation is generally beneficial to small
producers but takes a wrong turn by rely- FHEL opted to procure and market
ing on a “bottom of the supply chain” apples, both domestically and interna-
approach. That is, many NGO, govern- tionally. It also chose to source the apples
ment, and donor-funded schemes focus by going directly to the farmers. FHEL
on organizing farmers into producer provided pre-harvest and post-harvest
groups or co-operatives, training them to assistance to apple farmers in the state of
grow or produce something new, cover- Himachal Pradesh. Pre-harvest assistance
ing startup or switching costs, and then included:
promising to help find markets for their
product. But when the markets fail to • Guidance on proper cultivation to
materialize, everyone loses. ensure better quality fruit and better
yields.
Even private firms fall into this trap, as il-
lustrated by Fresh and Healthy Enterprise • Testing of maturity and color of
Limited (FHEL) in India, which tried a apples by trained personnel.
“middle of the supply chain” interven-
• Picking at appropriate time.
tion. FHEL is a fully owned subsidiary

, .


Post-harvest assistance included: beginning. Considering the hype over the
huge Indian market for fresh fruit and
• FHEL-designed cartons for crating vegetables, FHEL assumed there would
and shipping. be ample numbers of buyers.

• Cold storage facilities. Meanwhile, farmers had switched from
their original buyers to FHEL—but
• Grading and sorting on computerized because FHEL couldn’t sell off its inven-
automatic sorting/grading lines. tory of apples, it couldn’t make additional
purchases from the farmers. Thus the
• Dispatch of apples to customers.
farmers too were left without a buyer.
As a result, they either had to return to
FHEL has invested more than $17 mil-
the local mandi or try to reconnect with
lion in infrastructure and assistance to
previous buyers. With FHEL-provided
farmers since starting operations in 2006.
training, the farmers may now be more
Yet as of January 2009, FHEL is sitting
efﬁcient growers, but they’ve lost income
on tons of apples in storage and has no
and their lives have been disrupted.
buyers. Why? It failed to address top-of-
the-supply-chain issues from the very

, .


Contract Production MODEL 5

CORE MODEL ELEMENTS
A typical agricultural contract production arrangement has five features:

• Agreement to future purchase, usually at a predetermined price. Payment is
typically made at the time of purchase, on the spot.

• Provision of inputs and other resources such as seeds, fertilizers, and
pesticides — or, in the case of poultry, chicks and feed — on credit to each
contracted farmer, usually at the village. Technical advice and assistance may
also be provided.

• Technical specifications that include requirements and standards for
farmers’ use of inputs, quality assurance, permissible varieties, cultivation
and harvesting, and sometimes even packing and shipping.

• Direct collection, often from the farm-gate but sometimes delivered by
the producers.

• Onward sale and fulfillment, in which the contracting enterprise maintains
the market relationship and grades, processes, packs, and ships the
harvested commodity.

, .


A contract production54 deal is generally a simple assured buy-back arrangement
(often with pre-negotiated pricing) between an enterprise and the supplier. The
contractor usually furnishes a range of inputs and later collects outputs, essentially
outsourcing all production to the supplier.55 Contract production is an appealing
model for engaging low-income segments in supply chains because it makes use of
their comparative advantages: low-cost labor and land. When well implemented,
the model builds stable networks of suppliers in a way that creates cost and quality
advantages for the contractor.

Role of the Supply Chain Organizer in Managing Contract Production

INPUTS PRODUCTION LOGISTICS SALES & MARKETING

Provision of inputs: Farmers grow Farm gate or village Enterprise
either free or sold produce. Enterprise level collection, responsible for
(with credit) by the conducts regular transport, processing creating market
contracting monitoring, technical (if required) by linkages to ensure
enterprise. Start-up assistance, QA, and enterprise. forward sales of items
capital provided training. produced.
where needed.

The model has several attractive features that align risks and incentives at the
appropriate places in the supply chain. In particular, contract production:

• Transfers risk and capital requirements away from small, low-income
suppliers to larger organizations better suited to absorbing them.

• Aligns the incentives of the top-of-the-supply chain organizing
entity with those of small producers, enabling the latter to func-
tion as an aggregate.

• Covers small producers’ cost of participation and reduces their
risk by guaranteeing a market for their output, often at a ﬁxed
minimum price, frequently above spot-market value.

, .


• Provides a steady cash flow to contract farmers and encourages
them to stay with the contract provider.

• Ties small farmers directly to demand sources and eliminates the
need to participate in intermediated supply chains with low-mar-
gin commodity crops.

Calypso Foods is a specialty fruits and vegetables exporter that has organized its
supply chain end-to-end to grow, process, pack, and export processed foods such as
gherkins (pickles), pineapples, and sweet corn, mostly for European markets. The
company works with about 5,000 farmers, primarily on a contractual basis, and is
a private, for-profit firm with revenues of $6 million in 2008, up from $4.5 million
in 2007.

Calypso’s gherkin business includes a network of over 2,000 farmers in southern
India. The contract farming area is divided by Calypso into six “clusters,” each
covering 20 to 25 villages, about 300 acres of land, and several hundred farmers.
Clusters are run by an area manager and six field supervisors who are each respon-
sible for three or four villages.

Calypso targets the middle strata of the country’s farmer population, with an aver-
age landholding of between two and five acres and average monthly household
expenditure of Rs. 4,000 ($80). The land must meet Calypso’s standards for soil
composition, and participation in the supply chain requires each farmer to allocate
up to half an acre for gherkin cultivation. Farmers must also have access to irriga-
tion; in some cases, this may mean willingness to install drip irrigation, for which
financing is made available (up to Rs. 5,000, or $100).

Calypso bears the costs and risks of getting started, especially with a new and un-
familiar crop, and the Calypso model covers all phases of activity in the supply
chain. First, it provides inputs, making seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides available to

, .


contract farmers on affordable credit. It also provides technical assistance through
field supervisors who visit each farmer twice a week.

Farmers are paid in installments every two weeks to guarantee cash flow. At the
harvest, a Calypso buying team collects crops at a depot in each village. The same
plot of farmland can yield two-three harvests a year, but for a single farmer, crop
rotation can increase this number. Finally, gherkins are graded, processed, packed,
labelled and exported to end distributors.

The cost of inputs and cultivation to Calypso account for about 16 percent of total
export production costs, or about Rs. 8 of a Rs. 52 end sale price (per kilogram
of gherkin). The benefit to Calypso of this form of sourcing is an assured supply
that is less expensive to acquire than if it had to purchase or lease the land, hire the
workers, and centrally manage production — Calypso calculates its costs would rise
by some 30-40 percent per kilo of gherkin to do so.

The benefit to Calypso of The Calypso model also clearly benefits the farmers, who
this form of sourcing is see up to a 125 percent increase in net annual income,
an assured supply that is as well as skills upgrades through adoption of GAP-type
less expensive to acquire practices56 in cultivation and handling to suit European-
than if it had to purchase supermarket procurement standards.
or lease the land, hire the
workers, and centrally
manage production

, .


Gherkin Cultivation Accounts for a 125 Percent Increase in a Farmer’s Income
110–125K
5%

125% Average
Income Increase
66%

Rs 45–50K

Gherkin

Coconut
56%
Rice
27%

44%
7%

Before After Farmer’s Cost
of Investment1

Source: Management interviews and field visits; Monitor analysis.
Assumes average landholding of 4 acres with 1 acre under gherkin cultivation
1
amortized investment

Farmers also benefit in numerous other ways. They gain experience growing higher-
value crops, even though most diversify and continue to grow traditional crops and
staples. Buy-back guarantees mean they are insured against income uncertainty and
risk arising from market fluctuations. And the model yields second-order income
benefits: because gherkin farming is labor-intensive — 250 to 300 labor-days per
acre — farmers hire other landless workers to help in the fields, thereby generating
additional employment and incomes.57

Business models similar to Calypso’s are already in use and scaling up in many
emerging markets elsewhere for crops that include rice, cotton, flowers, and veg-
etables. Contract production is profitable for the operator, can be replicated for
different crops and products, and provides significant cost advantages — a worthy
“solution.”58 And at a system level, it efficiently makes credit available where needed
and keeps infrastructure investment aligned with market needs.

, .


Downside Risks

Despite its scalability and economic benefits, contract production is tricky to imple-
ment, as FAO and others have noted. Assuring a fixed price to participating farmers
implies the contractor will assume the entire market-price risk. Calypso guarantees a
fixed price market for the entire crop. In Calypso’s case, gherkin prices have remained
steady since 2004; consequently, it has not had to deal with the potential effects of
falling prices, which can obviously complicate relationships with the farmers.

Rising prices pose an additional, potentially more insidious, problem: side-selling.
This occurs when suppliers seek short-term advantage and break the contract by
selling to third parties, usually at a local spot market. In such instances, the contrac-
tor will take the loss (unless its contracts can be enforced — which, given the time,
cost, and vagaries of local jurisdictions, may be problematic). And if side-selling is
rampant, the enterprise may have trouble meeting its commitments to its custom-
ers — an occasional problem for Calypso in its pineapple business.59 To curb the
practice, a contractor can control input provision so as to penalize the farmer by
refusing to re-engage if side-selling occurs. The contractor can also select crops
that have no local spot markets — like gherkins, which aren’t part of Indians’ diets.
Such a course may narrow application of this model to niche markets.

“Switching time” — the time taken by farmers to earn a return from the new contract
crop — is a third hazard. One contract production scheme, run by Agrocel in Gujarat
aimed to convert farmers to organic cotton production, a switchover process that usually
takes a non-organic farm at least three years to complete. However, over three-fourths
of the small farmers in the scheme couldn’t wait the three years for the eventual pay-
back — they switched to BT cotton, a commercial, genetically-modified variety that
generates quicker returns. Agrocel’s experience illustrates the farmers’ low appetite for
risk and the short time horizon needed to switch a farmer out of a traditional activity.
And all of this happened in a program where the switching costs were already being
financed by Agrocel, which was near the top of the supply chain (selling directly on to
Marks & Spencer).

, .


CONTRACT PRODUCTION OUTSIDE OF AGRICULTURE: FABINDIA

Direct sourcing deep into the pyramid tural models push the grading and sorting
also works beyond agriculture in sectors function further down the chain.
where low-cost, distributed labor can be
aggregated efficiently. In general, unskilled The arrangement between the parties is
workers lack resources to invest in training not exclusive, although Fabindia provides
themselves or in financing a switch to bet- incentives to the COCs to refrain from
ter supply chains (or trade) or to producing side-selling. In fact, unlike the traditional
better quality goods or services. As a result, artisan co-operative arrangements, Fabindia
they hop frequently from job to job in co-owns these COCs with their supplier
search of the best deal and may not honor artisans — in each COC, 25 percent of
a given deal for long. the shares are reserved for artisans, which
creates incentives for individual workers to
Several employers have found ways to join the COC. Consequently, they receive
engage unskilled workers productively. not only payments from the value of
Fabindia is a well-known commercial the contracted goods but also occasional
retailer of clothing, home décor, and other dividends as their equity appreciates. One
goods in urban India. It set up 17 Com- reason these arrangements work is because
munity Owned Companies (COCs) to demand is growing so rapidly — Fabindia
coordinate supply from more than 13,000 has expanded from 65 stores in 2007 to its
individual craft artisans who make clothing, current 97 — that the retailer can absorb
housewares, and other goods to Fabindia all the COCs can produce and then some.
specifications. The retailer has increasingly How the company manages this potential
pushed the quality-assurance function issue if demand slows in the future will
down to individual COCs, much as agricul- bear watching.

, .


Finally, a key issue involves how enterprises might best implement a market-based
business model that creates positive income effects for the farmers and also en-
gages low-income segments. Generally, incentives will move contractors in the
opposite, less costly direction of contracting with fewer larger suppliers: it’s less
complicated, requires fewer purchase agreements, has simpler logistics, and so on.
The bias in contract production will always be towards big-
Despite the genuine ger producers. Monitor investigated several enterprises in
risks, contract production India that reached at least some smaller farmers, but the
is a profitable, scalable number varied — 50 percent of Eurofruits’ suppliers, less
business model that for Suguna Poultry.60
provides significant
positive income effects for Those wishing to create business models that are both
low-income farmers. profitable and engage the poor as suppliers need to deter-
mine the right product(s) to source and the ways in which
the economics of collection might best include smaller producers. We’ve seen suc-
cessful ways to make this happen: by first saturating an area with medium-sized
farmers and then moving to incorporate smaller farmers on top of existing fixed
costs; or by creating local collection depots where small farmers can drop off and
combine produce for the supply chain organizer.

Despite the genuine risks, contract production is a profitable, scalable business model
that provides significant positive income effects for low-income farmers. Although
primarily applicable in specific niche situations, the markets for which it most suited
include some of the most rapidly growing in emerging-markets agriculture: fruits
and vegetables and poultry are expected to grow at 33 percent over the next five
years — nearly 16 times the rate of agriculture in general in the developing world.61


Agriculture: KBRL, Pepsi, Mahagrapes, DFV, Agrocel; Poultry: Suguna Poultry, Pradan, Shanthi

, .


A CELEBRATED BEE SCHOOL — to MFIs or NGOs to borrow the initial
HONEY CARE AFRICA capital investment of $220. Honey Care
An innovative, for-profit Kenyan compa- does not itself finance loans but ensures
ny, Honey Care Africa has grown rapidly loan repayment through deductions from
to become the largest supplier of high farmers’ incomes, transferring these
quality honey to East Africa. Founded directly to the lender.
in 1999, Honey Care now sources di- Farmers receive two-and-a-half days of
rectly from some 12,000 farmers, 47 practical hands-on training through local
percent of whom are women. For the agricultural colleges, after which they sign
vast majority of Honey Care’s beekeep- a contract in which Honey Care guaran-
ers, honey offers supplementary income tees to buy all their production at prices
for a low level of effort; most tend four in line with the Fair Trade Labelling
beehives for some 15 minutes every two Organisation (FLO) recommendations.
weeks or so. In the first year, four hives Honey Care’s field staff services “col-
produce a single harvest of some 60 kilo- lection points” located near clusters of
grams — which equals about $80 income villages and brings in the gathered honey.
against a $220 upfront investment. After Field staff earnings are partly based on
the initial year as the hives become more the amounts of honey collected.
established, income increases to between
As might be expected, side-selling is a
$200 and $250 per year.
substantial challenge for Honey Care.
Honey Care organizes every segment Its beekeepers are liable to migrate to
of its supply chain end-to-end from alternative buyers for even a modest
the top, helps arrange financing, and premium. Honey Care counters this by
provides training and field services for committing to “consistent good quality
participating farmers. . Upon identifying service” to the farmers, who have begun
a promising new catchment area, Honey to realize the value of not defecting.
Care sends a representative in to promote Regular interaction with the field staff
its model and reach out to village and ensures a measure of oversight and keeps
farmer organizations and local self-help side-selling to the minimum. Honey Care
groups for support in spreading the also makes rapid payments, which also
word. Farmers who offer Honey Care helps to keep farmers loyal.
“an expression of interest” are connected

, .


Deep Procurement MODEL 6

CORE MODEL ELEMENTS
Most direct, deep agricultural procurement schemes involve common features:

• Market linkages to major buyers with information on pricing, required
quality, volumes, etc. passed directly on to producers.

• Direct purchasing relationships with the farmer, often through spot-market
procurement, with assured payment, and bypassing traditional middlemen and
layers in the chain. Pricing is not, however, guaranteed in this business model.

• Quality assurance closer to the source, resulting in lower overall costs.

• Direct collection that can include spot collection platforms for purchase,
arrangements for farmers to deliver directly, or aggregation points where
smaller producers can assemble their produce before grading and shipping.

• Technical assistance provided through training and instruction on market
requirements, with some schemes using extension services or their own
training force.

, .


A recurring theme in engaging low-income segments as suppliers is the need to
overcome formidable barriers to reaching them. In the case of the rural poor, the
obstacles are both geographical — dispersed farms and communities — and organi-
zational — overly complex and inefficient supply chains. In tandem, these barriers
mean the proprietor of a small vegetable farm in India, for example, may realize
only 25 percent of the eventual market value of his produce. Intermediaries such as
transporters, traders, commission agents, and wholesalers typically extract between
30 and 45 percent of the final market value, while spoilage and wastage may ac-
count for up to another 30 percent lost.

Costs of Intermediation and Wastage Represent Significant
Opportunities to Increase Incomes of Tomato Farmers

SYSTEM COSTS OPPORTUNITY

Wastage (to first point of sale)1 14%

Commission 3% 42%

Large Wholesalers 25%
1
includes wastage between farm gate and first point of sale and produce that never makes it to the
market.
Source: Monitor primary research at mandis, farmer interviews.

The high supply-chain costs suggest opportunities for direct sourcing from those
near the base of the pyramid. Indeed, some prominent private companies — Reli-
ance, ITC, Birla, ShopRite, and the Future Group — are already managing their
own supply chains in new retail operations for fresh fruits and vegetables. Other
companies like Tata, DCSL, and Mahindra, which traditionally operate in discrete
segments, are expanding elsewhere in the supply chain. The most prominent exam-
ple is ITC’s now famous e-Choupal initiative, which relies on village-based kiosks,

, .


the Internet, and its own collection points to bypass local mandis for crops such as
soy and wheat, which delivers procurement cost savings to ITC of about 1.5 per-
cent per transaction, spread over millions of transactions.62

So far, these private initiatives are sourcing from relatively large farms and have not
fully engaged the poor living further down the income scale. The reason is sim-
ple economics: it’s easier to deal with a few big producers
Several innovators are rather than manage many small ones. But several innova-
pioneering ﬁnancially tors are pioneering ﬁnancially viable business models that
viable business models engage small producers in supply chains. These apply not
that engage small only to agriculture but also to other sectors such as light
producers in supply chains. manufacturing and construction.
These apply not only to
agriculture but also to In the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, the So-
other sectors such as ciety for the Elimination of Poverty (SERP), a public
light manufacturing and agency, organizes more than 800,000 poor women into
construction. self-help groups and federations primarily to provide ac-
cess to credit, banking, and other services. It has also
arranged buyer relationships with two large agencies of the state government,
Civil Supplies Corporation (CSC) of India and AP Markfed (a government-creat-
ed co-operative marketing organization), to procure commodity crops like maize
and rice from farmers in the SERP network and sell them on to buyers at the top
of the supply chain.

As part of the arrangement, SERP has scattered extremely low-tech procurement
centers — usually weighing scales, tarps, quality-assurance mechanisms, and check
books — every four to six miles across rural Andhra Pradesh. SERP agents, who

, .


are usually members of self-help groups, staff the centers, procure the crops at
established prices, provide quality assurance, and then aggregate their purchases at
local hubs for eventual sale to AP Markfed and CSC.

The deep procurement model benefits all its parties. The small farmers receive
significant savings on their per-sale transaction costs — up to 90 percent per
sale — and fair terms for their produce at collection stations relatively close to their
homes. This translates to about a 10-15 percent income effect annually, driven by
transaction cost savings. The model also benefits CSC and AP Markfed, which es-
timates a saving of about five percent over traditional intermediated sourcing.63 At
the same time, the model lowers costs by sorting and grading of produce at earlier
stages in supply chain. SERP realizes commission revenues
to cover the costs of the network and its operations. Finally, Small farmers receive
the self-help group members who staff the SERP procure- significant savings
ment centers find productive employment. on their per-sale
transaction costs
This deep procurement model is highly scalable. Monitor — up to 90 percent per
has modeled an enterprise for commercial procurement of sale — and fair terms for
fruits and vegetables similar to SERP that would sell di- their produce at collection
rectly to bulk buyers — organized retail and agri-processing stations relatively close
sectors. The model provides savings to the purchaser at the to their homes.
top of the supply chain (ranging from 17 to 24 percent),
income benefit to the small farmer (from 10 to 30 percent, depending on farm size
and the portion of a farmer’s income that accrues from fruits and vegetables), and
profitability for the operator of such a network after three years.

Direct sourcing deep into the base of the pyramid also works beyond agriculture in
sectors where low-cost labor can be aggregated efficiently and where there are long,
intermediated sourcing chains. In general, unskilled workers lack resources to invest

, .


A MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE the village, and are usually well-respected and
MILK BUSINESS: NESTLÉ PAKISTAN somewhat educated members of the com-
munity. The selectee is then trained by Nestlé
Nestlé Pakistan’s deep procurement model
on various milk collection and operational
collects milk directly from 160,000 small
techniques — tasting, analysis, measuring
Pakistani farmers spread over 125,000 square
and sampling — so that quality assurance is
kilometers of land primarily in Punjab. The
undertaken at source. The VMC is respon-
end-to-end business takes in 500 million
sible for collection, storage, and all village
liters of milk a year, and in 2008 turned a net
level operations, including cash payment to
proﬁt of $20.7 million on revenues of $456
farmers and organizes extension services,
million. Although Nestlé recognizes smaller
delivered by Nestlé staff, who explain vac-
farmers involve a higher cost to serve, in
cination, worming, and basic veterinary
many ways it prefers to deal with this group
services to farmers at no cost. VMC agents
because smallholders “sell everything they
are paid on commission, while farmers are
can afford to sell” and have less bargaining
paid each Saturday according to the quality
power. They are thus less likely to defect
of milk — based on fat content and total dis-
from the Nestlé system.
solved solids — from a pricelist on display in
the chilling center.
Nestlé manages the entire supply chain end-
to-end, setting up “Village Chilling Centers”
Nestlé faces challenges typical of the business
in large villages, spaced out for a maximum
model. First, setting up a deep procurement
of 20 minutes traveling time from the most
network is time- and cost-intensive . For ex-
remote villages — at distances over 20 min-
ample, when expanding into Sind, Nestlé had
utes, unrefrigerated milk will turn. Farmers
to conduct its own aerial survey to identify
from neighboring villages come to deposit
“green patches of land” — validated against
their milk at the chilling center in the larger
census data — to decide where to locate their
village. Most of the chilled milk from village-
centers. Secondly, side-selling is a problem, es-
level centers is collected by tanker trucks and
pecially with farmers who supply 30-40 liters
transported to Nestlé factories.
per day — generally the minimum quantity of
interest to alternative buyers. Opportunistic
The key link in the Nestlé supply chain is the
middlemen often offer slightly higher prices,
Village Milk Collection Agent. VMC Agents
but Nestlé’s long record of fair and consistent
run the chilling centers and function as the
service to farmers helps surmount side-selling:
last link in the Nestlé model. They are typi-
few farmers actually defect.
cally selected by Nestlé in consultation with

, .


in training themselves, or to finance switching to better supply chains (or trade), or
to produce better quality goods or services. As a result, they frequently change em-
ployers in search of the best deal and may not honor a given deal for long.

Challenges

Although deep procurement has proven successful and scalable in a variety of
sectors, and is the business model that most consistently involves large corporate
entities, it is not without problems. First, it bypasses traditional intermediaries
who have a strong interest in opposing supply-chain innovation. ITC’s e-Choupal
manages this problem by absorbing intermediaries into its network. SERP handles
it through its mission — that is, according to supporters,
it creates more than enough social capital in local areas Every deep procurement
through the self-help groups to drown out complaints by model was preoccupied
intermediaries. Meanwhile, intermediaries are less critical by the imperative to add
in fruits and vegetables, as produce is harvested several volume to the network,
times per year and usually returns sufficient cash to avoid with goods and services
the need for credit in purchasing the next round of seeds moving in both directions.
and fertilizer.

A second issue involves generating sufficient throughput to justify creating and
maintaining a procurement network that reaches deep into the pyramid. Although
individual procurement centers are each inexpensive, creating a network requires
significant fixed cost, especially if circumstances require many hubs and intermedi-
ate collection facilities. Thus every deep procurement model Monitor studied was
preoccupied by the imperative to add volume to the network, with goods and ser-
vices moving in both directions. SERP is investigating the sourcing of additional
crops as well as using the network for distribution. ITC has recently begun to use its
e-Choupal network to push products down the chain — everything from insurance
to water filters are being distributed via the Choupal Saagar stores and network.64

, .


DEEP PROCUREMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: al development differs within Hortifruti’s
HORTIFRUTI area of operations, the company applies
Hortifruti was founded in 1972 and was different strategies in different countries.
acquired by Walmart in 2006. Thirty
In Honduras, Hortifruti builds around
years ago, it created the “Tierra Fertil”
“lead farmers” (also referred to as
(“fertile land”) program to facilitate
“preferred partners”) through which it
agricultural modernization among small
identifies and build the capacity of those
and medium producers that today con-
farmers best able to meet its quality
tinues to engage the base of the pyramid.
requirements consistently. Having dem-
The company estimates that, at any
onstrated such capacity, lead farmers
given moment it has some 7,000 or so
receive larger and larger orders for prod-
Costa Rican, Honduran, and Nicaraguan
uct or new products and are encouraged
families in its network. It also has newer
to work with neighboring farmers to
operations in El Salvador and Guatemala,
meet this demand. The lead farmer thus
the latter of which is the beneficiary of
serves as a node in providing technology,
a relatively recent partnership between
technical assistance, and market access.
Wal-Mart, USAID, and two nonprofit
Hortifruti’s regional operation now has
groups to link more small growers to the
some 250 products, the result of organic
Wal-Mart supply chain.*
expansion, constant identification of new
Hortifruti’s business model combines the lead farmers, and operations that are low-
infrastructure of direct, deep procure- cost, scalable, and easily sustainable.
ment — for market linkage, sourcing,
quality assurance, and support — with
aspects of a contract production model,
typically engaging its producers via in-
formal assured buy-back agreements and
supplying them with seed, technology,
and know-how. As the level of agricultur-

, .


Third, it is critical to find a buyer atop the supply chain to guarantee that outputs
will be purchased. This is the role AP Markfed performs for SERP and Fabindia for
the COCs. Unless overall demand is demonstrably growing reliably, potential guar-
antors and even participating small suppliers may view such a function as fraught
with risk.

A final issue involves, again, the substantial disincentives to work with large num-
bers of marginal producers. The key to this model is building supply chains that
source from the poor but are competitive with those using larger producers. Public
agencies like SERP have a mission to elevate the poor, whereas most for-profit
enterprises will gravitate to the easier task of building supply chains that engage
a few large producers instead of many small ones. As noted, Reliance, ITC, Birla,
and other companies tend to deal with larger producers with larger landholdings of
between five and ten acres.


Agriculture: Birla’s More, ITC Choupal Fresh, Reliance Fresh, Metro; Dairy: AMUL, Glaxo
SmithKline Beecham

, .


DEEP PROCUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTION LABOR: LABOURNET

Urban labor procurement models provid- The direct engagement of construction crews
ing direct income effect also show promise appeals especially to households and smaller
in the construction and maintenance sec- job contractors in the lower segments of the
tors, expected to be the largest generator of industry where there is less margin for adding
new jobs in India in the next five years. Like intermediate contractors and subcontractors.
agriculture — construction is a highly inter- Although the service was initially designed to
mediated business, with multiple participants serve contractors, it has also proved effec-
involved in fulfilling specific roles for each tive for architects, engineers, and others who
specific construction job. The low end of the want to disintermediate long supply chains
building trade requires only modest skill to and find help directly. For its part, Labour-
become a mason, painter, or even crew chief. Net earns fees from registering users on
As such, it is a natural magnet for employ- both sides of the transaction, as well as from
ment of the rural unskilled or semi-skilled transaction fees. Workers receive additional
as they migrate to cities and slums. For them income from more regular work. In addition,
to find productive employment — and for LabourNet has created a platform with which
general contractors to find them — is often it can pre-assure demand for services like ac-
a significant challenge, especially in a high cident and health insurance. Individually few
growth environment. construction workers can afford insurance,
but with over 3,000 crews registered on the
LabourNet, a young enterprise in Bangalore, LabourNet platform, the cost of serving this
offers a solution. The firm visits job sites and group is dramatically reduced.
labor centers, and has registered more than
6,000 workers and foremen as well as many LabourNet’s intervention is situated in the
general contractors. When employers need middle of the supply chain and it is not yet a
help, they simply contact LabourNet and fully commercially viable enterprise, although
get immediate referrals to crews that meet it recently converted from NGO to for-profit
criteria for location, skills, and availability. status. LabourNet is also expanding its busi-
Half of all inquiries result immediately in the ness model into different segments, including
hiring of a crew. Meanwhile, LabourNet’s domestic workers.
database continues to grow.

, .


Demand-Led Training MODEL 7

CORE MODEL ELEMENTS
Demand-led vocational training and placement brings a heretofore exclusively
formal-market model into more informal markets through:

• Market linkages to those with jobs to fill that require specific skills and traits
for employees or contractors.

• Pre-assured demand to ensure that workers are not sourced or trained
without knowing where their end placement will be.

• Retention support, where the entity tracks and sometimes supports
retention efforts to ensure the return on training investment.

• Certification of quality, providing employers and trainees with some
knowledge of the degree of quality conferred by the training and placement.

For those at the base of the pyramid, the best options for substantially improving
incomes and livelihoods are in the formal production or services sectors of the
economy. Low-income workers entering these markets, however, inevitably require
training in specific job-related skills or more general presentational basics, such
as dress, grooming, and the like. States, NGOs, and private firms have developed
business models to address these needs. India’s rapid creation of Special Economic
Zones and attendant support services is a prime and high-profile example.65

, .


Despite such programs, poor workers typically have little access to formal-sector
training and placement resources. Moreover, training initiatives are rare in growing
informal-sector industries like construction, and even at the low end of the formal
sector in such industries as textiles, which fans out widely into the informal sector.
Indeed, in Asia’s and Africa’s developing economies,
Training initiatives are rare the informal sector is often significantly larger than
in growing informal-sector the formal sector. India’s informal sector accounts for
industries like construction, some 90 percent of all employment.66
and even at the low end of the
formal sector. And if training initiatives are “rare,” they’re not
non-existent. NGOs, private firms, and states are in-
creasingly promoting efforts to provide rural people with marketable skills and
thus the possibility of more remunerative employment. We are particularly drawn
to business models that offer market-linked third-party training and placement
for the lower-income segments. The state of Andhra Pradesh alone has tapped
into several different models of this type in outsourcing vocational training for
hundreds of thousands of young workers as part of its Rajiv Udyogasri Society,
Employment Generation and Marketing Mission (EGMM), and other training
and placement initiatives.67

The basic outsourced training and placement model is a familiar one at the higher
end of job markets. There market-linked third party training and placement hap-
pens smoothly and without much need for government incentives or payment. The
model is simple: firms that need employees simply pay a third party to locate, train,
and place them — an effective, albeit hardly new, approach used widely in India and
elsewhere. However, we have begun to see new applications in India. Some rural
BPOs, for example, train and engage rural college graduates.

For low-income workers, the question becomes: to what extent can models de-
signed for high-end jobs be modified and adapted to the base-of-the-pyramid job

, .


markets? And more particularly, because poor people generally lack the cash flow
or savings to pay for training (not to mention their inability to take time off from
current income-earning activities), will another party — either government or em-
ployers themselves — pay for the training and placement?

The Indian exemplar in this area is TeamLease Services (TeamLease), the coun-
try’s second largest private employer. Although it has branched into permanent and
executive placement, TeamLease is primarily a “temping” agency — hiring, training,
placing, paying, and evaluating workers, on order mostly from formal sector cli-
ent companies. With 20 offices in 18 cities, it has a country-wide presence, serves
1,000 clients with 80,000 employees, and with over 600 locations is able — says
its promotional literature — to “reach into the heart of rural India.”68 Its model is
straightforward and wholly demand-driven. TeamLease:

• Takes requirements from employers, scopes the assignment, lays
out an operational process, and identifies and recruits individuals
to fill positions.

• Ensures sufficient training before placing the employee and ad-
ministers payroll and benefits for the duration of the fixed-term
assignment. Employees are enrolled in a database against which
new client requirements are matched and are generally assured
continuous employment.

• Typically focuses on college-educated candidates both in both ru-
ral and urban areas and on placing rural workers in urban formal
sector jobs.

• Charges recruiting, training, and placement back to the requisition-
ing firms that will receive newly trained temporary employees.69

, .


DEMAND-LED (BUT NOT OUTSOURCED) years of operation, Guangsha put over 750,000
TRAINING: GUANGSHA CONSTRUCTION workers through its schools. Guangsha also
founded and funded the Guangsha College of
Guangsha Construction, founded in 1992, is
Applied Construction Technology, a three-year
China’s largest non-state-owned construction
non-degree granting institution that has a Face-
company, with 2005 net profits of $19 mil-
book site to attract English-language teachers.
lion and an output value of $670.7 million.
Headquartered in Hangzhou, the capital of Guangsha’s training program appears wholly
Zhejiang Province, Guangsha Construction is demand-led, driven by construction-site
part of Guangsha Holdings Ltd, which claims requirements. It engages rural migrants es-
RMB 16.7 billion ($2.4 billion) in revenues and sentially as semi-permanent day-laborers, on
50,000 employees. a project-by-project basis, but will grant a
contract only to those who receive training. To
One way or another, companies train their new
be awarded their certificate and get a con-
hires — either on the job or more formally.
tract, workers must pass four exams: one on
Guangsha is different in that it reaches into
legal codes, two technical courses and a safety
the base of China’s economic pyramid to train
course. Guangsha say that 90 percent of stu-
low-skill, low- or no-income rural migrants
dents get their certificate on the first attempt
in marketable construction skills. In the late
and the remainder on their second attempt.
1990s, Guangsha began to explore the possibil-
The certificate is valid for one year, but if the
ities of training the temporary migrant workers
worker changes projects before then, retraining
who make up the majority of its construction-
is required for the new project. As an incentive
site workforce. The company was particularly
do well — and to promote employee retention
concerned about on-site accidents, which it
among top performers — Guangsha gives cash
found due largely to workers’ ignorance of
bonuses to the top 10 percent in any given
safety procedures or inadequate training in
training group.
equipment operation. Guangsha established its
own free-tuition schools in 2000 with an initial Retained workers will thus be retrained
investment of RMB 30 billion (at the time, each year or at the beginning of a new proj-
$3.65 billion). This is particularly notable since ect — whichever comes first. Workers who stay
most construction firms lack any long-term with Guangsha will be able to progress up the
relationship with their primarily informal sector skills ladder as, project by project, they receive
workers, and therefore have no incentive to successively higher-levels of training. Ultimate-
invest directly in their skills. ly, consistent high performers who qualify as
skilled workers will be offered permanent, full-
At Guangsha, vocational school “campuses”
time contracts — a rare step largely confined to
are now established on each construction site
of over 5,000 square meters. In the first five higher-level jobs such as project manager.

, .


TeamLease executives claim their employees earn on average three times the mini-
mum wage, thus offering a significant income benefit for the average emigrating
rural “fresher.”70

Despite the company’s focus on the formal sector — for example, banking, IT, and
other service industries — TeamLease is extending its model to the lower end of
the formal sector and to quasi-formal sector trades, like security, housekeeping, and
retail sales. (Company Chairman Manish Sabharwal has called sales “the most blue
collar white-collar job...(and)…most amenable to quick training.”)71 Perhaps most
important for low-income groups, TeamLease established a
blue-collar employment unit in 2006 and is moving down- TeamLease actually
market into informal-sector manufacturing and manual places more than 10,000
service trades.72 candidates a month, or one
every four minutes or so,
TeamLease also aggressively advocates on behalf of around the clock.
market-based solutions to ameliorate India’s poverty and
unemployment woes. It supports labor-law reforms to boost job creation and en-
dorses a vigorous flow of rural-to-urban migration to draw rural workers into the
labor market.73 It is also a strong proponent of public-private partnerships and has
teamed with several Indian states and volunteer organizations on job-creation and
training initiatives.74

One particular virtue of the TeamLease model is that it doesn’t result in frustrated,
unemployed trainees, as is the case in many government or other programs that may
provide comparable training but seldom line up jobs for alumnae. TeamLease actually
places more than 10,000 candidates a month, or one every four minutes or so, around
the clock. And a good percentage of the training it provides is rudimentary “fit-and-
finish” — “last-mile unemployability” issues, in company parlance — on such things
as quality of spoken English, accent neutralization, personal hygiene, and dressing for
work. Another part is basic IT training on popular business software.75

, .


None of this is particularly new or path-breaking apart from the scale at which
TeamLease operates and the ambitions of its senior executives, who mix public-
spirited zeal unabashedly with commercial motives. With imagination and a measure
of risk-taking, the TeamLease model has the capacity to expand further down the
economic pyramid to the quasi-formal sector and even more deeply into the in-
formal sector, either in single commercial enterprises or in partnership with public
sector agencies. Moreover, the model itself is manifestly scalable, and salaries for
temporary workers are converging with those of “perm” employees76 — a fact that
will loom larger as both skilled and entry-level temps become a more attractive op-
tion amid the labor-market churn of a ﬂuctuating economy.

The model nevertheless has inherent limitations. Although demonstrably success-
ful in the high-end formal sectors and promising to succeed at the very top of the
quasi-formal and informal sectors, the model has yet to be adapted compellingly
to industries that might employ workers in lower income segments. These will be
almost exclusively rural, less literate, and less skilled. Programs servicing the base of
the pyramid will need to focus on construction, textiles, commercial driver services,
and other more informal sector positions. For occupations like construction, where
jobs will be of limited duration (to project completion) and seldom for a single
employer consecutively, employer incentives to pay for skills and placement will
be slim. Other occupations — security, driver services, and textiles — hold greater
promise but remain fraught with risk.


Security: TOPS Security; Low-End Formal Sector: STRiVE; Rural BPO: DesiCrew,
Byrraju Foundation

, .


IL&FS’S PROJECT SEAM: ANOTHER CAUTIONARY TALE

Infrastructure Leasing & Financial than 70 percent of the costs. Trainee
Services Limited (IL&FS), an Indian costs of Rs. 20,000 a month (US$400) far
development and finance company that exceeded the projected monthly Rs. 6,500
ventured into the training arena, dis- (US$130) per trainee. Moreover — and
covered the difficulties of applying the more crushing — industry participants,
TeamLease business model to sectors who had guaranteed jobs for the trainees,
with high levels of informality. IL&FS refused to pay even their third of the
founded Project SEAM to train and place costs and instead argued the government
500,000 poor youth in the garment-man- should pick up the tab.
ufacturing sector over a five-year period.
Project SEAM recruited some 5,000 Meanwhile, underlying the dispute is
trainees for a pilot running of its month- the hard economic fact that a large
long training course, brought in third proportion of textile employees in
party skills certification, and, like Team- the “compliant” textile sector stay in
Lease, guaranteed placement into textile their jobs for about a year to learn
industry jobs with companies that “or- the trade, and then shift to the more
dered” new employees. So far, so good. lucrative — and more informal — “non-
compliant” sector in the textile clusters
But the IL&FS model failed the test of of India. This retention issue diminishes
sustainability, mainly due to two famil- or altogether eliminates any incentive
iar dysfunctions: unreliable government firms might have to pay a third party to
and unenforceable contracts. Govern- source and train these workers.
ment was slated to pay two-thirds of the
program’s costs and the requisitioning
industrial clients the remaining third. In
practice, however, IL&FS bore more

, .

What the Models Teach

AROUND THE WORLD today many market-based initiatives are working
at the base of the economic pyramid. Unfortunately, few of these will deliver the
desired impact in a commercially sustainable manner or achieve large scale. This
should not be surprising: simultaneous achievement of ambitious social and com-
mercial objectives is inherently difficult. Indeed, the two goals have often been
considered incompatible. And yet the two can be reconciled, as the successful mar-
ket-based solutions we’ve just described are proving.

Other parties — investors, entrepreneurs, NGOs, public policy makers — that wish
to replicate successful business models would do well to take account of the general
lessons they teach. Here are some routes to commercial viability and large scale.

ROUTES TO COMMERCIAL VIABILITY

For every formal new product or service launched low-end markets, an informal
product or service already exists that has evolved in a lower quality, more expensive,
but frequently better tailored to the needs of the poor. This sets a bar for market-
ers to these segments that is often invisible or ignored, and several lessons we’ve
observed may help get past it.

Lessons in Serving the Poor as Customers

Price products to match customer cash flows. Cash flow is king: business models that
ignore the irregularities of cash flows in low-income segments are unlikely to suc-

TEACHING AND LEARNING IN UTTAR PRADESH
Education is highly valued in India, where many low-income
people are willing to pay for private schools to help their children.

, .


ceed. The issue here is not just that the poor have limited amounts of cash. It’s that
they have unpredictable, lumpy cash flows. This in turn drives a general aversion
to paying higher prices, even for products and services that pay for themselves
relatively quickly. Unless the ticket price is sufficiently low and the payback period
sufficiently brief, there will be no sale.

Provide tailored products the poor genuinely want. As others point out, with a few excep-
tions, products — just like business models — need to be tailored specifically for
low-income markets.77 IDE found this out painfully after developing a superior
treadle pump for small farmers but selling less than 600,000 units in 16 years. The
reason? Low-income farmers prefer diesel pumps because they work well enough
and the terms for using them are familiar, flexible, and easier to manage. Marketing
for IDE remains its biggest challenge, as they find new ways communicate why its
pumps are better and offer competitive terms for obtaining them.78

Be wary of building a proprietary distribution channel. Even as a product must be tailored,
entrepreneurs need to recognize that building a proprietary distribution channel is
time-consuming and expensive. The key is to exploit the existing channels of oth-
ers. Most low-income markets for socially beneficial products and services simply
cannot support the cost of establishing and running a separate channel at any scale,
as NEST and others have discovered to their profound regret. Despite the obvious
obstacles, many social enterprises continue to attempt
Cash flow is king: business building their own and thus destroy the economics of
models that ignore the their offering.
irregularities of cash flows
in low-income segments “Low-cost provider” is the only viable strategic position. This
are unlikely to succeed. is a close corollary of the two preceding observations.
Most enterprises targeting the poor lack the luxury of
“early adopters” who will pay high prices to be avant garde and who generate “buzz”
by projecting the product’s appeal (and cross-subsidize efforts to achieve econo-

, .


mies of scale in production that will lower costs). For those working in low-end
markets, the only viable strategic position is a classic “low cost provider” posture,
leading to the lowest, or near-lowest, price. A low-cost provider has little-to-no
margin for testing concepts with more affluent customers, while the lack of early
adopters increases pressure to “get it right the first time.”

Just because they need it doesn’t mean they want it. To assume otherwise is a trap for the
benevolent and a classic blunder of development assistance. To substitute an opin-
ion about “what helps them most” for what low-income people actually say they’re
willing to buy flouts basic tenets of business and marketing. Yet our study found
many examples of enterprises and inventors who focus on the development of
novel technologies, products, and services the poor are presumed to need and want.
Like the NEST solar lantern or the Venus burner, products well-designed for low-
income markets often still fail to sell in significant volume, flouting Business 101
in obvious ways: by misperceiving what low-income consumers want to buy when
they can afford it or have access to credit; and by misunderstanding their cash flows,
or absolute ability to pay.

WHAT CUSTOMERS SAY

“I know I pay a lot for renting the diesel pump, but I can pay it back much later — even up
to a year later. I know the dealer very well.”

“I can only afford cattle because I have a dairy loan. I want other products to be offered in
the same way.”

“We want gold on credit. Everyone in our village does.”

Source: Monitor Focus Groups, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, Feb-May 2008.

, .


As Suppliers Or Producers

Success starts at the top of the supply chain. The most successful and scalable business
models all featured a similar attribute: they were set up tooth-to-tail by an organiza-
tional “brain” at or near the head of the supply chain. For the poor, this shifts the
alignment of risk to the party best able to bear it. For the enterprise overall, the top
has the clearest access to market signals on pricing, quality, trends, and so on, and
is able to translate market needs directly downstream to small producers. The top
can also align incentives down the chain, provide quality assurance, offer intermedi-
ate infrastructure unavailable in publicly shared systems, and even provide training.
In contract production, for example, Calypso Foods
The most successful and provides credit, covers switching costs, and supplies
scalable business models essential equipment. Such models have implications
all featured a similar for policy-makers and donors keen to help the poor
attribute: they were set gain access to markets: it suggests that interventions
up tooth-to-tail by an may do well to target those who are capable of effec-
organizational “brain” at tively and economically organizing supply chains at the
or near the head of top in addition to working directly with poor produc-
the supply chain.
ers well down the line.

Take account of sizable potential switching costs. From numerous rural supplier focus
groups, we noted a strong aversion to “switching” in general, and to switching
crops, products, and primary livelihood in particular. Most poor producers live
hand-to-mouth, and are therefore often deeply averse to new uncertainty — regard-
less of the potential payoff in terms of income down the line. Getting low-income
suppliers to make a switch — whether to a new crop or a new livelihood — will be
a large expense for the enterprise and poses a similarly sizable risk due to problems
in retaining trained workers in low-end markets.

Retention of trained workers is a potential “make or break” issue. The ﬂip side of switch-
ing costs is retention. Because successful, integrated models led from the top of

, .


the supply chain often rely on heavy investments in recruitment, training, switching
costs, and inputs, enterprise efforts to retain suppliers become critical. A weak reten-
tion capability — and the resulting need to overspend on training new hires — might
easily destroy the economics of any low-end supplier-side business models.

Credit is central to engaging the poor rather and not just a bolt-on externality. In some areas
a market-driven model might succeed without addressing the credit requirements
of a low-end market supplier. But at least in India, many such suppliers are already
indebted to informal sector moneylenders or agricultural middlemen, have limited
risk tolerance for switching, and thus need a business model that includes some
type of in-house credit, or covers switching costs, or both. For all the attention
microcredit has received in recent years, credit remains in short supply in most
emerging markets. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, Moni-
Aggregation can transform
tor found that more than 85 percent of all borrowers from poor people into viable
microfinance institutions and self-help groups had multiple economic entities and thus
sources of debt. Even so, borrowers reported they wanted worthwhile to involve in a
more credit, which they say they can afford. supply chain or to target for
infrastructure or finance.
As Both Customers And Suppliers

Aggregating consumers or suppliers may be the key to making a market. Several of our busi-
ness models use aggregation with great success — to achieve scale, reduce cost,
reduce risk, or some combination of all these. Indeed, aggregation is not a new
idea — co-operatives have been implementing it for centuries. But new business
models are aggregating in novel ways — take, for instance, Fabindia’s COC sup-
plier groups. Microfinance pools groups of customers to diminish risk and reduce
transaction costs through group cross-guarantees. Similarly, in some new assured
demand models (see text box below), the advance aggregation of sufficient cus-
tomers for housing fundamentally changes the economics of construction for the
developer, lowering the cost and making financing available. The pay-per-use model

, .


AGGREGATION IN ACTION: ASSURED DEMAND IN URBAN HOUSING

The paucity of individual purchasing power of grain, a piece of farm equipment, a bridge
at the bottom of the pyramid has led to that spans a seasonal floodway, or housing.
novel thinking about aggregating demand,
and thus sweetening low-end markets as Working with a range of constituencies,
economic opportunities for savvy entre- Monitor helped to develop more complex
preneurs. But too little purchasing power assured-demand models involving urban
isn’t the only disincentive to business at the housing construction and finance. These
bottom of the pyramid. Potential market require the inclusion of at least a third
entrants also perceive too much risk and too party — a financier — and often a fourth, the
high a cost to serve. employer/guarantor of the aggregated indi-
vidual customers, who facilitates, and vouches
An emerging business model that promises for, their ability to make payments. In the
to scale this trinity of obstacles is “assured example that follows, an NGO was a required
demand.” Offering suppliers the guarantee fifth party that facilitated arrangements.
of satisfactory demand overcomes the main
barriers to low-end market entry: volume and Although India has robust residential
value of customers, and cost to serve. This construction and housing finance indus-
assured-demand model isn’t really new — it tries, developers and financial institutions
has been a mainstay of the co-operative overwhelmingly prefer to focus on the high-
movement and it lies at the heart of the er-income urban markets The vast majority
prepaid mobile phone model. What’s new is of urban low-income families live in poor
an expanding variety of applications, from quality rentals, typically single rooms of 100-
financial services to housing. 250 sq. ft., often badly ventilated and lit, with
shared toilet and bath, in bad neighborhoods.
The simplest assured demand model consist They face constantly rising rents, unreason-
of two agents — a supplier and an aggre- able demands from landlords, and pressure
gation of customers that, as individuals, to move every two or three years.
would have no practical access to the offered
product or service. An agreement assuring In this context, Taral Bakeri, a respected
the supplier that the customers will make the Ahmedabad developer, partnered with Aa-
specified purchase completes the basic ar- shayen, a development-advocacy NGO, to
rangement. The assured-demand deal might build 800 apartments in two well-designed
involve purchasing anything several people floor plans — a 210 sq. ft. one-room effi-
want but cannot individually afford: a sack ciency and 300 sq. ft. single-bedroom unit,

, .


all with indoor plumbing — for purchase in a sentially zeroed out the risk of long sales
nearby suburb. The neighborhood is vibrant cycles and cash flow issues and let him
and well serviced by public transportation. focus on construction.
The least expensive houses in the Vatwa proj-
ect sell in the range of Rs. 250,000 ($5,000). • The financing bank found itself in an
attractive new market, with “assured”
Aashayen worked with Bakeri to line up both loan payments, effective collateral, and a
customers and financing even before the potentially highly profitable business.
building plans had been approved. Bakeri built
mock-up model apartments that wowed po- • And to circle back to those near the base
tential low-income buyers and financiers alike. of the pyramid but who may not be in
Aashayen approached the prospective buyers’ the market for housing: by opening up
formal-sector employers, who were happy a low-end market for decent houses,
to provide access to what they saw as a good many more construction workers found
deal for their workers. Employers perceived employment in India’s building trades, a
indirect benefits for themselves as well, in rapidly growing sector of the economy
the form of reduced worker absenteeism due and India’s largest employer of low-
to employee or family illness. In the model’s skilled urban labor.
defining act, most of the employers agreed to
deduct monthly mortgage payments from em- The assured-demand model answers the
ployee paychecks and to transfer these directly toughest question easily: it is eminently scalable
to the financing bank. because it is profitable to all parties. While not
at scale yet, we’d expect this business model to
The Ahmedabad model benefited all participants: scale through replication, with many players us-
ing similar approaches and adaptations.
• Customers in the middle of the income
pyramid finally got affordable, good-quali-
ty housing — with financing.

• For developer Bakeri, this was a profitable
business proposition, with less risk and
fewer headaches. He had a pre-financed
customer pool and signed contracts
before even breaking ground, which es-

, .


described here pools enough customers to capitalize a community facility and gen-
erate lower unit costs than could individually-owned devices. When dealing with
populations with low and sporadic cash flows, or with products or crops having
small lot sizes, only aggregation can transform poor people into viable economic
entities and thus worthwhile to involve in a supply chain or to target for infrastruc-
ture or finance.

Talk is easy. Implementation is hard. We can describe good models and promising ap-
proaches easily in writing, but in many cases the difference between success and
failure, even within a given model, comes down to execution. Consider the need
to balance profitability with social return, or the need
There are many actions for most enterprises to organize solutions end-to-end.
that entrepreneurs, These two considerations alone complicate and slow
investors, donors, down the march to scale. Honey Care has to arrange
policymakers, and other for credit with a network of NGOs and MFIs, selling
interested parties can relationships with retailers, training through agricul-
take to shorten the tural colleges, certification with international bodies,
time to scale. and also manage the day-to-day operations of collec-
tion and distribution with thousands of suppliers. And
it has to do it without benefit of being able to cross-subsidize from upper end mar-
kets, or being able to pay high salaries for talent. The success of every market-based
solution ultimately reflects immense hard work and attention to detail.

ROUTES TO SCALE

As happened in microfinance, the path forward is most likely to be blazed by smaller
social enterprises and firms growing larger and perfecting their business models,
with some large corporations entering where they deem it makes economic sense for
them to do so. And, as in microfinance, the route to scale in most instances will be

, .


long, a decade or more. It’s worth noting that the first sizable IPO in microfinance
took place in 2007, more than thirty years after the industry first began to form.

Many thoughtful and well-meaning parties, however, are justly impatient for solu-
tions to generate results at scale. This slow ramping up is frustrating, unsatisfying,
and seems at odds with the magnitude and urgency of challenges like global poverty.

So what can be done? Fortunately, there are many actions that entrepreneurs, inves-
tors, donors, policymakers, and other interested parties can take to shorten the time
to scale. The route to scale will depend on two factors: business model maturity,
and the size of the entity implementing the business model. Getting to scale
will also require overcoming barriers likely to stand in the way.

Business Model Maturity

The maturity of a given business model affects everything: risk, the need for fund-
ing, the probability of success. In general, the less mature is the model, the more
investment — and, very likely, soft funding — it will require. Financial returns are
likely to be lower for less-mature models, though returns also will vary by sector,
with higher returns possible in large sectors like education, health care, and water.
Social returns to less-mature models can be quite high, however, especially if they
operate in sectors and locations where government or other institutions are failing.

The business models discussed above sort into three tiers based on their maturity.
The first tier consists of those already proven and in the market today, often oper-
ating at or near scale with involvement of large corporations and other established
entities. These models include deep procurement (Wal-Mart, ITC, Reliance Fresh,
AMUL, Nestlé, and others), no frills/high volume service (prepaid mobile tele-
coms — with an added dash of pre-assured demand), and demand-led training
(Teamlease, Tops Security, and others). These models were not originally designed
to serve low-income segments but have proven successful in engaging the poor.

, .


Large corporations are active, with access to mainstream capital and product de-
velopment, and given the economic value in doing so, the markets are likely to
support this without much additional help. For these models the main challenge
is to develop adaptations and extensions that ensure they include and reach the
lowest-income customers and producers.

A second tier constitutes relatively successful business models that have had some
tailoring for low-income markets. Contract production and shared channels need
less development of core elements but may need to deal with some lingering ques-
tions. The success of contract production, for example, depends on enforceable
contracts, or, where these are lacking, on other ways to hold parties to agreements.
For these second-tier models, as with the first tier, another key question is how
deeply they can extend into the base of the pyramid, and how well they can work
with socially beneficial products that may require some push.

A third tier of business models are the least developed. They offer some proof of
concept but achieving large scale and commercial viability will require consider-
able investment. Yet these promise to produce perhaps the lowest-cost offerings to
low-income customers and social returns that over time will be impressive. These
business models include pay-per-use, which is prevalent in many markets — for
instance, Internet Cafes, diesel pump rentals, or other rental models — but lags in
other applications for socially beneficial infrastructure and services, and requires
further development to ensure that sufficient demand stimulation can be priced
into the model. Paraskilling has not been widely adopted despite the powerful ex-
ample of Aravind Eye Care — in part due to regulatory and other barriers in health
and education but also to the technical complexity of the model.

Size of Participants

The second factor affecting time to scale is the size of the enterprise implementing
the model. As C. K. Prahalad has pointed out, large corporations are well posi-

, .


tioned to achieve large scale quickly in low-income markets. ITC, Teamlease, and
the mobile telecom operators achieved scale much faster than their social enter-
prise counterparts. They did so by making modest adaptations to business models
proven in other markets.

Unfortunately, as noted, few large corporations are likely to enter low-income
markets eagerly, except in high-ﬁxed-cost sectors, or in industries in which low-in-
come people can become low-cost elements of integrated
supply chains. Given this reality, those who would like to Few large corporations are
hasten market-based solutions to maturity and scale face likely to enter low-income
daunting questions. What support can be provided to de- markets eagerly.
velop less mature business models? What interventions can
help small innovative enterprises to accelerate their path to scale? And what — if
anything — will motivate large corporations to enter and participate, given the op-
portunities elsewhere and the challenges of engaging low-income markets?

Overcoming the Barriers

Answering these questions starts with recognizing common barriers to reaching
scale. Looking across the business models, we found seven consistently recurring
obstacles:

Distribution is a barrier particularly in reaching the rural poor — whether for product
distribution or produce collection — where there are few private or public channels
and these are extremely expensive to build (see Shared Channels Model 4).

Customer education and awareness create an obstacle primarily for socially beneﬁcial
products and services, which aim to address shortcomings of the public education
and public health systems in creating demand for “push” services like clean drink-
ing water or family planning. Unlike in higher-end markets, the imperative to offer

, .


a low cost product or service makes it challenging for an individual enterprise to
absorb the significant customer education costs required to stimulate demand.

Cost of aggregation is a barrier for those engaging the base of the pyramid either as sup-
pliers or as customers. Microfinance was able to internalize this cost into its model,
but MFIs only aggregate small numbers of borrowers; the cost of putting together
large networks of small vegetable farmers, on the other hand, can far outweigh the
benefit of using a group that would otherwise be the lowest cost producers.

Fixed costs, especially for capital assets, creates an obstacle to commercial viability,
especially for smaller enterprises. Several models like LifeSpring Hospital and Gyan
Shala schools have worked around this by renting capital facilities, but for other mod-
els the capital cost of fixed assets means that full cost recovery is nearly impossible.

Capital and credit are barriers to scale for most smaller enterprises, whether or not
they serve the poor. However, the barriers are higher in low-income markets be-
cause poor people lack sources of credit or a financial cushion to cover input costs,
switching costs, or anything more than daily purchases. In middle markets, enter-
prises are often able to extend credit to customers. In low-income markets, this
is rarely possible, in part because the enterprises themselves lack the capital and
credit, and in part because external sources are unavailable to the poor, as well.

Human capital is a significant barrier in many models, especially those that aim to
serve rural low-income segments. Many enterprises told us about the difficulty of
finding and retaining labor, especially skilled labor like doctors or professionals.
Because of the imperative to keep costs and prices low, there is little room in the
models to pay high salaries, and many entrepreneurs have had to become very cre-
ative in figuring out ways not only to segment their customers but also their labor
market for the talent they need.

, .


System effects greatly complicate the work of many market-based solutions, since in
most cases markets are much less developed and there is no surrounding ecosystem
to plug in to — there are no petrol stations already existing to accompany the new
cars being manufactured. Put differently, all the scale success stories like Aravind
Eye Care had to undertake to organize the entire value chain end-to-end: this is
expensive, time consuming, and burdens models that otherwise must be low-cost.

Nonetheless, scale is achievable, and potentially faster than we’ve seen so far. We do
not have to be satisfied with settling for a decade or more to reach scale, but it will
require concerted and sustained activity and investment from a variety of players,
including first and foremost all those entities working on the ground in low-income
markets to pioneer and develop business models. Beyond
the actors directly implementing market-based solutions, ef- Scale is achievable, and
fort will be required from other parties, namely commercial potentially faster than
investors, impact investors, traditional aid donors and philan- we’ve seen so far.
thropists, and large corporations. Finally, building successful
market-based solutions will benefit from support from government in the form of
business-enabling policies and regulations, better subsidy regimes, SME policies, and
other rules of the road.

For all enterprises but the largest, as with all endeavors to build commercially sus-
tainable activities, it goes without saying that growth capital — in varying forms — is
the number one requirement. Enterprises need capital to develop a business model
or concept, test it, and expand those that look promising. In addition to sufficient
capital, each class of entrant or participant will need specific help to overcome the
obstacles to reaching large scale.

Actions to increase the odds of success for smaller social enterprises may in-
clude the following:

, .


• Make capital available in smaller, more patient, and flexible chunks—
both to grow businesses and validate business models. This
requirement points to a strong role for Impact Investors (see next
section), donors, and philanthropic capital.

• Combine capital with technical assistance in integrated facilities to assist
with everything from social marketing models to improving the
business model, customer understanding, or the capabilities of
inexperienced management teams.

• Turn fixed asset costs into variable costs — remove the imperative to
invest in fixed assets, enable enterprises to rent or lease assets
in tandem with service roll-out by moving the capital costs to
the books of an entity that can better afford to absorb the cost
and raise the appropriate capital. This will improve the odds for
many models that can be operationally sustainable but not full
cost sustainable.

• Address regulations that discriminate against small and medium enter-
prises in terms of access to finance, ability to compete, subsidized
competition, and other activities that distort the playing field.

For large corporations, these actions may help:

• Develop new models of aggregation, training, sourcing, and retention,
which will make it easier and less costly or risky for them to in-
volve smaller producers in supply chains or reduce cost to serve
low-income customers

• Encourage and provide incentives to corporations to share, extend, and adapt
existing channels, since often they are the owners of the best net-
works even to rural areas, and this will often cost less and take less
time than building new channels from scratch.

, .


• Consider the benefit of putting public-purpose funding into private enter-
prise. Where corporations can provide a service at scale better
than government or others, selectively provide smart fixed-cost
incentives to enter markets or move into adjacent spaces, develop
products, modify business models, organize value chains from the
top down, adapt a channel, or engage the poor in supply chains.79

For all enterprises, regardless of size, there are several key actions that can help
overcome the obstacles:

• Develop shared assets that address barriers to scale. These might include
marketing and channel activation assets, so that enterprises do
not need to internalize the cost of customer education on pub-
lic health benefits; shared channel resources that multiple players
can use; shared understanding of low-income customers and their
habits; or shared social infrastructure (e.g., self-help group federa-
tions). All of the above are elements that can eliminate the need
for individual market-based solutions to internalize the costs of
delivering a public good.

• Cultivate impact investors so that appropriate sources of capital are
available, creative instruments and guarantees are in place to allow
funds to flow in, financial and hard social metrics are in place, and
relevant benchmarks are set. This should include both primary
capital provided to enterprises, and secondary instruments such
as guarantees, balance-sheet sharing, and other ways to leverage
well-capitalized players to reduce and align risk to those most able
to absorb it.

• Rationalize the regulatory and policy environment to improve the general
business environment and SME policy, and reform specific poli-
cies and regulatory restrictions that inhibit market-based ventures.

, .


• Showcase and disseminate what works and what doesn’t. Successful ex-
amples, such as those discussed above, should be publicized.
Meanwhile, failed examples should also be publicized to avoid
wasting time and resources. We found many examples of pur-
ported market-based solutions that claimed to work but somehow
were missing a revenue source. Worse, we discovered many more
examples that were doomed to fail: groups organizing producers
or assets in the middle of the value chain with only a hope, not a
realistic plan, to sell anything to anyone; enterprises creating their
own sales force for a product that costs $4.00 and is sold every
three years; and schemes to sell services to the poor that they did
not understand or even know they could get. Such obvious prob-
lems should be nipped in the bud.

• Cultivate the community of interested parties, which can serve as fo-
rums for sharing lessons, ﬁnding common ground, sharing costs,
building common platforms, advocating for policy change, and
more. New groups are just beginning to emerge, for instance, the
Aspen Network for Development Entrepreneurs, led by the As-
pen Institute, or the Global Impact Investment Network, led by
the Rockefeller Foundation.

, .


IMPACT INVESTING EMERGES

A growing group of investors around the sorship from the Rockefeller Foundation,
world is seeking to make investments that names the activity impact investing, recog-
generate social and environmental value nizing the double meaning (investing for
as well as ﬁnancial return. Recently it has social and environmental impact, as well as
become possible to see their disparate and the impact that this new approach could
uncoordinated innovation in a range of have on investing as a whole). The report,
investing sectors and regions converging “Investing for Social & Environmental
to create a new global industry, driven by Impact: A Design for Catalyzing an Emerg-
similar forces and with common chal- ing Industry,” examines how leaders could
lenges. This loose collection of investment accelerate the industry’s evolution and
activities — which operate in the largely increase its ultimate impact through a series
uncharted area between philanthropy and of initiatives. The full report and a summa-
a singular focus on proﬁt — maximiza- ry can be found at www.monitorinstitute.
tion — is still in search of a name. A recent com/impactinvesting.
Monitor Institute report, with lead spon-

, .

Recommendations
and Concluding Thoughts

Recommendations and Concluding Thoughts

THE SUCCESS TO DATE of many market-based solutions in helping the
poor gives ample reason for optimism about the future impact of these initiatives.
Expanding and accelerating their growth will require independent and cooperative
actions from an array of constituencies.

Monitor’s analysis of successful at-scale business models shows that many ben-
efited from some soft funding assistance. On the one hand, we should always be
on the lookout for models that can reach scale and maturity without such support,
but we should also acknowledge that many will need it to achieve their objectives.

This should not be seen as a shortcoming but rather as a reflection of the imma-
turity of the pioneering business models, as well as recognition of two important
facts. First, most market-based approaches are aiming to fulfill a public function in
a self-sustaining capacity, and certain solutions — e.g., Gyan Shala schools — may
prove to be far more efficient uses of government, donor, or philanthropic funds
than traditional models of engagement or of government provision.80 And second,
most of the enterprises in this space are operating in environments in which the full
ecosystem needs to be developed end-to-end. If Google had needed to invent the
(government funded) Internet in addition to a superior search engine technology,
would it have been profitable out of the gate?

So what is to be done? Here follow recommendations and advice to the principal
constituencies whose support will be essential to the growth and long-term success
of market-based solutions. (See Be a Business Model Detective.)

FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKET IN AURANGABAD, MAHARASHTRA
New business models that aggregate low-income farmers in efficient supply chains
can improve livelihoods dramatically.

, .


For Commercial and Impact Investors

We believe market-based solutions offer promising, even exciting, opportunities to
create substantial social change while earning positive financial returns. And we do
not rule out sizable returns from greater opportunities, for example, in housing,
agricultural supply chains, and health care. But we have observed that many of the
parties seeking to invest in India and other emerging markets appear to have a more
definite (and higher) expectation of financial returns than specific targets for social
returns. This sets up a potential mismatch of expectations.

Globally, the general success of the MFI sector appears to be setting expectations
for all of impact investing. In addition to the Compartamos IPO in Mexico,81 several
social investment funds have invested in financial sector/MFI-based funds with the
promise — and delivery — of good returns in well-performing organizations, usu-
ally in the 20 — 25percent range.82 The majority of these — whether in India, Latin
America, or elsewhere — tended to be equity funds
The full ecosystem needs to expecting relatively large (for this market) deal sizes in
be developed end-to-end. If the vicinity of $6 million to $10 million each.83
Google had needed to invent the
(government funded) Internet Bearing in mind that MFIs are at least a decade ahead
in addition to a superior search of most of the business models we have profiled,
engine technology, would it these expectations must be tempered for the new
have been profitable out breed of next-generation market-based solutions.
of the gate? Many of these are still small, with total operating bud-
gets of less than $3 million. Their needs for capital
can range from equity, to debt, to working capital or even grants, depending on the
task required to get to scale or commercial viability. And the amounts required are
likely to be substantially lower than the $4 million floor contemplated even by many
impact investors. Investors will need generous amounts of patience, a willingness
to tolerate some unpredictability in returns, and perhaps some new vehicles for

, .


BE A BUSINESS MODEL DETECTIVE: A DOZEN QUESTIONS EVERYONE SHOULD ASK

It all sounds great after an hour’s conversa- 5. What is the price, and how does it
tion — the enterprise seems to be reaching match up to irregular and unpredictable
large numbers of poor people, has a high cash flows?
growth rate, delivers a huge social benefit
Economic Viability
and attractive returns on investment. But
when the research team makes an eyes-on 6. Does the business model promise to
field visit, a closer look may expose the be self-sustaining — at least covering its
stories as hyperbole. One useful antidote to costs — in the long term? What is the
the “one hour effect” is to be sure to ask revenue model? The distribution model?
the right questions. How strong are the market linkages to
end buyers and their preferences?
Target Group
7. What are the incentives for the partici-
1. Are the customers or suppliers/pro-
pants in every segment of the
ducers/workers really from the lowest
supply chain?
income segments?
8. How is retention managed, and what are
• What is the spread of the income effect the incentives for retention?
or access effect?
• Are higher income groups cross-sub- Capital Model
sidizing the model to make it work for 9. What type of financing will the enter-
poor people? prise use and how will it be invested? Is
2. If the customers or suppliers are not in subsidy or soft funding required? How
the lowest income segments, how might sustainable or replicable is its source
the (presumably otherwise compelling) of capital?
business model be modified to serve
them? What are the costs to reach and Scale
aggregate these participants?
10. How specialized or diversified are the
Product or Service operations, and what portion of the end-
to-end value system does the enterprise
3. Is this enterprise’s product or service
address, either directly or indirectly?
one poor customers will pay for? Do
low-income people say they want it, 11. How scalable is the enterprise? What’s
or has someone decided they need it? the marginal cost of adding customers
Does the enterprise need to “push” the or suppliers? Are systems in place to add
product? If yes, how, and how can the customers or suppliers at low cost? Is
channel absorb the cost of the push? this sufficiently replicable that it could
scale as a cluster of enterprises?
4. What substitutes exist for the product?
How else do poor customers satisfy the 12. What’s the product’s addressable mar-
demand the product or service offers? ket? Is this a niche that limits the scale of
the opportunity?

, .


both finding and making relatively small commitments efficiently. In some cases,
they will surely realize lower financial returns than they could get in more mature
segments and business models, albeit with robust social returns.

For Donors, Philanthropists, and Sources of Soft Funding

This category of actors will have a fundamental catalytic role to play.84 This is
the only source that can reliably and consistently serve long-term patient-capital
needs, tolerate lower-than-market returns, and cushion sub-scale enterprises as
they develop their business models and generate social returns in anticipation of
corresponding financial returns.
Investors will need generous
amounts of patience, a Success may require a re-orientation of some traditional
willingness to tolerate some models of promoting enterprise. For instance, an ability
unpredictability in returns, and to invest in and encourage large corporations to take a role
perhaps some new will be an essential part of any toolkit. For many philan-
vehicles for both finding thropies, however, this raises justifiable qualms and legal
and making relatively small issues, and most aid donors are not equipped to make
commitments efficiently.
these kinds of investments.

Any serious discussion of soft financing to support market-based solutions should
center primarily — though not exclusively — on four areas that emerge from Moni-
tor research as especially critical:

1. Providing flexible growth capital to help an enterprise to scale, particularly for smaller
enterprises where the transaction size will be too small for an Impact or com-
mercial investor to manage economically. This could be in the form of direct
capital, or — more likely — in the form of supporting wholesale vehicles that
can make these retail level investments through either direct capital or indirect
support such as guarantees or creative use of larger entities’ balance sheets.

, .


2. Supporting efforts to reach the lowest income segments. For all the promise of the
business models described in Section II, most are viable primarily in markets
in which the poor have at least some level of income or assets. For most of
these models to reach into the poorest groups, some support from soft fund-
ing sources will be necessary.

3. Building the capacity of the enterprise. In a world where most of the enterprises
are small and have to operate at the lowest cost point possible, capacity
building is often a luxury. Soft funding can help address key one-time costs,
whether for enterprise-level capabilities, business model development, product
development, or technical assistance to dismantle barriers to scale or viability.

4. Directly advancing the field and its infrastructure, as described above and, perhaps
most importantly, defining and driving an impact metrics effort that will help
refine understanding of what works and what does not.85

For Government and Policy Makers

Keys to overcoming some barriers to scale lie in the hands of government, so it will
fall to government to unwind these barriers. For instance, in most emerging mar-
kets, the business environment is treacherous for any enterprise, whether targeting
the poor or not. India ranks 122 on the global Doing Business ratings. Brazil fares
a bit worse at 125, and Philippines stands at 140. Improvements here would have
broad benefits, and not just to market-based solutions to poverty.

Beyond that obvious and needed role, however, there is also a need to reform spe-
cific policies and regulatory restrictions that inhibit market-based ventures. Such
restrictions impede business models in key sectors like health, education, and even
job training and skilling. For example, in India, educational requirements such as
minimum qualification requirements for teachers, restrictions on for-profit involve-
ment in schools and schools chains, and monopolies on school certification systems
inhibit the flexibility for entrepreneurs to provide a potentially superior offering to
the urban and rural poor.

, .


In addition, states are uniquely positioned to do more to create or promote the
creation of shared assets. The state already supports the creation of a range of pro
bono publico assets for use across multiple purposes and groups. These can serve as
ready-made vehicles for aggregation and thereby create viable units of custom-
ers or suppliers who otherwise lack economic power. Examples include self-help
group federations and co-operatives, which externalize the cost of aggregation for
specific enterprises. Creating or mandating the creation of shared physical assets,
like telecommunications towers, can address fixed costs and aggregation costs, too.

Finally, national, and even state or provincial, governments can direct their purchas-
ing power to create sufficient “anchor” demand so that enterprises that serve the
poor can economically invest in building out important assets or service provision.
An example would be vouchers for school or health care
facilities that guarantee their purchase of a specified
There is a need volume of pay-per-use water, thereby ensuring a suf-
to reform specific
ficiently high use rate for the vendor to reach breakeven
policies and regulatory
or make a profit.
restrictions that inhibit
market-based ventures.

, .


WHERE WILL ALL THIS WORK BEST?

Although most of the study and many of ral corollary — relatively little state
the examples are drawn from India, we control of the economy — and thus
view these business models as applicable a robust level of small-and-medium
to a broad range of countries that in our enterprise formation, indicating
estimation possess the proper conditions. that socially-oriented SMEs will the
And as examples herein from Mexico, opportunity to experiment promis-
Philippines, Kenya, Laos, Peru, and ing business models. Along with this
elsewhere show most of the developing should be an active informal sector
world exhibits a pronounced interest in that already provides goods, services,
this field. and supply chain participation pri-
vately to the poor, signaling the poor’s
In brief, we believe market-based solutions willingness to pay for a range of
will fare best in countries possessing: products and services.

• Sizeable National Markets. India sets • A robust civil society. The presence
the standard for a “national market of strong, vibrant attributes of civil
of the poor,” with 700 million or society — rule of law, enforceable
more opportunities to sell to the contracts, domestic order, non-
base of the pyramid or to buy its governmental organizations, and
products. But other national markets voluntarism — is a good indicator
need not be so large. Although we of receptivity to market-based ap-
would scarcely expect to find hives proaches. A high density of NGOs is
of low-end market-driven innova- helpful, as many new approaches are
tion in countries like Namibia or Fiji, often incubated first not by firms or
with their small dispersed popula- the state, but by civil society groups.
tions, diverse developing countries
like Kenya, with a population of 38 Countries where one might expect to
million, or even a surprising Laos, see a significant amount of base-of-the-
with 6.8 million,86 have proven to be pyramid-oriented enterprise, where the
hospitable grounds for developing business models highlighted above might
and proving out business models that scale well, include (but are not limited to)
reach and engage the poor. Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia,
Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
• A reasonably well-functioning private Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines,
economy. This will exhibit a natu- South Africa, and Thailand.

, .


CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Market-based solutions to social challenges are still in their earliest days. Relatively
few business models are demonstrably successful and many continue to show more
promise than hard results.

Few doubt that engaging the poor as customers and suppliers presents an excit-
ing — and significant — opportunity to establish new paradigms that might work
alongside other models to bring genuine social change in financially sustainable
ways. While the opportunities will be large, they may still not be large enough in
many sectors to attract large corporations, especially in bigger emerging markets
with large middle classes. However, even though the returns will not be outsized,
the opportunities — financially and otherwise — will certainly be large enough to
catalyze a range of activity from smaller or even medium-sized purpose-built enter-
prises. This segment of smaller promoters will drive the field in the coming decade,
and the key task will be to identify the most promis-
ing of the lot, help and hasten their growth, challenge
Whatever doubt there is about
conventional expectations, and enlarge the boundaries
financial returns and opportunity
of commercial and social enterprise.
size, the vast potential to
provide positive social returns
Whatever doubt there is about financial returns and
should elicit no doubt.
opportunity size, the vast potential to provide positive
social returns should elicit no doubt. The potential of
paraskilling models to lower costs and make essential services available to even
the poorest at high quality; of pay-per-use models to provide safe water and reli-
able, less costly energy; of livelihood models like contract production to improve
dramatically improve incomes — these are not the stuff dreams are made of but
are realizable opportunities. Market-based solutions shouldn’t substitute wholly for
other efforts in government and civil society, but they can supplement them to im-
prove affordability, quality, access, and incomes for the poor.

, .


The key will be to focus on the development of promising business models that can
achieve scale. We’ve identified seven such models for consideration, and we have no
doubt others are out there, largely unexplored but with similar catalytic potential.
The field must now set about the hard task of validating and refining these models
and testing them at scale, to see if they are as robust as they appear to be.

We conclude this report by pointing to the profound and critical role impact inves-
tors and providers of “soft” funding can play in helping build the field — especially
now in its early days of development. Those investors will be best positioned who
possess the patience, risk tolerance, and social motivations to invest in business
models that can scale and thus fulfill the promise at the base of the pyramid. That
promise remains large and bright.

, .

Appendix,
Acknowledgements & Notes

Appendix, Acknowedgements & Notes

Appendix: Overview of the India Study
In the course of doing the study, we examined more than 270 market-based so-
lutions — some housed within the same organization (e.g., Byrraju Foundation’s
different programs in education and clean drinking water) but most in distinct orga-
nizations. In most cases we did primary research — at a minimum, holding a one hour
(or more) interview to understand the enterprise, the business model, the customer
base, their barriers to scale, social benefit, etc. In many cases we went back to clarify
more, and in the case of 36 — ranging from ITC e-Choupal in Madhya Pradesh to
Biogas Bank in Gujarat to VisionSpring in Andhra Pradesh — we conducted exten-
sive field visits. In selected other cases, however, we relied on secondary research,
although it should be noted that in this field that there are relatively few secondary
sources for most small market-based solutions. Nonetheless, wherever possible, we
supplemented primary research with available secondary research.

Description of the Sample

Of the more than 270 market-based solutions we profiled, 134 engaged the poor
as customers, overwhelmingly in health, education, financial services and energy.
A further 111 engaged the poor as suppliers, largely in agriculture, livestock and
other non-farm livelihood interventions. Finally, 29 initiatives were multi-sector
or cross-sector.

HOUSING IN MUMBAI
New assured demand business models promise improved
affordable housing for urban low-income renters.

, .


Number of Initiatives Profiled by Sector
80

70
60
60

50
40
40
31 30 Sanitation
29
30 Water
25
24
20
5 11
10 6
13
0
Health Education Energy Water & Financial ICT Vocational Non-agri Agricul- Multi-
Sanitation Services Training & Liveli- ture & sector
Placement hoods Livestock

For Low-Income Customers For Low-Income Suppliers

Less than 20 percent of all market-based solutions were either at or near scale — a
statistic that reveals much about the state of the field. This finding was consistent
whether the organization was engaging the poor as customer or as supplier. This
held true despite the fact that over 55 percent of the enterprises had been in op-
eration for at least five years. Few large corporations were in this space — in fact,

BASIX Loan Officer interviews, Andhra Pradesh SERP Self-Help Group research, Andhra Pradesh

, .


we found that over two-thirds of the market-based solutions we encountered were
structured either as SMEs (37 percent) or as NGOs (31 percent).

Geographically, our sample had a strong rural bias, which is unsurprising since more
than 80 percent of poor people in India live in rural areas. About half of the market-
based solutions in our study concentrated on rural areas, and a further 32 percent
covered both rural and urban areas. Regional representation also was balanced, with
the exception of the East. The survey reflected activity in roughly equivalent propor-
tions in the South (32 percent), West (30 percent) and North (25 percent) of India.

Initiatives Profiled by Scale, Location, Legal Form and Duration
Scale of Operations Urban–Rural Split Legal Forms
At Scale 15% Large Corp. 19%
Urban 20%

Near NGO 31%
Scale 2% 48%
Rural
SME 37%
Not at 83%
Scale Both 32% Other 13%
Poor as Suppliers

Scale of Operations Geographic Coverage Number of Years in Operation
East 2% <1 year 18%
At Scale 16%
North 25%
1–5 years 27%
Near West
Scale 2% 30%
5–10
years 37%
South 32%
Not at
Scale 82% National >10 years 18%
11%
Poor as Customers

In-Depth Field Research

After mapping the field, we also did a comprehensive multidimensional investiga-
tion of three dozen market-based solutions to understand the business models in
detail, including field visits, in-depth management and organizational interviews,
focus group discussions, observation of business transactions and activities, and
economic analysis of business model. In the course of these field visits, we did ev-
erything from assess competitive offerings and substitutes to interview sales force
members to interview customers or small suppliers. Beyond interviews with various

, .


players in the market-based solution value chain — for instance, MFI loan officers
to understand their incentives — we spoke to over 600 customers and small farmer
(or other) suppliers, in focus groups and survey settings. These interactions were
not designed to be statistically significant in the way that large sample national
surveys are, but rather were focused on understanding key issues with preferences,
economics, buying behavior, and other more qualitative concerns. These initial data,
however, have been borne out subsequently by further interactions — for instance,
our housing focus group findings have now been backed up by more than 2,000
additional customer interactions.

, .


Acknowledgements
The authors of this report wish to acknowledge and thank many people who helped along
the way. First, we thank Monitor Group Chairman Mark B. Fuller for his enthusiastic sup-
port of the project from its inception and for encouraging us to publish the results in this
form. The original research project in India was directed by Ashish Karamchandani and Mike
Kubzansky and included core team members Mark Angelo, Parendim Bamji, Anamitra Deb,
Nishant Lalwani, Varad Pande, Radhika Rajagopalan, Kashmira Ranji, Suchitra Shenoy and
Raina Singh. In subsequent phases, Aditya Agarwal, Abhishek Aggrawal, Srivatsa Anchan, Ad-
itya Bajaj, Nabomita Dutta, Parijat Ghosh, Anshul Goswami, Nandini Maheshwari, Pradeep
Prabhala, Sanjana Ram, Vivek Sekhar, Vartika Srivastava, Vibhor Tikiya, Ridhima Tewary and
Raoul Uberoi provided analysis and assistance. Nikhil Ojha provided valuable guidance, sup-
port, and advice throughout.

As the project moved into its production phase, primary authors Ashish Karamchandani, Mike
Kubzansky, and Paul Frandano were supported by a research and editorial team including Vic-
toria Barbary, Davis Dyer, and Varad Pande. This team would like to thank Monitor colleagues
Maarten Kelder (Asia), David Pacis (Philippines), and Harald Harvey (South Africa) for sup-
porting the research and Nadim Mohamed, Xiangyi Liu, Jan Sy, and Henning Ringholz for their
work on international examples. Grail Research, a unit of Monitor Group, also supported the
international research, and we would like to thank Colin Gounden, Kurian Thomas, and Taru
Jeswani for their help.

Julia Frenkle, Jade Jump, Alyson Lee and Lily Robles of the Design Studio at Monitor handled
the design and production. Anamitra Deb, Mike Kubzansky, Nishant Lalwani, Varad Pande,
Suchitra Shenoy and Sarah Stein Greenberg took the photographs used here.

Several colleagues, partners, and friends read the manuscript in early draft (or endured presenta-
tions based on it) and provided helpful comments and advice, including Paul Carttar, Katherine
Fulton, Alan Kantrow, and Nikhil Ojha (all of Monitor), as well as Jim Bunch (Omidyar Net-
work) and Antony Bugg-Levine (Rockefeller Foundation). We are also grateful to Caroline
Quijada of Abt Associates for her review on franchising.

Finally, we wish to thank the following people who participated in interim reviews and
stress-tested our ﬁndings: Anil Sinha (IFC), Luis Miranda (IDFC), Lester Coutinho (Packard
Foundation), Sandeep Farias (Unitus), Sanjiv Phansalkar (Sir Dorabji Tata Trust), Brahamanand
Hegde (Fullertons), Abhiram Seth, S. Sivakumar (ITC), Shalaka Joshi (ICICI Bank), Arjun Up-
pal (Hariyali Kisaan Bazaar), Adrian Marti (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation),
Vijay Mahajan, (BASIX), Vineet Rai (Avishkaar), Varun Sahni (Acumen Fund), Stefan Nachuk
(Rockefeller Foundation), Jacqueline Khor (Imprint Capital), Jody Garcia and Greg Zwisler
(PATH), and Parmesh Shah (World Bank).

, .


Notes
1 C.K. Prahalad and Stuart L. Hart coined the celebrated synonym for the global poor, “the bottom of the pyramid,” in
their seminal journal article, “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid,” and subsequent writings by Prahalad and
associates. See Prahalad and Hart, “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid,” strategy+business, Issue 26, First Quarter
2002, http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~brewer/ict4b/Fortune-BoP.pdf, accessed Feb. 13, 2009.
2 World Bank working paper “Global Poverty and Inequality: An overview of the Evidence, Ferreira and Ravallion”
(http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/05/19/000158349_20080519
142850/Rendered/PDF/wps4623.pdf), accessed Feb. 26, 2009.
3 In the past decade, estimates of the number of food-insecure worldwide have fluctuated between 800 and 925 million,
consisting mostly of structural $1-a-day poverty. See; for example, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization’s The
State of Food Insecurity in the World, 2005 at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/a0200e/a0199e.pdf, accessed December
22, 2008, and Food and Agriculture Organization briefing paper “Hunger on the Rise: Soaring Prices Add 75 Million
People to Global Hunger Rolls,” accessed Feb. 27, 2009.
4 According to World Bank estimates. See World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD/World
Bank, 2006). http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/cover.htm, accessed Feb. 23, 2009.
5 Other experts have proposed similar propositions and models. See in particular John Elkington and Pamela Harti-
gan, The Power of Unreasonable People: How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets That Change the World (Cambridge, MA:
HBS Press, 2008).
6 Henry Chesbrough, Open Business Models (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2006) p. 2. Chesbrough contin-
ues, “It creates value by defining a series of activities from raw materials through to the final customer that will yield
a new product or service with value being added throughout the various activities. The business model captures value
by establishing a unique resource, asset, or position within that series of activities, where the firm enjoys a competitive
advantage.” Note that much of the literature in the social enterprise field focuses on business models as the legal status
of the enterprise, i.e. NGO vs. for-profit vs. co-operative vs. hybrid. Monitor’s view is that the business model must
reflect how value is created and captured, regardless of legal structure.
7 In Indonesia, Bank Dagang Bali, c. 1970; in Brazil, ACCION, c. 1973; and in Bangladesh, the celebrated Grameen
Bank, 1976.
8 We recognize that many microfinance practitioners also — or only — make individual loans, but as the format originated
with group lending, we begin our analysis there.
9 The “small product” business model was famously covered in Prahalad’s example of shampoo sachets and other con-
sumer products prevalent in rural areas all over the developing world.
10 See, for example, Connie Bruck, “Millions for Millions,” The New Yorker, October 30, 2006 for the running debate
between Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus and eBay founder Pierre Omidyar over how best to serve the poor
in the microfinance space.
11 See Ministry of Textile Annual Report 2006-07 (http://texmin.nic.in/annualrep/AR06-07-01.pdf), accessed February
27, 2009 ICRA Textile Sector Analysis Report 2008, accessed February 27, 2009 ASSOCHAM, Cygnus Textile Industry
Report — full citations, (http://www.cygnusindia.com/images/textiles_TOC.pdf), accessed February 27, 2009). The
pervasiveness of informality is also apparent from that fact that, in 2006, informal pickle manufacturers in India were
estimated to account for some 25 percent of the overall fruit-and-vegetable processed-foods market.
12 Monitor research in agricultural supply chains suggests that the poor pay a penalty of from 50 to 75 percent vis-à-vis
large farmers to sell their products into the public mandi system of agricultural procurement. The “bottom-of-the-
pyramid penalty” is discussed in Allen Hammond, William J Kramer, Julia Tran, Rob Katz, Courtland Walker, The Next
4 Billion: Market Size and Business Strategy at the Base of the Pyramid, (Washington DC: International Finance Corporation/
World Resources Institute, 2007).
13 Aneel Karnani wrote in “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: A Mirage,” that the market at the bottom of the
pyramid is generally too small monetarily to be very profitable for most multinationals. Abstract: SSRN.com/so13/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=914518, accessed Dec. 18, 2008. He argues that viewing the poor as producers is a more produc-
tive approach. As the organization of this report demonstrates, Monitor believes both approaches offer merit and must
be considered.
14 Hammond et al, Next 4 Billion, taking the sum of the market for BOP1500, BOP1000, and BOP500, which covers just
over 60 percent of urban India, and a higher proportion of rural India.

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15 IDTechEx, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Enterprise-Applications/Report-Global-RFID-Market-Hit-5-Billion-in-2007/.
16 In-Stat: http://www.instat.com/press.asp?ID=1413&sku=IN0501830ID.
17 Infonetics, including software and hardware. Cisco systems is the market leader with 38 percent share. https://www.
infonetics.com/pr/2007/ms07.sec.4q06.nr.asp.
18 Lyra Research, “Chinese Laser Printer Market to Surpass $5 Billion in 2010, Says Lyra Research,” http://www.lyra.com/
PressRoom.nsf/a6df7dce4a0ca65f85256d160061e4eb/1b7de37379ba76788525721f0057937d?OpenDocument.
19 Education segment sizing data from CLSA Report, March 2008, Indian Education: Sector Outlook.
20 Polaris Institute, http://www.polarisinstitute.org/india_and_the_regulation_of_bottled_water, accessed Jan. 23, 2009.
21 The company recently announced plans to double capacity.
22 Shenhua Chen and Martin Ravallion, “The Developing World Is Poorer Than We Thought, but No Less Successful in
the Fight against Poverty,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 4703, August 2008. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/08/26/000158349_20080826113239/, accessed Jan. 3, 2009.
23 Some solutions will target those above the 60 percent line, but if they are addressing underserved markets where the
poor can be customers the study continued to include them.
24 Even within this basic definition there can be some variation; for instance, whether a solution should have revenues
cover only operating costs or also be fully able to cover payback of fixed costs.
25 By “enterprise” we refer to companies, NGOs, and other entities engaged in operating market-based or demand-led solutions.
26 Other interested parties ranging from World Resources Institute to University of Michigan to IFC to Indian School of
Business have identified a number of other business models that warrant similar investigation.
27 For instance, the study found interesting applications of “third party pays” models (Planet Read in India, Playpumps
in South Africa), or B2B services/management companies (Indian Schools Finance Company), but lacked the scope or
resources to investigate them in depth.
28 This assumes an average monthly income in India of someone in the bottom 60 percent of the income distribution to
be Rs. 3,500/month ($70).
29 According to a World Bank Report discussion paper titled “India–Private Health Services for the Poor,” 2005 (http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-1095698140167/
RadwanIndiaPrivateHealthFinal.pdf ), accessed March 3, 2009. Whether this fact is due to the government’s failure to
deliver comparable competitive services or to the sheer willingness, ability, and determination to pay, both, or some
other factor is simply not clear.
30 This figure does not include all children in a family going to private school — Monitor field research indicates that in a
typical low-income family, of five children, one might go to private school, two to government school, and three remain
at home to contribute to the family’s income.
31 From Monitor analysis on NRS (2005) data, we determined that the cutoff income for the bottom 60 percent of custom-
ers in India is approximately Rs, 3,400 and therefore two weeks wages comprise approximately Rs. 1,700. The cost of the
lantern is Rs. 1,500.
32 The Byrraju Foundation runs “holistic” rural development programs in Andhra Predesh, India, and according to its
website “improves the lives” of nearly 3 million people in 200 villages.
33 Byrraju is one of at least four operators in India that use a similar model. The others include Water Health Interna-
tional, the Naandi Foundation, and Poorvi Enterprises.
34 Monitor Group interviews. See also Andy Schroeter, “Sunlabob Rural Energy Ltd, Lao PDR Rental of PV systems
provides quality lighting in remote Laos villages,” The Ashden Awards for Sustainable Energy (2007), http://www.
ashdenawards.org/files/reports/Sunlabob_2007_Technical_report.pdf, accessed Jan. 19, 2009.
35 According to a WHO-UNICEF joint report, India has made significant strides in provided access to safe drinking
water: in 2004, 86 percent of the country had such access, as opposed to 70 percent in 1990. See Meeting the MDG
drinking water and sanitation target: the urban and rural challenge of the decade (Geneva: WHO Press, 2006) http://
who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmpfinal.pdf, accessed Jan. 2, 2009.
36 For education in India, see James Tooley and Pauline Dixon, Private Schools for the Poor: A Case Study from India (Reading,
UK: CfBT, 2003).
37 CFW Shops and Well-Family Midwife Clinics, respectively.

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38 LifeSpring is the only private hospital that has a partnership with the state government (Andhra Pradesh) to provide
free vaccinations.
39 ANMs undertake an 18-month diploma program, the GNM course is three and a half years, and requires a higher-level
secondary-school education.
40 Leigh L. Linden, “Complement or Substitute? The Effect of Technology on Student Achievement in India,” 2008, unpub-
lished working paper http://www.columbia.edu/~ll2240/Gyan_Shala_CAL_2008-06-03.pdf, accessed Jan. 4, 2009.
41 Most Gyan Shala junior teachers work two shifts per day, thereby earning about Rs. 2,000 a month for a household
where they are typically not the sole wage earner.
42 The design team does the administration as well as the design and refinement of the teaching process. We therefore
assume that they spend their time evenly between these two tasks and hence 50 percent of its cost is attributed to the
teaching process.
43 NCERT Survey Data from Geeta Gandhi Kingdon, “The Progress Of School Education In India,” Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, Volume 23, Number 2, 2007, p. 186.
44 Ernst and Young, The Great Indian Retail Story, (Mumbai: Ernst and Young, India, 2006), http://www.ey.com/Global/
assets.nsf/Sweden/The_Great_Indian_Retail_Story/$file/The%20Great%20Indian%20Retail%20Story.pdf, accessed
March 10, 2009. The report points out that 80 percent India’s 12 million retail shops employ only household labor:
retail has traditionally been one of India’s easiest paths to self-employment.
45 The inevitable point of comparison, China, took 15 years or so to grow its formal retail sector from 5 percent to 20
percent. Ernst and Young, The Great Indian Retail Story.
46 The desire to create livelihoods and jobs through building a proprietary direct sales force is a frequently observed
tendency among social enterprises, but this almost always leads to a higher priced — and therefore — less competitive
product. There are many social innovators who continue to strive for solutions that address both the poor as customer
and as suppliers or producers in the same approach. Monitor’s research suggests that these approaches have, at best,
limited usefulness and, for the most part, should focus on one side of the equation or the other.
47 Sa-Dhan, “A Snapshot of Microfinance in India,” June 2008, http://www.sa-dhan.net/Adls/ResMaterials/08-06- per-
cent20snapshot percent20of percent20India percent20Microfinance percent20-Quick percent20summary.doc, accessed
Jan. 5, 2009. Sa-Dhan is India’s principal MFI professional association.
48 Hindustan Unilever Ltd. describes Project Shakti as seeking “to create income-generating capabilities for underprivi-
leged rural women, by providing a sustainable micro enterprise opportunity, and to improve rural living standards
through health and hygiene awareness.” It operates through rural self-help groups, which provide channels through
which numerous HUL products are distributed. http://www.hllshakti.com/sbcms/temp15.asp?pid=46802261, accessed
Jan. 29, 2009.
49 Insurance does not cover very expensive procedures such as chemotherapy or some treatments of serious burns.
50 We are indebted to Dr. Sanjiv Phansalkar of Sir Dorabji Tata Trust for this example.
51 Even without restrictions, however, it might not make sense for financial services entities to get into the business of
moving and carrying large amounts of inventory.
52 The Construction Equipment Association—India Knowledge Base and Introduction: (http://www.coneq.org.uk/
India_%20Introduction.pdf), accessed March 3,2009.
53 We did not look at self-employment, largely because it is outside the MBS construct as we establish it, and also to avoid
debates about “voluntary” versus “necessary” entrepreneurship. Additionally, the MFI sector’s emphasis on livelihood
generation has made vast investments in this regard over the last decade in India.
54 “Contract” is something of a misnomer in that, in informal economies, formally executed and enforceable contracts are
rare and arrangements typically more of the “handshake” variety. We nevertheless use the term as broadly indicative of
mutually agreeable arrangements that yield predictable outcomes for both producers and outsourcing parties.
55 While the concept of contract production is not new, we are deepening our understanding of variants that achieve
scale. Note that contract production may be highly regulated in some countries. In India, for example, the model has
flourished recently because most state governments amended farm produce marketing regulations to permit direct ac-
cess to farmers by private (non-state) actors through direct marketing, contract farming, and establishment of markets
in private/co-op sectors.

, .


56 According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization website, “Good Agricultural Practices” (GAP) codes,
standards and regulations have been developed in recent years by the food industry and producers’ organizations, but
also governments and NGOs, aiming to codify agricultural practices at farm level for a range of commodities. Their
purpose varies from fulfillment of trade and government regulatory requirements (in particular with regard to food
safety and quality), to more specific requirements of specialty or niche markets.” http://www.fao.org/prods/gap/in-
dex_en.htm, accessed Jan. 26, 2009.
57 In fact, wage rates for landless workers in the Calypso cultivation areas in Karnataka went up over 100 percent in
2007-08.
58 Indeed the model is not only scalable but replicable — diverse players ranging from Pepsi (potatoes), DFV (bananas),
KBRL (rice), Suguna Poultry and Pradan (chicken), Agrocel (cotton), and many others — are implementing this already
at or near scale.
59 Calypso has experienced significant seasonal side-selling of between 10-25 percent of total produce in its pineapple business.
60 Small farmers were defined as having less than two acres of land.
61 Source: Datamonitor Report “Fruit & Vegetables—Global Industry Guide;” FAO Report, “World Agriculture:
towards 2015/2030.”
62 Most of the interest and coverage of e-Choupal has been rooted in the excitement over the use of computers in the
business, especially around giving current pricing information. The more relevant dimension of e-Choupal, however,
is the direct sourcing, and the fact that broad acre crop farmers who participate in it realize an income effect of about
7-10 percent by participating in a shorter chain. The majority of that income effect is from cost savings vs. participating
at the mandi, i.e. from savings in marketing costs, increased area of crop, and better and cheaper inputs,” but a small
amount of it is from the realized price increases of about 5 percent on average. See Dresdner Allianz Research, Jan.
2005; ICA Economic Study, e-Choupal: impact and effect (2007).
63 SERP only charges 1-1.5 percent brokerage.
64 At one point, ITC experimented with selling Eureka Forbes’ Aquasure water filter via its Choupal Sagaar stores but
ultimately discontinued the pilot.
65 According to Indian government figures, as of September 30, 2008, Indian SEZs employed 362,650 people. Ministry
of Commerce & Industry, Department of Commerce, “Fact Sheet on Special Economic Zones,” http://www.sezindia.
gov.in/HTMLS/Fact percent20sheet percent20on percent20SEZs percent20as percent20on percent2018th percent
20November percent20- percent20Copy.pdf, accessed Dec. 15, 2008.
66 Estimates for India vary significantly. Edward Luce apparently citing International Labour Organization figures, sets the
informal — or, in Indian parlance, the “unorganized” sector — at 93 percent of total employment. Working with official
Indian statistics and a broad definition of “informal,” K.P. Kannan and T.S. Papola arrive at an informal sector of 88
percent. Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp. 47-48; ILO,
World of Work Report 2008 (ILO: Geneva, 2008) 120-121; Kannan and Papola, “Workers in the Informal Sector: Initia-
tives by India’s National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS),” International Labour Review,
Volume 146 Nos. 3-4, (2007), pp. 321-329.
67 According to the The Hindu Business Line, February 15, 2008, the Rajiv Udyogasri Society had in three years trained
more than 450,000 individuals and placed more than 300,000. http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/02/15/
stories/2008021551782300.htm, accessed Dec. 15, 2008. The Rajiv Udyogasri Society’s site http://www.rajivudyogasri.
gov.in/JobMelaServ?from=getNaJ&pag=ind, accessed Dec. 15, 2008.
68 TeamLease Website and Press Kit, http://www.teamlease.com/, accessed Dec. 17, 2008.
69 “TeamLease Staffing Solutions,” TeamLease promotional brochure, April 2006.
70 “Survey: Business in India — Still in the way: Red tape continues to make life hard for business,” The Economist, June 1,
2006; TeamLease executives often repeat this claim.
71 Aruna Viswanatha, “Andhra leads the way with sales jobs for rural youth,” liveMint.com posted Oct. 12, 2008, http://
www.livemint.com/2008/10/12230653/Andhra-leads-the-way-with-sale.html?d=1, accessed Dec. 16, 2008.
72 TeamLease Contract Service (TLCS) was founded in 2006. “TeamLease to create 2,000 blue-collar jobs,” Business Stan-
dard, March 28, 2007

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73 According to TeamLease Co-Founder and Chairman Manish Sabharwal, “In the short run we can’t take jobs to people;
we need to take people to jobs. This means creating the processes, institutions and framework for labour migration.
This is sacrilegious to the many who believe that keeping people in villages is a policy imperative because of urban
decay and quality of life.” Manish Sabharwal, “Ending the Ovarian Lottery,” The Economic Times, May 28, 2008.
74 See, for example, “Teamlease and Rajasthan government place 5,000 candidates at ‘Livelihood Mela’” March 17, 2008;
http://www.domain-b.com/companies/companies_t/TeamLease/20080317_livelihood_mela.html; “TeamLease job
hotline to impart skills training” August 13, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1182933; “Team-
Lease taps voluntary organizations,” The Hindu Business Line, June 24, 2006, http://www.thehindubusinessline.
com/2006/06/24/stories/2006062401490500.htm, accessed Dec. 17, 2008.
75 “Manish Sabharwal, “In Five Years, 25 percent of the World’s Workers Will Be Indian,” India Knowledge@ Wharton,
April 19, 2007, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4186 , accessed Dec. 17, 2008.
76 IndiaPRWire, “TeamLease releases Annual Temp Salary Primer 2008,” April 1, 2008, http://www.indiaprwire.com/
pdf/pressrelease/200804018450.pdf, accessed Dec. 17, 2008.
77 We should point out: plenty of non-tailored products are sold to the poor all the time: fertilizer, televisions, foodstuffs,
and batteries are all mass-market products and sell well. But for socially beneficial products and services there is less
luxury to sell the non-tailored article.
78 IDE recently received a large grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to refine its marketing and increase
penetration of its treadle pumps, which has an addressable market of 35-50 million farmers.
79 This does not advocate subsidizing large corporations for everything or indeed for most things.
80 This points strongly, however, to the need for well-developed social impact metrics, so that those who are injecting soft
funding into private sector models can know with much better precision what the result of their investment is, in both
financial and social terms.
81 In April 2007, the Mexican non-profit MFI Compartamos (“let’s share” in Spanish) went public in an enthusiastically
received IPO, prompting an international debate in the microfinance and development communities over how far
microfinance should go toward becoming “big business.” Compartamos reached one million borrowers in 2008.
82 Data sources: ShoreCap: Jean Pogge, “Easy Does It: Sourcing Deals Through Collaboration,” PRI Makers Network,
January 2008, p. 6 www.primakers.net/files/EasyDoesIt.ppt, accessed January 14, 2009; Jean -Philippe de Schrevel,
“BlueOrchard Private Equity Fund,” World Microfinance Forum, October 1 2008, p. 5 www.microfinanceforum.org/
cm_data/Jean-Philippe_de_Schrevel.pdf, accessed Jan. 14, 2009; Paul DiLeo and David FitzHerbert, The Investment
Opportunity in Microfinance, Grassroots Capital Management, LLC, June 2007, p. 24.
83 DiLeo and FitzHerbert, The Investment Opportunity in Microfinance.
84 Monitor will issue a white paper on this topic later in 2009, “The Role of Soft Funding and Government in Market-
Based Solutions” on its website www.mim.monitor.com.
85 Note that the Global Impact Investing Network has this task high on its agenda.
86 Kenya: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html
Laos: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/la.html.

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