No First Use’ policy of nuclear weapons

In a recent development, India’s defence minister
suggested that the “country may redesign it’s ‘No First
Use’ policy of nuclear weapons”, raising stakes at a
time of high tension due to abrogation of Article 370
with its “nuclear-armed” neighbour Pakistan.

 Origin of India’s nuclear program can be traced back to 1940’s
when nuclear program was initiated under the guidance of Homi
J. Bhabha.
 India’s conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, at the Pokhran
Test Range, Rajasthan, cloaking it as a peaceful nuclear
explosion as a deterrence against increasing Chinese aggression.
 This test, nicknamed “Smiling Buddha,” had an explosive yield
of between six and fifteen kilotons.
 In doing so, India became the world's sixth nuclear power after
the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

 The country refrained from nuclear testing for another 24 years,
until it conducted five nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named
"Operation Shakti"), and became a full fledge nuclear-weapon state.
 This test was conducted with the backdrop of India’s security
concerns such as collapse of USSR in 1991 and rise of a Pakistan
friendly USA as a sole super power.
 In 1998, the country had only a handful of ballistic missiles, limited
intelligence capabilities and precise conventional air-dropped
munitions.
 This test attracted international uproar and to calm all apprehension
and threats post-test, India announced a draft Nuclear Doctrine
containing 'No First Use’ (NFU) of nuclear weapons in 1999.

• This policy was formally adopted in 2003 with the
announcement of Nuclear Command
Authority (NCA) of India

 India had brought out its nuclear doctrine in 1999, which
was formally adopted by it in 2003, the major highlights of
this policy were:
 The doctrine says:
 India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
powered states, and would strictly control the export of such
materials and technologies.
 Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a
nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces
anywhere.

 In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces
anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will
retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.
 India would continue to put strict controls on the export of
nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies,
participate in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
negotiations, and continue to observe the moratorium on
nuclear tests.
 Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the
civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command
Authority.

 It paved the way for the creation of the Nuclear
Command Authority to handle the N-weapons.
 Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the
civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command
Authority.
 The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political
Council and an Executive Council.
 The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister.
• India remains committed to the goal of a nuclear-
weapons-free world, through global, verifiable and non-
discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

 "No First Use" is simply a pledge to not use nuclear weapons
as a means of warfare unless a rival nation resorts to such
action first.
 In 1964, China was the first nation to pass such a resolution
after it became a nuclear power.

 India strictly adhered to NFU.
 As a result, India built its own “triad” of land, sea and air
forces, all equipped with nuclear weapons.
 A Nuclear Triad refers to a three-pronged military force
structure that consists of land-launched nuclear missiles,
nuclear-missile-armed submarines and strategic aircraft with
nuclear bombs and missile.

 These components are land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers.
 ICBM: ICBM is a guided ballistic missile and has a range
of 5,500kms. They can deliver nuclear weapons and can also
carry chemical and biological weapons.
 SLBM: SLBM is a ballistic missile, it is capable of being
launched from submarines.
 Strategic bombers: These bombers are used to bomb the
enemy’s strategic positions which are far away from
airbases.

 In November 2018, India first nuclear-armed submarine ‘INS
Arihant’, successfully completed its first deterrence patrol,
heralding India’s entry into an exclusive club of powers with
land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons delivery platforms.
 INS Arihant is the indigenously-built nuclear-propelled
submarine, which is capable of firing ballistic missiles and can
stay underwater for months.
 Presently, India is estimated to have at least 520 kilograms of
plutonium, enough for, between 100 and 120 nuclear devices.
 Not only this, India has heavily invested in developing and
acquiring expensive missile defence systems.

 India's nuclear threat environment consists of two countries, one is
China and the other is Pakistan.
 China:
 China espouses a doctrine similar to India's, that of 'assured
retaliation', with a small number of nuclear weapons and an arsenal
designed to survive a nuclear first strike.
 India and China are the only nuclear-weapon states with a No First
Use (NFU) policy,
 China espouses a limited, ‘unacceptable’ strike on civilian targets
and not 'massive retaliation' like India.

 India is naturally concerned about Chinese strides in
technologies like the DF-17, a hypersonic glide vehicle
platform designed to render missile defence redundant,
among others.
 Pakistan:
 Pakistan utilizes a combination of proxy warfare (support to
terrorist groups) and the threat of nuclear weapons to offset
India’s superior capabilities in conventional warfare.
 The country makes no claims to NFU and depends entirely on
its nuclear deterrent to safeguard its strategic goals.

 India’s nuclear doctrine has become the subject of much
debate and criticism.
 This is not the first such issue has been raised. In 2016, then
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar raised doubts on India’s
adherence to the policy of 'no first use' by saying that

New Delhi cannot "bind itself" to 'no first use' for eternity.
 No First Use is the right policy to have, it has all the
advantages. But it is more 'self-deterring'. There are various
reasons that favors changes in India’s NFU policy:
 In case of a conflict, NFU allows Pakistan take first strike on
India and restricting India’s options even after receiving credible
intelligence about the possibility of attack.
 Pakistan has been using its nuclear umbrella to hide its
weaknesses in conventional warfare, time and again threatening
India of a Nuclear attack in case, any major action taken against
it.

 Another major reason for considering this policy is increasing
asymmetry of conventional military power between China and
India.
 India should revoke its “no first use’ policy. Where India’s
fails to deter China conventionally, it should leverage its
nuclear capability.
 The rethinking of policy will strengthen India’s position in the
global scenario, which will help it to rise further.

 If India really has to switch from NFU, it will have to make
substantial changes to existing nuclear structures, alert levels,
deployment and command and control arrangements.
 Adopting ‘first use’ policy of nuclear weapons would involve a
sizeable increase in delivery systems and warheads.
 It would also require a massive increase in India’s nuclear
delivery capabilities.

 Finally, India’s strike capabilities would have to be augmented
to such a level where India is confident of taking out most of
its adversary’s arsenal.
 India would have to alter significantly its nuclear alerting
routine.

 Tainting the responsible image: With time, India has attained
the status of a responsible nuclear nation, which is a matter of
national pride and now abandoning it, will taint India's image
as a responsible nuclear power.
 Compromising with its membership: Due to its responsible
image, India became a member of most of the technology
denial regimes such as the Missile Technology control regime
(MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is also actively
pursuing full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Parting away with NFU would be a costly affair.

 Promoting Pakistan: The first impact of India’s eroding NFU pledge
may be seen in Pakistan’s material response. This rhetoric shift will
heighten Pakistan’s interest in developing more nuclear weapons and
even using them before India.
 Impacting its membership: Currently, India is a member of most of
the technology denial regimes such as the Missile Technology control
regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is also actively
pursuing full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Revoking
the ‘no first use’ pledge would harm India’s nuclear image worldwide.
 Impact on Indo-US relations: After the 1998 tests, the United States
implemented economic sanctions against India. In 2005, both countries
agreed to India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement. The Indo-
American relations have since warmed. But, the current scenario can
change the picture.

In 2005, the two countries agreed to the India–
United States Civil Nuclear Agreement. The treaty
allowed India access to nuclear materials through the
international Nuclear Suppliers Group in exchange for
safeguards on civilian nuclear facilities, including
inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Separate cooperation agreements have since
allowed additional inspections.

 Though at present, the major impact on safety, security, potential
misunderstanding will not be clearly understood. But it is sure,
that other countries will not be able to fully avoid the costly and
dangerous arms race.

 Cooperation with China: NFU presents an opportunity for India
for cooperation with China to work jointly towards a Global No
First Use (GNFU) order. Thus, proper policies should be formulated
in this regard.
 Handling Pakistan with proper strategies: India’s foregoing NFU
cannot prevent Pakistan from using terrorism as a tool of its India
policy. On the contrary, it enables Pakistan to invite international
intervention in what India maintains is a bilateral issue. This
situation needs a proper strategy and critical evaluation of each pro
and cons.

 Welcoming periodic reviews: No doubt, periodic doctrinal reviews
could serve to enhance the engagement of India’s defence forces and
also facilitate greater civil-military coordination in all aspects of
nuclear policy formulation. Therefore, the move should be welcomed.
 Proper evaluation of issues & challenges: The review should focus
especially on shortcomings of the agreement, together with the
challenges. This will also help to dispel some of the misperceptions
about the Indian policy.
• For now, India should continue to focus on disarmament initiatives,
consistent with its unique position as a reluctant nuclear-armed state.

No First Use’ policy of nuclear weapons

More Related Content

What's hot (20)

Similar to No First Use’ policy of nuclear weapons (20)

More from jatinvermaiasacademy (14)

Recently uploaded (20)

No First Use’ policy of nuclear weapons