SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Presented by Anand Tanksali.
SAP – (Systems Application and Products) Provides different solutions: CRM, ERP, PLM, SCM, GRC, Business One… ERP Solutions consist of : FI,CO (Finance and Controlling) SD (Sales Distribution) HR (Human Resources) MM (Materials Management) etc… Modules integrated together using Netweaver platform SAP runs on multiple Operating Systems
 
 
Instances & Systems Admin entity groups related components providing one or more services Systems are identified by SAP System ID (SID) System instances  parameterization done in Profiles Client    Transaction     Authorization Client default (000, 001 and 006) Transaction code (SU01, SE16, FK01, PA20) Authorizations    Users assigned roles as per profiles and contains authorizations ABAP, Reports/Programs, Function Modules, RFC
SAP_ALL profile = SAP GOD Many profiles may enable and allow user to be GOD Each SAP system uses its own DB SAP processes run under <sid>adm or SAPService <SID> user accounts Direct access to DB means SAP compromised!!!! Connections between systems always based on TRUST Many customer interfaces implemented using FTP (cleartext, weak passwords)
Why do you need SAP Security? Errr What about Security I don’t care SAP should be up and running by Tuesday we have to take care of user passwords Umm What Security we have enough guards no more excuses SAP should be up on Tuesday
What the CFO does not realize : Weak security controls can result in Business and Financial Loss / Frauds CSO does not realize: SAP Security is much more than User Roles, Responsibilities & Authorizations
Security configurations of SAP is usually left to default By default many configurations are not secure Conclusion – SAP systems are not secure
First SAP Penetration Testing Framework developed by Cybsec -Labs Provides support for platform discovery investigation and  exploitation  Current versions available on Windows / Linux
 
 
 
 
 
SAP designed to interact with external systems Integrated Centralized information  Communicating with other systems ALE EDI HTTP RFC FTP XML ……
In early years SAP implemented IBM CPI-C interface to communicate with other systems  CPI-C allowed data transfer Complex apps needed to call  functions on other servers resulting in SAP Remote function Call interface RFC is the key component of SAP apps
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerabilities published by SAP
Admin should change passwords at regular intervals Ensure user should not have SAP_ALL access rights Adhere to SAP best practices Disable auto unlocking  Enforce a strong password policy Restrict access to Database
RFC is the weakest link in SAP and needs to be secured SAP admin must apply patches and harden the servers Network admin should apply rules on firewall and deny ports not required to be used for day-to-day operations Network admin should monitor logs regularly Advanced attacks should be avoided with proper configurations and patch management
Thank You! Anand Tanksali.

More Related Content

PPTX
Cs Comply And Audit V1.6
PPTX
Dell Password Manager Introduction
PPTX
Dell Quest TPAM Privileged Access Control
PDF
081712 isaca-atl-auditing sap-grc
PDF
Introduction to SAP Security
PPTX
SAP GRC 10.1 ONLINE - KNACK IT TRAINING
PDF
Software License Optimization Managed Services
Cs Comply And Audit V1.6
Dell Password Manager Introduction
Dell Quest TPAM Privileged Access Control
081712 isaca-atl-auditing sap-grc
Introduction to SAP Security
SAP GRC 10.1 ONLINE - KNACK IT TRAINING
Software License Optimization Managed Services

What's hot (20)

PDF
Sap GRC Basic Information | GRC 12 online training
PDF
Secure Management of Privileged Passwords
PPTX
Automate Data Scraping and Extraction for Web
PDF
FlexNet Manager Suite Cloud
PPTX
ROBOT and Banking on IBM i with Kevin Aker
PDF
SAP Security & Compliance Audits. Find your vulnerabilities before you get hu...
PPT
SAP grc
PPTX
SAP GRC AC 10.1 - ARM Workflows
PPT
eScan version 11 for Corporate & Enterprises
PPTX
Privileged Access Management - Unsticking Your PAM Program - CIS 2015
PPT
eScan version 11 for SMB
PPT
Virtualization Licensing Lottery
PDF
13 Tips to Write Secure Applications
DOCX
Haris Sheikh(system administrator)..
DOCX
Asia,scrsots
PDF
Why your works council has nothing to fear from SAP security. [Webinar]
PDF
FlexNet Manager Platform Implementation Service
PPTX
Flex net manager for sap applications v9 1 presentation
PDF
Towards new shores with cross-system SoD analyses. [Webinar]
PDF
Fiori and S/4 authorizations: What are the biggest challenges, and where do t...
Sap GRC Basic Information | GRC 12 online training
Secure Management of Privileged Passwords
Automate Data Scraping and Extraction for Web
FlexNet Manager Suite Cloud
ROBOT and Banking on IBM i with Kevin Aker
SAP Security & Compliance Audits. Find your vulnerabilities before you get hu...
SAP grc
SAP GRC AC 10.1 - ARM Workflows
eScan version 11 for Corporate & Enterprises
Privileged Access Management - Unsticking Your PAM Program - CIS 2015
eScan version 11 for SMB
Virtualization Licensing Lottery
13 Tips to Write Secure Applications
Haris Sheikh(system administrator)..
Asia,scrsots
Why your works council has nothing to fear from SAP security. [Webinar]
FlexNet Manager Platform Implementation Service
Flex net manager for sap applications v9 1 presentation
Towards new shores with cross-system SoD analyses. [Webinar]
Fiori and S/4 authorizations: What are the biggest challenges, and where do t...
Ad

Similar to Null Meet Ppt (20)

PPT
Sap security – thinking with a hacker’s hat
PDF
EAS-SEC: Framework for securing business applications
PDF
SAP security made easy
PDF
Practical SAP pentesting (B-Sides San Paulo)
PDF
Practical SAP pentesting workshop (NullCon Goa)
PDF
Implementing SAP security in 5 steps
PDF
Assess and monitor SAP security
PDF
GRC 2013 Preventing Cyber Attacks for SAP - Onapsis Presentation
PDF
Securing SAP in 5 steps
PDF
SAP portal: breaking and forensicating
PPTX
SAP (In)Security: New and Best
PDF
What CISOs should know about SAP security
PPTX
DeltaGRiC_Consulting_SMAC_Digital Innovation Security Conference_Presentation...
PDF
EAS-SEC Project
PDF
Injecting evil code in your SAP J2EE systems. Security of SAP Software Deploy...
PPTX
ISACA 2016 Annual Conference SA_State of Risk_Tunde Ogunkoya_DeltaGRiC_Consul...
PDF
#askSAP GRC Innovations Community Call: Cybersecurity Risk and Governance
PDF
Assessing and Securing SAP Solutions
PDF
[CB19] Spyware, Ransomware and Worms. How to prevent the next SAP tragedy by ...
PDF
SAP security in figures
Sap security – thinking with a hacker’s hat
EAS-SEC: Framework for securing business applications
SAP security made easy
Practical SAP pentesting (B-Sides San Paulo)
Practical SAP pentesting workshop (NullCon Goa)
Implementing SAP security in 5 steps
Assess and monitor SAP security
GRC 2013 Preventing Cyber Attacks for SAP - Onapsis Presentation
Securing SAP in 5 steps
SAP portal: breaking and forensicating
SAP (In)Security: New and Best
What CISOs should know about SAP security
DeltaGRiC_Consulting_SMAC_Digital Innovation Security Conference_Presentation...
EAS-SEC Project
Injecting evil code in your SAP J2EE systems. Security of SAP Software Deploy...
ISACA 2016 Annual Conference SA_State of Risk_Tunde Ogunkoya_DeltaGRiC_Consul...
#askSAP GRC Innovations Community Call: Cybersecurity Risk and Governance
Assessing and Securing SAP Solutions
[CB19] Spyware, Ransomware and Worms. How to prevent the next SAP tragedy by ...
SAP security in figures
Ad

Null Meet Ppt

  • 1. Presented by Anand Tanksali.
  • 2. SAP – (Systems Application and Products) Provides different solutions: CRM, ERP, PLM, SCM, GRC, Business One… ERP Solutions consist of : FI,CO (Finance and Controlling) SD (Sales Distribution) HR (Human Resources) MM (Materials Management) etc… Modules integrated together using Netweaver platform SAP runs on multiple Operating Systems
  • 3.  
  • 4.  
  • 5. Instances & Systems Admin entity groups related components providing one or more services Systems are identified by SAP System ID (SID) System instances parameterization done in Profiles Client  Transaction  Authorization Client default (000, 001 and 006) Transaction code (SU01, SE16, FK01, PA20) Authorizations  Users assigned roles as per profiles and contains authorizations ABAP, Reports/Programs, Function Modules, RFC
  • 6. SAP_ALL profile = SAP GOD Many profiles may enable and allow user to be GOD Each SAP system uses its own DB SAP processes run under <sid>adm or SAPService <SID> user accounts Direct access to DB means SAP compromised!!!! Connections between systems always based on TRUST Many customer interfaces implemented using FTP (cleartext, weak passwords)
  • 7. Why do you need SAP Security? Errr What about Security I don’t care SAP should be up and running by Tuesday we have to take care of user passwords Umm What Security we have enough guards no more excuses SAP should be up on Tuesday
  • 8. What the CFO does not realize : Weak security controls can result in Business and Financial Loss / Frauds CSO does not realize: SAP Security is much more than User Roles, Responsibilities & Authorizations
  • 9. Security configurations of SAP is usually left to default By default many configurations are not secure Conclusion – SAP systems are not secure
  • 10. First SAP Penetration Testing Framework developed by Cybsec -Labs Provides support for platform discovery investigation and exploitation Current versions available on Windows / Linux
  • 11.  
  • 12.  
  • 13.  
  • 14.  
  • 15.  
  • 16. SAP designed to interact with external systems Integrated Centralized information Communicating with other systems ALE EDI HTTP RFC FTP XML ……
  • 17. In early years SAP implemented IBM CPI-C interface to communicate with other systems CPI-C allowed data transfer Complex apps needed to call functions on other servers resulting in SAP Remote function Call interface RFC is the key component of SAP apps
  • 18.  
  • 19.  
  • 20.  
  • 21.  
  • 22.  
  • 23.  
  • 24.  
  • 25.  
  • 27. Admin should change passwords at regular intervals Ensure user should not have SAP_ALL access rights Adhere to SAP best practices Disable auto unlocking Enforce a strong password policy Restrict access to Database
  • 28. RFC is the weakest link in SAP and needs to be secured SAP admin must apply patches and harden the servers Network admin should apply rules on firewall and deny ports not required to be used for day-to-day operations Network admin should monitor logs regularly Advanced attacks should be avoided with proper configurations and patch management
  • 29. Thank You! Anand Tanksali.