Operations_Process[5]

The Second Battle of Zhawar and LTG Nabi Azimi
1
General Mohammed Nabi Azimi led the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, DRA,
Commandos at the second Battle of Zhawar.1 General Azimi failed to achieve his immediate and
long-term objectives. After making several tactical errors and failing to meet his objectives
General Nabi Azimi either made a decision to leave for Kabul on business or was sent away at
the direction of the USSR. "Good tactics can save even the worst strategy. Bad tactics will
destroy even the best strategy." The Commander’s role in the operations process is vital to
mission success. General Nabi Azimi’s, ineffective leadership resulted in tactical blunders and
ultimately failure to achieve the strategic mission. General Azimi’s leadership failures and the
confusion that followed his departure are good examples of how leadership directly impacts a
mission.
The Soviet Afghan War, also known as the Bear Trap or the Soviet Union’s Vietnam,
lasted almost ten years, from 1979 to 1989.2 During the nine years the Soviet Union was at war
in Afghanistan they fought many battles in numerous areas, to include both battles of Zhawar.
Zhawar was a large Mujahideen logistics transfer base located four kilometers from the Pakistan
border and 15 kilometers from Miram Shah, a resupply and training base in Pakistan.3 The
Mujahideen base was a series of tunnels and caves located high up in the mountains south east of
Khost in Patika Province. The tunnels ran up to 500 meters in length and contained a hotel,
mosque, arms depot, medical point and other logistic support and sustainment.4 The base was
1 Grau, Lester W.; Jalali, Ali Ahmad; The Campaign for the Caves: The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan
War; The Journal of Slavic MIlitary Studies, Volume 14, Number 3, September 2001,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/010900-zhawar.htm> accessed 9 January 2013
2 Yousaf, Brigadier Mohammad; Adkin, Mark; “Afghanistan-The Bear Trap: The defeat of a Superpower”
Casemate, 2001 p. 159
3 Grau, Lester; globalsecurity.org
4 Yousaf, Mohammad; p. 166

2
dug in at about 7000 feet high in the mountains which offered a strong natural defense. The
approach was covered by minefields, anti-aircraft guns, RPGs, mortars, SA-7s and small arms.5
As the war progressed the Soviets, aided by the DRA, focused more attention on
attacking Mujahideen strongholds. The Mujahideen tried to offset the combat power by building
strongholds like Zhawar.6 In February 1986 the Soviets decided it was time that the DRA should
be leading the attack against the Mujahideen and attempt a second attack on Zhawar.7 LTG
Mohammed Nabi Azimi was the overall commander of the Afghan Ground Forces and planned
the attack with his advisor, MG V. G. Trofimenko.8 The plan was to attack the infrastructure
around Zhawar and seal off the Mujahideen's supply route to Miram Shah.9 If the Soviets and
DRA failed to cut off the Mujahideen supply route, thousands of reinforcements would have
been able to join the fight.
On February 28th, the DRA, aided by two Soviet battalions, left Gardez headed toward
Zhawar, but they stopped in Matwarkh and occupied the area for a month.10 The Mujahideen
took advantage of this and attacked the Afghan forces, but the Afghan forces did not move into
the Khost valley until the arrival of the Soviets 25th ID.11 Upon arrival at Khost the Afghans and
Soviets prepped for their offensive. At midnight on the 2nd of April the assault on Zhawar
began lead by artillery and air strikes from the Soviets.12 The DRAs 37th Commando Brigade
was flown in using Soviet aircraft for the initial air assault.13 The ground assault ran into heavy
5 Yousaf, Mohammad; p. 167
6 Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain:Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan
War, to be published in 1998, xvii and Chapter 11, page 1
9 Yousaf, Mohammad; p.169
11 Lyakhovskiy, Aleksandr, The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghan Veterans; Moscow; Iskona; 1995; p. 306

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Mujahideen resistance and the Commandos had missed the drop zone and air assaulted in past
Zhawar, in Pakistan.
In spite of the failure of the air assault team General Azimi committed the remainder of
his forces to the open areas around Zhawar.14 The Mujahideen responded to the Soviet Artillery
and aircraft attacks by going on the offensive and attacking the landing zones resulting in the
capture of the 500 Commandos (who had missed their drop zones).15 To make matters worse,
General Azimi had failed to stop the Mujahideen reinforcements from arriving just in time to aid
in capturing the DRA Commandos.
At this point General Azimi had failed to ensure the air assault troops had landed
successfully, failed to protect them after they landed, and committed the remainder of his forces
to an altered plan that could not succeed. The lone DRA/Soviet success was that Soviet air
strikes had trapped a lot of Mujahideen fighters in their caves, and injured the commander
Jalaluddin Haqani.16
The fighting continued for ten more days before General Varrenikov sent a letter to the
Soviet Minister of Defense, in his correspondence he wrote that General Azimi should be
replaced. Shortly after the letter was sent, and as the battle continued, General Azimi flew off to
Kabul on important business, where he issued orders until he was replaced.17 It was roughly ten
days after General Azimi's replacement, General Gafur, could push from Tani to Zhawar.18 On
the 17th of April the Soviets and DRA increased the tempo and began their assault on Zhawar,
14 Grau, Lester, globalsecurity.org

4
the Mujahideen afraid their leader was dead, headed for Pakistan and by the 19th the base was
ceded to the DRA and Soviet forces.19
The caves were destroyed but the Soviets and Afghans left only hours after the bases
destruction and did not remain to control the area.20 The DRA and Soviets fought 57 days to
hold the land for a few hours and then gave it right back to the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen
shot down at least thirteen helicopters, captured 530 Commandos, and killed approximately 1500
Soviets and DRA.21 Of the 530 captured Commandos, all 78 officers were executed.22
As the commander, General Mohammed Nabi Azimi was responsible for the successes
and failures of the DRA and Soviets at the second battle of Zhawar. As the leader, it was
General Azimi’s responsibility to go through the operations process to ensure the mission was
successfully executed. Once a leader receives a mission he must first make sure that he
understands the mission objective, the enemy, and the operational environment.23 It appears that
the mission objective was unclear. The objective to destroy the base would require different
tactics than holding an area for the long term.
General Azimi did not understand the enemy as evidenced by the miscalculation of
enemy strength and their weaponry. It appeared he made decisions without proper collection or
assessment of intelligence. His failure to understand the operational environment was evidenced
by several factors. First, he chose the wrong time of year to attack as the weather was
unfavorable. Second, he failed to fully comprehend the impact of the bases nearness to Pakistan.
Third, he failed to block the route to Miram Shah. Failure to block this route allowed for the
19 Yousaf, Mohammad; p.169-170
20 Kakar, M. Hassan, Afghanistan:The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982; University of
California Press, 1997, p.260
22 Grau,Lester; globalsecurity.org
23 ADRP 5-0; p. 1-3

5
Mujahideen to move freely back and forth between Zhawar and Miram Shah. Lastly, it did not
appear that there was a plan to establish and maintain their lines of communication. Without
lines of communication, long-term success was not possible. General Azimi was not able to
provide proper support for his troops for the extended time of the battle.
The commander must understand the problem, and then he must visualize the end state
and the nature of the operation.24 General Azimi needed to attack the Mujahideen at Zhawar and
take control of their central logistics and training facility. To hold the area, General Azimi
needed reserve troops to send in and defend against Mujahideen attacks. During the battle
General Azimi made the decision to send all his reserve troops into the fight after his
Commandos were captured. Without a reserve force General Azimi would have no way to
control Zhawar and achieve the end state.
Once the commander visualizes the fight he must then describe the operation and
disseminate the commander’s intent, guidance, and commander’s critical information.25
Importantly, he must make sure that his subordinates understand this information and are
prepared to execute his plan. The commander will then direct the warfighting functions. General
Azimi received good intelligence about the Mujahideen reinforcements but did not plan to have
anyone close the route to Miram Shah. He also maneuvered his reserve troops into an area that
allowed the Mujahideen to have a major tactical advantage over his troops.
Throughout the steps of the operations process the leader must continuously assess and
lead.26 General Azimi failed to ensure the air assault team was trained to navigate in the terrain.
When General Azimi’s Commandos air assaulted into the wrong location and were captured, he
24 ADRP 5-0; p. 1-3
25 ADRP 5-0; p. 1-3
26 ADRP 5-0; p. 1-3

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failed to correctly assess the impact that would have on mission success. The DRA and Soviets
lost their ability to hold Zhawar based on that decision. When there were indications that the
battle was turning against them, General Azimi decided to leave the battle and fly to Kabul on
what he claimed to be official business. He failed in his obligation to use his leadership to affect
the morale and mission in a positive way.
General Azimi demonstrated numerous failures of great magnitude throughout the
operations process because he failed to get good intelligence, disseminate that intelligence, and
provide tactical leadership to coordinate operations that were clearly not going as planned. He
failed to understand the problem of the enemy’s strength throughout the operation including the
enemy’s ability to send reinforcements. General Azimi’s Mission Command was affected by
ignoring these issues and was the reason for his failures throughout the operations process.
The battle was praised publicly as a victory for the DRA and Soviets. However, the
overall goal of the battle was not achieved. The mission was to eliminate the Mujahideen
logistic center and resupply point, but because General Azimi sent in all reserve units, the DRA
was unable to hold the area. Sun Tzu said, “There are many ways a warlord can bring
destruction to his own army.” One of those ways is “causing unnecessary retreat by not correctly
employing resources.” This failure allowed the Mujahideen to return and have the base fully
operational within a few weeks.27
Failure to block or close off the supply route from Miram Shah to Zhawar was another
failure in Mission Command that greatly affected the outcome of the battle. Going into the battle
it was known that reinforcements could be sent in along that route and General Azimi did
nothing about it. He allowed the Mujahideen to send thousands of reinforcements along the

7
route causing the DRA and Soviets to lose many lives and resources. When General Azimi left
the battle to fly to Kabul on “official business”, the battle started to swing in the favor of the
Soviets and DRA troops. The change in leadership and mission command affected the fight but
without reserve troops the end state could not be achieved.
General Azimi is a great example for future leaders of what not to do and how important
the operations process is for leaders. Before his unit arrived in Khost, they stopped for almost a
month outside the town without letting the Mujahideen know that they were coming. The DRA
commander could have used this opportunity to understand the enemy and operational
environment and visualize the end state and nature of the operation. This example shows how
vital it is to understand the end state of the operation and how crucial assessments can be. The
air assault team was critical to mission success yet mission training seemed to be poor and there
were no backup plans to ensure the success of that part of the operation. A commander must
ensure that whatever forces he commits have support to maintain superiority.
The DRA and Soviet’s had good intelligence, strong fires plan and aviation support that
allowed them to successfully attack the Mujahideen and force them to abandon their base.
However, the end state of their mission was to take control of and destroy the base. General
Azimi’s poor understanding and visualization forced the DRA and Soviets to leave Zhawar after
a few hours and before the base could be properly destroyed. Because the commander did not
visualize the nature of the operation, the Mujahideen were able to return to Zhawar and turn it
into an even larger base.
General Azimi at the Second battle of Zhawar is a great example of what leaders should
not do throughout the operations process. Major failures can occur by something as simple as
not using METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, Troops, and Equipment) or any other part

8
of the operations process. All failures will be a result of not analyzing one or more of the six
areas of the operations process. Sun Tzu said it best, “It doesn’t matter that you may appear to
be able to overwhelm the enemy. You must still be prepared and your generals must understand
and believe your plans will succeed.” General Nabi Azimi showed that overwhelming numbers
account for nothing if you do not follow the operations process.

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References
1. Grau, Lester W.; Jalali, Ali Ahmad; The Campaign for the Caves: The Battles for Zhawar
in the Soviet-Afghan War; The Journal of Slavic MIlitary Studies, Volume 14, Number 3,
September 2001, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/010900-
zhawar.htm> accessed 9 January 2013
2. Kakar, M. Hassan, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-
1982; University of California Press, 1997
3. Yousaf, Brigadier Mohammad; Adkin, Mark; Afghanistan- The Bear Trap: The defeat of a
Superpower; Casemate, 2001
4. Tanner, Stephen; Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War
against the Taliban; Da Capo Press, 2002
5. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen
Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, to be published in 1998, xvii and Chapter 11
6. ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process

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