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“The laws of history are as absolute at the laws of physics, and if the probabilities of error are greater, it is only because history does not deal with as many humans as physics does atoms, so that individual variations count for more.” 
Isaac Asimov, Foundation and Empire (1952)
Optimal Control in Agent-based Economic Models: A Survey 
James Matthew B. Miraflor | CS 296 - Seminar
“This is what I mean by the ‘mechanics’ of economic development - the construction of a mechanical, artificial world, populated by the interacting robots that economics typically studies, that is capable of exhibiting behavior the gross features of which resemble those of the actual world.” 
Robert Lucas, Jr., “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”. Journal of Monetary Economics. 1988.
The “Robots” = “Representative Agents” 
•Firms. Production function 
•Consumers. Utility function 
•Government 
–Usually is a constraint rather than an objective function 
–Behavior – Efficient or Inefficient? Benevolent or Corrupt? 
•Optimization 
•Equilibrium 
–When does an economy stop growing? At what point do firms stop producing, consumers stop consuming, government stop spending?
PRODUCTION 
Firms, Technology, Capital, and Labor
The Neoclassical Production Function 
•Production function: 푌=퐹(퐾,퐿,퐴) 
–where 푌 is the output, 퐴 is the total factor productivity/technology, 퐿 is the labor input, 퐾 is the capital input 
–satisfies conditions below: 
1.Constant returns to scale: 
퐹휆퐾,휆퐿,휆퐴=휆퐹(퐾,퐿,퐴),∀휆>0 
–Replication argument 
2.Positive and diminishing returns 
o 휕퐹 휕퐾 >0, 휕2퐹 휕퐾2<0, 휕퐹 휕퐿 >0, 휕2퐹 휕퐿2<0
The Neoclassical Production Function 
3.Inada (1963) Conditions: 
olim 퐾→0 휕퐹 휕퐾 =lim 퐿→0 휕퐹 휕퐿 =∞,lim 퐾→∞ 휕퐹 휕퐾 =lim 퐿→∞ 휕퐹 휕퐿 =0 
4.Essentiality: 
o퐹0,퐿=퐹퐾,0=0 
•Per Capita values 
푌=퐹퐾,퐿,퐴→ 푌 퐿 =퐹 퐾 퐿 ,1, 퐴 퐿 =퐿푓푘, 
푦=푓(푘) 휕퐹 휕퐾 =푓′푘, 휕퐹 휕퐿 =푓푘−푘푓′(푘)
Per Capita values 
•퐾(푡) =퐼푡−훿퐾푡=푠퐹(퐾,퐿,퐴)−훿퐾푡 
• 퐾푡 L= 푠퐹퐾,퐿,푇 퐿 − 훿퐾푡 퐿 =푠푓푘−훿푘 
•Take the time derivative of 푘 to get: 
•푘 = 푑 퐾 퐿 푑푡 = 퐿퐾 −퐾퐿 퐿2= 퐾 퐿 − 퐿 퐿 퐾 퐿 = 퐾 퐿 −푛푘 
o 퐿 퐿 =푛 (population growth) 
o푘 = 퐾 퐿 −푛푘→ 퐾 퐿 =푘 +푛푘 
•푘 +푛푘=푠푓푘−훿푘 
•푘 =푠푓푘−훿푘−푛푘
Capital Dynamics 
•Change in capital is produced good not consumed. 
•푘 =푓푘−푐−(푛+훿)푘, where: 
–푘 is the per capita capital (퐾/퐿), 푘 = 푑푘 푑푡 is the change in capital, or the investment, due to savings. 
–훿 is the depreciation rate of capital 
–푛 is the population rate 
•Notice that 푛 behaves like a depreciation rate since it represents the fraction of resources to be given to the next generation.
Savings/Investment and Consumption 
Capital (k) 
Output (y) 
Gross 
Product 
f(k) 
Some level of Capital (k) 
Actual GDP (y) 
Actual 
Savings 
(s*y) 
Gross Savings s*f(k) 
consumption per worker 
investment per worker 
Borrowed/derived from DE201 lecture slides of Prof. Emmanuel de Dios
Gross 
Product 
f(k) 
k* 
Gross Savings s*f(k) 
Population Growth 
k1 
k2 
Investment is greater than population growth; capital per person increases 
Population growth is greater than investment; capital per person decreases. 
Savings/Investment and Consumption 
Capital 
(k) 
Output (y) 
Borrowed/derived from DE201 lecture slides of Prof. Emmanuel de Dios
Savings and Economic Growth 
Gross Product f(k) 
Gross Savings s*f(k) 
High economic growth 
Zero growth 
Negative economic growth 
Population Growth 
Capital 
(k) 
Output (y) 
Borrowed/derived from DE201 lecture slides of Prof. Emmanuel de Dios
Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
푌=퐹퐾,퐿=퐴퐿훼퐾훽 
•훼 and 훽 are the output elasticities of capital & labor 
–measures the responsiveness of output to a change in either labor or capital, ceteris paribus. 
•If we want production per capita, we divide the function buy 퐿 to get 푌 퐿 =퐴퐿훼−1퐾훽=퐴퐿훼−훽−1퐾 퐿 훽 →푦=퐴퐿훼−훽−1푘훽 
•where 푦 and 푘 are per capita production and per capita capital respectively. 
•Conventionally, we set 훼+훽=1 so that 훽=1−훼
CONSUMPTION 
The Utility Function and Discounting of the Future
The Utility Function 
•푐푡=푐푡 represents the consumption at time 푡 
•푢푡= 푢푐푡=푢(푐푡) represents the utility of consumers from consuming 푐푡. 
•푈0 is the total, accumulated utility over infinite time of the consumer, i.e. 푈0= 푒−휌푡 푢푐푡 푑푡 ∞ 0 
oIf 퐿푡 is the population level at time 푡, we have: 푈0= 푒−휌푡 푢푐푡퐿푡 푑푡 ∞ 0
Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
•If production is Cobb-Douglas, then the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal savings (Kurz, 1968) : 
1.A 푢(푐푡) must be Constant Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (CEIS) 
푢푐푡= 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 
–where 휎= 1 푠 and 푠 is the savings rate 
–Constant aversion to fluctuations in consumption 
–One doesn’t get more or less risk averse as one gets richer (or poorer). 
2.Discount rate 휌 must be related to the parameters of 휌=훽−푠, where 훽 is share of capital to production.
Optimal Cumulative Consumption 
•A consumer agent will want to maximize consumption over time, i.e. max푈0= 푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 푑푡 ∞ 0 
푠.푡. 푘 =푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘, 푘0>0 푔푖푣푒푛 
•The solution to this optimal control problem will then govern the dynamics of savings across time. 
•How do we solve?
BASICS OF OPTIMAL CONTROL 
The Hamiltonian and the Maximum Principle
The Lagrangean (Static Optimization) 
m푎푥 {푓(푥)|푔푖 =0,푖퐾} •Given the function 푦=푓(푥1,…,푥푛) subject to a constraint 푔푖(푥1,…,푥푛)=0, 푖=1,…,푘 the Lagrangean is 
퐿푥;휆=푓푥+ 휆푖푔푖(푥) 푘 푖=1 
•where the  is the vector of Lagrangean multipliers. 
•Let 푦=푓푥1,푥2, 푔푥1,푥2=0 
퐿푥1,푥2,휆=푓푥1,푥2+휆푔(푥1,푥2) 
•To determine 푥1∗,푥2∗,휆∗: 휕퐿 휕푥1= 휕푓푥1,푥2 휕푥1+ 휕푔푥1,푥2 휕푥1=0 휕퐿 휕푥2= 휕푓푥1,푥2 휕푥2+ 휕푔푥1,푥2 휕푥2=0
The Hamiltonian (Dynamic Optimization) 
•Definition. Given the problem 
푀푎푥 퐽= 푓푥,푢,푡푑푡 푇 0 
푆.푡. 푥′푡=푔(푥,푢,푡) 
푥0=푥0,푥푇 free,푇 fixed 
푢푡휖 ℝ 
•The Hamiltonian of the problem is the function 
퐻푥,푢,휆,푡=푓푥,푢,푡+휆푔(푥,푢,푡) 
•휆(푡) is called the costate variable.□ 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
Problem of Dynamic Optimization 
•From among functions x 휖C1[0,T] starting at (0,x0) and ending at (T,xT), choose an x* such that J(x*) ≥ J(x). 
•Note that in Optimal Control terms, we are actually selecting a u (governing x) that optimizes x 
0 T 
x 
x0 
xT 
x*(t) 
Figure 1 
□ 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
The Pontryagin Maximum Principle in Terms of the Hamiltonian 
•Theorem. Given the problem 
•푀푎푥 퐽= 푓푥,푢,푡푑푡 푇 0 
•푆.푡. 푥′푡=푔(푥,푢,푡) 
• 푥0=푥0,푥푇 free,푇 fixed 
• u(t) 휖 ℝ 
•퐻푥,푢,휆,푡=푓푥,푢,푡+휆푔(푥,푢,푡) 
•If the pair (u*(t), x*(t)) is optimal, then there is a continuously differentiable function 휆(푡) such that: 
a. 휕퐻 휕휆 = x*′ (Hλ = x*′) 
b. 휕퐻 휕푥 =−휆′ (Hx = −λ′) 
c. 휕퐻 휕푢 =0 (Hu = 0) 
d.x*(0) = x0 
e.λ(T) = 0 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
Infinite Horizon Problems 
•The Infinite Horizon Optimal Control Problem 
•푀푎푥 푓푥,푢,푡푒−푟푡푑푡 ∞ 0 
•푆.푡. 푥′푡=푔(푥,푢,푡) 
• 푥0=푥0,푢(푡)∈푈 
퐻푥,푢,휆,푡=푓푥,푢,푡푒−푟푡+휆푔(푥,푢,푡) 
•The objective function is sensible only if, for all admissible pairs (푥,푢,푡), the integral converges. 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
Infinite Horizon Problems 
Transversality Conditions. 푎 푥∞ 푓푟푒푒 
lim 푡→∞ 휆푡=0 푏 푥∞≥푥푚푖푛 
lim 푡→∞ 휆(푡)≥0 lim 푡→∞ 휆푡=0 푖푓 푥∞>푥푚푖푛 푐 푥∞ 푓푖푥푒푑 
lim 푡→∞ 퐻=0 
TVC is a description of how the optimal path crosses a terminal line in variable endpoint problems. 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION 
The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model
The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 
•Question: How much should a nation save? 
•max푈0= 푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 푑푡 ∞ 0 
•푠.푡. 푘 =푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘, 푘0>0 푔푖푣푒푛 
•The solution to this optimal control problem will then govern the dynamics of savings across time. 
•Note that lim 푡→∞ 푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 =0 
oOne can verify that for this to happen, 휌>푛
Solving the Model 
•Setting up the Hamiltonian 
퐻=푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐(푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘) 
•Where 휐 is the dynamic Lagrange multiplier 
o휐 can also be interpreted as the shadow price of investment 
•The First Order Conditions (FOCs) are: 
o퐻푐=0 
o퐻푘=−휐 
oTransversality condition (TVC): lim 푡→∞ 푘푡푣푡=0
퐻=푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐(푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘) 
•퐻푐=0→푒−(휌−푛)푡푐푡 −휎−휐=0 (1) 
•퐻푘=−휐 →휐푓′푘−푛−훿=−휐 
o− 휐 휐 =푓′푘−푛−훿 (2) 
•Take logs and time derivative of (1): 
o−휌−푛푡−휎ln푐푡=ln휐 
o−휌−푛−휎 푐 푐 = 휐 휐 → 푐 푐 =휎−1(−휌+푛− 휐 휐 ) (3) 
•Plug (3) to (2) to get: 
o훾푐= 푐 푐 =휎−1푓′(푘)−휌−훿 
oIn the Cobb-Douglas case: 훾푐=휎−1훽푘−(1−훽)−휌−훿
Equilibrium in Consumption 
훾푐= 푐 푐 =휎−1푓′(푘)−휌−훿 =휎−1훽푘−(1−훽)−휌−훿 
•In equilibrium, i.e. 푐 푐 =0, 푓′푘=휌+훿 
oIf consumption is to remain at its current level, marginal return to capital must at least reach the level of the combined future discounting and capital depreciation 
oAt this level, an individual is indifferent between consuming and spending.
Transitional Dynamics 
From our constraint: 푘 =푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘 
• 푘 푘 = 푓푘−푐 푘 −푛−훿 
• 푐 푐 =휎−1푓′(푘)−휌−훿 
•In equilibrium 
o 푘 푘 =0→푐=푓푘−푛+훿푘 
o 푐 푐 =0→푓′(푘)=휌+훿
푘 =0 curve: 푐=푓(푘)−(푛+훿)푘 푐 =0 curve: 푓′(푘)=휌+훿 
(푛+훿)푘 
푓(푘) 
푘 
푘 
푐 
푘∗ 
푐 =0 
푘 =0 
퐸 
퐸 = steady state 
푘0 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
푘∗ 
푐∗ 
퐸 
푐 =0 
푘 =0 
푐 
푘 
+ 
− 
+ 
− 
The Ramsey Model 
Stable branch 
Unstable branch 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
The Ramsey Model 
•The steady state E = (k*,c*) is a saddle-point equilibrium. It is unique. 
•At equilibrium, k* is a constant; hence, y* = f(k*) is a constant. Since k ≡ K/L and y ≡ Y/L, then at E, the variables Y, K, and L all grow at the same rate. 
•The only way for the economy to move toward the steady state is to hitch onto a stable branch. 
•Given an initial capital-labor ratio k0, it must choose an initial per capita consumption level c0 such that the pair (k0,c0) lies on the stable branch.
푘∗ 
푐∗ 
퐸 
푐 =0 
푘 =0 
푐 
푘 
+ 
− 
+ 
− 
The Ramsey Model 
Stable branch 
Unstable branch 
If the economy is not on a stable branch, ever-increasing k accompanied by ever-decreasing c leads per capita consumption towards starvation.
푘∗ 
푐∗ 
퐸 
푐 =0 
푘 =0 
푐 
푘 
+ 
− 
+ 
− 
The Ramsey Model 
Stable branch 
Unstable branch 
If economy is not on a stable branch: Ever-increasing c accompanied by ever-decreasing k leads to capital exhaustion. 
Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
The Ramsey Model 
•If the economy is not on a stable branch, the dynamic forces lead to: 
–Ever-increasing 푘 accompanied by ever- decreasing 푐 (streamlines pointing to the southeast) leading per capita consumption towards starvation. 
–Ever-increasing c accompanied by ever- decreasing 푘 (streamlines pointing to the northwest) implying overindulgence leading to capital exhaustion. 
•The only viable long-run alternative for the economy is the steady state at 퐸.
The Ramsey Model 
•At steady state, per-capita consumption becomes constant and its level cannot be further raised over time. 
•That’s because the production function does not include technological progress. 
•To make a possible rising per-capita consumption, technological progress must be introduced.
ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
The Barro Model of Public Spending 
Leyte Vice Gov. Carlo Loreto 
Tacloban City Vice Mayor Jerry Yaokasin 
Gov. Dom Petilla 
Coca-Cola FEMSA CEO Juan Ramon Felix 
Coca-Cola Corporate Affairs director Jose Dominguez 
Reopening of Plant at Tacloban City
Barro Model of Public Spending 
•Economist Robert J. Barro (1990) builds on the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model to propose a “public spending” model: 
푦=푓푘,푔=퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 
o푔 is the government’s input to production (infrastructures, highways, public works, etc.) 
o훼 is the elasticity of government’s share to production 
o푔 is financed entirely from tax revenues. 
oportion of the economy is taxed so the government can spend.
Effect of Taxes 
oDefining 휏 as the constant average and marginal income tax rate, we then have 
푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼. 
•Note also, that disposable savings is less than that earlier, since aside from consumption, a portion (휏) of production is taxed. In this case, our constraint is transformed into: 푘 =1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐, 푘0>0 푔푖푣푒푛
Barro’s Optimal Control Problem 
•The optimal control problem in Barro (1990) then becomes: 
•max푈0= 푒−휌푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 푑푡 ∞ 0 
•푠.푡. 푘 =1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐, 푘0> 0 푔푖푣푒푛 
•where 푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 
•This is the “competitive case”, wherein consumer agents take government spending as a given and then optimize.
Competitive Case 
•Setup the Hamiltonian 
퐻=푒−휌푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐 
•The First Order Conditions (FOCs) are: 
o(1) 퐻푐=0→푒−휌푡푐−휎=휐 
o(2) 퐻휐=−휐 →휐 =−휐1−휏퐴푘−훼푔훼= −푣1−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 
o(3) TVC
Competitive Case 
•For (1), taking log of both sides and differentiating, we get: 
o 푒−휌푡푐−휎=휐→−휌푡−휎ln푐=ln휐 
o 푑 푑푡 −휌푡−휎ln푐= 푑 푑푡 ln휐→−휌−휎 푐 푐 = 휐 휐 (3) 
oSubstitute (3) into (2) to get: 
o 휐 휐 =−1−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 
o−휌−휎 푐 푐 =−1−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 
o 푐 푐 =휎−11−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 −휌 (4)
Size of the Government 
푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 
•We can get the size of the government 휏 by 
o휏= 푔 푦 = 푔 퐴푘1−훼푔훼= 푔 푘 1−훼 퐴−1→ 
o 푔 푘 =(휏퐴)1/(1−훼) 
•Plug it into (4) to get: 
o 푐 푐 =휎−11−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 −휌 
•훾1= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴1∗−휌 
owhere 퐴1∗=1−훼퐴 11−훼1−휏휏 훼 1−훼
Command Economy 
•In a command economy, the government will take into account that private output affects public income and (through the production function) other people’s marginal product of capital. 
•To solve, subsitute 퐴1∗=1−훼퐴 11−훼1−휏휏 훼 1−훼 in the A part of the Hamiltonian 
•퐻= 푒−휌푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐
Command Economy 
•The FOCs are: 
o푒−휌푡푐−휎=휐 
o 휐 휐 =−1−휏퐴 11−훼휏 훼 1−훼−휌 
•Substituting the usual way we obtain: 
•훾2= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴2∗−휌 
•Where 퐴2∗=1−휏퐴 11−훼휏 훼 1−훼
Efficiency of the Command Economy 
•훾1= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴1∗−휌 
owhere 퐴1∗=1−훼퐴 11−훼1−휏휏 훼 1−훼 
•훾2= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴2∗−휌 
–Where 퐴2∗=1−휏퐴 11−훼휏 훼 1−훼 
•Note that since for all values of 휌, 퐴1∗<퐴2∗→훾1<훾2 
•Government is forced to provide one more unit of public input for every unit of savings by individuals. 
•The assumption is that the government is a “benevolent dictator”. 
•What if it is not?
CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT 
The Ellis-Fender Model
Ellis & Fender (2006) Model 
•Takes off from a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the “engine of growth” is public capital accumulation. 
•Public capital financed by taxes on private output. 
•Government can either use taxes to fund public capital accumulation or engage in corruption. 
•Ellis & Fender defines output as: 
푦푡=푓푙푡,푝푡=푙푡훼푝(푡)훽,0<훼,훽<1 
•where 푙(푡) is the effective labor and 푝(푡) is the public capital.
Ellis & Fender (2006) Model 
•Public capital then moves according to: 푝 =휏푡−휔−푏푡−휔−휎푝(푡) 
•where: 
o휏푡−휔 represents the taxes paid at interval of length 휔 in the past, 
o푏푡−휔 is portion of past tax payments that were corrupted by the government 
o휎 is capital depreciation. 
•Interval 휔 is production lag 
–But their subsequent results demonstrate that it can also be seen as “transparency”
Optimal Consumption 
•Goal of consumer-citizens - maximize accumulated consumption 
•Let 푐푡 be the consumption and −푙푡 be the decision to pursue leisure. 
푢푡=푢푐푡,푙푡=[푐푡+푙푡]휃 
•where 0<휃<1 is the intertemporal substitution parameter (similar to 1−휎 earlier), and r is the discount rate (similar to 휌 earlier). 
–instantaneous budget constraint 푐푡=푦푡−휏푡 must be satisfied. 
•Optimization problem max [푐푡+푙푡]휃푒−푟푡 푑푡 ∞ 0
Optimal Corruption 
•Goal of the government - maximize its accumulated corruption. 
•Having defined 푏 earlier: max 푏푡푒−푟푡 푑푡 ∞ 0 
•We set up the second goal as a constraint together with the equation of motion 푝 
•Reduces to an isoperimetric (due to the integral term in the constraint) Ramsey-type optimization problem
The “Robots” = Economic Agents 
•Firms. 푌=퐴퐿훼퐾훽→푓(푘) 
•Consumers. 푢푐푡= 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 
•Government. 푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 
•Optimization 
omax푈0= 푒−(휌−푛)푡푢푐푡푑푡 ∞ 0 
o푠.푡. 푘 =1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐, 푘0>0 
•Equilibrium. 푘 푘 = 푐 푐 =훾=0
“The relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not whether they are descriptively “realistic,” for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.” 
Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (1966) 
Thank you for listening!
Sources 
•Ellis, Christopher James & John Fender (2006, May). “Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model”. International Tax and Public Finance. Volume 13, Issue 2-3: 115-149. 
•Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (1990a, December). “Lecture Notes on Economic Growth(I): Introduction to the Literature and Neoclassical Models”. NBER Working Paper No. 3563. 
•Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (1990b, December). “Lecture Notes on Economic Growth(II): Five Prototype Models of Endogenous Growth”. NBER Working Paper No. 3564.

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Optimal Control in Agent-based Economics: A Survey

  • 1. “The laws of history are as absolute at the laws of physics, and if the probabilities of error are greater, it is only because history does not deal with as many humans as physics does atoms, so that individual variations count for more.” Isaac Asimov, Foundation and Empire (1952)
  • 2. Optimal Control in Agent-based Economic Models: A Survey James Matthew B. Miraflor | CS 296 - Seminar
  • 3. “This is what I mean by the ‘mechanics’ of economic development - the construction of a mechanical, artificial world, populated by the interacting robots that economics typically studies, that is capable of exhibiting behavior the gross features of which resemble those of the actual world.” Robert Lucas, Jr., “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”. Journal of Monetary Economics. 1988.
  • 4. The “Robots” = “Representative Agents” •Firms. Production function •Consumers. Utility function •Government –Usually is a constraint rather than an objective function –Behavior – Efficient or Inefficient? Benevolent or Corrupt? •Optimization •Equilibrium –When does an economy stop growing? At what point do firms stop producing, consumers stop consuming, government stop spending?
  • 5. PRODUCTION Firms, Technology, Capital, and Labor
  • 6. The Neoclassical Production Function •Production function: 푌=퐹(퐾,퐿,퐴) –where 푌 is the output, 퐴 is the total factor productivity/technology, 퐿 is the labor input, 퐾 is the capital input –satisfies conditions below: 1.Constant returns to scale: 퐹휆퐾,휆퐿,휆퐴=휆퐹(퐾,퐿,퐴),∀휆>0 –Replication argument 2.Positive and diminishing returns o 휕퐹 휕퐾 >0, 휕2퐹 휕퐾2<0, 휕퐹 휕퐿 >0, 휕2퐹 휕퐿2<0
  • 7. The Neoclassical Production Function 3.Inada (1963) Conditions: olim 퐾→0 휕퐹 휕퐾 =lim 퐿→0 휕퐹 휕퐿 =∞,lim 퐾→∞ 휕퐹 휕퐾 =lim 퐿→∞ 휕퐹 휕퐿 =0 4.Essentiality: o퐹0,퐿=퐹퐾,0=0 •Per Capita values 푌=퐹퐾,퐿,퐴→ 푌 퐿 =퐹 퐾 퐿 ,1, 퐴 퐿 =퐿푓푘, 푦=푓(푘) 휕퐹 휕퐾 =푓′푘, 휕퐹 휕퐿 =푓푘−푘푓′(푘)
  • 8. Per Capita values •퐾(푡) =퐼푡−훿퐾푡=푠퐹(퐾,퐿,퐴)−훿퐾푡 • 퐾푡 L= 푠퐹퐾,퐿,푇 퐿 − 훿퐾푡 퐿 =푠푓푘−훿푘 •Take the time derivative of 푘 to get: •푘 = 푑 퐾 퐿 푑푡 = 퐿퐾 −퐾퐿 퐿2= 퐾 퐿 − 퐿 퐿 퐾 퐿 = 퐾 퐿 −푛푘 o 퐿 퐿 =푛 (population growth) o푘 = 퐾 퐿 −푛푘→ 퐾 퐿 =푘 +푛푘 •푘 +푛푘=푠푓푘−훿푘 •푘 =푠푓푘−훿푘−푛푘
  • 9. Capital Dynamics •Change in capital is produced good not consumed. •푘 =푓푘−푐−(푛+훿)푘, where: –푘 is the per capita capital (퐾/퐿), 푘 = 푑푘 푑푡 is the change in capital, or the investment, due to savings. –훿 is the depreciation rate of capital –푛 is the population rate •Notice that 푛 behaves like a depreciation rate since it represents the fraction of resources to be given to the next generation.
  • 10. Savings/Investment and Consumption Capital (k) Output (y) Gross Product f(k) Some level of Capital (k) Actual GDP (y) Actual Savings (s*y) Gross Savings s*f(k) consumption per worker investment per worker Borrowed/derived from DE201 lecture slides of Prof. Emmanuel de Dios
  • 11. Gross Product f(k) k* Gross Savings s*f(k) Population Growth k1 k2 Investment is greater than population growth; capital per person increases Population growth is greater than investment; capital per person decreases. Savings/Investment and Consumption Capital (k) Output (y) Borrowed/derived from DE201 lecture slides of Prof. Emmanuel de Dios
  • 12. Savings and Economic Growth Gross Product f(k) Gross Savings s*f(k) High economic growth Zero growth Negative economic growth Population Growth Capital (k) Output (y) Borrowed/derived from DE201 lecture slides of Prof. Emmanuel de Dios
  • 13. Cobb-Douglas Production Function 푌=퐹퐾,퐿=퐴퐿훼퐾훽 •훼 and 훽 are the output elasticities of capital & labor –measures the responsiveness of output to a change in either labor or capital, ceteris paribus. •If we want production per capita, we divide the function buy 퐿 to get 푌 퐿 =퐴퐿훼−1퐾훽=퐴퐿훼−훽−1퐾 퐿 훽 →푦=퐴퐿훼−훽−1푘훽 •where 푦 and 푘 are per capita production and per capita capital respectively. •Conventionally, we set 훼+훽=1 so that 훽=1−훼
  • 14. CONSUMPTION The Utility Function and Discounting of the Future
  • 15. The Utility Function •푐푡=푐푡 represents the consumption at time 푡 •푢푡= 푢푐푡=푢(푐푡) represents the utility of consumers from consuming 푐푡. •푈0 is the total, accumulated utility over infinite time of the consumer, i.e. 푈0= 푒−휌푡 푢푐푡 푑푡 ∞ 0 oIf 퐿푡 is the population level at time 푡, we have: 푈0= 푒−휌푡 푢푐푡퐿푡 푑푡 ∞ 0
  • 16. Constant Elasticity of Substitution •If production is Cobb-Douglas, then the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal savings (Kurz, 1968) : 1.A 푢(푐푡) must be Constant Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (CEIS) 푢푐푡= 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 –where 휎= 1 푠 and 푠 is the savings rate –Constant aversion to fluctuations in consumption –One doesn’t get more or less risk averse as one gets richer (or poorer). 2.Discount rate 휌 must be related to the parameters of 휌=훽−푠, where 훽 is share of capital to production.
  • 17. Optimal Cumulative Consumption •A consumer agent will want to maximize consumption over time, i.e. max푈0= 푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 푑푡 ∞ 0 푠.푡. 푘 =푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘, 푘0>0 푔푖푣푒푛 •The solution to this optimal control problem will then govern the dynamics of savings across time. •How do we solve?
  • 18. BASICS OF OPTIMAL CONTROL The Hamiltonian and the Maximum Principle
  • 19. The Lagrangean (Static Optimization) m푎푥 {푓(푥)|푔푖 =0,푖퐾} •Given the function 푦=푓(푥1,…,푥푛) subject to a constraint 푔푖(푥1,…,푥푛)=0, 푖=1,…,푘 the Lagrangean is 퐿푥;휆=푓푥+ 휆푖푔푖(푥) 푘 푖=1 •where the  is the vector of Lagrangean multipliers. •Let 푦=푓푥1,푥2, 푔푥1,푥2=0 퐿푥1,푥2,휆=푓푥1,푥2+휆푔(푥1,푥2) •To determine 푥1∗,푥2∗,휆∗: 휕퐿 휕푥1= 휕푓푥1,푥2 휕푥1+ 휕푔푥1,푥2 휕푥1=0 휕퐿 휕푥2= 휕푓푥1,푥2 휕푥2+ 휕푔푥1,푥2 휕푥2=0
  • 20. The Hamiltonian (Dynamic Optimization) •Definition. Given the problem 푀푎푥 퐽= 푓푥,푢,푡푑푡 푇 0 푆.푡. 푥′푡=푔(푥,푢,푡) 푥0=푥0,푥푇 free,푇 fixed 푢푡휖 ℝ •The Hamiltonian of the problem is the function 퐻푥,푢,휆,푡=푓푥,푢,푡+휆푔(푥,푢,푡) •휆(푡) is called the costate variable.□ Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 21. Problem of Dynamic Optimization •From among functions x 휖C1[0,T] starting at (0,x0) and ending at (T,xT), choose an x* such that J(x*) ≥ J(x). •Note that in Optimal Control terms, we are actually selecting a u (governing x) that optimizes x 0 T x x0 xT x*(t) Figure 1 □ Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 22. The Pontryagin Maximum Principle in Terms of the Hamiltonian •Theorem. Given the problem •푀푎푥 퐽= 푓푥,푢,푡푑푡 푇 0 •푆.푡. 푥′푡=푔(푥,푢,푡) • 푥0=푥0,푥푇 free,푇 fixed • u(t) 휖 ℝ •퐻푥,푢,휆,푡=푓푥,푢,푡+휆푔(푥,푢,푡) •If the pair (u*(t), x*(t)) is optimal, then there is a continuously differentiable function 휆(푡) such that: a. 휕퐻 휕휆 = x*′ (Hλ = x*′) b. 휕퐻 휕푥 =−휆′ (Hx = −λ′) c. 휕퐻 휕푢 =0 (Hu = 0) d.x*(0) = x0 e.λ(T) = 0 Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 23. Infinite Horizon Problems •The Infinite Horizon Optimal Control Problem •푀푎푥 푓푥,푢,푡푒−푟푡푑푡 ∞ 0 •푆.푡. 푥′푡=푔(푥,푢,푡) • 푥0=푥0,푢(푡)∈푈 퐻푥,푢,휆,푡=푓푥,푢,푡푒−푟푡+휆푔(푥,푢,푡) •The objective function is sensible only if, for all admissible pairs (푥,푢,푡), the integral converges. Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 24. Infinite Horizon Problems Transversality Conditions. 푎 푥∞ 푓푟푒푒 lim 푡→∞ 휆푡=0 푏 푥∞≥푥푚푖푛 lim 푡→∞ 휆(푡)≥0 lim 푡→∞ 휆푡=0 푖푓 푥∞>푥푚푖푛 푐 푥∞ 푓푖푥푒푑 lim 푡→∞ 퐻=0 TVC is a description of how the optimal path crosses a terminal line in variable endpoint problems. Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 25. DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model
  • 26. The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model •Question: How much should a nation save? •max푈0= 푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 푑푡 ∞ 0 •푠.푡. 푘 =푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘, 푘0>0 푔푖푣푒푛 •The solution to this optimal control problem will then govern the dynamics of savings across time. •Note that lim 푡→∞ 푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 =0 oOne can verify that for this to happen, 휌>푛
  • 27. Solving the Model •Setting up the Hamiltonian 퐻=푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐(푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘) •Where 휐 is the dynamic Lagrange multiplier o휐 can also be interpreted as the shadow price of investment •The First Order Conditions (FOCs) are: o퐻푐=0 o퐻푘=−휐 oTransversality condition (TVC): lim 푡→∞ 푘푡푣푡=0
  • 28. 퐻=푒−(휌−푛)푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐(푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘) •퐻푐=0→푒−(휌−푛)푡푐푡 −휎−휐=0 (1) •퐻푘=−휐 →휐푓′푘−푛−훿=−휐 o− 휐 휐 =푓′푘−푛−훿 (2) •Take logs and time derivative of (1): o−휌−푛푡−휎ln푐푡=ln휐 o−휌−푛−휎 푐 푐 = 휐 휐 → 푐 푐 =휎−1(−휌+푛− 휐 휐 ) (3) •Plug (3) to (2) to get: o훾푐= 푐 푐 =휎−1푓′(푘)−휌−훿 oIn the Cobb-Douglas case: 훾푐=휎−1훽푘−(1−훽)−휌−훿
  • 29. Equilibrium in Consumption 훾푐= 푐 푐 =휎−1푓′(푘)−휌−훿 =휎−1훽푘−(1−훽)−휌−훿 •In equilibrium, i.e. 푐 푐 =0, 푓′푘=휌+훿 oIf consumption is to remain at its current level, marginal return to capital must at least reach the level of the combined future discounting and capital depreciation oAt this level, an individual is indifferent between consuming and spending.
  • 30. Transitional Dynamics From our constraint: 푘 =푓푘−푐−푛푘−훿푘 • 푘 푘 = 푓푘−푐 푘 −푛−훿 • 푐 푐 =휎−1푓′(푘)−휌−훿 •In equilibrium o 푘 푘 =0→푐=푓푘−푛+훿푘 o 푐 푐 =0→푓′(푘)=휌+훿
  • 31. 푘 =0 curve: 푐=푓(푘)−(푛+훿)푘 푐 =0 curve: 푓′(푘)=휌+훿 (푛+훿)푘 푓(푘) 푘 푘 푐 푘∗ 푐 =0 푘 =0 퐸 퐸 = steady state 푘0 Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 32. 푘∗ 푐∗ 퐸 푐 =0 푘 =0 푐 푘 + − + − The Ramsey Model Stable branch Unstable branch Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 33. The Ramsey Model •The steady state E = (k*,c*) is a saddle-point equilibrium. It is unique. •At equilibrium, k* is a constant; hence, y* = f(k*) is a constant. Since k ≡ K/L and y ≡ Y/L, then at E, the variables Y, K, and L all grow at the same rate. •The only way for the economy to move toward the steady state is to hitch onto a stable branch. •Given an initial capital-labor ratio k0, it must choose an initial per capita consumption level c0 such that the pair (k0,c0) lies on the stable branch.
  • 34. 푘∗ 푐∗ 퐸 푐 =0 푘 =0 푐 푘 + − + − The Ramsey Model Stable branch Unstable branch If the economy is not on a stable branch, ever-increasing k accompanied by ever-decreasing c leads per capita consumption towards starvation.
  • 35. 푘∗ 푐∗ 퐸 푐 =0 푘 =0 푐 푘 + − + − The Ramsey Model Stable branch Unstable branch If economy is not on a stable branch: Ever-increasing c accompanied by ever-decreasing k leads to capital exhaustion. Borrowed/derived from ECON207 lecture slides of Prof. Rolando Danao
  • 36. The Ramsey Model •If the economy is not on a stable branch, the dynamic forces lead to: –Ever-increasing 푘 accompanied by ever- decreasing 푐 (streamlines pointing to the southeast) leading per capita consumption towards starvation. –Ever-increasing c accompanied by ever- decreasing 푘 (streamlines pointing to the northwest) implying overindulgence leading to capital exhaustion. •The only viable long-run alternative for the economy is the steady state at 퐸.
  • 37. The Ramsey Model •At steady state, per-capita consumption becomes constant and its level cannot be further raised over time. •That’s because the production function does not include technological progress. •To make a possible rising per-capita consumption, technological progress must be introduced.
  • 38. ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT The Barro Model of Public Spending Leyte Vice Gov. Carlo Loreto Tacloban City Vice Mayor Jerry Yaokasin Gov. Dom Petilla Coca-Cola FEMSA CEO Juan Ramon Felix Coca-Cola Corporate Affairs director Jose Dominguez Reopening of Plant at Tacloban City
  • 39. Barro Model of Public Spending •Economist Robert J. Barro (1990) builds on the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model to propose a “public spending” model: 푦=푓푘,푔=퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 o푔 is the government’s input to production (infrastructures, highways, public works, etc.) o훼 is the elasticity of government’s share to production o푔 is financed entirely from tax revenues. oportion of the economy is taxed so the government can spend.
  • 40. Effect of Taxes oDefining 휏 as the constant average and marginal income tax rate, we then have 푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼. •Note also, that disposable savings is less than that earlier, since aside from consumption, a portion (휏) of production is taxed. In this case, our constraint is transformed into: 푘 =1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐, 푘0>0 푔푖푣푒푛
  • 41. Barro’s Optimal Control Problem •The optimal control problem in Barro (1990) then becomes: •max푈0= 푒−휌푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 푑푡 ∞ 0 •푠.푡. 푘 =1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐, 푘0> 0 푔푖푣푒푛 •where 푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 •This is the “competitive case”, wherein consumer agents take government spending as a given and then optimize.
  • 42. Competitive Case •Setup the Hamiltonian 퐻=푒−휌푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐 •The First Order Conditions (FOCs) are: o(1) 퐻푐=0→푒−휌푡푐−휎=휐 o(2) 퐻휐=−휐 →휐 =−휐1−휏퐴푘−훼푔훼= −푣1−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 o(3) TVC
  • 43. Competitive Case •For (1), taking log of both sides and differentiating, we get: o 푒−휌푡푐−휎=휐→−휌푡−휎ln푐=ln휐 o 푑 푑푡 −휌푡−휎ln푐= 푑 푑푡 ln휐→−휌−휎 푐 푐 = 휐 휐 (3) oSubstitute (3) into (2) to get: o 휐 휐 =−1−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 o−휌−휎 푐 푐 =−1−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 o 푐 푐 =휎−11−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 −휌 (4)
  • 44. Size of the Government 푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 •We can get the size of the government 휏 by o휏= 푔 푦 = 푔 퐴푘1−훼푔훼= 푔 푘 1−훼 퐴−1→ o 푔 푘 =(휏퐴)1/(1−훼) •Plug it into (4) to get: o 푐 푐 =휎−11−휏퐴1−훼 푔 푘 훼 −휌 •훾1= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴1∗−휌 owhere 퐴1∗=1−훼퐴 11−훼1−휏휏 훼 1−훼
  • 45. Command Economy •In a command economy, the government will take into account that private output affects public income and (through the production function) other people’s marginal product of capital. •To solve, subsitute 퐴1∗=1−훼퐴 11−훼1−휏휏 훼 1−훼 in the A part of the Hamiltonian •퐻= 푒−휌푡 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 +휐1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐
  • 46. Command Economy •The FOCs are: o푒−휌푡푐−휎=휐 o 휐 휐 =−1−휏퐴 11−훼휏 훼 1−훼−휌 •Substituting the usual way we obtain: •훾2= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴2∗−휌 •Where 퐴2∗=1−휏퐴 11−훼휏 훼 1−훼
  • 47. Efficiency of the Command Economy •훾1= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴1∗−휌 owhere 퐴1∗=1−훼퐴 11−훼1−휏휏 훼 1−훼 •훾2= 푐 푐 =휎−1퐴2∗−휌 –Where 퐴2∗=1−휏퐴 11−훼휏 훼 1−훼 •Note that since for all values of 휌, 퐴1∗<퐴2∗→훾1<훾2 •Government is forced to provide one more unit of public input for every unit of savings by individuals. •The assumption is that the government is a “benevolent dictator”. •What if it is not?
  • 48. CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT The Ellis-Fender Model
  • 49. Ellis & Fender (2006) Model •Takes off from a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the “engine of growth” is public capital accumulation. •Public capital financed by taxes on private output. •Government can either use taxes to fund public capital accumulation or engage in corruption. •Ellis & Fender defines output as: 푦푡=푓푙푡,푝푡=푙푡훼푝(푡)훽,0<훼,훽<1 •where 푙(푡) is the effective labor and 푝(푡) is the public capital.
  • 50. Ellis & Fender (2006) Model •Public capital then moves according to: 푝 =휏푡−휔−푏푡−휔−휎푝(푡) •where: o휏푡−휔 represents the taxes paid at interval of length 휔 in the past, o푏푡−휔 is portion of past tax payments that were corrupted by the government o휎 is capital depreciation. •Interval 휔 is production lag –But their subsequent results demonstrate that it can also be seen as “transparency”
  • 51. Optimal Consumption •Goal of consumer-citizens - maximize accumulated consumption •Let 푐푡 be the consumption and −푙푡 be the decision to pursue leisure. 푢푡=푢푐푡,푙푡=[푐푡+푙푡]휃 •where 0<휃<1 is the intertemporal substitution parameter (similar to 1−휎 earlier), and r is the discount rate (similar to 휌 earlier). –instantaneous budget constraint 푐푡=푦푡−휏푡 must be satisfied. •Optimization problem max [푐푡+푙푡]휃푒−푟푡 푑푡 ∞ 0
  • 52. Optimal Corruption •Goal of the government - maximize its accumulated corruption. •Having defined 푏 earlier: max 푏푡푒−푟푡 푑푡 ∞ 0 •We set up the second goal as a constraint together with the equation of motion 푝 •Reduces to an isoperimetric (due to the integral term in the constraint) Ramsey-type optimization problem
  • 53. The “Robots” = Economic Agents •Firms. 푌=퐴퐿훼퐾훽→푓(푘) •Consumers. 푢푐푡= 푐푡 1−휎−11−휎 •Government. 푔= 휏푦=휏퐴푘(1−훼)푔훼 •Optimization omax푈0= 푒−(휌−푛)푡푢푐푡푑푡 ∞ 0 o푠.푡. 푘 =1−휏퐴푘1−훼푔훼−푐, 푘0>0 •Equilibrium. 푘 푘 = 푐 푐 =훾=0
  • 54. “The relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not whether they are descriptively “realistic,” for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.” Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (1966) Thank you for listening!
  • 55. Sources •Ellis, Christopher James & John Fender (2006, May). “Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model”. International Tax and Public Finance. Volume 13, Issue 2-3: 115-149. •Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (1990a, December). “Lecture Notes on Economic Growth(I): Introduction to the Literature and Neoclassical Models”. NBER Working Paper No. 3563. •Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (1990b, December). “Lecture Notes on Economic Growth(II): Five Prototype Models of Endogenous Growth”. NBER Working Paper No. 3564.