TLS for Dummies
Maxime Besson
info@worteks.com
2
(vɔʁ.tɛks)
Services
Heterogeneous and complex
infrastructures, cloud, mail,
authentication, security

Studies, audit and consulting

Technical expertise

Technical support

Training

R&D
Edition
Collaboration and
application portal
Mutualized platform
for development
Identity and Access
Management
Partnership
In this talk
•
A tiny spoonful of cryptography
•
Public Key Infrastructures, Certificate Authorities
•
Different types of security
Our goal
•
We want to secure communication between two people
– On the internet
•
Symmetric-key cryptography
Looks good, let’s do that
•
But wait, how do you exchange the key in the first place
•
Can’t do that on the internet, it’s full of eavesdroppers
Symmetric encryption
Public key encryption
And how does this help us?
•
If Bob sends us his public key, we can send him a
message that only he can decrypt
•
Eve is defeated!
•
But wait….
The (wo)man in the middle
Damned, foiled again
•
How can we make sure that Bob’s public key belongs to
Bob?
Signature
So…
•
Our original goal was confidentiality
•
•
Signature is a different security property: it proves
authenticity
•
•
Often combined with a hash function for integrity
How does signature help us
•
Bob’s key cannot be signed by Bob because we don’t
trust his key yet.
•
We need a trusted third party
Trusted third party
Certificate Authorities
•
Organizations that deliver certificates
– A document containing a public key, and identity, and
some metadata
– A signature by the CA’s private key binds links them
together
•
The security of the whole is only as good as the security
of the verification process
– Mallory can try to have her public key cerfied as Bob’s!
Does it help us?
•
Yes, if everybody trusts the Certificate Authority, then
all we need to have is the CA’s public key, and we can
communicate with anybody!
Public Key Infrastructure
•
A system based on Certificate Authorities is one but
many possible ways to distribute public keys
•
Such systems are called Public Key Infrastructures
– There are other types (web of trust, blockchain...)
Let’s sum it up
Finally, a secure system
•
(If you don’t mind the all-powerful CA at the center of it
all)
•
Every time either participant wants to send something,
it needs to encrypt it with the other participant’s public
key
•
What could go wrong ?
Too slow !
•
Public key cryptography is just too slow
•
But you know what isn’t?
– Symmetric cryptography
– But it’s insecure!
•
UNLESS!
Best of both worlds
•
Keys are just messages
•
We can generate a symmetric key
•
Send it securely using public-key cryptography
•
And then, immediately start using it
•
That way, the performance penalty is only used at the
beginning of the connection
Our current scheme
Congratulations
•
We just invented TLS!
TLS, in broad strokes
•
Phase 1: Authentication and key echange
– The server authenticates to the client
– Sometimes, the client also authenticates to the server
– Key exchange occur
•
Phase 2: Data exchange
– Uses symmetric encryption
Imagine the following scenario
Certificate validation
•
When receiving a certificate, we must make sure that
– It belongs to the person we wanted to talk to
●
For websites, it means that it was issued to the correct domain
– It’s not too old or too young
– It was signed by a trusted authority
– The signature is valid
•
TLS software does this by default
– Don’t disable it
– It will make Mallory very happy if you do
Certificate validation
•
A certificate ties a public key to an identity
•
The CA has to do its own verification
– Usually, you only need to prove ownership of the domain
mentionned in the certificate
●
Anyone can get a certificate for
https://this.is.google.i.swe.ar/
– EV certificates cover the legal entity behind the request
●
They are displayed as a green bar with a company name
Reality is complicated
•
In reality, we don’t JUST use a symmetric cipher
– Integrity is guaranteed through HMAC or AEAD
•
There are many versions of TLS
– SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3
●
Use TLS 1.2, and start planning for TLS 1.3
•
Diffie-Hellman key exchange ensures perfect forward
secrecy
•
There are many algorithms and parameters
– Usually auto negotiated, but...
30
Thanks for your
attention
More informations:
info@worteks.com
@worteks_com
linkedin.com/company/worteks
Channel security
•
CAs like being ambiguous about this
•
The strength of the symmetric cipher has NOTHING to
do with certificates
– Except obsolete SGC
•
But if the certificate is too weak, you are at risk of MITM
– You can have a super-strong secure channel to a hacker’s
computer
Will TLS make my website slower
•
Short answer: no
•
Long answer:
– It makes connection slower
●
It’s worth it
●
Use keepalive
– If you are using modern CPUs, the overhead of the
symmetric cipher is insignificant
What the hell are Elliptic Curves
•
A mathematical tool used in cryptography (ECC)
•
Used in public key encryption, so only during the
certificate phase
•
They use smaller keys than the previous RSA scheme
– Faster connection time
– Lower CPU consumption

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#OSSPARIS19 - TLS for dummies - MAXIME BESSON, Worteks

  • 1. TLS for Dummies Maxime Besson info@worteks.com
  • 2. 2 (vɔʁ.tɛks) Services Heterogeneous and complex infrastructures, cloud, mail, authentication, security  Studies, audit and consulting  Technical expertise  Technical support  Training  R&D Edition Collaboration and application portal Mutualized platform for development Identity and Access Management Partnership
  • 3. In this talk • A tiny spoonful of cryptography • Public Key Infrastructures, Certificate Authorities • Different types of security
  • 4. Our goal • We want to secure communication between two people – On the internet •
  • 6. Looks good, let’s do that • But wait, how do you exchange the key in the first place • Can’t do that on the internet, it’s full of eavesdroppers
  • 9. And how does this help us? • If Bob sends us his public key, we can send him a message that only he can decrypt • Eve is defeated! • But wait….
  • 10. The (wo)man in the middle
  • 11. Damned, foiled again • How can we make sure that Bob’s public key belongs to Bob?
  • 13. So… • Our original goal was confidentiality • • Signature is a different security property: it proves authenticity • • Often combined with a hash function for integrity
  • 14. How does signature help us • Bob’s key cannot be signed by Bob because we don’t trust his key yet. • We need a trusted third party
  • 16. Certificate Authorities • Organizations that deliver certificates – A document containing a public key, and identity, and some metadata – A signature by the CA’s private key binds links them together • The security of the whole is only as good as the security of the verification process – Mallory can try to have her public key cerfied as Bob’s!
  • 17. Does it help us? • Yes, if everybody trusts the Certificate Authority, then all we need to have is the CA’s public key, and we can communicate with anybody!
  • 18. Public Key Infrastructure • A system based on Certificate Authorities is one but many possible ways to distribute public keys • Such systems are called Public Key Infrastructures – There are other types (web of trust, blockchain...)
  • 20. Finally, a secure system • (If you don’t mind the all-powerful CA at the center of it all) • Every time either participant wants to send something, it needs to encrypt it with the other participant’s public key • What could go wrong ?
  • 21. Too slow ! • Public key cryptography is just too slow • But you know what isn’t? – Symmetric cryptography – But it’s insecure! • UNLESS!
  • 22. Best of both worlds • Keys are just messages • We can generate a symmetric key • Send it securely using public-key cryptography • And then, immediately start using it • That way, the performance penalty is only used at the beginning of the connection
  • 25. TLS, in broad strokes • Phase 1: Authentication and key echange – The server authenticates to the client – Sometimes, the client also authenticates to the server – Key exchange occur • Phase 2: Data exchange – Uses symmetric encryption
  • 27. Certificate validation • When receiving a certificate, we must make sure that – It belongs to the person we wanted to talk to ● For websites, it means that it was issued to the correct domain – It’s not too old or too young – It was signed by a trusted authority – The signature is valid • TLS software does this by default – Don’t disable it – It will make Mallory very happy if you do
  • 28. Certificate validation • A certificate ties a public key to an identity • The CA has to do its own verification – Usually, you only need to prove ownership of the domain mentionned in the certificate ● Anyone can get a certificate for https://this.is.google.i.swe.ar/ – EV certificates cover the legal entity behind the request ● They are displayed as a green bar with a company name
  • 29. Reality is complicated • In reality, we don’t JUST use a symmetric cipher – Integrity is guaranteed through HMAC or AEAD • There are many versions of TLS – SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 ● Use TLS 1.2, and start planning for TLS 1.3 • Diffie-Hellman key exchange ensures perfect forward secrecy • There are many algorithms and parameters – Usually auto negotiated, but...
  • 30. 30 Thanks for your attention More informations: info@worteks.com @worteks_com linkedin.com/company/worteks
  • 31. Channel security • CAs like being ambiguous about this • The strength of the symmetric cipher has NOTHING to do with certificates – Except obsolete SGC • But if the certificate is too weak, you are at risk of MITM – You can have a super-strong secure channel to a hacker’s computer
  • 32. Will TLS make my website slower • Short answer: no • Long answer: – It makes connection slower ● It’s worth it ● Use keepalive – If you are using modern CPUs, the overhead of the symmetric cipher is insignificant
  • 33. What the hell are Elliptic Curves • A mathematical tool used in cryptography (ECC) • Used in public key encryption, so only during the certificate phase • They use smaller keys than the previous RSA scheme – Faster connection time – Lower CPU consumption