Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - An overview and critique

Vikas Sharma
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program
An Overview and Critique
Vikas Sharma, PMP®
Associate Director,
Public Sector & Government Practice, Frost & Sullivan
April, 2014
Contains 14 pages (excluding the cover sheet and References)

Vikas Sharma
Section 1 – Introduction
While Pakistan had a civilian nuclear program since the 1960s aided by USA’s Atoms for Peace initiative; the
turning point in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons came in the wake of defeat in 1971 at the hands of India, and
secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh). A crucial blow to Pakistan’s strategic and political influence, the
defeat pushed Pakistani leadership towards pursuing nuclear weapons as essential levelers to combat India’s
conventional superiority; their resolve encapsulated in President Bhutto’s eminently quotable vow of acquiring
nuclear weapons even if it meant eating grass. Today Pakistan is a member of the ‘nuclear club’ with an arsenal
~120 warheads. However, Pakistan’s regular appearance in lists of ‘unstable governments’, rising religious
militancy in the region, and experience with A.Q. Khan Network (that was held responsible for illicit transfer of
nuclear technology in and out of Pakistan); have raised concerns globally. This paper provides an overview of
Pakistan’s nuclear program, its regional/international cooperation, and key issues stirring international worry.

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Section 2 – Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon Program
This section provides an overview of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities, command & control regime, and
instances of foreign assistance; and goes on to analyze key tenets of Pakistani nuclear engagement policy.
Infrastructure & Arsenal
• Pakistan is one of two countries (other being India) actively producing highly enriched Uranium (HEU).
Starting production in 1980s, Pakistan is believed to have produced 2-3.5 tonnes of HEU, with current
annual production of 120-180kg at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at Kahuta, enough for 10-15
warheads. Pakistan also has a parallel Plutonium production capability, with four operational reactors at
Khushab (and one more under construction). Annual production from Khushab is estimated
conservatively at 33kg. As of 2011, Pakistan’s Plutonium stockpile was estimated at around 150kg, set
to rise fast as Pakistan’s seemingly aims to shift to a Plutonium-based nuclear program (evidenced by
expansions at Khushab and new facilities at Nilore and Chashma).
• Pakistan guards information on nuclear capability with extreme secrecy and doesn’t release official
statistics regarding the size of its nuclear arsenal. Estimates based on available information – number of
launchers, amount of fissile material produced and converted into weapon cores, amount used in each
weapon, declarations by senior army generals – place Pakistan’s nuclear warheads at 120 at end-2013.
These warheads are not believed to be operationally deployed but in central storage at various sites.
Pakistan’s HEU-based warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20kg of
HEU, partly based on a similar Chinese warhead design.
Delivery Systems
• Presently, Pakistan has two delivery modes for nuclear weapons – missiles controlled by the Pakistan
Army and aircraft controlled by Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

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• The perceived need to display ability to execute a nuclear strike deep within India has been the key
motivation behind Pakistan’s interest in medium and long-range missiles. Pakistan has a variety of
nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with ranges up to 2500km. The two flagship
ballistic missile series are:
o Shaheen – Solid-fueled ballistic missiles (BMs) with Chinese M-11 and M-18 lineage capable
of delivering conventional or nuclear payloads. Shaheen 1 is a short-range ballistic missile with
a range of 750km and Shaheen 2 is medium ranged at 2500km. While costlier, Shaheen missiles
are believed to have higher accuracy and shorter deployment time than Ghauri.
o Ghauri – Liquid-fueled BMs believed to be based on North Korea’s Rodong series. With a
range of 2300km, Ghauri-II improved on Ghauri-I (1500km). Being liquid-fueled, Ghauri
missiles can’t store fuel for extended periods and need to be fueled for hours before launching,
thus making them vulnerable to ‘first strike’. Because of this, Pakistan is believed to be moving
away from Ghauri as nuclear missiles of choice, using them for testing instead.
• In addition to BMs, Pakistan has also developed two families of cruise-missiles
o Babur – Can be launched from ground-based erector launchers, warships and submarines, with
a range of 700-1000km; and are designed to avoid radar detection. Development was motivated
by India’s reported plans to acquire Patriot missiles to counter Pakistan’s BMs. Work is
believed ongoing on developing sea-based and air-based launch platforms for Babur.
o Ra’ad – Is an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) operational with the PAF. Current range is
stated to be 350km and it can be armed with a 10-35kt nuclear warhead.
• To diversify its nuclear-strike options and to address concerns that increasing number of nuclear assets and
bases make Pakistan a ‘target-rich’ environment; Pakistan maintains air-based strike capability. Between
dedicated squadrons of F-16s and Mirage V (soon to be replaced by Chinese JF-17s), Pakistan’s nuclear-
dedicated aircraft exceed 50. The development of above-mentioned Ra’ad has bolstered Pakistan’s aeriel
options in addition launching nuclear warheads from fighter-bombers (toss bombing).

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• Pakistan has developed ‘Nasr’, short-range nuclear-capable BMs that carry sub-kt warheads up to 60km.
This foray into tactical nuclear capability is believed to be in response to India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
Command and Control
• Government’s command and control system is based on “C4I2SR” – command, control, communication,
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The current structure, referred to as Strategic
Command Organization (SCO), has three tiers – National Command Authority (NCA), Strategic Plans
Division (SPD), and three Strategic Forces Commands (SFCs).
• Established in 2000, NCA supervises all organizations involved in nuclear weapons, development, and
employment, including the military. With Pakistan’s prime minister as its chairperson, NCA comprises
top civilian and military officials. NCA has two committees – Employment Control Committee (ECC)
that defines nuclear strategy and establishes command and control systems; and Development Control
Committee (DCC) that is responsible for weapon development and oversight. Final authority to launch
nuclear strikes requires consensus within NCA, with chairperson casting the final vote.
• SPD, a 70-officer body headed by an Army director-general, acts as NCA’s secretariat, and is a key
power-center. Its functions include formulating nuclear policy/strategy, developing chain of command,
securing arsenals, and formulating/coordinating operational plans with the three SFCs for movement and
deployment of weapons. SPD also oversees selection and training of personnel to serve in the nuclear
complex. SPD has authority to investigate suspicious personnel conduct that may relate to proliferation;
and recommend punishments for retired/serving personnel that override other laws.
Foreign Assistance
• China and Pakistan have long been allies and have signed numerous agreements on peaceful use of
nuclear technology, whereby China has supplied nuclear power capability and equipment to Pakistan.
However, China has also been accused of assisting in Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program, with claims

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of sale of weapon technology and weapon-grade Uranium, and of conducting weapon testing on
Pakistan’s behalf. Evidence confirming these claims would hold China in direct breach of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that it is a signatory to. China has repeatedly refuted these allegations.
• Reports by Congressional Research Service (CRS) in the US have alleged that Pakistan has secretly
obtained ballistic missile technology from North Korea, with flagship missile ‘Ghauri’ said to be
reverse-engineered from North Korea’s Rodong missiles.
• Officials from Israel and US have alleged since the 1990s that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons projects are
being financed by Saudi Arabia, with the understanding that Pakistan would make nuclear weapons
available to Saudi Arabia if called upon. This issue is discussed in detail later in this paper.
Key Tenets of Nuclear Engagement Policy
• Pakistan has stated that its nuclear weapons are solely intended to deter military aggression and would
be used only if its ‘national integrity was threatened’ (President Musharraf in 1999) or ‘only if the very
existence of Pakistan as a state is threatened’ (Lieutenant General Kidwai in 2001). Kidwai detailed
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold on various facets:
o Spatial – penetration by Indian forces on a large scale
o Military – destruction of large swathe of land or air forces that could lead to imminent defeat.
Nuclear retaliation is also threatened in case of pre-emptive strikes meant to destroy Pakistan’s
nuclear installations.
o Economic – strangulation via economic blockades, stopping Indus River’s flow, capture of
Karakoram Highway etc.
o Political – destabilization of Pakistan’s political stability by external forces
• Since 1999, Pakistan has a declared ‘minimum deterrence’ policy, whereby instead of seeking a nuclear
arsenal equivalent to India’s, Pakistan has set upon attaining one that is just large enough to inflict
‘unacceptable damage’ on India instead. By definition of guaranteed unacceptable damage, Pakistan is

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understood to use an Indian pre-emptive strike as planning assumption, to be calibrated further with
deployment of missile defense by India. Pakistan first declared attainment in 2005, and has reiterated
commitment to maintain it in line with changing bilateral relations and evolving understanding of
‘unacceptable damage’.
• It has been widely conjectured that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are kept on ‘low-alert’ mode. During
peacetime, missiles are stored separately separate from warheads; and possibly in a disassembled form.
However, these storage sites are located within military bases, which means that weapons can be
deployed with low latency. David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security
describes Pakistan’s stance as ‘partial deployment’. Once made operational, one of three defined
scenarios is to be executed – ‘launch on warning’; ‘launch under attack’; ‘launch on orders’.
• Pakistan is assumed to subscribe to NATO’s controlled escalation approach in its nuclear engagement
policy – having developed options for limited strikes on Indian bases near the border to signal resolve
before heading for full-scale war.
• While Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, it hasn’t ruled out first-use
against nuclear-armed aggressors. This can be construed as an attempt to balance the scale against
India’s conventional nuclear superiority. Also, it has possibly given Pakistan leeway to support low-
intensity border conflicts or proxy-wars in Kashmir; while effectively deterring India at strategic level
• While not officially declared, Pakistan’s nuclear targeting strategy is understood to be counter-value
(targeting population and industrial areas) vis-à-vis counter-force (targeting military installations).
India’s military bases are widely dispersed across its huge geography, which makes counter-force less
viable given Pakistan’s paucity in both number and range of weapons. On the contrary, several major
Indian cities and industrial centers are within Pakistan’s striking range.

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Section 3 – Participation in Arms Control and Disarmament Measures
Pakistan’s posturing towards agreements and efforts directed at disarmament, non-proliferation and weapons-
control is determined predominantly by its relationship with India. Pakistan typically offers to sign treaties that
India declares willingness to, and refuses cooperation where India does the same. In view of that, this section
analyzes Pakistan’s stance on international measures and organizations; followed by a discussion on bilateral
efforts with India.
Involvement in International Measures and Organizations
• Pakistan is a non-signatory to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Since Pakistan developed
nuclear weapons post-1967, it can’t enter NPT as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS), and entering NPT as a
non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) would entail dismantling its nuclear arsenal and placing nuclear
materials under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan’s enduring stance since 1967 had been that it would sign
NPT as a NNWS if India did likewise. However, nuclear cooperation agreements between US-India and
NSG waivers secured by India have left Pakistan aggrieved and it has changed its position, claiming it
would only join as a NWS. Pakistan has cited growing military asymmetry with India as justification for
needing to maintain adequate nuclear deterrence.
• Pakistan has blocked negotiations on UN’s Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that seeks to
prohibit further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Pakistan argues that FMCT should
also require states to reduce current stocks of fissile material, since without this requirement; Pakistan
would be disadvantaged against India’s larger existing fissile stocks and production capability, and its
capacity to maintain minimum deterrence curtailed. Pakistan’s opposition has been hardened by
nuclear-trade waivers granted to India by NSG in 2008 on US backing, since India can now ostensibly
purchase foreign uranium for power-reactors while utilizing domestic reserves for developing nuclear
weapons. Pakistan has expressed openness to FMCT if granted similar NSG waivers to access nuclear

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material for civilian energy use, a move opposed by USA on grounds of Pakistan’s unsatisfactory
proliferation record. Interestingly, Pakistan’s FMCT opposition marks a rare occasion where Pakistan
has taken a position independent of and contrary to India’s.
• Although India and Pakistan have an unspoken moratorium on testing, both are non-signatories to
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that bans nuclear explosions in all environments.
Ostensibly, neither country is not facing undue pressure on this count since USA itself hasn’t ratified
CTBT. Analysts consider it unlikely that Pakistan will test first, cognizant of the international sanctions
and criticism it may draw. Three scenarios for possible future Pakistani testing can be painted:
1. Pakistan tests after an Indian test campaign, either for political posturing or for technical reasons
(for example, enhancing reliability and security, testing new types of warheads such as
thermonuclear devices, or new designs for smaller warheads).
2. Pakistan follows France’s example, conducts a final test-campaign, and joins CTBT
3. Pakistan detects critical design flaws in its warheads and has to test to correct them
• Pakistan is party to some multilateral organizations and programs, including the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). It is part of USA’s Secure Freight Initiative, having stationed
systems at Port Qasim to scan containers for nuclear materials. Pakistan has made its export control
mechanisms more stringent, including the 2004 Export Control Act and establishing Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate biological, nuclear and missile-related
exports. Pakistan also maintains control lists of dual-use goods that are in line with standards maintained
by organizations like NSG, Australia Group (AG), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Bilateral Efforts with India
• Negotiations to dial-down nuclear war posturing have been mired by multiple instances of failure to
reach agreement and rejected proposals. Some examples:
o Pakistan has repeatedly rejected India’s offer of a treaty on ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons

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o India rejected proposal for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (1978)
o India rejected proposal for mutual inspections of each other’s nuclear facilities (1979)
o India rejected proposal for simultaneous adherence to NPT (1979)
o India rejected simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards (1979)
o India rejected a bilateral nuclear test-ban treaty (1987)
o India rejected a proposed South Asia Zero-Missile Zone (1994)
• The first few proposals were raised by Pakistan when it hadn’t as yet perfected nuclear weapons
technology, and were treated with suspicion by India as time-biding measures. Even in later years,
India’s declared distrust of Pakistan’s intentions and contention that Pakistan may run a covert weapons
program has blocked bilateral agreements. Seemingly, India’s distrust has been vindicated on several
occasions such as revelations on A.Q. Khan Network, and Pakistan’s inability to garner trust from
international community at large, including long-time ally USA.
• There have been instances of successful bilateral diplomacy too as detailed below:
o Agreement to not attack each other’s nuclear facilities (1989). Ever since, both countries have
exchanged lists of nuclear installations at the start of each year
o Agreement to set up a hotline to warn each other of accidents that may be mistaken for attacks
(2004), followed by agreement to alert each other on ballistic missile tests. These were seen as
necessary given persistent tensions and extremely short response-times available to react to
perceived attacks
o It merits noting that none of these agreements limited nuclear programs in either country
• Strategic analysts concur that India’s securing NSG waivers has dented prospects of further nuclear-
weapon related diplomacy between the neighbors, as Pakistan has perceived this development with great
indignation and as a signal of preferential treatment for India, in effect recognizing India as a NWS, a
status coveted by but declined to Pakistan.

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Section 4 – Areas of Concern
Other than looming threat of mutually-destructive nuclear war in the Indian sub-continent, Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program has given the broader international community several other causes for trepidation that can be
classified into two buckets – 1) concerns over proliferation of weapons and related technology to other nations
and 2) concerns over Pakistan’s ability keep its nuclear arsenal safe. This section details and analyzes various
facets of these concerns.
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• Pakistan’s biggest proliferation black-mark is the black market network set up and operated under Abdul
Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), who headed Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and is revered as ‘father of
the Pakistani bomb’. It found its origins in Pakistan’s extensive use of clandestine procurement networks
in 1970s to obtain technology for its fledgling nuclear-weapons program (a fact admitted by Pakistan’s
intelligence agency ISI). Khan directed this procurement effort, and subsequently ‘re-wired’ the
networks to provide key nuclear weapon components – material, enrichment technology, warhead
designs, names of middlemen/manufacturers – to willing buyers for profit. Confirmed buyers include
Libya, Iran and North Korea, though suspicion is attached to Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Syria too. This
episode remains the severest loss of control over nuclear technology ever, and an enduring
embarrassment for Pakistan’s government that scrambled to deny links with the culprit it once hailed as
a national hero. Pakistan’s continued reluctance to provide access to A.Q. Khan for IAEA questioning
has been criticized, and the network’s complete dismantling is unconfirmed.
• Past incidents of Al-Qaeda contact with Pakistan’s nuclear intelligentsia have raised eyebrows, most
notably the verified collaboration between retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
scientists – Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed – and Al-Qaeda leadership. Under
umbrella of UTN humanitarian organization, discussions were held with Osama bin Laden and Ayman

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al-Zawahiri in August 2001 on nuclear bomb design and construction of radiological dispersal devices.
UTN’s alleged work on biological weapons and ‘dirty-bombs’ also came to light. Post 9/11, Pakistan
interrogated these scientists and placed them under house-arrest.
• Saudi Arabia’s long-standing relationship with Pakistan (especially in military domain), is an open
secret. Speculation is rife over a ‘pact’ that in return for financial assistance, Pakistan would make
nuclear weapons available to Saudi Arabia if needed. Saudis’ interest in nuclear deterrents stems
primarily from concern over Iran’s covert nuclear program. Saudis have threatened for years that if Iran
gains nuclear weapon capability, Riyadh would follow. US efforts to relax sanctions in return for
curtailed enrichment activities by Iran are believed to have strained US-Saudi relations, and raised the
specter of Saudis turning to Pakistan. While Riyadh could just be posturing to pressurize US to be firmer
with Iran, there exists clear recent precedent (2011) of Saudis requesting and receiving Pakistani military
forces to quell a Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain. Some possible scenarios Pakistan could follow:
1. Promises nuclear retaliation from sites in Pakistan in event of nuclear attack on Riyadh
2. Commits nuclear-armed airplanes into Saudi airfields
3. Houses nuclear-capable missiles and crews to Saudi Arabia (would require Saudi development
of requisite infrastructure – launch-pads, storage, control)
4. Sells nuclear missiles and technological know-how to Riyadh
Interestingly (and worryingly), scenarios 1-3 don’t violate NPT and are similar to US stationing of
nuclear-weapons in Europe during Cold War.
• While chances of state-approved proliferation are assessed as low (except in Saudi Arabia’s case),
concerns over proliferation by knowledgeable ‘insiders’ (such as A.Q. Khan and Bashiruddin Mahmood)
persist. Pakistan has taken concrete steps to ensure such individuals’ reliability. SPD has instituted a
Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) similar to USA’s for officials and scientists working on
sensitive projects. All individuals undergo security clearance by ISI, Intelligence Bureau, Military

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Intelligence and SPD; and are subjected to checks every two years or when transferred from one area of
programme to another. Checks encompass all aspects related to family, education, political affiliations
and fundamentalist inclinations. Similarly, a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) has been started for
all military personnel involved in Pakistan’s nuclear program. Crucially, the 2007 Ordinance that legally
institutionalized NCA, gave SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct and prosecute any guilty
personnel (whether retired or serving) with upto 25 years imprisonment, notwithstanding any other laws.
• Another attempt to prevent recurrence of ‘Khan Network’-like debacles has been 2004’s Export Act,
established to strengthen controls over export of material, equipment and technologies related to nuclear
weapons. A control-list of dual-use goods that is consistent with international regimes like NSG, MTCR
and Australia Group, is maintained and updated regularly. Exporters found guilty of violations face
heavy fines, lengthy imprisonment, and seizure of all assets and property. As another show of intent,
Pakistan has joined GICNT.
Security of Nuclear Weapons
• There is considerable international concern regarding security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, especially in
light of increased insurgent and terrorist violence, and areas of Pakistan coming under Taliban control.
Taliban-linked groups have led successful attacks on numerous government and military targets. Attacks
on Minhas Air Force Base (which is conjectured to house nuclear weapons though denied by authorities)
in 2007-09 and temporary gain of access to base by terrorists in a 2012 gunfight made global news.
Pakistan’s HEU facility at Khushab lies close to Taliban-heavy territory. Also, there have been
attempted kidnappings of officials and technicians working at nuclear power sites in west-Pakistan.
Additionally, while Pakistan’s widely-known policy of separate storage of warheads and delivery
vehicles provides protection against accidental launch, it has been argued that it makes it easier for
unauthorized personnel to gain access and remove weapons’ fissile material.
• Other worrisome scenarios that have been painted include –

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o loss of control to weapons to rogue military units
o ascension to power of a radical Islamist government that is liberal with proliferation to Islamist
terrorists or ignites mutually-destructive war with India
o attack on civilian nuclear facilities to release large amounts of radioactivity or to acquire spent
fuel to make ‘dirty bombs’
• Cognizant of the importance of security, Pakistan has a 10,000-strong security force headed by a two-
star general deployed at its nuclear facilities. Facilities are geographically distributed and feature multi-
layered security – air defence systems, no-fly zones, fencing, monitoring by close-circuit camera and
sensors – supported by counterintelligence teams. Additionally, warheads are equipped with Permissive
Action Links (PALs) that prevent activation by unauthorized personnel. For safe transportation, Pakistan
has ratified Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and has met stated
guidelines. Post 9/11, Pakistan has welcomed US assistance (both financial and technical) in the area of
security, while pointedly reserving the right to ‘pick and choose’ measures to undertake. As for securing
spent fuel from nuclear power plants, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has devised a 5-
year Nuclear Security Action Plan that includes procedures for handling spent fuel in accordance with
IAEA standards. Additionally, PNRA has established safety and security centers, campaigns to locate
and secure orphan sources, and detection equipment at strategic points to strike down smuggling.
• There is little genuine evidence to suggest deficiencies in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal upkeep. Senior US
officials from government, military and intelligence bureaus have repeatedly expressed confidence in
Pakistan’s nuclear security. Other governments (including France, U.K. and even India) have concurred
on Pakistan having a solid command-and-control system and having made significant investments to
heighten security at nuclear facilities. Analysts have likened Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to sanctuaries
of stability amidst an otherwise chaotic country. A 2014 security study by Nuclear Threat Initiative
(NTI) ranked Pakistan as ‘most-improved’ among the ‘nuclear club’ and rated its overall nuclear
security above India’s. Looking deeper, the threat of Islamic fundamentalists coming to power seems

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far-fetched given past election performance record of Islamist parties. Similarly, a Taliban takeover
scenario seems to dramatically over-estimate Taliban’s influence and goodwill, which has eroded with
multiple terrorist attacks carried out by them on Pakistani soil. In fact, government is plotting to wipe
out their threat, revealing its first counter-terrorism policy in February 2014. While continuing down the
negotiation route, Pakistan has made clear its intent to react to Taliban-perpetrated terrorism with force,
conducting aerial bombing of Taliban headquarters and sending troops to tribal hideouts. It also merits
mention that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has successfully survived a military coup (rise of Musharraf to
power in 1999) and a major constitutional change (Eighteenth Amendment in 2010 directed at diluting
Presidential powers). These are positive indicators for continued nuclear integrity in the face of future
instability in the country.

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Section 5 – References
The key sources referred to for developing this paper are listed below:
1. Bruno Tertrais, July 2012. “Pakistan’s Nuclear and WMD Programmes: Status, Evolution and Risks”
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
2. Henry D. Sokolski, Jan 2008. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War” Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College
3. A.H Nayyar, August 2008. “A Pakistani Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”
Freidrich Ebert Stiftung
4. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, March 2013. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and
Security Issues” Congressional Research Service (CRS)
5. Toby Dalton and Jaclyn Tandler, September 2012. “Understanding the Arms Race in South Asia”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
6. Malik Qasim Mustafa, March 2009. “Are Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Safe?” Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad
7. Malik Qasim Mustafa, March 2011. “FMCT and Pakistan: Futuristic Perspectives” Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad
8. Rajesh M. Basrur, May 2009. “Nuclear Weapons and India-Pakistan Relations” Strategic Analysis
Vol.33, No.3, Routledge
9. David E. Sanger, June 2004. “The Khan Network” Stanford Institute for International Studies
10. Moeed Yusuf, January 2009. “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons”
Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution
11. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert Norris, September 2013. “Global Nuclear Inventories, 1945-2013”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2013 69:75

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - An overview and critique

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