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How Can a CIO Secure a Moving Target
      with Limited Resources?


                                Dr. Stefan Frei
                            Research Analyst Director
                                       Secunia


Session ID: SPO2-302
Session Classification: Intermediate
Know your Enemy
The Changing Threat Environment
                                                           Fastest
                                                          growing
             Personal                 Theft               segment
Motivation




                 Gain
                                                Author   Tools created by
             Personal                             of        experts now
               Fame                             Tools      used by less-
                         Vandalism                       skilled criminals,
                                                         for personal gain
             Curiosity


                          Script-    Hobbyist   Expert
                          Kiddy      Hacker

                              Attackers’ Expertise
Availability of Malware Tools
leads to ..

      High degree of attack
          automation



    More opportunistic attacks
Malware as a Service (MaaS)
                                     Malware offered for
                                     $249 with a Service
                                     Level Agreement and
                                     replacement
                                     warranty if the
                                     creation is detected
                                     by any anti-virus
                                     within 9 months




Source: www.turkojan.com
Malware Construction Kit
Live Demonstration
We “trojanize” Windows Minesweeper using an
off-the-shelf malware construction kit

Absolutely no coding expertise required!
Full Remote Control..
                              List / start / stop / disable services
Read clipboard


List and kill processes       Read / modify registry

Life capture and control of
desktop

                              Life capture of webcam or
Remote command console        microphone

Online / offline keylogger
                              Disable taskbar / desktop icons / start-
Execute commands              button, reboot, ..
                              Restart / update trojan. Load new
                              plug-ins
Malware Development Process
         Obfuscation & Quality Assurance
1 Original Malware
 Create core malicious
 functionality:
 DDoS, steal data,
 spread infection, ..




2     Permutations
                              3           Quality
                                                          4      Deployment
                                         Assurance            Only malware that
    Obfuscate malware.
    Create multiple serial        Test new creations          passed    QA     (not
    variants to thwart            against a number of         detected) is used for
    detection engines             up-to-date anti-virus       deployment
                                  engines

                             Reject if
                             detected
An Arms Race …

286 million    virus samples counted
               in 2010
 783,562       samples / day
  32,648       samples / hour
     544       samples / minute
       9       samples / second

       Source: Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR), Volume 16
Limitations of traditional defense
We are to loose this Arms Race ..


 25%           of 123 publicly known exploits
               missed by top 10 prevention products


 40%          missed after slight tweaking
              of the exploits
                                       NSS Labs Test of 2010/Q3

  Up to 9% of the end-points in enterprises are found to
  be bot infected
                                NSS Labs Anti-Malware Test Report 2010Q3
                                           Damballa on Darkreading, 2010
From a Criminal’s
      Perspective

#Hosts x #Vulnerabilities
           =
     Opportunity
Worldwide Internet Usage
    2,095 Million
    estimated Internet users on March 31st, 2011




                                    penetration of
                        31%         population


                       448%         growth from
                                    2000 to 2010
                                      Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com



                      12
2,095 Million potential victims..
End-points are increasingly targeted
     End-point are where the most valuable
 1   data is found to be the least protected
     By definition, end-point PCs have access to all data needed
     to conduct their business

     End-points are difficult to secure
 2   Highly dynamic environment and unpredictable usage
     patterns by users


     A single vulnerable program is enough
 3   Cybercriminals only need a single vulnerable program to
     compromise the entire system
From a Criminal’s
      Perspective

#Hosts x #Vulnerabilities
           =
     Opportunity
Analysis
What does an end-point look like?
Data: Scan results from more than 4.8 Mio users
of the Secunia Personal Software Inspector PSI

Secunia PSI is a lightweight scanner to
 enumerate and identify insecure programs
 automatically install missing patches




 Free for personal use http://secunia.com/psi
Distribution of   Distribution of
  #vendors         #programs
The Top-50 Software Portfolio ..
Covers the 50 most prevalent programs to
represent a typical end-point:
28 Microsoft and 22 third-party (non MS) programs
from 12 different vendors



   12                28                  22
                                          Third-
   Vendors          Microsoft
                                          party

                                     Top-50 Portfolio as of December 2011
An alarming trend ..
in # of end-point vulnerabilities
 Number of vulnerabilities continuously increased since 2007


                             870      Vulnerabilities
                                      in 2011




                                                        doubled
                                                         in two years
                             421 in 2009
                             229 in 2007



                                18
A relevant trend ..
in criticality and type of vulnerabilities

      800+
      Vulnerabilities


         of which


      >50%
What is the source
of this increasing trend?


            ?
OS          MS           TP
Operating   Microsoft   Third-party
 System     Programs     Programs
It is third-party programs
 Non-Microsoft programs are found to be almost
 exclusively responsible for this increasing trend

                                OS                What you
                                12%
                                      MS           patch
                                      10%
                  TP
                  Third-party
                  Programs

                  78%
Cybercriminals                                        Origin of vulnerabilities
                                        in the Top-50 Portfolio as of Dec 2011
  don’t care
The Operating System
& Top-50 Software Portfolio
                          Top 50 Portfolio
                                     2011


                                     +
  Vulnerabilities   870     Vulnerabilities   867   Vulnerabilities   869
How do we keep a typical
 end-point up to date?
Complexity hurts
12 different update mechanisms ..

 11 Update                                      1 Update
Mechanisms                       OS            Mechanism
                                 12%
   TO PATCH
                                       MS        TO PATCH
                                       10%
22 third-party
  programs
                   TP
                   Third-party
                                             OS+28 Microsoft
                                               programs
fix 78% of the     Programs                   fix 22% of the
 vulnerabilities                               vulnerabilities
                   78%
Cybercriminals
     know
patch available
       ≠
patch installed
Patch Complexity ..
has a measurable effect on security
           Percent of unpatched programs


                                              Third-Party




                                               Microsoft




                   2.7% insecure Microsoft programs
   2011 average    6.5% insecure Third-Party programs
You can’t hide
Even rare programs have exploits
                         Programs with low market share are
  FALLACY                not exposed - as no exploits exist


                               Exploit availability vs. market
                                    share of programs


  22% of the programs
  with 10-20% market
   share have exploits
Are we doomed?
The Good News
most patches are available on time!


72%
of the patches are available
 on the day of vulnerability   Patch Availability
                  disclosure

      72%           28%
Cybercriminals
.. don’t need zero-day exploits!
Malware propagation methods:

         of the attacks had no patch available at the
< 1%     day of attack (zero-day attack)
                                  Microsoft SIR 11 Report 1H2011




         Cybercriminals always find more than enough
         opportunity in unpatched and well
         understood program vulnerabilities
Instant patching of all programs is a
major challenge
                             What patching
                           strategy yields the
                               largest risk
                             reduction with
                           limited resources
                               available ?
Simulation
Static vs. Dynamic Patching
Say you have a portfolio of the 200 most
prevalent programs
On average, how many programs do you need
to patch every year to get a 80% risk reduction?

    Static Approach            Dynamic Approach
Patch the N most prevalent   Patch the N most critical
programs every year          programs every year
Statically patching
                        .. the most prevalent programs

                                       Percentage of risk remediated          Patching N of 200 programs
                                          by patching N programs
                                                                              Strategy 1: Static
                                100%                                          Risk remediated by patching the
Percentage of risk remediated




                                                                              N most prevalent programs
                                80%

                                60%

                                40%

                                20%
                                                                             80% risk reduction achieved
                                 0%                       37                 by patching the 37 most
                                       0         20            40       60   prevalent programs
                                           Number of programs patched
Statically patching
                        .. the most critical programs

                                       Percentage of risk remediated          Patching N of 200 programs
                                          by patching N programs
                                                                              Strategy 1: Static
                                100%                                          Risk remediated by patching the
Percentage of risk remediated




                                                                              N most prevalent programs
                                80%

                                60%
                                                                              Strategy 2: By Criticality
                                                                              Risk remediated by patching the
                                40%                                           N most critical programs

                                20%
                                                                             80% risk reduction achieved
                                 0%         12            37                 by either patching the 12 most
                                       0         20            40       60   critical programs, or by patch-
                                           Number of programs patched        ing the 37 most prevalent
                                                                             programs
Why?
.. chasing a moving target
    Programs vulnerable in one year, but not




                                               39%
        in the previous or following year




                                               of the programs vulnerable
                                               in one year are not
                                               vulnerable in the
                                               next year or
                                               vice versa


          Not vulnerable in
          other year
Job Security ..
It depends when you get 0wned
          ✓                      ✓                     ✗           time

  Patch not            Patch available           Patch available
  available             not installed              & installed
 valid excuse,                                 no excuse needed
 can’t do a lot             #@!;#$
limited feasible    protection available,         exploitation
   protection        not implemented            no more possible
           Patch released            Patch installed
A patch provides
       better protection
than thousands of signatures


    it eliminates the

root cause
Properties of a Patch
.. from a risk & operations perspective
    No false positives (no false alarms)
    No false negatives (no missed attacks)
    No latency or other delays introduced
    No resources whatsoever consumed after
     deployment


       A patch essentially terminates
        the arms race with cybercriminals
The Known Unknowns
Business                              Criminals
 View                                   View
              Your Infrastructure
           Microsoft    Third Party
           Programs      Programs
              1/5           4/5
The Known Unknowns
Business                                Criminals
 View                                     View
              Your Infrastructure
           Microsoft      Third Party
           Programs        Programs
              1/5             4/5

                business critical
                   programs
             programs you know
                   about
              programs you don’t
                 know about
The Known Unknowns
Business                                 Criminals
 View                                      View
               Your Infrastructure
            Microsoft      Third Party
            Programs        Programs
               1/5             4/5

 What you        business critical
  patch             programs
              programs you know
                    about
               programs you don’t
                  know about
The Known Unknowns
Business                                 Criminals
 View                                      View
               Your Infrastructure
            Microsoft      Third Party
            Programs        Programs
               1/5             4/5
                                         What they
 What you        business critical        attack
  patch             programs
              programs you know
                    about
               programs you don’t
                  know about
Common Fallacy

               Business                               Cybercriminal
Program X is not                                 Program X is just the
business critical,                               attack vector to
therefore we won’t                               compromise the entire
spend time patching it                           system

X = { Adobe Flash, Reader, Firefox, Java, .. }




                    Exploitation of any program can
                    compromise the entire end-point
Failure of End-Point Security
What is needed:
 Reduce Complexity
  We need tools to simplify and automate
  patch management in order to master the
  complexity

 Intelligence
  We need tools to enumerate and identify all
  critical programs to ensure we spend
  resources on the relevant parts
Conclusion - I
Know your enemy and risks
 Microsoft is still perceived as the primary
  attack vector
  Our defense likely locks the front door while
  the back door remains wide open

 Intelligence
  Knowing all programs and the risks is critical
  in this dynamic environment
  This saves resources in remediation process
Conclusion - II
Know your tools
 We need Antivirus, IDS/IPS, ..
  But we also need to know the limitations of
  those technologies

 Patching is a primary security measure
  Given the effectiveness of eliminating the
  root cause, and the availability of patches
Stay Secure!

    Dr. Stefan Frei

Mail: sfrei@secunia.com
 Twitter: @stefan_frei

    secunia.com
Supporting Material

 Secunia 2011 Yearly Report
 http://secunia.com/company/2011_yearly_report/


 How to Secure a Moving Target with Limited Resources
 http://bit.ly/hzzlPi


 RSA Paper “Security Exposure of Software Portfolios”
 http://bit.ly/eQbwus

 Secunia Quarterly Security Factsheets
 http://secunia.com/factsheets


 Secunia Personal Software Inspector (PSI)
  free for personal use
 http://secunia.com/psi

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Maximize Computer Security With Limited Ressources

  • 1. How Can a CIO Secure a Moving Target with Limited Resources? Dr. Stefan Frei Research Analyst Director Secunia Session ID: SPO2-302 Session Classification: Intermediate
  • 2. Know your Enemy The Changing Threat Environment Fastest growing Personal Theft segment Motivation Gain Author Tools created by Personal of experts now Fame Tools used by less- Vandalism skilled criminals, for personal gain Curiosity Script- Hobbyist Expert Kiddy Hacker Attackers’ Expertise
  • 3. Availability of Malware Tools leads to .. High degree of attack automation More opportunistic attacks
  • 4. Malware as a Service (MaaS) Malware offered for $249 with a Service Level Agreement and replacement warranty if the creation is detected by any anti-virus within 9 months Source: www.turkojan.com
  • 5. Malware Construction Kit Live Demonstration We “trojanize” Windows Minesweeper using an off-the-shelf malware construction kit Absolutely no coding expertise required!
  • 6. Full Remote Control.. List / start / stop / disable services Read clipboard List and kill processes Read / modify registry Life capture and control of desktop Life capture of webcam or Remote command console microphone Online / offline keylogger Disable taskbar / desktop icons / start- Execute commands button, reboot, .. Restart / update trojan. Load new plug-ins
  • 7. Malware Development Process Obfuscation & Quality Assurance 1 Original Malware Create core malicious functionality: DDoS, steal data, spread infection, .. 2 Permutations 3 Quality 4 Deployment Assurance Only malware that Obfuscate malware. Create multiple serial Test new creations passed QA (not variants to thwart against a number of detected) is used for detection engines up-to-date anti-virus deployment engines Reject if detected
  • 8. An Arms Race … 286 million virus samples counted in 2010 783,562 samples / day 32,648 samples / hour 544 samples / minute 9 samples / second Source: Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR), Volume 16
  • 9. Limitations of traditional defense We are to loose this Arms Race .. 25% of 123 publicly known exploits missed by top 10 prevention products 40% missed after slight tweaking of the exploits NSS Labs Test of 2010/Q3 Up to 9% of the end-points in enterprises are found to be bot infected NSS Labs Anti-Malware Test Report 2010Q3 Damballa on Darkreading, 2010
  • 10. From a Criminal’s Perspective #Hosts x #Vulnerabilities = Opportunity
  • 11. Worldwide Internet Usage 2,095 Million estimated Internet users on March 31st, 2011 penetration of 31% population 448% growth from 2000 to 2010 Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com 12
  • 12. 2,095 Million potential victims.. End-points are increasingly targeted End-point are where the most valuable 1 data is found to be the least protected By definition, end-point PCs have access to all data needed to conduct their business End-points are difficult to secure 2 Highly dynamic environment and unpredictable usage patterns by users A single vulnerable program is enough 3 Cybercriminals only need a single vulnerable program to compromise the entire system
  • 13. From a Criminal’s Perspective #Hosts x #Vulnerabilities = Opportunity
  • 14. Analysis What does an end-point look like? Data: Scan results from more than 4.8 Mio users of the Secunia Personal Software Inspector PSI Secunia PSI is a lightweight scanner to  enumerate and identify insecure programs  automatically install missing patches  Free for personal use http://secunia.com/psi
  • 15. Distribution of Distribution of #vendors #programs
  • 16. The Top-50 Software Portfolio .. Covers the 50 most prevalent programs to represent a typical end-point: 28 Microsoft and 22 third-party (non MS) programs from 12 different vendors 12 28 22 Third- Vendors Microsoft party Top-50 Portfolio as of December 2011
  • 17. An alarming trend .. in # of end-point vulnerabilities Number of vulnerabilities continuously increased since 2007 870 Vulnerabilities in 2011 doubled in two years 421 in 2009 229 in 2007 18
  • 18. A relevant trend .. in criticality and type of vulnerabilities 800+ Vulnerabilities of which >50%
  • 19. What is the source of this increasing trend? ? OS MS TP Operating Microsoft Third-party System Programs Programs
  • 20. It is third-party programs Non-Microsoft programs are found to be almost exclusively responsible for this increasing trend OS What you 12% MS patch 10% TP Third-party Programs 78% Cybercriminals Origin of vulnerabilities in the Top-50 Portfolio as of Dec 2011 don’t care
  • 21. The Operating System & Top-50 Software Portfolio Top 50 Portfolio 2011 + Vulnerabilities 870 Vulnerabilities 867 Vulnerabilities 869
  • 22. How do we keep a typical end-point up to date?
  • 23. Complexity hurts 12 different update mechanisms .. 11 Update 1 Update Mechanisms OS Mechanism 12% TO PATCH MS TO PATCH 10% 22 third-party programs TP Third-party OS+28 Microsoft programs fix 78% of the Programs fix 22% of the vulnerabilities vulnerabilities 78%
  • 24. Cybercriminals know patch available ≠ patch installed
  • 25. Patch Complexity .. has a measurable effect on security Percent of unpatched programs Third-Party Microsoft 2.7% insecure Microsoft programs 2011 average 6.5% insecure Third-Party programs
  • 26. You can’t hide Even rare programs have exploits Programs with low market share are FALLACY not exposed - as no exploits exist Exploit availability vs. market share of programs 22% of the programs with 10-20% market share have exploits
  • 28. The Good News most patches are available on time! 72% of the patches are available on the day of vulnerability Patch Availability disclosure 72% 28%
  • 29. Cybercriminals .. don’t need zero-day exploits! Malware propagation methods: of the attacks had no patch available at the < 1% day of attack (zero-day attack) Microsoft SIR 11 Report 1H2011 Cybercriminals always find more than enough opportunity in unpatched and well understood program vulnerabilities
  • 30. Instant patching of all programs is a major challenge What patching strategy yields the largest risk reduction with limited resources available ?
  • 31. Simulation Static vs. Dynamic Patching Say you have a portfolio of the 200 most prevalent programs On average, how many programs do you need to patch every year to get a 80% risk reduction? Static Approach Dynamic Approach Patch the N most prevalent Patch the N most critical programs every year programs every year
  • 32. Statically patching .. the most prevalent programs Percentage of risk remediated Patching N of 200 programs by patching N programs Strategy 1: Static 100% Risk remediated by patching the Percentage of risk remediated N most prevalent programs 80% 60% 40% 20% 80% risk reduction achieved 0% 37 by patching the 37 most 0 20 40 60 prevalent programs Number of programs patched
  • 33. Statically patching .. the most critical programs Percentage of risk remediated Patching N of 200 programs by patching N programs Strategy 1: Static 100% Risk remediated by patching the Percentage of risk remediated N most prevalent programs 80% 60% Strategy 2: By Criticality Risk remediated by patching the 40% N most critical programs 20% 80% risk reduction achieved 0% 12 37 by either patching the 12 most 0 20 40 60 critical programs, or by patch- Number of programs patched ing the 37 most prevalent programs
  • 34. Why? .. chasing a moving target Programs vulnerable in one year, but not 39% in the previous or following year of the programs vulnerable in one year are not vulnerable in the next year or vice versa Not vulnerable in other year
  • 35. Job Security .. It depends when you get 0wned ✓ ✓ ✗ time Patch not Patch available Patch available available not installed & installed valid excuse, no excuse needed can’t do a lot #@!;#$ limited feasible protection available, exploitation protection not implemented no more possible Patch released Patch installed
  • 36. A patch provides better protection than thousands of signatures it eliminates the root cause
  • 37. Properties of a Patch .. from a risk & operations perspective  No false positives (no false alarms)  No false negatives (no missed attacks)  No latency or other delays introduced  No resources whatsoever consumed after deployment  A patch essentially terminates the arms race with cybercriminals
  • 38. The Known Unknowns Business Criminals View View Your Infrastructure Microsoft Third Party Programs Programs 1/5 4/5
  • 39. The Known Unknowns Business Criminals View View Your Infrastructure Microsoft Third Party Programs Programs 1/5 4/5 business critical programs programs you know about programs you don’t know about
  • 40. The Known Unknowns Business Criminals View View Your Infrastructure Microsoft Third Party Programs Programs 1/5 4/5 What you business critical patch programs programs you know about programs you don’t know about
  • 41. The Known Unknowns Business Criminals View View Your Infrastructure Microsoft Third Party Programs Programs 1/5 4/5 What they What you business critical attack patch programs programs you know about programs you don’t know about
  • 42. Common Fallacy Business Cybercriminal Program X is not Program X is just the business critical, attack vector to therefore we won’t compromise the entire spend time patching it system X = { Adobe Flash, Reader, Firefox, Java, .. } Exploitation of any program can compromise the entire end-point
  • 43. Failure of End-Point Security What is needed:  Reduce Complexity We need tools to simplify and automate patch management in order to master the complexity  Intelligence We need tools to enumerate and identify all critical programs to ensure we spend resources on the relevant parts
  • 44. Conclusion - I Know your enemy and risks  Microsoft is still perceived as the primary attack vector Our defense likely locks the front door while the back door remains wide open  Intelligence Knowing all programs and the risks is critical in this dynamic environment This saves resources in remediation process
  • 45. Conclusion - II Know your tools  We need Antivirus, IDS/IPS, .. But we also need to know the limitations of those technologies  Patching is a primary security measure Given the effectiveness of eliminating the root cause, and the availability of patches
  • 46. Stay Secure! Dr. Stefan Frei Mail: sfrei@secunia.com Twitter: @stefan_frei secunia.com
  • 47. Supporting Material  Secunia 2011 Yearly Report http://secunia.com/company/2011_yearly_report/  How to Secure a Moving Target with Limited Resources http://bit.ly/hzzlPi  RSA Paper “Security Exposure of Software Portfolios” http://bit.ly/eQbwus  Secunia Quarterly Security Factsheets http://secunia.com/factsheets  Secunia Personal Software Inspector (PSI) free for personal use http://secunia.com/psi