Pojman ethics 8e_ppt_ch13
- 1. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong Louis P. Pojman and James Fieser 8th edition
- 2. Chapter Thirteen: The Fact–Value Problem Rants are pervasive in discussions of moral issues—such as abortion, euthanasia, sexual morality, and capital punishment—in the media and in personal dialogue. Frequently, our moral assessments are not really factual judgments. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 3. The Fact–Value Problem The problem of determining whether values are essentially different from facts, whether moral assessments are derived from facts, and whether moral statements can be true or false like factual statements. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 4. Metaethics Metaethics is the method of inquiry that addresses the fact–value problem. Many contemporary philosophers focus on the metaethical functions of ethical terms, the status of moral judgments, and the relation of ethical judgments to nonethical factual statements. What, if anything, is the meaning of the terms good and right? How, if at all, can we justify our moral beliefs? © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 5. Hume and Moore: The Problem Classically Stated David Hume: The fallacy of deriving ought from is George Edward Moore: The naturalistic fallacy © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 6. The Fallacy of Deriving Ought from Is (1 of 3) David Hume (1711–1776) Moral theories begin by observing some specific facts about the world, and then they conclude from these same statements about moral obligation. In other words, they move from statements about what is the case to statements about what ought to be the case. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 7. The Fallacy of Deriving Ought from Is (2 of 3) Examples of this fallacy in ordinary theories: God exists; therefore, we should obey God’s moral commands. God will punish and reward us in the afterlife; therefore, we should behave morally. People are sociable creatures; therefore, we should behave morally. Without rules, society would fall into chaos; therefore, we should behave morally. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 8. The Fallacy of Deriving Ought from Is (3 of 3) Examples of this fallacy in sophisticated theories: Through reason we can detect eternal truths about fit behavior; therefore, we should behave morally as informed by our reason. There is a kind of sixth sense that detects inappropriate conduct; therefore, we should behave morally as informed by this sixth sense. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 9. Hume’s Solution Moral assessments are not rational inferences; they are emotional reactions—feelings of pleasure and pain we experience when we witness or hear about some event. If we witness a concrete “fact,” such as a vengeful, cold- blooded killing. We feel that it is wrong. The feeling introduces the new and distinctly moral element. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 10. The Naturalistic Fallacy (1 of 2) G.E. Moore claims philosophers have been entangled in ethical problems because they have not clearly defined the territory of ethics. Ethics involves arriving at decision-making procedures for morally good behavior. We need to discover the meaning of the term good. The foundation of ethics is an understanding of the term good. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 11. The Naturalistic Fallacy (2 of 2) It is a fallacy to identify “good” with any specific natural property such as “pleasure” or “being more evolved.” Moore claims that a concept like the “Good” is indefinable because it is a simple property, a property that has no parts and thus cannot be defined by constituent elements. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 12. Open-Question Argument The open-question argument is a test to help determine whether a moral theory commits the naturalistic fallacy. For any property that we identify with “goodness,” we can ask, “Is that property itself good?” © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 13. Moore and Hume Like Hume’s fallacy of deriving ought from is, Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is another way of articulating the fact–value problem. Regardless of how many things we intuitively recognize as being accompanied by moral goodness, there will always be a gap between the facts we examine and the value we find within them. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 14. Ayer and Emotivism Alfred Jules Ayer (1910–1989) was influenced by Hume and Moore. Ayer’s two pronged approach: He argues that the fact–value problem arises because moral statements cannot pass a critical test of meaning called the verification principle. His solution is that moral utterances are only expressions of feelings, a position called emotivism. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 15. Ayer’s Theory(1 of 2) All meaningful sentences must be either tautologies or empirically verifiable. His argument: 1. A sentence is meaningful if and only if it can be verified. 2. Moral sentences cannot be verified. 3. Therefore, moral sentences are not meaningful. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 16. Ayer’s Theory(2 of 2) Philosophers distinguish between cognitive and noncognitive statements. Traditional moral theories claim to be cognitivist; Ayer says they are misguided. Ayer says moral utterances express our feelings and are not factually meaningful, morality doesn’t involve our reasoning ability, and ethical disagreement is a disagreement in attitude. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 17. Criticisms of Emotivism The verification theory of meaning doesn’t pass its own test. There is a problem with the view that ethical disagreements are disagreements in attitude. It cannot distinguish between reasons and causes that change our attitudes. Morality seems deeper than mere emotions or acting on feelings or attitudes. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 18. Stevenson’s Moderate Emotivism Charles Leslie Stevenson (1908–1979) says moral utterances can include noncognitive and cognitive elements. Specific components of typical moral utterances: Emotive expression (noncognitive) Report about feelings (cognitive) Description of other qualities (cognitive) © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 19. Hare and Prescriptivism Ayer’s prescriptive function of moral utterances: They recommend or command that others adopt our attitude. Richard Mervyn Hare (1919–2002): Four important features about moral judgments: They are prescriptive. They exhibit logical relations. They are universalizable. They involve principles. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 20. Prescriptivity Moral judgments have both a descriptive (fact) and prescriptive (value) element. The descriptive element involves the facts about a particular action, such as “charity maximizes pleasure.” The prescriptive element is conduct guiding and recommends that others adopt our value attitude. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 21. The Logic of Moral Reasoning (1 of 2) There is a logic to prescriptive judgments. Moral judgments do not have truth value, but they do have a logical form. Thus, we can argue about particular judgments and use arguments to reach particular prescriptions. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 22. The Logic of Moral Reasoning (2 of 2) Hare holds two theses about the distinction between is and ought—between descriptive and prescriptive statements as they pertain to logical form: 1. No indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises that cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them alone. 2. No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises that does not contain at least one imperative. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 23. Universalizability In making moral judgments, one should make the same judgment in all similar cases. A judgment is not moral unless the agent is prepared to universalize his or her principle. Universalizability is a necessary condition: If a principle is moral, then it applies universally. Universalizability is a sufficient condition: If a principle applies universally, then it is moral. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 24. Principles Principles are central to moral reasoning. They serve as major premises in our moral arguments. We acquire or learn a basic set of principles. We learn when to use or to subordinate those principles. We choose our own principles, and we must commit to them, universalizing them. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 25. Criticisms of Prescriptivism It is too broad and allows for conduct that we typically deem immoral. It permits trivial judgments to count as moral ones. It allows the moral substance in life to slip away from ethical theory. There are no constraints on altering one’s principles. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 26. Naturalism and the Fact–Value Problem All the noncognitivist solutions to the fact–value problem are troubling: Reducing moral utterances to emotional outbursts or universal prescriptions destroys many elements we find essential to morality. The fact–value problem still demands some answer—one that matches our conceptions of what morality should do. Naturalism provides one such answer. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 27. Naturalism Naturalism links moral terms with some kind of natural property. Natural in that they are found in the natural world, specifically the natural realms of human psychology and society. Geoffrey Warnock argues that morality is linked with “the betterment of the human predicament.” © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 28. Naturalism and the Open-Ended Question Moore would charge that Warnock commits the naturalistic fallacy. Moore’s theory regards the idea of goodness as though it was a thing, the fallacy of hypostatization. It’s a category mistake to treat a functional term as though it was a thing. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 29. Conclusion Possible solutions to the fact–value problem: Hume—Value judgments are emotional reactions to specific facts. Moore—Value judgements involve intuitively recognizing value within facts. Ayer—Value statements are expressions of feelings in response to facts, emotivism. Hare—Moral statements have descriptive and prescriptive elements. © 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.