Presentation2 certificate farce
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This document summarizes Sandy Dunn's presentation titled "The Certificate Farce" given at Boise BSides on November 21, 2015. The presentation used an analogy where driver's licenses are used to verify identity and food signatures are used to determine if food is safe. However, the processes for issuing IDs and protecting signatures are flawed, making it easy for criminals to impersonate others or poison food. The presentation highlighted issues with trusting certificates and how certificate authorities don't always properly revoke compromised certificates. It also provided an overview of TLS certificate validation tools and resources for monitoring certificates.
Presentation2 certificate farce
- 1. The Certificate Farce Boise BSides 11-21-2015
- 2. SANS Master’s Student Sandra (Sandy) Dunn HP Cybersecurity subzer0girl@gmail.com Twitter @subzer0girl Thank you for data & research support ! Jim Lairmore, HP Inc. Kevin Bocek, Venafi Dan DeSantis, Venafi
- 3. • You live where multiple organizations can issues driver license ID’s • Some of those organizations include ones that the governments have control and are known to be untrustworthy • Some of these organizations don’t have great processes and accidently issue IDs to people they shouldn’t (whoops) • The ID’s are the only way you know which business or individuals you can trust with your private and financial data • There are criminals actively trying to trick you to get your data • When you ask for an ID there is a security officer that helps you check the ID. He warns you if the driver’s license is out of date, if the license was written with bad ink, or if the name on the license doesn’t match the name the person or business told you. You ignore him a lot… You used to try to listen, but you can’t really understand what he is telling you and he used to say “it’s not safe it’s not safe” and it was safe the driver license was just out of date. The people forgot to get a new one. • When someone has their ID stolen or bad guys steal people’s stuff after showing them their driver’s license then their ID is revoked. • To see if a person ID was revoked you have to ask the organization for all the driver’s licenses that they have revoked. They send you back a book the size of set of encyclopedias and that can take several days. Sometimes it’s hard to know where to ask for the books because they change the address of where to go get them. It got too hard you mostly don’t ask any more.
- 4. How confident are you that you can trust the ID’s that people use to prove their identity?
- 5. • These driver’s licenses perform another very important task for you. They help you know what food is safe to eat because unfortunately there are people actively and aggressively trying to poison you. • When you get food there is signature on the food that is signed by the people who made it. You determine if the food is safe based on whether you trust who made the food. • The people who want to poison you know that you trust the signature and will eat anything if it is signed by someone you trust. • They actively try to steal the special pens used to make the signatures you trust. Some businesses know this and protect the pen and lock them up. Some businesses just leave the pen laying around. • The truth is the people trying to poison you don’t really need to work very hard to steal pens for the special signatures. • The people who sell the special pens that make the signatures really need to make money and they will really sell them to anyone without asking too many questions.
- 6. How confident are you that you won’t get poisoned Alexander Litvinenko November 1 2006, Litvinenko suddenly fell ill and was hospitalized from poisoning by radioactive polonium-210. He died November 23. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Litvinenko Andrey Lugovo
- 7. Do free TLS certificate make the internet more secure? https://letsencrypt.org/ http://www.infoworld.com/article/2984243/security/the-perils-of-free-digital-certificates.html#tk.ifw-infsb
- 8. At the end of this presentation Know where to find data that supports how often certificate trust is broken Less blind trust in code signing Hold people and sites accountable for out of date / self signed certificates Align with the urgency to manage certificates in your environment Know about some tools
- 9. • TLS 1.3 RFC expected in April 2016 • SHA1 no longer supported January 1, 2016 • NIST December 2015 • Google December 2015 • Microsoft June 2016 • Mozilla July 2016 Keynote: Alex Stamos The Moral Imperatives and Challenges for Modern Application Security https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xVoBA1f4gY Coming TLS changes
- 10. Common TLS Certificates Trust Anchors • Website • Code Signing Certificates • S/MIME email encryption • Digital ID / User Identity • SSH • RDP • Business to Business Applications • VOIP • VPN • IoT
- 11. Recent Code Signing Key Compromise News
- 12. 10.28.15 Google to Symantec – “You have until June to fix this or we will flag Symantec issued certificates as vulnerable” We issued 23 test certificates That seems low, we don’t believe you Ok, your right it’s 2,458 Certificates http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/still-fuming-over-https-mishap-google-gives-symantec-an-offer-it-cant-refuse/
- 14. • Komodia TLS intercept libraries • MITM HTTPS traffic • EFF Recommends reinstalling a fresh OS https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/dear-software-vendors-please-stop-trying-intercept-your-customers-encrypted Considering that Lenovo implemented this intentionally and the potential damage, was this a criminal act ?
- 15. Netcraft research indicates Certificate Authorities aren’t flagging domains with names that are similar to common, high traffic sites. Universal SSL certificates (free CloudFlare certificate) accounted for 40 percent of certificates used by phishing sites. http://www.infoworld.com/article/2992605/security/phishing-sites-exploit-trust-in-valid-ssl-certificates.html
- 16. CRL (Certificate Revocation List ) • blacklist of revoked certificates • Often hard coded in the url • Often disabled because of the length of time to check OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) • Improvement over CRL lists but the soft fail defeats the purpose OCSP Stapling best option • Requires implementation by Web Server Administrator to implement • SSLLabs.com OCSP Stapling will become a factor in your grade TLS Certificate Revocation
- 17. And the bad guys know it doesn’t really work.... 8 % of the certificates being served had been revoked
- 18. SANS Internet Storm Center https://isc.sans.edu/crls.html?token=e01d79423885ad9aac53ab92eb75274c116b548e&startdate=2014-10-04&enddate=2015-11-03&submit=Update
- 20. OCSP Certificate Pinning OCSP Stapling requires the website administrators to enable it on their web server Certificate Transparency Add a layer of visibility to domain owners for CA issued TLS certificates. an open auditing and monitoring system that lets any domain owner or CA determine whether certificates have been mistakenly or maliciously issued. TACK Dynamic certificate framework. TACK requires protocol changes for both the server and the client side of any SSL transaction which has been met with a cold reception. Convergence Instead of hard coded CA’s. Convergence configures a dynamic set of Notaries. No incentive for the notary investment Sovereign Keys Addressed issues like the ineffectiveness of browser certificate warnings. Ended up just really replacing one remote authority with another. DANE DNS Authentication of Named Entities a proposal based on DNSSEC to eventually replace the CA system. It is based on the idea of using the DNS hierarchy to issue SSL certs the same way that domains are managed and resolved - with few root keys & individual organizations in charge. The challenge is that countries that have little trust would be required to trust the reliability of the DANE entry.
- 21. TLS Tools
- 22. OWASP OWASP Cheat Sheets OWASP Testing tools OWASP.org TLSSLed TLSSLed is Linux shell script to evaluate the security of target Kali Linux O-Saft OWASP SSL advanced forensic tool / OWASP SSL audit for testers https://www.owasp.org/index.php/O-Saft ssldump – An SSL/TLS network protocol analyzer It identifies TCP connections on the chosen network interface and attempts to interpret them as SSL/TLS traffic. When it identifies SSL/TLS traffic, it decodes the records and displays them in a textual form to stdout. If provided with the appropriate keying material, it will also decrypt the connections and display the application data traffic. http://ssldump.sourceforge.net/ SSLyze check for web SSL/TLS and also STARTTLS for smtp, xmpp, pop3, ftp, imap, ldap and rdp https://github.com/nabla-c0d3/sslyze SSL Server Test Provides a grade of a sites TLS implementation https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ SSL Client Test Client TLS information https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewMy Client.html
- 23. Prevention Ideal, Detection a Must ! But you won’t see this in your logs…… Censys Shodan Alexa Netcraft Google Hacks Internet Archives
- 25. This doesn’t look good …
- 26. https://sonar.labs.rapid7.com/ Project Sonar Sonar collects SSL Certificates, Web Server responses, DNS records, and responses from common UDP services. We use this data to identify large-scale misconfigurations and vulnerabilities in consumer, enterprise, and critical infrastructure systems. All Sonar data is provided to the public free of charge in cooperation with the University of Michigan. You can find the data at Scans.IO.
- 27. SSL/TLS Filters Cert Version Cert Bits Cert Issuer Cert Subject / Cert Name Check for known issues (Heartbleed) Cipher Bits / Protocol Grab cert for all services 27 Searches and indexes by responses to queries https://shodanio.wordpress.com/2014/06/16/kicking-the-shodan-api-up-a-notch/
- 30. • What certificates are present on a given IP? • Which client IPs access a given service? Flying Pig – TLS Knowledge Base https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-ssl/
- 31. http://blog.squarelemon.com/ DerbyCon TLS Fingerprinting Lee Brotherston @synackpse • Recognizing a TLS Fingerprint is possible by Capturing client TLS initial hello packets • Recognize SuperFish, PrivDog, and GeniusBox clients in network traffic “Using TLS fingerprinting we can quickly and passively determine which client is being used, and apply strategies from both the attacker and defender perspectives. These strategies allow us to achieve smarter defending and stealthier attacking” Lee Brotherston
- 32. http://www.infoworld.com/article/2992605/security/phishing-sites-exploit-trust-in-valid-ssl-certificates.html Netcraft TLS Certificate Services Deceptive Domain Score analyzes the likelihood that a domain name will be used for fraudulent activities. Phishing Alert Service sends an alert if your site / certificate is used for a phishing scam
- 33. Urgent need to proactively manage TLS Certificate inside and outside your firewall Think about code signing trust Hold people and sites accountable for out of date / self signed certificates Start now it’s going to get worse Summary
- 34. OWASP https://owasp.org Cheat Sheets Key Pinning, TLS testing, CA Security Council https://casecurity.org/ is a multi-vendor industry advocacy group created to conduct research, promote Internet security standards and educate the public on Internet security issues. CA Browser (CAB) forum, which is a group that includes both CAs and web browser vendors. https://cabforum.org/ Voluntary consortium of certification authorities, vendors of Internet browser software, operating systems, and other PKI-enabled applications industry guidelines governing the issuance and management of X.509 v.3 digital certificates. Online Trust Alliance https://otalliance.org/resources/SSL/CABestPractice s.html European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) www.etsi.org independent, not-for-profit, standardization organization in the telecommunications industry) in Europe W3C http://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/web-https TAG’s position on securing the Web through the use of cryptography, identifies some of the associated issues, and recommends further work to aid in its use. Its primary audience is W3C participants
- 35. Title Link PKI Trust Models: Whom Do You Trust https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/vpns/pki-trust-models- trust-36112 Digital Certificate Revocation https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/certificates/digital- certificate-revocation-35292 Building and Managing a PKI Solution for Small and Medium Size Business https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/certificates/building- managing-pki-solution-small-medium-size-business-34445 SSl/TLS: What’s Under the Hood https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/authentication/ssl-tls- hood-34297 Windows Enforcement of Authenticode Code Signing and Timestamping http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/32288.windo ws-enforcement-of-authenticode-code-signing-and-timestamping.aspx The Scary and Terrible Code Signing Problem You Don’t Know You Have https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/certificates/scary- terrible-code-signing-problem-don-039-t-36382 The Business Case For TLS Certificate Enterprise Key Management https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/critical/business- case-tls-certificate-enterprise-key-management-web-site-certificates- wrangling-36392
- 36. http://wiki.cacert.org/Risk/History History of Certificate Risks & Threats
- 37. More Fear Uncertainty and Doubt
- 38. http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_ccs12.pdf We’ve focused on browser based TLS, there are many other applications that rely on TLS libraries and have validation challenges. More Work To do
- 39. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking.pdf BGP Hijacking The problem is: the encryption is backed by SSL/TLS PKI
- 40. Sniffly Sniffly is an attack that abuses HTTP Strict Transport Security and Content Security Policy to allow arbitrary websites to sniff a user's browsing history. It has been tested in Firefox and Chrome https://github.com/diracdeltas/sniffly
- 41. Highly classified decryption program run by the NSA The British signals intelligence agency GCHQ has a similar program codenamed Edgehill. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35531.pdf Bullrun
Editor's Notes
- #3: Information Security Officer is similar to being a hostage negotiator Between the security team & the business (1) There is a lot of tension (2) You inform everyone of the law (3) Your fully aware that if people don't listen someone could die (4) you negotiate the ransom
- #7: Died from poisoned tea
- #8: Understand that providing free certificates is trying to solve one problem - but there is a cost – it creates other problems.
- #9: Not just the code signing for your desktop and mobile applications but the code signatures that your business relies on as trust anchors
- #10: Hashes are useful as long as they are unique. If two different message inputs generate the same hash (collision), then it is no longer safe information Counter perspective - Alex Stamos points out in his Moral Imperatives and Challenges for Modern Application Security Presentation that not supporting SHA1 will have a devastating effect on 3rd world countries that only have access to older technologies, for a threat that is “theoretical”
- #12: It doesn’t break that often does it ? Umm it breaks a lot.
- #13: CA need more transparency and accountability
- #14: (1) This single expiring certificate caused collateral damage across multiple apps. What was broken was not easily discernible. Apple has yet to acknowledge what happened.
- #18: GovRat is malware bundled with digital certificates for code signing and sold on TheRealDeal market place Hardcoding a URL very difficult for a long living certificates By the time DOD abandoned CRL checking in 2006 the CRL list was 200 MB (unlike CRLs and OCSP, which only involve the CA),
- #21: CT helps with the detection problem by establishing a set of append-only public logs of certificates that anyone can audit. Individuals can submit observed certificates to public logs. Logs can be independently monitored to alert site owners when a new certificate for their site is entered in the log. This alerting will help a site owner quickly detect certain types of miss-issuance and get any miss-issued certificates revoked. In Chrome, CT is required for all new EV certificates.
- #29: Even though Censys much better for certificate search / Shodan provides other certificate finds
- #30: More search tool options
- #31: The NSA Flying Pig program inspiration for the CIRCL Passive SSL project
- #33: These service from Netcraft are another defensive tool that could be enormously beneficial depending on environmental risk.
- #34: Not just the code signing for your desktop and mobile applications but the code signatures that your business relies on as trust anchors
- #41: Another consideration is the leaked TLS client data. Another way to track people.
- #42: Snowden documentation provided insight into how active government