Prior to beginning work on this assignment, read the a model of gl

Prior to beginning work on this assignment, read the A Model of
Global Citizenship: Antecedents and Outcomes article and
watch the Globalization at a Crossroads (Links to an external
site.) video. For the first link I have attached a pdf format for
you to read just in case the link does not work.
Go to the Ashford University Library and locate one additional
source on global citizenship that will help support your
viewpoint, or you may choose one of the following articles
found in the Week 1 Required Resources: I saved the articles on
a pdf format as well for you to choose one them for the
assignment.
· From Globalism to Globalization: The Politics of Resistance
· Transnationalism and Anti-Globalism
Reflect: Please take some time to reflect on how the concept of
global citizenship has shaped your identity and think about how
being a global citizen has made you a better person in your
community.
Write: Use the Week 1 Example Assignment Guide when
addressing the following prompts: Also saved it and attached it
as a word doc.
· Describe and explain a clear distinction between “globalism”
and “globalization” after viewing the video and reading the
article.
· Describe how being a global citizen in the world of advanced
technology can be beneficial to your success in meeting your
personal, academic, and professional goals.
· Explain why there has been disagreement between theorists
about the definition of global citizenship and develop your own
definition of global citizenship after reading the article by
Reysen and Katzarska-Miller.
· Choose two of the six outcomes of global citizenship from the
article (i.e., intergroup empathy, valuing diversity, social
justice, environmental sustainability, intergroup helping, and

the level of responsibility to act for the betterment of this
world).
· Explain why those two outcomes are the most important in
becoming a global citizen compared to the others.
· Describe at least two personal examples or events in your life
that illustrate the development of global citizenship based on
the two outcomes you chose.
· Identify two specific general education courses.
· Explain how each course influenced you to become a global
citizen.
The Importance of Becoming a Global Citizen
· Must be 750 to 1,000 words in length (not including ti tle and
references pages) and formatted according to APA style, as
outlined in the Ashford Writing Center’s APA Style
resource. (Links to an external site.)
· Must include a separate title page with the following:
· Title of paper
· Student’s name
· Course name and number
· Instructor’s name
· Date submitted
· For further assistance with the formatting and the title page,
refer to APA Formatting for Word 2013 (Links to an external
site.).
· Must utilize academic voice. See the Academic Voice (Links
to an external site.) resource for additional guidance.
· Must include an introduction and conclusion paragraph. Your
introduction paragraph needs to end with a clear thesis
statement that indicates the purpose of your paper.
· For assistance on writing Introductions & Conclusions (Links
to an external site.) as well as Writing a Thesis
Statement (Links to an external site.), refer to the Ashford
Writing Center resources.
· Must use at least one credible source in addition to the two
required sources (video and article).

· The Scholarly, Peer Reviewed, and Other Credible
Sources (Links to an external site.) table offers additional
guidance on appropriate source types. If you have questions
about whether a specific source is appropriate for this
assignment, contact your instructor. Your instructor has the
final say about the appropriateness of a specific source for an
assignment. The Integrating Research (Links to an external
site.) tutorial will offer further assistance with including
supporting information and reasoning.
· Must document in APA style any information used from
sources, as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center’s In-Text
Citation Guide (Links to an external site.).
· Must have no more than 15% quoted material in the body of
your essay based on the Turnitin report. References list will be
excluded from the Turnitin originality score.
· Must include a separate references page that is formatted
according to APA style. See the Formatting Your References
List (Links to an external site.) resource in the Ashford Writing
Center for specifications.
Before you submit your written assignment, you are encouraged
to review the review the Grammarly (Links to an external
site.) page tutorial, set up a Grammarly account (if you have not
already done so), and use Grammarly to review a rough draft of
your assignment. Then carefully review all issues identified by
Grammarly and revise your work as needed.
2
Week 1 Assignment Two

Importance of Becoming a Global Citizen
Student’s Name
GEN499 General Education Capstone
Professor’s Name
1
Date
Note: This assignment should be written in the correct format
per APA guidelines. Please click on the Writing Center tab at
the left-hand toolbar of the course. You will then click on the
“Writing a Paper” tab, which goes over the basics of writing an
essay. For information on how to write in-text citations in APA
format, click on the “Citing Within Your Paper” link under the
Writing Center & Library tab. This paper needs to consist of
750 – 1,000 words (excluding the title and reference page).
Start your paper with the title of this assignment:
Importance of Becoming a Global Citizen
The introduction paragraph of this paper should inform the
reader of the topic you are writing about while providing
background information and the purpose or importance of
addressing this topic of global citizenship. You should prepare
the reader by stating the concepts you are about to address
further in your paper. Typically a good introduction paragraph
is made up of 5 – 7 sentences.
Short Title of First Prompt (i.e. Distinction between
“Globalism” and “Globalization”)
After viewing the required video “Globalization at a
Crossroads”, you need write a paragraph of 5 – 7 sentences
addressing the distinction between “globalism” and
“globalization” It’s important to cite the video per APA

guidelines within this paragraph.
Short Title of Second Prompt
Write a paragraph (about 5 sentences) describing how being a
global citizen in the world of advanced technology can be
beneficial to your success in meeting your persona, academic,
and professional goals.
Short Title of Third Prompt
After reading the article by Reysen and Katzarska-Miller,
you need to write a paragraph of 5 – 7 sentences explaining why
there has been a disagreement between theorists about the
definition of global citizenship. Within the article, the authors
address how specific schools of thought define global
citizenship. It would be a good idea to paraphrase this
information in your own words and cite the article per APA
guidelines. Also, within this paragraph, you should provide your
own definition of global citizenship after reading what other
ideas are from the article.
Short Title of Fourth Prompt
Note: Based on the article, you need to write two paragraphs: a
paragraph on each of the two outcomes of global citizenship you
chose (intergroup empathy, valuing diversity, social justice,
environmental sustainability, intergroup helping, and the level
of responsibility to act for the betterment of this world).
Name of First Outcome Addressed (i.e. Valuing Diversity)
Within this paragraph you need to explain why this outcome is
important in becoming a global citizen. It’s a good idea to first
define the outcome in your own words and then provide a
thorough explanation on why it’s important for your own
development as a global citizen.
Name of Second Outcome Addressed (i.e. Social Justice)
Same instructions as the first paragraph above.
Short Title for Fifth Prompt
First Personal Example on (Name First Outcome)
You need to write a short paragraph describing a personal
experience that has corresponds to the first outcome you
addressed in the third prompt and has assisted or resulted in

your development as a global citizen.
Second Personal Example on (Name of Second Outcome)
You need to write a short paragraph describing a personal
experience that has corresponds to the second outcome you
addressed in the third prompt and has assisted or resulted in
your development as a global citizen.
Short Title of Sixth Prompt
You need to write a 5 – 7 sentence paragraph that identifies two
specific education courses and explains how each of those
courses assisted or influenced your development in becoming a
global citizen.
Conclusion
In this paragraph, you need to summarize the main points of this
assignment and include a description of why this topic is
important to address when it comes to the development of
global citizenship. Typically a good conclusion paragraph
consists of 5 – 7 sentences. Keep in mind that you should not
share new information in the conclusion paragraph. This means
that there should not be any in-text citations. You are basically
summarizing what you have written.
References
Note: References are written below in the correct format per
APA guidelines. In addition to these two required resources,
you must locate another scholarly source from the Ashford
University Library that applies to this topic and can be used to
support your perspective.
Reysen, S., & Katzarska-Miller, I. (2013). A model of global
citizenship: Antecedents and outcomes. International Journal of
Psychology, 48(5), 858-870.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207594.2012.701749
Stucke, K. (Writer). (2009). Globalization at a crossroads

[Series episode]. In M. Stucke & Claudin, C. (Executive
Producers), Global issues.
https://fod.infobase.com/OnDemandEmbed.aspx?token=39350&
wID=100753&plt=FOD&loid=0&w=640&h=480&fWidth=660&
fHeight=530
Transnationalism and Anti-Globalism
Johannes Voelz
College Literature, Volume 44, Number 4, Fall 2017, pp. 521-
526 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:
For additional information about this article
[ Access provided at 16 Feb 2021 01:15 GMT from The
University of Arizona Global Campus ]
https://doi.org/10.1353/lit.2017.0032
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/672845
https://doi.org/10.1353/lit.2017.0032
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/672845
COLLEGE LITERATURE: A JOURNAL OF CRITICAL
LITERARY STUDIES 44.4 Fall 2017
Print ISSN 0093-3139 E-ISSN 1542-4286
© Johns Hopkins University Press and West Chester University
2017

TRANSNATIONALISM AND ANTI-GLOBALISM
JOHANNES VOELZ
The recent resurgence of nationalism in the United States finds
expression in a whole vocabulary, made up of slogans, rallying
cries, and buzzwords. Most prominent among them may be
“Make
America Great Again” and “America First,” but there is another
buzzword—anti-globalism—which is particularly suggestive of
the
conundrum transnationalism faces in the Age of Trump. The
term
anti-globalism results from an act of rhetorical appropriation
and
resignification, and as I want to suggest, the idea of
transnationalism
plays an important role in this repackaging effort.
Anti-globalism recalls the anti-globalization movement of the
1990s and early 2000s, but this resonance brings out the
differences
rather than similarities between the two: where anti-
globalization
was concerned with a critique of the economic system, anti -
global-
ism attacks what is perceived as a larger ideology of globalism
that
allegedly promotes free trade as well as cultural and raci al
mixing.
From the view of the leftist anti-globalization movement,
globaliza-
tion was driven by the institutions that backed the Washington
Con-
sensus (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World

Bank,
and the US Treasury), global corporations that exploited the
waning
sovereignty of nation-states, and national governments that
colluded
with the forces of global capital, for instance by entering into
inter-
national free trade agreements, such as the North American Free
522 COLLEGE LITERATURE | 44.4 Fall 2017
Trade Agreement. The targets of that earlier movement were
there-
fore the profiteers and structures of economic globalization.
This economic understanding of globalization opened up a space
for alternative conceptions of globalization that could compete
with
the economic version. It is no coincidence, therefore, that it was
also
in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the academic field of
Amer-
ican Studies turned to the transnational as an emerging
paradigm.
American Studies entered its transnational phase by engaging in
profound soul-searching about the possibilities of altering the
object
of study seemingly prescribed by the field’s name (see, for
instance,
Janice Radway’s 1998 Presidential Address at the American
Studies
Association, titled “What’s in a Name?”). Although rather
diverse

manifestos appeared in quick succession, there emerged a
consensus
that sticking to the nation form was a sign of ideological
backward-
ness, whereas transcending the nation held out the potential for
pro-
gressive change. From the get-go, transnational American
Studies
aimed to transcend the nation on two different conceptual
planes:
first, on the level of methodology, where transnationalism in
essence
meant adopting a particular perspective; second, on the level of
the
object of study, where transnationalism referred to phenomena
that
went beyond the limits of the nation. This blending of method
and
object of study meant in effect that the transnational wasn’t
some-
thing one could neutrally observe, describe, and chart. Rather,
studying the transnational meant affirming the transnational.
This
is because the approval for the new method jumped over, as it
were,
to an approval of the phenomena studied. If, in other words, the
transnational perspective of scholars was greeted as the
successful
overcoming of critical parochialism, then phenomena
embodying
the transnational were themselves to be commended. This valua-
tion guided the choice of what was to be studied: Preferred
objects
included oppositional social movements that traversed national
boundaries, aesthetic forms that traveled beyond the confines of
the

nation, and ideas that circulated in similarly unbounded ways
(clearly,
this list is not meant to be comprehensive). In short,
transnational
American Studies provided the opportunity to salvage a
“globaliza-
tion from below” (to use a phrase popular with the anti -
globalization
movement), and to favorably contrast it to both nationalism and
eco-
nomic globalization (or “globalization from above”).
One of the problems faced—but rarely addressed—by propo-
nents of transnationalism emerged from this differentiation of
eco-
nomic and cultural globalization. Did the idea that these two
forms
of globalization are principally different really hold up? Didn’t
both
Johannes Voelz | CRITICAL FORUM 523
visions of globalization rely on some of the very same images:
flows
(of goods, people, ideas) as something natural, borders and
bound-
aries as artificial? Wasn’t there, in fact, a deep affinity between
the
longing for cultural transnationalism and the ideology of
economic
globalization, despite the political differences that seemed to
keep
them both neatly separated? I have argued elsewhere that
conceptu-

ally (though not politically) transnational American Studies is
indeed
indebted to economic globalization, and that it is nonetheless
advis-
able to pursue the project of transnationalism, albeit in a self-
re-
flexive manner (Voelz 2011). But rather than revisiting this
debate
at this point, suffice it to say that the question of
transnationalism’s
oppositional purity emerged from the somewhat tenuous
conceptual
framework shared by the anti-globalization movement and
transna-
tional Americanists: globalization, according to this framework,
had
an economic and a cultural aspect, which were to be seen as
opposed
to one another.
Quite some time has passed since the early 2000s. By now, aca-
demic transnationalism in American literary and cultural stud-
ies has been solidly institutionalized. Think only of the Journal
of
Transnational American Studies, the recent Cambridge
Companion to
Transnational American Literature, edited by Yogita Goyal
(2017), or
the founding of the “Obama Institute for Transnational
American
Studies” at the University of Mainz, Germany. Meanwhile, pre-
dictably, the hype that initially attended the “transnational turn”
has faded rather quickly. The anti-globalization movement, on
the
other hand, has largely run out steam, mostly because center-
left

parties across North America and Europe failed to support it;
they
embraced neoliberal reforms instead, a decision which has cost
many
of them a good share of their votes. (One could add that the
move-
ment only petered out after the demise of Occupy, or that, in
fact,
it has survived in places like Spain, where Podemos has
managed
to transform the protest against neoliberal globalization into
party
politics—but these are nuances that don’t change the big
picture.)
Along with the overall decline of anti-globalization came the
rise of
anti-globalism (itself a movement of transnational scope), and
thus
the seemingly miraculous transformation of a left-wing into a
right-
wing movement.
How in the world could that happen? In moving the critique
of globalization across the political spectrum, anti-globalists
have
rejected the foundational premise of anti-globalization and
academic
transnationalism: they refuse to differentiate between two
differ-
ent kinds of globalization, be they “from below and from
above,”

“cultural and economic,” or simply “good and bad.” As London-
based
blogger Jacob Stringer has aptly summarized it on
opendemocracy.
net: “[Anti-]Globalisation refers to certain processes in the
interests
of corporate trade. [Anti-]Globalism refers to a global outlook,
bor-
ders too open, a feared mingling of cultures, implied dangerous
liai-
sons with aliens” (March 26, 2017). Anti-globalists, in other
words,
have tied the critique of economic globalization to xenophobia,
rac-
ism, and a disdain for global elites, and have thus
conceptualized
economic and cultural globalization as hanging together.
Anti-globalists’ longing for cultural isolationism, it must be
admitted, has rendered the economic dimension of anti-
globalism
strikingly toothless. It is as if they offered cultural anti -
globalism as
a solution to the problems caused by global capitalism: their
implied
economic platform seems to be limited to the call for
protectionism
(the economic dimension of “America First!”) and the hope for
more
high-paying manufacturing jobs. In Strangers in Their Own
Land,
sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016) has recently shown
just
how deeply the Tea Party members and Trump supporters she
inter-
viewed in Louisiana are invested in the free market, and how

much
they detest the welfare state. Their critique of economic
globaliza-
tion spares multinational corporations (even if these
corporations,
like the petrochemical companies in Louisiana, ruin the
environ-
ment and cause a virtual cancer epidemic) because they are seen
as
the older siblings of small businesses run by local
entrepreneurs.
Though the anti-globalists’ mix of economic and cultural anti-
glo-
balism may be rife with logical faults and moral deficiencies,
their
triumph should not be simply dismissed as racist and
xenophobic
(though it is that, too). Instead, their rise should prompt
scholars
of transnationalism to reflect on the involvement of the idea of
the
transnational in the political struggle that divides the United
States
and, increasingly, other countries in which right-wing populism
has taken hold. In this context, it becomes newly significant
that
transnational Americanists have tended to politically identify
with
the transnational formations they study and that they have thus,
as
described earlier, conflated method and object of study. As a
result
of this conflation, academic transnationalism has come to
embody
the idea of globalism targeted by the anti-globalist agenda.

Econom-
ically, transnationalism encapsulates the privileged status of a
global
elite (here, transnationalism refers to the scholars) and
culturally, it
raises fears of migration, hybridity, and the demise of white
hege-
mony (here, transnationalism refers to the phenomena studied).
Seen in this light, the idea of globalism embodied by
transnational
Johannes Voelz | CRITICAL FORUM 525
American Studies becomes a tailor-made point of attack for
what
John Judis, in The Populist Explosion (2016), has described as
the tri-
angular scapegoating of right-wing populism. Right-wing
populism
is triangular in that it claims to defend “the people” against two
per-
ceived enemies: the elites (situated above) and undeserving
“others”
(situated below).
The challenge of anti-globalism, then, is not only that it rejects
transnationalism’s starting premise of the two kinds of
globaliza-
tion, but, more crucially, that it brings to light the degree to
which
transnationalism is itself involved in the divisive struggle
currently
rocking the United States. This challenge, I think, can be seen
as

a welcome opportunity to generate a new kind of knowledge
from
within transnational American Studies. It calls for an approach
that
is more self-reflexive than the identificatory stance taken by
many
scholars of transnationalism so far. Rather than starting from
the
presumption that studying transnational formations means
helping
to fight the good fight, transnational American Studies could
begin to
chart how the transnational itself has become a currency, or
capital,
in the struggle for symbolic advantages in a starkly divided
society.
This isn’t to devalue the study of transnational formations, but
rather to come to realize that embracing and valuing the
transna-
tional is a maneuver that helps secure symbolically
advantageous
positions. This is the case both in the academic field of
American
Studies, which has long been organized around a moral
economy of
political engagement, and in the larger public sphere of the
United
States. The idea (taken from Bourdieu) is not that we
consciously
try to amass as much symbolic capital as possible—as if we
were
rational-choice actors in the field of symbolic capital—but
instead
that trying to carve out for ourselves a recognized position in
the

field of transnational American Studies is what it means to
“have
an investment in the game” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 98).
The same goes for the other side of the divide: the embrace of
anti-globalism speaks to the specific value of the ideas and
princi-
ples captured by the term transnationalism in the broader
political
discourse of the United States. Here, too, the currency of the
idea
of transnationalism has a particular valuation. The fact that we
may
think of this value as “negative” when used by anti-globalists
begins
to suggest that taking stock of transnationalism as a currency
helps
us capture its political existence. I am suggesting, in other
words,
to incorporate a self-reflexive and relational sociology of the
trans-
national into the program of transnational American literary and
cultural studies.
One of the welcome ramifications of such an extension of
Amer-
icanist transnationalism, it seems to me, would be to overcome
the
harmful dualism of nation and trans-nation. Ultimately, this
dualism
suggests that by turning to the transnational, we will have to
learn
to stop worrying about the nation-state. But Trump’s rise to

power
should make it apparent that American Studies needs to be able
to provide explanations of what goes on inside the United
States.
The truly surprising suggestion to be taken away from the rise
of
anti-globalism is this: a self-reflexively and relationally
revamped
transnational American Studies may provide a necessary tool for
coming to terms with the nationalist resurgence.
WORKS CITED
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to
Reflexive Sociol-
ogy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goyal, Yogita, ed. 2017. The Cambridge Companion to
Transnational American
Literature. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. Strangers in their Own Land:
Anger and
Mourning on the American Right. New York: The New Press.
Judis, John. 2016. The Populist Explosion: How the Great
Recession Transformed
American and European Politics. New York: Columbia Global
Reports.
Ebook.
Radway, Janice. 1999. “What’s in a Name? Presidential Address
to the
American Studies Association, 20 November, 1998.” American
Quarterly
51.1: 1–32.

Stringer, Jacob. “Why did anti-globalisation fail and anti-
globalism suc-
ceed?” Open Democracy. March 26, 2017. Opendemocracy.net.
Last vis-
ited: May 28, 2017.
Voelz, Johannes. 2011. “Utopias of Transnationalism and the
Neoliberal
State.” In Re-Framing the Transnational Turn in American
Studies, edited
by Winfried Fluck, Donald E. Pease, and John Carlos Rowe.
Hanover,
NH: University Press of New England.
JOHANNES VOELZ is Heisenberg-Professor of American
Studies,
Democracy, and Aesthetics at Goethe-University Frankfurt,
Ger-
many. He is the author of Transcendental Resistance: The New
Amer-
icanists and Emerson’s Challenge (UP New England, 2010) and
The
Poetics of Insecurity: American Fiction and the Uses of Threat
(Cambridge
UP, forthcoming 2017).
New Political Science, Volume 26, Number 1, March 2004
From Globalism to Globalization: The Politics of
Resistance1
Benjamin Arditi

National University of Mexico (UNAM)
Abstract The assumption of this article is that the “second great
transformation”
proposed by global actors parallels the one advanced by those
who resisted laissez-faire
capitalism in the 19th century. Both dispute the unilateral
imposition of a new planetary
order and endeavor to modify the rhythm and direction of
economic processes presented
as either fact or fate. In doing so, they effectively place the
question of the political
institution of this order on the agenda. I look briefly at the
familiar underside of
globalism and then move on to develop a tentative typology of
initiatives that set the tone
for a politics of globalization. These include radical and viral
direct action, the
improvement of the terms of exchange between industrialized
and developing countries,
the expansion of the public sphere outside national borders
through global networks, the
accountability of multilateral organizations, and the
advancement of democracy at a
supranational level. Participants in these initiatives take politics
beyond the liberal-
democratic format of elections and partisan competition within
the nation-state. They
exercise an informal supranational citizenship that reclaims—
and at the same time
reformulates—the banners of social justice, solidarity, and
internationalism as part of the
public agenda.
Ever since the market ceased to be a taboo and globalization
became a dominant

cognitive framework, the Left seems to have confined itself to a
principled
commitment toward the dispossessed and a continual call for
measures to
ameliorate inequality. Outside the mainstream, globaliphobic
groups—an ex-
pression I use as shorthand to designate the naysayer as well as
Beck’s “black,”
“green,” and “red” protectionists2—offer more militant, yet
scarcely innovative
responses. They conceive globalization as a purely negative
phenomenon, little
more than old capitalism dressed in new clothes. For them,
especially the red
and black globaliphobes, the assault on sovereignty spearheaded
by govern-
ments and multilateral agencies in the name of international
trade strengthens
the hand of the business and financial community, compromises
the autonomy
of domestic political decisions, and reinforces the submissive
status of less
1 I would like to thank Toshi Knell, Eric Mamer and two
anonymous reviewers for
New Political Science for their comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
2 Ulrich Beck, What is Globalization? (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2000). For Beck, “black”
protectionists mourn the loss of national values, the “green”
variety upholds the state as
the last line of defense against the international market’s assault
on environmental values,
while the “red” ones maintain their faith in Marxism and see
globalization as yet another

example of the class struggle.
ISSN 0739-3148 print/ISSN 1469-9931 online/04/010005–18
2004 Caucus for a New Political Science
DOI: 10.1080/0739314042000185102
6 Benjamin Arditi
developed countries to the dictates of the major industrial
nations. Globali-
phobes are quite right about this, but they also think about the
phenomenon
from a reductionist perspective that confuses globalization with
what Beck calls
“globalism,” that is, “the ideology of rule by the world market,
the ideology of
neoliberalism.”3 In doing so, they neglect the range of
contending forces set into
motion by the process of globalization itself. The paradoxical
effect of this
confusion is that their diagnostic converges with that of the
neoliberal right: both
conceive globalization as a victory of liberalism, except that
each assigns
opposite values to it.
Yet the hegemony of the market and free trade is not quite the
same as the
victory of liberalism tout court. When one looks at the efforts to
recast the rules
and the institutional design of the international order that has
been emerging
from the ruins of the Berlin wall, the thesis of a liberal end of
history proves to

be somewhat premature. Globalism undermines Westphalian
sovereignty and
deepens inequality, but also has at least a potential for political
innovation as the
resistance to globalism opens the doors for an expansion of
collective action
beyond its conventional enclosure within national borders.
Notwithstanding the
unipolarity of the international order, the wide array of new
global warriors that
rally around the banner of the World Social Forum—“another
world is poss-
ible”—are assembling a politics that seeks to move the current
setting beyond
mere globalism. This intervention examines some of the
symptoms of this move.
The Underside of Globalism
Every age of great changes brings along an underside.
Nineteenth-century
industrialization unleashed a productive power on a scale
unknown before
while it simultaneously destroyed traditional communities,
virtually wiped out
the cottage industry of artisan production, and created a new
urban underclass.
Industrial society also saw the emergence of efforts to resist and
modify the
capitalist reorganization of the world. Globalization, with its
remarkable time–
space compression and its impact on our perception of
distance,4 presents us
with an underside too. It has three salient aspects: the deepening
gap between
rich and poor countries, the creation of a mobile elite and an

increasingly
confined mass, and the resurrection of more rigid and less
liberal models of
identity as a defensive reaction to the dislocations brought upon
by globalization
under the guise of globalism.
The first point has been discussed profusely.5 For the purpose
of our
3 Ibid., p. 9.
4 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences
(Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998), pp. 16ff.
5 The figures of inequality are staggering. At the end of the
19th century, the difference
in the average income of the richest and the poorest country was
9:1. Things got much
worse since then. According to the UN, the income gap between
the richest 20% and the
poorest 20% of the planet in 1960 was 30:1, while in 1997 it
jumped to 74:1. The case of
Africa is even more daunting, as the average GNP of around
US$360 per person is below
the annual service of the foreign debt. In countries like Angola
and the Ivory Coast, it is
simply not payable, for it stands at 298% and 146% of their
GNP correspondingly.
Moreover, despite our extraordinary capacity to produce food,
every 3.6 seconds some-
where on the planet someone dies of hunger or for reasons
directly derived from it. That
makes 24,000 deaths per day. In the meantime, average
international aid from develop-

From Globalism to Globalization 7
argument, it suffices to point out that one does not need to be an
orthodox
communist or a Rousseau-style egalitarian to understand that a
minimum
threshold of equality is required to shore up governance and
level the field for
participants in the public sphere. The second aspect addresses a
sociological
issue. While moral indignation in the face of human suffering is
not enough to
reorient the global patterns of development towards greater
social justice and
solidarity, the persistence of exclusion confirms the coexistence
of two worlds or
life-experiences concerning globalization. These typically show
themselves, and
converge, in one place, border crossings, and around one issue,
mobility.
Advocates of globalism extol the virtues of the free transit of
capitals, goods,
services, and people. Without it, globalization faces a real and
perhaps unsur-
passable limit. That is why the World Trade Organization
(WTO) insists on this
free passage. However, migratory controls to stop the entry of
those fleeing from
poverty or persecution multiply. The freedom of the market, say
Zincone and
Agnew, entails a schizophrenic logic—positive for capital and
negative for
labor.6 The UN reports something similar: “The collapse of

space, time and
borders may be creating a global village, but not everyone can
be a citizen. The
global professional elite now face low borders, but billions of
others find borders
as high as ever.”7 Bauman builds on this to identify a novel
socio-political
division developing in the global order. If distance has ceased
to be an obstacle
only for the rich—since for the poor it never was more than a
shackle—this
creates a new type of division between the haves and the haves
not. The former
are tourists who travel because they can and want to do so,
while the latter are
vagabonds, people who move because the world around them is
unbearable,
more of a prison than a home.8 While the vagabond is the
nightmare of the
tourist, he says, they share something in that they are both
“radicalized”
consumers—they are embarked in a continual pursuit of
satisfaction fueled by
desire rather than by the object of desire—only that the former
is a “defective”
one. Thus, they are not mutually exclusive categories, both
because tourists
might become vagabonds and because one might occupy the
position of the
tourist in some domains and of the vagabond in others.
The third salient aspect of globalization arises from the
exponential increase
in the pace of political, technological, economic, or cultural
change. Its impact is

(Footnote continued)
ment countries has dropped from 0.33% of their GNI in 1990 to
0.23% in 2001, with
Denmark topping the list at 1.08% and the US positioning itself
at the bottom with just
0.11%. See United Nations, Human Development Report 1999
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999); UN, Human Development Report 2003,
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/;
Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (London:
Penguin Books, 2002); Jan
Nederveen Pieterse, “Global Inequality: Bringing Politics Back
In,” Third World Quarterly
23:6 (2002), pp. 1023–1046; Nancy Birdsall, “Life is Unfair:
Inequality in the World,”
Foreign Policy 111 (1998), pp. 76–93; Adam Zagorin, “Seattle
Sequel,” TIME, April 17, 2000,
p. 36; http://www.thehungersite.com; Giovanna Zincone and
John Agnew, “The Second
Great Transformation: The Politics of Globalization in the
Global North,” Space and Polity
4:2 (2000), pp. 5–21; W. Bowman Cutter, Joan Spero and Laura
D’Andrea Tyson, “New
World, New Deal: A Democratic Approach to Globalization,”
Foreign Affairs 79:2 (2000),
pp. 80–98; Barry K. Gills (ed.), Globalization and the Politics
of Resistance (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
6 Zincone and Agnew, op. cit., p. 12.
7 Human Development Report 1999, p. 31.
8 Bauman, op. cit., pp. 20–24, 92–97.
8 Benjamin Arditi

undecidable. It can be lived as an opening up of possibilities for
emancipatory
projects or as a threat to identity and to the certainties of a more
familiar world.
When the latter gains the upper hand, people might turn to
aggressive forms of
nationalism, religious orthodoxy, tribalism, or messianic
leaders—none of which
are likely to enhance toleration—with the expectation of
restoring certainty. This
is not entirely new. The industrial revolution also undermined
the referents of
everyday life without offering cultural responses, at least not at
the beginning.
Marx and Engels describe the distinctive traits of the
dislocations brought upon
by capitalism in a well-known passage of the Manifesto. They
say:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted
disturbance of all social
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the
bourgeois epoch
from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their
train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new -
formed ones become
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy
is profaned.
Nationalism helped to counteract this “uninterrupted
disturbance” that un-
dermined identities and governmentality. Kahler argues that in
the 19th century,

especially after the expansion of the franchise, the emergence of
mass national-
ism had a political function, for it enabled states to forge strong
links with the
citizenry and to ensure their loyalty in an age of democracy.
Later, anticommu-
nism and the promise of economic prosperity replaced
nationalism as a political
programmed.9 Globalism has nothing comparable to offer, or
rather, as Debray
remarks, it seems to offer no other mystique than the prospect
of economic
growth.10 The latter is certainly desirable, at least if one
expects some form of
income distribution as its side effect, but it is probably not
enough to sway those
whose livelihood and identity are threatened by the rapid
reorganization of
labor markets and trade patterns. As suggested, the danger here
is the possible
appeal of projects that offer certainty at the expense of
toleration. The strong and
often violent revival of nationalism and the aggressive
affirmation of ethnic
identities illustrate an uncanny hardening of territorial and
cultural frontiers in
a global setting where the role of borders is supposed to have
waned. This is
complicated further by the rise of religious radicalism and by
the religious
coding of the global terrorism that became notorious after the
events of 9/11.
Since then, those hitherto known as freedom fighters became the
security
nightmare of the West. Much to the chagrin of those advocating
the end of

history in the aftermath of the Cold War, the enduring presence
of such
radicalism shows that the liberal world-view is not without
rivals. Interestingly,
Debray describes religious radicalism—but not religious
terrorism—as a defens-
ive response to the loss of a sense of belonging, or better still,
to the dislocation
of cultural referents in the wake of globalism. He argues that
when people feel
lost the list of “believers” usually grows. That is why he says
that sometimes
9 Miles Kahler, “The Survival of the State in European
International Relations,” in
Charles S. Maier (ed.), The Changing Boundaries of the
Political (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp. 288, 290; also Richard Falk, “The
Decline of Citizenship in the
Era of Globalization,” Meeting Point (1998),
http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/
falk_citizen.html.
10 Regis Debray, “God and the Political Planet,” New
Perspectives Quarterly 4:2 (1994),
p. 15.
religion (but we could also say “nationalism” or “ethnic
intolerance,” which are
similar in this respect) turns out to be not the opium of the
people but the
vitamin of the weak.11

Globalism therefore revolutionizes the certainties of the past
and inserts
entire populations into a more open, changing and diverse
world, often enhanc-
ing the array of options of how and where to live their lives.
Bauman’s tourists
embody this freedom of choice and movement, so dear to liber al
thought. Yet it
also reminds us of a possible trade off between these new
possibilities and the
relative security that accompanied identities in a more parochial
world. Bauman
captures this disorientation when he speaks of globalization as
the perception of
“things getting out of hand.”12 The question here is not simply
the fear of
turning into vagabonds or remaining trapped forever in that
position; it refers
instead to the demand for certainty, a desire for more rigid
codes that function
as navigational maps for living in a world in constant flux. This
is what Debray
had in mind when he described religion as a vitamin of the
weak. This vitamin,
however, is not sought by the casualties of globalism alone, but
also by the
champions of globalism who must now face the flip side of
cheap airfares, cheap
weapons, and cheap digital communications being available to
its opponents
too. In an international scene dominated by a neo-Hobbesian
concern for
security—terrorism, AIDS, drugs or immigration—the trade off
between a
rapidly changing world and the demand for certainty—both in

the center and in
the periphery of global capitalism—reinforces our suspicion
about a facile
endorsement of a liberal telos of history. It does so if only
because it reveals that
not everyone sees capitalism—which Milton Friedman famously
characterized
as a general freedom to choose—and political liberalism as
universally valid
goods, and because sometimes the very advocates of those
values easily override
them by imposing illegal tariffs on imports or by engaging in
wars of aggression
in the name of prosperity and security.
Resistances to Globalism
Yet to accept this underside as a necessary consequence of
globalization is to
submit to the naturalist fallacy of globalism, which presents the
unilateral
imposition of a world order modeled around the Washington
Consensus as our
destiny instead of as an act of political institution. Arguably,
one could say that
the war on terrorism unleashed after 9/11 reactivates its
political origin. It is the
true index of globalization, or if one prefers, an implicit
acknowledgement that
globalism seeks to hegemonize globalization but can neither
control nor exhaust
it. However, it is the disagreement with and resistance to the
current state of
things that reactivates it explicitly.
What type of resistance? Another parallel with the 19th century

can help to
clarify this. Simplifying things a bit, the range of responses of
those excluded
from the benefits of the industrial revolution oscillated between
two perspec-
tives. One was the destruction of machines advocated by the
Luddites in the
revolts of the 1810s and 1820s in the North of England —mainly
the Midlands,
Yorkshire, and Lancashire. Theirs was a mode of direct action
motivated by near
11 Ibid.
12 Bauman, Globalization: Human Consequences, p. 59.
10 Benjamin Arditi
starvation and the desperation stemming from it, but also by a
desire to restore
the working conditions of earlier times, which presupposed that
a return to the
pre-industrial economy of small-scale producers and artisans
was a viable
alternative. Marx and the International Working Men’s
Association or First
International exemplified the other position. For them there was
little or no room
for nostalgia since capitalism was here to stay, so the political
task of the day
was not to destroy machines but to organize the resistance of
the dispossessed
through trade unions and other movements. Their aim was to
transform capital-
ism from within in order to build a more just and fraternal

society. In the
celebrated opening lines of the Manifesto, their socialist and
internationalist
project was the specter haunting Europe—or rather, the
European ruling classes.
Polanyi sees the alternative in similar, yet less revolutionary
terms, as he claims
that by the 1830s “[E]ither machines had to be demolished, as
the Luddites had
tried to do, or a regular labor market had to be created. Thus
was mankind
forced into the paths of a utopian experiment.”13
Today we face a similar challenge and a new specter, one
haunting the
neoliberal efforts to reduce globalization to globalism. While
globaliphobes—in
many ways the latter-day Luddites—see globalization as the
ruse of capitalism
and call for a return to the state-centered and protectionist
policies of the past,
others have chosen to become global warriors to transform the
current state of
affairs. Like their socialist predecessors in the industrial age,
the more lucid
critics of the global condition are not against globalization or
trade per se. Just
like those who opposed Gulf War II were not always pacifists,
in the sense that
many did not pose a moral injunction to war as such but only to
a war that
lacked the moral and political legitimacy of a UN resolution,
these critics are not
necessarily opposed to globalization but rather to globalism.14
They do not stand
in awe for the momentum it has gathered nor delude themselves

about the
eventual disappearance of its negative effects either. They
partake in the global
fray to modify the course of globalization from within. Global
warriors aim to
bring about what Zincone and Agnew, in a felicitous play of
words with the title
of Polanyi’s celebrated study of industrialization, call the
political phase of the
“second great transformation.”15
We can read the latter as a move from globalism to
globalization, which
amounts to an effort to politicize economic processes currently
mystified as
either fact or fate. I propose a tentative typology of the
initiatives undertaken by
global-minded actors. It functions as a provisional guideline to
differentiate
forms of collective action that seek to modify the course of
globalization. Their
common trait is the resistance to the Washington Consensus of
the 1990s—cap-
tured in ATTAC’s slogan “The World is not for Sale”—in order
to transform
13 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and
Economic Origins of Our Time
(1944), foreword by Joseph E. Stiglitz and introduction by Fred
Block (Boston: Beacon
Press, 2001), p. 85.
14 A similar point is made by Fabio de Nardis, “From Local to
Global: Values and
Political Identity of the Young Participants in the European
Social Forum,” paper

presented at the Sixth Conference of the European Sociological
Association, Murcia,
Spain, September 23–26, 2003.
15 Zincone and Agnew, op. cit., pp. 7–8. Also Mary Kaldor,
“‘Civilizing’ Globalization?
The Implications of the ‘Battle in Seattle’,” Millennium:
Journal of International Studies 29:1
(2000), pp. 105–114.
globalism from within and below. Their actions extend the
political field—and
by implication, the scope of citizenship—beyond the enclosure
of the nation-
state. As in any classification, the boundaries between the
various groupings are
somewhat porous, as initiatives tend to overlap and to appear
conjointly. I will
distinguish six types, the first two being common to political
activism more
generally.
Radical Direct Action
The lingering perception of the anti-globalization (i.e. anti-
globalism) movement
consists of a string of cities—Seattle, Prague, Gothenburg,
Genoa—accompanied
by images of sit-ins, smashed windows, street violence, police
barricades, and
people being arrested. It also includes iconic referents like the
destruction of a

McDonald’s restaurant in France led by José Bové and the
Confédération
Paysanne to protest against the use of genetically modified
foods. This imagery
is prevalent partly because street-based politics tends to be
more salient and thus
the media picks on it as newsworthy. They are also the ones that
instill most fear
in the hearts of governments, business leaders, and multilateral
agencies more
accustomed to the logic of expert committees than to mass
mobilizations,
although at times they embarrass and even undermine the
strategic planning of
other global protesters too. That is why some might argue that
many activist
groups lack a strategic political compass. This is correct, but it
is not the full
story, as they range from strict globaliphobes to those with a
clearer agenda for
transforming globalism. Examples of those who do have such an
agenda are
those who participate in the World Social Forum of Porto
Alegre, in the more
recent European Social Forum, which gathered nearly 60,000
people when
launched in Florence in November 2002, as well in other
initiatives I will
mention shortly.16 Leading organizations associated with direct
action include
the Ruckus Society, Global Exchange, and an array of anarchist
groups like the
Black Bloc.17 One could also mention the “glocal” dimension
of resistance, like
the international support for local struggles against privatized
utility companies

in Third World countries. Here one can think of solidarity
campaigns for the
Bolivian Water Wars of 2000 against a subsidiary of Bechtel
Corporation in
Cochabamba, or for the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee set
up to resist rate
increases of privatized state utilities in South Africa.18
16 See Fabio de Nardis, “Note Marginale del Forum Sociale
Europeo,” Il Dubbio: Rivista
di Critica Sociale 3:3 (2002), http://www.ildubbio.com.
17 Jeffrey St. Clair, “Seattle Diary: It’s a Gas, Gas, Gas,” New
Left Review 238 (1999),
p. 88; also “Hans Bennett Interviews Bobo,” Alternative Press
Review 7:1 (2002), http://
www.altpr.org/apr16/blackbloc.html. The Ruckus Society
(http://ruckus.org/training/
index.html) has a training camp for direct action where
“Participants split their time
between theoretical/strategic workshops focusing on a wide
array of advanced campaign
skills and hands-on technical training in tactics for non-violent
demonstrations. The
objective of each Action camp is to provide participants with
the opportunity to share
strategies, facilitate leadership development, and build
relationships that will help to
spawn more collaboration in the form of alliance, networks, and
coalitions.”
18 For the Bechtel case, see
http://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel/index.htm. For the
Soweto and other resistances to the privatization programs
induced by the IMF and the
WB, see Paul Kingsnorth, “One No, Many Yesses: The Rise of

the New Resistance
Movement,” June 2003,
http://www.signsofthetimes.org.uk/king.html.
12 Benjamin Arditi
Advocates of direct action—who can be violent or non-violent
in their
expression of discontent with the order of things—are the
generic equivalent of
the “dangerous classes” of 19th-century conservative discourse.
Yet most move-
ments and protests have a radical wing or radical strands among
their ranks.
Luddites shunned negotiation or accommodation within the
system, and pro-
moted the destruction of machines instead of proposing an
alternative to the
brutal exploitation of early capitalism. They ultimately failed,
but theirs proved
to be a productive failure, for cotton merchants and politicians
got the message
about the perils of excessive greed. New social movements have
been perhaps
less destructive of private property, although the cathartic
dimension of destruc-
tion should not be overlooked in mass protests. Yet they also
appealed to radical
direct action to advance their cause—the antinuclear protests in
Germany during
the 1970s and the guerrilla tactics of Greenpeace are typical
examples. One can
agree or not with these “hot” actions, which are often
accompanied by more

protests and slogans than by strategic proposals, but they play
an important
role. They provide an initial momentum for resistances to
globalism and for the
globalization of resistances, and therefore contribute to give
visibility to the
political phase of the “second great transformation.” As
Wallach says, some-
times direct action helps to cut through the arrogance of the
international
bureaucracy.19 Experts of multilateral agencies often refuse to
give any serious
thought to proposals of advocacy groups or stall them in the
paper chase of
countless committees. As theorists of realpolitik have shown, a
capacity for
disruption—which is a de facto veto power—serves as a
bargaining tool, in this
case helping global warriors to get their case heard.
Viral Direct Action
The analogical model of these initiatives is the propagation of
digital viruses
over the Web: once they start to circulate, whoever created them
loses track of
how they propagate and cannot control who will get infected or
when they will
be contained. Chain letters are a less damaging example of such
dissemination.
Terrorist cells are a more threatening illustration. Viral action
coincides with
what Deleuze and Guattari designate as a “rhizome,” a mode of
organization
that lacks an “arborescent” or tree-like central structure
connecting and directing

its parts.20 A rhizome links people and individuals, and
facilitates further
links—independent initiatives generated by other groups and
individuals—
without the usual hierarchies or infrastructure of more
conventional social and
political organizations. The range of viral actions is qui te
broad. While it is not
confined to the “cool” medium of cyberspace, the latter
provides interesting
examples. Some consist of gathering funds for relief operations
or clicking on
websites like The Hunger Site (www.thehungersite.org) to
donate a cup of food,
a percentage of a mammogram, or to save a square foot of
rainforest—all of this
free of cost for those who do so. Others include organizing
independent boycotts
of firms employing child labor or sharing information and other
resources for
19 Lori Wallach, “Lori’s War,” interview with Moisés Naı́m,
Foreign Policy 118 (2000),
p. 32.
20 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus
(London: Athlone Press,
1988), pp. 3–25.
sponsoring initiatives or organizing protests. Among the latter,
one could
mention the efforts of MoveOn (www.moveon.org, which has an

e-mail list with
1.8 million members) to organize an internet protest against the
war on Iraq, or
to disseminate information …
A model of global citizenship: Antecedents
and outcomes
Stephen Reysen1 and Iva Katzarska-Miller2
1
Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University–Commerce,
Commerce, TX, USA
2
Department of Psychology, Transylvania University, Lexington,
KY, USA
A s the world becomes increasingly interconnected, exposure to
global cultures affords individualsopportunities to develop
global identities. In two studies, we examine the antecedents
and outcomes of
identifying with a superordinate identity—global citizen. Global
citizenship is defined as awareness, caring, and
embracing cultural diversity while promoting social justice and
sustainability, coupled with a sense of
responsibility to act. Prior theory and research suggest that
being aware of one’s connection with others in the
world (global awareness) and embedded in settings that value
global citizenship (normative environment) lead to
greater identification with global citizens. Furthermore, theory
and research suggest that when global citizen
identity is salient, greater identification is related to adherence
to the group’s content (i.e., prosocial values and

behaviors). Results of the present set of studies showed that
global awareness (knowledge and interconnectedness
with others) and one’s normative environment (friends and
family support global citizenship) predicted
identification with global citizens, and global citizenship
predicted prosocial values of intergroup empathy,
valuing diversity, social justice, environmental sustainability,
intergroup helping, and a felt responsibility to act
for the betterment of the world. The relationship between
antecedents (normative environment and global
awareness) and outcomes (prosocial values) was mediated by
identification with global citizens. We discuss the
relationship between the present results and other research
findings in psychology, the implications of global
citizenship for other academic domains, and future avenues of
research. Global citizenship highlights the unique
effect of taking a global perspective on a multitude of topi cs
relevant to the psychology of everyday actions,
environments, and identity.
Keywords: Global citizenship; Social identity; Normative
environment; Global awareness; Prosocial values.
A lors que le monde devient de plus en plus interconnecté,
l’exposition à des cultures globales offre auxindividus
l’opportunité de développer des identités globales. Dans deux
études, nous avons examiné les
antécédents et les conséquences de s’identifier à une identité
dominante – le citoyen global. La citoyenneté globale
est définie comme la conscience, la bienveillance et l ’adhérence
à la diversité culturelle, tout en promouvant la
justice sociale et la durabilité, joint à un sens des

responsabilités à agir. La théorie et la recherche antérieures
suggèrent que le fait d’être conscient d’être connecté aux autres
personnes dans le monde (conscience globale) et
d’être enchâssé dans des milieux qui valorisent la citoyenneté
globale (environnement normatif) amène une plus
grande identification aux citoyens globaux. De plus, la théorie
et la recherche suggèrent que lorsque l’identité de
citoyen global est saillante, une plus grande identification est
reliée à une adhérence au contenu du groupe (c.-à-d.
les valeurs et les comportements prosociaux). Les résultats des
présentes études ont montré que la conscience
globale (connaissance et interconnexion avec les autres) et
l’environnement normatif d’une personne (les amis et
les membres de la famille qui soutiennent la citoyenneté
globale) prédisaient l’identification aux citoyens globaux.
De plus, la citoyenneté globale prédisait les valeurs prosociales
de l’empathie intergroupe, de la mise en valeur de
la diversité, de la justice sociale, de la durabilité
environnementale, de l’entraide intergroupe et du sens des
responsabilités à agir pour l’amélioration du monde.
L’identification aux citoyens globaux jouait un rôle
médiateur sur la relation entre les antécédents (environnement
normatif et conscience globale) et les conséquences
(valeurs prosociales). Nous discutons de la relation entre les
présents résultats et les résultats des autres recherches
en psychologie, des implications de la citoyenneté globale pour
les autres domaines académiques et des avenues
de recherche futures. La citoyenneté globale met en lumière
l’effet unique de la prise de perspective globale sur
Correspondence should be addressed to Stephen Reysen,
Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University–Commerce,

Commerce, TX 75429, USA. (E-mail: [email protected]).
International Journal of Psychology, 2013
Vol. 48, No. 5, 858–870,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207594.2012.701749
© 2013 International Union of Psychological Science
une multitude de sujets liés à la psychologie, sur les plans des
actions quotidiennes, de l’environnement et de
l’identité.
A medida que el mundo se vuelve cada vez más interconectado,
la exposición a las culturas globales les ofrecea los individuos
oportunidades para desarrollar identidades globales. En dos
estudios examinamos los
antecedentes y consecuencias de la identificación con una
identidad supraordinal —el ciudadano global. La
ciudadanı́a global se define como la conciencia, el cuidado y la
aceptación de la diversidad cultural a la vez que se
promueve la justicia social y la sustentabilidad, emparejada con
un sentido de responsabilidad de acción. La
teorı́a e investigaciones previas sugieren que el ser consciente
de la conexión que uno tiene con otras personas del
mundo (conciencia global) y estar inserto en entornos en que se
valora la ciudadanı́a global (entorno normativo)
conduce a una mayor identificación con los ciudadanos
globales. Además, la teorı́a e investigación sugieren que
cuando la identidad del ciudadano global es destacada, la mayor
identificación se relaciona con la adhesión al
contenido del grupo (por ej., los valores y comportamientos

prosociales). Los resultados de la presente serie de
estudios mostraron que la conciencia global (el conocimiento y
la interconexión con los demás) y el propio
entorno normativo (los amigos y familia que apoyan la
ciudadanı́a global) predijeron la identificación con los
ciudadanos globales, y la ciudadanı́a global predijo los valores
prosociales de empatı́a intergrupal, valoración de
la diversidad, justicia social, sustentabilidad ambiental, ayuda
intergrupal y una sentida responsabilidad de
actuar para la mejora del mundo. La relación entre los
antecedentes (entorno normativo y conciencia global) y
los resultados (valores prosociales) estuvo mediada por la
identificación con los ciudadanos globales. Se discuten
la relación entre estos resultados y otros resultados de
investigaciones psicológicas, las implicaciones de la
ciudadanı́a global para otros ámbitos académicos y los futuros
lineamientos de investigación. La ciudadanı́a
global destaca el efecto único de adoptar una perspectiva global
frente a una multitud de temas pertinentes a la
psicologı́a de las acciones cotidianas, los entornos y la
identidad.
Spurred by globalization, the concept of global
citizenship identity has become a focus of theoriz-
ing across various disciplines (Davies, 2006;
Dower, 2002a). In psychology, with a few excep-
tions (e.g., immigration, self-construal), little
research has empirically explored the vast effects
of globalization on identity and psychological
functioning. Calls for greater attention to the
effects of cultural (Adams & Markus, 2004) and
global (Arnett, 2002) influences on everyday life
have been relatively ignored. In the present paper

we cross disciplinary boundaries to draw on
theoretical discussions of global citizenship, and
utilize a social identity perspective (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987) to add conceptual and structural
clarity to the antecedents and outcomes of taking a
globalized perspective of the world.
Clarifying the concept of global citizenship is
difficult due to the use of seemingly synonymous
terms to describe a superordinate global identity,
and the influence of theorists’ disciplinary per-
spectives in defining the construct. A multitude of
labels are used to describe inclusive forms of
citizenship, such as universal, world, postnational,
and transnational citizenship. While some theorists
use the terms interchangeably, others make clear
distinctions. For example, Golmohamad (2008)
equates global citizenship with international and
world citizenship, while Haugestad (2004) suggests
that a global citizen is concerned about social
justice, a ‘‘world citizen’’ is concerned about trade
and mobility, and an ‘‘earth citizen’’ is concerned
about the environment.
The confusion regarding global citizenship is
exacerbated as theorists draw from diverse dis-
ciplines and perspectives (e.g., political, theologi -
cal, developmental, educational) to define the
construct. For example, theorists in philosophy
may highlight morality and ethics, education
theorists may highlight global awareness, while
others may eschew the concept altogether as
idealist and untenable because there is no concrete
legal recognition of global group membership (for

a review of competing conceptions of global
identity see Delanty, 2000; Dower, 2002a). In an
effort to integrate the various disciplinary framings
and highlight the commonalities in prior discus-
sions of global citizenship, Reysen, Pierce,
Spencer, and Katzarska-Miller (2012b) reviewed
global education literature and interviews with
self-described global citizens, and indeed found
consistent themes regarding the antecedents
(global awareness, normative environment) and
values posited to be outcomes of global citizenship
(intergroup empathy, valuing diversity, social
justice, environmental sustainability, intergroup
helping, and a felt responsibility to act for the
betterment of the world).
For the purpose of the present research, we
define global citizenship, as well as the related
constructs identified by Reysen and colleagues
(2012b), by drawing from prior interdisciplinary
theoretical discussions. Global awareness is defined
MODEL OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP 859
as knowledge of the world and one’s interconnect-
edness with others (Dower, 2002a; Oxfam, 1997).
Normative environment is defined as people and
settings (e.g., friends, family, school) that are
infused with global citizen related cultural patterns
and values (Pike, 2008). Intergroup empathy is
defined as a felt connection and concern for people
outside one’s ingroup (Golmohamad, 2008;
Oxfam, 1997). Valuing diversity is defined as an
interest in and appreciation for the diverse cultures

of the world (Dower 2002b; Golmohamad, 2008).
Social justice is defined as attitudes concerning
human rights and equitable and fair treatment of
all humans (Dower, 2002a, 2002b; Heater, 2000).
Environmental sustainability is defined as the belief
that humans and nature are connected, combined
with a felt obligation to protect of the natural
environment (Heater, 2000). Intergroup helping is
defined as aid to others outside one’s group, and is
enacted through behaviors such as donating to
charity, volunteering locally, and working with
transnational organizations to help others globally
(Dower, 2002a). Responsibility to act is defined as
an acceptance of a moral duty or obligation to act
for the betterment of the world (Dower, 2002a,
2002b). In line with themes found in prior
theorizing, we adopt the definition of global
citizenship as awareness, caring, and embracing
cultural diversity while promoting social justice
and sustainability, coupled with a sense of
responsibility to act (Snider, Reysen, &
Katzarska-Miller, in press).
SOCIAL IDENTITY PERSPECTIVE
To empirically examine the antecedents and out-
comes of global citizenship, we utilize a social
identity perspective (Hogg & Smith, 2007; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Individuals feel
different levels of identification (i.e., felt connec-
tion) with social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Each group has a prototype or set of interrelated
attributes (i.e., group content), that are specific to
that group (Hogg & Smith, 2007). When a
particular group membership is salient, the more
strongly one identifies with the group the more

depersonalization and self-stereotyping occur in
line with the group’s content such as norms,
beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors (Turner et al.,
1987), and personality (Jenkins, Reysen, &
Katzarska-Miller, 2012). In effect, when an iden-
tity is salient, one’s degree of identification with
the group predicts adherence to the group’s
normative content (Hogg & Smith, 2007; Turner
et al., 1987).
EVIDENCE OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
CONTENT
Following a social identity perspective, we argue
that membership in the group ‘‘global citizen’’ is
psychological in nature. As suggested by
Golmohamad (2008), global citizenship is a mind-
set or attitude one takes. In effect, individuals
perceive themselves to be global citizens and can
feel a psychological connection with global citizens
as a group. Consequently, greater identification
with global citizens should predict endorsement of
the group content (i.e., norms, values, behaviors)
that differs from the content of other groups (e.g.,
American). To test this notion, Reysen and
colleagues (2012b) asked participants to rate
endorsement of prosocial values (e.g., intergroup
helping), and identification with global citizens,
cosmopolitans, world citizens, internatio nal citi-
zens, and humans. Global citizenship identifica-
tion predicted endorsement of intergroup
empathy, valuing diversity, environmental sustain-
ability, intergroup helping, and felt responsibility
to act, beyond identification with the other super-
ordinate categories.
Additional studies showed that global citizen-

ship identification predicted participants’ degree of
endorsement of prosocial values and related
behaviors (e.g., community service, recycling,
attending cultural events) beyond identification
with subgroup identities (e.g., nation, state,
occupation). Across the studies, global citizenship
content (i.e., prosocial values) was shown to differ
from the content of other social identities. In
effect, there is converging evidence that the content
of global citizenship is related to the prosocial
values (e.g., social justice, environmentalism)
posited in the literature, and global citizenship
identification predicts these prosocial values
beyond identification with other superordinate
and subgroup identities.
EVIDENCE OF ANTECEDENTS TO
GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
As the world has become increasingly connected,
exposure to global cultures affords individuals
opportunities to develop global identities (Norris,
2000). To examine the influence of cultural context
on global citizenship identity, Katzarska-Miller,
Reysen, Kamble, and Vithoji (in press) assessed
participants’ perception of their normative envir-
onment (i.e., friends and family express an
injunctive norm that one ought to be a global
citizen), global citizenship identification, and
860 REYSEN AND KATZARSKA-MILLER
endorsement of prosocial values in samples from

Bulgaria, India, and the United States.
Participants sampled in the US rated their
normative environment and global citizenship
identification lower than participants sampled in
the other two countries. Mediation analyses
showed that the relationship between cultural
comparisons (US vs. Bulgaria, US vs. India) and
global citizenship identification was mediated by
participants’ perception that others in their nor-
mative environment valued global citizenship (i.e.,
participants’ environment contained an injunctive
norm that prescribes being a global citizen).
Further analyses showed that global citizenship
identification mediated the relationship between
cultural comparison and social justice, intergroup
empathy and helping, and concern for the envir-
onment. In other words, one’s normative environ-
ment is a strong predictor of global citizenship
identification, and global citizenship identification
mediates the relationship between cultural setting
and prosocial values.
Global awareness represents knowledge of
global issues and one’s interconnectedness with
others. Gibson, Reysen, and Katzarska-Miller
(2011) randomly assigned participants to write
about meaningful relationships (interdependent
self-construal prime) or not (control) prior to
rating their degree of global citizenship identifica-
tion and prosocial values. Participants primed with
interdependence to others showed greater global
citizenship identification and prosocial values
compared to participants in the control condition.
The relationship between priming interdependence
(vs. no prime) and global citizenship identification
was mediated by students’ perception of their

normative environment. Furthermore, global citi-
zenship identification mediated the relationship
between the interdependence prime (vs. no prime)
and endorsement of prosocial values. In effect,
raising participants’ awareness of interconnected-
ness with others led to greater endorsement of
prosocial values through a greater connection with
global citizens.
Conversely, raising the saliency of global com-
petition (related to an independent self-construal)
can reduce identification with global citizens.
Snider and colleagues (in press) randomly assigned
college students to read and respond about
globalization leading to the job market becoming
more culturally diverse, more competitive, or did
not read a vignette. Participants in the competition
condition rated global citizenship identification,
academic motivation, valuing diversity, intergroup
helping, and willingness to protest unethical
corporations lower than participants in the
culturally diverse framing condition.
Furthermore, participants exposed to the competi-
tion vignette were more willing to reject outgroups
than those in the diversity framed condition.
Students’ degree of global citizenship identification
mediated the relationship between globalization
message framing and academic motivation, valu-
ing diversity, intergroup helping, and willingness
to protest unethical corporations.
To summarize, past research has shown that
one’s normative environment (friends, family) and
global awareness (knowledge and interconnected-
ness with others) predict global citizenship identi-

fication. Global citizenship identification is
consistently found to mediate the relationship
between normative environment and global aware-
ness, and degree of endorsement of the group’s
content (i.e., prosocial values). Therefore, there is
considerable evidence to suggest a model of global
citizenship in which normative environment and
global awareness predict global citizenship, and
global citizenship predicts endorsement of proso-
cial values.
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT RESEARCH
In the present paper we test a model of the
antecedents and outcomes of global citizenship
identity. Following past theorizing (Davies, 2006;
Dower, 2002a, 2002b; Oxfam, 1997; Pike, 2008;
Schattle, 2008) and research (Gibson et al., 2011;
Katzarska-Miller et al., in press; Reysen et al.,
2012b; Snider et al., in press) we hypothesize a
structural model of global citizenship with one’s
normative environment (i.e., close others endorse
being a global citizen) and global awareness
(knowledge and interconnectednes s with others)
predicting identification with global citizens, and
global citizenship identification predicting endor-
sement of prosocial values that represent the
group’s content (i.e., intergroup empathy, valuing
diversity, social justice, environmental sustainabil-
ity, intergroup helping, and felt responsibility to
act). In Study 1 we test the proposed structural
model, and in Study 2 we replicate the model with
a second sample of participants.
STUDY 1

The purpose of Study 1 is to test the predicted
model of global citizenship. Past theory and
research suggest that one’s normative environment
and global awareness predict greater global
citizenship identification, and identification with
global citizens predicts prosocial value outcomes.
MODEL OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP 861
In effect, global citizenship is expected to mediate
the relationship between antecedents (normative
environment and global awareness) and outcomes
(prosocial values).
Method
Participants and procedure
Undergraduate college participants (N ¼ 726,
57.6% women) completed the survey for either
course credit toward a psychology class or extra
credit in a nonpsychology class. Their mean age
was 28.90 years (SD ¼ 9.98). Participants rated
items assessing normative environment, global
awareness, global citizenship identification, inter-
group empathy, valuing diversity, social justice,
environmental sustainability, intergroup helping,
felt responsibility to act, and demographic infor-
mation. All items used a seven-point Likert-type
scale, from 1 ¼ strongly disagree to 7 ¼ strongly
agree.
Materials

Normative environment. Two items (‘‘Most
people who are important to me think that being
a global citizen is desirable,’’ ‘‘If I called myself a
global citizen most people who are important to
me would approve’’) were combined to assess the
perception that others in one’s environment believe
that people ought to identify as global citizens
(injunctive norm) (a ¼ .82).
Global awareness. Four items (‘‘I understand
how the various cultures of this world interact
socially,’’ ‘‘I am aware that my actions in my local
environment may affect people in other countries,’’
‘‘I try to stay informed of current issues that
impact international relations,’’ ‘‘I believe that I
am connected to people in other countries, and my
actions can affect them’’) were combined to form a
global awareness index (a ¼ .80).
Global citizenship identification. Two items
(‘‘I would describe myself as a global citizen,’’
‘‘I strongly identify with global citizens’’) were
adapted from prior research (see Reysen, Pierce,
Katzarska-Miller, & Nesbit, 2012a) to assess
global citizenship identification (a ¼ .89).
Intergroup empathy. Two items (‘‘I am able to
empathize with people from other countries,’’ ‘‘It
is easy for me to put myself in someone else’s shoes
regardless of what country they are from’’) were
used to assess intergroup empathy (a ¼ .76).
Valuing diversity. Two items (‘‘I would like to
join groups that emphasize getting to know people
from different countries,’’ ‘‘I am interested in
learning about the many cultures that have existed

in this world’’) were combined to assess valuing
diversity (a ¼ .91).
Social justice. Two items (‘‘Those countries that
are well off should help people in countries who
are less fortunate,’’ ‘‘Basic services such as health
care, clean water, food, and legal assistance should
be available to everyone, regardless of what
country they live in’’) were combined to assess
belief in social justice (a ¼ .74).
Environmental sustainability. Two items
(‘‘People have a responsibility to conserve natural
resources to foster a sustainable environment,’’
‘‘Natural resources should be used primarily to
provide for basic needs rather than material
wealth’’) were combined to assess belief in
environmental sustainability (a ¼ .76).
Intergroup helping. Two items (‘‘If I had the
opportunity, I would help others who are in need
regardless of their nationality,’’ ‘‘If I could, I
would dedicate my life to helping others no matter
what country they are from’’) were adapted from
past research (Katzarska-Miller et al., in press) to
assess intergroup helping (a ¼ .76).
Responsibility to act. Two items (‘‘Being
actively involved in global issues is my responsi-
bility,’’ ‘‘It is my responsibility to understand and
respect cultural differences across the globe to the
best of my abilities’’) were combined to assess felt
responsibility to act (a ¼ .78).
Results

All of the assessed variables were moderately to
strongly positively correlated with one another (see
Table 1 for means, standard deviations, and zero-
order correlations between the assessed variables).
We conducted a series of structural equation
models using AMOS 19 to examine the predicted
model’s fit, subsequent modification, and the
mediating role of global citizenship identification.
Due to the related nature of the prosocial values,
we allowed the disturbance terms for the variables
to covary. We evaluated model fit using the
normed fit index (NFI) and the comparative fit
index (CFI), for which values greater than .90 are
acceptable. Following Browne and Cudeck (1993),
862 REYSEN AND KATZARSKA-MILLER
we set the root mean square error of approxima-
tion (RMSEA) value of .08 as an acceptable level.
Items loaded well on each of the factors,
including normative environment (.83, .84), global
awareness (.49 to .91), global citizen identification
(.86, .91), intergroup empathy (.85, .74), valuing
diversity (.96, .86), social justice (.78, .76), environ-
mental sustainability (.80, .76), intergroup helping
(.78, .80), and responsibility to act (.78, .82). The
predicted model adequately fit the data, w2(146) ¼
820.24, p 5 .001; RMSEA ¼ .080, CI(075; .085),
NFI ¼ .907, CFI ¼ .922. However, examination of
the modification indices suggested allowing two
of the global awareness item errors to covary.
Following this allowance, the model difference was
significant (Dw2(1) ¼ 211.70, p 5 .001), and the fit

indices showed the model appropriately fit the data,
w2(145) ¼ 608.54, p 5 .001; RMSEA ¼ .066,
CI(.061; .072), NFI ¼ .931, CFI ¼ .946.1
As shown in Figure 1, normative environment
and global awareness were positively related (r ¼ .51,
p 5 .001). Normative environment (b ¼ .78,
p 5 .001, CI¼ .701 to .858) and global awareness
(b ¼ .20, p 5 .001, CI ¼ .104 to .287) predicted
global citizenship identification (significance
computed with bias-corrected bootstrapping with
5000 iterations, 95% confidence intervals). Global
citizenship identification predicted intergroup
empathy (b ¼ .53, p 5 .001, CI ¼ .445 to .606),
valuing diversity (b ¼ .61, p 5 .001, CI ¼ .542 to
.667), social justice (b ¼ .53, p ¼ .001, CI ¼ .439 to
.608), environmental sustainability (b ¼ .50,
p 5 .001, CI ¼ .418 to .581), intergroup helping
(b ¼ .51, p 5 .001, CI ¼ .419 to .594), and felt
responsibility to act (b ¼ .70, p 5 .001, CI ¼ .633
to 769). Using bias-corrected bootstrapping (5000
iterations), the indirect effect of normative environ-
ment and global awareness on the prosocial values
(e.g., social justice) was reliably carried by global
citizenship identification (see Table 2 for standar-
dized betas of indirect effects and 95% bias-
corrected confidence intervals; all indirect effects
were significant at p 5 .001, two-tailed).
Discussion
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine our
predicted model of global citizenship identifica-
tion. Following a small modification, the model

TABLE 1
Study 1: Correlations and means (standard deviations)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean (SD)
1. Normative environment 1.0 4.58
(1.44)
2. Global awareness .44 1.0 4.76
(1.24)
3. Global citizenship
identification
.75 .53 1.0 4.57
(1.54)
4. Intergroup empathy .34 .54 .42 1.0 4.98
(1.40)
5. Valuing diversity .47 .59 .51 .49 1.0 4.84
(1.57)
6. Social justice .39 .33 .41 .40 .44 1.0 5.62
(1.36)
7. Environmental
sustainability

.38 .36 .38 .40 .42 .63 1.0 5.63
(1.29)
8. Intergroup helping .37 .50 .39 .55 .54 .53 .47 1.0 5.54
(1.34)
9. Responsibility to act .49 .59 .56 .58 .65 .51 .54 .63 1.0 5.09
(1.44)
All correlations significant at p 5 .01. Seven-point Likert-type
scale, from 1 ¼ strongly disagree to 7 ¼ strongly agree.
1
Contact the first author for detailed model information,
including item loadings and disturbance term intercorrelations.
In
Studies 1 and 2 we also examined the reversed causal model,
with the outcomes (prosocial values) predicting antecedents
(global awareness, normative environment) through global
citizenship …

Prior to beginning work on this assignment, read the a model of gl

More Related Content

What's hot (17)

Similar to Prior to beginning work on this assignment, read the a model of gl (9)

More from DIPESH30 (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

Prior to beginning work on this assignment, read the a model of gl