Program Evaluation An Introduction 5th Edition David Royse Bruce A Thyer
Program Evaluation An Introduction 5th Edition David Royse Bruce A Thyer
Program Evaluation An Introduction 5th Edition David Royse Bruce A Thyer
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8. Program Evaluation
An Introduction
F I F T H E D I T I O N
David Royse
University of Kentucky
Bruce A. Thyer
Florida State University
Deborah K. Padgett
New York University
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Australia • Canada • Mexico • Singapore • Spain • United Kingdom • United States
10. Contents
PREFACE xi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
The Importance of Program Evaluation 1
What Is a Program? 5
Characteristics of “Good” Programs 5
Program Evaluation Defined 12
Reasons Why Programs Are Evaluated 13
Motivations for Program Evaluation 14
Overcoming the Subjective Perspective 18
Philosophical Assumptions of Program Evaluation 22
More on Positivism 26
Chapter Recap 29
Chapter 2 Ethical Issues in Program Evaluation 34
Historical Background: The Origin and Growth of
Institutional Review Boards (IRBS) 34
Ethical Guidelines 35
How Ethical Guidelines Get Operationalized 40
Research with Special Populations 43
v
11. Ethical Issues Pertaining to Diverse Cultures
and Groups 44
The Practitioner-Evaluator’s Ethical Responsibilities 47
Concluding Thoughts on Ethics and Evaluation 52
Chapter 3 Needs Assessment 55
What Is Needs Assessment? 55
Definitions of Need 57
Planning a Needs Assessment 59
Selecting a Needs Assessment Approach 61
Convergent Analysis and Multimethod Approaches 69
Thinking Creatively about Needs Assessment 72
Community Readiness 76
Chapter 4 Qualitative and Mixed Methods in Evaluation 83
Introduction 83
What Is “Qualitative Evaluation”? 83
When Is Qualitative Evaluation Useful? 84
Qualitative Methods and Evaluation of Practitioners
In Situ 86
Methods of Qualitative Evaluation 86
Managing and Organization Data 93
Data Analysis 93
Quality Control 94
Writing the Report 96
Dissemination and Advocacy 98
Examples of Qualitative Evaluations 102
Chapter 5 Formative and Process Evaluation 108
Developing a Logic Model 108
Formative Evaluation 112
Conducting a Formative Evaluation 113
Process Evaluation 116
Program Description 117
Program Monitoring 121
Becoming a Program Monitor 122
vi contents
12. Mission Statements, Goals, and Objectives 123
Writing Program Objectives 127
What Should Be Monitored? 129
Quality Assurance 132
Total Quality Management 134
Chapter Recap 137
Chapter 6 Single System Research Designs 141
What Are Single System Research Designs? 141
Selecting Outcome Measures 143
Assessing Measures Over Time 145
Needs Assessments 145
Notation and General Principles 147
Formative Evaluations 148
Quality Assurance Studies 152
Summative Evaluation Designs 154
Experimental Designs 157
External Validity 162
Inferential Statistics 165
How To Prepare Graphs 167
Ethics of Single System Research Designs 168
Chapter Recap 170
Chapter 7 Client Satisfaction 175
The Importance of Monitoring Consumer
Satisfaction 175
The Problem with Client Satisfaction Studies 177
A Sampling of Recent Client Satisfaction Studies 180
Annotations about Client Satisfaction 181
Explanations for High Ratings 183
Recommendations for Client Satisfaction Studies 184
Chapter 8 Sampling 194
Nonprobability Sampling Designs 194
Probability (Scientific) Sampling 198
Considerations in Selecting a Sample 200
contents vii
13. How Big Should the Sample Be? 201
Chapter Recap 204
Chapter 9 Group Research Designs 207
What Are Group Research Designs? 207
Starting an Outcome Evaluation 208
Outcome Evaluation Designs 210
General Principles of Group Research Designs 212
Pre-experimental Research Designs 212
Quasi-Experimental Research Designs 223
Some Threats to Internal Validity 229
Protection Against Alternative Explanations 233
Experimental Designs 234
Efficacy and Effectiveness Studies 241
What About Negative Outcome Studies? 242
A Note About the Term Experiment 245
Chapter Recap 247
Chapter 10 Cost-Effectiveness and Cost Analysis 255
Cost as an Evaluative Criterion 255
Example of a Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation 257
How to Do a Cost-Effectiveness Study 258
Whose Point of View? 260
Cost-Benefit Analysis 262
Chapter Recap 265
Chapter 11 Measurement Tools and Strategies 271
Importance of Measurement 271
Deciding What to Measure 273
Reliability 275
Locating Appropriate Instruments 285
Constructing “Good” Evaluation Instruments—
Questionnaire Design 288
Troubleshooting Questions—An Opportunity to Apply
What You’ve Learned 291
viii contents
14. Chapter 12 Illustrations of Instruments 301
Criteria for Selecting Evaluation Instruments 302
Clinical Anxiety Scale 303
CES-D Scale 305
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 307
Evaluation Self-Efficacy Scale 309
Policy Advocacy Behavior Scale 311
The Community Attitudes Toward Sex Offenders Scale
(CATSO) 314
Chapter 13 Pragmatic Issues 317
Treatment Fidelity 317
Fidelity Nightmares 321
Program Drift and the Transfer of Programs 324
Political Nature of Evaluation 325
The “Threat” of Evaluation 328
Guidelines for Evaluation in Politically Charged
Arenas 329
Culturally Sensitive Evaluation Practice 332
Final Thoughts 336
Chapter 14 Data Analysis 341
What Does It Mean to Analyze Data? 341
Data Analysis and the Computer 342
Levels of Measurement 343
Univariate Analysis 345
Bivariate Analysis 351
Multivariate Analysis 360
Myths About Statistical Significance 362
Understanding Trends 364
Using Statistics in Reports 365
Type I and Type II Errors 367
Final Thoughts 370
Chapter 15 Writing Evaluation Proposals, Reports,
and Journal Articles 373
Components of the Evaluation Proposal and Report 373
Considerations in Planning and Writing Evaluation
Reports 383
contents ix
15. Common Mistakes Made by Students in Writing
Evaluation Reports 384
Checklist for Writing and Assessing Evaluation
Reports 387
The Utilization of Evaluation Reports 387
Writing for Professional Publication 389
Index 393
x contents
16. Preface
A textbook must provide, first and foremost, information to assist the reader in bet-
ter understanding the topic. Second, it ought to provide the information in a way
that can be easily accessed and digested, and it needs to be credible. Textbooks
that have gone through multiple editions continue to improve as a result of re-
viewers’ comments and readers’ feedback, and this one is no exception. Looking
back over the efforts associated with this Fifth Edition, the old wedding custom of
“something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue” comes to
mind. We have built upon the solid foundation of previous editions, but then added
“something new.” It almost goes without saying that we have “borrowed” from
others in that we both cite and quote examples of program evaluation studies
from the literature. “Something blue” . . . well, we’re not sure about that.
Those who have used the Fourth Edition might be interested in knowing what
has changed in this new edition. Based on reviewers’ comments we have:
• Created a new chapter to explain sampling.
• Incorporated new material on designing questionnaires.
• Overhauled the chapter on qualitative evaluation. It is now “Qualitative and
Mixed Methods in Evaluation.”
• Reworked the “Formative and Process Evaluation” chapter with expanded
coverage on developing logic models.
• Added new studies and references; new Internet sources of information.
• Included new examples of measurement instruments (scales) with a macro
focus.
• Inserted new checklists and guides (such as ways to minimize and monitor for
potential fidelity problems—Chapter 13).
• Revised the chapter “Writing Evaluation Proposals, Reports, and Journal
Articles” to give it less of an academic slant. There’s new material on writing
xi
17. executive summaries and considerations in planning and writing evaluation
reports for agencies.
• Deleted the chapter on Goal Attainment Scaling.
Sometimes it is hard to know how much to “redo” and how much to leave
alone. There are always new ideas and recent studies that ought to be highlighted
as exemplars. So, some content must change to keep a text current. However, edu-
cators choose books that they have used in the past because they know and like
that content. If a book changes too much, then it may not always have the same
comfortable fit as when it was previously chosen. It is somewhat of a challenge,
then, to know what to keep and what to toss. And that is why, dear reader, you
are invited to let us know what works and what doesn’t. If there is some aspect
of program evaluation that we have missed or haven’t explained very well, then
send an e-mail and tell us what you think.
For those of you who are just discovering this book, Program Evaluation is
designed to be a primary textbook for graduate students in social work, sociology,
psychology, public administration, counseling, education, nursing, and other re-
lated disciplines. It may also be used as a supplemental textbook in research meth-
odology classes. We hope that we have written clearly enough that practitioners,
administrators, and other persons who have just acquired the responsibility for
overseeing or evaluating specific programs may find it to be a valuable resource.
Our focus is on communicating the essentials, that is, the basic tools and
knowledge necessary to conceptualize a program evaluation and carry out the tasks
associated with examining and appraising program performance. This book is
designed to help students and practitioners understand and contribute to evidence-
based practice. It is vitally important that we professionals and professionals-
in-training continually examine the effectiveness of our programs and their impact
upon our clients. This is the way improvement comes about—with benefits for
both clients and society. We hope in some small way that our book is able to pre-
pare and assist you for this important responsibility.
David Royse (droyse@uky.edu)
Bruce Thyer (bthyer@fsu.edu)
Deborah Padgett (deborah.padgett@nyu.edu)
xii preface
18. CHAPTER
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1
Introduction
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
Welcome to the field of program evaluation, that aspect of professional training
aimed at helping you to integrate research and practice skills, using the former to
enhance the latter. We recognize that relatively few practitioners in the human ser-
vices of social work, psychology, counseling, education, public administration, and
nursing will have careers devoted to scientific research. However, everyone in those
fields will be concerned with providing services to clients at some level (individuals,
families, couples, small groups, organizations, or communities), and every human
services practitioner will be intensely interested in learning whether the services pro-
vided really do help the clients they are intended to serve. Thus, even if research
may not be your cup of tea, evaluating services and programs using scientifically
credible research tools is a professional skill that you will find valuable. And apart
from possibly being involved in the design and conduct of program evaluations
yourself, you will read and critically analyze evaluation studies conducted by others
and published in disciplinary journals and books. Your ability to judge the value of
published and unpublished program evaluations is another valuable skill to en-
hance. Otherwise, how will you be able to decide what types of services are worth
providing to clients?
In the human services field, scientific research can be broadly classified into
having three main (often interrelated) purposes: to objectively describe things; to
empirically evaluate the effectiveness of services; or to validly explain things.
Descriptive research can be undertaken to better understand the characteristics or
needs of clients of a particular agency. Evaluative research helps determine whether
these needs are being met or clients’ goals attained, while explanatory studies aim at
uncovering the causes of psychosocial problems or the processes by which
1
19. interventions work (thus contributing to what is known respectively as etiological
or interventive theory).
Program evaluation can be seen as a subset of those activities labeled research,
which itself has been simply defined as “systematic procedures used in seeking
facts or principles” (Barker, 2003, p. 368). Evaluation research refers to “system-
atic investigation to determine the success of a specific program” (Barker, 2003,
p. 149). Program evaluation is a practical endeavor, not an academic exercise,
and is not primarily an attempt to build theory or necessarily to develop social sci-
ence knowledge (although it is wonderful when that happens). Tripodi (1987) has
noted, in the Encyclopedia of Social Work, that “the mission of program evalua-
tion in social work is to provide information that can be used to improve social
programs” (p. 366).
Curiously, although for many decades the singularly crucial importance of hu-
man services professionals designing and conducting program evaluations has been
widely recognized, program evaluation research remains rarely undertaken. Rosen,
Proctor, and Staudt (1999) reviewed all articles (N = 1,849) published in 13 major
social work journals from 1993 to mid-1997. Of these, only 863 (47 percent) were
research articles. Of these 863 research articles, 314 were descriptive studies, 423
were explanatory ones, and only 126 involved evaluation (e.g., outcome) studies
of some type. Overall, program evaluation articles with replicable interventions re-
presented only 3 percent of all published social work articles! Consider this fact in
light of the quotations contained in Box 1.1.
Currently then, we have the very odd situation that although many authorities
consider program evaluation to be perhaps the most valuable type of research con-
tribution one can make, such studies seem to be very rarely undertaken and pub-
lished. Instead, most empirical studies have a focus on descriptive and explanatory
research work, which, at best, may have potential implications for practice in the
human services, not the potential for direct applications that a well-crafted outcome
study would possess.
Why is it necessary to evaluate established services? Because there are always
alternative, and sometimes better, ways to solve problems. For instance, consider
an article entitled “Time-Limited Therapy in University Counseling Centers: Do
Time-Limited and Time-Unlimited Centers Differ?” (Gyorky, Royalty, & Johnson,
1994). The authors found that counseling centers with time limits had longer wait-
ing lists and served a smaller percentage of the student body than did centers with
no limits on counseling duration. Now, if you were in charge of a university
counseling center, would you want to read this article? Would it be important to
understand the authors’ methodology and sample?
As another example, take a study authored by several behavioral scientists and
social workers (Lynam et al., 1999). These authors evaluated a widely used drug
abuse prevention program (known as Project DARE) by following up (10 years
later) with over 1,000 fifth graders who had received either Project DARE (in 23
different schools) or a less structured drug education program (provided in 8 differ-
ent schools). The schools were randomly assigned to provide DARE (17 one-hour
sessions over 17 weeks, taught by police officers) or health education training
(weekly 30 to 45 minute sessions over 2 to 4 weeks, taught by health educators).
Ten years after training, there were no differences, as assessed by marijuana use,
2 chapter 1
20. variety of illicit drugs used, or self-esteem, between the kids who received Project
DARE versus the comparison health education training.
Suppose you were a school counselor and assigned the task of choosing a drug
abuse prevention program for your school to provide. Given the much higher costs
of the DARE program, relative to the less expensive (in terms of time and money)
health education training; the failure by Lynam et al. (1999) to find a superior long-
term effect of DARE; and prior evaluation studies indicating that DARE has no
long-term effect on drug use (e.g., Dukes, Ullman, & Stein, 1996), would you try
to obtain Project DARE for your school? Common sense suggests no, until such
time as DARE develops a stronger empirical research base. But should you make a
decision without looking at the studies yourself? Probably not.
Suppose you are asked to help provide mental health counseling services to
women who experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following a sexual
assault. What should you do to help these clients? An evaluation study of therapy
BOX 1.1
Opinions on the Importance of
Evaluation Research
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I appeal to you…. Measure, evaluate, estimate, appraise your results, in some form, in
any terms that rest upon something beyond faith, assertion, and “illustrative case.”
State your objectives and how far you have reached them…. Out of such evaluations
will come, I believe, better service to the client. (Cabot, 1931)
The third type of research, evaluative studies of welfare programs and the activities of
practitioners, are the most important of all. (Angell, 1954, p. 169)
[S]ocial work is not a science whose aim is to derive knowledge; it is a technology
whose aim is to apply knowledge for the purpose of control. Therefore, on the re-
search continuum social work research falls nearer to the applied end, because of its
purpose of practical knowledge. (Greenwood, 1957, p. 315)
Evaluation and client feedback are not only necessary for effective service delivery, but
are an ethical requirement of the profession. Systematic methods must be developed to
assess whether social workers are helping, harming, or doing nothing for the people
they serve. (Rosenberg & Brody, 1974, p. 349)
Social work has no more important use of research methods than assessment of the
consequences of practice and policy choices…. [S]mall scale, agency-based studies are
worthwhile if they succeed in placing interest in effectiveness at the center of agency
practice and when they create a critical alliance between practitioners and researchers.
(Mullen, 1995, pp. 282–283)
Studies are needed on the effectiveness of psychosocial intervention, including inter-
ventions previously tested under ideal controlled conditions, in real-world health care
systems. (Ell, 1996, p. 589)
Research on actual service interventions is the critical element in connecting research
to the knowledge base used by professional practitioners…. [T]he issue now is one of
developing investigations of social work intervention initiatives, studies that go be-
yond descriptions and explanatory research. (Austin, 1998, pp. 17, 43)
We need to establish a research agenda for social work…. And intervention studies
must be high in priority to such an agenda. (Rosen, Proctor, & Staudt, 1999, p. 9).
introduction 3
21. provided by social workers and psychologists conducted by Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs,
and Murdock (1992) would be relevant in helping you decide what services to
offer. Forty-five female rape victims who suffered from PTSD as a consequence of
being sexually assaulted were randomly assigned to receive cognitive-behavioral
therapy, supportive counseling, or to a wait-list condition. At three and one-half
months after treatment, the cognitive-behavioral therapies were considerably more
beneficial in helping the women overcome PTSD symptoms than supportive
counseling or the passage of time alone (wait-list condition). Moreover, a second
study with a much larger sample size (N = 96) recently replicated the finding that
cognitive-behavioral therapy was superior to no treatment (Foa et al., 1999).
Evaluation studies such as these should have a very important bearing on your
decision about choosing therapeutic services for clients. Empirical research is cer-
tainly not the only consideration in adopting treatment models, but we do view it as
an essential one. Here is one other compelling study (Weiss, Catron, Harris, &
Phung, 1999). One hundred and sixty children referred for mental health treatment
were randomly assigned to conventional child psychotherapy as provided in commu-
nity mental health clinics by clinical social workers, psychologists, or nurses or to ac-
ademic tutoring by graduate students or elementary school teachers. Psychotherapy
lasted an average of 60 sessions, while the tutoring lasted about 53 sessions, each
over about 2 years. A number of reliable and valid outcome measures assessed psy-
chopathology, adaptive functioning, and behavioral problems. The children receiving
professional psychotherapy significantly improved over the 2-year period. This is a
desirable outcome, of course, but so did the kids receiving academic tutoring, at a
much lower cost intervention. In effect, the authors concluded that traditional child
psychotherapy had no positive effects beyond those obtainable by nonprofessional
academic tutoring not focused on mental health issues. Now, suppose you are em-
ployed as an administrator at a local mental health clinic, and you are asked to
choose interventions for children referred to your program. You can spend a lot of
money on licensed mental health providers, or less money on graduate student tutors,
and expect similar results. What will you do? Well, it would take a pretty confident
administrator to announce the abandonment of agency efforts to conduct psychother-
apy for children (illustrating the potential influence of nonscientific issues into the
decision-making process). And, in fact, a well-informed administrator might wait to
see if the findings are replicated by other studies—that they were not just a fluke.
Nonetheless, studies like this one should serve as a stimulus to search the men-
tal health literature very carefully for effective alternatives to traditional child psy-
chotherapy (e.g., Christophersen & Mortweet, 2001; Hibbs & Jensen, 2005) or
perhaps to see whether other more positive studies better support the use of tradi-
tional interventions. Again, the implications are clear.
There are some examples of evaluations with positive results that can be used to
develop effective policies and programs by human service practitioners seeking guid-
ance as to what types of interventions work best. For example, a group of
Scandinavian researchers completed a systematic review of high-quality evaluation
studies examining the effects of welfare-to-work programs. Their 122-page analysis
was grounded in a review of 46 programs involving over 412,000 participants
worldwide, although most such studies were conducted in North America. These
welfare-to-work programs “… results in a slight increase in the likelihood that the
4 chapter 1
22. unemployed person will find employment, that earnings will increase and that welfare
payments will be reduced. They also reduce the likelihood that the unemployed
person will remain on long-term welfare” (see http://www.sfi.dk/sw45769.aspn,
downloaded on 28 August 2008). If you are working in the field of helping the poor
find jobs, you would be well-advised to obtain this free systematic review and to
become familiar with those approaches shown to be more effective than others.
Another systematic review on the Campbell Collaboration website found that cogni-
tive behavioral treatment is helpful to children suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder. Another review supported the positive effects of after-school parent involve-
ment at improving children’s academic performance. The websites of the Campbell
Collaboration (www.campbellcollaboration.org) and the Cochrane Collaborations
(www.cochrane.org) contain numerous sytematic reviews which represent some of
the most credible research projects ever undertaken in a wide array of domains in
the human services, including social welfare, criminal justice, education, health, and
medicine. These are exceptional resources for program evaluators to be familiar with.
We believe that previously published and credible evaluation studies should be a
major source of input into the design of an agency’s programs. Our hope is that
through reading this book, you will acquire greater skills in locating and critically
evaluating such studies, and in designing and conducting empirical evaluations of
your own practice and of the outcomes of the agency where you may be employed.
When we improve our programs and interventions by making them more effective
and efficient, all those involved with or touched by the social service delivery system
are affected. Consumers and their families may recover faster when we discover that
one approach works better than another. Armed with information from the program
evaluation, workers and managers can better treat and advocate for their clients—pos-
sibly making their own jobs more enjoyable and less frustrating. Ultimately, even tax-
payers benefit. But let us back up a bit and discuss what constitutes a program.
WHAT IS A PROGRAM?
A program is an organized collection of activities designed to reach certain objectives.
Let’s consider the two main elements of this definition in depth. Organized activities—
programs—are not a random set of actions but a series of planned actions designed to
solve some problem. If there is no problem, then there is no need for programmatic
intervention. So, programs are interventions or services that are expected to have
some kind of an impact on the program participants. Could a bereavement support
group for school-aged children be considered a program? What about a telephone hot-
line for parents? Would it be stretching things too much to describe a residential drug
treatment facility’s efforts aimed at reducing client attrition as a program?
CHARACTERISTICS OF “GOOD” PROGRAMS
Programs tend to have certain characteristics that help us identify them. First of all,
programs tend to require staffing. A residential drug treatment facility, for instance,
is going to need a lot of staff. It may even have a separate staff who run an after-
care or outpatient drug treatment program. The personnel of both programs may
occasionally be asked to speak to high school students and groups in the
introduction 5
23. community as part of the facility’s drug education program. Staff may have their
time allocated among several programs or dedicated to only one.
Second, programs usually have their own budgets. Because employing staff re-
quires financial resources, programs sometimes can be identified by their budgets.
However, some fine programs have minimal budgets because of heavy reliance on
volunteers. Stable funding is important to the success of most programs. Morale
and performance fall when employees do not get paid on a regular basis, or
when they are asked to put aside normal duties and engage in last minute fund-
raising or grant writing to get the program through several more months.
Programs started with “soft money” (grants or nonrecurring funds) often experi-
ence high rates of staff turnover until the programs secure some continuity in
funding.
Another characteristic of programs is that they have their own identity. In
short, they are visible or recognizable by the public. Big Brothers/Big Sisters is an
example of an organization with a national reputation for a single program. In
some communities, a program may be recognized by the location where it has
been housed for a number of years, or by its unique slogan, sign, letterhead, spokes-
person, or public service announcements.
When an organization has multiple programs, differences are sometimes found
in philosophy, policies or procedures, and mission, and perhaps even in the way
their corresponding staffs dress and how they account for their time. Such contrasts
make it easy to differentiate one program from another.
Within an agency, one outpatient counseling program may have the service phi-
losophy that “no one is turned away,” while another outpatient counseling pro-
gram may have a different philosophy—providing service only for those who meet
certain eligibility guidelines, such as having private insurance or being able to afford
to pay. A service philosophy may also clearly communicate how the clientele is to
be treated, for example, “We respect the dignity and worth of all those we serve in
caring for their physical, spiritual, psychological, and social well-being” or “The
customer is always right.”
Unfortunately for program evaluators, programs can be vague and hard to dis-
tinguish and define. A former governor once made a public announcement that he
was unveiling “a new program” to put state social workers in public schools. The
program, he said, should help prevent dropouts and poor achievement among stu-
dents who faced serious personal and family problems. However, the newspaper ac-
count said the program would require no additional staff or funding. In essence,
some social services employees would be placed in schools that could supply them
with office space and phones.
Did the governor’s announcement create a program? Not in this instance. It
never got off the ground. Why not? It had no name, no staff, no funding, no slogan,
no visibility. Most schools did not have surplus office space. Further, the governor
made no suggestion of any new activities or ways of tackling the problems children
and their families faced.
On the other hand, starting a bereavement support group in an elementary
school, even if volunteers contribute the leadership and the group has no budget
to speak of, could be considered a program if it has an ongoing presence and a pre-
sumed impact that could be measured. For evaluation purposes, speaking to an
6 chapter 1
24. assembly of high school students once or twice a year about drugs and alcoholism
might also be considered a program.
In the best of all possible worlds, every human services program would be
solidly established on the basis of scientifically credible evidence that had been pre-
viously published in peer-reviewed professional journals. That is, before the practi-
tioners jumped into a social problem and started “helping,” someone did serious
review and appraisal of the relevant evaluation studies that tested the usefulness of
various methods of potentially helping. If a careful search of the literature and
critical review of the existing outcome studies found that one or more models of
intervention had credible evidence of effectiveness, and these approaches were
“teachable” to the existing service providers, cost effective, and ethical, contempo-
rary standards of ethical practice would suggest that the service program be focused
around these empirically supported services as opposed to interventions lacking a
sufficient foundation in empirical research.
Now, this poses a dilemma for practitioners and administrators, namely, “What
if no empirically-based services are known to exist for a particular problem?” In that
case, one would be justified in primarily relying on the more traditional sources of
practice knowledge, namely, theory, practice wisdom, common sense, tradition, and
authority. But (and this is a big but), practitioners should only claim that no
evidence-based interventions exist after having made a thorough and up-to-date
search of the relevant practice research literature. Fortunately, evidence-based inter-
ventions are now well established for a majority of the serious conditions described
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American
Psychiatric Association, 2000), and increasingly for conditions that do not lend
themselves to the DSM system—problems such as unemployment, domestic violence,
child abuse and neglect, and troubled youth. We believe that every human services
agency should keep abreast of these developments by subscribing to relevant journals
(e.g., Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Archives of General Psychiatry,
Research on Social Work Practice) and acquiring the latest edition of professional
books that summarize the latest studies on evidence-based practice (e.g., Brownson,
Baker, Leet, & Gillespie, 2003; Drake, Herrens, & Lynde, 2005; Hibbs & Jensen,
2005; LeCroy, 2008; Nathan & Gorman, 2007; Roth & Fonagy, 2005; Seligman &
Reichenberg, 2007; Thyer & Wodarski, 2007).
The question may legitimately arise, “How much evidence is enough evidence
in order for a given intervention to be considered to have an adequate empirical
foundation?” The Task Force on Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological
Procedures (Chambless et al., 1996, p. 16) of Division 12 (Clinical Psychology) of
the American Psychological Association has promulgated one set of minimal recom-
mendations. In order for a psychosocial intervention to be considered for inclusion
in their list of empirically supported treatments, it had to meet the following criteria:
The Treatment Must Be Supported by
1. At least two good between-group design experiments demonstrating efficacy in
one or more of the following ways:
a. Superior to pill or psychological placebo or to another treatment
b. Equivalent to an already established treatment in experiments with
adequate statistical power, or
introduction 7
25. 2. A large series of single case designs (N > 9) demonstrating efficacy. These
experiments must have:
a. Used good experimental designs, and
b. Compared the intervention to another treatment, as in 1a
Among the other criteria to be applied are that experiments must be conducted
using treatment manuals (this enhances the ability to replicate interventions), the
characteristics of the clients must be clearly specified, and effects must have been
demonstrated by at least two different investigators or treatment teams. Although
these standards may seem a bit stringent to students and practitioners unaccus-
tomed to rigorous research, they are not unwarranted; and they serve as an initial
starting place to begin classifying particular interventions as evidence-based or not.
Human services professionals can employ this set of standards when selecting types
of treatment programs to provide. Over time, it is likely that these standards will be
augmented by additional criteria (e.g., “The treatment has been evaluated in real-
life clinical settings”) that will enhance their usefulness.
The human services professions are slowly moving in the direction of evidence-
based practice, which has been defined as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individuals”
(Sackett, Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 1997, p. 2). Further, it is “the integra-
tion of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values” (Sackett,
Strauss, Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 2000, p. 1). Gambrill (1999) concurs:
“It involves integrating individual practice expertise with the best available external
evidence from systematic research as well as considering the values and expectations
of clients” (p. 346). Although this statement may seem like common sense, the fact is
that at present no clear ethical or legal mandates require that human services profes-
sionals deliver evidence-based practices, where evidence-based practices are known
to be established. This could change, however, in the very near future. Clearly, it is
the direction in which the human service professions are heading (see Norcross,
Beutler, & Levant, 2006; Norcross, Hogan, & Koocher, 2008; Straus, Richardson,
Glasziou, & Haynes, 2005; Thyer, 2004, 2008b; Thyer & Wodarski, 2007).
The Role of Theory in Program Evaluation
In the best of all possible worlds, every program would also be based on a sound the-
oretical model. That is, before the helpers jumped into a social problem and started
helping, they would develop a model that would have examined the problem—how
and why it originated and what would work best to remedy the situation. A psycho-
social or other theory can be an organizing principle for each program, one that pro-
vides a consistency of effort by suggesting a standard approach derived from some
well-articulated and comprehensive social or behavioral science theory. Such a theory
may serve as a guide in conceptualizing the causes of problems and in proposed
mechanisms of action for interventions.
Take the problem of hyperactive behavior (HB). If one approaches the under-
standing and treatment of children with HB from a biological orientation, one
would focus on possible underlying disturbances in brain chemistry to explain HB,
and on the use of medications to regulate these chemical irregularities. If one sub-
scribed to a learning theory orientation, one might examine the possible role of an
8 chapter 1
26. overstimulating environment, or of peer/parental/teacher inadvertent reinforcement
for HB, as tentative causes of HB, and of environmental manipulation and positive
behavior management programs to reinforce on-task activities as an intervention.
One trained in a biopsychosocial approach might employ both approaches. There
are many theories on the causes of HB and theoretically based interventions.
Another example might be that of drinking too much alcohol (often called alco-
holism). There are also a wide array of theories as to the etiology of abusive drink-
ing, and of ways to help people drink less or to abstain from drinking. According to
the theory of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), alcoholism is caused by a biologically
based allergic reaction to ethanol, in that the smallest sip triggers an irresistable
craving to drink more, leading to a loss of control. This biological theory leads, nat-
urally, to an interventive theory, namely to abstain completely from exposure to
alcohol. Just as a person with a peanut allergy is told to avoid all consumption of
peanuts, the alcoholic is provided a program of education, interpersonal support,
and spiritual development intended to reinforce their attempts to abstain completely.
No one is ever said to “recover” from alcoholism, anymore than one is likely to
cease having a peanut allergy, according to the AA theory—people are simply in var-
ious stages of “recovery.” AA is a program of recovery clearly derived from both an
etiological and interventive theory, in this case a biological one. However, there are
certainly other theories of abusive drinking based on learning theory, genetic,
psychodynamic, and familial influences, and so forth. Each theory has its own deriv-
ative programs (e.g., antabuse medication to produce nausea upon drinking, anti-
craving drugs, behavior modification, the community-reinforcement approach to
abstinence, psychotherapy, rational recovery, family therapy, meditation, etc.).
Consider a different problem. Suppose you are hired to run a treatment program
for men who batter. Do these men fit a single profile? Is one interventive strategy all
that is needed? Saunders (1992) argues that there are three theoretically distinct
types of men who batter: those who were severely abused as children; emotionally
volatile men with rigid sex-role attitudes, who fear losing their partners and are de-
pressed, suicidal, and angry; and family-only aggressors who tend to have relatively
liberal attitudes about sex roles, the lowest rate of abuse in childhood, the most mar-
ital satisfaction, and who are generally nonassertive. Is there a possibility that some
interventions may work better with one type of abuser than with another?
Theoretical models can be important to understanding how a program should
work and where one should look for indications that a program is successful (see
Box 1.2). But all too often what passes for theory in many social service agencies
is a blend of past experience and tradition. Evaluators would have no problem
with that if the program was often successful in rehabilitating, helping, fixing, or
curing clients. But when a program is not successful much of the time, the possibil-
ity exists that even though the program was implemented as designed, the underlying
theory is flawed. Such a situation calls for new thinking and a new approach to the
problem. Theories may be able to tell us how to accomplish our goals (Conrad &
Miller, 1987), but not in every case.
Program evaluation studies should generally be considered as relatively poor
tests of the validity of theories. Take, for example, a program with a theoretically
derived intervention that is found to produce positive results with the clients—they
appear to be really benefitting from the program’s services. You might be tempted
introduction 9
27. to conclude that this means that the program’s underlying theory is thus proven to be
valid. Doing so would be making a mistake. An intervention may work quite well for
reasons completely unrelated to its underlying theoretical rationale. For example, the
early (circa 1950s) behavioral psychotherapy called systematic desensitization (SD)
was said to work because of an underlying theoretical process called reciprocal inhi-
bition (RI). Careful tests in the late 1960s and 1970s found out pretty conclusively
that while, yes, SD was moderately helpful in overcoming certain anxiety disorders
it did not work because of any processes of RI. More recently the psychotherapy
called eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR, circa 1990s) was
said to work because of underlying physiological changes in the brain created by ask-
ing the client to move their eyes back and forth in a certain pattern established by the
therapist, while thinking of traumatic events. It turns out that these so-called saccadic
eye movements are completely irrelevant to the modest improvements garnered by
EMDR, which are more plausibly attributed to mild exposure to anxiety-evoking im-
agery and to placebo factors (see Lohr, Hooke, Gist, & Tolin, 2003). Generally
speaking, the theoretical propositions that therapies and programs are based on
require evidence of their validity independent of their successful outcomes.
Negative outcomes also are problematic in terms of making inferences about
the validity of a program’s underlying theory. Say you conduct a program evalua-
tion of a theoretically based service and the outcome is negative, for example, the
clients do not improve, or, heaven forbid, get worse. Doesn’t this “prove” that the
theory the program is based on is incorrect? Not so fast. Advocates of the theory
may claim that the outcomes were negative because the treatment or service was
not really implemented correctly, or that the therapists were insufficiently trained
or supervised, the duration of treatment was too brief, the outcome measures were
insufficiently sensitive to detect the delicate but far-reaching beneficial effects of
therapy, that the follow-up period was not long enough, etc. There can be a myriad
of reasons (some genuine and some spurious) why a program may not work, and
invalidity of underlying theory is but one. We do not encourage program evaluators
to make inferences about the truth or falsity of theories based on the program’s out-
comes. In very rare cases, a really stringently designed and executed outcome study
with negative results could be seen as reflective of the underlying theory’s invalidity,
but it is much less credible to claim that a positive outcome means that the theory is
correct. Programs may work for many reasons apart from those hypothesized by
the program’s developers or conceptual grandparents.
To a certain extent, program designers and implementers are protected from
many of the problems that accompany misguided and erroneous theories when
BOX 1.2
Characteristics of “Good” Social
Service Programs
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
• Staffing • Conceptual or theoretical foundation
• Budgets • A service philosophy
• Stable funding • Systematic efforts at empirical evaluation of services
• Recognized identity • Evidence-based research foundation
10 chapter 1
28. they base programs not solely on theories alone but also on methods of practice
that have been empirically supported by research and evaluation. The best pro-
grams, those on the “cutting edge,” will be built on a firm foundation of the latest
empirical research. These programs can provide a level of confidence and knowl-
edge about what to expect in terms of success rates. These would be the programs
we would choose for ourselves if we or our families needed intervention.
Theory and programs are linked in complex ways that we will discuss at vari-
ous times throughout the book. In this chapter, we will consider the ways theory
and empirical research can influence and shape a program.
If you want to see how evaluators and researchers present an intervention in
terms of a theoretical model, review the study by Telch, Agras, Rossiter, Wilfley,
and Kenardy (1990) that examines the use of group cognitive-behavioral treatment
for nonpurging bulimia. Similarly, Jemmott and Jemmott (1991) have applied the
theory of reasoned action in order to increase the use of condoms and prevent the
spread of AIDS. Zambelli and Derosa (1992) have looked at specific group inter-
vention techniques for bereaved school-aged children that were theoretically based
and derived from four protective mechanisms identified by Rutter (1987).
You should realize, however, that many (perhaps most) human services pro-
grams are not based on any explicit theory of human behavior or any etiological
social or behavioral social science theory explaining how particular problems arise,
or even any particular interventive theory. Such “atheoretical” programs may be
based on common sense, authority, or tradition. For example, we know of one gov-
ernor who arranged for the state to provide the mother of every newborn baby a
compact disc (CD) of classical music. These CDs were duly distributed to thousands
of new mothers, costing the state hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxpayer
money. This authoritative initiative was instigated by the governor’s reading about
something supposedly called the “Mozart effect,” wherein listening to a particular
Mozart sonata resulted in college students earning higher test scores. The (vain)
hope was that mothers who were given CDs of classical music (which failed to con-
tain a recording of the particular Mozart sonata in question!) would play these
within hearing of their infants, who would grow up to be smarter. This human ser-
vices program was not based on any etiological theory about intelligence, or even
an interventive theory on how listening to classical music was supposed to improve
intelligence. It was based on authority, the governor’s mandate. Unfortunately, sub-
sequent studies failed to demonstrate the Mozart effect in test taking, and none
demonstrated any improvement in infant intelligence.
Numerous examples of such atheoretical programs can be found from policies
removing the driver’s licenses of high school dropouts to policies within child pro-
tective service programs, homeless shelters, soup kitchens, and so forth. Ask the
practitioners providing such services about their program’s social or behavioral the-
oretical orientation, and often you will be met with puzzled looks. To be sure, these
programs can be prospectively designed in accord with some theory, but in many
instances they are not. And it can be misleading to retroactively attempt to fit a the-
oretical approach to explain a particular program, because the same program could
no doubt be similarly explained by perhaps dozens of rival theories, leaving you no
closer to a valid understanding of how the program may be exerting its effects, if
any. The relationship between formal theory and research on practice outcomes is
introduction 11
29. a complex one, and Thyer (1994, 2001) addresses it more completely than is possi-
ble here.
Not to be ignored are the possible negative effects of theory in human service
programs, especially as they relate to programs and their evaluation (Thyer,
2008c). Many social programs are likely based on false theory, theories based on
invalid etiological and therapeutic propositions. So-called boot camps for juvenile
delinquents are one example. Here the theory (loosely used) is that youth who get
into trouble with the law have some sort of defect in their “character.” Certain poli-
ticians’ military experiences led them to believe that a Marine-style boot camp regi-
men could somehow correct the character of misbehaving young men (and women),
and then, upon their release from the boot camp, be restored to their home commu-
nities having become somehow “stronger” in character and better prepared to resist
the influence of evil peers. Well, the evidence is pretty clear that boot camps do not
work well at preventing recidivism in youth (see systematic review on the topic avail-
able at www.campbellcollaboration.org and MacKenzie, Bierie, & Mitchell, 2007).
Those states which support boot camps for juveniles can be seen as providing a dis-
service to kids, squandering taxpayers’ funds, and employing hundreds of staff en-
gaged in delivering useless services, not to mention diverting youth from potentially
more effective programs. The efforts expended by evaluators to appraise the out-
comes of ineffective programs can also be seen as diverted from more useful activi-
ties. These are all harmful effects of grounding social services in invalid theories.
Programs vary greatly. Some are sophisticated and others simplistic—even com-
posed of a single activity. In scale they range from a small cooperative babysitting
program for young mothers to the federal food stamp program that touches mil-
lions of lives. It is not always easy to determine whether certain activities should
be considered a program or part of the collection of activities that comprise a larger
single program. Either way, program evaluation can be undertaken as long as a de-
sired objective or outcome can be stated. Although in some agencies programs are
referred to as services, in this book the terms will be used interchangeably.
PROGRAM EVALUATION DEFINED
Program evaluation is applied research used as part of the managerial process.
Evaluations are conducted to aid those who must make administrative decisions
about human services programs. Unlike theoretical research, where scientists engage
in science for its own sake, program evaluation systematically examines human ser-
vices programs for pragmatic reasons. Decision makers may need to know if a pro-
gram accomplished its objectives, if it is worth funding again next year, or if a less
expensive program can accomplish the same results. We like the following defini-
tion provided by Grinnell and Unrau (2008, p. 553):
A form of appraisal, using valid and reliable research methods, that examines the
processes or outcomes of an organization that exists to fulfill some social need.
Program evaluation is like basic research in that both follow a logical, orderly
sequence of investigation. Both begin with a problem, a question, or a hypothesis.
Normally, there is some review of what is known about the problem, including
prior efforts and theoretical approaches (this is known as reviewing the literature).
12 chapter 1
30. A research or evaluation design (a blueprint to guide the data collection efforts) is
developed, and data are gathered and then analyzed. When thought of this way,
both research and evaluation are similar to the task-centered or problem-solving
process known to many human services professionals.
Research and evaluation differ with regard to the expected use or utility of the
data. There may be no anticipated need or demand for “pure” research, whereas an
assemblage of individuals may anxiously await the results of a program evaluation.
Also, the goal of research is to produce generalizable knowledge, while information
from a program evaluation may be applicable to only a specific program. However,
both are approached with some degree of rigor. Think of program evaluation as a
tool—a management tool that you can use to make (and to help others make) bet-
ter decisions about social and human services programs. Program evaluation helps
us to make the best use of our resources as we labor to improve the quality of life
of our clients.
Program evaluation involves making comparisons. In fact, Schalock and
Thornton (1988) have defined program evaluation as “structured comparison.”
Few programs can be evaluated without comparing them to something. Programs
in one agency may be compared to similar programs in other agencies, to past or
prior efforts, or against a stated objective; but without some form of comparison,
there can be no evaluation. A major thrust of this book is to help you find or create
(to conceptualize) bases of comparison for your own program evaluation efforts.
REASONS WHY PROGRAMS ARE EVALUATED
Quite often social and human services programs are evaluated because of a need to
be accountable to a sponsoring or funding agency, or because competition for scarce
funds requires that only one program (normally, the most effective or efficient pro-
gram) can be funded. Program evaluation is needed whenever new interventions are
being tried and it is not known whether they will be as successful as former methods,
or when there is a perception that a program could be improved—that it could be-
come more productive or better in some way. We evaluate on those occasions when
it is important to have some objective assessment or feedback about the worth of our
social and human services programs. The following scenarios illustrate some of the
occasions when program evaluations are encountered.
Scenario 1: The Required Evaluation Your agency is applying for funding
from the United Way in your community to begin a new program designed to pro-
vide counseling to men who have been prosecuted for domestic violence. You have
been asked to prepare the program proposal. As you read the instructions for pre-
paring the proposal, you notice that besides describing the project, listing its objec-
tives, pointing out its uniqueness, and stating the amount of funding that will be
required, the proposal also requires a project evaluation. At the end of the project
year, data must be presented to show that the project had a successful outcome and
an impact on the problem of domestic violence.
Scenario 2: Competition for Scarce Funds Your innovative program for
men who batter has been operating for a year. You have been able to obtain
introduction 13
31. some data that you hope will favorably influence the committee deciding the con-
tinuation of funding for your program. As you prepare your presentation, you dis-
cover that a second domestic violence project from another agency will also be
making a request to be funded. You further learn that there is only enough money
to fund one program.
Scenario 3: Evaluation of New Interventions Many more clients desire the
services of your outpatient counseling agency than you have staff to serve. At a
planning session, one of the newer staff members suggests that the agency move
from a one-on-one counseling model to a group services model. The benefits are
clear—instead of limiting each practitioner to seven or eight scheduled clients a
day, each therapist could conduct three or four group sessions a day and have con-
tact with 25 to 30 clients. In spite of being able to serve more clients, the staff is
not very supportive of this proposal, because they believe that individual counseling
is much more effective than group counseling.
Scenario 4: Evaluation for Accountability You work in a large residential
agency serving young children. Unfortunately, a child care aide was recently discov-
ered molesting one of the children. The public is in an uproar. Community leaders
are calling for the agency director and all key staff to resign. You feel that the
agency is a good one—better than other residential programs within the commu-
nity. Because the agency director knows that you are enrolled in a program evalua-
tion course at the nearby university, she calls you into her office and asks you to
find some way of objectively documenting the strengths of the agency. “Can you
show,” she asks, “that the great majority of our young people have a favorable ex-
perience here, a good impression of the agency, and that they go on to do well in
school and in life after they leave the agency?”
MOTIVATIONS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION
Why do we evaluate human services programs? Programs are evaluated basically
because administrative decisions have to be made, and it is important to know
(or to show) that our programs are “good” programs. Individual policy or deci-
sion makers may have a hypothesis about a program (e.g., the free clinic’s counsel-
ing program is highly effective). At other times, questions may be raised (e.g., is the
free clinic’s counseling program effective?). Hypotheses or questions provide the
motivation for a program evaluation. It makes no real difference whether a ques-
tion or a hypothesis serves as the catalyst for an evaluation. This can be seen in
Box 1.3.
The list in Box 1.3 could easily be made much longer. An interest in exploring
one question may lead to other areas. The evaluator may start off wanting to know
whether clients were being helped, but in the process of designing a methodology
the initial question or problem becomes modified somewhat. The evaluator may
want to know not only whether clients were helped but also whether one approach
was cheaper (more cost-effective) than another. Other questions may concern
whether improvement has been made in a certain staff’s productivity since last
year or whether the program has reached its intended target population. On some
14 chapter 1
32. occasions, administrators may want to use evaluation data to help garner public
support for human services programs. (The public is much more likely to support
tax increases for those programs perceived to be “good” than those thought to be
ineffective or poorly run.) Program evaluation can also be used in terms of market-
ing programs to the public. (As a program manager or agency director, having data
showing that 92 percent of your clientele say that they would refer their friends or
family members to your agency could be very useful information to have on hand.)
Social and human services programs have evolved to combat such social prob-
lems as drug abuse. Think for a moment of other social problems in this country.
We could begin listing such problems as:
Poverty
Substance abuse
Homelessness
Adolescent pregnancies
Unemployment
Mental illness
Child abuse
Illiteracy
Domestic violence
High infant mortality rates
Crime
Hunger
AIDS
BOX 1.3 Motivations for Program Evaluation
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
We want to show: We want to know:
1. That clients are being helped. Are clients being helped?
2. That clients are satisfied with our
services.
Are clients satisfied with the services
received?
3. That the program has an impact on
some social problem.
Has the program made any real difference?
4. That a program has worth. Does the program deserve the amount of
money spent on it?
5. That one program or approach is
better than another.
Is the new intervention better than the old?
6. That the program needs additional
staff or resources.
How do we improve this program?
7. That staff are well utilized. Do staff make efficient use of their time?
introduction 15
33. For each social problem, there are hundreds if not thousands of programs. Some of
these programs work and need to be continued; others are ineffective. If it cannot
be demonstrated that certain programs have any impact on these problems, then
further evaluative research should be undertaken to discover why the programs
were not successful. There may be very logical reasons; for example, the programs
could be poorly managed, underfunded, or poorly conceptualized or designed.
There are many other reasons. As human services professionals, we need to be just
as interested in the outcomes of national programs as we are in our local programs.
Program evaluation is not to be understood as having application only to the
agency that employs us.
Although the examples used thus far have helped us to understand the need for
program evaluation primarily at the local level, an immense need remains for pro-
gram evaluation of national expenditures and programs. For instance, an article in
Brandweek (April 1998) entitled “Drug Money” has noted that the Partnership for
a Drug-Free America and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
have embarked on an antidrug campaign costing almost $2 billion. The author of
the article, Daniel Hill, says that this enormous expenditure of money is backed
only by “flimsy” research. Two of the three studies supposedly showing the effec-
tiveness of media antidrug messages had yet to be published, and the author of the
third acknowledged that her respondents might have been saying what they thought
the researchers wanted to hear.
Several experts have pointed out that no well-controlled studies show that me-
dia campaigns are effective in changing behavior. The deputy director of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy was, according to the Hill article, unable to cite
any research supporting the contention that antidrug advertising works. Although
there is no doubt that a serious drug abuse problem exists in this country, should
billions of dollars be spent on untested interventions? Shouldn’t research support
the effectiveness of interventions (even those perceived to be harmless) before vast
sums of money are spent on them?
The example of the antidrug advertising campaign is not an out-of-the ordinary
one. According to an article in the New York Times, in the 1960s and 1970s, the
federal government invested billions of dollars on job training “without a clue
about what worked and what did not” (Passell, 1993). As a society we need to test
new ideas to combat old problems. For example, do monetary incentives to mothers on
welfare for using Norplant contraceptives significantly affect the number of children
they have? Is offering full college scholarships to low-income students who remain in
school, pass their courses, remain drug-free, and do not become pregnant or get in
trouble with the law a realistic way to combat poverty?
Evaluators, through carefully controlled studies, can determine whether spend-
ing money “up front”—for example, paying low-income, pregnant women to
attend prenatal education and care classes—saves money in the long run. There is
some indication that giving pregnant Medicaid recipients a $10 bill for each ap-
pointment they keep results in a considerable reduction in the amount of time new-
born infants stay in intensive care units (Kolata, 1994).
Whether at the local, state, or national level, program evaluation often begins
by identifying a problem. Decision makers want to distinguish programs that work
from those that do not and to know if their money is well spent. They may have
developed questions about a program because of some incident or problems
16 chapter 1
34. brought to their attention. These problems can be visible and well-recognized or
those known only to a handful of staff, administrators, or trustees.
A problem is any undesirable situation or condition. Sometimes program evalua-
tions are undertaken in order to determine the extent or magnitude of a problem or to
confirm a suspected problem. As you think about the agency where you are working or
interning, what problems come to mind? (If you do not initially think of any problems,
have you seen any recent data suggesting that the program is effective or efficient?)
There are probably as many reasons for conducting program evaluation as there
are different programs. In addition to the reasons already given, those in the helping
professions also conduct program evaluations because they have a responsibility to
improve programs. For instance, the National Association of Social Workers’ Code of
Ethics (1999) states, under ethical standard 5.02(a), “Social workers should monitor
and evaluate policies, the implementation of programs, and practice interventions.”
And social workers’ ethical responsibility to the profession is also seen in standard
5.02(b), which states: “Social workers should promote and facilitate evaluation and
research to contribute to the development of knowledge.”
We all have an ethical obligation to evaluate our practice (see Box 1.4). All
too often, we get caught up in service delivery as measured by billable hours,
home visits, numbers of phone calls, and internal audits of agency and accredita-
tion forms without systematically appraising whether all this effort produces ben-
eficial outcomes for clients. We have an ethical mandate to determine whether our
clients are being helped, whether they are any better off as a result of our inter-
ventions. Program evaluation is a major means by which we can fulfill this ethical
responsibility.
BOX 1.4
Selected Professional Association
Guidelines on the Ethical Mandate
to Evaluate Programs and Services
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Social workers should monitor and evaluate policies, the implementation of programs,
and practice interventions. Social workers should promote and facilitate evaluation and
research to contribute to the development of knowledge. Social workers should … fully
use evaluation and research evidence in their professional practice. (National
Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics, 1999, p. 20)
All school social work programs, new or long-standing, should be evaluated on an on-
going basis to determine their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and contributions to
the process of educating children. (NASW, 1992, p. 16)
Clinical social workers shall have … knowledge about and skills in using research to
evaluate the effectiveness of a service. (NASW, 1989, p. 7)
There are periodic, systematic, and effective evaluations of psychological services….
When the psychological service unit is a component of a larger organization, regular
assessment of progress in achieving goals is provided in the service delivery plan.
Such evaluation could include consideration of the effectiveness of psychological ser-
vices…. (Board of Professional Affairs, 1987, p. 8)
Monitor effectiveness. Counselors continually monitor their effectiveness as profes-
sionals and take steps to improve when necessary. (American Counseling Association,
Code of Ethics, 1999, p. 6)
introduction 17
35. OVERCOMING THE SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE
Anytime we have a choice, we find ourselves in a position where a decision must be
made between two or more alternatives. Often, informal (and perhaps even uncon-
scious) criteria guide us in making choices. Although these criteria may be more the
product of visceral reactions than of contemplation, they aid us in the making of
choices. They help us to determine such things as “good” restaurants and “good”
movies, and to rate the services of care providers (e.g., a “good” physician). In each
of these instances, good is defined subjectively and somewhat arbitrarily. For exam-
ple, my notion of the best restaurant in town may be one that specializes in Italian
food. You, on the other hand, may intensely dislike Italian cooking. My notion of a
good movie may be Texas Chainsaw Massacre, whereas your taste may run to less
violence. My notion of a good physician may be one who, although known for a
disheveled appearance, answers my every question, while your opinion of a good
physician requires that the physician dress appropriately and look distinguished.
Because appearance is important to you, you may have no confidence in a physician
who does not look the role (whether or not your questions get answered).
What does this have to do with program evaluation? Just this: every day (some-
times many times a day) human services professionals must direct people to their
programs or refer them to other programs based on their subjective impressions.
When we make referrals, we want clients to go, not to programs that are not effec-
tive, but to the “good” programs. We want them to have the best possible chance
of succeeding or doing well in that program. We have a professional responsibility
to avoid making referrals to ineffective or deficient programs. We also want the
programs we direct or that employ us to benefit our clients. But, how do we recog-
nize a good program, or a poor program?
How do we know when our programs are effective? We like to believe that we
help our clients, but what actual evidence do we have that the majority of our clients
are helped by our programs? Most helping professionals have had clients who have
made giant strides as a result of skilled intervention. We feel rewarded by these suc-
cessful clients. They help us feel that we are competent and that we have chosen the
right career. Unfortunately, there are also those clients with whom we are unsuccess-
ful. These clients, despite our best efforts, drop out of programs, make a mess of
their lives, or seem to have gained nothing from our interventions. Think of all the
clients who have made their exits from your programs. What is the proportion of
“successful” clients to “unsuccessful” clients? Are you more successful than unsuc-
cessful with your clients? What evidence could you present of your success?
We have raised these questions to help you understand that program evaluation
involves a different perspective than you may normally employ when thinking about
your clients. Clinicians and practitioners tend to evaluate their practice subjectively
and in terms of selected individual cases. They think of Mrs. Smith (with whom they
were successful), Mr. Arthur (who was a model client and who now comes back to
volunteer his services), or perhaps Kathy M., with whom they were not a success.
However, this “case focus” does not facilitate the aggregation of data at a program
level so that an overall determination can be made about the effectiveness of the pro-
gram as a whole. Although one bad apple may spoil an entire bushel, one client who
does not succeed does not mean that a whole program needs to be overhauled.
18 chapter 1
36. The difficulties with attempting evaluation using a “case focus” with a single
client can be demonstrated easily. Consider Mrs. Smith. Although you felt that you
were successful in helping Mrs. Smith to quit drinking, others may not be so quick
to shower accolades on you. Those who are skeptical of your abilities as a clinician
may point out that while Mrs. Smith may no longer drink, the rest of her family is
in turmoil. Her husband left home; a teenage daughter ran away. Mrs. Smith is
now living with another recovering alcoholic and working for minimum wage as
a waitress, although she was previously employed as a registered nurse. You reply
to these critics, “She’s not drinking. She feels good about herself. I think she’s
shown great improvement.” Although it may be possible to argue that any given
case was or was not a success, a manager needs to look at the program as a whole.
Are the clients (as an aggregate) better or worse off as a result of participating in
the program?
Consider the case of Mr. Arthur. Everyone in the agency agrees that he has
made significant changes in his life since becoming a client of your program.
However, on closer inspection, it is revealed that you spent twice as much time
with Mr. Arthur as you did with the average client. Was he a success because he
got twice as much attention? Would he have been a success if he had received
only as much time as the “average client” receives? (Did he get so much time
because he was an “easy” client to work with?)
We have already admitted that the program was not successful with Kathy M.
However, is Kathy the typical client or the unusual client? Perhaps Kathy was the
most severely disturbed client that your program has ever admitted. Given her pre-
vious history of multiple hospitalizations, perhaps no one really expected her to
make any significant gains.
We can see from these examples that our perspective as practitioners often in-
volves subjective evaluations. That is, we believe that a client has improved or not
improved. The problem with subjective evaluations is that others may not share
them. While you think of Mrs. Smith as an example of a successful client, perhaps
your best friend and coworker thinks of Mrs. Smith as something less than a suc-
cess. Although you are quite pleased that Mr. Arthur has overcome a great many of
his problems, perhaps your program director has sent you a strongly worded mem-
orandum suggesting that the program’s waiting list is such that you are not to
spend as much time with the rest of your clients. Although Kathy M. made no
progress in treatment, the same program director is not disappointed. “We learned
something,” she says. “We learned what won’t work with clients like this. Next
time, we’ll try something a little different.”
In conversation we can get away with saying things like “I did a good job with
that family,” “She’s a good therapist,” or “It’s a good program, you’ll like it there.”
However, a thesaurus lists nine different meanings for the word good as an adjec-
tive (see Box 1.5). Seldom does anyone ask how we define good. What we are
allowed to do as conversationalists we cannot do as program evaluators.
Evaluators are concerned with specificity and measurements. We want verifi-
able evidence, not someone’s opinion. It matters whether a program produces
changes in behavior, attitudes, or knowledge. Further, we might want to know
how much change was experienced by the average client, how long it was sus-
tained, and at what cost.
introduction 19
37. Subjective evaluations about the success of individual clients are very much like
the initial examples of a “good” movie and a “good” restaurant. We can expect
differences in opinion. Within most groups, if someone says, “That is not a good
restaurant!” there are sure to be others within the crowd who will disagree.
Someone else may say, “Well, it is my favorite restaurant!” or “That’s interesting.
We were just there on Wednesday and had a wonderful meal.” The problem with
subjective evaluations is that everyone is usually right. The person who had a bad ex-
perience with a restaurant probably got poor service or an improperly prepared meal.
The person who ate there on Wednesday could have just as easily not had a wonder-
ful meal. The individual who boldly proclaimed the restaurant to be his favorite res-
taurant might be quite willing to forget an occasional bad meal because he goes there
for the atmosphere, he is personal friends with the proprietor, or his girlfriend works
there. Another possibility is that he just does not have a discriminating palate.
To become evaluators, we need to adjust our perspectives so that we are able to
see beyond a single meal or a single client. We need to see the larger picture. We
need to go from a micro focus to a macro focus. What are the experiences that
most of the restaurant patrons or clients have? In a sense, we need to forget the in-
dividual and broaden our perspective to focus on the most common or frequent ex-
perience. What percent of the patrons would not return? With what percent of our
caseload are we successful? We need to look for corroborative evidence that might
convince neutral observers. (For instance, counting the number of patrons leaving
meals unfinished or leaving in the middle of a movie might substantiate rather pow-
erfully one’s own subjective experience.)
As evaluators, we want to be able to objectively conclude that this program is a
good one and that another is not—based not on personal opinion but on factual
evidence. When we go beyond our own personal experience or opinions and collect
information about the experiences that others have had, we have begun to develop
an evaluative stance—we have moved from subjectivity to objectivity.
BOX 1.5 Denotations of the Word GOOD
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Usage Example
1. Pleasant, fine I had a good meal.
2. Moral, virtuous Mother Theresa was a good person.
3. Competent, skilled She is a good worker.
4. Useful, adequate It was good that I read the book before the quiz.
5. Reliable Pat is a good source of information.
6. Kind, giving My grandmother is so good.
7. Authentic, real He makes a good point.
8. Well-behaved Rachel is such a good child.
9. Considerable There is a good deal more poverty now than
5 years ago.
20 chapter 1
38. An objective stance tends to place faith in numbers and counting. As a rough rule
of thumb, the more individuals we are able to interview, survey, or contact, the more
confidence we can place in our evaluative findings. Numbers constitute objective data.
When, for instance, 97 out of 100 clients indicate that they would recommend our
services to their friends, this constitutes objective data. Anyone examining the
responses of the 100 clients and sorting them into piles of “would recommend” and
“would not recommend” services ought to arrive at the same conclusion.
Evaluators are, in some respects, applied scientists. Scientists seek to understand and
explain the world around them. However, it is not just explanations that scientists seek,
but correct explanations. Whether we think of ourselves as program evaluators or as
applied scientists, our findings must stand independently, apart from our claims or per-
suasive oratory. Our findings should be replicable (reproducible); others must be able to
independently arrive at the same conclusions. If someone did not like or agree with the
findings from a particular program evaluation, then this person could repeat the evalua-
tion using the same methodology. Assuming that no major changes occurred within the
agency in the interim and that the original evaluation methodology was sound, findings
from the second study should be the same or very similar to those of the first study.
Objectivity demands precision. Evaluators must be precise about the program
they are evaluating, what they will be measuring, how they will collect and analyze
their data, and who they will be interviewing or observing during a given time pe-
riod. Such matters require specificity. Vagueness is rarely tolerated in research or
evaluation. Note the lack of specificity in the following: “This evaluation will deter-
mine if specialized inservice training on the use of empathy helps nurses perform
their jobs better.” Do you find it too vague? The statement is unclear because we
are left wondering: What nurses are being discussed? Has it been established that
empathy is necessary to perform their jobs? What jobs are under consideration?
What does it mean to perform better? How is empathy to be measured?
One way that evaluators become more specific and precise is by using operational
definitions. An operational definition is the way a variable or concept (such as empathy)
is to be defined and measured for the purposes of the evaluation. The evaluator may use
a standardized scale to measure level of empathy. Or the evaluator may use some sort
of behavioral measures, such as the number of times during a therapeutic session the
counselor nods affirmatively or makes supportive statements such as “I understand.”
Counselors may be operationally defined as those holding certain degrees or as all
persons who work in a certain program regardless of their educational background.
As one begins to operationally define the key concepts for a proposed evaluation or
study, often the vagueness disappears. In the case of the vague statement, “This evalua-
tion will determine if specialized inservice training on the use of empathy helps social
workers perform their jobs better,” operationally defining important concepts might
change it to: “Do social workers with higher levels of empathy place more children in
adoptive homes per year than social workers with lower levels of empathy?”
The effort to become more precise does not rule out the subjective experience in
program evaluation. Although a single “bad” subjective experience cannot consti-
tute a program evaluation, it may lead to a formal evaluation as a program man-
ager, agency director, or members of the board of directors become concerned
about whether an incident or experience reflects what is “really going on” with
the program. The program evaluator seeks to understand the “reality” or “truth”
introduction 21
39. about a program. In the process, the evaluator may collect a large number of sub-
jective opinions about the program. Objective evaluations do not rely on the opin-
ions of any one person (no matter how influential), but instead attempt to gain a
comprehensive view from the opinions of the aggregate or group.
Because the reality about a program’s performance can sometimes be painful
and have far-reaching implications (e.g., loss of funds and the corresponding laying
off of a number of an agency’s employees), program evaluators often seek the best
possible objective evidence that they can obtain (given such pragmatic constraints
as budget, time, access to clients or their records, and cooperation of the staff).
Having objective or “hard data” to guide decisions about programs is superior to
decision making without program evaluation data. By way of analogy, if you were
on trial for an offense that you did not commit, you would want your lawyer to
present as much objective evidence on your behalf as possible to assist the jury in
realizing your innocence. You probably would not feel comfortable in allowing
your attorney to hinge the entire case on the subjective testimony of a single charac-
ter witness who would testify that you were a “good” student or a “good” friend.
This emphasis on overcoming the subjective perspective is aspirational, not nec-
essary perfectly accomplished. We are all human beings with our own biases, some
of which we may be unaware of, and the introduction of this human element is
something we strive to reduce to the irreducible minimum so that our conclusions
are not significantly compromised. Good science is not a question of conducting a
“purely” objective piece of research, which, lacking perfect objectivity, is fatally
flawed and its results no better than “other ways of knowing.” A more realistic per-
spective is addressed by Gorenstein (1986, p. 589):
It makes no sense to reject the potential scientific import of a construct simply because
social values may have played some role in its formulation. The question of whether a
construct has any scientific importance is an empirical one. It has to do with whether
the construct exhibits lawful properties.
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS
OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
As a specialized form of social and behavioral science research, program evaluation is
predicated on certain philosophical assumptions pertaining to the nature of reality, and
of the design and conduct of research inquiry. Although these philosophical assump-
tions are often confused with theory, you can differentiate them by recalling that social
and behavioral science theories are explanations of problems or interventions, explana-
tions amenable to investigation via scientific research, and that theories themselves are
based on certain philosophical assumptions that are fundamentally untestable. Some of
these philosophical foundations of program evaluation are listed in Box 1.6.
Each of these points of view has occupied central controversies within philoso-
phy for hundreds of years, and in some cases, millennia. In offering them as charac-
terizing the philosophy of science undergirding program evaluation, we make no
pretense that any one of them can be considered irrefutably justified either by logic
or by empirical data. Consider them, like Euclid’s axioms, as undemonstrated prop-
ositions (although common sense would suggest that they are self-evident) that
serve as intellectual pivot points around which program evaluation efforts revolve.
22 chapter 1
40. BOX 1.6
Selected Philosophical Foundations
of Program Evaluation
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Acceptance of:
Realism—The point of view that the world has an independent or objective existence
apart from the perceptions of the observer
Determinism—The assumption that all phenomena have physical causes that are
potentially amenable to scientific investigation
Positivism—The belief that valid knowledge about the objective world can be arrived
at through scientific research
Rationalism—The belief that reason and logic are useful tools for scientific inquiry,
and that, ultimately, truthful explanations of human behavior will be rational
Empiricism—A preference to rely on evidence gathered systematically through obser-
vation or experiment, and capable of being replicated (that is, verified) by others,
using satisfactory standards of evidence
Operationalism—The assertion that it is important to develop measures of phenomena
(e.g., client problems, interventive procedures) that can be reliably replicated by others
Parsimony—A preference for the simpler of the available adequate explanations for
behavioral phenomena
Pragmatism—The view that the meaning or truth of anything resides in its conse-
quences in action
Scientific skepticism—The point of view that all claims should be considered of doubt-
ful validity, until substantiated by credible scientific data
Rejection of:
Nihilism—A doctrine that all values are baseless and that nothing is knowable or can
be communicated
Anecdotism—The belief that anecdotes prove something empirically
Metaphysics—Explanation involving supernatural, incorporeal or immaterial entities
or factors
Dualism—The view that the world consists of the two fundamental entities of mind
and matter
Reification—Attributing reality status to an abstract or hypothetical construct (e.g.,
the superego) in the absence of adequate evidence supporting the existence of that
construct
Circular Reasoning—An explanation for human behavior in which causes and effects
cannot be distinguished from each other
Scientism—The theory that the investigational methods used in the natural sciences
should be applied to answer all questions of concern to people (e.g., ethical questions,
moral questions, etc.)
Solipsism—The view that there is no proof that anything exists outside the mind
introduction 23
41. No one, for example—certainly not the authors—is capable of providing a philo-
sophically irrefutable proof that the world has a physical reality (as opposed to a
subjective construction in one’s mind). But in order to take action, some assump-
tions are necessary. Thus, for example, the distinguished social work educator
Bertha Capen Reynolds claimed “A second characteristic of scientifically oriented
social work is that it accepts the objective reality of forces outside itself with which
it must cooperate” (Reynolds, 1942, p. 24). Can this assumption of an objective
reality, known in philosophy as realism, be irrefutably shown to be true? No, but
for the purposes of attempting to improve the condition of the world we live in,
some such practical assumptions must be accepted.
We urge the reader to understand that the assumption of the validity of some
of these philosophical beliefs does not preclude accepting others, even those appar-
ently at odds with the former. For example, the assumption of realism does not dis-
avow the importance of individual clients’ perceptions of their world, or of the
meaning they ascribe to their lives and relationships. Nor does it deny that to
some extent individuals construct their own reality. But realism asserts that there
is an element to the client’s world that objectively exists, and that this is often a
very important one, in fact often the most important to program evaluators. For
example, evaluations of domestic violence interventions are more likely to concen-
trate on ascertaining whether or not acts of violence really declined or ceased, as
opposed to trying to understand a spouse’s “meaning” of what it means to be
beaten. The evaluation of a neighborhood watch crime reduction program may
look at community members’ perceptions of crime rates, but the actual rates of var-
ious crimes before and after the implementation of the neighborhood watch pro-
gram are usually seen as more important. Program evaluations usually focus on
determining objective changes in the lives of clients, not on understanding subjec-
tive processes. Of course, it is a legitimate part of science to study such subjective
processes, such as the meaning to clients of changes brought about by a program,
but such is not usually the primary focus of program evaluation. Sometimes evalu-
ation studies encompass both aspects of the impact of programs—objective and
subjective—and that can be worthwhile.
To accept determinism does not deny that many other phenomena (e.g., psycho-
social problems) exist and possess such a complex constellation of interlocking etio-
logical factors that creates an appearance of chaos or randomness at times. And it
may be that only a portion of a particular psychosocial phenomena is “determined”
in a scientific sense. If so, then it is the task of scientific inquiry and of program
evaluation to fully explore the limits of this determinism, even if it yields an under-
standing less than 100 percent complete. A “Program of Assertive Community
Treatment” that helps reduce psychiatric rehospitalization by 30 percent among the
chronically mentally ill is not a failure because it is not 100 percent effective. Clearly,
a 30 percent reduction leaves much to be understood and plenty of room for addi-
tional improvements. But 30 percent is 30 percent better than where the clients were
previously. To be a positivist is not to assert that certain knowledge in a particular
area currently exists, but rather to claim that it is a good idea to strive for such
knowledge through scientific methods because this will result in ever closer approx-
imations to truth. Although one may be an empiricist, this need not deny the role of
common sense, intuition, authority, and tradition as potentially valuable sources of
knowledge.
24 chapter 1
42. Rationalism contends that factual explanations for psychosocial phenomena can
be arrived at via logic—armchair reasoning if you will. Unfortunately, rationalism can
also lead to errors. Thus, rationalism and logical thinking are seen as components of
ultimately truthful explanations (e.g., being able to explain logically why a program
works), but these conclusions must be evaluated using empirical tests, as these are
the best means of sorting out truth from fiction.
Parsimony in theory is nothing new. Clinicians are taught, for example, to exclude
organic factors as possible causes of a client’s depression prior to implementing an in-
tervention based on a presumptive psychodynamic etiology. Similarly, a theoretical ex-
planation that uses fewer unverified factors is generally preferred over one that invokes
more complex accounts. Consider, for instance, that for many years homosexuality
was associated with severe psychopathology. Why? Well, many homosexuals sought
treatment from psychiatrists and other mental health professionals. Thus, they ap-
peared to have greater pathology than the general population. Was the assumption
correct? One possibility was that homosexuality was associated with mental disorder.
The second possibility was that this conclusion was only a distortion caused by a selec-
tion bias (those seeking treatment for mental and emotional problems were not repre-
sentative of all gays and lesbians). Parsimony suggested that careful attention be given
to the latter explanation prior to accepting the former; and indeed, studies have found
that gays and lesbians are no more or less mentally disordered than heterosexuals.
Certainly not all parsimonious explanations possess greater validity than more
complex reasons. After all, many psychosocial problems are really very complex.
Parsimony simply cautions us to rule out or entertain potentially simpler accounts
prior to accepting more involved ones.
Pragmatism, although commonly seen as synonymous with practicality, has a
more in-depth meaning involving the consequences of some program. According
to pragmatism, the “meaning” of a child abuse prevention program resides in the
numbers of children who are not exposed to abuse as a result of that program.
A job-finding program’s real meaning is based on the number of clients successfully
placed in good jobs. A program or intervention that fails to produce any changes
can be said, in a pragmatic sense, to be a meaningless program. The meaning of a
program is not how clients or service providers view the service, but stems from the
practical, positive results obtained because of involvement with it. Pragmatism does
not exclude other (perhaps more subjectivist) interpretations of what a program
may mean to individuals; but for the purposes of program evaluation and practice
in the human services, it refers to the practical outcomes of an intervention. And
that, after all, is what program evaluation is aimed at finding out.
Scientific skepticism is the profession’s shield against the premature adoption of
unsupported claims. The burden of proof lays at the feet of the person making an
unusual claim. “Facilitated communication helps kids with an autistic disorder
communicate.” “Neurolinguistic programming is an effective treatment for phobias.”
“Primal scream therapy helps people who are depressed.” It is not difficult for the
reader to encounter such claims every day. Scientific skepticism is the modest request
that such assertions be supported with credible evidence prior to being accepted or
widely adopted in practice. The burden of proof is not on the skeptic to show that
these things do not work—it rests with the proponents to demonstrate that they do.
Unlike the doctrine of nihilism, a point of view fatal to the spirit of scientific inquiry,
skepticism is a tempered perspective. It does not deny the possibility that genuinely
introduction 25
43. truthful explanations can be obtained; skepticism requires only that appropriate
proofs be provided for positive assertions. Whenever a human services professional en-
counters a proposal to fund a new program, it is always a good idea (scientifically, if
not politically) to ask “Where are the data to support this approach?”
We like the idea of using the national census to illustrate these principles. At a
given point in time, one number represents how many persons live in the United
States (realism). The census is designed to try and capture this mythic number as
closely as possible (positivism). The scientific methods used by the Bureau of the
Census attempt to use empirical and operationalized methods to obtain data from
U.S. residents. This is certainly not a perfect approach to trying to gain an accurate
census—minorities of color, undocumented aliens, and other marginalized persons
(e.g., the homeless) are undercounted. However, no reasonable alternative method-
ologies outside of conventional scientific inquiry can be employed for this purpose.
We cannot simply ask some noted authority, “Excuse me, Mr. President, how many
people are there in the United States at this moment?” Our intuition or even per-
sonal practice experience cannot help, and it is extremely unlikely that divine reve-
lation will lend a hand. Similarly, it can be assumed that certain outcomes follow
clients’ experiences with a particular human services program, and it is the task of
the program evaluator to best ascertain what these outcomes may be. Cumbersome
and imperfect though they may sometimes be, there is no substitute for systematic,
empirically oriented efforts at evaluation guided by the methods and philosophy of
mainstream science, which, parenthetically, can embrace both quantitative and
qualitative research approaches.
Lastly, the notion of what might be called anecdotism—the belief that anec-
dotes prove something empirically—needs to be addressed. Personal experiences
and accounts can create very powerful belief systems that may yield true conclu-
sions in a situation or for a particular individual. Someone who is mugged by a
bearded bandit may justifiably be afraid of this fellow the next time he is encoun-
tered; however, to generalize that fear to all bearded individuals would be unfortu-
nate. The problem with anecdotes is that their “truth” may not generalize.
At the same time, the personal experiences of clients and staff with a program
are important to the program evaluator. We want to know about the problems en-
countered and the good things that resulted. These experiences may become part of
a qualitative evaluation or aggregated into more of a quantitative evaluation.
However, we should not assume that an individual anecdote (or even several of
them) constitutes a philosophical foundation for program evaluation. Although a
single event (e.g., death of a client) may trigger an evaluation, that event does not
provide a worldview guiding all inquiry as do the positions previously discussed (sci-
entific skepticism, pragmatism, and so on). Science does not reject anecdotes as false,
or claim that all are false, but merely asserts that as evidence they provide a low level
of proof and that they are most meaningful when augmented by more robust stan-
dards of evidence. It has been justifiably said that the plural of anecdote is not data.
MORE ON POSITIVISM
Much discussion has been expended in the program evaluation literatures over the
meaning of the term positivism, and of its value as a foundation for inquiry in the
human services (Bolland & Atherton, 2002; Smith, 2002; Thyer, 1993, 2008b, 2008c).
26 chapter 1
44. Keep in mind that from its inception, professional social work accepted the doctrine
of positivism, established in the early part of the 1800s by the French philosopher
and scientist Auguste Comte. Comte is said to have established the discipline of soci-
ology, which he originally called social physics, based on his contention that human
behavior could be studied using the same tools and principles that science used to
study natural phenomena:
The word positive came from ponere and had been employed since the fourteenth
century to mean laid down. In the sixteenth century, it began to refer to knowledge
that was based on facts and was thus reasonably certain. Eighteenth century thinkers
used the word positive to oppose the metaphysical. (Pickering, 1993, p. 65)
According to Comte, “Unlike theological beliefs, scientific truths could be
proved if necessary…. [S]cientific truths were always provisional because they could
be proved wrong at any time” (Pickering, 1993, p. 171). Despite its name, positiv-
ism took a provisional approach to the development of knowledge, with Comte
noting in 1825 that “Scientific laws were only hypotheses constructed by man
with external materials and confirmed by observation; they amounted to no more
than approximations of a reality that could never be rigorously understood”
(Pickering, 1993, p. 294).
From its inception, positivism was concerned not just with studying human
phenomena, but also with improving the human condition. “Social science was
not … just an intellectual mixture of history, the physical sciences, physiology, and
political economy. It had a practical vocation: to regenerate society…. Although
Comte admitted that we could never fully know external reality, he assumed that
scientific theories were getting closer to representing it exactly” (Pickering, 1993,
pp. 294, 296, italics added). Positivism came to exert an enormous influence on sci-
ence, on the emerging social sciences, and in social welfare in particular. In the
United States, the American Social Science Association (ASSA) was established in
1865, and set forth as its mandate:
Social science was understood by (ASSA) members to refer to the whole realm of
problematical relationships in human affairs. One became a social scientist “by
contributing to the store of esoteric knowledge and practical expertises … a new way to
care for the insane or to administer charity—all of these were equally valuable
contributions to social science.” (Haskell, 1997, pp. 97–98, italics added)
This Association proposes to afford to all persons interested in human improvement,
an opportunity to consider social economics as a whole…. They are to collect all
facts, diffuse all knowledge, and stimulate all inquiry, which have a bearing on social
welfare. (Haskell, 1997, p. 102, italics added)
From the ASSA emerged, in 1879, the Conference on Charities, transformed in
1884 into the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (NCCC). In 1917
the NCCC became the National Conference on Social Work, transformed again
into the National Conference on Social Welfare in 1957, which in turn dissolved
in the mid-1980s. A paper presented at the 1889 meeting of the NCCC was titled
“Scientific Charity” and an article appearing in an 1894 issue of the influential
journal The Charities Review was titled “A Scientific Basis for Charity.” Such early
works were a part of the movement called scientific charity (or scientific philan-
thropy), which had its own origins in the 1870s, again based on the fundamental
assumptions of positivism.
introduction 27
45. The distinguished social work educator Frank Bruno (1964) provided this
overview of a National Conference on Charities meeting of the late 1800s:
Most of the leaders of the Conference accepted the implications of a scientific approach
to social work problems. They acted on the tacit assumption that human ills—sickness,
insanity, crime, poverty—could be subjected to study and methods of treatment, and
that a theory of prevention could be formulated as well…. This attitude raised these
problems out of the realm of mysticism into that of a science…. As a result of the
adoption of this scientific attitude, Conference speakers and programs looked toward
progress, not backward toward a golden age. They believed in the future; that it was
possible, by patient, careful study and experimentation, to create a society much better
than the one they lived in. (pp. 26–27)
And about 30 years earlier Bruno (1936) had provided his own congruent perspec-
tive on the integration of science and social work:
Social work holds as its primary axiom that knowledge of human behavior can be
acquired and interpreted by the senses and that inferences drawn from such knowledge
can be tested by the principles of logic. The difference between the social work of the
present and all of the preceding ages is the assumption that human behavior can be
understood and is determined by causes which can be explained. We may not at present
have a mastery of the methods of understanding behavior, but any scientific approach
to behavior presupposed that it is not in its nature incomprehensible by sensory per-
ceptions and inference therefrom. It follows from such a theory that understanding is
the first step in the direction of control and that the various forms of human misery are
susceptible not only of amelioration, which our predecessors attempted, but also of
prevention or even of elimination, when once thir nature is understood. (pp. 192–193)
Both of the above statements, dated though they may be, could be said to charac-
terize the mainstream contemporary perspective adhered to by science in general,
and by program evaluation in particular. A more recent synopsis of positivism was
put forth by Glashow (1989, p. 24E):
We believe that the world is knowable, that there are simple rules governing the be-
havior of matter and the evolution of the universe. We affirm that there are eternal,
objective, extra historical, socially neural, external and universal truths and that the
assemblage of these truths is what we call … science. Natural laws can be discovered
that are universal, invariable, inviolate, genderless and verifiable. They may be found
by men or women …
You will encounter the term positivism in your academic studies, and in the
program evaluation literature. Keep in mind the relatively simple premise behind
it: “A paradigm introduced by Auguste Comte, which held that social behavior
could be studied and understood in a rational, scientific manner—in contrast to ex-
planations based on religion or superstition” (Rubin & Babbie, 2008, p. 642).
Positivism is an approach, not intended to represent accomplished facts about hu-
man behavior. As Todd noted back in 1920 “Science does not claim to have com-
plete knowledge for the world or to have established perfect order out of chaos in
this world. It is less an accomplished fact than an attitude” (p. 71). Nor does positiv-
ism deny the potential utility of other nonscientific approaches to knowledge develop-
ment in social work—tradition, values and ethics, religion, mysticism; all may have
a valuable contributing role to our field. Asserting that one approach (called A) is
28 chapter 1
46. useful, is not to say that B is valueless. Positivism does make strong claims regarding
the value of scientific approaches to knowledge development in general and program
evaluation in particular. Some may even claim it makes the strongest claims. What
is important is the development of reliable and valid information, and this can be
approached through many methods, including positivistic ones.
CHAPTER RECAP
Whether you are a direct service worker, program director, or an agency adminis-
trator, you want the agency that employs you to be well managed and responsive to
the needs of clients and community. How does an agency become a well-managed
agency? One essential way is the evaluation of its efforts, where problems are iden-
tified and corrective action taken.
What is essential to learn about program evaluation? Besides understanding the
purpose of program evaluations and some of the various reasons why they are con-
ducted, you need to know the difference between a subjectively held opinion and
one that is derived from objective data. This book will help you develop ways of
identifying, collecting, and using data that will allow you to be as objective as pos-
sible when evaluating programs in the social and human services. Objective data
are seen as having greater credibility and as providing better information for the
decisions that face program managers. Evaluators use operational definitions to
obtain objective data that can be replicated if necessary. Theoretical models suggest
not only what interventions might work, but also where to find the changes that
have resulted.
Questions for Class Discussion
1. Make a list of five or six human services programs with which you or members
of the class are familiar. In another column, list what is known about how well
each program does its job. For example, what is its success rate? Other than
subjective feelings about these programs, what is known about how “good”
these programs are? In a third column, make a list of questions that you would
like to have answered about each program.
2. Evaluators must operationally define what will be recognized as “success” or
a “successful outcome.” Try your hand at operationally defining “success”
for several of the programs you listed in question 1.
3. For the human services programs you listed in question 1, discuss your ideas
about theoretical orientations on which the interventions might be based.
4. Discuss your experiences with program evaluation in your job or field
practicum.
5. What are the characteristics of a “good” television program? Make a list of all the
subjective opinions held by the class members about a “good” television program.
How could you objectively determine if a television program is “good”?
6. Why is it necessary to develop operational definitions about such things as what
constitutes recidivism or a successful client outcome? Use specific examples.
7. Pick one of the philosophical assumptions undergirding program evaluation
described in Box 1.6 and defend it as a useful orientation for empirical research.
introduction 29
47. Pick another assumption and present some reasoned arguments as to why you
do not think it to be a valid perspective.
8. Assume that the ‘perfect’ program evaluation has been conducted (sadly it has
not) and it found that participation in Alcoholic’s Anonymous leads to sobriety.
Discuss what implications this has for the theory underlying AA.
Mini-Projects: Experiencing Evaluation Firsthand
1. Choose a product (e.g., coffeemakers, DVD players, televisions, microwave
ovens), and develop a set of objective standards that could help consumers select
a model of superior performance and avoid the inferior models. Once you have
finished, consult back issues of Consumer Reports to see how the standards you
used compare with those used by the Consumer Products Testing Union.
2. What would you request in the way of an evaluation if you were in a position to
require evaluation of a national program? Select a national program, and iden-
tify what information would be needed in order for an unbiased panel of experts
to conclude that the program was successful.
3. Find an example of a program evaluation study published in a professional
journal. We suggest that you learn to use the online database called PsycINFO,
which is likely available via your local university library, to locate such studies.
Briefly describe how key variables were operationally defined in this study, how
the program’s success was measured, and whether or not the program explicitly
made use of an explanatory theory—etiological or interventive, or both.
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introduction 33
51. CHAPTER
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2 Ethical Issues in
Program Evaluation
Ethical issues in program evaluation encompass a broad realm of concerns that be-
come heightened when the participants of a study are vulnerable in some way.
Although most often associated with medical experiments, harm can result from
participation in evaluation research, even if not life threatening. In keeping with up-
dated (and more accurate) terminology, the phrase “human subjects” will be re-
placed whenever possible with “participants” in this chapter.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH
OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBS)
By the 1970s, widespread concern about unethical research experiments led to a
federal mandate requiring that institutional review boards (IRBs) be convened to
oversee research in organizations receiving federal funds (primarily universities but
also hospitals, and other entities). As such, IRBs were empowered to review the inves-
tigator’s research objectives, methodology, and protocols with special emphasis on
plans for recruiting participants and gaining their consent.
IRBs were created to protect human participants from research that is risky,
harmful, or does not respect the rights and dignity of human beings. These boards
are usually comprised of professionals knowledgeable about research methods as
well as lay citizens representing the community. It is the IRB’s task to consider pro-
posed research and to determine whether it follows ethical guidelines set forth by the
federal government’s Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP).
Do we need IRBs? Are they a waste of time for the knowledgeable and ethical
researcher? Despite public awareness of the horrific medical experiments carried out
by Nazi physicians, serious and flagrant abuses of human subjects occurred in this
country, the most notorious of these was the infamous Tuskegee study conducted by
34
52. the U.S. Public Health Service. Beginning in 1932, 400 black males, mostly poor and
illiterate, with tertiary-stage syphilis were informed that they would receive free treat-
ment for their “bad blood.” In actuality, these men received no treatment for syphilis
even after penicillin became available. Instead, they received free physical exams, peri-
odic blood testing, hot meals on examination days, free treatment for minor disorders,
and a modest burial fee. The public outcry over the Tuskegee study led Congress to
pass the National Research Act (Public Law 93-348) in 1974 mandating the forma-
tion of IRBs. The legacy of Tuskegee, and the distrust it engendered regarding research
ethics, continues today in African American communities and elsewhere.
According to Oakes (2002), the literature on evaluation has largely neglected
discussion of IRBs despite their rapid growth in numbers and in power. By so often
straddling the threshold between “research” and “non-research” (the latter in the
form of internal evaluation for program improvement), program evaluations may
or may not fall under IRB jurisdiction. Evaluations considered to be “research,”
that is, their findings are intended for dissemination and knowledge development,
may be exempt from IRB review if there are no federally funded programs involved.
Increasingly, however, evaluation researchers are seeking institutional IRB approval
so that they may publish and share their findings with a wider audience. Many pro-
grams and agencies have begun to establish their own internal IRBs as a result.
ETHICAL GUIDELINES
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (the Belmont Report) in 1979 identified three ethical principles
for research on humans: beneficence—maximizing good outcomes for humanity and
research subjects while minimizing or avoiding risk or harm; respect—protecting the
autonomy of all persons and treating them with courtesy and respect, including those
who are most vulnerable; and justice—ensuring reasonable, nonexploitative, and
well-considered procedures are administered fairly (the fair distribution of costs and
benefits). These principles have been fashioned into the following ethical guidelines
for researchers and evaluators to follow.
GUIDELINE 1: RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS MUST BE VOLUNTEERS All of those partici-
pating in a research or evaluation effort should freely decide to do so without coercion
of any kind. They must also be competent to understand their choices. If eligible partici-
pants are under age 18 or not considered able to fully comprehend the consent process
due to mental impairment, their legal caretaker must give permission, and the participant
still must give assent. Although very young children are generally asked to orally assent
to research procedures in language they can understand, the older the minor, the more
the informed consent should conform to a written document like adults would receive.
Study participants’ right to self-determination must be respected, and their free-
dom to withdraw from the study at any time carefully protected. In most instances,
IRBs require that consent forms be in writing and signed permission be obtained,
but exceptions can be made for vulnerable populations such as undocumented
immigrants. Consent forms provide general but brief information on the nature of
the project and indicate that the participant is free to withdraw consent and to dis-
continue participation in the project at any time without any penalty or loss of bene-
fits (see Figure 2.1). When evaluating a social service program, it is vitally important
ethical issues in program evaluation 35
53. Outpatient Drug Treatment Program Aftercare Study
Investigator:
Ellen Samovar, MSW, Principal Investigator, (231) 555–5760
I __________ have been asked to participate in an evaluation of the Outpatient Drug Treatment Program
(ODTP) being conducted by Ms. Samovar.
Purpose:
I understand that the purpose of this study is to examine the success of the Outpatient Drug
Treatment Program in which I am participating—to learn how approximately 300 clients have
stopped using drugs and what factors may influence these decisions.
Duration and Location:
I understand the study will take place at the ODTP offices on 717 South First Street. Further, I
understand that the study will take about 60 minutes of my time on two different occasions.
Procedures:
I will be asked to answer questions about my social and psychological well-being, relationships,
employment, drug use, and illegal activities. In addition, I will be asked to provide a urine sample to test
for evidence of drugs in my system and will be given a Breathalyzer to test for alcohol.
Risks/Discomforts:
It has been explained to me that some of the interview questions are very personal, involving drug
and criminal behavior, and may cause some discomfort in answering them.
Benefits:
I understand that the benefits from participating in this study may be to help researchers and those
involved in public policy better understand the factors that lead to the starting and stopping of drug use.
Confidentiality:
I understand that a research code number will be used to identify my responses from those of other
clients and that my name, address, and other identifying information will not be directly associated with any
information obtained from me. A master listing of persons participating in the study and their identifying
information will be kept in a secure location under lock and key except when being used by select staff.
Further, I understand that a certificate of confidentiality has been obtained from the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) that protects investigators from being forced to release any of my data, even
under a court order or a subpoena. When results of this study are published, my name or other identifying
information will not be used.
Payments:
I will be paid $25 for my time and cooperation for each scheduled testing episode. If I stop early, I
understand that I will be paid an amount appropriate to the time I have spent.
Right to Withdraw:
I understand that I do not have to take part in this study, and my refusal to participate will involve no
penalty or loss of rights to which I am entitled. I may withdraw from the study at any time without fear of
losing any services or benefits to which I am entitled.
Signatures:
I have read this entire consent form and completely understand my rights as a potential research
subject. I voluntarily consent to participate in this research. I have been informed that I will receive a copy of
this consent should questions arise and I wish to contact Ms. Samovar or the University of Somewhere’s
Institutional Review Board (231-555-4949) to discuss my rights as a research subject.
_________________________
Date
_________________________
Date
_________________________
Date
__________________________________________________
Signature of Research Subject
__________________________________________________
Signature of Witness
__________________________________________________
Signature of Investigator
Figure 2.1
| Consent to Participate in a Research Study
36 chapter 2
54. that recipients of services fully understand these assurances. Evaluators can use a
checklist to ensure that all the necessary informational items are contained in the con-
sent forms they use (see Box 2.1).
Consent forms are not typically employed with mail, Internet, or telephone
surveys unless the data being gathered are in some way sensitive (e.g., involve informa-
tion about past or present drug use or illegal activities). In such cases, consent forms
may need to be mailed in advance and consent obtained before the participant is
contacted for data collection. When questionnaires or surveys are used with adults
who are not part of a vulnerable population, the principle of implied consent may be
used—that is, the act of participation is seen as giving informed consent. In these in-
stances, IRBs may not require written consent.
A problem arises when potential participants feel that they cannot refuse con-
sent. If they are on probation or parole, or receiving some form of public assistance,
they may not feel free to refuse without putting themselves in some jeopardy.
Clients in treatment for mental health problems, if approached by a clinician, may
fear being penalized if they refuse. A homeless person may be “coerced” into partic-
ipation by being offered a substantial financial incentive. This is when consultation
with an IRB can come in handy—extra steps may be needed to allay suspicions and
inform potential participants of their rights.
Human services professionals must be alert to the possibility that even good-
naturedly encouraging clients to participate in research can be perceived as coer-
cion. Because professionals are “gatekeepers” of services, clients can feel pressured
into participating in order to gain access to or continue receiving services.
GUIDELINE 2: POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ABOUT THE
STUDY TO DETERMINE ANY POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS AS WELL AS BENEFITS Sufficient
information includes an explanation of the purpose of the research, the expected
BOX 2.1 Checklist for Informed Consent Forms
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
±
Each informed consent form should contain explanation of the following points:
___ How the research subject was chosen/invited to participate and how many will be
involved
___ Who is conducting the study
___ The purpose of the study
___ Where the study will take place and how long it will last
___ What is required of the research subject
___ Possible risks or discomforts
___ Possible benefits of participation
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Title: Miss Santa Claus of the Pullman
Author: Annie F. Johnston
Illustrator: Reginald Bathurst Birch
Release date: December 11, 2012 [eBook #41604]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MISS SANTA
CLAUS OF THE PULLMAN ***
61. The Project Gutenberg eBook, Miss Santa Claus of the Pullman,
by Annie Fellows Johnston, Illustrated by Reginald B. Birch
Note: Images of the original pages are available through Internet
Archive/American Libraries. See
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MISS SANTA CLAUS OF THE
PULLMAN
63. BY
ANNIE FELLOWS JOHNSON
Author of "The Little Colonel Series," etc.
With illustrations by
REGINALD B. BIRCH
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1913
Copyright, 1913, by
The Century Co.
Published, October, 1913
TO
MY SISTERS
LURA AND ALBION
64. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Miss Santa Claus Frontispiece
PAGE
"Oh, dear Santa Claus" 19
"Here!" he said 29
"Oh, rabbit dravy!" he cried 57
He pushed aside the red plush curtain and looked in 69
And ran after the boy as hard as she could go 77
It was about the Princess Ina 99
The shower of stars falling on the blanket made her
think of the star-flower
121
"Take it back!" 165
66. T
CHAPTER I
HE last half hour had seemed endless to Will'm, almost as long
as the whole four years of his life. With his stubby little shoes
drawn up under him, and his soft bobbed hair flapping over his ears
every time the rockers tilted forward, he sat all alone in the sitting-
room behind the shop, waiting and rocking.
It seemed as if everybody at the Junction wanted something that
afternoon; thread or buttons or yarn, or the home-made doughnuts
which helped out the slim stock of goods in the little notion store
which had once been the parlor. And it seemed as if Grandma Neal
never would finish waiting on the customers and come back to tell
the rest of the story about the Camels and the Star; for no sooner
did one person go out than another one came in. He knew by the
tinkling of the bell over the front door, every time it opened or shut.
The door between the shop and sitting-room being closed, Will'm
could not hear much that was said, but several times he caught the
word "Christmas," and once somebody said "Santa Claus," in such a
loud happy-sounding voice that he slipped down from the chair and
ran across the room to open the door a crack. It was only lately that
he had begun to hear much about Santa Claus. Not until Libby
started to school that fall did they know that there is such a
wonderful person in the world. Of course they had heard his name,
as they had heard Jack Frost's, and had seen his picture in story-
books and advertisements, but they hadn't known that he is really
true till the other children told Libby. Now nearly every day she came
home with something new she had learned about him.
Will'm must have known always about Christmas though, for he
still had a piece of a rubber dog which his father had sent him on his
first one, and—a Teddy Bear on his second. And while he couldn't
67. recall anything about those first two festivals except what Libby told
him, he could remember the last one perfectly. There had been a
sled, and a fire-engine that wound up with a key, and Grandma Neal
had made him some cooky soldiers with red cinnamon-drop buttons
on their coats.
She wasn't his own grandmother, but she had taken the place of
one to Libby and him, all the years he had been in the world. Their
father paid their board, to be sure, and sent them presents and
came to see them at long intervals when he could get away from his
work, but that was so seldom that Will'm did not feel very well
acquainted with him; not so well as Libby did. She was three years
older, and could even remember a little bit about their mother before
she went off to heaven to get well. Mrs. Neal wasn't like a real
grandmother in many ways. She was almost too young, for one
thing. She was always very brisk and very busy, and, as she
frequently remarked, she meant what she said and she would be
minded.
That is why Will'm turned the knob so softly that no one noticed
for a moment that the door was ajar. A black-bearded man in a
rough overcoat was examining a row of dolls which dangled by their
necks from a line above the show case. He was saying jokingly:
"Well, Mrs. Neal, I'll have to be buying some of these jimcracks
before long. If this mud keeps up, no reindeer living could get out to
my place, and it wouldn't do for the young'uns to be disappointed
Christmas morning."
Then he caught sight of a section of a small boy peeping through
the door, for all that showed of Will'm through the crack was a
narrow strip of blue overalls which covered him from neck to ankles,
a round pink cheek and one solemn eye peering out from under his
thatch of straight flaxen hair like a little Skye terrier's. When the man
saw that eye he hurried to say: "Of course mud oughtn't to make
any difference to Santy's reindeer. They take the Sky Road, right
over the house tops and all."
68. The crack widened till two eyes peeped in, shining with interest,
and both stubby shoes ventured over the threshold. A familiar sniffle
made Grandma Neal turn around.
"Go back to the fire, William," she said briskly. "It isn't warm
enough in here for you with that cold of yours."
The order was obeyed as promptly as it was given, but with a
bang of the door so rebellious and unexpected that the man
laughed. There was an amused expression on the woman's face,
too, as she glanced up from the package she was tying, to explain
with an indulgent smile.
"That wasn't all temper, Mr. Woods. It was part embarrassment
that made him slam the door. Usually he doesn't mind strangers, but
he takes spells like that sometimes."
"That's only natural," was the drawling answer. "But it isn't
everybody who knows how to manage children, Mrs. Neal. I hope
now that his stepmother when he gets her, will understand him as
well as you do. My wife tells me that the poor little kids are going to
have one soon. How do they take to the notion?"
Mrs. Neal stiffened a little at the question, although he was an old
friend, and his interest was natural under the circumstances. There
was a slight pause, then she said:
"I haven't mentioned the subject to them yet. No use to make
them cross their bridge before they get to it. I've no doubt Molly will
be good to them. She was a nice little thing when she used to go to
school here at the Junction."
"It's queer," mused the man, "how she and Bill Branfield used to
think so much of each other, from their First Reader days till both
families moved away from here, and then that they should come
across each other after all these years, from different states, too."
Instinctively they had lowered their voices, but Will'm on the
other side of the closed door was making too much noise of his own
69. to hear anything they were saying. Lying full length on the rug in
front of the fire, he battered his heels up and down on the floor and
pouted. His cold made him miserable, and being sent out of the
shop made him cross. If he had been allowed to stay there's no
telling what he might have heard about those reindeer to repeat to
Libby when she came home from school.
Suddenly Will'm remembered the last bit of information which she
had brought home to him, and, scrambling hastily up from the floor,
he climbed into the rocking chair as if something were after him:
"Santa Claus is apt to be looking down the chimney any minute to
see how you're behaving. And no matter if your lips don't show it
outside, he knows when you're all puckered up with crossness and
pouting on the inside!"
At that terrible thought Will'm began to rock violently back and
forth and sing. It was a choky, sniffling little tune that he sang. His
voice sounded thin and far away even to his own ears, because his
cold was so bad. But the thought that Santa might be listening, and
would write him down as a good little boy, kept him valiantly at it for
several minutes. Then because he had a way of chanting his
thoughts out loud sometimes, instead of thinking them to himself, he
went on, half chanting, half talking the story of the Camels and the
Star, which he was waiting for Grandma Neal to come back and
finish. He knew it as well as she did, because she had told it to him
so often in the last week.
"An' the wise men rode through the night, an' they rode an' they
rode, an' the bells on the bridles went ting-a-ling! just like the bell
on Dranma's shop door. An' the drate big Star shined down on 'em
and went ahead to show 'em the way. An' the drate big reindeer
runned along the Sky Road"—he was mixing Grandma Neal's story
now with what he had heard through the crack in the door, and he
found the mixture much more thrilling than the original recital. "An'
they runned an' they runned an' the sleighbells went ting-a-ling! just
like the bell on Dranma's shop door. An' after a long time they all
70. comed to the house where the baby king was at. Nen the wise men
jumped off their camels and knelt down and opened all their boxes
of pretty things for Him to play with. An' the reindeer knelt down on
the roof where the drate big shining star stood still, so Santy could
empty all his pack down the baby king's chimney."
It was a queer procession which wandered through Will'm's
sniffling, sing-song account. To the camels, sages and herald angels,
to the shepherds and the little woolly white lambs of the Judean
hills, were added not only Bo Peep and her flock, but Baa the black
sheep, and the reindeer team of an unscriptural Saint Nicholas. But
it was all Holy Writ to Will'm. Presently the mere thought of angels
and stars and silver bells gave him such a big warm feeling inside,
that he was brimming over with good-will to everybody.
When Libby came home from school a few minutes later, he was
in the midst of his favorite game, one which he played at intervals all
through the day. The game was Railroad Train, suggested naturally
enough by the constant switching of cars and snorting of engines
which went on all day and night at this busy Junction. It was one in
which he could be a star performer in each part, as he personated
fireman, engineer, conductor and passenger in turn. At the moment
Libby came in he was the engine itself, backing, puffing and
whistling, his arms going like piston-rods, and his pursed up little
mouth giving a very fair imitation of "letting off steam."
"Look out!" he called warningly. "You'll get runned over."
But instead of heeding his warning, Libby planted herself directly
in the path of the oncoming engine, ignoring so completely the part
he was playing that he stopped short in surprise. Ordinarily she
would have fallen in with the game, but now she seemed blind and
deaf to the fact that he was playing anything at all. Usually, coming
in the back way, she left her muddy overshoes on the latticed porch,
her lunch basket on the kitchen table, her wraps on their particular
hook in the entry. She was an orderly little soul. But to-day she came
in, her coat half off, her hood trailing down her back by its strings,
71. and her thin little tails of tightly braided hair fuzzy and untied, from
running bare-headed all the way home to tell the exciting news. She
told it in gasps.
"You can write letters to Santa Claus—for whatever you want—
and put them up the chimney—and he gets them—and whatever
you ask for he'll bring you—if you're good!"
Instantly the engine was a little boy again all a-tingle with this
new delicious mystery of Christmastide. He climbed up into the
rocking chair and listened, the rapt look on his face deepening. In
proof of what she told, Libby had a letter all written and addressed,
ready to send. One of the older girls had helped her with it at noon,
and she had spent the entire afternoon recess copying it. Because
she was just learning to write, she made so many mistakes that it
had to be copied several times. She read it aloud to Will'm.
"Dear Santa Claus:—Please bring me a little shiny gold ring
like the one that Maudie Peters wears. Yours truly, Libby
Branfield."
"Now you watch, and you'll see me send it up the chimney when
I get my muddy overshoes off and my hands washed. This might be
one of the times when he'd be looking down, and it'd be better for
me to be all clean and tidy."
Breathlessly Will'm waited till she came back from the kitchen, her
hands and face shining from the scrubbing she had given them with
yellow laundry soap, her hair brushed primly back on each side of its
parting and her hair ribbons freshly tied. Then she knelt on the rug,
the fateful missive in her hand.
"Maudie is going to ask for 'most a dozen presents," she said.
"But as long as this will be Santy's first visit to this house I'm not
going to ask for more than one thing, and you mustn't either. It
wouldn't be polite."
72. "But we can ask him to bring a ring to Dranma," Will'm
suggested, his face beaming at the thought. The answer was
positive and terrible out of her wisdom newly gained at both church
and school.
"No, we can't! He only brings things to people who bleeve in him.
It's the same way it is about going to Heaven. Only those who
bleeve will be saved and get in."
"Dranma and Uncle Neal will go to Heaven," insisted Will'm
loyally, and in a tone which suggested his willingness to hurt her if
she contradicted him. Uncle Neal was "Dranma's" husband.
"Oh, of course, they'll go to Heaven all right," was Libby's
impatient answer. "They've got faith in the Bible and the minister
and the heathen and such things. But they won't get anything in
their stockings because they aren't sure about there even being a
Santa Claus! So there!"
"Well, if Santa Claus won't put anything in my Dranma Neal's
stocking, he's a mean old thing, and I don't want him to put
anything in mine," began Will'm defiantly, but was silenced by the
sight of Libby's horrified face.
"Oh, brother! Hush!" she cried, darting a frightened glance over
her shoulder towards the chimney. Then in a shocked whisper which
scared Will'm worse than a loud yell would have done, she said
impressively, "Oh, I hope he hasn't heard you! He never would come
to this house as long as he lives! And I couldn't bear for us to find
just empty stockings Christmas morning."
There was a tense silence. And then, still on her knees, her hands
still clasped over the letter, she moved a few inches nearer the
fireplace. The next instant Will'm heard her call imploringly up the
chimney, "Oh, dear Santa Claus, if you're up there looking down,
please don't mind what Will'm said. He's so little he doesn't know
any better. Please forgive him and send us what we ask for, for
Jesus' sake, Amen!"
73. "Oh, dear Santa Claus"
Fascinated, Will'm watched the letter flutter up past the flames,
drawn by the strong draught of the flue. Then suddenly shamed by
the thought that he had been publicly prayed for, out loud and in the
daytime, he ran to cast himself on the old lounge, face downward
among the cushions.
Libby herself felt a
trifle constrained after
her unusual
performance, and to
cover her
embarrassment seized
the hearth broom and
vigorously swept up
the scraps of half-dried
mud which she had
tracked in a little while
before. Then she
stood and drummed
on the window pane a
long time, looking out
into the dusk which
always came so
surprisingly fast these
short winter days,
almost the very
moment after the sun
dropped down behind
the cedar trees.
It was a relief to
both children when
Grandma Neal came in
with a lighted lamp.
Her cheerful call to
know who was going to help her set the supper table, gave Will'm
74. an excuse to spring up from the lounge cushions and face his little
world once more in a natural and matter-of-course way. He felt safer
out in the bright warm kitchen. No stern displeased eye could
possibly peer at him around the bend of that black shining stove-
pipe. There was comfort in the savory steam puffing out from under
the lid of the stew-pan on the stove. There was reassurance in the
clatter of the knives and forks and dishes which he and Libby put
noisily in place on the table. But when Grandma Neal started where
she had left off, to finish the story of the Camels and the Star, he
interrupted quickly to ask instead for the tale of Goldilocks and the
Three Bears. The Christmas Spirit had gone out of him. He could not
listen to the story of the Star. It lighted the way not only of the
camel caravan, but of the Sky Road too, and he didn't want to be
reminded of that Sky Road now. He was fearful that a cold
displeasure might be filling the throat of the sitting-room chimney. If
Santa Claus had happened to be listening when he called him a
mean old thing, then had he ruined not only his own chances, but
Libby's too. That fear followed him all evening. It made him vaguely
uncomfortable. Even when they sat down to supper it did something
to his appetite, for the dumpling stew did not taste as good as usual.
75. I
CHAPTER II
T was several days before Will'm lost that haunting fear of
having displeased the great power up the chimney past all
forgiveness. It began to leave him gradually as Libby grew more and
more sure of her own state of favor. She was so good in school now
that even the teacher said nobody could be better, no matter how
hard he tried. She stayed every day to help clean the blackboards
and collect the pencils. She never missed a syllable nor stepped off
the line in spelling class, nor asked for a drink in lesson time. And
she and Maudie Peters had made it up between them not to whisper
a single word until after Christmas. She was sure now that even if
Santa Claus had overheard Will'm, her explanation that he was too
little to know any better had made it all right.
It is probable, too, that Will'm's state of body helped his state of
mind, for about this time his cold was well enough for him to play
out of doors, and the thought of stars and angels and silver bells
began to be agreeable again. They gave him that big, warm feeling
inside again; the Christmas feeling of good-will to everybody.
One morning he was sitting up on a post of the side yard fence,
when the passenger train Number Four came rushing in to the
station, and was switched back on a side track right across the road
from him. It was behind time and had to wait there for orders or till
the Western Flyer passed it, or for some such reason. It was a happy
morning for Will'm. There was nothing he enjoyed so much as
having one of these long Pullman trains stop where he could watch
it. Night after night he and Libby had flattened their faces against
the sitting-room window to watch the seven o'clock limited pass by.
Through its brilliantly lighted windows they loved to see the
passengers at dinner. The white tables with their gleam of glass and
shine of silver and glow of shaded lights seemed wonderful to them.
76. More wonderful still was it to be eating as unconcernedly as if one
were at home, with the train jiggling the tables while it leaped
across the country at its highest speed. The people who could do
such things must be wonderful too.
There were times when passengers flattening their faces against
the glass to see why the train had stopped, caught the gleam of a
cheerful home window across the road, and holding shielding hands
at either side of their eyes, as they peered through the darkness,
smiled to discover those two eager little watchers, who counted the
stopping of the Pullman at this Junction as the greatest event of the
day.
Will'm and Libby knew nearly every engineer and conductor on
the road by sight, and had their own names for them. The engineer
on this morning train they called Mr. Smiley, because he always had
a cheerful grin for them, and sometimes a wave of his big grimy
hand. This time Mr. Smiley was too busy and too provoked by the
delay to pay any attention to the small boy perched on the fence
post. Some of the passengers finding that they might have to wait
half an hour or more began to climb out and walk up and down the
road past him. Several of them attracted by the wares in the window
of the little notion shop which had once been a parlor, sauntered in
and came out again, eating some of Grandma Neal's doughnuts.
Presently Will'm noticed that everybody who passed a certain
sleeping coach, stooped down and looked under it. He felt impelled
to look under it himself and discover why. So he climbed down from
the post and trudged along the road, kicking the rocks out of his
way with stubby little shoes already scuffed from much previous
kicking. At the same moment the steward of the dining-car stepped
down from the vestibuled platform, and strolled towards him, with
his hands in his trousers' pockets.
"Hullo, son!" he remarked good-humoredly in passing, giving an
amused glance at the solemn child stuffed into a gray sweater and
blue mittens, with a toboggan cap pulled down over his soft bobbed
hair. Usually Will'm responded to such greetings. So many people
77. came into the shop that he was not often abashed by strangers. But
this time he was so busy looking at something that dangled from the
steward's vest pocket that he failed to say "Hullo" back at him. It
was what seemed to be the smallest gold watch he had ever seen,
and it impressed him as very queer that the man should wear it on
the outside of his pocket instead of the inside. He stopped still in the
road and stared at it until the man passed him, then he turned and
followed him slowly at a distance.
A few rods further on, the steward stooped and looked under the
coach, and spoke to a man who was out of sight, but who was
hammering on the other side. A voice called back something about a
hot-box and cutting out that coach, and reminded of his original
purpose, Will'm followed on and looked, likewise. Although he
squatted down and looked for a long time he couldn't see a single
box, only the legs of the man who was hammering on the other
side. But just as he straightened up again he caught the gleam of
something round and shiningly golden, something no bigger than a
quarter, lying almost between his feet. It was a tiny baby watch like
the one that swung from the steward's vest pocket.
Thrilled by the discovery, Will'm picked it up and fondled it with
both little blue mittens. It didn't tick when he held it to his ear, and
he couldn't open it, but he was sure that Uncle Neal could open it
and start it to going, and he was sure that it was the littlest watch in
the world. It never occurred to him that finding it hadn't made it his
own to have and to carry home, just like the rainbow-lined mussel
shells that he sometimes picked up on the creek bank, or the silver
dime he had once found in a wagon rut.
Then he looked up to see the steward strolling back towards him
again, his hands still in his trousers' pockets. But this time no
fascinating baby watch bobbed back and forth against his vest as he
walked, and Will'm knew with a sudden stab of disappointment that
was as bad as earache, that the watch he was fondling could never
be his to carry home and show proudly to Uncle Neal. It belonged to
the man.
78. "Here!" he said
"Here!" he said,
holding it out in the
blue mitten.
"Well, I vow!"
exclaimed the
steward, looking
down at his watchfob,
and then snatching
the little disk of gold
from the outstretched
hand. "I wouldn't
have lost that for
hardly anything. It
must have come
loose when I stooped
to look under the car.
I think more of that
than almost anything
I've got. See?"
And then Will'm
saw that it was not a
watch, but a little
locket made to hang
from a bar that was
fastened to a wide
black ribbon fob. The
man pulled out the
fob, and there on the other end, where it had been in his pocket all
the time, was a big watch, as big as Will'm's fist. The locket flew
open when he touched a spring, and there were two pictures inside.
One of a lady and one of a jolly, fat-cheeked baby.
"Well, little man!" exclaimed the steward, with a hearty clap on
the shoulder that nearly upset him. "You don't know how big a favor
you've done me by finding that locket. You're just about the nicest
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