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Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 1
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Annex I.2
Failure Mode
Effects Analysis
(FMEA)
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 2
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
(see IEC 60812)
 Evaluation of potential failure modes for processes
 The likely effect on outcomes and/or product performance
 Once failure modes are established,
risk reduction can be used to
eliminate, reduce or control the potential failures
 FMEA relies on process understanding
 Summarize the important modes of failure, factors causing
these failures and the likely effects of these failures
How to perform?
Break down large complex processes into manageable steps
ICH Q9
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 3
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Potential Areas of Use(s)
 Prioritize risks
 Monitor the effectiveness of risk control activities
 Equipment and facilities
 Analyze a manufacturing process
to identify high-risk steps or critical parameters
RNP: Risk Priority Number C. Kingery, The Six Sigma Memory Jogger II
ICH Q9
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 4
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
How to perform?
1. Establish a team
2. Identify the known and potential failure modes:
Develop lists of known problems and brainstorm other
potentials…
e.g.
> Product not meeting specification
> Process not meeting yield requirements
> Malfunctioning equipment
> Software problems
Newly identified failure modes should be added at any time
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 5
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
How to perform?
3. Characterise the severity, probability and detectability
 An equal number of levels is sometimes helpful
> Some preference to 3, 4, 5, 6 or 10 levels
> But: an even number of levels avoids the mid point
 Use different scales
> Linear: 1, 2, 3, 4
> Exponential: 1, 2, 4, 8
> Logarithmic: 1, 10, 100, 1000
> Self made: 1, 3, 7, 10
Multiplying different scales will differentiate the outcome
The aim is to come
up with a method
of prioritising
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 6
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
How to perform?
4. Define actions
5. Revisit the ranking
6. Define residual risk
7. Perform a short summary
> Scope
> Data from the assessment & control
(e.g. No. of identified failure modes)
> Level of accepted risk without actions i.e. residual risk
(e.g. Risk priority Number < 50)
> Recommended actions, responsibilities and due dates
(including approval, if appropriate)
> Person in charge for follow-up of FMEA
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 7
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Severity (Consequences of failure)
• 10 Extreme
• Predicted to cause severe impact to quality (Product out of
specifications, no Expert Statement possible)
• 7 High
• Predicted to cause significant impact on quality (Failure to meet
specifications, no Stability data, Expert Statement possible)
• 3 Moderate
• Predicted to cause minor impact on quality (Failure to meet
specifications, Stability data available)
• 1 Low
• Predicted to have no/minor impact on quality of the product
(Quality within specifications)
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 8
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Probability (Likelihood failure will happen)
• 8 Regular failures
• Expected to happen regularly
• 4 Repeated failures
• Expected to happen in a low frequency
• 2 Occasional failures
• Expected to happen infrequently
• 1 Unlikely failures
• Unlikely to happen
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 9
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Detectability (Ability to find the failure)
• 4 Normally not detected
• Failure very likely to be overlooked, hence not detected
(no technical solution, no manual control)
• 3 Likely not detected
• Failure may be overseen
(manual control, spot checks)
• 2 Regularly detected
• Failure will normally be detected
(manual control, routine work with statistical control)
• 1 Always detected
• Failure can and will be detected in all cases
(monitoring, technical solution available)
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 10
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
FMEA: Quantitation of Risk : Severity
10 Dangerously High Failure could lead to death or permanent injury to the customer. Financial:
>$1,000,000
9 Extremely high Failure could lead to injury to the customer. Failure would create non-compliance
with registered specifications. Failure likely to lead to recall. Financial: $1,000,000
8 Very High Failure could lead to adverse reaction for customer. Failure would create
noncompliance with GMP regulations or product registrations. Failure possible to
lead to recall. Financial: $500,000
7 High Failure leads to customer percept ion of safety issue. Failure renders individual
unit(s) unusable. Failure causes a high degree of customer dissatisfaction. Recall
for business reasons possible but Authority required recall unlikely. Financial:
$100,000
6 Moderate Failure causes a high degree of customer dissatisfaction and numerous
complaints. Failure unlikely to lead to recall. Financial: $50,000
5 Low Failure likely to cause isolated customer complaints. Financial: $10,000
4 Very Low Failure relates to non-dosage form issues (like minor packaging problems) and
can be easily overcome by the customer. Financial: $5,000
3 Minor Failure could be noticed by the customer but is unlikely to be perceived as
significant enough to warrant a complaint.
2 Very Minor Failure not readily apparent to the customer. Financial: <$1,000
1 None Failure would not be noticeable to the customer. Financial: none
Dr. Gary Harbour, Pfizer
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 11
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
FMEA: Quantitation of Risk : Probability
10 Very High: Failure is
almost inevitable
More than one occurrence per day or a probability of more than three occurrences in
10 units (Cpk < 0.33 or <1σ).
9 One occurrence every three to four days or a probability of three occurrences in 10
units (Cpk ~ 0.33 or ~1 σ).
8 High: Repeated
failures
One occurrence per week or a probability of 5 occurrences in 100 units (Cpk ~ 0.67
or ~2 σ).
7 One occurrence every month or one occurrence in 100 units (Cpk ~ 0.83 ~2.5 σ).
6 Moderate:
Occasional Failures
One occurrence every three months or three occurrences in 1,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.00 or
~ 3 σ).
5 One occurrence every six months to one year or one occurrence in 10,000 units (Cpk
~ 1.17 or ~ 3.5 σ).
4 One occurrence per year or six occurrences in 100,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.33 or ~ 4 σ).
3 Low: Relatively few
Failures
One occurrence every one to three years or six occurrences in 10,000,000 units (Cpk
~ 1.67 or ~5 σ).
2 One occurrence every three to five years or 2 occurrences in 1,000,000,000 units
(Cpk ~ 2.00 OR ~6 σ).
1 Remote: Failure is
unlikely
One occurrence in greater than five years or less than two occurrences in
1,000,000,000 units (Cpk > 2.00 OR >6 σ).
For batch failures use the time scale for unit failures use the unit scale. Dr. Gary Harbour, Pfizer
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 12
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
FMEA: Quantitation of Risk: Detection
10 Absolute
Uncertainty
The product is not inspected or the defect caused by the failure is not detectable.
9 Very Remote Product is sampled, inspected, and released based on Acceptable Quality Level
(AQL) sampling plans.
8 Remote Product is accepted based on no defects in a sample.
7 Very Low Product is 100% manually inspected in the process.
6 Low Product is 100% manually inspected using go/no-go or other mistake-proofing
gauges.
5 Moderate Some Statistical Process Control (SPC) is used in the process and product is final
inspected off-line.
4 Moderately High SPC is used and there is immediate reaction to out-of-control conditions.
3 High An effective SPC program is in place with process capabilities (Cpk) greater than
1.33.
2 Very High All product is 100% automatically inspected.
1 Almost Certain The defect is obvious and there is 100% automatic inspection with regular
calibration and preventive maintenance of the inspection equipment.
Dr. Gary Harbour, Pfizer
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 13
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Severity / Probability / Detection (SPD)
PhD R.C. Mendson, Menson & Associations, Inc
ICH EWG London, March 2004
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 14
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Severity (S)
> Link to end product functional failure
> Medical Department involvement
 Probability (P)
> Use historical data
> Similar processes products
 Detection
> Method validation studies
> Historical data
EXAMPLE
Takayoshi Matsumura, Eisai Co.
Drying Process
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 15
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Ranking Severity (S) Probability (P) Detection (D)
10 Death More than once a day Impossible to detect
9 ↓ 3 – 4 times a day Remote
8 Permanent injury Once a week Very slight
7 ↓ Once a month Slight
6 Temporary injury Once in three month Low
5 ↓ Once in half – one year Medium
4 Reported/ dissatisfied Once a year Moderately high
3 ↓ Once in 1 – 3 years High
2 Notice/ no report Once in 3 – 5 years Very High
1 ↓ Less than once in 5 years Virtually certain
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co
EXAMPLE
Drying Process
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 16
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Process Potential Failure Mode Potential Cause S P D RPN
1.
Set up
contamination disheveled gown of operator
insufficient cleaning of equipment
2.
Start drying
contamination damage of inlet-air filter
degradation of product damage of thermometer
3.
Maintain
temperature
long drying time unstable supply-air volume
high Loss On Drying
(LOD)
damage of timer
low LOD high dew-point
non-uniformity of LOD uneven temperature distribution
Drying Process
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co
EXAMPLE
RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 17
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Existing controls: IPC of LOD and degradation product after drying process
Drying Process
Process Potential Failure Mode Potential Cause S P D RPN
1.
Set up
contamination disheveled gown of operator 3 5 8 120
insufficient cleaning of
equipment
7 2 8 112
2.
Start drying
contamination damage of inlet-air filter 7 3 6 126
degradation of product damage of thermometer 7 3 3 63
3.
Maintain
temperature
long drying time unstable supply-air volume 2 4 5 40
high LOD malfunction of timer 2 2 2 8
low LOD high due-point 3 3 3 27
non-uniformity of LOD uneven temperature distribution 3 5 3 45
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Takayoshi Matsumura, Eisai Co
EXAMPLE
RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 18
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Take action when RPN is over 100
Take action when severity is over 5
Remaining critical parameters after taking action; further controls required
Drying Process
Process Potential Cause RPN Recommended Action S P D RPN
1.
Set up
disheveled gown of operator 120 use long gloves and goggles 3 2 8 48
insufficient cleaning of
equipment
112 change cleaning procedure 7 2 4 56
2.
Start drying
damage of inlet-air filter 126 change maintenance period 7 2 6 84
damage of thermometer 63 change calibration period 7 2 3 42
3.
Maintain
temperature
unstable supply-air volume 40 ― 2 4 5 40
malfunction of timer 8 ― 2 2 2 8
high dew-point 27 ― 3 3 3 27
uneven temperature
distribution
45 ― 3 5 3 45
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Based on Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co.
EXAMPLE
RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 19
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Analyse a granulation process step
because only a few parameters are adjustable and many
problems can occur by manual operations
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger, Roche
Severity (Consequences):
3: high Predicted to cause significant impact to quality (failure to meet specifications)
2: moderate Predicted to cause minor impact to quality (failure to meet specifications)
1: minor Predicted to could have minor impact on quality of the product (quality within specifications)
Probability
4: regular failures Expected to happen frequently
3: repeated failures Could happen occasionally
2: occasional failures Expected to happen infrequently
1: failure is unlikely Unlikely to happen
Detectability
3: probably not detected May overlook a fault or failture possibly can not be detected (no technical solution up to now)
2: occasionaly not detected Failture may be missed (manual control, routinely work with statistical control)
1: detectable Failture can and will be detected (e.g. using statistical tools)
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 20
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk Assessment Risk Reduction
Sub-Step
Event
(Failure mode)
Effect
Severity
(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability
(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability
(D)
[1<2<3]
Risk
factor
(S*P*D)
Actions:
Risk reduction strategy
Severity
(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability
(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability
(D)
[1<2<3]
Risk
factor
(S*P*D)
Risk
reduction
Comments
Wet seving Drying Temperature
not meet specification of
degradation
2 4 1 8 implement 2 temperature measures 1 1 1 1 7
automatically interruption
by not meeting range;
Temperatur monitoring in
batch record
Granulation Drying water content
not meet specification of
degradation
2 3 1 6 introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment
introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2
direct measurement; time
consuming
humidity measurement in the exausting
air
2 1 2 4 2
indirect measurment;
unspecifoc
Granulation kneeding time
not meet specification of
dissolution
3 3 1 9 reduce personnal fluctuation 3 3 1 9 0
operator knowledge;
depending on power
consumption;
automatisation not possible
at that time
Granulation power consumption
not meet specification of
dissolution
3 2 1 6
try to get to a minumum an optimum of
kneeding time
3 2 1 6 0
depending on kneeding
time depending on material
properties
Pre-mixing mixing time
not meet specification of
content uniformity
3 2 3 18 IPC measure on content uniformity 3 2 1 6 12 influence on efficacy
Pre-mixing Granulation speed of adding water
not meet specification of
disolution and
desintegration
3 3 3 27
Analyse (seeving of granulate sieve
analysis); use of dosage pumps
3 2 1 6 21
to get fine appropriate
granulate
Pre-mixing Granulation manner of adding water
not meet specification of
disolution and
desintegration
3 1 1 3 install spray nozzles 1 1 1 1 2
to get fine appropriate
granulate
Granulation Quality of Excipients
all parameters have to be
re-evaluated
3 4 3 36
Adapt internal specification of physical
parameters (e.g. density, metability
wetability)
1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier
Granulation Quality of API
all parameters have to be
re-evaluated
3 4 3 36
Adapt internal specification of physical
parameters (e.g. density, metability
wetatility)
1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier
Overview Risk before cotrol Max 36 Risk after control Max 9 32
Average 17 Average 4 10
Min 3 Min 1 0
Failure
Mode
Effects
Analysis
(FMEA)
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger, Roche
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 21
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2 Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Risk Assessment
Sub-Step
Event
(Failure mode)
Effect
Severity
(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability
(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability
(D)
[1<2<3]
Risk
factor
(S*P*D)
Granulation Drying water content
not meet specification of
degradation
2 3 1 6
Risk Reduction
Actions:
Risk reduction strategy
Severity
(S)
[1<2<3]
Probability
(P)
[1<2<3<4]
Detectability
(D)
[1<2<3]
Risk
factor
(S*P*D)
Risk
reduction
Comments
introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment
introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2
direct measurement; time
consuming
humidity measurement in the exaust air 2 1 2 4 2
indirect measurment;
unspecific
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger, Roche
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 22
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Prepare a risk profile
Severity / Consequences
i negligible
ii marginal
iii critical
iv catastrophic
Probability
A frequent
B moderate
C occasional
D rare
E unlikely
F very unlikely
Consequences
Risk
protection
level
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger, Roche
Picture: © Zurich Insurance Ltd, Switzerland
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 23
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Prepare a risk profile: Probability
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger, Roche
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 24
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Risk Evaluation
> Prepare a risk profile: Consequences
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger,
Roche
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 25
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Risk Evaluation
> Prepare a risk profile: Consequences
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger,
Roche
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 26
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
 Risk Evaluation: Risk Profile
> For high risks, which are not acceptable, risk reduction
measures have to be taken as a high priority
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger, Roche
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 27
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
How to perform?
3. Summary (Risk Evaluation)
> The effects are rated in terms of their
consequences and the
causes are assessed in terms of their probabilities
a) qualitative or b) quantitative
> Based on these results a risk profile is completed.
> In this profile the risks are compared with the
risk protection level, which determines the accepted
probability for defined consequences
> Use as an aid to prioritise actions!
EXAMPLE
S. Rönninger, Roche
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 28
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 QRM for facilities, equipment and utilities
Assess an existing compressed air system
> Old approach: 60 “risks” should have been solved in detail
> Initial RM-Approach:
 4 sessions in total 16 people
 153 potential risks discussed
 34 Cases beyond the action limit
 30 Corrective actions have been performed (- 50%)
> Review of RM-Approach after inspection
 Did you consider this hazard?
- yes: show and explain rationale
- yes, but start discussion for a yes/no decision
- no: revisit initial risk assessment
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 29
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Experiences
 Ease of applicability
> Prospective tool
> Good tool for operators to use
> Can be used to identify critical steps for validation
> More objective than Fault Tree Analysis
> Covers minor risks
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 30
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Experiences
 Limitations
> Can be time and resource consuming
> Mitigation plans must be followed up
> Not a good tool for analysis of complex systems
> Compound failure effects cannot be analyzed
> Incorporating all possible factors requires a thorough
knowledge of characteristics and performance of the
different components of the system
> Successful completion requires
expertise, experience and good team skills
> Dealing with data redundancies can be difficult
Based on Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co
EXAMPLE
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 31
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Annex I.3
Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality
Analysis
(FMECA)
Annex I: Methods & Tools
prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 32
ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT
I.3: Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
(IEC 60812)
 Extended to incorporate an investigation
of the degree of severity of the consequences,
their respective probabilities of occurrence and
their detectability
 The product or process specifications should be
established
 Identify places where additional preventive actions
may be necessary to minimize risks
Potential Areas of Use(s)
 Utilized on failures and risks associated with manufacturing
processes ICH Q9

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Q9_Failure_Mode_Effects_A.ppt

  • 1. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 1 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Annex I.2 Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)
  • 2. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 2 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) (see IEC 60812)  Evaluation of potential failure modes for processes  The likely effect on outcomes and/or product performance  Once failure modes are established, risk reduction can be used to eliminate, reduce or control the potential failures  FMEA relies on process understanding  Summarize the important modes of failure, factors causing these failures and the likely effects of these failures How to perform? Break down large complex processes into manageable steps ICH Q9
  • 3. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 3 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Potential Areas of Use(s)  Prioritize risks  Monitor the effectiveness of risk control activities  Equipment and facilities  Analyze a manufacturing process to identify high-risk steps or critical parameters RNP: Risk Priority Number C. Kingery, The Six Sigma Memory Jogger II ICH Q9
  • 4. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 4 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) How to perform? 1. Establish a team 2. Identify the known and potential failure modes: Develop lists of known problems and brainstorm other potentials… e.g. > Product not meeting specification > Process not meeting yield requirements > Malfunctioning equipment > Software problems Newly identified failure modes should be added at any time EXAMPLE
  • 5. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 5 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) How to perform? 3. Characterise the severity, probability and detectability  An equal number of levels is sometimes helpful > Some preference to 3, 4, 5, 6 or 10 levels > But: an even number of levels avoids the mid point  Use different scales > Linear: 1, 2, 3, 4 > Exponential: 1, 2, 4, 8 > Logarithmic: 1, 10, 100, 1000 > Self made: 1, 3, 7, 10 Multiplying different scales will differentiate the outcome The aim is to come up with a method of prioritising EXAMPLE
  • 6. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 6 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) How to perform? 4. Define actions 5. Revisit the ranking 6. Define residual risk 7. Perform a short summary > Scope > Data from the assessment & control (e.g. No. of identified failure modes) > Level of accepted risk without actions i.e. residual risk (e.g. Risk priority Number < 50) > Recommended actions, responsibilities and due dates (including approval, if appropriate) > Person in charge for follow-up of FMEA EXAMPLE
  • 7. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 7 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Severity (Consequences of failure) • 10 Extreme • Predicted to cause severe impact to quality (Product out of specifications, no Expert Statement possible) • 7 High • Predicted to cause significant impact on quality (Failure to meet specifications, no Stability data, Expert Statement possible) • 3 Moderate • Predicted to cause minor impact on quality (Failure to meet specifications, Stability data available) • 1 Low • Predicted to have no/minor impact on quality of the product (Quality within specifications) EXAMPLE
  • 8. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 8 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Probability (Likelihood failure will happen) • 8 Regular failures • Expected to happen regularly • 4 Repeated failures • Expected to happen in a low frequency • 2 Occasional failures • Expected to happen infrequently • 1 Unlikely failures • Unlikely to happen EXAMPLE
  • 9. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 9 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Detectability (Ability to find the failure) • 4 Normally not detected • Failure very likely to be overlooked, hence not detected (no technical solution, no manual control) • 3 Likely not detected • Failure may be overseen (manual control, spot checks) • 2 Regularly detected • Failure will normally be detected (manual control, routine work with statistical control) • 1 Always detected • Failure can and will be detected in all cases (monitoring, technical solution available) EXAMPLE
  • 10. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 10 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT FMEA: Quantitation of Risk : Severity 10 Dangerously High Failure could lead to death or permanent injury to the customer. Financial: >$1,000,000 9 Extremely high Failure could lead to injury to the customer. Failure would create non-compliance with registered specifications. Failure likely to lead to recall. Financial: $1,000,000 8 Very High Failure could lead to adverse reaction for customer. Failure would create noncompliance with GMP regulations or product registrations. Failure possible to lead to recall. Financial: $500,000 7 High Failure leads to customer percept ion of safety issue. Failure renders individual unit(s) unusable. Failure causes a high degree of customer dissatisfaction. Recall for business reasons possible but Authority required recall unlikely. Financial: $100,000 6 Moderate Failure causes a high degree of customer dissatisfaction and numerous complaints. Failure unlikely to lead to recall. Financial: $50,000 5 Low Failure likely to cause isolated customer complaints. Financial: $10,000 4 Very Low Failure relates to non-dosage form issues (like minor packaging problems) and can be easily overcome by the customer. Financial: $5,000 3 Minor Failure could be noticed by the customer but is unlikely to be perceived as significant enough to warrant a complaint. 2 Very Minor Failure not readily apparent to the customer. Financial: <$1,000 1 None Failure would not be noticeable to the customer. Financial: none Dr. Gary Harbour, Pfizer EXAMPLE
  • 11. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 11 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT FMEA: Quantitation of Risk : Probability 10 Very High: Failure is almost inevitable More than one occurrence per day or a probability of more than three occurrences in 10 units (Cpk < 0.33 or <1σ). 9 One occurrence every three to four days or a probability of three occurrences in 10 units (Cpk ~ 0.33 or ~1 σ). 8 High: Repeated failures One occurrence per week or a probability of 5 occurrences in 100 units (Cpk ~ 0.67 or ~2 σ). 7 One occurrence every month or one occurrence in 100 units (Cpk ~ 0.83 ~2.5 σ). 6 Moderate: Occasional Failures One occurrence every three months or three occurrences in 1,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.00 or ~ 3 σ). 5 One occurrence every six months to one year or one occurrence in 10,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.17 or ~ 3.5 σ). 4 One occurrence per year or six occurrences in 100,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.33 or ~ 4 σ). 3 Low: Relatively few Failures One occurrence every one to three years or six occurrences in 10,000,000 units (Cpk ~ 1.67 or ~5 σ). 2 One occurrence every three to five years or 2 occurrences in 1,000,000,000 units (Cpk ~ 2.00 OR ~6 σ). 1 Remote: Failure is unlikely One occurrence in greater than five years or less than two occurrences in 1,000,000,000 units (Cpk > 2.00 OR >6 σ). For batch failures use the time scale for unit failures use the unit scale. Dr. Gary Harbour, Pfizer EXAMPLE
  • 12. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 12 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT FMEA: Quantitation of Risk: Detection 10 Absolute Uncertainty The product is not inspected or the defect caused by the failure is not detectable. 9 Very Remote Product is sampled, inspected, and released based on Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) sampling plans. 8 Remote Product is accepted based on no defects in a sample. 7 Very Low Product is 100% manually inspected in the process. 6 Low Product is 100% manually inspected using go/no-go or other mistake-proofing gauges. 5 Moderate Some Statistical Process Control (SPC) is used in the process and product is final inspected off-line. 4 Moderately High SPC is used and there is immediate reaction to out-of-control conditions. 3 High An effective SPC program is in place with process capabilities (Cpk) greater than 1.33. 2 Very High All product is 100% automatically inspected. 1 Almost Certain The defect is obvious and there is 100% automatic inspection with regular calibration and preventive maintenance of the inspection equipment. Dr. Gary Harbour, Pfizer EXAMPLE
  • 13. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 13 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Severity / Probability / Detection (SPD) PhD R.C. Mendson, Menson & Associations, Inc ICH EWG London, March 2004 EXAMPLE
  • 14. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 14 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)  Severity (S) > Link to end product functional failure > Medical Department involvement  Probability (P) > Use historical data > Similar processes products  Detection > Method validation studies > Historical data EXAMPLE Takayoshi Matsumura, Eisai Co. Drying Process
  • 15. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 15 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Ranking Severity (S) Probability (P) Detection (D) 10 Death More than once a day Impossible to detect 9 ↓ 3 – 4 times a day Remote 8 Permanent injury Once a week Very slight 7 ↓ Once a month Slight 6 Temporary injury Once in three month Low 5 ↓ Once in half – one year Medium 4 Reported/ dissatisfied Once a year Moderately high 3 ↓ Once in 1 – 3 years High 2 Notice/ no report Once in 3 – 5 years Very High 1 ↓ Less than once in 5 years Virtually certain I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co EXAMPLE Drying Process
  • 16. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 16 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Process Potential Failure Mode Potential Cause S P D RPN 1. Set up contamination disheveled gown of operator insufficient cleaning of equipment 2. Start drying contamination damage of inlet-air filter degradation of product damage of thermometer 3. Maintain temperature long drying time unstable supply-air volume high Loss On Drying (LOD) damage of timer low LOD high dew-point non-uniformity of LOD uneven temperature distribution Drying Process I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co EXAMPLE RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
  • 17. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 17 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Existing controls: IPC of LOD and degradation product after drying process Drying Process Process Potential Failure Mode Potential Cause S P D RPN 1. Set up contamination disheveled gown of operator 3 5 8 120 insufficient cleaning of equipment 7 2 8 112 2. Start drying contamination damage of inlet-air filter 7 3 6 126 degradation of product damage of thermometer 7 3 3 63 3. Maintain temperature long drying time unstable supply-air volume 2 4 5 40 high LOD malfunction of timer 2 2 2 8 low LOD high due-point 3 3 3 27 non-uniformity of LOD uneven temperature distribution 3 5 3 45 I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Takayoshi Matsumura, Eisai Co EXAMPLE RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
  • 18. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 18 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Take action when RPN is over 100 Take action when severity is over 5 Remaining critical parameters after taking action; further controls required Drying Process Process Potential Cause RPN Recommended Action S P D RPN 1. Set up disheveled gown of operator 120 use long gloves and goggles 3 2 8 48 insufficient cleaning of equipment 112 change cleaning procedure 7 2 4 56 2. Start drying damage of inlet-air filter 126 change maintenance period 7 2 6 84 damage of thermometer 63 change calibration period 7 2 3 42 3. Maintain temperature unstable supply-air volume 40 ― 2 4 5 40 malfunction of timer 8 ― 2 2 2 8 high dew-point 27 ― 3 3 3 27 uneven temperature distribution 45 ― 3 5 3 45 I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Based on Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co. EXAMPLE RPN: Risk Priority Number = S*P*D
  • 19. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 19 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)  Analyse a granulation process step because only a few parameters are adjustable and many problems can occur by manual operations EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche Severity (Consequences): 3: high Predicted to cause significant impact to quality (failure to meet specifications) 2: moderate Predicted to cause minor impact to quality (failure to meet specifications) 1: minor Predicted to could have minor impact on quality of the product (quality within specifications) Probability 4: regular failures Expected to happen frequently 3: repeated failures Could happen occasionally 2: occasional failures Expected to happen infrequently 1: failure is unlikely Unlikely to happen Detectability 3: probably not detected May overlook a fault or failture possibly can not be detected (no technical solution up to now) 2: occasionaly not detected Failture may be missed (manual control, routinely work with statistical control) 1: detectable Failture can and will be detected (e.g. using statistical tools)
  • 20. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 20 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Risk Assessment Risk Reduction Sub-Step Event (Failure mode) Effect Severity (S) [1<2<3] Probability (P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability (D) [1<2<3] Risk factor (S*P*D) Actions: Risk reduction strategy Severity (S) [1<2<3] Probability (P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability (D) [1<2<3] Risk factor (S*P*D) Risk reduction Comments Wet seving Drying Temperature not meet specification of degradation 2 4 1 8 implement 2 temperature measures 1 1 1 1 7 automatically interruption by not meeting range; Temperatur monitoring in batch record Granulation Drying water content not meet specification of degradation 2 3 1 6 introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2 direct measurement; time consuming humidity measurement in the exausting air 2 1 2 4 2 indirect measurment; unspecifoc Granulation kneeding time not meet specification of dissolution 3 3 1 9 reduce personnal fluctuation 3 3 1 9 0 operator knowledge; depending on power consumption; automatisation not possible at that time Granulation power consumption not meet specification of dissolution 3 2 1 6 try to get to a minumum an optimum of kneeding time 3 2 1 6 0 depending on kneeding time depending on material properties Pre-mixing mixing time not meet specification of content uniformity 3 2 3 18 IPC measure on content uniformity 3 2 1 6 12 influence on efficacy Pre-mixing Granulation speed of adding water not meet specification of disolution and desintegration 3 3 3 27 Analyse (seeving of granulate sieve analysis); use of dosage pumps 3 2 1 6 21 to get fine appropriate granulate Pre-mixing Granulation manner of adding water not meet specification of disolution and desintegration 3 1 1 3 install spray nozzles 1 1 1 1 2 to get fine appropriate granulate Granulation Quality of Excipients all parameters have to be re-evaluated 3 4 3 36 Adapt internal specification of physical parameters (e.g. density, metability wetability) 1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier Granulation Quality of API all parameters have to be re-evaluated 3 4 3 36 Adapt internal specification of physical parameters (e.g. density, metability wetatility) 1 2 2 4 32 contact supplier Overview Risk before cotrol Max 36 Risk after control Max 9 32 Average 17 Average 4 10 Min 3 Min 1 0 Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche
  • 21. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 21 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2 Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Risk Assessment Sub-Step Event (Failure mode) Effect Severity (S) [1<2<3] Probability (P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability (D) [1<2<3] Risk factor (S*P*D) Granulation Drying water content not meet specification of degradation 2 3 1 6 Risk Reduction Actions: Risk reduction strategy Severity (S) [1<2<3] Probability (P) [1<2<3<4] Detectability (D) [1<2<3] Risk factor (S*P*D) Risk reduction Comments introduce online NIR 2 1 1 2 4 indirect measurment introduce IPC analytic 2 2 1 4 2 direct measurement; time consuming humidity measurement in the exaust air 2 1 2 4 2 indirect measurment; unspecific EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche
  • 22. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 22 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)  Prepare a risk profile Severity / Consequences i negligible ii marginal iii critical iv catastrophic Probability A frequent B moderate C occasional D rare E unlikely F very unlikely Consequences Risk protection level EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche Picture: © Zurich Insurance Ltd, Switzerland
  • 23. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 23 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)  Prepare a risk profile: Probability EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche
  • 24. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 24 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)  Risk Evaluation > Prepare a risk profile: Consequences EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche
  • 25. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 25 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)  Risk Evaluation > Prepare a risk profile: Consequences EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche
  • 26. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 26 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT  Risk Evaluation: Risk Profile > For high risks, which are not acceptable, risk reduction measures have to be taken as a high priority I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche
  • 27. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 27 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) How to perform? 3. Summary (Risk Evaluation) > The effects are rated in terms of their consequences and the causes are assessed in terms of their probabilities a) qualitative or b) quantitative > Based on these results a risk profile is completed. > In this profile the risks are compared with the risk protection level, which determines the accepted probability for defined consequences > Use as an aid to prioritise actions! EXAMPLE S. Rönninger, Roche
  • 28. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 28 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)  QRM for facilities, equipment and utilities Assess an existing compressed air system > Old approach: 60 “risks” should have been solved in detail > Initial RM-Approach:  4 sessions in total 16 people  153 potential risks discussed  34 Cases beyond the action limit  30 Corrective actions have been performed (- 50%) > Review of RM-Approach after inspection  Did you consider this hazard? - yes: show and explain rationale - yes, but start discussion for a yes/no decision - no: revisit initial risk assessment EXAMPLE
  • 29. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 29 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Experiences  Ease of applicability > Prospective tool > Good tool for operators to use > Can be used to identify critical steps for validation > More objective than Fault Tree Analysis > Covers minor risks EXAMPLE
  • 30. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 30 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.2: Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) Experiences  Limitations > Can be time and resource consuming > Mitigation plans must be followed up > Not a good tool for analysis of complex systems > Compound failure effects cannot be analyzed > Incorporating all possible factors requires a thorough knowledge of characteristics and performance of the different components of the system > Successful completion requires expertise, experience and good team skills > Dealing with data redundancies can be difficult Based on Takayoshi Matsumura, Esai Co EXAMPLE
  • 31. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 31 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT Annex I.3 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
  • 32. Annex I: Methods & Tools prepared by some members of the ICH Q9 EWG for example only; not an official policy/guidance July 2006, slide 32 ICH Q9 QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT I.3: Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (IEC 60812)  Extended to incorporate an investigation of the degree of severity of the consequences, their respective probabilities of occurrence and their detectability  The product or process specifications should be established  Identify places where additional preventive actions may be necessary to minimize risks Potential Areas of Use(s)  Utilized on failures and risks associated with manufacturing processes ICH Q9

Editor's Notes

  • #8: Self made scale