Qj V82 Spring 2009

CONNECTIONS
The Quarterly Journal

Volume VIII, Number 2 Spring 2009

Modern Developments in Defense Education............................................................. 1
Jim Barrett

A Gaming Approach to Enhancing Defense Resource Allocation.............................. 7
Todor Tagarev and Gueorgui Stankov

The Defense Policy of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic Since 1989:
Stages, Milestones, Challenges, Priorities, and Lessons Learned ............................. 17
Josef Prochazka

Missile Defense and NATO Security........................................................................ 35
Peppino A. DeBiaso

Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options ...................................... 45
Amy F. Woolf

GAO Report on NATO Enlargement: Albania and Croatia...................................... 75
Joseph A. Christoff, et al.

The Influence of the Neoconservative Movement on U.S. Foreign Policy............... 91
Arsenije Dusanic and Plamen P. Penev

i

Modern Developments in Defense Education
Jim Barrett *
Motivation
The first version of this paper was written for the members of a NATO-sponsored Ex-
pert Team, prior to one of the in-country visits described below. A description of de-
fense education would seem to be unnecessary for a group of experts, who were all
very familiar with the enterprise of military training and education. Perhaps. Nonethe-
less, there have been significant developments over the last decade or so, and there
may well be some differences of opinion among us on the importance or the future im-
pact of some of these changes. Moreover, our understanding of defense education is so
strongly influenced by our very different national experiences that we may not have an
accurate sense of the larger picture. It was with these caveats in mind that the earlier
version of this essay was written, in order to test our assumptions about how these new
developments will affect defense education structures and systems, to provoke reac-
tion, and thereby to serve as a basis for the team’s deliberations. This paper is offered
in that same spirit; comments, criticisms, and corrections will be welcome.

Modern Currents
The last fifteen years have seen remarkable growth and expansion in the area of de-
fense education. The training apparatus that prepares armed forces for conflict is now
seen as something more – an important educational system for the nation, and an im-
portant forum for multi-national cooperation on peace and security. Of course, the
training of forces for armed conflict remains the core mission of any military training
and education system; that fact alone distinguishes defense education from all other
educational systems.
But warfare has changed, and modern armies are responsible for much more than
the management of violence. Those of us who are in the business of military training
and education have seen remarkable changes in the education of officers (and also of
NCOs) in response to the modern perception of war as a broader spectrum of more
complex conflicts. Words like stabilization and reconstruction have become standard
parts of the vocabulary of defense education. Soldiers are expected to be knowledge-
able about underlying political and cultural issues and to be interoperable, not just with
the forces of allies, but also with civilian governmental and even non-governmental or-
ganizations. For the West, the current deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan daily bring
important lessons for the form and content of defense education in the new security en-

*
Dr. Jim Barrett was Co-chair of the Education for Reform Working Group of the Partnership
for Peace Consortium from 2006 until 2008. He is the former Director of Learning and Inno-
vation at the Canadian Defence Academy and former Vice Principal of the Royal Military
College of Canada. He is grateful for helpful conversations with Fred Labarre, David
Emelifeonwu, and John Berry.

1

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL

vironment. For newly independent and small states, on the other hand, a variety of dif-
ficult and complex unresolved conflicts closer to home can be expected to dominate
thinking about defense and security for years to come. Defense education is a long-
term investment, and its impact will only become clear over several years. Much of
that future will depend on how we design our educational systems today.
The preeminent new developments in defense education include:
• Substantially enhanced academic standards
• The growth in continuing professional military education
• International collaboration.
All of these are enabled and frequently stimulated by developments in distance
learning, distributed learning, and e-learning, which I will refer to simply by the col-
lective acronym DL. The transformative power of DL should not be underestimated,
but neither should it be taken for granted. The use and application of these forms of
learning is highly dependent on national culture and the state of local development.
Enhanced Academic Standards
Since the end of the Cold War there has been an almost universal enthusiasm for in-
creased academic standards in our defense institutions. The impact is evident at all
three institutional levels: the military academy, the staff college, and the national de-
fense college. The growing importance of academic standards has led to a vision of the
staff college in particular as a post-graduate institution, and to the development of new
masters’ degrees in military science. This has in turn given the military academy in-
creased importance. As staff colleges and national defense colleges seek to meet the
demands of higher academic standards, they find many of the scholars needed to im-
plement these more rigorous measures in the faculty of the military academy. These
professors and defense scholars, who are typically engaged in the military education of
cadets, are an important engine of defense education. This may be the strongest argu-
ment for the coordinated oversight and management of the three institutional levels as
a coherent system. Perhaps equally important, there are now increased linkages be-
tween military academies and colleges and civilian universities and colleges. In part,
this growth in civilian-military educational cooperation reflects a growing interest in
the civilian academic realm in matters of national defense and security. That is good
news, for universities are among the most stable and influential of a nation’s institu-
tions.
For European staff colleges, the Bologna Process sets a reasonable and achievable
common standard for what might be termed a “professional” masters’ degree, and this
has pushed some staff colleges to acquire university status. There are indications of a
parallel Erasmus militaire initiative more directly rooted in the defense academies,
which seeks to foster the exchange of officers, instructors, and curricula as a means to
increase interoperability and to foster a common defense and security culture in
Europe. One suspects that, in time, a de facto global academic standard will develop
for staff colleges, and even national defense colleges. The challenge will be to preserve

2

SPRING 2009

the essential military character of staff college instruction while accommodating aca-
demic processes and standards. This will demand thoughtful compromise by both aca-
demic and military authorities, and can be expected to take some time.
Continuing Professional Military Education
The need for continuing professional military education arises in part from the transi-
tion from the Cold War, and in part from the emergence of new, broader models of
warfare. All of these changes place a formidable learning burden on the modern offi-
cer. There is simply not enough time to include all the required curricula in existing
residential courses, nor is it efficient to learn all that new material out of context or in
situations that are too far removed from operational experience. As a result, we see the
emergence of hybrid programs, where part of a required course is provided in resi-
dence, and the remainder is offered by DL. Well-designed hybrid programs draw
strongly from the experience of the students. In some cases, the entire command and
staff qualification can be acquired by DL. These new modalities of program delivery
are proving to be useful for regular forces, and particularly so for the reserves. They
work best when introduced as part of a coherent defense education structure and ac-
companied by appropriate policies supported by senior authority.
One particularly challenging new element is the increased need for inter-agency
professional development. The so-called comprehensive approach—drawing on the
capacities of defense, diplomacy, and development—has attracted a fair bit of attention
and stimulated much debate that should in time produce some well-designed inter-
agency education programs. We now find more civilian students at the staff and na-
tional defense colleges, as well as some entirely new courses designed for public ser-
vants and other civilians. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is more prevalent in the
emerging democracies of the East than in the established ones of the West. More effort
is needed in this regard, although it may not be simple. The challenge arises not only
from the profound cultural divide between the military and civilian worlds, but also
from the asymmetry of resources and organizational talent available to military and ci-
vilian organizations. To be truly effective, we will need multi-national, inter-agency
education, which will by definition confront us with more and greater cultural and ca-
pability gaps that will need to be spanned.
International Collaboration
Long-term defense reform starts with defense education, and defense education reform
is a fully shared enterprise, where the newly independent states are the key players.
They, after all, have the greatest investment in regional security, and they have the best
understanding of their regions’ politics and culture. The challenge is to ensure that
these individual national and regional views are not overwhelmed by Western perspec-
tives and priorities. It is true that the dominant models of modern defense education are
Western, but some of the best thinking in defense education reform can be found in the
newly independent states. It may be that those states are more focused on preparing
their armies for the defense of the motherland, but defense education is fully compati-
ble with this mission, offers better prospects for long-term stability, and is not very ex-

3


pensive. Defense education addresses the key strategic questions of how the defense
and security of states can be achieved cooperatively, using the timeless tools of the
academy: study, debate, and teaching. It can only succeed with the active participation
of the regional players, with the cooperation of the West. How best might we promote
a balanced dialogue?
The answer may lie in the Defense Institution Building initiative articulated at the
2004 Istanbul Summit. Encouraged by NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and
by the United States and other sponsoring nations, the military and civilian academics,
educators, and administrators of our military academies and defense academies have
engaged in a collaborative PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution
Building) activity, known within the PfP Consortium as the Defense Education En-
hancement Project, or DEEP. This project has three major components. The first is the
development of a Reference Curriculum, and the second is an Educators’ Forum. Both
these activities are relatively well underway. The third component is a series of in-
country visits designed to assist partner nations with the development of their defense
education systems in support of an Individual Partner Action Plan (IPAP) or a Mem-
bership Action Plan (MAP). There have already been a number of in-country visits, but
this activity is less well defined than the other two, and we are still very much in a
learning mode. It will be important to assess and report on the visit process itself so
that, over time, an agreed approach and shared expectations will emerge.
The main efforts of international cooperation in defense education are aimed at
providing support to the defense colleges of new and emerging democracies through
the PAP-DIB/DEEP activities. While the academic products of these institutions are
important, the great prize is the interconnected, supportive human network that will
sustain not only defense education but also broader contact and dialogue between na-
tions. That support network is, by its design, balanced to ensure that the voices of the
reforming states will govern the process and pace of change. The new Reference Cur-
riculum is the result of this kind of collaboration. The best examples of its early appli-
cation are not simple reflections of the printed document, but new and independent
work done in-country and informed by the intellectual discourse that lies at the heart of
PAP-DIB.
The PAP-DIB Reference Curriculum is a construct familiar to any academic. It is
neither a template nor a doctrine, but rather an assembly of ideas designed to stimulate
thought and debate. There are three main themes within the curriculum: Public Ad-
ministration and Governance; Defense Management and Economics; and Ethics and
Leadership. The contributing scholars are drawn from three geopolitical areas:
NATO/PfP sponsoring nations, nations who have lived the transformation from the
Soviet bloc to national independence, and new Partner nations. The support network
can therefore be roughly described as a 3 x 3 x 3 matrix, with one axis representing
content, the second representing experience or national context, and the third axis rep-
resenting the three activities of content development, educators’ workshops, and in-
country visits. It is possible for any nation, regardless of its geopolitical power or stage
of development, to participate profitably within this general framework.

4

SPRING 2009

Conclusion
It is not possible to predict with any certainty what kinds of warfare today’s young
lieutenants will face when they become colonels and generals. Climate change and en-
vironmental decay will bring new conflicts, which will require new means of resolu-
tion. But over our lifetimes and in our many nations we have accumulated a rich body
of experience and have gained many insights. Drawing on our collected knowledge, we
have much to teach each other. Some of the most interesting and innovative develop-
ments in defense education can be found in the newer democracies, which are often
less constrained by old habits and old assumptions. The PAP-DIB/DEEP project gives
us the framework and the tools to learn together, to debate our ideas, and to share our
wisdom. We have an opportunity now to build on that framework, to extend it and,
most of all, to exploit it for our national and at the same time our mutual benefit.

5

A Gaming Approach to Enhancing Defense Resource
Allocation
Todor Tagarev and Gueorgui Stankov *
Summary
This article describes the approach and the experience of the Defense and Force Man-
agement Department at the “G. S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College in Sofia, Bul-
garia in conducting interactive simulations that support decision making on force
structure, force development programs, and the respective allocation of resources. The
primary purpose of the simulation is to educate students (mostly senior military and ci-
vilian MOD personnel) in the intricacies of defense planning and programming in a
changing environment, and to provide hands-on experience in defense programming
and budgeting. In addition, it allows participants to explore the space of potential pol-
icy alternatives, force structuring, and programming decisions, thus serving as a power-
ful decision-support tool.

Introduction
In transparent defense management systems, decisions about the allocation of re-
sources—personnel, weapon systems and equipment, infrastructure, and money—are
clearly related to policy objectives and priorities. However, the link between policy
objectives and resource allocation is not straightforward. Intricate methods and models
are used to define requirements, match a given solution to a requirement, aggregate in-
dividual solutions, analyze the costs of force structures, and manage the development
of the armed forces.
Experienced defense policy makers and planners are aware that even in mature de-
fense planning systems, where the assumption is that rationality in decision making
prevails, the provision of transparency is a daunting task. The armed forces are com-
monly expected to conduct diverse operations and perform a variety of other tasks un-
der conditions that often do not lend to advance clarification. Perceptions and expecta-
tions change, on the part of both political leaders and the societies that empower them.
It is particularly difficult to predict the amount of money that these actors will be will-
ing to invest in defense, especially in the medium and long term. People and organiza-
tions within the defense establishment aggressively compete for their share of the de-
fense budget. And these are only a few among the factors that render the environment

*
Dr. Todor Tagarev is a Senior Research Fellow at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and
Head of its Center for Security and Defense Management. Col. Gueorgui Stankov serves at
the J6 Directorate of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. At the time of writing
this article they were respectively Head and Senior Assistant Professor at the Defense and
Force Management Department of “G. S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College in Sofia.

7


in which force development and resource allocation decisions are made one of
significant uncertainty.1
Yet in a democratic societies decision makers are accountable to the citizens for the
way they use limited societal resources to raise and sustain armed forces. Therefore, a
student of security and defense matters is expected to understand the principles of de-
fense planning and resource allocation, including the principle of transparency, and to
be aware of the need and the methods for preserving transparency under the impact of
unforeseen events.
It was with this belief in mind that in 2004 the leadership of the National Security
and Defense faculty of the “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College in Sofia decided
to include a game simulating defense planning and resource allocation decision making
in the curricula of all of its master’s programs and a number of other courses.2 A simi-
lar game was specially developed for training senior defense civilians and military staff
in Ukraine. The game was conducted at the National Defense Academy of Ukraine in
Kiev in May 2008, and is judged to be very successful.
This essay presents the game as conducted at the “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and
Staff College and briefly describes the supporting computer tool. It then builds on the
rich educational experience that the game offered, and provides ideas for how such in-
teractive simulations can be used as a decision-support tool. The concluding portion of
the essay emphasizes the usefulness of such decision-making simulations for the devel-
opment of military and civilian expertise and the advancement of democratic civil-
military relations.

Goals and Objectives
The primary goal of the simulation is to educate military and civilian students in the
principles of defense planning and program-based defense resource management. It
enhances students’ understanding of important linkages in defense policy making,
force development, and budget planning; provides first-hand experience in the process
of linking security and defense policy objectives to program decisions to budget pro-

1
Paul Davis describes this uncertainty as “massive” and “ubiquitous.” For details refer to Paul
K. Davis, “Lessons from Defense Planning and Analysis for Thinking about Systems of
Systems,” WR-459-OSD, Prepared for the Symposium on Complex System Engineering
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 2007); Paul K. Davis, “Strategic Planning
Amidst Massive Uncertainty in Complex Adaptive Systems: the Case of Defense Planning,”
in Unifying Themes in Complex Systems, vol. IIIB: New Research, eds. Ali A. Minai and
Yaneer Bar-Yam (Berlin: Springer, 2006), 201–14.
2
This decision was made after the presentation of a very successful one-week game in the
“G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College at the end of 2003 by the U.S. Institute for
Defense Analysis (IDA, www.ida.org). The authors gratefully acknowledge the impetus
provided by IDA in 2003 and the permission to use the supporting tools. Since 2004, both
the concept for the game and the supporting tools underwent considerable evolution, in
which the authors played key roles. Therefore, we bear full responsibility for the text
presented herein.

8

SPRING 2009

posals; and allows the students to appreciate the role of key defense policy and plan-
ning documents. Furthermore, the simulation increases understanding of the ways un-
certainty is accounted for, and trains the students in the application of key mechanisms
for the incorporation of changes in the planning environment while preserving the in-
tegrity of a defense policy.
The second goal of the game is to provide an exercise in role playing. As a result of
the simulation, a participating student is expected to better understand the difference
between expert and decision-making roles in designing defense policy, and the par-
ticular interactions among variety of stakeholders: civilians and military, political lead-
ership and experts, as well as among staff with different functional responsibilities.
The third goal in the design of the simulation was to provide decision support to
defense policy and resource allocation deliberations. The fourth (and final goal) of the
game is relevant both to students and decision makers. Based on “best practice” mod-
els, the simulation allows students to compare existing and potential future processes
of defense resource decision making to current best practices in the field, and to iden-
tify important process gaps.3 It is further useful in identifying data and information re-
quirements, as well as highlighting the necessary methodological, analytical, and
training support required for the efficient implementation of advanced defense plan-
ning and resource management.4

Approach
To meet the stated goals (and building on the IDA approach and tools), the team at the
Defense and Force Management Department, led by Todor Tagarev, designed an inter-
active simulation, or game, under the title “Decision making in managing force devel-
opment.” The simulation is conducted with students in the master’s programs under the
faculty of National Security and Defense, as well as with students drawn from a num-
ber of additional post-graduate courses. The game usually runs for four days, with six
periods in class each day.5 In addition, students are expected to work on game assign-
ments in their time out of class.

3
See Handbook on Long-Term Defense Planning, RTO Technical Report 69 (Paris: NATO
Research and Technology Organization, April 2003), available at http://www.rta.nato.int/
Pubs/ RDP.asp?RDP=RTO-TR-069; Guide to Capability-Based Planning, TR-JSA-TP3-2-
2004 (TTTCP Joint Systems and Analysis Group, Technical Panel 3, MORS Workshop,
October 2004), available at http://www.mors.org/meetings/cbp/read/TP-3_CBP.pdf; and
Todor Tagarev, “Introduction to Program-based Defense Resource Management,” Con-
nections: The Quarterly Journal 5:1 (Spring-Summer 2006): 55–69, available at
https://consortium.pims.org/introduction-to-program-based-defense-resource-management-0.
4
The first two of the goals are educational. The latter two were addressed within project
SfP 981149 “Operations Research Support to Force and Operations Planning in the New Se-
curity Environment,” financed partially by the NATO Science for Peace program.
5
Alternatively, the game may be conducted over three days, with eight periods in class per
day. One class period equals forty-five minutes. Thus, the game includes eighteen hours of
total class time.

9


Structure
The game is based on the security, economic, and social environment and policies of
an imaginary country, with a notional organization of decision-making bodies and a
typical armed forces structure. It is organized in nine blocks: an introductory block,
seven interactive sessions, and a concluding block with a discussion on practical chal-
lenges. In the interactive sessions, in working groups of six to ten students, game par-
ticipants are asked to:
• Analyze the security and social environment and reach an agreement on
defense policy objectives and priorities
• Analyze planning scenarios and derive capability requirements
• Agree on a draft defense programming guidance
• Design force development programs
• Make program decisions and propose a “Program Decision Memorandum”
• Discuss and propose a defense budget
• Propose changes in force development during budget execution and assess the
impact on the level of defense capabilities.
This structuring of the game in sessions (or process phases, as presented in Figure
1) roughly emulates current best practices in defense policy making, programming, and
budgeting.6 One major difference is that the design of force development programs and
the program decisions are included in the process of deciding on future force struc-
tures. One of the reasons for this—one that is commonly acknowledged in the defense
planning community—is that whether or not a future force structure is affordable and
achievable depends to a great extent on the force’s current situation (force size, opera-
tional engagements, legacy systems and their remaining life time). Another reason that
is particularly salient for Bulgaria and other countries with immature defense institu-
tions and defense planning and financial management mechanisms is that standing
long-term defense plans—although sanctioned at the highest governmental level—are
often unaffordable.7 What makes such cases even more complicated is that defense
ministries sign procurement contracts not according to programs, constrained by offi-
cial budget forecasts, but in response to requirements in long-term plans, while addi-
tional procurement cases and other resource-intensive proposals are pushed through the
decision pipeline. A third reason is simple practicality—such simplification permits in-

6
For details, see Todor Tagarev, “The Art of Shaping Defense Policy: Scope, Components,
Relationships (but no Algorithms),” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 5:1 (Spring-Sum-
mer 2006): 15–34, available at https://consortium.pims.org/the-art-of-shaping-defense-
policy-scope-components-relationships-but-no-algorithms; and Todor Tagarev, “Introduction
to Program-based Defense Resource Management.”
7
See, for example, Bulgaria’s “Plan for Organizational Development and Modernization of
the Armed Forces till 2015,” approved by the Council of Ministers with Ordnance # 301 of
2004, State Gazette 103 (November 2004).

10

SPRING 2009

Simulated country,
security environment,
security policy

Defence Policy
Objectives
(Missions &
Ambitions)
Scenarios,
Required
Capabiities,
Priorities
Programming
Guidance
Design of
Force
Development
Programs
Program
Decision
Memorandum

Drafting
Defence
Budget

Capability levels
Budget
Execution
Budget execution
report

Figure 1: The Process of Defense Resource Allocation Used in the Simulation.

structors to shorten the duration of the game. Other simplifications are described be-
low.
At the end of each session, the working groups report to a plenary group. Thus,
game participants are aware of and can compare alternative views. They are also
tasked to identify the advantages and disadvantages of selected alternatives.
Roles
During the interactive sessions, game participants play roles. Depending on the ses-
sion, each working group acts as:
• Defense Council in interactive session 1
• Defense Requirements Council in interactive session 2
• Programming Council in interactive sessions 3, 5, 6 and 7
• Program Teams in interactive session 4.
Such advisory bodies and program teams really exist in the defense establishment
of Bulgaria, which makes it easier for an experienced defense practitioner to associate
himself or herself with a given role—such as Deputy Minister of Defense for policy,
personnel, or acquisition; Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations; Chief of
Staff of the Land Forces, the Air Force, or the Navy, etc. During the game each par-
ticipant plays two types of roles: one that is close to his or her background (e.g., a
military officer plays the role of a flag officer) and one that is atypical (e.g., an officer
playing the role of a civilian deputy minister). This approach enables the leaders of the
simulation to make the game rather realistic. Approximately half the members of a
simulated advisory body have relevant expertise and contribute to informed decision

11


making, while often bringing with them the views typical of and the loyalties implicit
to a particular defense organization. At the same time, each participant has the oppor-
tunity to get within the skin of someone on the “other side,” to understand what drives
them and better appreciate their respective rationales.
In the simulation, just like in real life, participants are tasked to act within a rational
framework, but the decisions they make collectively reflect the mixture of perceptions,
individual experiences and preferences, priorities, and loyalties of the particular stu-
dents in that group. Since each group has a different combination of participants, with
a different set of experiences, the decisions they make are thus inherently subjective.
Coping with Uncertainty
During the game the participants are forced to adapt previous decisions, plans, and
programs to unforeseen events or other changes in the environment, just like leaders of
the defense establishment in real life. In each realization of the simulation we prefer to
use events that are clearly related to current hot-button issues. The following are
among the events most often used in simulations:
• The international community decides to intervene in a conflict region and the
country decides to contribute, perhaps deploying a battalion-size unit to an
allied force or a coalition. The approved defense budget did not foresee such
an operation, and the decision of the parliament to send troops abroad does
not provide for additional financing. Therefore, the cost of the unforeseen
participation has to be covered within the defense budget.
• A natural disaster occurs, such as a flood, massive forest fire, or earthquake.
In response, the government decides to finance certain activities in order to
alleviate the negative consequences to the population. Part of that financing is
from the previously forecasted (or, depending on the game phase, approved)
defense budget.
• The Minister of Defense decides to make an expensive procurement—e.g., to
buy a ship—within the budget-planning phase or within budget execution,
while such procurement is not included in the respective defense program.
• An accident in a depot where surplus ammunition is stored leads to casualties
among the civilian population, and the government decides to speed up the
process of utilization (without providing any addition to the defense budget).
• The economic and financial environment during budget implementation dif-
fers considerably from the one anticipated during planning and programming,
for example:
o The real rate of inflation is twice the forecasted one
o The dollar value of the national currency increases (or drops), while
payments on signed contracts are to be made in dollars
o The price of fuel increases dramatically, thus raising the cost of
training programs

12

SPRING 2009

Figure 2: Relating Objectives, Force Structure, and Program and Budget Decisions
in a Changing Force Development Environment.

o The labor market becomes more competitive, and military salaries
need to be increased in order to meet recruitment targets.
Such events may be introduced in any of the interactive sessions, and are always
introduced in sessions six and seven.
Game participants are then tasked to find affordable solutions while still preserving
the transparency of the linkages from security objectives to missions and defense am-
bitions to capability requirements and force structure to defense activities and capabil-
ity levels. In practice, the players are able to search for only a limited number of solu-
tions, using the feedback loops presented in Figure 2.

Supporting Computer Tool
The conduct of the game is supported by a computer tool, which is a spreadsheet in
Microsoft Excel. The tool automates all calculations, including costing, as well as the
transition from program costs to budget. Relevant to the concept of the simulations, the
tool is simple and realistic, allowing participants to keep their focus on the main issues
and leverages in force structuring and programming, namely:
• Personnel levels
• Percentage of conscripts among the enlisted personnel
• Level of training
• Major procurement projects
• Disposal of excess equipment and infrastructure

13


• Planned contributions to operations.
The tool automatically sums up data from all programs, immediately visualizing the
main defense planning parameters. For example, it aggregates (potential) budget re-
quests, highlighting the difference between the cost of all programs and the fiscal guid-
ance. In addition, the tool allows a straightforward merging of programmatic informa-
tion from different sources—for example, of programs developed by two or more
working groups. The computer tool provides for reasonable protection of the model
structure and the built-in data from unauthorized interference by students. Thus, only
instructors can make changes in the program structure, costing factors, elements with
an impact on the fiscal guidance, and other essential features. Finally, the use of com-
mercial-off-the-shelf software such as Excel spreadsheets is considered an efficient ap-
proach to the simulation, as there are no special requirements for software licenses, in-
stallation and maintenance competencies, etc.

Using the Simulation as a Decision Support Tool
Over the last five years the simulation has proved to be one of the most effective ways
to educate students in the complexities of defense policy making, planning, and re-
source management. For mid-career officers and civilians, as well as for new political
appointees in Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defense, it is particularly useful in revisiting ma-
jor factors and clarifying relationships in setting defense policy and plans, translating
policy objectives into budget decisions, and reiterating the need for a rational and
transparent decision making process. In addition, it is a promising tool to support the
process of defense policy making and planning, and has already been used in this ca-
pacity (albeit with limited objectives).
Such interactive simulations with decision makers, people playing particular roles,
or a mix of participants can be used to discuss and rationalize the major “dimensions”
of defense policy—ambitions, operations, manpower policy, technological level and
defense industrial ambitions, budget levels, etc.—and rationalize the process of priori-
tization. It can be further used to generate rough approximations of qualitatively differ-
ent force structure alternatives, and thus quickly explore the space of viable force
structures. With such alternatives in place, game participants may define and discuss
the pros and cons of force structures that are considered acceptable and can be sus-
tained within anticipated defense budget levels. Given a change in the force develop-
ment environment—the necessity to meet urgent and unforeseen requirements, macro-
economic parameters that differ significantly from the ones used during programming
and budget planning, etc.—the simulation can support the generation, analysis, and
selection of new program alternatives, reflecting the consequent changes in budget,
readiness levels, procurement plans, etc. (We would add a note of caution: it should
not be expected that such an approach will result in detailed, meticulously costed force
structures and programs that can be turned directly into force development, budgeting,
or procurement decisions. While the simulation can be helpful as a decision support
tool, it is not intended to produce defense policy fully-formed).

14

SPRING 2009

On two occasions in 2007, senior Bulgarian defense officials (including a deputy
minister of defense, and directors and department heads from the defense ministry)
participated in simulations conducted by the Defense and Force Management Depart-
ment with mixed groups of senior officers and civilian students. Decision makers lis-
tened to and analyzed working group reports during plenary sessions. The main focus
in these cases was on:
• Structuring and defining defense ambitions
• Establishing alternative approaches to partitioning defense capabilities, in par-
ticular the way in which alternative representations of capabilities are per-
ceived
• Deriving capability requirements from the analysis of planning scenarios.8

Conclusion
Interactive simulations such as the one described in this article can help make complex
theories clearer, and present students with the opportunity to apply theoretical princi-
ples and approaches, develop critical thinking skills, and provide “a welcome relief
from the everyday tasks of reading and preparing for classes.”9 In fields with few abso-
lutes—like that of defense policy making, planning, and resource allocation—partici-
pants in a simulation can explore the main issues through experimentation, interacting
with and learning from fellow students.
We found the creation of incentives through competition to be of particular value.10
Game participants are divided into teams that are permanent throughout the game. All
teams report on the same assignment at the end of each interactive session. Although
the faculty always claim that there is no “textbook” solution to the assignment, the mo-
tivation of students increases throughout the stages of the game, and teams almost
without exception try to outperform the others. An additional benefit of this competi-
tive approach is the opportunity it provides to check and compare the validity of the re-
sults against the solutions of other teams.
Finally, our experience confirms and reinforces the finding that human gaming is
essential in exploratory analysis supporting defense planning amidst massive uncer-
tainty.11 Hence, interactive simulations hold the potential to be a powerful tool in sup-
port of decision making on defense policy, planning, and resource allocation.

8
At the time these were novel and methodologically challenging issues for policy makers and
planners in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense.
9
Michael D. Kanner, “War and Peace: Simulating Security Decision Making in the Class-
room,” PS: Political Science & Politics 40:4 (October 2007): 795–800.
10
For this and other principles involved in using interactive simulations with senior defense
personnel, refer to Hari Bucur-Marcu and Cătălin-Marius Târnăcop, “Defense Institution
Building: Training in Support of Defense Planning,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal
5:1 (Spring-Summer 2006): 103–15.
11
Davis, “Strategic Planning Amidst Massive Uncertainty in Complex Adaptive Systems: The
Case of Defense Planning.”

15

The Defense Policy of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic
Since 1989: Stages, Milestones, Challenges, Priorities, and
Lessons Learned
Josef Prochazka *
The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the perception of international security
and the subsequent formulation of security and defense policies in both Western and
Eastern bloc countries. The newly established political leadership in the formerly
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe had to struggle to adapt their de-
fense policies to a new politico-strategic environment while dealing with the many
challenges of democratic governance. Furthermore, the transformation of these states
also required a transition from a centrally-planned economy to free market structures.
The Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR)—known since 1 January 1993 (after
its peaceful dissolution) as the Czech Republic (CR)—was no exception to this proc-
ess. The CSFR’s primary goal after the Velvet Revolution1 was to establish a liberal
democracy and a free market economy in the light of Western political and economic
values.2 Ensuring external and internal security has been always seen as an integral part
of those overall objectives; thus, the key steps of the transition from communism in the
Czech Republic were profoundly connected with security and defense policy formula-
tion and its execution.
This essay examines the main drivers shaping the defense policy of the CSFR and
CR since 1989. It also charts its evolution in the form of defense sector reforms. This
project also identifies the most important lessons learned, which may be useful for fu-
ture defense policy formulation and execution in small and medium-size countries that
are undergoing the process of military transformation as an integral part of their overall
democratization.
For the purpose of this project, “defense policy” is understood as a program for de-
fending a country against its enemies and as a set of all necessary precautions taken by
one state in order to safeguard and strengthen its external security. Defense policy is a
process, with objectives and priorities. The political leadership of the CSFR and CR
has always strived to adopt a liberal defense policy that reflects developments in the
national and international security environment, national values and interests, and that

*
Josef Prochazka (LTC, ret.) has been responsible since 2007 for strategic planning within the
Defense Policy and Strategy Division of the Czech Ministry of Defense. He previously
served as the deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the Czech Defense Uni-
versity. He writes on strategic management, strategic planning, and the management of de-
fense resources.
1
The so-called Velvet Revolution, by which Czechoslovakia shook off Communist rule, began
on 17 November 1989 with student demonstrations in Prague.
2
Thomas Szayna and James Steinberg, Civil-Military Relations and National Security Think-
ing in Czechoslovakia: A Conference Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
1992), 24.

17


takes account of the resources available to small, rapidly developing countries. The
central questions addressed in this essay are how successful was this process and what
could have been accomplished more effectively?
The formulation and execution of defense policy in the CSFR and CR were more or
less successful. One could consider the Czech Republic as a very successful country in
this context.3 On the other hand, not all of the visions, strategies, and plans that were
contemplated by the new Czech state became a reality, and there exists an excellent
opportunity to analyze the causes behind these setbacks in order to share valuable ex-
perience and lessons learned.
This paper charts the development and execution of the defense policy of the CSFR
and the CR, and identifies four distinct periods in this almost twenty-year-long process:
• Democratization
• Integration
• Reforms
• Transformation.
Each of these periods was driven by different objectives, trends, and events. Fur-
thermore, each period was reflected as the official defense policy of the Czech Repub-
lic in strategic and conceptual documents approved by the Czech Parliament.

The Military in Czech Society
Starting Position
No independent formulation and execution of defense policy existed during the Com-
munist era in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak People’s Armed Forces (CPAF) were
shaped—in their structure, equipment, doctrine, and support—according to Soviet of-
fensive strategy. In comparison to the country’s population, economy, and resources,
the CPAF were relatively robust, heavily equipped, and supported by a substantial de-
fense industry. The Czech military during this era was entirely controlled by the gov-
erning Communist Party; most generals and high-ranking officers were members of the
Communist Party, and all officers were loyal to and active supporters of the totalitarian
regime. The CSFR was a member of the Warsaw Pact and, since the 1968 invasion,
Soviet armed forces operated on its territory.4 Forces under high operational readiness

3
The U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said in September 1995 on a visit to the Czech
Republic that the country was leading Central Europe’s race to join NATO, and that it had
made more progress toward democracy than any other nation in the region. (Associated Press
Worldstream, 19 September 1995.)
4
One of the new government’s first acts was to suggest talks with Moscow on the future of the
80,000 Soviet soldiers that had been stationed in Czechoslovakia since the Warsaw Pact in-
vasion that crushed the reforms of 1968. See “Czech Party Names New Government,” St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, 4 December 1989.

18

SPRING 2009

were stationed along the nation’s western border, while low-readiness forces, military
schools, and supporting elements were located in the eastern part of the country.5
Czech society’s opinion of the CPAF was very low, because these forces had been
ineffective in repelling either the 1938 German invasion or the 1968 Soviet takeover.
Furthermore, the CPAF were misused by the Communist regime to stop public demon-
strations against the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 and the so-called “Normalization
Process,” which was initiated in August 1969.
Democratization (1989–1992)
The period of democratization in Czech society began on 17 November 1989. In this
era, the nation’s defense policy focused primarily on depoliticizing the CPAF by ap-
plying democratic control principles based on the Western democratic model. This
objective was seen as a matter of urgency because the new political leadership saw the
CPAF as a potential threat to the democratization process in society as a whole.6
This approach to defense policy was driven by the assumption that the danger of
nuclear holocaust had disappeared. As a result of this assumption (and the anticipated
peace dividend), the defense budget in the CSFR and other countries was reduced,
along with their defense capability. Nevertheless, the new world proved to be a dan-
gerous place, filled with new challenges. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union demonstrated this fact and threatened the security and defense interests of the
Czech Republic.
In November 1990, the Czech government approved The Concept for the Devel-
opment of the Czechoslovak Army by the End of 1993, which outlined the relocation of
units and called for massive reductions in personnel, weapon systems, and infrastruc-
ture. Additional restructuring included changes in the command and force structure. At
the same time, a more defensive military strategy and doctrine for the CSFR had been
adopted in March 1991. Czech defense policy during this period stressed the impor-
tance of independent territorial defense of the entire country against a non-specified
opponent instead of its former anti-NATO orientation.
Concurrently, domestic defense industry research, development, and production
potential and capabilities had been reduced through conservation of military produc-
tion, restructuring, and privatization of state-owned factories. This process did not
have a significant negative impact on the economic and social stability of the country
(the Slovak part of the country was affected more seriously, due to its greater reliance

5
As of 31 December 1989, the CSPA’s main combat force comprised fifteen ground divisions,
two air force divisions, two air defense divisions, an artillery division, and a number of sur-
face-to-air missile units. Some 210,000 personnel were on active duty, of whom 148,595
were conscripts and 61,405 were military professionals—41,715 generals and other officers
and 19,690 non-commissioned officers (NCOs).The CSPA also employed about 80,000 ci-
vilian staff.
6
Miroslav Tuma, Relics of Cold War Defense Transformation in the Czech Republic (Stock-
holm: International Peace Research Institute, Policy Paper No. 14, September 2006); avail-
able at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP14.pdf.

19


on defense production). The critical issue of this period became the withdrawal of So-
viet military forces to the Russian Federation. This objective was successfully com-
pleted—almost exactly in parallel to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Treaty—on 30
June 1991.7
Unfortunately, due to historical resentments and the arrogance of both the Czech
and Slovak political leadership, the unity of the CSFR became fragile after the revolu-
tion. The union of the two in the form of Czechoslovakia was peacefully dissolved on
31 December 1992. The military assets of the former state were divided between the
Czech and Slovak Republics in a fair and pragmatic way, in proportion to their respec-
tive population (the ratio was approximately 2:1).
By the end of 1992, the democratization stage had been successfully completed.
The armed forces were controlled by the civilian minister of defense, and had been
completely depoliticized. The Communist political architecture in the ministry of de-
fense was abolished. This ministry’s structure was changed in the spring of 1991, and
clear lines were drawn between civilian and military responsibilities. The discredited
generals, officers, and members of the counter-intelligence service left the armed
forces after several screening processes were conducted. More importantly, decisions
about further development of the armed forces and their eventual operational use were
to be made in accordance with the newly adopted constitution and respective laws by a
democratically elected government. The position of an Inspector General, who was in-
tended to oversee the armed forces, was created in December 1990. His duties in-
cluded performing inspections and preparing parliamentary reports concerning defense
policy and strategy implementation, defense spending, and the level of military prepar-
edness. Most importantly, the armed forces remained politically neutral during the first
years following the Velvet Revolution. This neutrality and loyalty to the new political
leadership had a positive impact on the democratic development of the country and the
peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia into its two successor republics.
The defense policy that was in place during this period reflected the need to display
support for international peace and stability. This resulted in the deployment of a
chemical unit as a part of a coalition force during Operation Desert Storm during the
first Gulf War (1990–91) and in participation by one infantry battalion in UN peace-
keeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a part of UNPROFOR in 1992. Both
operations were successfully accomplished and contributed to gains in valuable opera-
tional experience within the Czech military. As a direct result of these deployments, the
image of the armed forces in Czech society improved significantly.

7
Officials in Czechoslovakia wanted to replace both Cold War blocs (NATO and Warsaw
Pact) with a pan-European collective security system based on the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. They believed that this arrangement would overcome the East-
West dichotomy. They called for the withdrawal of U.S troops from Europe as well. They
also considered Czechoslovak neutrality as an option (as reflected in Henry Kissinger’s pro-
posal in July 1990). See Szayna and Steinberg, Civil-Military Relations and National
Security Thinking in Czechoslovakia, 26.

20

SPRING 2009

The formulation of defense policy during this period was negatively influenced by
the new political leadership’s lack of expertise in security matters in general, and in de-
fense in particular. It resulted in unrealistic assessments of future needs and the role of
the armed forces. Due to these errors, questionable modernization programs were
adopted during this era.
Obviously, after the massive defense budgets of the Communist era, the Czech
military budget saw dramatic cutbacks. As a result of these reductions, research, devel-
opment, and new procurement projects had to be more or less frozen. Furthermore, the
armed forces were required to reduce their manpower and operational costs signifi-
cantly. It accomplished this by decreasing staff, reducing training activities, and short-
ening the time for compulsory service from twenty-four to eighteen months.
Integration (1993–1999)
The process of integrating the Czech Republic into Western political and military
structures started before the formal offer of NATO membership was extended in 1997.8
In September 1990 and in the spring of 1991, the NATO Secretary-General visited the
CSFR, and Czech officials expressed their hope of one day joining NATO, which was
neither politically nor militarily prepared for enlargement at this time.
The execution of defense policy in the Czech Republic was still influenced by the
reductions in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and by the ongoing
tensions in the Balkans (the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which started in 1995,
and in Kosovo, which began in 1999). These conflicts seriously threatened security and
stability not only in the general European region, but in the Czech Republic as well.
These conflicts proved that future challenges would require a strong military. Further-
more, international solutions were required that were far superior to the capabilities of
the UN-led peacekeeping force. The spectrum of threats and risks to the security of the
Czech Republic were widening during this period, leading to an increased emphasis on
the need for security cooperation and collective action instead of independent defense
arrangements. A large, conventional attack against the Czech Republic was considered
unlikely, but various smaller threats were proliferating.
Based on this development, the strategic objectives of Czech defense policy in this
integration stage were clearly defined. After initial political discussions concerning
future territorial defense requirements, the country’s geostrategic position in Europe,
its economic possibilities, resource limitations, and possible future security and de-
fense interests, the Czech Republic determined to pursue NATO membership and sup-
port the broad-ranging effort to strengthen relations with the West. These efforts were
not restricted to the armed forces, but also included the realms of politics and eco-
nomics. As a matter of fact, this objective enjoyed both public and political support
across the entire political spectrum and resulted in enhanced interest on the part of the

8
“Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic,” available at
www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8344/3.doc.

21


political leadership in the country’s future security and defense needs.9 Persistent and
vocal opposition from Russia was viewed as the most serious obstacle to this integra-
tion process.10
During this seven-year integration stage, there were several important strategic and
conceptual documents that were elaborated by the ministry of defense and adopted by
the Czech government, which will be discussed below. The first important step taken
was that the position of the minister of defense was significantly altered. Unfortunately,
there had been four ministers of defense between 1993 and 1999, each with different
ideas concerning how the defense sector should be reformed.11
Another challenge that had to be confronted was the fact that there was still a very
limited ability within the ministry of defense and the armed forces to think strategically
and conceptually, despite efforts by Western countries to educate defense sector per-
sonnel and to provide some kind of expertise. The first tangible result in the process of
Western integration was achieved when the Czech Republic was admitted to the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council on 1 January 1993. In the wake of this step, the Czech
Republic joined the NATO Partnership for Peace on 10 March 1994, and then signed
an associated partnership agreement with the Western European Union on 9 May 1994.
Between 1993 and 1997, the Czech defense budget did not allow for a qualitative
change in the armed forces in terms of modernization of equipment, conduct of needed
training, and improvement of working conditions.12 As a result, two separate and dis-
tinct forces were being created. The Rapid Reaction Forces were high-priority forces,
designed to be deployable and interoperable with troops from other NATO allies. The
Territorial Forces were lower priority forces responsible mainly for territorial de-
fense.13 Furthermore, in an effort to cut operational costs, the Air Force retired 20 per-
cent of its equipment. Other steps that were taken included reducing the command

9
When the Czech Republic became a member of NATO, 66.9 percent of the population sup-
ported accession to membership, while 22.6 percent opposed it, and 10.5 percent held no
opinion. Even more interesting fact was that 80 percent of the armed forces’ professional
soldiers supported entry into NATO. See Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak
Republic, A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Lit-
tlefield Publishers, 2004), 79.
10
The Security Policy of the Czech Republic (Prague: Institute of International Relations,
1997), 17.
11
Jeri Sedivy, “Czech Military Transformation,” NATO Review (Spring 2005); available at
www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/analysis.html.
12
As the Czech Republic’s first minister of defense, Antonym Bauds, noted in 1993, the
Communist-inspired symbols that decorated the main meeting room of the ministry of de-
fense could be easily removed, but it was much more difficult to transform the Czech armed
forces into a modern military of the Western type. See Czech National News Wire (26 Janu-
ary 1993).
13
In the early 1990s, territorial defense still played an important role in Czech defense policy.
See the Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic of 9 June 1993 (No. 297) on
the negotiation of the Concept for the Development of the Army of the Czech Republic by
1996; available at http://racek.vlada.cz/usneseni.

22

SPRING 2009

structure from six to three levels,14 cutting the length of compulsory service from eight-
een to twelve months, and adopting the concept of semi-professional armed forces.15
Mobilization measures, reserves, and defense industry capability were still seen as
essential components of defense policy, but they drained significant resources from the
military budget.
Defense concepts adopted in 1997 and 1999 reflected NATO requirements, and
were oriented toward the long term.16 However, successful implementation of these
concepts was compromised by inadequate and poorly managed resources. This unsys-
tematic approach resulted in a loss of prospective personnel, who were not motivated
enough to stay in this unstable environment—characterized by low salaries, limited ca-
reer opportunities, mismanagement, an eroding organizational culture, and ineffective
military budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes.
Before the Czech Republic joined NATO on 12 March 1999, the Czech armed
forces had fulfilled the military requirements for membership. Through this process,
secure and interoperable communication and exchange of information were ensured,
airfield infrastructures were modernized, and necessary logistical arrangements for
possible NATO reinforcement on Czech territory were established.
Security and defense issues had never played a substantial role in Czech domestic
policy up to this point. However, the decision to strive for NATO membership repre-
sented a turning point in this situation during the second half of the 1990s. The NATO
accession process quickened all of the defense sector reform processes. Military legis-
lation was drafted and approved by Parliament in 1998 and 1999, and the government
approved basic security documents in 1999.17
We can argue, however, that Czech defense policy in this integration period neither
succeeded in focusing on the qualitative characteristics of the defense sector, nor did it
properly address the need for stable and sustainable development that would realisti-
cally reflect potential risks and take advantage of upcoming opportunities (such as
those offered by NATO membership). Despite many problems with reform implemen-
tation—e.g., inappropriate decision making, irresponsible management of financial and
human resources, a lack of long-term planning, ineffective acquisition, excessive lo-
gistic support structures, poorly maintained and unwieldy infrastructure, and useless
stocks of old materiel and ammunition—the use of military capabilities actually be-

14
Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republic, 29.
15
Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic of 21 December 1995 (No. 732) on the
Military Strategy of the Czech Republic; available at http://racek.vlada.cz/usneseni.
16
Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic of 26 March 1997 (No. 178) on the
Plan of the Concept for the Development of the Army of the Czech Republic until 2000 with
an Outlook to 2005; available at http://racek.vlada.cz/usneseni/. See also “The Concept for
the Development of the Defense Establishment until 2004 with Outlook to 2009,” Vojenské
rozhledy 4 (1999): 3–15; available at www.army.cz/avis/vojenske_rozhledy/499.htm.
17
Marie Vlachova, Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic: A Success or a Failure
(Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Se-
ries, No. 78, August 2002).

23


came one of the Czech Republic’s success stories. First, during a period of severe
floods in Moravia 1997, the Czech armed forces proved to be the only effective or-
ganization able to protect life and property. Second, successful deployments of Czech
units in NATO-led operations in the Balkans proved the growing interoperability with
the Allies of some Czech military assets on the operational and tactical level. For ex-
ample, the NATO Integrated Air Defense System ensured protection of Czech air-
space, with contributions from the Czech Republic of appropriate command and
weapon systems and sensors.
Nevertheless, political decision making concerning deployments abroad was highly
controversial, because of the lack of any common interest and consensus among politi-
cal parties. Despite the economic recession and political instability in 1997, the Czech
government pursued a strict fiscal policy. The ministry of defense therefore experi-
enced (contrary to the case in the first half of the 1990s) a positive budgetary develop-
ment between 1999 and 2002. Military expenditures became one of the government’s
priorities. The government decided to incrementally increase the share of military ex-
penditures as a percentage of GDP by 0.1 percent annually, with a goal of reaching
2 percent of GDP by the year 2000.18
This decision demonstrated the willingness of the Czech political leadership to
share the defense burden with Allies, and showed its determination to continue with the
reforms necessary to achieve full interoperability. This approach also enabled an am-
bitious modernization program designed to improve military operational capability and
support an ailing domestic defense industry.
Reforms (2000–2006)
After two years in NATO, the Czech Republic had successfully implemented only 26
of its 132 force goals.19 This resulted in sharp criticism from NATO which, coupled
with the disappointing results from the military campaign in Kosovo, pushed both
Czech politicians and military representatives to reevaluate the achievements of the
past decade and to examine the country’s options for choosing the reform process that
could best produce a more effective and relevant military.20 It was determined that the
reform process that would be most likely to succeed was one that would take advantage
of NATO membership. Unfortunately for the defense sector, however, the govern-
ment’s top priority became EU membership.
Defense policy formulation was influenced by a growing number of intra-state con-
flicts (failing states) and unprecedented terrorist activities by radical Islamic groups
(such as the attacks of September 11). The probability of a conventional attack against
the Czech Republic was assessed as very low. Furthermore, the potential to predict a
conventional attack in advance and take the appropriate measures to enhance the na-
tion’s defense capabilities was considered to be relatively feasible. In response to these

18
Program statement of the Government of the Czech Republic, 23 July 1996; available at
http://wtd.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=501.
19
Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republic, 104.
20
The Czech Republic conducted its Strategic Defense Review in 2001.

24

SPRING 2009

emerging threats, Czech defense policy was adapted again, and addressed the new re-
quirements for enhancing the military posture and capabilities of the nation’s armed
forces.
The objective of this stage was to reform a still inflated military into a small force
with 35,000 active soldiers and 10,000 civilian employees. Furthermore, an ambitious
modernization program was developed, spanning the entire Czech military, including
infantry, air defense, combat service and combat service support, and the infrastructure
of large military bases. Stress was put on deployability, mobility, and interoperability
with NATO forces. Human resources received the highest priority, with an emphasis
on career opportunities, fair evaluation and promotion procedures, improved benefits,
and better working conditions. Discussions involved the creation of an all-volunteer
professional force, and the termination of conscription. As necessary preconditions for
this reform, several key steps were deemed necessary: the rationalization of all busi-
ness processes, the reduction of garrisons, changes in the command and force structure,
and the reduction of reserve forces. It was believed that by implementing the outlined
measures, the ministry of defense could free up resources desperately needed for the
further modernization of obsolete weaponry, materiel, and infrastructure and for im-
proving the working and social conditions of military and civilian personal. Emphasis
was placed on “soft” values, such as pride, the military’s standing in society, and the
overall cultural and professional improvement of the military organization.21
During this reform period, existing strategic documents were updated—namely the
Security Strategies of 2001 and 2003, and the Military Strategies developed in 2002
and 2004. These amended documents reflected the rapidly changing security environ-
ment, the requirement for a complex approach to security and defense, an evolution in
NATO’s political and military thinking, and the Czech Republic’s international obli-
gations and economic realities. Based on the basic principles of these strategic docu-
ments, two conceptual documents for further development of the armed forces were
adopted by the government.22 The original Concept 2002 was deemed too ambitious
and expensive. This became even more obvious after adjustments were made to ac-
count for new financial realities in 2003. Significant reductions were needed to bring
this concept in balance with the resources available—specifically, a force reduction
from three to two mechanized brigades, a reduction of operational commands from five
to two, garrison realignment, and a reduction in personnel (target numbers cut by 9,000
military staff, to 26,200 and by 1,200 civilian staff, to 8,800). The government was

21
“Concept for the Development of a Professional Army of the Czech Republic and Mobiliza-
tion of Armed Forces,” Vojenské rozhledy 3 (2002); available at www.army.cz/avis/
vojenske_rozhledy/2002_3/obsah3.htm.
22
“Concept for the Development of a Professional Army of the Czech Republic and Mobiliza-
tion of the Czech Armed for the Period 2004–2008” and “Concept for the Development of a
Professional Army of the Czech Republic and Mobilization of the Czech Armed Forces Re-
vised for the New Resource Framework for period 2004–2010,” A-Report 24 (2003); avail-
able at www.army.cz/avis/areport2003/ar24str.pdf.

25


also forced to lower its sights in terms of deployable capability (a deployable brigade
was downsized from 5,000 to 3,000 troops).
During this period, the Czech Republic successfully accomplished its strategic ob-
jective of integration into Western structures, and became a full member of the EU on
1 May 2004. The Czech military became an all-volunteer force on 1 January 2005,
faster than had been foreseen in the conceptual documents.23 Furthermore, the armed
forces reached its initial operational capability at the end of 2006 as planned in the first
step of its reform process (thirty-seven units fulfilled NATO standards to create a bri-
gade task force of up to 3,000 troops prepared for NATO deployment). The Czech
command and force structure was modified according to the revised concept docu-
ment.24 Personnel resources were stabilized, with salaries being increased, along with
improvements to the career management process and changes to the personnel struc-
ture.25 The number of garrisons, infrastructure, and stockpiles of materiel were reduced
and rationalized. Specialization of the armed forces into units focusing on CBRN de-
fense, Passive Surveillance Systems (PSS), and medical service became an investment
priority. The military education system was adjusted to account for the declining de-
mand for officers by the smaller military. Outsourcing of services was implemented to
ensure that the functions previously conducted by conscripts continued to be accom-
plished. The most important (and the most controversial) modernization projects were
accomplished—e.g., battle tanks, supersonic and subsonic aircraft systems, transport
aircraft, and infrastructure. The armed forces successfully participated in foreign op-
erations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Success in defense reform was inelucta-
bly connected to the Czech Republic’s assuming greater responsibility and a more im-
portant role in multinational operations. In 2005, the Czech Republic became a lead
nation in the Multinational Brigade in Kosovo and assumed its command. In 2006, the
Czech Republic took responsibility for air traffic control at the Kabul International Air-
field in Afghanistan. In addition, classical infantry units with broad-spectrum niche ca-

23
The Defense Concept from 1999 prescribed a gradual reduction in the number of conscripts
as the Czech armed forces moved further towards professionalization. By 2009, the rapid re-
action units should all be fully professional and there should be only around 22,000 con-
scripts on active duty. The Defense Concept from 2002 aimed to achieve an all-volunteer
force by 2006.
24
The main structure of the Czech military that was implemented in line with the revised Con-
cept is as follows: an integrated MoD with directly subordinated elements (intelligence ser-
vice, military police, special forces, military schools and hospitals) and two operational HQs.
Joint Command consists of two mechanized brigades; an artillery brigade; a surveillance
battalion; fixed-wing, rotary, and transport air bases; an air defense brigade; an air command
and control brigade; a CBRN brigade; a logistic brigade; a rescue and engineer brigade; a
communication battalion; a passive surveillance battalion; and a PSY OPS/CIMIC Centre.
Supporting and training command is created by directorates for personal, logistic and medi-
cal support and training and doctrine.
25
Including the introduction of accommodation allowances, which were equal to approxi-
mately one-third of an officer’s average pre-tax salary.

26

SPRING 2009

pabilities were being used (medical, EOD, CBRN, military police, special forces, and
helicopters).
During this stage of the defense reform process, the military budget again declined
significantly as a result of changing government priorities after the short period of sta-
bility experienced in 1999. The first budget cut was connected with the floods during
the summer of 2002. These cuts were necessary in order to pay for the reconstruction
of destroyed national infrastructure. Later reductions in 2005 and 2006 were influ-
enced by a strict government fiscal policy as the country pursued EU membership and
worked to fulfill Stability Pact criteria to achieve admission into the EU Monetary
Zone (the priority was the reduction of state debt and the budget deficit).26
Transformation (2007–2025)
During the transformation period, which is presently under way, Czech defense policy
primarily addresses itself to the new strategic thinking in NATO, which is the product
of a new perception of the security environment, taking into account such factors as the
stability and reconstruction of failing states, the proliferation of WMD, ballistic missile
defense, cyber defense, and energy security. Czech defense policy is also being driven
by the demand to develop a more expeditionary military capability.27 Furthermore, dur-
ing this period the newly elected government (a coalition government led by the Lib-
eral Party) changed its attitude toward public spending, placing greater emphasis on
saving and budget cuts.
As a result of these influences, in the first half of 2007 the MoD assessed its reform
achievements concerning Concept 2002 and the revised Concept (2003). In addition,
the MoD asked NATO for out-of-cycle consultation in order to deal with the growing
gap between the financial resources required for further defense transformation and the
resources allocated by the new Czech government. Based on this feedback, the gov-
ernment tasked the minister of defense to come up with feasible and realistic proposals
in order to reestablish the equilibrium between the main objectives of the nation’s de-
fense policy and the available resources without compromising the Czech Republic’s
security or international obligations.
During this process it was recognized that the nation’s military capabilities still did
not completely meet rapidly changing military requirements. Defense planning disci-
plines were not adequately interconnected. There was still no effective command and
control system within the ministry of defense or the armed forces, despite its reduced

26
Those cuts created a gap greater than the amount of an entire year’s military budget in the
middle-term perspective in comparison with the money required for successful Concept im-
plementation.
27
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO
Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006; available at www.nato.int/docu/
basictxt/b061129e.html.

27


size and improved efficiency.28 There were significant delays in some modernization
projects (e.g., communications and information systems, armored personnel carriers,
air and land transport), as well as in eliminating useless materiel and infrastructure. An
effective corps of non-commissioned officers was also notably absent. The military’s
rank structure was still not properly balanced, featuring too many high-ranking offi-
cers. Furthermore, there were many civilian employees who lacked clear rules and pro-
cedures career progression.
Based on these deficiencies, the government recognized the need to build a more
useful military with expeditionary capabilities that could serve worldwide, under di-
verse conditions, together with Allies and Partners, to accomplish peacekeeping mis-
sions in accordance with international law or to defend the Czech Republic and the se-
curity interests of its Allies and Partners. The conceptual framework outlined necessary
changes in the ministry of defense and the armed forces up to 2018, when the Final
Operational Capability (FOC) is to be achieved. Furthermore, the government asked
the minister of defense to elaborate upon a more visionary outlook extending as far as
2025,29 to update the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, to rewrite the Concept
for Armed Forces Mobilization, and to elaborate upon the Concept for the Protection
of Czech airspace after 2015.
In the autumn of 2007, a transformation document was adopted by the government
and discussed in parliament. In order to simultaneously meet new military requirements
and comply with rapidly declining financial resources, political-military ambitions
were adjusted in favor of supporting the most likely operational deployments.30 In line
with this document, the command and force structure will be changed in order to deal
successfully with the most likely operational scenarios.31 Business processes will be
streamlined based on external audit results; spending for operation and maintenance
will be more strictly monitored; investments in new materiel will be reprioritized; mul-
tinational cooperation in capability development will be enhanced; and strategic capa-
bilities will be shared within NATO and the EU. It has become clear that most of the
planned programs will be postponed and reduced (the armored personnel carrier pro-
gram will be reduced by half), and that plans for large-scale infrastructure projects to
concentrate units in garrisons will be disregarded. New programs aimed at supporting

28
One of the reasons why command and control systems were not delivering desired output
was the failure in the implementation of the process management model that has been seen as
the most effective tool for overall business rationalization within the ministry of defense.
29
Long-Term Vision of the Czech Republic Ministry of Defense (Prague: Ministry of Defense,
2008); available at www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8492/Dlouhodob__vize_resortu_
Ministerstva_obrany.pdf.
30
The Czech Republic is able to deploy 40 percent and sustain in operations 8 percent of its
army, as is set forth in the Istanbul criteria, and plans to increase these figures up to 60 per-
cent and 12 percent respectively by 2014. Furthermore, all deployable units should meet
NATO standards in line with the Capability Statements by 2018.
31
Preparations for worst-case scenarios—including mobilization, the maintenance of duplicate
administrative structures and supporting databases of personnel and materiel, and training of
reserves—will be reduced to a minimum.

28

SPRING 2009

ongoing operations will be implemented or will receive higher priority, such as the
modernization of the military’s helicopters and the development of a new generation of
UAVs, small personnel carriers, transport airplanes, communications and information
systems and network-enabled capabilities).
During the summer of 2008, the government approved updating the Military Strat-
egy to take into account the long-term vision for the transformation of the Czech armed
forces. The Military Strategy set forth the nation’s political-military ambitions and
provided the basic principles for the construction and deployment of the armed
forces.32 This document stressed the importance of collective defense and multinational
cooperation for defending the Czech Republic. The military will most likely be de-
ployed in full-spectrum joint, combined, and multinational operations. The nation will
build one set of forces to operate with all international organizations, which will rely
on sharing some strategic capabilities with Allies.33 The Czech armed forces will be
modular, interoperable, and capable of cooperating with a wide spectrum of actors.
Furthermore, the armed forces will provide niche capabilities in the field of CBRN
protection and will be structured and equipped for the most likely operational scenar-
ios. The ability to react to the most dangerous threats as the situation dictates will also
not be ignored.
The Long-Term Vision is the first attempt since 1989 to look beyond the current
security horizon and orient the MoD’s administration and military planners toward
long-term developments for both the ministry and the armed forces. One of the most
important and remarkable successes during this period is indisputably the change in the
way the Czech Republic’s political leadership and military representatives have ap-
proached defense policy formulation and its implementation. After a long period of
short-term and middle-term approaches, the nation has recognized the critical need for
long-term strategic thinking. Long-term political guidance makes it easier for military
planners to think about future military operations and required capabilities. Further-
more, armament and acquisition policy and human resource development policy bene-
fit from this approach.
The MoD accelerated the implementation of transformation objectives in 2008.
Ministerial guidance consisting of six strategic objectives and tasks has been adopted,
and the Middle-Term Plan (2009–2014) outlines programs and activities in order to
meet those objectives and tasks in accordance with new priorities. The Czech Repub-
lic’s obligations with respect to the NATO defense planning cycle for 2008–2018 were
discussed and agreed to as challenging but fair. NATO’s response to the Czech De-
fense Planning Questionnaire was the most positive since the Czech Republic entered
NATO.

32
Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 908, on Military Strategy of Czech
Republic (23 July 2008); available at www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8492/Vojensk__
strategie__R-2008.pdf.
33
Strategic lift, strategic intelligence, air-ground surveillance, missile defense, protection of its
air space within the NATO Integrated Air Defense System.

29


Concerning the deployment of military capabilities, the Czech Republic will con-
tinue contributing in line with its updated political-military ambitions. During the sec-
ond half of 2009, the nation will provide forces to the stand-by EU Battle Group. Fur-
thermore, Czech supersonic aircraft will conduct air-policing missions in the Baltic
countries in order to protect their airspace. The activities of the Provincial Reconstruc-
tion Team (PRT) in Afghanistan will support NATO stabilization and reconstruction
efforts there, and helicopter deployments will enhance weak NATO intra-theater lift
capabilities.
After analyzing the military budget, one can see that Czech defense spending is
well below the agreed upon NATO benchmark in terms of percentage of overall GDP
(the budget forecast for 2009 is for military spending of 1.4 percent of GDP). On the
other hand, a reasonable balance between personnel (50 percent), operations (25 per-
cent), and investment (25 percent) spending has been achieved. Additionally, the gov-
ernment pledged to cover costs of unplanned military deployments in case of crisis
management.

Lessons Learned
Caution is always needed when identifying lessons learned and making recommenda-
tions for the future, or when highlighting mistakes for other countries to avoid. How-
ever, several aspects of the process of defense policy formulation and execution in the
CSFR and the Czech Republic are worth considering for countries currently in a state
of transition, whether they are NATO applicants or countries that are newly independ-
ent, newly democratic, or turning their attention to new military and non-military
threats.
1. Strive for clear role delineation between political leadership and military
representation. The principle of civil control over the military must be legally
established and implemented by an educated, well-prepared, and responsible
political leadership. (Successfully achieved)
2. The formulation of defense policy is easier than its implementation. The
elaboration of realistic and feasible strategic and conceptual documents is dif-
ficult, but their implementation is even more complicated. People responsible
for the design of defense reforms should be accountable for their implementa-
tion. (Still a desired goal)
3. Take a complex approach to security matters and promote a wide articula-
tion of defense policy objectives. The main objectives of defense policy
should be well balanced with policies of other areas of government, in order
to gain needed political support for their implementation and to avoid signifi-
cant budgetary constraints during the process. Plans and programs should
convince the political leadership that they provide value for the money they
will cost. Furthermore, defense policy execution should be reinforced by ef-
fective diplomacy; in the Czech case this included the withdrawal of Soviet
Union military units, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the dismemberment

30

SPRING 2009

of the CSFR, and the Czech Republic’s integration into Western structures.
The reduction of the size of the military should be coupled with social pro-
grams and effective economic reforms including conversion, privatization,
and restructuring of the defense industry. (Partially implemented)
4. Set acquisition policy objectives and modernization priorities. An acquisition
policy must reflect overarching political goals, actual military needs, and the
nation’s level of technological development. Furthermore, it must strive for
the most effective life-cycle cost solution. Acquisition of costly modernization
programs should be the least-preferred solution for capability enhancement.
Nonmaterial solutions involving business processes and improved tactics,
techniques, and procedures should be given top priority. Project management
should be performed in a timely manner, within both budget and delivery ca-
pabilities. (Partially applied)
5. Personnel management is critical. Investment in people should be given a
high priority. Steps that should be taken include recruitment from competing
markets using a set of incentives in line with demographic trends, selection of
the best suited personnel, proper training reflecting the likely deployment re-
alities, appropriate education, protection during operations, fair career op-
portunities, transparent promotion procedures, benefits based on fulfillment of
standardized performance criteria and in balance with responsibilities, moti-
vational working conditions, and social appreciation. (Striving for, but failed
to achieve fully)
6. Allocations of financial resources reflect defense priorities. Limited resources
require allocation based on transparently established priorities, defense policy
objectives, and constantly updated financial standards. Furthermore, person-
nel expenditures, operational expenditures, and investment expenditures must
be well-balanced, support the long-term objectives of defense policy, ensure
adequate training, sustain demand for operational deployments abroad, and
continue necessary modernization. Limited resources should be balanced with
rational business processes within the entire MoD (new procedures, integra-
tion of information systems, outsourcing, and flexible organization). (Partially
implemented)
7. Engage in strategic management and long-term defense planning. Decision-
making processes at the strategic level must be supported by adequate analyti-
cal tools to enhance transparency and to avoid non-systematic solutions, mis-
allocation of funds, and risks to the country’s defense capability. Defense
planning must be driven by rigorous analytical processes in order to determine
long-term military operational requirements and must be adequately respon-
sive to lessons learned during current operations (urgent operational require-
ments should not supersede the standard planning process). Internationally,
the military should contribute its fair share to collective defense, shared capa-
bilities, and cooperation. (Partially applied)

31


Conclusions
The Czech Republic’s process of defense policy formulation has always been seen as
an integral part of security policy articulation within the nation, and is balanced with
foreign, internal security, and economic policies. Economic interests have in many in-
stances superseded defense interests (including procurement decisions, offset policies,
and garrison and military infrastructure closures). To some extent, Czech defense pol-
icy has reflected changes in the internal and external security environment and public
sentiment (democratization, integration, and professionalization). The objective of
Czech defense policy has been mostly influenced by liberal values and beliefs. Proc-
esses such as the democratization of military structures, participation in international
institutions, weapons nonproliferation and reduction, military diplomacy and coopera-
tion, and conflict prevention have become the major drivers of defense policy in the
Czech Republic, rather than an emphasis on strong military capabilities. The use of
military power has always been seen as the option of last resort in solving security
problems and crises, and this use of power has required an international mandate.
As reflected in this essay, the four periods of defense policy formulation and exe-
cution (democratization, integration, reform, and transformation) in the Czech Repub-
lic have resulted in an overall transformation of the country’s defense sector. It has
been an enormous task with many setbacks; however, almost two decades after the end
of the Cold War, the defense interests of the Czech Republic are now safeguarded by
membership in Western political, military, and economic structures (collective defense
and a strong North Atlantic link) and by existing credible military capabilities which
create a basis for fair and valuable contributions to both these structures and to inter-
national peace and stability operations.
Since 1989, the Czech military has been incrementally changed in many aspects to
become an effective tool for defense policy execution. First, the Czech armed forces
democratized in line with the Western model of democratic control of the military.
Furthermore, the military was never used to resist or obstruct the broader transforma-
tion efforts underway in Czech society.
Third, the relics of the Cold War’s robust forces—in terms of personnel, weaponry,
and a military infrastructure with an immense mobilization capability and enormous
industrial potential—have been replaced through painful, nonsystematic reforms which
fortunately did not lead to social or economic disruption. To the contrary, these
reforms have led to a flattened command structure and a deployable, sustainable, and
fully professional force structure. Modernization of the Czech Republic’s military has
resulted from a combination of high-tech updates to outdated equipment and
infrastructure. The speed of replacement and reconstruction depends on available
resources. This process will continue in line with newly adopted strategic and
conceptual documents and with the resources available.
Fourth, the Czech military has accelerated a process of successful integration into
Western security structures, and has contributed significantly to enhancing the coun-
try’s strong international recognition through successful operational engagements. Fi-
nally, the military’s learning processes have been positively influenced by cooperation

32

SPRING 2009

with Allies and Partners. Future long-term transformation has been contemplated to en-
sure continuous adaptation to the changing environment and new challenges.
A lot has been achieved in the last twenty years, and even more will be necessary to
continue with the successful adaptations of the country’s defense policy for the twenty-
first century. This will remain one of the most significant challenges confronting the
Czech Republic. How it addresses this challenge will have profound and far-reaching
implications for the nation’s ability to protect and advance its vital strategic, security,
and defense interests.

33

Missile Defense and NATO Security
Peppino A. DeBiaso *

For our readers who noted the article on missile defense policy in the Fall 2008 edition,
which provided a Russian point of view, this article, reprinted from the Joint Force
Quarterly, provides a U.S. point of view on the subject.

Henri Bigo, Executive Director, PfP Consortium

Armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the global proliferation of ballistic
missiles is introducing more widely the means of modern strategic warfare that were
once the purview of only a small number of countries. This transformation in the secu-
rity environment raises new questions for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) on the strategic implications of defending its territory against ballistic missile
attack. During the recent NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, the Alliance acknowl-
edged for the first time that missile defense can make a contribution to protecting
NATO territory and populations from attack. Consequently, NATO is undertaking an
intensive examination of the issues associated with a comprehensive continental de-
fense against ballistic missiles to enable it to counter future military risks.

Emerging Security Environment
The threats to the security of the United States and its NATO allies have changed sig-
nificantly since the early 1990s and the demise of the Soviet Union. A broader and
more complex range of challenges confronts the Alliance today. Prominent among
these are the proliferation of destructive technologies, such as nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver them at great distances. Ballistic
missiles capable of carrying WMD have become the weapon of choice for an increas-
ing number of states that view them as low-cost, high-impact arms capable of offsetting
Western military advantages. And the danger they pose is expanding in Northeast and
South Asia, as well as the Middle East.
In the 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, nine nations possessed ballistic mis-
siles. Today, more than twenty states have these weapons. Furthermore, these missiles
are undergoing improvements in range, accuracy, mobility, and ability to carry a vari-
ety of conventional and unconventional warheads. Over the past decade, in addition to
the roughly two-dozen states operating short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1,000 kilo-
meters), the number of countries with medium-range (1,000–2,500 km), intermediate-
range (2,500–5,500 km), or intercontinental-range (greater than 5,500 km) ballistic
missiles has increased from five to nine. Not only has the number of nations possessing

*
Dr. Peppino A. DeBiaso is Director of the Office of Missile Defense Policy in the U.S.
Department of Defense. This article was originally published in Joint Forces Quarterly 51
(4th Quarter 2008).

35


ballistic missiles been growing, but this group also includes some of the most danger-
ous regimes in the world, such as North Korea and Iran.
North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and is a major
exporter of missiles and missile technology to other countries, including Iran, Syria,
and Pakistan. North Korea has long possessed a large arsenal of short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (Mobs). Through the 1990s, it
was also able to develop or acquire the technologies for ballistic missiles capable of
striking other continents. In August 1998, it tested the three-stage Taepo Dong 1 mis-
sile in an attempt to orbit a satellite. The missile’s third stage failed, but not before it
flew long enough to prove that North Korea had the basic technologies necessary for
longer-range ballistic missiles. Pyongyang is now developing several such longer-range
weapons, including a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range es-
timated at 2,500 km. In July 2006, North Korea conducted seven widely publicized
launches. It successfully fired six theater-class SRBMs and Mobs, demonstrating the
capability to conduct salvo strikes against U.S. forces in the region, as well as South
Korea and Japan. The seventh missile, the Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ inter-
continental ballistic missile, was flown for the first time. The Taepo Dong 2, capable of
carrying a nuclear payload, could reach much of the Asia-Pacific region and parts of
the United States when operational. Although the Taepo Dong 2 failed shortly after
launch, the test made clear the significant program North Korea has under way to build
ever more sophisticated missiles with global reach.
In the Middle East, while several states are fielding new and improved SRBMs and
Mobs, Iran represents the most serious concern because it unites a vigorous ballistic
missile program, the development of key capabilities needed to produce nuclear weap-
ons, the demonstrated use of missile-delivered chemical weapons (against Iraq in the
1980s), and the stated desire to destroy nearby countries (namely Israel). Iran also has
a history of support for international terrorism, especially in terms of weapons trans-
fers. Most recently, Iran reportedly supplied the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah with
both long-range rockets and short-range ballistic missiles, with the former used against
civilian population centers in Israel during the conflict in 2006. Iran already has the
largest inventory of SRBMs and Mobs in the region to underpin its growing freedom
of action throughout the wider Middle East.
Iran’s plans to deploy longer-range ballistic missiles go beyond the capacity needed
to strike U.S. forces and allies in the Middle East. It is developing technology for mis-
siles of increasing range and sophistication, which will allow it to threaten Europe. Iran
is modifying its 1,300-km Shahab-3 MRBM in order to give it greater range. In 2004,
it claimed that it had successfully extended this missile’s range to 2,000 km. If true,
Iran can now target large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe, along
with U.S. and NATO bases and deployed forces in Turkey and Central Asia. Tehran
recently announced that a new solid propellant MRBM—the Ashoura—is in develop-
ment and could begin flight testing soon. It also continues to work closely with North
Korea on ballistic missiles of longer range. As a result of ongoing foreign assistance,
Iran’s Mobs and IRBMs could develop more rapidly than would be possible on the ba-
sis of its indigenous capabilities. According to multiple open source reports, Tehran

36

SPRING 2009

Figure 1: Current and Projected Ranges of Iran’s Missiles.

has acquired from North Korea 2,500-km-range missile systems. As with most ballistic
missiles, the possibility to extend this range exists through improving the design of the
airframe or using lighter payloads. A range increase to 3,500–3,800 km would allow
Iran to reach European targets as far west as the United Kingdom (as shown below in
Figure 1). Additionally, it continues to develop the key technologies for an interconti-
nental-range ballistic missile and a space launch vehicle, giving it multiple paths to
achieving weapons capable of striking the United States by the middle of the next dec-
ade.
The spread of ballistic missiles and missile technology has been accompanied by
corresponding trends in the area of WMD. This is the case for two major reasons. First,
there are more than twenty nations today that possess or are seeking to acquire nuclear,
biological, or chemical capabilities that can be carried by ballistic missiles. Second, in
the past decade, the proliferation of WMD technologies and the expertise required to
“weaponize” them have been accelerated by the willingness of both state and non-state
organizations to collaborate to advance these programs. This became evident with the
revelation in 2003 that A.Q. Khan, known as the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear

37


Figure 2: Ballistic Missile Use since 1980.

weapons program, had built an international network of suppliers and expertise over
several decades to sell nuclear bomb-making design information and technology to
several countries, including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.
The consequences of these activities are beginning to emerge. In October 2006,
North Korea carried out a nuclear weapons test. Its progress in developing a nuclear
device (along with any foreign assistance it may have received) went largely unde-
tected. Moreover, North Korea continues to provide assistance to other states’ nuclear
programs, as suggested by recent events regarding its cooperation with Syria on a nu-
clear reactor. The disclosure in 2007 that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program
for many years further highlights the difficulty of accurately predicting the emergence
of new nuclear weapons states. A 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) con-
cludes that, although Iran appears to have suspended some aspects of this program, it is
keeping its options open on nuclear weapons. Indeed, Iran’s ongoing pursuit of en-
riched uranium is the crucial element it its capacity to bring a nuclear capability to
fruition. Its activities in this area, combined with its program to build longer-range
missiles, reflect its commitment to acquiring strategic arms.
All of these troubling indicators are characteristic of today’s security environment.
The spread of WMD technologies along with missile delivery vehicles is increasing the
strategic warfare potential of regional powers and will influence the shape of future
crises and conflicts. Indeed, states have already demonstrated a willingness to use bal-
listic missiles to serve a variety of political and military goals. As illustrated in
Figure 2, there have been at least ten conflicts since the early 1980s in which states
have conducted missile launches against civilian as well as military targets. This also
has included the employment of ballistic missiles armed with WMD that occurred
when Iraq and Iran used chemical weapons in the 1980–88 “War of the Cities,” killing
and injuring tens of thousands.

38

SPRING 2009

Responding to New Threats
The United States and its allies are considering how best to counter these new
threats—namely, the prospect of catastrophic weapons falling into the hands of a rising
number of countries with the ability to deliver them trans-regionally and with little
warning. The United States, for its part, has taken steps to field missile defenses
against these arms in order to underwrite four key global security goals.
First, missile defense can serve as a valuable instrument—along with diplomatic
and political measures—to combat WMD proliferation and support nonproliferation
efforts. Defenses may dissuade adversaries from choosing to acquire or expand ballis-
tic missile arsenals by negating any advantage that they might hope to achieve by
building them in the first place. In the presence of defenses, ballistic missiles launched
by hostile states would no longer have a “free ride” against the population centers or
deployed forces of the United States and its allies. Defenses would make ballistic mis-
siles an unwise military investment with diminishing utility. Missile defense can further
strengthen the goal of nonproliferation by providing allies the means to protect them-
selves against a nuclear-armed adversary without having to acquire their own nuclear
deterrent. This is the path Japan has taken, developing a layered missile defense system
in cooperation with the United States to protect its population centers and military
forces against the threat of a North Korean missile attack.
Second, missile defense provides the leadership of the United States and its allies
with a wider range of responses to manage crises and conflicts beyond the immediate
use of offensive weapons. This was demonstrated during the North Korean launch
preparations of the Taepo Dong 2, when the United States placed its missile defense
system on operational alert for the first time. Although still limited in its capabilities,
the system was prepared to defend the United States against any North Korean long-
range ballistic missile. While some national security experts called for preemptive
strikes against the North Korean missile and its launch facility, missile defenses gave
American decision makers an option beyond preemptive strikes that, in turn, contrib-
uted to stability during the crisis.
Third, by diminishing the likelihood of a successful attack, missile defense can en-
hance traditional offense-based deterrence by introducing doubt and uncertainty into a
potential adversary’s plans to attack. By denying the achievement of the political or
military goals of any contemplated threat or actual strike, defenses would reinforce the
deterrence of aggression. Finally, and most importantly, missile defense provides pro-
tection to threatened population centers and deployed forces against actual attack
should deterrence and diplomacy not succeed in preventing a conflict.
The missile defense approach the United States is taking to address threats to its
national territory as well as to its forces abroad involves a number of elements. To
protect its troops and those of its coalition partners against shorter-range missiles, the
Pentagon is fielding ground- and sea-based interceptors and tracking radars along with
sensors on land, at sea, and in space. These include the land-based Patriot Advanced
Capability–3 (PAC–3) and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems for de-
fense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles for forward operating troops,

39


military bases, and combat staging areas. Also being deployed are sea-based missile
defense systems on Aegis-class ships, which will provide a mobile capability against
missile attack. These are being fitted to carry the Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) inter-
ceptors to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
To defeat longer-range ballistic missiles, the United States is establishing a ground-
based defense system in Alaska and California. The Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
will engage intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of
flight, hundreds of kilometers above the Earth. This ground-based defense—which is
supported by space-based sensors and land- and sea-based radars—will allow the
United States to defend itself against missiles launched from Northeast Asia or the
Middle East. The U.S. missile defense system, with approximately fifty Gibes planned
for deployment by 2013, is designed to provide a modest defense against a few tens of
long-range ballistic missiles.
As ballistic missile and WMD threats change over time, so will the composition of
missile defense forces. Adjustments to the number and locations of defenses will be
based on new or emerging dangers. Some threats (like Libya) may recede, while others
(like Iran) may grow. Given the uncertainty in forecasting the timing and location of
adversaries possessing such weapons, and the many years required to build and field
defenses, the United States and its allies must consider how to have systems in place
before a threat fully emerges.

Missile Defenses in Europe
Against the backdrop of the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD tech-
nologies, the United States is advancing a range of initiatives to extend the benefits of
missile defense to its allies. As NATO territory comes under increased risk of ballistic
missile attack, the ability of the Alliance to preserve its freedom to act across the full
spectrum of military conflict—from humanitarian and peace enforcement interventions
to conventional operations—will require some measure of Alliance protection. Over
time, defenses that only protect the United States may lead to the decoupling of U.S.
security from that of its allies. This would undermine the indivisibility of Alliance se-
curity, which has been the bedrock of NATO since its founding. However, by extend-
ing the protection afforded by missile defenses to Europe, it is possible to offer a set of
capabilities to blunt ballistic missile/WMD coercion of NATO, thereby allowing the
Alliance to more effectively deter aggression and carry out its military and security ob-
ligations.
NATO has been examining the requirements for missile defense for several years.
Its past focus has been on the protection of military forces operating outside of Europe
against short-range missile threats. The United States, Germany, and the Netherlands,
for example, are deploying new shorter-range missile defenses composed of the PAC–
3 system. Italy, Germany, and the United States are jointly developing the Medium
Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) to provide mobile defense for expeditionary
forces against short-range missile threats. As ballistic missile threats have evolved in
terms of range, technical sophistication, and payload, allies have started to examine

40

SPRING 2009

longer-range missile defenses. Toward this end, in 2001 NATO initiated a major tech-
nical feasibility study to define an architecture for protecting Alliance deployed forces
operating outside of NATO territory against ballistic missile threats of up to 3,000 km.
Known as the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program,
this effort was completed in 2003. The following year, the supporting technical blue-
print and required funding were approved by NATO defense ministers to begin build-
ing a command and control “operational backbone” to which nations could contribute
missile defense interceptors and sensors in the future.
As important as this work was, it remained limited in scope because it did not ex-
amine options for protecting Alliance territory and population centers from longer-
range threats. In recognition of the growing risk from missiles, the November 2002
Prague Summit Declaration by NATO heads of state and government stated, “Today
we initiated a new NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study to examine options for
protecting Alliance territory, forces, and population centers against the full range of
missile threats, which we will continue to assess.” This follow-on feasibility study of
the architectural options to defend NATO forces, populations, and territory from bal-
listic missiles of all ranges was completed in July 2005. At the November 2006 Riga
Summit, NATO heads of state and government acknowledged the study’s findings that
missile defense for Alliance territory and populations is technically feasible.
In parallel with these efforts at NATO, the United States carried out a series of de-
tailed technical and architectural assessments examining options to provide protection
for Europe and the United States from longer-range ballistic missiles launched from the
Middle East. The analysis concluded that the optimal location for defending Europe
against limited intermediate- and long-range missile strikes, and for providing addi-
tional capability to the current missile defense system located in Alaska and California
to defend the United States, is Central Europe. After consultations with interested
NATO allies, the United States began formal discussions in January 2007 on basing
defenses in Europe.
The current U.S. proposal calls for an interceptor site of up to ten Gibes in Poland
similar to those deployed in Alaska and California. The Gibes would be housed in un-
derground silos in an area about the size of a soccer field. These interceptors, like
those based in the United States, employ small non-explosive hit-to-kill vehicles to de-
stroy incoming warheads. The interceptors would be supported by a fixed X-band ra-
dar in the Czech Republic. They would track and discriminate ballistic missiles in the
midcourse portion of their flight. The radar’s location would be optimized to point its
narrow beam toward the Middle East to detect missiles in flight from that region. The
data collected would be used to guide the Gibes to the projected trajectory of the mis-
sile warhead. These new missile defense assets would be integrated with existing ra-
dars in Fylingdales in the United Kingdom and Thule in Greenland, as well as with the
missile defense interceptors located in California and Alaska. Construction of the mis-
sile defense sites could begin as early as 2009, with the first interceptors in place in
2011–12.
The proposed plan offers a way that the United States and its NATO allies can not
only cooperate on missile defense, but also maintain the collective security of the Alli-

41


ance by creating a defense that would protect all NATO countries facing a long-range
ballistic missile threat from the Middle East. Some Alliance members in south eastern
Europe would not face these long-range threats given their proximity to the region.
Rather, they are more likely to be threatened by shorter-range ballistic missiles. For
these countries, short- and medium-range missile defense systems would provide the
desired protection. To this end, individual NATO nations are already pursuing shorter-
range missile defense systems, and the Alliance, as described above, is developing the
ALTBMD program to link them into an integrated command and control network.

Figure 3: Areas Protected by U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System.

At the April 2008 NATO summit, heads of government took a major step in mov-
ing the Alliance toward a policy on continental defense. They cited a growing threat to
Alliance territory and populations arising from proliferation and the “substantial con-
tribution to the protection of allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by
the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defense assets” in
Central Europe. NATO leaders also stated the importance of exploring ways to link the
U.S. long-range missile defense capability with current NATO short-range missile de-
fense efforts through the development of options that NATO would consider at its
2009 summit.
In the framework NATO agreed to, the long-range missile defense assets proposed
by the United States could provide a capability to the Alliance that would complement
existing and planned NATO missile defense efforts. A long-range defense system in
Europe would be interoperable with current Alliance short-range defenses as well as
NATO’s ALTBMD program. The command and control architecture for the U.S. long-
range missile defense system is being designed to be compatible with ALTBMD and
the NATO Air Command and Control System, which, when operational, will serve as a
unified air command and control network enabling NATO members to seamlessly
manage air operations and air defense over Alliance territory. Information on missile
defense operations, including data from the U.S. ballistic missile defense system,
would be a part of this shared situational awareness. As missile defense systems, op-
erators, and commanders from NATO nations are able to effectively coordinate efforts,

42

SPRING 2009

they should be better positioned to deploy assets efficiently, ensure vital areas are de-
fended, and avoid redundant resource expenditures.
Cooperation on missile defense along this path could lead to significant efficiencies
and cost savings, with the United States focusing on long-range defense while NATO
systems address shorter-range threats to allies in south eastern Europe. This approach
combines Allied national missile defense contributions with possible NATO assets
similar to the way the Alliance has fielded capabilities in the past. Such an arrangement
would also provide another avenue for burden sharing in Europe, with hosting nations
providing a significant contribution to the collective defense of the Alliance. U.S. and
European combined efforts in short- and long-range defense would keep U.S. and
NATO security indivisible by providing all members with a defense against the full
range of ballistic missile threats. With the protection provided by U.S. and allied capa-
bilities in Europe, NATO member states would have an answer should a future hostile
state attempt to use WMD-armed ballistic missiles to intimidate or coerce the Alliance
regarding actions in defense of its interests.

Consultations with Russia
Since the January 2007 announcement of U.S. plans to field defenses in Europe to
counter limited attacks from potentially hostile states such as Iran, Russia has ex-
pressed strong objections. Officials claim the system could nullify Moscow’s strategic
nuclear arsenal. The United States has been transparent with Russia regarding its plans
and capabilities for the long-range missile defense system in Europe, and has encour-
aged the Kremlin’s cooperation against common dangers arising from missiles and
WMD in the Middle East and elsewhere. Senior U.S. officials have conducted frequent
consultations with their Russian counterparts, as well as Russian experts, on the pro-
posed U.S. defense system.
U.S. officials have explained in detail that the proposed missile defense system for
Europe would pose no threat to Moscow’s ICBM assets that might be launched from
Russia at the United States. Nor would it have any capability against the Russian sea-
based strategic force of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Given their proposed lo-
cation, U.S. long-range interceptors based in Europe could not catch up to Russian
missiles in flight—the defensive interceptors would be in a “tail chase.” Although a
moot point because of the preceding fact, it is evident that ten interceptors would not
be able to threaten Russia’s strategic force of hundreds of missiles and thousands of
warheads. Nor can these systems be used as offensive ballistic missiles or converted to
carry warheads. To do so would require significant modifications and testing, all of
which would be impossible to undertake clandestinely.
To address Russian concerns, the United States has offered an array of measures to
increase transparency in its missile defense activities, including those proposed for
Europe. These range from visits to missile defense sites and opportunities to observe
related tests to the sharing of information on U.S. missile defense plans and programs.
The United States has also been willing to explore cooperation with Russia across the
full spectrum of missile defense activities. In 2007, it provided Russia with a compre-

43


hensive list of possible cooperative missile defense measures. For example, the United
States proposed to develop a joint regional missile defense architecture that could in-
corporate both U.S. and Russian missile defense assets. This concept could involve any
number of linked missile defense assets or systems, all working toward the goal of de-
fending the United States, Europe, and Russia from the shared threat of ballistic missile
attack. To date, Moscow has not directly engaged on these cooperative proposals. In-
stead, it insists that Washington and its allies must suspend plans to deploy long-range
missile defenses in Europe. In exchange, Russia has stated that it would be willing to
jointly monitor Iranian missile activity and share any relevant data from its early
warning radar systems. Despite these differences, the United States is continuing to ex-
plore opportunities for cooperation with Russia, both bilaterally and within NATO.
The long lead time involved in building and deploying missile defenses, combined
with the growing dangers of nuclear and missile threats, suggests the need for the
United States and its NATO allies to address, in a timely and comprehensive manner,
how best to move forward with the proposals before them. As they do, several areas
merit further attention. The Alliance should:
• Sharpen its focus on the strategic implications of a shift to defending its
populations and territory against ballistic missile attacks
• Broaden its understanding of the ways in which missile defense can comple-
ment other measures to combat and roll back WMD and missile proliferation
• Expand intelligence-sharing on the extent and timing of WMD and ballistic
missile threats to European allies so they may better assess the implications of
such threats for stability and the protection of European interests
• Develop a roadmap for the incremental fielding of defenses that integrates
shorter- and longer-range systems from those nations with the capacity to
make contributions; this should include identifying arrangements for the
command and control of such defenses in a way that optimizes the effective-
ness of the system and is transparent to all allies.
Together, these efforts would lead to a better understanding of the contribution
missile defense can make to strengthening the Atlantic Alliance as it adapts to the secu-
rity environment of the twenty-first century.

44

Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options
Amy F. Woolf *
Summary
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) in 1991; it entered into force in December 1994, and is due to expire in De-
cember 2009. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss op-
tions for continuing their arms control relationship, but have not agreed on whether to
extend START or how to replace it. START counts each deployed ICBM, SLBM, and
bomber as a single delivery vehicle under the treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles
and attributes an agreed number of warheads to each deployed delivery vehicle. This
attribution rule provides the total number of warheads that count under the 6,000-war-
head limit in the treaty. To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the
numbers and locations of ballistic missiles, launchers, and heavy bombers deployed by
the other country. The parties use a wide variety of means to collect information—or
monitor—these forces and activities. Some of these monitoring systems, such as over-
head satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties. They have also been
required to exchange copious amounts of data on locations, operations, and technical
characteristics of the treaty-limited items. This verification regime has allowed the
parties to remain confident in each other’s compliance with the treaty.
The United States and Russia began to discuss their options for arms control after
START expired as early as mid-2006. They have, however, been unable to agree on a
path forward. Neither side wants to extend START in its current form, as some of the
treaty’s provisions have begun to interfere with some military programs on both sides.
Russia wants to replace START with a new treaty that would further reduce deployed
forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules that are in place in
START. The United States initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but would
have been willing to informally extend some of START’s monitoring provisions. It has
recently agreed to conclude a new treaty, with monitoring provisions attached, but this
treaty would resemble the far less formal Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that
the two sides signed in 2002. In December 2008, the two sides agreed that they wanted
to replace START before it expired, but acknowledged that this task would have to be
left to negotiations between Russia and the incoming Obama Administration.
The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future
of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse, or they could
extend START for five years. They could extend START, and then amend it to ease
some of the outdated provisions. They could negotiate a new treaty, or they could pur-

*
Amy F. Woolf is a Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Congressional Research Ser-
vice. This essay has been adapted from the version of the report submitted to the U.S. Con-
gress on 23 December 2008. The original version of this report will continue to be updated
as circumstances change.

45


sue less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. Moreover, if a new treaty
included further reductions in nuclear weapons, it could use some START definitions
and counting rules, or the less formal Moscow Treaty declarations.

Introduction
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) on 31 July 1991. After the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991,
the parties signed a protocol that named the four former Soviet Republics with nuclear
weapons on their territory—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia—parties to the
Treaty.1 START entered into force on 4 December 1994. The treaty was to remain in
force for fifteen years, unless replaced by a subsequent agreement, and, therefore, will
expire on 5 December 2009.2 According to Article XVII of the treaty, the parties must
meet “no later than one year” before this date to consider whether the treaty should be
extended or allowed to lapse.3 If the parties agree to extend the treaty, the extension
would last for five years, unless START were replaced by a subsequent agreement
during that time. The United States and Russia have held several meetings to discuss
the options for continuing their bilateral arms control relationship after START, but
have not yet reached an agreement on whether to extend START or on how to replace
it. The discussions between the two parties, along with statements from members of the
U.S. Congress and others following the process, reflect not only on the specific issues
that may be addressed in a possible follow-on treaty, but also on the broader question
of what role (if any) arms control should play in future U.S.-Russian relations.
The Treaty contains many detailed definitions and restrictions that not only limit
the number of nuclear warheads each nation is permitted to deploy but also restrain the
locations and movement of delivery vehicles carrying nuclear warheads and require
extensive exchanges of data about them. Many of these provisions reflect the more
competitive relationship between the United States and Soviet Union that prevailed
during the Cold War, and the concerns that drove their inclusion in the treaty may no
longer seem as important to the U.S.-Russian relationship.
Specifically, some in the second Bush Administration and the broader foreign pol-
icy community have argued that, because the United States no longer structures its nu-

1
The leaders in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed to eliminate all of the nuclear weap-
ons on their territories and to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nu-
clear weapons states. These three states have been nuclear-free since the late 1990s; all re-
maining Soviet-era nuclear warheads are deployed in Russia.
2
The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known
as the Moscow Treaty) on 24 May 2002. They do not, however, consider this treaty to be a
successor to START. Article II of the Moscow Treaty specifically states that START remains
in force. See Amy F. Woolf, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty, CRS Report RL31448 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 18 Janu-
ary 2008).
3
The parties did not need to make a decision about the future of START in December 2008;
they just needed to meet to consider the question.

46

SPRING 2009

clear forces in response to a Russian threat, it no longer needs a treaty that restrains
and reduces the weapons that make up that threat. They, therefore, question whether
START, or U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control in general, remain important as tools in
the political relationship between the United States and Russia.
Some U.S. critics of arms control argue that the bilateral arms control process
should fade away after START expires. They note that START may have served its
purpose by helping to reduce the size of the Russian arsenal after the demise of the So-
viet Union and by restraining the permitted operations of the remaining forces, but its
reductions have been overtaken by deeper cuts mandated by the Moscow Treaty. They
also point out that the restrictions on Russian forces serve to restrict the flexibility of
U.S. forces. In the current environment, the United States may be better served by
maintaining its own freedom of action in deploying and operating its nuclear forces
than by retaining START’s or similar restraints on U.S. and Russian forces.
Others, however, argue that START remains relevant to the U.S.-Russian relation-
ship and deserves to be either extended or replaced with a similar treaty. In this view,
the predictability created by START’s well-defined restrictions on Russian and U.S.
nuclear forces can benefit both countries. Moreover, continuing this cooperation can
help to restore some trust in the relationship between the two nations. In addition, some
in Russia still feel threatened by U.S. nuclear weapons and continue to value the re-
straints provided by arms control treaties such as START.
Some members of the U.S. Congress have joined this debate, with several endors-
ing the view that extending START (and its monitoring and verification provisions)
will help improve the relationship between the United States and Russia. For example,
Senator Richard Lugar has stated that “the current U.S.-Russian relationship is compli-
cated enough without introducing more elements of uncertainty. Failure to preserve the
START Treaty would increase the potential for distrust between the two sides.”4 Some
also believe, as Senator Lugar has noted, that the “failure to renew START will be seen
worldwide as weakening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and [will be]
a further sign to many foreign leaders and experts that U.S. nonproliferation policy is
adrift.”5
The United States Congress has limited influence on the process of seeking a re-
placement for START. If the United States and Russia amend START, or negotiate a
new treaty to replace it, the U.S. Senate will have to provide its advice and consent be-
fore the parties ratify the treaty. However, if the two parties do not reach any agree-
ment and START lapses, or if they choose simply to extend START for five years, ac-
cording to the provision in Article XVII, the Senate would not have to approve or re-
ject the outcome. Nevertheless, Congress can, through resolutions, hearings, and con-
sultations, offer the administration its views on the future of START and the U.S.-Rus-
sian arms control regime.

4
Richard Lugar, speech at conference on “Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
Chantilly, VA (30 January 2008).
5
Richard Lugar, “Trust Still Needs Verification,” Washington Times (18 July 2008): 24.

47


This article provides background information about START and reviews the dis-
cussions about a possible successor to the treaty. It also presents a range of alternatives
that the United States and Russia might consider if they choose to follow START with
a new framework for the arms control process.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Key Limits
START limits long-range nuclear-capable delivery systems—land-based interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Slims), and
heavy bombers—in the United States and the four states of the former Soviet Union.
The treaty limits both the number of delivery systems and the number of warheads that
can be carried on these systems. As Table 1 below indicates, each side can deploy
6,000 “attributed” warheads on no more than 1,600 ballistic missiles and heavy bomb-
ers, with no more than 4,900 attributed warheads on land-based and submarine-based
ballistic missiles.

Table 1: Central Limits in START 6

Deployed Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles 1,600
Heavy ICBMs 154
Accountable Warheads on Deployed Delivery Vehicles 6,000
Ballistic Missile Warheads 4,900
Warheads on Heavy ICBMs 1,540
Warheads on Mobile ICBMs 1,100
Total Ballistic Missile Throwweight 3,600 metric tons 7

Within the aggregate limits on ballistic missile warheads, START also limits each
side to no more than 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs, which are defined as those with
a throwweight greater than 4,350 kg, and 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs. These
two limits are an added effort to restrain forces that the United States feared would
provide the Soviet Union with an avenue to exceed the warhead limit. The United
States had long sought to use the arms control process to limit (or eliminate) the Soviet
monopoly on heavy ICBMs, because it believed that the Soviet Union could expand
the capabilities of these missiles by deploying them with more warheads or higher
yield. The United States did not have any ballistic missiles of this size, and had no
plans to develop or deploy them. The Soviet Union initially resisted U.S. pressures to

6
From the full text of the treaty and its many annexes, which is available at the U.S. State
Department website: www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18535.htm.
7
This is around 54 percent of the throwweight deployed on Soviet missiles when the treaty
was signed.

48

SPRING 2009

limit these missiles, but eventually agreed under START to halve their force of 304
SS-18 ICBMs, each of which was deployed with ten warheads.
As the START negotiations proceeded through the 1980s, the United States also
grew concerned about the Soviet deployment of ballistic missiles on mobile launchers.
The Soviet Union had begun to deploy single-warhead SS-25 missiles on road-mobile
launchers and ten-warhead SS-24 missiles on rail-mobile launchers. The United States
considered these missiles both a military and an arms control problem. Because the
United States did not think it could locate and track these missiles all the time, it be-
lieved it would be difficult to target them during a conflict. Moreover, because the So-
viet Union had large land areas where it could operate and conceal these missiles, U.S.
negotiators argued that the United States would not be able to monitor mobile ICBM
deployments well enough to count the missiles and verify Soviet compliance with the
limits in START.
The United States initially proposed that START ban mobile ICBMs, even though
it was considering the possible use of mobile launchers for its new ten-warhead Peace-
keeper (MX) ICBM and for a prospective small, single-warhead ICBM. But after the
United States and Soviet Union began to consider options for a monitoring and verifi-
cation regime that might track the numbers of mobile ICBMs, they agreed to limit,
rather than ban, these systems. The limited numbers—when combined with location re-
strictions, notifications prior to movement, data exchanges that identified the numbers
of missiles and warheads based at approved locations, and a continuous monitoring re-
gime outside the final assembly facility for one type of mobile ICBM—would help
each side count the number of acknowledged mobile ICBMs and complicate efforts to
conceal extra missiles or warheads. Even though the United States eventually dropped
its plans to deploy mobile ICBMs, it agreed to apply these limits and restrictions to the
Peacekeeper (MX) missiles that were deployed in silos.
START also limits the total amount of throwweight on each side’s ballistic mis-
siles, to an amount equal to around 54 percent of the amount of throwweight deployed
on Soviet missiles before the treaty entered into force. Throwweight is the combined
weight of the post-boost vehicle, warheads, guidance system, penetration aids, and
other equipment found on the front end of a missile. It is considered to be a measure of
a missile’s destructive capacity because larger missiles with greater throwweight can
carry larger or greater numbers of warheads. Hence, this limit was a further effort by
the United States to limit the potential for the Soviet Union to add warheads to its mis-
siles in violation of the treaty’s limits. Because the Soviet forces that were deployed
when START was signed carried more than three times as much throwweight as U.S.
missiles, the United States did not have to reduce its forces to comply with this limit.
However, the United States could have exceeded the limit on throwweight if it had de-
ployed new, larger missiles while START remained in force.
Counting Rules
START counts each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, each deployed
SLBM and its associated launcher, and each deployed heavy bomber as a single deliv-
ery vehicle under the treaty limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles. They count regardless of

49


whether they are equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads. They also continue
to count under the treaty limits until the launchers or bombers are eliminated according
to the treaty’s detailed elimination procedures.
For example, a bomber (such as the U.S. B-1 bomber) that has been converted to
carry conventional weapons continues to count under the treaty limits. Moreover, an
empty missile launcher, either on land or on a ballistic missile submarine, continues to
count as if it still held a missile and the missile still carried the attributed number of
warheads, even if the missile system is deactivated or the launcher has been converted
to another purpose.
The number of warheads attributed to each type of missile or bomber is listed in an
agreed database.8 For the most part, the number of warheads attributed to each type of
missile equals the maximum number of warheads that the missile had been tested with
and could be equipped to carry when the treaty entered into force. In some cases, how-
ever—such as for the U.S. Trident II (D-5) missile—the number of warheads attributed
to the missile (eight) fell below the maximum number the missile could carry (twelve).
The Soviet SS-18 missile had also been tested with twelve or fourteen warheads, but
the database counted it as carrying only ten. The parties adopted this formula of
counting delivery vehicles and attributing warheads to each type of delivery vehicle
because, although they sought to reduce warheads, they could not monitor the actual
numbers of warheads deployed on the delivery vehicles. They could, however, identify
and count the large delivery vehicles with their monitoring systems.
The number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers falls far below the maximum
number that could be carried on those aircraft. Heavy bombers that are not equipped to
carry long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) 9—such as the
U.S. B-1 and B-2 bombers—count as only one warhead under the START limits. This
number applies even though these bombers can carry at least sixteen bombs and short-
range missiles. Further, heavy bombers that are equipped to carry ALCMs count as
half of the maximum number of weapons they are permitted to carry. START states
that U.S. bombers can be equipped to carry up to twenty ALCMs, but they only count
as ten warheads under the treaty limit of 6,000 warheads. Russian bombers can be
equipped to carry up to sixteen ALCMs, and count as only eight warheads under the
treaty limit.
START allows the United States and Soviet Union to reduce the number of war-
heads attributed to a particular type of ballistic missile through a process known as
“downloading.” According to the treaty, each party can reduce the “attributed number”
listed in the database for up to three types of missiles. If they do this, they must then
reduce the number of warheads carried on each missile, and if the number declines by

8
The most recent data base exchanged among the parties to the treaty can be found at U.S.
State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “START Ag-
gregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms;” available at www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/
2008/110337.htm.
9
Long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles are those with a range of more than
600 kilometers.

50

SPRING 2009

more than two warheads, they must replace the platform on the missile that holds the
warheads, so that it does not have space for the larger number of missiles.
This “downloading” process would allow each country to spread its 4,900 ballistic
missile warheads among a greater number of missiles. The countries use short-notice
onsite inspections to confirm that the number of warheads actually deployed on a par-
ticular missile does not exceed the number of warheads attributed to that type of mis-
sile in the database. The United States has taken advantage of this provision with its
Minuteman III and Trident II missiles.
Existing types of missiles cannot be deployed with more warheads than the number
attributed to that type of missile in the database. The number in the database could only
increase if the missile were altered to meet the definition of a “new type” of missile.
START bans new types of heavy ICBMs. For smaller missiles, it contains an elaborate
definition that is designed to allow the parties to distinguish between modified versions
of existing ballistic missiles, which would be subject to the warhead attribution num-
bers already in the database, and new types, which would receive a new warhead attri-
bution number. During the negotiations, the parties agreed that the definition would re-
flect changes in missile characteristics—such as the propellant used, the number of
stages, its length and diameter, and its throwweight—but they differed on the magni-
tude of the changes that would define a “new type” of missile. The United States feared
that, with smaller changes, the Soviet Union would be able to have a missile that was
virtually identical to an existing missile declared a new type with a greater number of
warheads, and then might secretly retrofit the older version with more warheads as
well. This was one of the last issues resolved in the START negotiations.10
Collateral Constraints
START contains detailed definitions of the specific items and activities limited by the
treaty. The parties have also been required to exchange copious amounts of detailed
data on the technical characteristics of the treaty-limited items. The treaty mandates
that the parties locate all strategic forces limited by the agreement at “declared facili-
ties,” which include production, assembly, testing, storage, maintenance, deployment,
and elimination facilities. It outlines detailed notifications that must be provided and
procedures that must be followed when items move from one location to another. It
further defines detailed procedures that the countries must follow when they eliminate
weapons limited by the treaty, or close down facilities that had once housed these
items. Designed to reduce ambiguities and minimize the opportunities for dispute,

10
The Soviet Union suggested that a 15 percent change in throwweight would be enough to
distinguish a new type of missile, while the United States wanted a throwweight change of
30 percent and a change in one other missile characteristic. They eventually agreed to essen-
tially split their differences and defined a new type of missile as one with a 21 percent
change in throwweight and at least a 5 percent change in the length of the first stage. This
would mean that new types of missiles would have to be significantly different from existing
types.

51


these details provide the foundation for the treaty’s verification regime by drawing
sharp distinctions between permitted and prohibited forces and activities.
Monitoring and Verification
Verification is the process that one country uses to assess whether another country is
complying with an arms control agreement. To verify compliance, a country must de-
termine whether the forces and activities of another country are within the bounds es-
tablished by the limits and obligations set forth in the agreement. Treaty language
forms the core of the verification regime: it describes the limits and obligations the
countries must observe and allows them to identify the forces and activities that com-
ply with the terms of the treaty. The identification of compliant activities also helps a
country focus on what it should look for when it collects information about the other
country’s forces and activities. No verification regime can ensure the detection of all
violations, but the START regime is designed to ensure that parties would have a high
probability of detecting militarily significant violations.
The parties to a treaty use a wide variety of means to collect information on (or
monitor) the forces and activities of the other parties. Some of these monitoring sys-
tems, such as overhead satellites, operate outside the territories of the treaty parties.
But the parties can also cooperate in providing information by exchanging data, dis-
playing treaty-limited items, and allowing onsite inspections. Once they have collected
this information, the parties analyze and refine the raw data to help develop a meaning-
ful picture of each other’s forces and activities. They then evaluate the results of the
monitoring process, compare the observed forces and activities with the expected
forces and activities, and determine whether the other party has complied with its obli-
gations under the terms of the treaty.
To verify compliance with START, each side monitors the numbers and locations
of ballistic missiles, launchers, and heavy bombers deployed by the other country. To
achieve this goal, the countries have had to:
• Establish the number and location of deployed and stored ballistic missiles
and deployed bombers when the treaty entered into force
• Confirm the technical characteristics of existing types of weapons and estab-
lish the measurements for new types of weapons
• Add the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers deployed after the
treaty entered into force
• Subtract the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers eliminated,
according to treaty rules, during the life of the treaty
• Track treaty-limited items when they move between declared facilities
• Monitor the armaments on permitted systems, to confirm that missiles and
bombers are deployed with the numbers and types of warheads permitted by
the START database
• Monitor ballistic missile flight tests to determine the characteristics of differ-
ent types of ballistic missiles.

52

SPRING 2009

START contains a complex verification regime that is designed to allow the parties
to achieve these objectives. Both sides use their own satellites and remote sensing
equipment—their National Technical Means of Verification (NTM)—to gather the
vast majority of the information each needs to monitor the other country’s forces and
activities and to determine whether the other country has complied with the limits in
START. But the treaty also contains a number of specific verification provisions that
are designed to help the parties gather and confirm the needed information. For exam-
ple, it bans measures that would interfere with the parties’ ability to collect information
with their NTM, and requires that they use data exchanges, notifications, and onsite in-
spections to gather information about forces and activities limited by the treaty. These
measures do not replace monitoring with NTM, but they can add detail to information
collected by NTM, enhance a country’s confidence in the meaning and reliability of the
information, and help deter violations. The treaty also established the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission (JCIC), where the parties meet to discuss treaty imple-
mentation issues and compliance questions.

Access Measures. START contains several verification measures that allow the coun-
tries’ NTM to gain access to information about the other country’s treaty-limited
forces. These measures include a ban on interference with NTM—for example, the
parties cannot interfere with the launch or operation of the other side’s satellites—and
a requirement that they broadcast telemetry (the technical data generated during missile
flight tests) over open channels. START also bans efforts to conceal forces and activi-
ties from NTM and mandates that the parties display treaty-limited items under certain
circumstances, so that NTM can confirm their locations and some characteristics.
The ban on data denial during missile flight tests was a particularly important fea-
ture of START for the United States. Each nation transmits data, known as telemetry,
during its flight tests of ballistic missiles. Even before START came into effect, each
nation monitored the other’s missile flight tests to gain information about characteris-
tics such as missile throwweight, launch weight, and the number of reentry vehicle re-
leases tested during the flight. The nations could deny each other access to this data by
encrypting it and transmitting it in coded form, recording it during the flight and stor-
ing it aboard the missile for recovery after the test, or by jamming and otherwise inter-
fering with the other side’s receiving instruments. Because the United States believed
that this information would be critical to its efforts to monitor Soviet compliance with
START, it insisted that the treaty contain a complete ban on the denial of data gener-
ated during flight tests. Not only must the parties broadcast unencrypted data during
the tests, they also agreed to exchange the tapes of data recorded during the flight tests.

Information Exchanges. START mandates that the parties exchange detailed informa-
tion about the numbers, locations, and characteristics of treaty-limited ballistic missiles
and heavy bombers. For the most part, this information confirms data that each country
collects with its own NTM. It can provide additional details and help the countries in-
terpret ambiguous or incomplete data. The countries have also had to notify each other
when they move ballistic missiles or bombers that are limited by the treaty. These noti-

53


fications help each country monitor the locations of the other side’s permitted systems
and detect the possible presence of excess or illegal systems.

Onsite Inspections. Under START, the United States and Russia have conducted sev-
eral different types of onsite inspections. They use these inspections to collect infor-
mation about permitted systems and activities at declared facilities, but they are not
permitted to go “anywhere, anytime” in search of treaty violations. These inspections
may not provide much new information that is needed to verify compliance with the
treaty, but they can confirm and add detail to information collected by NTM and data
exchanges. Further, with the short notice available before many of these inspections, a
country would find it difficult to hide evidence of a violation at a declared facility.
START has permitted inspections at all the declared facilities that produce, house,
and support ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. The countries use these inspections
to confirm information about the number of systems located at each facility. They have
also viewed treaty-limited items to confirm information about their characteristics. For
example, they can use short-notice inspections to confirm that the number of warheads
on a missile does not exceed the number attributed to that type of missile in the data-
base. Each country has also established permanent monitoring systems around a final
assembly facility for one of the other country’s mobile ICBMs to help them count mo-
bile ICBMs as they are deployed.
Each of the inspections permitted by START is governed by complex and detailed
procedures that address everything about the inspection process. These procedures
outline (among other things) the airports the inspectors can use when they arrive in the
country, the amount of notice they need to give before the start of an inspection, the
amount of time the host country has to transport the inspectors to the selected site, the
types of equipment the inspectors can use, the amount of time that can transpire during
the inspection, and the procedures the inspectors and hosts would use to resolve ques-
tions that came up during the visit. These procedures and rules are designed to outline
the rights and responsibilities of both parties, and minimize any potential conflict that
might occur during inspections, but they also can create conflicts of their own if ques-
tions about procedures come up during the process. Most analysts agree, however, that
the START inspection process has had few significant problems over the years.

Synergy in Monitoring and Verification. Each verification provision in START is de-
signed to provide the parties with a distinct source of information about the forces and
activities of the other side. They also mesh together in a way that is designed to deter
violations and increase confidence in the parties’ compliance with the treaty. For ex-
ample, much of the data collected during onsite inspections can also be collected by
NTM or shared during data exchanges. The inspections essentially confirm expected
information. Nevertheless, this redundancy can detect inconsistencies and thereby
complicate efforts to conceal information and evade treaty limits. For example, if one
party did not notify the other before it moved a treaty-limited item to a different facil-
ity, but the other party’s NTM detected the movement, the inconsistency might raise
questions about whether the first party was trying to hide or conceal an item limited by

54

SPRING 2009

the treaty. Over time, the START regime has also allowed the parties to collect infor-
mation that may not be central to the goals of the treaty but could still add to their un-
derstanding of the forces and operations of the other side. Many of the treaty’s sup-
porters argue that this adds confidence and predictability to assessments of the other
side’s strategic forces.
START Implementation
In September 1990, before START entered into force, the United States had more than
10,500 accountable warheads deployed on nearly 2,250 delivery vehicles.11 By mid-
2008, this number had declined to 5,941 accountable warheads on 1,214 delivery vehi-
cles.12 Soviet forces had declined from more than 10,000 accountable warheads on
2,500 delivery vehicles in September 1990 to 4,138 accountable warheads on 839 de-
livery vehicles in mid-2008. All the nuclear warheads from the SS-18 ICBMs and
heavy bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned to Russia by May 1995. All Soviet-
era nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine’s territory by June 1996, and all
eighty-one SS-25 mobile ICBMs had been moved from Belarus to Russia by late No-
vember 1996. Ukraine has eliminated all the ICBM silos and heavy bombers that were
deployed on its territory. All the parties have also participated in the onsite inspections
permitted under the treaty. They continue to meet, twice each year, in the JCIC. While
both the United States and Russia have raised some questions about compliance with
the treaty, both agree that there have been few significant compliance disputes.

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 13
In 2001, during its first year in office, the second Bush Administration conducted a
Nuclear Posture Review to evaluate the size, structure, and role of the U.S. nuclear ar-
senal. As a part of that review, the administration determined that the United States
could reduce its strategic forces to between 1,700 and 2,000 “operationally deployed
nuclear warheads.” During a summit meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in
November 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would
pursue these reductions unilaterally in the next decade, without signing a formal arms
control agreement. President Putin indicated that Russia wanted to use the formal arms
control process to achieve deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals, and emphasized that
the two sides should focus on “reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement.”14

11
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Archives, “START Data Base,” exchanged 1
September 1990.
12
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “Fact
Sheet: START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons,” 1 October 2008.
13
The text of this treaty can be found at U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation, Treaties and Agreements section; available at
www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/10527.htm.
14
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Conference: President Bush and
President Putin Discuss New Relationship,” 13 November 2001.

55


Within the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell supported the
conclusion of a “legally binding” arms control agreement. He apparently prevailed
over the objections of officials in the Pentagon, who reportedly wanted the United
States to maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in response to
its own needs.15 Consequently, the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offen-
sive Reductions Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty) on 24 May 2002. It re-
ceived the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate on 6 March 2003 and the approval of
the Russian Parliament on 14 May 2003; it entered into force on 1 June 2003.
The Moscow Treaty states that the United States and Russia will reduce their
“strategic nuclear warheads” to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 31 December
2012.16 The text does not define “strategic nuclear warheads” and, therefore, does not
indicate whether the parties will count only those warheads that are “operationally de-
ployed,” all warheads that would count under the START counting rules, or some other
quantity. The text does refer to statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in No-
vember and December 2001, when each outlined their own reduction plans. As a re-
sult, the United States and Russia each use their own definition when counting strategic
nuclear warheads, and neither uses the START counting rules. The Moscow Treaty
does not limit delivery vehicles or impose sublimit on specific types of weapons sys-
tems. Each party shall determine its own “composition and structure of its strategic of-
fensive arms.” In addition, the treaty does not contain any definitions or descriptions of
the types missiles and bombers whose warheads count under the treaty limits. In addi-
tion, the treaty does not contain any monitoring or verification provisions.
During the hearings on the resolution of ratification, the Bush Administration noted
that the United States and Russia already collect information about strategic nuclear
forces under the START limits as well as through the implementation of the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. At the time, some in Congress ques-
tioned whether this information would be sufficient for the duration of the Moscow
Treaty, since START expires three years ahead of the later treaty.17 This discontinuity
is one of the primary reasons why many analysts and members of Congress believe the
two sides should at least extend the monitoring and verification provisions in START
through the end of the Moscow Treaty.

Preparing for START Expiration
U.S.-Russian Discussions
In September 2006, U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph and Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak met to initiate a new strategic security dialogue. This

15
Jonathan S. Landay, “Rumsfeld Reportedly Resists Firm Limits on Nuclear Arms,” San Jose
Mercury News (27 April 2002).
16
See Amy F. Woolf, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, CRS
Report RL31448.
17
For details, see U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on the Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Reductions, Testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell, 9 July 2002.

56

SPRING 2009

dialogue evolved into a series of meetings that addressed a range of issues; START
was included, but was not high on the agenda of the meetings. During the first meeting,
and at a second one in December 2006, the two sides outlined their goals for the talks.
Russia indicated that it wanted to follow START with a new formal treaty that would
be “similar in size and complexity to START” and would use many of the same defini-
tions and counting rules as START. Russia also suggested that the two sides establish a
regular working group, with meetings chaired at the Assistant Secretary level, to work
out the details of this new treaty. According to a Bush Administration official, the
United States had “no appetite for those big, giant documents that try to script every
single element of strategic forces.”18
The Bush Administration emphasized that the United States and Russia no longer
needed arms control agreements to manage their strategic relationship. The United
States also did not want to set up a working group or negotiate a new treaty to follow
START, and preferred to pursue broader “strategic discussions” within a political
framework.19
In spite of their differences, the United States and Russia agreed that they should
continue to implement some of the monitoring and verification provisions in START
after the treaty expired. Russia proposed that they include these verification provisions
in a new, legally binding treaty that would also limit the number of warheads permitted
on each side. According to one Russian official, these measures would have to be a
part of a legally binding agreement to be permitted by domestic Russian law.20 The
United States, however, argued for a less formal arrangement of transparency and con-
fidence-building measures. These could include voluntary notifications and site visits,
but would not contain the detailed procedures and provisions included in START.21
Although Undersecretary of State Joseph initially rejected the idea, the two sides
did hold a series of meetings chaired at the Assistant Secretary level to pursue a possi-
ble monitoring and verification agreement. They continued to disagree, however, on
whether the verification measures should be voluntary or legally binding, and whether
they should be attached to a formal treaty that would also limit the numbers of de-
ployed warheads.
In addition to the periodic meetings at the Undersecretary level (Joseph/Kislyak,
then Rood/Kislyak) and the working group meetings at the Assistant Secretary level,
the United States and Russia held several high-level meetings that addressed the future
of U.S.-Russian arms control. For example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met
with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in July 2007. Their formal statement
after the meeting stated that “the United States and Russia reiterate their intention to

18
Sebastian Sprenger, “Nations to Kick off Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism Next Week:
Separate U.S.-Russian Meeting on START Expected,” Inside the Pentagon (26 October
2006).
19
Nicholas Kralev, “Russia, U.S. to Discuss START,” Washington Times (6 March 2007): 1.
20
Wade Boese, “U.S., Russia Exploring Post-START Options,” Arms Control Today (May
2007).
21
Kralev, “Russia, U.S. to Discuss START.”

57


carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their
national security requirements and alliance commitments.” It added that the “ministers
discussed development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and pre-
dictability regarding strategic offensive forces.”22 But the United States still did not ac-
cept Russia’s proposal to pursue a formal treaty.
The U.S. position began to shift later in 2007. Secretary Rice and Secretary of De-
fense Robert Gates held joint meetings in Moscow with their counterparts in October,
and concluded that, although the United States was still seeking something “far less
formal than a major treaty,” it might accept, according to Secretary Gates, “a binding
agreement” preserving some of START, as long as it was “narrowly focused.”23 Never-
theless, the United States continued to reject a formal treaty that would limit the num-
ber of nuclear weapons. When Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice traveled to Moscow
to discuss START again in March 2008, Secretary Rice argued that the current U.S.-
Russian relationship does not require “the kind of highly articulated, expensive limita-
tions and verification procedures that attended the strategic arms relationship with the
Soviet Union.”24 Russian officials, however, continued to reject the U.S. proposals for
an “informal notification” regime.
Presidents Bush and Putin failed to break this stalemate when they met in Sochi,
Russia in April 2008. Although they signed a new Strategic Framework that contained
a pledge to enact nuclear weapons reductions “to the lowest possible level consistent
with our national security requirements and alliance commitments,” they failed to agree
on a way forward in their arms control relationship. Russia still wanted to negotiate a
treaty based on the START framework, while the United States was only willing to
codify some verification measures.25
The talks continued through the spring and summer of 2008, although according to
some news reports they were “irregular and unproductive.”26 Some reports suggested
that the United States might suspend the talks in response to the Russian incursion into
Georgia in August 2008, but both sides agreed the talks were important enough to
continue in September and October.27 Nevertheless, the two sides remained far apart.
Russia was unwilling to recede from its call for a formal treaty with detailed definitions
and counting rules, while the United States still preferred a less formal agreement that

22
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Joint Statement by U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey
Lavrov,” 3 July 2007.
23
Ken Fireman, “Gates, Rice Made Last-Minute Offer of New Arms Ideas in Moscow,”
Bloomberg News (13 October 2007).
24
Wade Boese, “U.S., Russia at Odds on Key Arms Issues,” Arms Control Today (April 2008).
25
Wade Boese, “Bush, Putin Leave Arms Disputes Unsettled,” Arms Control Today (May
2008).
26
Wade Boese, “Russia Wants Limits on Prompt Global Strike,” Arms Control Today (June
2008).
27
Wade Boese, “U.S.-Russian Strategic Dialogue in Limbo,” Arms Control Today (October
2008).

58

SPRING 2009

called for transparency and confidence-building measures. The United States did, how-
ever, recognize that Russia would not permit onsite visits without a formal treaty, so
Washington proposed in October 2008 that the two sides attach an informal transpar-
ency regime to a legally binding treaty that essentially reiterated the limits and declara-
tions outlined in the Moscow Treaty. Russia rejected this proposal. In a speech deliv-
ered on 10 October 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia at-
taches “exceptional importance to concluding a new, legally binding Russian-American
agreement on nuclear disarmament” to replace START. He further noted that “what we
need is a treaty and not a declaration,” which is a reference to the format used in the
Moscow Treaty.28
The United States and Russia—along with representatives from Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan—met in the JCIC from 13–21 November 2008. This forum provided
the venue for the formal meeting, mandated by START, where the parties considered
whether to extend the Treaty.29 They did not reach any agreements during this meeting,
other than to note that they were leaving the options open for the incoming Obama
Administration. The United States and Russia held one final meeting in their series of
strategic security discussions on 15 December 2008, where bilateral arms control was
one of many issues on the agenda.30 They held extensive discussions about the U.S.
draft treaty, but they failed to reach agreement on any of the outstanding issues.
Neither the United States nor Russia believes the two parties should extend the
START agreement. Neither wants to continue to implement all the monitoring and
verification provisions included in START; the lengthy and highly detailed lists of
procedures and requirements have proven costly and complicated. In some cases, these
details were designed to address concerns about the potential for cheating and evasion
that no longer exist in the current environment. Moreover, as is noted below, some of
the limits and restrictions have begun to interfere with ongoing weapons programs for
both nations. A simple extension of START would not reduce these pressures and,
unless the parties could agree on a new treaty, could remain in force for five years.
Russian Proposals for Revision
In a speech to Russian diplomats in June 2006, then-President Vladimir Putin proposed
that the United States and Russia begin negotiations to replace START with a new
treaty.31 Since then, Russia has consistently and repeatedly insisted that the two sides
replace START with a treaty that would not only reduce each side’s strategic offensive

28
Wade Boese, “Bush Administration Sets Russian Arms Talks,” Arms Control Today (Octo-
ber 2008).
29
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, “Fact
Sheet: Statement by the United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,” 21 November 2008.
30
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Media Note: Acting Under Secretary
for Arms Control and International Security John C. Rood to Travel to Moscow for Bilateral
Strategic Security Dialogue Talks,” 12 December 2008.
31
Wade Boese, “Russia Seeks New Nuclear Accord,” Arms Control Today (September 2006).

59


forces to 1,500 warheads, but also would count the warheads on all deployed delivery
vehicles, as START has done.32 Such an agreement would maintain the predictability
and the stability afforded by START, an outcome that would not be possible in the ab-
sence of a detailed, legally binding treaty.33 The new treaty would not need to keep all
the provisions of START, but should preserve “the main systematic structure of the
agreement,” including limitations on delivery vehicles and warhead deployments.34
Reports indicate that Russia would like the new treaty to relax START’s require-
ments for new types of ballistic missiles. As was noted above, START contains a pre-
cise definition of the changes needed to have a new missile counted as a “new type.”
These provisions were designed to prevent Russia from deploying its SS-25 missile
with more than one warhead. But Russia has developed the RS-24 missile, a new vari-
ant of its single-warhead SS-27 missile, which is itself a variant of the SS-25, and it
plans to deploy this new system with three warheads on each missile.35 Because the
missile does not satisfy the treaty’s “new types” definition, it would be limited to a sin-
gle warhead under START, and a three-warhead version would violate the treaty. This
missile had its third successful test launch in late November 2008, and recent press re-
ports indicate that Russia now plans to deploy this missile in December 2009, as soon
as START expires. Russian officials have indicated that this missile is critical to the
future of Russia’s strategic forces, not only because it can carry up to three warheads,
but also because it will incorporate technologies that would allow it to penetrate U.S.
ballistic missile defenses.36
According to some reports, Russia would also like the new treaty to ease some of
the restrictions that START imposes on mobile ICBMs.37 Although these restrictions
were intended to apply to both parties, the United States has never been affected by
them because it never deployed mobile ICBMs. These provisions—including limits on
the size of deployment areas, notifications about exercises, and the rights to special on-
site inspections after the missiles have dispersed for exercises—were designed to com-
plicate any effort to hide extra missiles within the legal deployments of mobile ICBMs.

32
Wade Boese, “Arms Issues Divide U.S. and Russia,” Arms Control Today (September 2007).
33
Nikolai Sokov, “START I Replacement: The End of Cold War Disarmament,” PONARS Pol-
icy Memo No. 418 (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, December
2006).
34
Arms Control Association, “Interview with Sergey Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the
United States,” December 2008; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/
KislyakInterview.
35
Pavel Podvig, “Why START Is Important,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (3 July 2007).
36
“Russia to Deploy Missile to Counter U.S. Missile Shield Next Year,” London Daily Tele-
graph (29 November 2008).
37
Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov, “ReSTART: The Need for a New U.S.-Russian
Strategic Arms Agreement,” Arms Control Today (September 2006).

60

SPRING 2009

But they also impinge on the operations of the permitted missiles and add to the costs
of operating the systems.38
Over the years, Russia has also expressed concerns about the U.S. ability to add
warheads to its missiles quickly by restoring warheads that had been removed under
START’s downloading provisions. It may insist that a new treaty require the United
States to replace the platform on all downloaded missiles, instead of just those that
have had more than two warheads removed.39
Russia would like to retain some of START’s monitoring and verification provi-
sions, although it would like to make them less costly and cumbersome. For example,
the two sides could reduce the numbers of short-notice inspections permitted each year,
and replace these inspections with less formal “visits.” The parties could also reduce
the number of mandatory notifications, which were intended to help each side monitor
the numbers and locations of treaty-limited items, and replace them with routine, peri-
odic data exchanges.40
U.S. Proposals for Revisions
When U.S. and Russian talks on the future of START began in 2006, the United States
expected START to expire and the parties to pursue their own priorities for moderniz-
ing and modifying their nuclear forces. However, the participants in the U.S. govern-
ment were divided on the question of whether to extend START’s monitoring provi-
sions. According to some reports, U.S. officials believed the two sides should evaluate
whether they even needed to continue to implement these provisions because, even
without START, the amount of military cooperation and transparency between them
had increased over the years.41 They further argued that the inspections regime had be-
come too costly and cumbersome for the United States and could interfere with mili-
tary operations, without providing certain knowledge about Russia’s nuclear forces.
Moreover, in the new security environment, the United States no longer needs detailed
information about Russian forces; it just needs to understand the general trends and
pending changes in force size and structure. Therefore, according to this argument, the
two sides need at most an informal system with less structured visits and looser inspec-
tions.
Others argued that the START regime provides valuable information about Russian
forces that is not available elsewhere, while also helping to build confidence and coop-

38
Nikolai Sokov, “Review of Disarmament Issues in U.S.–Russian Relations,” James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (November
2007).
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
David Francis, “Arms Expert Calls for START Verification Extension,” Global Security
Newswire (8 November 2005).

61


eration between the two sides.42 Furthermore, reports indicate that officials in the U.S.
intelligence community have argued that, without START’s cooperative monitoring
provisions, it will not be able to assess with any degree of confidence Russia’s compli-
ance with the limits in the Moscow Treaty.43
While the United States has not identified any of the central limits in START that
impinge on its current plans and programs, some officials have expressed concerns that
an extension of these provisions (or their inclusion in a new treaty) could affect future
plans, such as the possible deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles
and the potential deployment of these conventional missiles at sites that are not listed
in the treaty.44 This concern has emerged as a major roadblock in the recent U.S.-Rus-
sian discussions about what type of treaty should follow START.45 Russia has insisted
that the new treaty count the warheads that could be deployed on all strategic delivery
vehicles, as START did, in part to capture the warheads that could be carried on mis-
siles converted to carry conventional weapons. It wants to count these warheads to
limit the United States’ ability to break out of the treaty by converting the missiles back
to nuclear warheads.46 The United States, however, does not want the warheads that
could be carried on these missiles to count under the treaty because it does not want
any limits on conventional warheads or any forced trade-offs between numbers of nu-
clear and conventional warheads.
U.S. officials have also expressed concerns about some of START’s monitoring
and verification provisions. For example, the U.S. Navy has indicated that Russian re-
quests for re-entry vehicle inspections on U.S. ballistic missile submarines can inter-
fere with the scheduled maintenance and operations of the submarines, because the
navy must bring the submarine into port and the missile into a handling facility on the
base. The treaty’s limits on the number of warheads that can be removed (or
downloaded) from Trident submarines might also interfere with the navy’s deployment
plans for the future, particularly if the United States chooses to remove more warheads
from Trident missiles as it continues to reduce the overall number of strategic war-
heads in its arsenal.
Some in the U.S. government have also argued that START’s provisions requiring
the exchange of telemetry data during flight tests of ballistic missiles will interfere with

42
Carol Giacomo, “U.S. to Let START Nuclear Treaty Expire,” Reuters (22 May 2007); see
also Jonathan S. Landay, “Dispute Delays Arms Control Talks with Moscow,” McClatchy
Newspapers Washington Bureau (18 June 2007).
43
Wade Boese, “News Analysis: The Bush Administration and Verification,” Arms Control
Today (April 2005).
44
Phil Gardner, Michael George, Vera Lev, and Sandra McMahon, Extension of the START
Treaty? An SAIC Emerging Issues Project (December 2005).
45
Walter Pincus, “U.S., Russia Split over Scope of Arms Treaty Follow-up but Concur on
Goal, Negotiator Says,” Washington Post (22 December 2008): 19.
46
“Russia Concerned by U.S. Position on START, Deputy Foreign Minister Says,” Interfax
News Agency (19 December 2008).

62

SPRING 2009

U.S. military plans and programs.47 In particular, the United States uses retired Minute-
man II ICBMs as target vehicles during tests of its missile defense capabilities. Be-
cause these missiles are still limited by the START provisions, the United States must
provide Russia with all the telemetry generated during these flights. Yet the data from
these tests may reveal information not only about the Minuteman II ICBMs but also
about the goals of the flight test and the characteristics of the missile defense intercep-
tors. This concern has been a key issue in discussions about whether (and how) the
United States and Russia should extend some of START’s monitoring provisions.
The Bush Administration eventually proposed that the two sides replace START
with a short, legally binding treaty similar to the Moscow Treaty and a longer, non-
binding appendix on transparency and cooperation. This transparency regime would be
far less detailed and complex than START. It would allow for informal visits, without
the detailed plans and notifications required by START, and probably would relax the
telemetry provisions, or at least exempt Minuteman II flights during missile defense
tests from the requirement to broadcast and exchange telemetry. Moreover, as is noted
above, the legally binding portion of the U.S. proposal would not contain any of the
detailed definitions and counting rules of START; the parties would declare their num-
bers of deployed warheads, as they do under the Moscow Treaty.
Options for the Future
Many expect the Obama Administration to review the U.S. position on the future of
START and the U.S.-Russian arms control process. In response to questions posed by
the Arms Control Association, then-candidate Barack Obama stated that he would
“seek Russia’s agreement to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of
START before it expires.” He also said that he would seek “real, verifiable reductions
in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons—whether deployed or no deployed, whether
strategic or nonstrategic…. ”48 His transition team has since reaffirmed these goals.
While this statement does not specify whether the new U.S. president will support an
extension of START or its replacement with another agreement, it indicates that he is
more open to completing formal agreements with Russia in general, and to negotiating
further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.
The United States and Russia have two distinct issues to consider when they con-
template the future of their arms control relationship. First, what, if anything, should
they do within the next year to extend or replace START? And, second, should they
seek to negotiate a new treaty to replace the Moscow Treaty before it expires in 2012?
Moreover, should the provisions in a new treaty focus on transparency and confidence-
building measures, or should the two nations also seek to implement deeper reductions
in their strategic offensive forces?
It is unlikely that the United States and Russia will be able to negotiate and ratify a
new treaty before the end of 2009, even though both sides have said they want to do so.

47
Ibid.
48
Arms Control Association, “2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama,”
Arms Control Today (24 September 2008).

63


The Obama Administration has to name the senior State Department and Defense De-
partment officials who will be responsible for crafting U.S. policy on arms control and
nuclear weapons, developing its negotiating positions for a future arms control treaty,
and negotiating and reaching agreement on a wide range of issues with Russia. Both
sides must present any prospective treaty to their legislatures for approval. Moreover,
during its first year in office, the Obama Administration must conduct a Nuclear Pos-
ture Review, which could recommend changes in both U.S. nuclear weapons policy
and the U.S. force structure.49 These changes could affect U.S. arms control proposals,
but the study will not be completed until early 2010.
The United States and Russia could choose from a number of options for the future
of their arms control relationship. They could allow START to lapse, or they could
extend START for five years. They could negotiate a new treaty, or they could pursue
less formal arrangements to manage their nuclear forces. A new treaty could include
further reductions in nuclear weapons, or it could simply establish a transparency re-
gime that called for continued cooperation in monitoring without further reductions in
deployed weapons. In their discussions thus far, the United States and Russia have
agreed they do not want to extend START, but they have been unable to agree on what
kind of arrangement will follow START, in part because they do not agree on the goals
they seek to achieve in their discussions. Hence, the remainder of this article will re-
view some of the possible goals for the future of the U.S.-Russian arms control rela-
tionship before it reviews the range of options.

Possible Goals
Improving the U.S.–Russian Relationship
Many of the public discussions about the future of the U.S.-Russian arms control proc-
ess focus on whether arms control can help the United States and Russia improve the
tenor of their broader political relationship. As was noted at the beginning of this es-
say, many observers (including some who served in the Bush Administration) believe
that the U.S.-Russian relationship has evolved to the point where the parties no longer
need arms control as a symbol of their cooperation on resolving common security is-
sues. Others, however—including some members of the U.S. Congress—believe that
START and the arms control process still represent “the foundation of the U.S.-Rus-
sian strategic relationship” and a “key basis for trust between the two sides.”50

Supporting Nuclear Nonproliferation Goals. During the past few years, the public de-
bate over arms control and nuclear weapons has increasingly focused on the role that
the U.S.-Russian arms control process can play in furthering broader international nu-
clear nonproliferation goals. For example, many analysts have argued that a U.S.-Rus-
sian agreement to either extend or replace START can demonstrate their commitment

49
The mandate for the new Nuclear Posture Review is contained in the FY2008 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 110- 181, Sec. 1070).
50
Senator Richard Lugar, “ Trust Still Needs Verification,” Washington Times (18 July 2008).

64

SPRING 2009

to their arms reduction obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and can
therefore help strengthen the nonproliferation regime in general, and help ensure a suc-
cessful outcome at the 2010 review conference of the NPT.51 Others, however, argue
that the nations that are currently seeking nuclear weapons would not be swayed in
their decisions by any steps taken by the United States or Russia, as their nuclear pro-
grams derive from their own political and security concerns. Moreover, they note that
the United States and Russia have already reduced their Cold War-era nuclear arsenals
sharply, without reaping any benefits in their efforts to stem nuclear proliferation.

Restraining Weapons. Many analysts in the United States and officials in the Bush
Administration have argued that, in the current security environment, the United States
and Russia no longer need to worry about all the details related to the size or structure
of the other side’s nuclear forces. Rather, they just need to understand the general
trends.52 Both have reduced their forces in recent years, and neither needs to fear that
the other would attack it with its remaining forces. Therefore, this view holds that the
two nations no longer need to negotiate formal treaties to establish and maintain bal-
ance between their force structures. Moreover, these treaties undermine the flexibility
that each nation may need to adjust its forces in response to future threats from emerg-
ing adversaries.
Although Russia recognizes that the relationship between the two nations is not as
tense as it was during the Cold War, it still sees threats to its security from U.S. poli-
cies and programs. Therefore Russia continues to value arms control measures that re-
strain U.S. forces because these measures provide both stability between the two sides’
forces and predictability for Russia when it considers how U.S. forces may evolve.53
Many analysts in the United States also believe that the stability and predictability
offered by arms control agreements are sufficiently valuable to offset any limits the
treaties may impose on U.S. flexibility. Some argue that the process of implementing
an arms control treaty, with its communication and cooperation provisions, is an im-
portant exercise in itself, so that the parties can avoid misunderstandings while they
work together to reduce nuclear forces and nuclear dangers. Others, however, empha-
size that the actual limits and restrictions in the treaty determine the amount of stability
and predictability offered by the treaty just as much as does the cooperation required to

51
Jenifer Mackby and Edward Ifft, “The End of START,” Special to the Washington Post (20
April 2007).
52
Jonathan S. Landay, “Dispute Delays Arms Control Talks with Moscow,” McClatchy
Newspapers Washington Bureau (18 June 2007).
53
In a recent interview with the Arms Control Association, Russia’s Ambassador to the United
States, Sergey Kislyak (who, as Deputy Foreign Minister, participated in talks on the future
of START) stated that “the mutual constraints provided for in START should not be lost be-
cause they do provide stability and are one of the important things that also should be pre-
served and should not be discarded.” See Arms Control Association, “Interview with Sergey
Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the United States,” December 2008; available at
www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/KislyakInterview.

65


implement them. They note that the United States and Soviet Union included many of
the detailed provisions in START because both nations wanted to restrain and reduce
the nuclear forces of the other side in order to reduce the threat from those forces, and
both agreed to include detailed monitoring and verification provisions so that they
could be more confident about achieving the goal of reducing the threat.

Promoting Transparency and Cooperation. Many have argued that—at least in the
near term—the United States and Russia should seek to replace START with a regime
that will ensure transparency and build confidence, even if it does not mandate deeper
reductions in nuclear weapons.54 This type of agreement will ensure that some form of
monitoring and verification provisions remains in place in the gap after START ex-
pires and while the Moscow Treaty remains in force. A confidence-building regime can
foster cooperation between the two sides even if the data it provides is not needed to
verify compliance with an arms control treaty. As one observer has noted, START
“forces the United States and Russia to communicate,” and to interact in ways that can
build trust between them.55 Therefore, an agreement that allowed the parties to con-
tinue with data exchanges, notifications, and some inspections could prove valuable,
even if it did not mandate specific future reductions.
Some argue that the United States and Russia can promote transparency and con-
tinue their cooperation without signing a formal arms control agreement. They note
that the two sides will continue to cooperate on reducing nuclear dangers through the
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs that the United States funds to improve
security and eliminate weapons in Russia. These efforts can be bolstered by informal
visits to weapons deployment areas and storage facilities. Moreover, some have argued
that the formal monitoring and verification provisions in START can create tensions
and undermine cooperation with their rigid requirements and stringent rules, which do
not allow the parties to adapt their activities when conditions change.56
Scope
Reductions vs. Transparency. Some analysts have argued that START provides the
United States and Russia with a framework they could use to move quickly to negotiate
a comprehensive agreement that would both reduce forces below the Moscow Treaty
limits and outline a wide-ranging monitoring and verification regime.57 This approach
would not only satisfy Russia’s preference for pursuing deeper reductions in a subse-
quent agreement to START in the near term, but would also allow the United States
and Russia to demonstrate bold leadership to the international community in the
months before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The two sides may not have time to
complete this type of agreement before START expires, but this could still advance the

54
Edward Ifft, “The Future of START,” speech delivered to the Arms Control Association on
11 June 2007; available at www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20070612IfftSpeech.pdf.
55
Pavel Podvig, “ Why START Is Important.”
56
Gardner, et al., Extension of the START Treaty?
57
Daryl G. Kimball, “START Over,” Arms Control Today (June 2007).

66

SPRING 2009

arms control agenda by highlighting their commitment to pursue a treaty on deep re-
ductions even if START were to lapse in the near term.
On the other hand, some have argued that a shorter, less detailed document—such
as the Moscow Treaty—might be sufficient to foster communication and cooperation.
Even without specific definitions and restrictions, such a document can still demon-
strate the parties’ intent to reduce nuclear arms. Further, with fewer detailed restric-
tions, both sides would be able to maintain the flexibility they might need to alter their
forces to meet unforeseen changes in the international security environment. Moreover,
the negotiations could probably proceed more quickly than those that would seek to
produce a lengthy, detailed treaty. The United States and Soviet Union took seven
years to negotiate START, but the United States and Russia completed the Moscow
Treaty in less than a year.

Linkages. The START regime limits only strategic offensive delivery vehicles and the
warheads carried by those systems. But the history of U.S.-Soviet arms control nego-
tiations is full of examples where one side or the other has tried to include limits or re-
strictions on other types of weapons. Over the years, both countries have sought to in-
clude some types of limits on their shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons in arms
control agreements; analysts continue to suggest that these limits are both necessary
and inevitable in a future agreement.58 The two sides have also often linked progress in
discussions on missile defense programs with progress on limits on strategic offensive
nuclear weapons. This linkage was explicit in the 1970s, when the first Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT I) produced both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the In-
terim Agreement on Offensive Arms. This linkage between offense and defense re-
mains important to Russia, as is evident in its concerns about U.S. plans to deploy mis-
sile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Several analysts have also suggested that future treaties should limit not only de-
ployed warheads, but also the numbers of warheads that each side retains in its stock-
pile of reserve warheads.59 While no arms control treaty has ever sought to reduce ei-
ther nation’s stockpile of reserve warheads, as the number of deployed warheads de-
clines further, the number of warheads in storage could create an imbalance if either
side could return them to deployment quickly. Moreover, reductions in the numbers of
stored warheads (and their consolidation in a smaller number of storage facilities)
might ease concerns about the possibility that some might be stolen from insecure in-
stallations and fall into the hands of terrorist groups.

Participants. Although the United States and Soviet Union signed START as a bilat-
eral agreement, it evolved into a multilateral treaty when Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and

58
Oliver Thranert, U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet (Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 December 2008).
59
As of this writing, President-elect Obama has indicated that he would seek to include limits
on weapons in the stockpile in a future arms control treaty. See Arms Control Association,
“2008 Presidential Q&A: Democratic Candidate Barack Obama.”

67


Kazakhstan succeeded the Soviet Union as parties to the treaty. Each of the four for-
mer Soviet states is subject to the limits, restrictions, and monitoring provisions in
START, even though Russia is the only one with nuclear weapons left on its territory.
Each also has a voice and a vote in the deliberations in the Joint Compliance and In-
spection Commission established by the treaty. If the parties agree to extend START,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will remain as parties to the treaty unless they agree
to amend it to include only the United States and Russia. If the United States and Rus-
sia sign a new treaty, these three former Soviet states probably would not be in-
cluded.60
Analysts have long suggested that, as the United States and Russia reduce their
forces to ever lower levels, they may eventually open up the arms control process to
other nuclear weapons states. This was rarely an issue during the Cold War, because
the United States and Soviet Union each deployed thousands of warheads on their
strategic offensive nuclear weapons. France, Great Britain, and China have just a few
hundred deployed warheads each.61 Most analysts agree that these other nations should
not join the process until the United States and Russia reduce to 1,000 or fewer war-
heads. Hence, as the United States and Russia decide how (or whether) to advance
their bilateral arms control agenda, they may also begin to think about when (or
whether) to expand the process to include other nuclear nations.

Potential Paths
Allow START to Lapse
The United States and Russia could allow START to lapse at the end of 2009. The
Bush Administration initially preferred this option because it did not want to continue
the formal U.S.-Russian arms control process at all, but also because it believed that
START could lapse without signaling the end of U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation or
even the end of formal arms control. As the Bush Administration eventually suggested,
the two sides could agree to continue to implement some of the monitoring provisions
in START without signing a formal treaty, so that they could both gather the informa-
tion needed to verify compliance with the Moscow Treaty and maintain the cooperative
relationship that had developed during START’s verification process. This path could,
however, conflict with Russia’s domestic law, as it would need to be a party to a le-
gally binding treaty before it could allow foreigners to have access to sensitive military

60
According to an official with the U.S. State Department, Russia “prefers working bilaterally
with the United States on nuclear weapons issues and wants to ‘exclude’ Belarus, Kazakh-
stan, and Ukraine from future arrangements.” See Wade Boese, “START Decision Put Off to
2009,” Arms Control Today (December 2008).
61
For summaries of the nuclear forces of these nations, see Robert S. Norris and Hans Kris-
tensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August
2008); Norris and Kristensen, “British Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists (November/December 2005); and Norris and Kristensen, “French Nuclear Forces,
2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 2005).

68

SPRING 2009

and nuclear sites.62 To rectify this problem, the parties might seek to negotiate a sepa-
rate executive agreement or memorandum of understanding to allow the visits. Alter-
natively, they could attach the monitoring provisions to a simple treaty document that
essentially restated the provisions of the Moscow Treaty, as the Bush Administration
suggested.
If the parties allowed START to lapse, and did not have the time to agree on a re-
placement before December 2009, they could still pursue negotiations on a treaty that
would eventually replace both START and the Moscow Treaty. Concerns about the
absence of any arms control limits might inspire them to press forward on this task and
seek compromises in a short amount of time. Conversely, if the absence of arms con-
trol limits did not appear to threaten stability or diminish the level of cooperation be-
tween the parties, then the pressure to reach a new agreement might decrease. Hence,
this path may be attractive to those who believe that the United States and Russia no
longer need formal treaties to manage their relationship, but it may appear too risky to
those who believe that the arms control process remains an important part of the rela-
tionship.
Extend START
Neither the Bush Administration nor the current Russian leadership want to extend
START in its present form, particularly for the full five years allowed under the terms
of Article XVII of the treaty. Yet this path may be the only one available if the parties
want to retain some of the START monitoring and verification provisions in the near
term. They could possibly agree to extend START for a shorter period of time—per-
haps two years—while they negotiate a new treaty that would replace START. But this
option is not mentioned in the current treaty, so it might need to be handled as an
amendment to the treaty, and thus require the approval of both nations’ legislatures.
The U.S. Senate might not object to a short-term extension of START, particularly
since several senators have already called on the parties to extend the treaty’s moni-
toring and verification regime, but Russia’s parliament may not be as accepting. The
current tensions in the U.S.-Russian relationship—along with ongoing concerns about
U.S. plans to deploy missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic—
could lead some in Russia to question whether any extension of START, with its limits
on Russia’s ability to modernize its forces and deploy multiple warhead ballistic mis-
siles, serves Russia’s interests.
Extend and Amend START
Instead of amending START so that they could extend it for less than the mandated
five years, the parties might extend START according to the treaty provisions, which
they could do without seeking approval from their legislatures, then try to amend the
treaty to adjust the provisions that each finds too restrictive in the current environment.
For example, Russia might want to alter the “new types” rule in START, or it might

62
Alexei Arbatov and Rose Gottemoeller, “New Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing
U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control,” Arms Control Today (July/August 2008).

69


seek a waiver from the rule for the RM-24 missile. For its part, the United States might
want to alter the provision requiring the exchange of telemetry from missile flight tests,
or seek a waiver for retired Minuteman II missiles that are used as missile defense tar-
gets. Both sides might want to modify the verification protocol to remove some of the
more costly and intrusive requirements, particularly if the parties believe the data they
provide is no longer critical to understanding the scope of the other side’s nuclear
forces. Consequently, they might be able to craft a package of amendments that would
incorporate each side’s highest priorities.
Both the United States and Russia would have to submit this package for approval
by their legislatures. Some in the U.S. Senate might object to the changes that relieve
Russia of some of its obligations, but a package that addressed both nations’ concerns
might still win the approval of the necessary two-thirds majority. The Russian parlia-
ment might object to any agreement that extended START without addressing Russia’s
concerns about U.S. missile defense plans. However, it might accept an amendment
package that addressed some of Russia’s concerns with the provisions in START. In
addition, if the United States and Russia extended START for five years before negoti-
ating the amendments, the Russian parliament would have to accept either the unmodi-
fied extension or the amendment package.
Replace START
Regardless of whether they allow START to lapse or extend it before December 2009,
the United States and Russia could continue negotiations on a new treaty. If they com-
pleted the treaty before an extended START expired, the new treaty could replace
START, or—if it were similar to the Moscow Treaty, with aggregate limits but no de-
tailed definitions, counting rules, or monitoring provisions—it could run concurrently
without substituting for START.
As was noted above, Russia would like the new treaty to be a complete package of
further limits on nuclear weapons, detailed definitions and counting rules, and moni-
toring and verification provisions. The Bush Administration, on the other hand, would
have liked the new treaty to essentially replace the Moscow Treaty, with some informal
monitoring provisions to offer a measure of transparency and cooperation. A future
treaty could take either of these forms, or it could focus solely on monitoring measures
by establishing a legally binding framework for transparency and cooperation not
linked to the need to verify compliance with restrictions on nuclear forces and activi-
ties.
Further Reductions with START Rules
A new treaty could contain START-style definitions and counting rules, along with
deeper reductions in the permitted numbers of warheads. This combination of provi-
sions would continue to reduce U.S. and Russian deployed forces and would also pro-
vide transparency and predictability for the future. Without the START-style defini-
tions and counting rules, neither side would be able to confirm that the other has com-
plied with the treaty’s reductions, because each will not know what the other side con-
sidered to be limited by the treaty.

70

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At the same time, a treaty that required the United States to reduce its forces below
the Moscow Treaty limits of 1,700–2,200 warheads but that also used the START
counting rules to calculate the number of warheads attributed to deployed delivery ve-
hicles could force the United States to make hard choices and significant changes in
the structure of its nuclear forces. Under START, all deployed delivery vehicles count
under the treaty’s limits (Russia has proposed that the same be true in a new agree-
ment); the parties then calculated the number of deployed warheads by multiplying the
number of deployed delivery vehicles by a set number of warheads listed in the data-
base for that type of delivery vehicle.
The Moscow Treaty, on the other hand, does not assume all delivery vehicles carry
deployed warheads, and allows the parties to exclude those that do not. As a result, the
United States does not count the launchers or warheads on two of its fourteen Trident
submarines, because they are in overhaul and not “deployed.” However, these systems
would count under the START rules. It also has removed more than two warheads
from some Trident missiles, without changing the front end of the missile. Under the
START provisions, these missiles would count as six warheads each. In its declaration
under the Moscow Treaty, the United States counts only the aggregate number of ac-
tual deployed warheads; it does not even have to specify how many warheads are de-
ployed on any given missile or submarine. Moreover, under the Moscow Treaty, the
United States counts only the bomber weapons maintained in the active stockpile at
U.S. bomber bases. Under START, each bomber equipped to carry cruise missiles
would count as twenty warheads, regardless of available weapons or actual deploy-
ments.
These differences produce striking variations in the number of warheads that count
under each treaty. In May 2008, the United States declared that it had 2,871 operation-
ally deployed strategic warheads that would count against the Moscow Treaty.63 At the
same time, when it exchanged START data with Russia in July 2008, it stated that it
had 5,951 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed Slims, and heavy bomb-
ers. Many of these attributed warheads could be eliminated with some accounting
changes, but it is clear that under START definitions, the United States would have to
count hundreds of warheads that it excludes from the Moscow Treaty total because it
does not consider them to be operationally deployed.64
To bring its warhead totals down to 1,500 or less while using definitions and
counting rules similar to those in START, the United States could seek to deploy each

63
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, “2008
Annual Report on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty,” 13 May 2008.
64
For example, this total includes 400 warheads attributed to Peacekeeper missiles. These mis-
siles have been deactivated, but the United States did not eliminate the silos according to
START rules, so the warheads still count. It also excludes up to 768 warheads that could be
deployed on four Trident submarines. The U.S. Navy has converted these submarines to
carry non-nuclear cruise missiles, but because it did not remove the launch tubes for the Tri-
dent missiles, they still count under START as if each launch tube held one missile and each
missile carried either six or eight warheads.

71


of its remaining Trident missiles with a smaller number of warheads. However, if
START rules apply, a reduction of more than two warheads would necessitate the
costly replacement of the platform on the post-boost vehicle on each missile. The
United States could suggest that the new treaty relax this rule, but Russia may object,
as it has been concerned about the U.S. ability to upload its missiles and increase its
warheads in a crisis. Russia has long suggested that the parties tighten the downloading
rules to minimize this possibility.
As an alternative, the United States could reduce its total warheads by eliminating
some of its deployed launchers (bombers, ICBMs, or Slims), or even removing one leg
of its “strategic triad” from the nuclear force. However, the United States probably
would not want to reduce the number of B-52 and B-2 bombers, as these aircraft also
fly conventional missions in ongoing conflicts, so it might have to remove them from
the nuclear force altogether. It also might be difficult to reduce the Minuteman fleet of
ICBMs below the current number of 450 without also reducing the number of bases
and cutting into the number of personnel trained to operate the system. Furthermore, as
the number of deployed platforms drops, it may be difficult to justify the costs associ-
ated with retaining the smaller force.
Most experts agree that the Trident submarines are going to be the mainstay of the
U.S. nuclear arsenal in the future. But, unless the United States cuts deeply into the
other “legs” of its strategic triad, deep reductions in total warheads may require reduc-
tions in the number of Trident submarines. If the United States were to reduce its Tri-
dent fleet to ten or fewer submarines, it might not be able to operate out of two bases,
as it does now, and retain submarines in both oceans on patrol in the areas from where
they would fire their missiles. Changes in this deployment pattern might require
changes in the missions and targets of the submarine fleet. The president and the U.S.
military would probably want to consider the implications of these basing and opera-
tional changes before deciding whether to accept arms control limits that produce such
changes.
Hence, if the United States agrees to replace START with a new treaty that reduces
warheads below the levels in the Moscow Treaty but retains many of the definitions
and counting rules of START, it will have to make difficult choices about how to
structure and operate its nuclear force. These decisions are not likely to come easily or
quickly, and could delay both the start and the finish of negotiations on a new treaty.
Further Reductions without START Rules
The complexities detailed above demonstrate why the Bush Administration was un-
willing to follow START with a similar, detailed document. Even those in the admini-
stration who believe that the U.S.-Russian arms control process should continue argue
that the two sides should pursue a treaty that does not contain the same level of detail
that existed in START. For example, during a speech before the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace in October 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “I am
not sure that agreements that are the size of a telephone book and take years to negoti-
ate are in the interest of either party.” He went on to say, “I believe we should go for
another agreement with Russia. I believe it could involve further cuts in the number of

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warheads. I believe we do need the verification provisions. But I think it ought to be an
agreement that is shorter, simpler, and easier to adjust to real-world conditions than
most of the arms control agreements I’ve seen over the last forty years.”65
A shorter, less detailed treaty may not, however, provide the level of transparency
or predictability sought by many analysts. Under the Moscow Treaty (which is short
and contains few details) neither the United States nor Russia has to offer any transpar-
ent view into the structure of its nuclear forces. Each simply has to declare how many
warheads it has deployed on its operational forces. Further, because the treaty includes
no timelines for the reduction process, and no definitions of the items limited by the
treaty, neither side can predict with confidence the process or outcome of the other
side’s reductions. As a result, some argue that, while the shorter negotiations may seem
preferable, a shorter treaty with fewer details would not necessarily serve the goals of
an arms control process that seeks to strengthen the relationship between the United
States and Russia or to reduce the perceived threats from their nuclear weapons.
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
Some members of Congress and analysts outside government have called on the United
States and Russia to extend the monitoring regime in START, even if they cannot
reach agreement on further reductions in nuclear forces. In a “Dear Colleague” letter
circulated in July 2007, Representative Ellen Tauscher, Chair of the House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, noted the “transparency re-
quired by the START verification regime has bred confidence in both Russia and the
U.S. enabling cooperation on a range of nuclear arms issues.”66
An agreement that established a transparency regime without imposing any further
reductions in nuclear weapons could allow the United States and Russia to sustain their
confidence in their knowledge of each other’s nuclear deployments. The START re-
gime’s extensive exchanges of data about the characteristics of each party’s weapons
systems provide both nations with significant amounts of information that would not
have been available otherwise, or would have been extremely difficult to acquire. The
parties can be confident in the accuracy of this data because they have the opportunity
to visit the sites and view the weapons themselves. Moreover, START required each
party to notify the other when they changed the numbers or locations of strategic sys-
tems. Even if the parties have not agreed to limit or reduce their nuclear weapons, they
could continue to house their weapons at agreed sites, provide data about their charac-
teristics and capabilities, and provide notifications when they moved them.
Some have also argued that by continuing to cooperate in monitoring the locations
and characteristics of deployed nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia would

65
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century,”
speech delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 28
October 2008; available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_
checked.pdf.
66
Representative Ellen Tauscher, “Call on the President to Extend the Most Significant
Remaining Arms Control Agreement of Our Time,” July 2007.

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be better positioned to monitor compliance with the Moscow Treaty. The notifications
and data exchanges would continue to inform them about the numbers and locations of
missiles and bombers, while onsite visits would give them an opportunity to count the
warheads deployed on at least some missiles. These inspections would not, however,
provide the parties with an opportunity to calculate all the warheads that would count
under the Moscow Treaty. Because START inspections were designed to confirm that
the number of warheads deployed on a particular missile did not exceed the number
specified in the database, they do not provide a way to count the total number of war-
heads deployed within the entire force. However, by confirming that the deployed war-
head number did not exceed the number in the database, the inspections could provide
the parties with some confidence in the number of warheads they might then use in
their calculations of deployed warheads across the force.

Choosing a Path
Although President-elect Obama has stated that he would like the United States and
Russia to negotiate deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals, the two nations still may
not be on the same page in their views of their arms control relationship. They still
have to decide what (if anything) to do about START before it expires, and what (if
any) type of treaty they should negotiate to replace START in the longer term. They
may agree that such a treaty should contain more details than were included in the
Moscow Treaty, but they will still have to decide which of START’s counting rules
and definitions will continue to apply, whether the new treaty would ease or tighten the
rules governing the downloading of missiles and the deployment of new types of mis-
siles, and which of the treaty’s monitoring and verification provisions they would con-
tinue to implement. Moreover, they would have to decide whether to include only de-
ployed warheads, or all deployed and reserve warheads, and whether to link reductions
in strategic weapons to other issues, like nonstrategic nuclear weapons or missile de-
fense.67
Because each side would like some of START to continue and some of it to end,
both may find it difficult to reach an agreement on the substance of a new treaty that
matches their priorities. On the other hand, if they balance and offset their differing
preferences and priorities, they may be able to craft a compromise that provides them
with more transparency and predictability than the Moscow Treaty, but less precision
than the START agreement.

67
For a detailed proposal that addresses these issues, see Arbatov and Gottemoeller, “New
Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Control.”

74

GAO Report on NATO Enlargement: Albania and Croatia *
Joseph A. Christoff, et al.
Background: NATO Enlargement
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 by twelve European and North
American countries to provide collective defense against the emerging threat that the
Soviet Union posed to the democracies of Western Europe. Since its inception, the Al-
liance’s key objective has been to achieve a lasting peace in the North Atlantic area
that is based on the common values of democracy, the rule of law, and individual lib-
erty. Article 10 of the treaty permits the accession of additional European states if they
are in a position to further the treaty’s principles and contribute to North Atlantic secu-
rity. While members must unanimously agree to any new country’s accession, the
treaty contains no explicit criteria that a country must meet to join the Alliance.
NATO’s invitations to countries to join the Alliance are political decisions based on
the unanimous agreement of members.
At the 1999 summit meeting in Washington, D.C., NATO promulgated, among
other things, the Membership Action Plan, to provide guidance and counseling to other
NATO aspirants to facilitate their preparations for possible membership. The plan sets
forth defense, budgetary, information security, legal, political, and economic goals for
countries to work toward in order to enhance their readiness for membership. Essen-
tially, NATO wants countries that are seeking to join the Alliance to:
• Be democracies that are based on the rule of law
• Have harmonious relations with neighboring countries and settle international
disputes peacefully
• Provide and protect civil liberties, human rights, and minority rights
• Have an open market economy.
In addition, NATO wants countries to modernize and restructure their defense ca-
pabilities to be interoperable with NATO and therefore be able to contribute to NATO
operations. To reach that goal, NATO would like countries to spend at least the
equivalent of 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense develop-
ment. Countries also need to implement NATO requirements for handling and securing
NATO classified information and to be free from legal barriers that would prevent a
country from deploying forces abroad or hosting foreign troops on their territory. Each

*
This report was presented to the relevant committees in the U.S. Congress by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in September 2008. It was also presented to the
Secretaries of State and Defense. Key staff in the GAO’s International Affairs and Trade sec-
tion who contributed to this report include Joseph A. Christoff, Jeffrey D. Phillips, M. Eliza-
beth Guran, Gezahegne Bekele, Lynn A. Cothern, Martin H. De Alteriis, Ernie E. Jackson,
and Berel Spivack. The full text of the original report is available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d081165r.pdf.

75


country participating in the Membership Action Plan develops an annual plan of ac-
tions that it will pursue to achieve those goals. NATO reviews the plans and monitors
aspirant member states’ progress in implementing them, providing annual feedback to
each country.
Since its inception, NATO has enlarged its membership five times as changing po-
litical and strategic circumstances have warranted. The first three occasions were
linked to confrontation with the Communist bloc, particularly the Soviet Union, and
were the result of pressing strategic and security needs. Turkey and Greece joined
NATO in 1952 for strategic reasons, permitting NATO to shore up its southern flank to
forestall Communist military action in Europe at the height of the Korean War. West
Germany joined the Alliance in 1955 after agreeing to maintain extensive NATO
forces on its territory and to place its national army within NATO’s integrated com-
mand structure. With Spain’s accession to membership in 1982, NATO gained better
access to Spain’s air and naval bases, while the newly democratized nation improved
its chances of joining the European Economic Community.
A significantly different strategic environment marked the fourth and fifth rounds
of enlargement. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s goal was to extend
stability eastward. In 1994, NATO committed to enlarging its membership to include
the newly democratic states of the former Communist bloc. As a result, Poland, Hun-
gary, and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance in 1999. At its summit meeting in
November 2002 in Prague, NATO invited seven additional countries to join as part of
the fifth round of enlargement. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slova-
kia, and Slovenia became members in March 2004. On 2 April 2008, Albania and
Croatia were invited to begin accession talks with NATO, marking the start of the sixth
round of enlargement. Figure 1 shows the two new invited countries and the current
European members of NATO.

Reports to Congress on New NATO Members
The admission of new members to NATO requires ratification by two-thirds of the
United States Senate. To ensure that Congress had sufficient information on the coun-
tries invited to join NATO, the Senate mandated in a 1999 resolution that the president
provide Congress with information on countries seeking to join the Alliance before
NATO made any decision on enlarging its membership.1 In particular, the president
was required to assess how countries would further the principles of the North Atlantic
Treaty, contribute to North Atlantic security, and affect U.S. national security interests.
The president also was required to evaluate countries’ eligibility for membership and
estimate the military requirements and costs associated with a country’s membership

1
Resolution of Ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the acces-
sion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 144 Cong. Rec. S4217-20, 1998.

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Figure 1: Countries Invited to Join NATO and Current European NATO Members.

for both NATO and U.S. budgets.2 President George W. Bush submitted a classified
report on Albania and Croatia to Congress on 28 March 2008 to meet this requirement,
in advance of the invitation to begin accession talks that was issued to the two coun-
tries on 2 April 2008.
Prior to signing any protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of any
country, the Senate mandated that the president provide Congress a classified and an
unclassified report that provide updated information on the status of political, eco-
nomic, defense, and related issues for the countries invited to join NATO in the recent
round of enlargement discussions.3 In addition, these reports are to provide an assess-
ment of the invited countries’ likely impact on NATO’s military effectiveness and an
analysis of the ability of each invited country to fulfill the full range of financial bur-

2
Section 3(2)(E)(i) of the Senate Resolution of Ratification of the Protocols to the North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 144
Cong. Rec. S4217-20, 1998.
3
Ibid., Section 3(2)(E)(ii).

77


dens of NATO membership. President Bush submitted these reports on Albania and
Croatia to Congress on 20 June 2008.
The Senate also requires that the U.S. Government Accountability Office—the in-
vestigative arm of Congress charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and
payment of public funds—review and assess these reports. To fulfill our mandate, we
determined whether the reports met the Senate’s requirements, the information in the
reports was complete, and the information in the reports was current.
To address our objectives, we reviewed information from an array of reports and
analyses from the U.S. government, NATO, and the countries invited to join NATO,
and discussed supporting documentation and methodologies used to prepare the reports
with officials of the Departments of Defense and State. To address the first objective,
we determined whether major issues in the mandates were addressed in the reports. To
address whether information in the reports was complete, we assessed whether infor-
mation in the president’s reports concerning the aspirant countries was consistent with
other U.S. government documents and data we collected from various sources, and
whether key evidence that could affect the conclusions in the reports was included. To
assess whether information in the reports was current, we assessed the supporting evi-
dence to determine that it was dated within the past year and whether key events that
have occurred that might alter the general information provided in the reports were in-
cluded. This report addresses both the March and the June 2008 President’s reports.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through September 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objec-
tives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our find-
ings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Scope and Methodology
We assessed the March and June 2008 classified reports and the June 2008 unclassi-
fied report and determined whether they addressed each of the mandated requirements.
We assessed the completeness of the information by identifying whether all the major
issues in the mandate were addressed, information in the reports and other U.S. gov-
ernment source documents were consistent, and key evidence that could affect the con-
clusions in the reports was included. However, due to our time frames, we did not
compare the information with that contained in non-U.S. government sources. For the
financial information, in our 2003 report, we determined whether the methodology and
analytical criteria were clearly and fully described and whether the methodology pro-
vided a range of information that supported the conclusions.
To assess the currency of the 2008 reports, we determined whether the supporting
evidence was current and whether any recent events cast doubt over the findings. For
the purpose of this report, we defined current information as being from documents
dated within the past twelve months or those most recently available. As part of our as-
sessment, we also determined whether the president’s reports addressed the recom-
mendations that GAO made in its May 2003 report on NATO enlargement, and

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whether the unclassified report was generally consistent with the findings and conclu-
sions identified in the classified reports.
We relied primarily on source documents from U.S. government agencies, includ-
ing:
• The U.S. State Department’s country background reports and annual reports
assessing human rights practices, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons
• State Department reports and cable traffic concerning the aspirant countries
• Defense reform assessments prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense
• NATO documents concerning the aspirant countries’ progress in meeting the
goals identified in NATO’s Membership Action Plan
• Country background reports from the Congressional Research Service
• Assessments and reports from the U.S. intelligence community.
We also reviewed reports from Amnesty International, Freedom House, and Human
Rights Watch, and statistics from the Fraser Institute’s and the Heritage Foundation
and The Wall Street Journal’s annual assessments of economic freedom. To assess the
reliability of the statistical indexes in the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal and
Fraser Institute’s assessments, we reviewed the methodologies used to create them, and
compared the indexes against each other. We determined that the indexes are useful
tools for describing the relative levels of economic freedom for the nations included in
them.

Results in Brief
President Bush’s March and June 2008 reports on NATO enlargement respond to the
congressionally mandated requirements and address all the key elements contained in
the resolution concerning Albania’s and Croatia’s accession to NATO membership.
For example, the reports discuss how Albania and Croatia would further the principles
of NATO and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. They also discuss
country eligibility for membership, including political, economic, defense, budgetary,
information security, and legal issues—all goals of NATO’s Membership Action Plan
(MAP).4 Similarly, the president’s reports respond to mandated requirements for esti-
mates of the potential impacts of new members on both NATO and U.S. costs, and on
NATO’s shared costs.
The March 2008 report, submitted before the commencement of accession talks
with Albania and Croatia, responded to the requirements for information identified in
the congressional mandate. The June 2008 report updated the information in the March
2008 report and responded to additional information requirements concerning the aspi-

4
The MAP is a document intended to aid the preparations of those nations seeking to join the
Alliance. Their participation in the MAP and in other NATO programs is intended to enable
them to make significant strides in reforming their militaries and in enhancing the interop-
erability of their armed forces with NATO forces.

79


rant countries’ ability to meet the full range of the financial burdens of NATO mem-
bership and the aspirants’ likely impact upon the military effectiveness of NATO.
The March 2008 report contained responses to the five requirements in the Senate’s
mandate, explaining:
• How these countries’ accession would further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and contribute to North Atlantic security
• The countries’ eligibility for membership based on the principles and criteria
identified by NATO and the United States
• How these countries’ accession would affect U.S. national security interests
• The common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrat-
ing the countries into NATO and the impact on NATO’s costs and members’
shares of those costs
• The impact on U.S. defense and other budgets of integrating the country into
NATO.
The June 2008 report on NATO enlargement responded to a specific Senate request
to update the information contained in the March 2008 report and provide an analysis
of the countries’ ability to meet the full range of financial burdens of NATO member-
ship and of their likely impact on NATO’s military effectiveness.
The GAO analysis found the reports’ information to be generally complete, and
consistent with the data we collected from various sources, including agencies within
the U.S. government and NATO. For example, the discussion of country eligibility for
membership, including political, economic, defense, budgetary, information security,
and legal issues and the status of their implementation is detailed and provides more
information than reports submitted to Congress for previous rounds of NATO
enlargement. The reports are also current, and address the relevant key events; in addi-
tion, there have been no recent developments that would call into question any of the
reports’ conclusions.
However, we found that the reports provide an incomplete explanation of why
NATO lowered its estimate of certain enlargement costs for the two aspirants. We also
found that the information concerning the countries’ ability to fulfill the full range of
financial burdens of NATO membership is incomplete. The June 2008 classified and
unclassified reports provide little information concerning Albania and Croatia’s ability
to meet the full range of financial burdens of NATO membership, and do not identify
the methodology used to support the conclusion that Albania and Croatia will be able
to meet their financial obligations. We raised similar issues in our May 2003 report on

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the previous round of NATO enlargement.5 Without a complete understanding of the
aspirant countries’ ability to meet their financial obligations, NATO cannot be assured
that goals in other areas will be achieved, since many of the goals rely on financial re-
sources for their successful implementation. In addition, a key U.S. intelligence as-
sessment that we reviewed differs from some of the conclusions in the president’s re-
ports concerning Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet NATO financial obligations.
We are recommending that, for future NATO aspirants, the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, provide more complete information on the
true costs of NATO enlargement. Such information would include the full range of the
financial burdens of NATO membership for each country invited to join NATO in the
future, each country’s ability to assume those burdens, and the methodology used to
reach the conclusions on this issue included the president’s report, with explicit identi-
fication of the known and unknown costs involved.

March 2008 Report
The information in President Bush’s report of March 2008 is generally complete. In
addition to providing detailed information on the status of each aspirant under each re-
quired element, the report discusses challenges, progress, and future plans to address
the elements. However, in response to the requirement to provide an analysis of the
common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating the aspi-
rant countries into NATO, we found that the report provides an incomplete explanation
for why NATO lowered its estimate of certain enlargement costs for the two aspirants.
Requirement 1: How a Country Would Further the Principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and Contribute to North Atlantic Security
To assess how Albania and Croatia would further the principles of the North Atlantic
Treaty and contribute to North Atlantic security, the president’s March 2008 report
provides a broad discussion of the countries’ support of NATO principles, such as de-
mocracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, and provides some examples of Alba-
nia’s and Croatia’s achievements in this area. For example, Albania remains committed
to good neighborly relations and regional cooperation with its neighbors and has con-
tinued to be a steadfast ally in the global war on terrorism, offering substantial troop
contributions to the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The report states that
Croatia respects and promotes the basic principles embodied in the North Atlantic
Treaty. It has a stable, multiparty, democratic political system characterized by regular
elections and a free and vibrant press. Croatian armed forces are under civilian control.

5
Government Accountability Office, “NATO Enlargement: Report Is Responsive to Senate
Requirements, but Additional Information Could Be Useful,” GAO-03-255 (Washington,
D.C.: GAO, 15 November 2002); and “NATO Enlargement: Reports Are Responsive to Sen-
ate Requirements, but Analysis of Financial Burdens Is Incomplete,” GAO-03-722 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: GAO, 5 May 2003). These reports are available at www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03255.pdf and www.gao.gov/new.items/d03722.pdf, respectively.

81


In discussing the countries’ potential impacts on North Atlantic security, the report
describes their contributions to regional peace and stability—in particular, the ways in
which Albania and Croatia address issues with neighboring countries and enhance re-
gional cooperation. For example, Albania is a member of a Black Sea economic coop-
eration organization, which promotes economic liberty, cooperation, and trade devel-
opment. Croatia enjoys good relations with neighboring countries and was elected to a
non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council during the 2008-2009 pe-
riod. To address the implications of these countries’ membership for U.S. security, the
report provides a detailed discussion of the contributions that Albania and Croatia have
made and continue to make to NATO operations in Europe’s Balkan region and their
cooperation and assistance in the war on terrorism.
Requirement 2: Country’s Eligibility for NATO Membership Based on the
Principles and Criteria Identified by NATO and the United States
Most of the March 2008 report addresses the second information requirement of the
mandate: to evaluate Albania’s and Croatia’s eligibility for NATO membership based
on the principles identified by NATO and the criteria identified by the United States.
The president’s report presents a detailed discussion of the political, economic, de-
fense, budgetary, information security, and legal goals that are part of each country’s
eligibility for membership. These goals emanate from NATO’s Membership Action
Plan. The report includes more detail on issues concerning membership eligibility than
the reports submitted to Congress in 2002 and 2003, during the previous round of
NATO enlargement.6 In addition to providing an update on the status of each MAP
category, the report identifies the challenges faced by Albania and Croatia in meeting
these goals and their plans to correct identified challenges. For example, the report
notes that corruption in Albania remains a problem, but that the government has made
additional arrests of high-level public officials and is making progress on convictions.
The political and economic goals addressed in NATO’s MAP cover a broad spec-
trum, ranging from the implementation of democratic institutions, free and fair elec-
tions, the rule of law, judicial independence, and civil liberties to peaceful relations
with bordering countries, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and protection
of human rights and minority rights. The report’s discussion of defense issues is exten-
sive and describes Albania and Croatia’s achievements in each of five key capability
areas: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; command and control;
effective engagement; and survivability of forces and infrastructure. The report’s
discussion of budgetary issues focuses on the countries’ commitments to defense
spending as a percentage of gross domestic product, and defense procurement. Discus-
sion of information security and legal issues focuses on the extent to which each coun-

6
One of the findings in the GAO’s November 2002 report on NATO enlargement was that the
president’s report filed in advance of that enlargement round provided limited discussion of
some eligibility issues, particularly concerning challenges facing the countries seeking
NATO membership and what the countries were doing to address those challenges. See
GAO-03-255.

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try has met or achieved NATO requirements. For information security, the report as-
sesses the extent to which Albania and Croatia have implemented NATO requirements
for personnel screening and the handling and storage of classified documents. Regard-
ing legal issues, the report assesses whether the countries’ constitution and/or laws
provide any barriers to the deployment of their troops abroad in support of NATO op-
erations, and discusses certain other legal issues.
The report also discusses the status of each country’s economy, including economic
growth. We also assembled additional information not contained in the president’s re-
ports that Congress may find useful on economic issues as they pertain to the two
states—specifically, this information is a comparison of measures of economic free-
dom for NATO aspirants. These independent assessments of the level of economic de-
velopment in Albania and Croatia are in line with the MAP commitment to promote
stability through economic freedom. These assessments rely on two current studies that
produce numerical measures of economic freedom—the Fraser Institute’s 2007 Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World report, which covers 141 countries for the year 2005, and
the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal’s 2008 report, Index of Economic Free-
dom, which covers 162 countries generally for the year ending mid-2007.7 Both in-
dexes are revised annually and are based on numerous measures or indicators that are
grouped together into areas of economic freedom.
To measure economic freedom, the Fraser Index studied twenty-three factors—
some of which include multiple components—that fall into five categories 8:
• Size of government
• Legal structure and security of property rights
• Access to sound money
• Freedom to trade internationally
• Regulation of credit, labor, and business.
Each country’s overall score for economic freedom is based on the average of its
scores in each of these five areas. Scores range from zero to ten, with ten the highest
degree of economic freedom.
To measure economic freedom, the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal in-
dex studied numerous economic variables that fall into ten broad categories of eco-
nomic freedom 9:

7
The Fraser Institute is an independent Canadian economic, social research, and educational
organization that works to raise the level of understanding about economic and social policy;
an additional 72 institutions in 72 countries are co-publishers. The Heritage Foundation is a
research and educational institute that promotes conservative public policies that are based
on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional
American values, and a strong national defense.
8
For the Fraser Index, the key ingredients of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary
exchange, freedom to enter and compete, and protection of persons and their property.

83


• Business freedom
• Trade freedom
• Government size
• Monetary freedom
• Investment freedom
• Financial freedom
• Fiscal freedom
• Property rights
• Freedom from corruption
• Labor freedom.
Each country’s overall score for economic freedom is based on the average of its
scores in each of these ten areas. The index scores countries from 0 to 100, with 100
indicating an assessment of “most free.”
Figure 2 below presents the ratings of countries by the Fraser Index and the Heri-
tage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index for the NATO applicants Albania and
Croatia, each of the ten newer members, as well as each of the sixteen older members.
The farther a country’s location is toward the upper right of the graph, the higher its
ratings of economic freedom. For example, considered together, the two indexes rate
the United States followed by Canada then the United Kingdom as having the most
economic freedom, and they appear farthest toward the upper right. Since all of the
countries we are concerned with scored between five and nine on the Fraser Index and
fifty and ninety on the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index, we limited the
graph to this region.
Both Albania and Croatia have low levels of economic freedom compared to most
NATO members. Economic freedom in Albania is rated lower than all NATO mem-
bers by the Fraser Index, but slightly greater than or equal to seven NATO members
according to the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index. The level of eco-
nomic freedom in Croatia is rated slightly greater than or equal to that in three NATO
members, according to the Fraser Index, but is lower than all NATO members accord-
ing to the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index.
Requirement 3: Potential Effect of Albania’s and Croatia’s NATO
Membership on the National Security Interests of the United States
The March 2008 report provides generally complete information on Albania and
Croatia’s impact on U.S. national security interests by focusing primarily on the aspi-
rant countries’ participation in NATO-led and coalition operations, both within the re-
gion and outside of it. The report speculates on Albania and Croatia’s continued capa-

9
The Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal index defines economic freedom as the ab-
sence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption
of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty.

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Figure 2: Indexes of Economic Freedom for NATO Members and Countries
Seeking NATO Membership.

bility to provide support to coalition operations. For example, the report stated that Al-
bania is building its niche military capabilities and is on its way to being fully interop-
erable with NATO forces. It stated that Croatia has demonstrated its willingness to
contribute to common defense and security efforts, and that its membership in NATO
would strengthen stability and security in the Balkans.

85


Requirement 4: An Analysis of the Common-Funded Military Requirements
and Costs Associated with Integrating the Countries into NATO
The president’s report of March 2008 contains an incomplete analysis of the common-
funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating the aspirant coun-
tries into NATO. NATO estimates the common-funded enlargement costs for Albania
and Croatia at USD 60 million each over a period of ten years or more post-accession.
This is nearly half the estimate for a small aspirant country used during the previous
round of enlargement. The report does not, however, provide an explicit explanation of
how NATO reached this significantly reduced number, except to state that the decision
to reduce the cost estimate was based on experience from the 2004 round of enlarge-
ment. Providing a fuller explanation of how NATO arrived at these cost figures would
be useful, particularly in light of the uncertainties associated with the condition and ca-
pability of defense facilities in Albania and Croatia, as identified in the report. These
uncertainties include the condition and capability of command, control, and communi-
cations networks, reception facilities, and air defense systems.
The report offers a generally complete explanation of the impact of enlargement on
NATO’s costs and members’ shares of those costs. In its calculations, the report as-
sumes that, given the relatively modest estimated costs of enlargement for Albania and
Croatia, these costs would be funded largely within future common-funded budget
ceilings. The report does not, however, explain how it determined that Albania and
Croatia’s enlargement costs will be “modest,” particularly after identifying uncertain-
ties associated with defense facilities and installations in these two countries. The re-
port projects that any increases to the NATO Security Investment Program or military
budget attributable to this round of enlargement would be minimal. On the basis of Al-
bania and Croatia’s projected cost shares, the report states that the U.S. cost share for
each of the military common budgets would be reduced by approximately 0.08 percent.
Requirement 5: Impact on U.S. Defense and Other Budgets of Integrating Al-
bania and Croatia into NATO
The report contains a generally complete discussion of the impact that the integration
of Albania and Croatia into NATO would have on the U.S. defense budget and other
U.S. budgets; the information provided generally supports the conclusions presented.
According to the report, the costs can be accommodated within the likely future
ceilings for the NATO Security Investment Program budget through a reordering of
project priorities and extending the schedules for other projects. As a result, the report
concludes that there will be minimal impact on DOD budget elements that provide the
U.S. contribution to the NATO Security Investment Program and the military budget.
For NATO’s civil budget, the report estimates that in light of the smaller number and
size of the current aspirants, the addition of Albania and Croatia will result in only a
small increase in the civil budget, and possibly a modest addition to the construction
costs for the new NATO headquarters building. Any increase would be partially offset
by the new members’ contributions to the civil budget and to the construction project.

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June 2008 Report
The information contained in President Bush’s June 2008 report on NATO enlarge-
ment is generally complete. As required, the report updates the information contained
in the March 2008 report on the integration of Albania and Croatia into NATO. The
report then provides an analysis of the countries’ ability to meet the full range of finan-
cial burdens of NATO membership, and the likely impact upon the military effective-
ness of NATO. However, we found that the information and analysis concerning the
countries’ ability to fulfill the full range of financial burdens of NATO membership are
incomplete. The report does not discuss the methodology used to reach conclusions
about the countries’ ability to meet financial obligations and does not include some
costs. As mentioned above, without a full understanding of the aspirant countries’ abil-
ity to meet their financial obligations, NATO cannot be assured that goals in other ar-
eas will be achieved if the countries lack sufficient financial resources. In addition, a
key U.S. government information source differs from some of the conclusions in the
President’s reports concerning Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet NATO financial
obligations.
Aspirant Countries’ Financial Qualifications
The June 2008 classified and unclassified reports provide incomplete information on
Albania and Croatia’s ability to meet the full range of the financial burdens of NATO
membership. The discussion in the reports is limited to identifying the countries’ com-
mon-funded budget cost share and their 2008 defense budgets.10 On the basis of this
information on the two governments’ commitments to meet these costs, and the current
rate of economic growth in both countries, the president’s reports conclude that Alba-
nia and Croatia should be able to meet their financial obligations to NATO. The re-
ports do not identify the methodology used to support the conclusions that Albania and
Croatia should be able to meet their financial obligations. Without such a discussion of
the methodology used, it is difficult to understand how the conclusions were derived.
In addition, the reports do not discuss all the costs associated with NATO member-
ship. For example, becoming a NATO member also entails the cost of supporting
country representation at NATO’s facilities, such as its civilian and military headquar-
ters in Belgium and its command posts in Europe, as identified in the GAO’s 2003 re-
port on NATO enlargement.11 As we reported, officials of the aspirant countries in-
vited to join NATO during the previous round of enlargement stated that the costs of
establishing and maintaining country representation at NATO facilities should be in-

10
For example, according to the June 2008 unclassified report, Albania’s common-funded
budget cost share, which includes the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO Secu-
rity Investment Program, is 0.0685. Croatia’s common-funded budget cost share is 0.2550.
Albania’s approved 2008 defense budget is USD 268.9 million, which represents 2.01 per-
cent of GDP. Croatia’s approved 2008 defense budget is USD 1.14 billion, which is 1.8 per-
cent of GDP.
11
GAO, “NATO Enlargement: Reports Are Responsive to Senate Requirements, but Analysis
of Financial Burdens Is Incomplete,” GAO-03-722.

87


cluded in considerations of the costs of NATO membership. According to these offi-
cials, costs could vary between under 1 percent to as much as 2 percent of a country’s
annual defense budget. For countries with relatively small GDPs, this commitment of
personnel and resources could be significant. By failing to discuss all of the costs asso-
ciated with NATO membership, the reports do not provide comprehensive support for
their conclusions on this issue.
In addition to not reporting the costs of country representation at NATO facilities,
the reports also did not identify the costs of NATO membership as a percentage of the
countries’ total defense budgets. As discussed in our previous report on enlargement,
the president’s reports are not required to include this information, but these data
would have provided useful background about the level of demand these costs will
place on a country’s total allocation of funds for defense, and hence its ability to fulfill
the full range of NATO financial obligations.
Impact on the Military Effectiveness of NATO
We found that the information and description of the methodology for assessing the
likely impact of Albania and Croatia on NATO’s military effectiveness in the June
2008 reports were generally complete. The methodology laid out in the classified and
unclassified reports assessed the soundness and feasibility of each country’s defense
reform plan, each country’s support of U.S. and Allied actions through contributions to
U.S. and NATO military operations, and the ability of each country to contribute spe-
cialized military capabilities to NATO once it becomes a member. The information
provided supports the reports’ conclusions about the likely impact of these countries’
membership on NATO’s military effectiveness.
The discussion of defense reform plans provides an understanding of the status of
the countries’ defense modernization efforts, their degree of military preparedness, and
the extent to which NATO may need to assist the countries in accomplishing certain
tasks. For example, the report points out that both Albania and Croatia have trans-
formed their militaries from primarily territorial-based forces to militaries capable of
deploying to Alliance and coalition operations, and that the United States and NATO
have had numerous opportunities to assist Albania and Croatia in developing and im-
plementing their defense reform plans. Identifying examples of how Albania and Croa-
tia have participated in or contributed to NATO or other multilateral defense opera-
tions demonstrates how they can be expected to participate in NATO operations as
members of the Alliance. Determining what kinds of specialized military capabilities
the aspirants could provide to NATO illustrates how they will enhance NATO’s prepa-
rations for future missions.

Conclusion
President Bush’s reports to the Congress on the accession of Albania and Croatia to
NATO membership responded to the Senate’s requirements, providing information
that was generally complete and current on each of the two aspirant states. While the
discussion of country eligibility for membership is detailed and provides more infor-

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mation than reports submitted to Congress for previous rounds of NATO enlargement,
we found that the information and methodology concerning the full range of the finan-
cial burdens of NATO membership, and the countries’ ability to assume those burdens,
was incomplete. We raised similar issues in our May 2003 report on NATO enlarge-
ment, but the President’s 2008 reports do not address these issues. Without a more
complete assessment of the financial burdens of NATO membership for Albania and
Croatia, and their ability to assume those burdens, Congress would not have a fully ac-
curate picture of the true cost of NATO enlargement.

Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide Congress with a complete picture of the cost of NATO enlargement, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
provide more complete information on the financial burdens of NATO enlargement for
the president’s reports to Congress. The needed information would include the full
range of the financial burdens of NATO membership for each country invited to join in
the future, each country’s ability to assume those burdens, and the methodology used to
reach conclusions on this issue in the reports, with explicit identification of the known
and unknown costs involved. Given the short time frames for congressional action on
this round of NATO enlargement, we would not expect such information to be pro-
vided for Albania and Croatia, but would expect that the Secretary implement our rec-
ommendation for all future NATO aspirant countries.
The GAO provided a copy of this report to the Departments of Defense and State
for comment. DOD officials responded orally that the department concurred with the
recommendation. They also provided additional information and documents on Alba-
nia and Croatia’s ability to meet financial obligations that were not available at the
time the reports were drafted. DOD officials said that they would add a more detailed
discussion of the financial burdens of NATO membership for each country invited to
join in the future. This would include more explicitly identifying both known and un-
known costs and the methodology used to reach the report’s conclusions. We modified
the recommendation slightly to reflect DOD’s comments. The State Department gener-
ally concurred with the report’s findings and conclusions but had no comments on the
recommendation.

89

The Influence of the Neoconservative Movement on U.S.
Foreign Policy
Arsenije Dusanic and Plamen P. Penev *
This brief essay is drawn from a larger dissertation project at the University of Vienna
dealing with the subject of neoconservatism, written under the supervision of Prof.
Heinz Gärtner. In the limited space available here, we will primarily attempt to explain
a few small facets of this political-philosophical phenomenon. We will also make an
effort to illuminate the pattern of explanations offered for the military deployment in
Iraq, which was vigorously promoted by neoconservatives in the United States. Who
are the Neocons actually? What are their goals? What beliefs and experiences shape
their thinking?
The term neoconservative has never represented a coherent and unified political
construct; there was no central link between the various political ideas that characterize
the positions held by those thinkers typically identified with neoconservatism. The
centrifugal forces within the neoconservative community have typically been predomi-
nant, until the movement is mobilized by the awareness of an enemy. This is most no-
tably the case in the original animating impetus behind the emergence of neoconserva-
tism in the U.S.: anti-communism and the pursuit of victory over the Soviets. Most
histories of the movement trace its origin to a group of formerly leftist thinkers in the
U.S. who in the middle of the twentieth century were driven rightward by the totalitar-
ian excesses of Stalinism in the USSR. Almost all scholars who have studied the issue
speak of a loose grouping of liberal intellectuals who share similar ideas and views and
who mainly use publications in magazines (The Public Interest, The National Review,
Commentary, and The Weekly Standard) to advance their thinking and disseminate
their ideas. Martin Lipset summed up this view of the diverse and fragmented nature of
the movement, stating that the perception of the neoconservatives as a tightly unified
group is based on a phenomenon that most sociologists call “labeling.”
Neo-conservatism, both as an ideological term and as a political grouping, is one of
the most misunderstood concepts in the contemporary political lexicon. The reason is
simple: the word has never referred to a set of doctrines to which a given group of ad-
herents subscribed. Rather, it was invented as an invidious label to undermine political
opponents, most of whom have been unhappy with being described as “neoconserva-
tive.” The neoconservatives are perhaps the most prolific group of intellectuals in

*
Arsenije Dusanic was educated in Belgrade and Moscow. He has also studied in Vienna,
Hong Kong, and Buenos Aires. He holds an MSc in Economics from the Vienna University
of Economics and Business Administration, and will be studying at the London School of
Economics in the following academic year. Plamen P. Penev studied political science at the
Free University of Berlin, and received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of
Vienna in 2008.

91


American history; in fact, neoconservative thought on practically every major issue of
U.S. politics or policy in the past forty years is extensively developed.
Francis Fukuyama adds that the neoconservatives have an idealistic belief in social
progress and the universality of rights, coupled with intense anti-communism. And it is
remarkable that main principles of neoconservatism feature no coherent vision in rela-
tion to the domestic and foreign affairs in the United States, with only one exception—
the fight against the USSR.
One can argue that, without the Cold War, neoconservatism could not exist. Just as
the events of 11 September 2001 provided the “window of opportunity” for contempo-
rary neoconservatives to implement their agenda in Iraq, the Cold War played the same
role for neoconservatives fifty years ago. Hence, our first hypothesis is that the Cold
War assured the existence of the neoconservative movement. The provocative question
raised by this hypothesis is its opposite implication: Why didn’t neoconservatism dis-
appear with the end of the Cold War? Instead, the movement lurked for a while behind
the liberal internationalism of the Clinton era, particularly given that President Clinton
was also willing to approve the use of military resources for humanitarian missions.
However, after their years of semi-exile during the Clinton Administration, U.S. Neo-
cons successfully and artfully invented the doctrine of morally-motivated intervention-
ism, which they planned to use to overturn the old order of the international peace ar-
chitecture.
To discuss neoconservatism as a complex set of ideas is accurate and apt, since the
neoconservative legacy is complex and heterogeneous. We can distinguish between a
few generations and typologies of neoconservatives: Cold War liberals, democratic
internationalists, liberal imperialists, realistic Wilsonians, Straussians, neoconservative
realists, liberal realists, etc.
After September 11, and especially after the Iraq War, many commentators ex-
plored the intellectual links between the neoconservative movement and Leo Strauss, a
European émigré and longtime political philosopher at the University of Chicago who
died in 1973. What is remarkable about these writers’ obsession with the Strauss con-
nection is that Leo Strauss never held an opinion on Saddam Hussein or Iraq. In fact,
Leo Strauss had been dead for three decades by the time contemporary Neocons be-
came preoccupied with regime change in Iraq. Thus, we cannot find a significant in-
tellectual debt to Strauss in contemporary neoconservatism.1 Strauss’s writings, in
short, are philosophical inquiries and have nothing of the dogma of a political move-
ment. His thought culminates in no political program, no slogans or “cookie cutter”
approaches to public policy. His focus is on how to read the so-called “Great Books.”
Strauss was characterized by many of his critics as the intellectual mastermind behind
the war in Iraq, as an elitist who preached a policy of force and deception, and as the
philosopher-king of the neoconservative movement.

1
The creed of Leo Strauss might be reduced to six principles: a deep suspicion of the power of
the state; a preference for liberty over equality; patriotism; a belief in established institutions
and hierarchies; skepticism about the idea of progress; and elitism.

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One of the most widely quoted definitions of the movement identifies neoconser-
vatives as conservative internationalists with idealistic-utopian aspirations (in the vein
of Lenin and Trotsky), who endorse high military spending and define the United
States’ national interest very broadly. What they feared most was global anarchy, in the
terms of the neo-realist school in international relations (similar to that articulated by
Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz), in which evil conquers good. In terms of the
structure of U.S. government, they desired an “imperial presidency” (in the words of
Arthur Schlesinger); thus, neoconservative intellectuals were active under various
presidents, based on the so-called “revolving door principle.”
Francis Fukuyama, writing in the period after his detachment from the neoconser-
vative movement, explained that neoconservatism today has become evidently associ-
ated with concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism, and American hegem-
ony and primacy (the set of ideas that has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine).
But the attempt to examine neoconservatism only in the context of the policies of the
Bush Administration is too simplistic, and does not offer sufficient guidance for inter-
preting neoconservatives’ political-philosophical concepts. Rather, what is needed is
an intensive investigation of U.S. foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson, which even
found resonance as recently as the 2008 presidential election in the United States. The
contemporary neoconservative agenda is about shaping a new kind of politics, where
the instruments of hard power lie in the foreground, while soft power—which actually
won the Cold War (as Margaret Thatcher noted, Ronald Reagan won the Cold War
without firing a shot)—will be maneuvered onto the sidelines.
The moral and historical error of the neoconservatives lies in their own narrow-
mindedness, as most critics point out. Two widely noted works of political science—
the first by Francis Fukuyama (The End of History, published in 1992) and the second
by Samuel P. Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations, published in 1996)—have had an
enormous impact on the philosophical and dialectical thinking of contemporary neo-
conservatives.2 These two books have to a certain extent transformed the thinking of
the neoconservative movement, and brought the Neocons to the conclusion that de-
mocracy is the primary achievement of humanity and now, since the Cold War has
ended, it is the task of the modern Western democracies, especially the United States,
to spread democracy throughout the world. Such ideas—which were also expressed by
political dissidents such as Natan Sharansky—were the basis for a historically conge-
nial version of the global political map after the Cold War.
Along with Francis Fukuyama, another author whose ideas were kidnapped by the
neoconservatives was Samuel P. Huntington. First in an article in Foreign Affairs and
then in his book-length study The Clash of Civilizations, he explained his thinking
about the future of international relations. What Huntington wanted to say was cer-
tainly not what most neoconservative intellectuals wanted to hear. Following Oswald
Spengler and Arnold Toynbee—whose most influential books were published before

2
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); and
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

93


World War I and after World War II, respectively—he analyzed the relationships be-
tween different cultures (an interaction he famously characterized as the “clash of civi-
lizations”). The ideological narrative of the second generation of neoconservatives
combined the views of Huntington and Fukuyama. From then on, the leitmotifs in the
scholastic world of contemporary neoconservatives were dogmatic activism and his-
torical determinism, which nobody in “Old Europe” wanted to understand. It is this
ideological basis that constitutes the now rigid structure of indoctrination for the neo-
conservative movement, since with the passing of Fukuyama and Huntington they lost
two of the most prominent political scientists of the twentieth century.
The dream that democracy is the inevitable fate of humanity and the belief that the
“clash of civilizations” is looming over the horizon—with an implacably hostile Islam
as the main actor—resulted in a Manichaean doctrine, which neither of the two above-
mentioned scholars would have accepted. Democracy as a terminus of human devel-
opment on the one hand, and the existential struggle with the moral values of Islam on
the other, was the foundation of the neoconservative mindset, which suddenly gained a
philosophical character.
Even Fukuyama himself stressed that many readers had misunderstood his book
The End of History and the Last Man. If neoconservatives wanted to know what the
yearning for democracy is, they should have read Fareed Zakaria’s The Future of
Freedom.3 That all people aspire for freedom is self-evident; Immanuel Kant postu-
lated it in his categorical imperative in the eighteenth century. But the notion that
Western liberal democracy offers the appropriate recipe for the reconstruction of so-
cieties, regardless of culture, is not necessarily true. For Fukuyama, everything was
primarily about modernization. What was universal from the beginning was not a
dream of a liberal democracy, but the desire to live in a post-modern society, with its
technical achievements, high standard of living, and quality health care.4 However, the
neoconservative apologists could not know this, since ultimately they never dealt with
such issues (e.g., social engineering, nation building) in their programmatic agendas.
It is important to take a step back from the many imprecise conclusions of many
journalistic sources and try to conduct an in-depth analysis of the issues. In doing this
we will try to retain a scientific approach and remain (reasonably) close to neutral in
our views. The risk of failing while verifying or falsifying the hypothesis is always pre-
sent; nonetheless, we will attempt to tackle the problem scientifically.
Today, neoconservatism is very often associated solely with the U.S. military inter-
ventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is only partially true. What many critical ob-
servers often forget is that neoconservatism is not a simple term of definition, and to
present neoconservatism only with the help of simple comparisons and conspiracy
theories would bring us to a deadlock.

3
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2003).
4
See Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century
(London: Atlantic Books, 2003).

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We ourselves do not purport to be apologists for neoconservatism, but we do think
that it represents one of the possible sets of strategies in the fight against terrorism. It
does not mean that “the Neoconservative Moment” must necessarily transform into a
“unipolar moment.”5 Furthermore, it is clear that neoconservatism does not represent
the only possible political-philosophical world order. Contemporary neoconservatism
is “a kind of muscular Wilsonianism, minus international institutions.”6
So, was the U.S. attack on Iraq legitimate and legal? From the neoconservative
point of view, it definitely was. According to the neoconservative point of view, mili-
tary action was justified because Saddam Hussein had long been considered to be a
disruptive factor in the region. Involved in both Gulf Wars (against Iran and then the
invasion of Kuwait), Saddam was ready to risk a “World War IV” and to assume the
role of a peer (and competitor) to the U.S.7
From the neoconservative perspective, Saddam was far more dangerous to the
United States than Al Qaeda. This could be seen in the attempts by three key members
of the administration of the second President Bush—Under Secretary of Defense
Douglas Feith, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld—to convince the president that Iraq represented a crucial issue for
U.S. security. The nightmare scenario that had Saddam secretly developing a func-
tional WMD program caused suspicion that terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda
could gain possession of such deadly weapons, which in turn led to the conviction that
the security of the American people and the territorial integrity of the American nation
were at stake. This was a rational argument, and the Iraqi leadership bore some respon-
sibility for feeding this key tenet of neoconservative belief, because Saddam and his
clique broke several international agreements, and evicted UN weapons inspectors
from the country. Furthermore, the Hussein regime was willing to cooperate only when
placed under pressure from the U.S. and UN; even so, however, it obstructed inspec-
tions and never disclosed the extent of its “nuclear program.” In the end, the neocon-
servatives were suspicious, and could not view the efforts (and perhaps the honest in-
tentions) of the Iraqi dictator as being serious and credible.
Saddam himself also made a miscalculation, and showed that he had not learned
much from the first Gulf War. When he intervened in Kuwait, Saddam was convinced
that he would be able to dictate his conditions to the international community, led by
the United States. It was true that the American position irritated him, since the U.S.
administration a priori had ruled a military invasion of Kuwait by Iraq as being unac-
ceptable. So he calculated that—in spite of its clearly articulated position—the United
States would swallow the strategic defeat represented by his invasion of Kuwait and
negotiate with him. This gross underestimation cost the Iraqi dictator significant do-
mestic and international legitimacy, and negated his reputation in the Middle East as a

5
Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1990–91).
6
Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative
Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
7
See Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism (New
York: Doubleday, 2007).

95


promoter of pan-Arab unity. Saddam wanted to be the new Nasser, but ultimately he
came to be seen as a villain who attempted to thumb his nose at the world’s sole super-
power, and to change the geopolitical order in the world’s most sensitive region.
President George H.W. Bush’s response at this time was deliberate and well
thought-out. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft assembled an international military coalition, which was also supported by
the UN, and which forced Saddam to retreat. There was, however, no UN mandate to
depose Saddam, and he remained in power, although with significantly diminished
credibility, even within the Arab world.
Saddam’s original blunder was that in September 1980 he had believed that the en-
tire Arab world would support him after he ordered his troops to attack Iran. Obvi-
ously, this war was sparked by a territorial conflict between the two countries, but the
idea that the Iraqi despot represented the Arab cause against the Persians carried a
double flaw. This war—which Saddam deliberately orchestrated, and was the longest
and most intense war fought since 1945—represented a risk factor for the Saudi re-
gime, and did not help either of the adversaries to achieve its political goals.
An additional significant neoconservative argument in favor of U.S. intervention in
Iraq was rooted in the belief that the United States had to show the United States’ po-
tential adversaries and enemies in the Middle East that the new Bush Administration
was prepared to act swiftly and firmly, with a full mobilization of U.S. political, eco-
nomic, and social resources (as compared with the Clinton Administration’s indeci-
sion). According to this line of argument, it would be a tremendous mistake to give ter-
rorists evidence to support the belief that the United States would pull back from one
of the regions of greatest strategic importance for its national interests (the Middle
East) simply because it had been hit hard by a terrorist attack on 9/11. Terrorist groups
needed to know that the new American leaders would make no distinction between ter-
rorists and their supporters. An American retreat from the Middle East would be
equivalent to admitting defeat; thus, the U.S. response to attacks of this sort had to be
prompt and supported by overwhelming military strength. Even though the Cold War
was long since over (and was in no danger of reheating), the old tried and tested no-
tions of the Cold War era such as the domino theory gained renewed importance.
Should the U.S. lose in Iraq, this would have unforeseeable consequences for the entire
Middle East—this was the main premise of many neoconservative proponents, like
Richard N. Perle and Elliott Abrams.
U.S. neoconservatives also saw the occupation of Iraq as the next step in the larger
reconstruction of the entire Middle East. They tried to present their ideas to the world
community as a plan for the “Greater Middle East.”8 However, this plan existed only
on paper, and was never implemented. The neoconservatives developed this plan—the

8
See “A Clean Break: New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” report prepared by the Institute
for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies’ “Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy To-
ward 2000.” The main substantive ideas in this paper emerged from a discussion in which
prominent opinion makers—including Richard Perle, James Colbert, Charles Fairbanks, Jr.,
Douglas Feith, Robert Loewenberg, David Wurmser, and Meyrav Wurmser—participated.

96

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so-called “Road Map”—and tried to impose it on their Israeli partners (such as Benja-
min Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon) as well as the Palestinians. The plan failed misera-
bly, however, as the “Greater Middle East” notion in their presentation received no
support from either the Israelis or the Palestinians. Neoconservative attempts to re-
shape the geopolitical landscape, enhance the level of regional and global security, and
make Iraq a model democracy for the entire Arab world were extremely ambitious;
however, they lacked any significant awareness of (and accounting for) cultural and
historical realities.
Analogies between the wave of democratization after World War II in West Ger-
many, Italy, and Japan with the situation in an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous
tribal state showed how deeply flawed the neoconservative argument actually was. Iraq
was envisioned as being the first democratic Arab state, and was assigned the task of
weakening both pan-Arabism and Islamist radicalism; it will be a long time before this
neoconservative project comes to fruition (if it is ever achieved at all). It became in-
creasingly unrealistic to talk about the rise of democratic institutions, economic pro-
gress, and social emancipation in Iraq (which is not to say that this neoconservative
idea was by definition impossible—exactly at the time this article was being written,
shortly before the U.S. elections in November 2008, it seemed that some progress was
being made with regard to security and stability in Iraq).
Another key argument of neoconservative foreign policy—the democratization
premise—had a humanitarian dimension that some critics grossly underestimated. Ac-
cording to this view, one of the main reasons for the U.S. deployment in Iraq was the
question of universal human rights (the U.S. violations of human rights at Guantanamo
and Abu Ghraib represent dark spots in this regard). Saddam was a cruel dictator who
used his Baath regime to create a terrorist state based on repressive and barbaric means
of control, and the neoconservatives wanted to put an end to this. The parallels to
Woodrow Wilson’s agenda and his appeal of “making the world safe for democracy”
are easy to recognize. What strengthened the new neoconservative belief in the hu-
manitarian dimension of U.S. foreign policy was the hypothesis that such a brutal re-
gime—with its apparatus of state power and patronage structures for pitting groups
against each other—could be replaced with a moderate leadership. Freedom and de-
mocracy are “God’s gift to humanity,” as George W. Bush said, and the neoconserva-
tives saw themselves as leading the United States down the right path, however diffi-
cult (and the end of which is yet not in sight). From the perspective of many political
observers, the scope of the neoconservative blunder in the Middle East does not neces-
sarily seem as irreparable today as it did three years ago. So there remains the hope
that the new U.S. leadership under President Obama will bring changes to the U.S.
blueprint for a democratic and more territorially stable Middle East.
The second intervention in Iraq emerged in the post-Cold War era, and many of the
United States’ traditional partners believed that the American “benevolent hegemon”
was now disoriented, and in search of new arenas of geopolitical conflict and control.
The unprecedented level of unipolarity after the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed
U.S. forces free rein to intervene anywhere and anytime they wanted. A number of left-
oriented critics of the neoconservative school—such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Em-

97


manuel Todd, and Noam Chomsky—discussed the thesis that U.S. foreign policy had
lost its compass in the wake of the Cold War and the proxy wars in the Third World,
and could not find a substitute for its lost spheres of influence in Vietnam and Iran.
The geopolitical tide in the Persian Gulf had shifted dramatically against the United
States, and a new guarantor of stability (and promoter of U.S. interests in the region)
was needed.
It is hard to imagine that the neoconservatives wanted to promote Iraq as their pri-
mary mechanism of domination and control in the region, and reduce their dependence
on the Saudi royal family. But it is indisputably true that the United States relocated
their naval formations in the Persian Gulf, in the process providing a tremendous num-
ber of new bases from which to launch air operations, so that even Turkey’s refusal to
allow U.S. troops to use its territory (and thus open a new front in the Iraq war) did not
prevent the U.S. from dislocating Iraqi forces. So the criticism promoted by opponents
of the neoconservatives that the U.S. invaded Iraq in order to improve its own strategic
and military position is simply not relevant. Even the presumption that the United
States was actively searching for war scenarios in the Middle East, and that the attacks
of 9/11 provided a so-called “window of opportunity” are devoid of any logical basis.
Perhaps the most widely cited argument in favor of U.S. intervention in Iraq—one
that is popular even today among many neoconservative intellectuals—is that the
situation in the Middle East bore similarities to that in Europe in the 1930s. The anal-
ogy rests on the assumption that Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement toward
the Third Reich essentially gave Germany permission to annex the Sudetenland. If
Saddam is compared with Hitler (as many neoconservatives stated), George W. Bush
could not follow the dangerous path set forth by the conservative British Prime Minis-
ter. According to neoconservatives, the United States will never again allow dictators
to set the terms of negotiations, thus surrendering power to them and conferring legiti-
macy on their regimes. Had Chamberlain taken a tougher stance in 1938, this thinking
holds, the world would have most likely avoided the Second World War.
The final element of the neoconservative interest in intervening in Iraq (one that is
highly controversial) concerns the security of Israel. The political scientists John
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argued in their book The Israel Lobby and U.S. For-
eign Policy that the U.S. and the neoconservatives (a certain number of whom are of
Jewish descent) had intervened in Iraq in order to guarantee the security and borders of
Israel.9 This absurd thesis simply cannot be true, because Iraq had lost its monopoly on
weapons procurement after the first Gulf War, and was not capable of posing a serious
threat to the Israeli Defense Forces, which are superbly trained and equipped with the
most modern armaments. The international sanctions and arms control measures in the
wake of Iraq’s failed annexation of Kuwait in the 1990s nullified Iraq’s military poten-

9
See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007). Our argument here draws on Max Boot’s es-
say, “Myths About Neoconservatism,” in Neoconservatism, Irwin Stelzer, ed. (London: At-
lantic Books, 2004), 45–52.

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SPRING 2009

tial, so it was extremely difficult for Saddam even to maintain the miserable state of its
army, much less to speak about upgrading it.
The argument of this article is that neoconservatism as it applies to U.S. foreign
policy has a liberal vision; its roots lie in a bygone landscape, at the dawn of America’s
struggle against a totalitarian foe. At home and abroad, the struggle for democracy is
also a struggle for equal opportunity. For many neoconservatives, liberty alone is the
goal, and government action to promote social justice imperils it. But for modern liber-
als like Peter Beinhart, championing freedom around the world requires championing
development, because (as the architects of the Marshall Plan understood) liberty is
unlikely to survive in the midst of economic despair and social engineering.10
The Neocons supported the war because they considered it the only remaining way
to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining a nuclear bomb. They also believed it could
produce a decent, pluralistic Iraqi regime, which might help open a democratic “third
way” in the Middle East between secular autocrats and their theocratic opponents—a
third way that offered the best long-term hope for protecting the United States’ strate-
gic interests. The blunders in Iraq will haunt U.S foreign policy for years to come, but
the war on terror will likely last even longer that that. How the United States fight it
will help shape the kind of country it becomes in the new millennium.

10
See Peter Beinart, The Good Fight (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).

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Qj V82 Spring 2009

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Qj V82 Spring 2009