Risk and Hazop Analysis
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The document discusses risk and hazard analysis for deep water marine systems. It introduces the topic and outlines some related accidents that demonstrate the need for such analysis. The document then reviews some key studies and literature on risk assessment methods, separating them into categories of major references, best practices, considerations of human error, and data and processes used. Finally, it provides an overview of the qualitative analysis process, outlining typical methods like case studies, interviews, and data analysis techniques like HAZOP and expert rating. The document proposes using such techniques to systematically identify and address hazards associated with deep water marine systems.
Risk and Hazop Analysis
- 1. Ocean of Discovery FACULTY OF MARINE SCIENCE AND MARITIME TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF MARITIME TECHNOLOGY By O.O. Sulaiman PhD, CEng, CMarEng
- 2. Ocean of Discovery Risk and Hazard Operability Process Of Deep Water Marine System Sulaiman1, W.B. Wan Nik2, A. H. Saharuddin3, A.S.A.kader4, M.F. Ahmad5 O 12/9/2010 28
- 3. i. INTRODUCTION ii. RELATED WORK iii. RISK PROCESS/ HAZOP PROCESS iv. CONCLUSION
- 4. Introduction the word of water, maritime accident and consequential casualties. increasing deep sea operation challenge of design for safety , environment, reliability and sustainability uncertainty associated with deep sea operation, system complexity , environmental impose and human errors warrant need for the use of scientific , reliability and risk base model for sustainable, efficient and reliable system design Uncertainty associated with HAZID -> use of HAZOP as one of the best method for HAZID 11/23/2012 4
- 5. Related Problem i. Alpha piper ii. BP oil spill iii. Exon Valdez GHG Amount Industrial contribution CO2 67.5%, Combustion energy sector accounted for 86.7% of total CO2 emissions, landfills (46.8%) and fugitive emissions from oil and gas (26.6%) CH4 32.4% landfills (46.8%) and fugitive emissions from oil and gas (26.6%) accounted for 73.4% of total CH4 emissions N2O 0.1% Traditional biomass fuels accounted for 86.4% of total N2O emissions 11/23/2012 5
- 6. KEY STUDIES International Maritime Organisation (IMO)., (2006): Amendments to the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule Making Process. 2006., MSC/ – MEPC.2 / Circ 5 (MSC/Circ.1023 – MEPC/Circ.392). Parry, G. (1996), The Characterization of Uncertainty in Probabilistic Risk Assessments of Complex Systems. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 54:2-3., 119-126. N. ,, Soares, C., A. P. Teixeira. (2001).Risk Assessment in Maritime Transportation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 74:3.,., 299-309. UK, HSE, 1999, Offshore Technology Report” Effective Collision Risk Management for Offshore Instalation, UK, London
- 7. 2.LIERATURE REVIEW Major References Best Practice Human Error Data and Process US “The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) risk-based decision-making guidelines Coast categorize human error into four categories, which form a matrix: intentional Guard’s errors, unintentional errors, errors of omission, and errors of commission” (USCG) “An error of omission occurs when an operator fails to perform a step or task. An error of commission occurs when an operator performs a step or task incorrectly .” Nivolian “ Technical factors are more readily resolved than human factors through itou et. technological and regulatory “fixes” leaving human-related errors and al (2004) breakdowns as the probable cause of industrial accidents.” Hee et. “ Hee et. al concluded that human inputs to technological and engineering al (1999) processes may actually contribute to accident risks from the begin stages of equipment design.” Human 11/23/2012Factors vs. Human Errors 7 (based on Gordon, 1998)
- 8. Best Practice Institution Studies Model Application Drawback The Norwegian Guidelines on how to apply risk analysis to meet its Brown et al Environmental performance of tankers Damage analysis (1996) deal only with oil spill Petroleum regulations Directorate Sirkar et al Consequences of collisions and Difficulties on (1997) groundings quantifying UK Health & Guidance on risk assessment in the context of consequence metrics Safety Executive Offshore Safety Cases Brown and Hybrid use of risk assessment, Oil spill assessment Canada- Guidance on installation Safety Analysis to help Amrozowicz probabilistic simulation and a spill limited to use of fault (2000) consequence assessment model tree Newfoundland operators meet its regulations Offshore Petroleum Sirkar et al Monte Carlo technique to estimate Lack of cost data Board (1997) damage and+ spill cost analysis for environmental damage American Recommended practice for design and hazard Petroleum Institute analysis offshore production platforms. IMO (IMO 13F Pollution prevention index from Lack (Sirkar et al (1995) probability distributions damage and (1997) rational oil spill. The UK Offshore Procedure for the conduct of formal safety Research Alternative rational approach to Lack employment of operators assessment of offshore installations, with very brief Council measuring impact of oil spills stochastic Associations coverage of hazard assessment. Committee(199 probabilistic methods 9) Pitblado & Turney Introduction to QRA for the process industries, (1995) Prince William The most complete risk assessment Lack of logical risk Sound, Alaska, assessment Aven (1992) Discussion of offshore QRA, focusing in particular (PWS (1996) framework (NRC on reliability analysis. (1998)) Volpe National Accident probabilities using statistics Lack employment of Crook (1997) Qualitative review of recent technical and Transportation and expert opinion. stochastic methods regulatory developments in the field of safety Center (1997)). against fire, inherently safer design, and human factor. Puget Sound Simulation or on expert opinion for Clean up cost and Area, USCG cost benefit analysis environmental Brian Veitch Rescue and evacuation from offshore platform (1999)) damage omission 11/23/2012 8
- 9. 3.0 Qualitative Analysis Process Methods: Case study Baseline data • Qualitative: Determine and collect the ship paint • constructivist, naturalistic, application parameters and standards. interpretive, postpositivist or postmodern perspective.(Creswell, Interviews:- Industry, ship Owner, classification 2003) Society (Lloyd’s Register of Shipping), - Manufacturer • Used to describe the overall Phone calls framework/procedure • used to look at reality, • based on a philosophical stance Data analysis- HAZOP, expert rating - models identify basic concepts and describe what reality is like, and the conditions by which we can study it. Deductive recommendation - ideas identified in models are refer to concepts.
- 10. DATA ANALYSIS POP&C – POLLUTION PREVENTION & CONTROL Safe Transportation of Hazardous Goods by Tankers PASSIVE SAFETY ACTIVE SAFETY P2 P3 C alibration of P5 P6 Probabilis tic Index-A us ing pertinent s ce rio na s to match his torical ris k Po llu tio n Preven tion En v iro n m tal Impact A s en sessmnt e LOSS OF WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY LO SS O F D AMAG E FIR E/ EX PLOSION STA BILITY / p f1 SIN K A GE Pfd (Waterways and vessel OIL OU TFLOW- Co RISK RED U CTIO N COLLISION/ MEA SU RES/ Database) STA Y A FLOAT HAZID GR OU N DING LOSS OF V ESSEL-Cp IN CID EN T P fi MA N A G EMENT p f2 P4 Rf LOSS OF D EA TH/IN J UR Y - Cl STR U C TU RA L STRU CTU RA L P7 FA ILU R E IN TEG RITY p f3 P fs Po llu tio n Mitig atio n an d Con trol C alibration of En v iro n m tal Impact A s en sessmnt e Pf through pertinent s cenarios , us ing s tructural reliability, to match his torical ris k Formalised Risk Assessment or Risk -Based Design of Tankers Risk = Σ w. Pfi x Σ w. C i. Rf 11/23/2012 10
- 11. Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques Qualitative Application Quantitative tools Application Methods Frequency and Consequence Involve analysis of causal Checklist Ensure that organizations are complying with standard practice Analysis factor and impact of accident Failure Modes and Effects Use to analyse the components Safety/Review Identify equipment conditions or operating procedures that could Analysis (FMEA) (equipment) failure modes and Audit lead to a casualty or result in property damage or environmental the impacts on the surrounding impacts. components and the system What-If Identify hazards, hazardous situations, or specific accident events that could lead to undesirable consequences. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Use to analyse combinations of equipment failures and Hazard and Identify system deviations and their causes that can lead to human errors that can result in Operability undesirable consequences and determine recommended actions to an accident Study reduce the frequency and/or consequences of the deviations. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Use to analyse various (HAZOP) consequences of events, both Preliminary Identify and prioritize hazards leading to undesirable failures and successes that can Hazard consequences early in the life of a system. lead to an accident. Analysis (PrHA) Determine recommended actions to reduce the frequency and/or Technique for Human Use to analyse human error consequences of prioritized hazards. Performance Reliability Prediction (THERP) Components of risk based method 11/23/2012 11
- 12. Components of Risk based Methods Components of RBM Cause of Accident Process Suitable techniques HAZID HAZOP, What if analysis, FMEA, FMECA Risk analysis FTA, ETA Risk Influence diagram, evaluation decision analysis Risk control Regulatory, economic, option environmental and function elements matching and iteration Cost benefit ICAF, Net Benefit analysis Human Simulation/ Probabilistic reliability Uncertainty Simulation/probabilistic Risk Simulation/ probabilistic Monitoring
- 13. HAZOP PROCESS • A HAZOP analysis is detail HAZID, it mostly divided into section or nodes involve systemic thinking and assessment a systematic manner the hazards associated to the operation. Hazard operability (HAZOP) is done to ensure that the systems are designed for safe operation with respect to personnel, environment and asset. • In HAZOP all potential hazard and error, including operational issues related to the design is identified. The quality of the HAZOP depends on the participants. Good quality of HAZOP participants are (HSE, 1999): Politeness and unterupting To the point discussion- avoid endless discussion Be active and positive Be responsible Allow HAZOP leader to lead
- 14. HAZOP PROCESS • It involve How to apply the API 14C for those process hazard with potential of the Major Accident. • Dynamic simulation for consequence assessment of the process deviation, failure on demand and spurious function of the safety system, alarm function and operator intervention is very important for HAZOP study. • Identification of HAZOP is followed with application of combined Event tree and Fault tree analysis for determination of safety critical elements, training requirement for the operators and integrity and review of maintenance manuals.
- 15. HAZOP PROCESS • HAZOP process is as followed: • Guide word/ brainstorming -> Deviation -> Consequence -> Safeguard - >Recommended action Propulsion failure HAZOP could follow the following: • Guide word :i.e. No pitch, No blade • Description: I.e. No rotational energy transformed, object in water break the blade • Causes: i.e. operation control mechanism • Safety measurement to address implementation of propeller protection such grating, jet • Also important HAZOP, is implementation of IEC61511 to assess the hazards associated to failure on demand and spurious trips, • In HAZOP record the worksheets efficiently to cover all phases also play important role.
- 16. HAZOP PROCESS • Advance HAZOP can also e implemented through Simulation operations to identify, quantify, and evaluate the risks. SIMOP Methodology includes: • Consequence Assessment • Frequency Analysis • Risk Calculation • Risk Analysis • Safety Criticality Elements • HAZOP is not intended to solve everything in a meeting. Identified hazard is solved in the closing process of the finding from the study. Table 2 shows typical HAZOP report. • Safety barrier management involve optimisation between the preventive and mitigation measures fundamental. • To determination of the safety critical elements (SCE), performance standards for the design of safety Critical Elements and in integrity assurance.
- 17. HAZOP PROCESS • Safety level integrity (SIL) involves assessment and verification according to IEC61508 and IEC61511Qualitative SIL assessment uses the risk graphs and calibration tables during the brainstorming sessions where the required SIL is assigned to the safety systems. • dynamic simulation could be optimised with greater accuracy. This saves a significant effort, time and cost for the project. It involve application of HAZOP & SIL assessment Alarm Management Fire & Explosion Stud Case study
- 18. Components SERM Collision Risk Model 11/23/2012 18
- 19. Fire Accident Scenario Analysis Compression Fire Hot work 3 area Manifold area Toxicity Radio active 4 products HP gas area PPE 2 Separation Management If PTW is not 3 area of work followed correctly permit (A) , the accident may happen Compressor Fire & 3 Loading Condition Loading Condition area Explosion Model Model Process area Handling Halting of 4 Engine Engine proximity of room room Fire Protection Model Fire Protection Model process under pressure CONSEQUENCE Untility area Fire fighting No availability of 2 Cargo leakage Model Cargo leakage Model Fire Explosion Fire Explosion system Fire Fighting Model consequence consequence Model Accommodation Accommodation system Separation Fire & Escape routes are 3 LPG Hazard Model LPG Hazard Model Explosion obstructed PPE Contractor not 2 Suvivability Model Suvivability Model using PPE Compressor Compressor PPE 3 room room Evacuation model Evacuation model Tank area Fire No Fire & Gas 2 detection Compression Explosion Escape routes are 3 area obstructed Compression Fire Hot work 3 area Manfold area Toxicity Radio active 4 products
- 20. Collision Model on Langat River 11/23/2012 20
- 21. Data and Model Assessment of rainfall-Runoff model Assess the impacts of wind loading Assessment of wave loading Assessment of system design Assessment of disposal Assessment of dynamic positioning Assessment of energy system Assessment of passing vessel Assessment of human reliability analysis Assessment of location Assessment of historical data 11/23/2012 21
- 22. (v). ACCIDENT DATA Primary data Secondary data from UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) Categorized different types of marine casualties and incidents Risk based regulation risk based operation risk based design Total risk concept Risk based method Technolohgy element Environmetal elements Human element Risk (R) = Probability (P) X Consequence (C) 11/23/2012 22
- 23. System Risk Analysis: Components of System Vs Standard Compliance Analysis High level goal assessment / Safety and environmental protection objective Tier -Standards requirement 1&2 - Functional requirement Goal Analysis criteria compliance verification of Goal based Tier 3 Regulatory instruments/ Classification rules, industrial Tier 4 standards Class guides, technical procedure Design process process Approval Secondary standards for company or individual system - Code of practice, safety and quality systems Tier 5 shipbuilding, operation maintenance and manning 11/23/2012 23
- 24. Components of Integrated Risk Analysis Regulatory standards Formal safety analysis Lesson learnt/ experience Define objective Hazard StandardA apply assessment Design concept Design detail Manufacture Testing Installation Trial Operation in service Maintenance Repair Modifications Ddecommissioning 11/23/2012 24
- 25. System Level Analysis -Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Simplified Processes of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Action & Check STEP 1: Identify a Failure Mode Risk Priority STEP 2: Number Determine (RPN) Severity FMEA STEP 4: STEP 3: Determine Determine Detectability Occurrence 11/23/2012 25 RPN = Severity Rating x Occurrence Rating x Detection Rating
- 26. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Five steps of FTA: Define the undesired event to study i. Obtain an understanding of the system ii. Construct the fault tree iii. Evaluate the fault tree iv. Control the hazards identified Output event Output event Basic Undeveloped Event Event AND OR Gate Gate Input events Input events Figure 1: Logic Gates & Typical Primary Events 11/23/2012 26
- 27. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) ETA process: i. Define the system. ii. Identify the accident scenarios. iii. Identify the initiating event (IE). iv. Identify pivotal events. v. Build the event tree diagram. vi. Obtain the failure event probabilities. vii.Identify the outcome risk. 11/23/2012 27
- 28. Accident Consequence Modeling C11 Causes Accident C12 Categories d an ort ate nsp F ra T C1 C2 C3 Failures, Human and Organizational Errors, Environmental Stressors Safeguards, Barriers, Operational Controls, Risk Control Options C 28 Consequences
- 29. As Low as Reasonable Possible Principle (ALARP), Risk Acceptability Criteria, cost Effectiveness Assessment (CEA) Scenario Probability Consequence Cumulative Probability S1 P1 C1 P1=P1+P2 S2 P2 C2 P2=P3+P2 Si Pi Ci Pi=Pi+3+Pi Sn+1 Pn+1 Cn+1 Pn-1=Pn+Pn+1 Sn Pn Cn Pn=Pn 11/23/2012 29
- 30. (iii). Channel Complexity Analysis Human Reliability Analysis DP Visibility Mooring Criticality/ MTTB/ Stochastic Poison, Binomial 11/23/2012 30
- 31. Cost Benefit Analysis, RCO • Risk control measures are used to group risk into a limited number of well practical regulatory and capability options. Risk Control Option (RCO) aimed to achieve (David, 1996): – Preventive: reduce probability of occurrence – Mitigation: reduce severity of consequence • In estimating RCO, the following are taken into consideration: • DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Years) or QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years) • LQI (Life Quality Index) • GCAF (Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality) • NCAF (Net Cost of Averting a Fatality) • ICAF (Implied Cost of Averting Fatality 11/23/2012 31
- 32. Sustainability Analysis costt Diferent between cost of polution control and environmetal damage Minimum sum of cost Cost of polution control High damage cost with no control No economic gain from polusion control Cost of damage from polution Minimum sum of cost 11/23/2012 32
- 33. Validation Frequency model Consequence Model ALARP 11/23/2012 33
- 34. Validation of HAZOP Expert Rating workshop: Industry Manufacture Classification Society Operator accademecian
- 35. Conclusion • Following need for maritime activities to operate in much harsh condition, institutions are adopting system based approach that account for total risk associated with system lifecycle to protect the environment and prevent accident. • Employment of risk method to address each contributing factor to accident is very important. Qualitative risk in system description and hazard identification can best be tackled through HAZOP. • The outcome of HAZOP can be processed in quantitative analysis which may include probabilistic and stochastic dynamic simulation process for system level analysis, while fault tree and event tree quantitative analysis can be utilized to determine risk index • Translation of dynamic risk analysis can be translated into ALARP influence diagram can provide decision support risk cost control option towards sustainable, reliable, efficient propulsion technology choice y for system design and operability.
- 36. Ocean of Discovery Thank You