RSA криптосистем

The RSA Cryptosystem

Dan Boneh
Stanford University

The RSA cryptosystem

 First published:
• Scientific American, Aug. 1977.
(after some censorship entanglements)

 Currently the “work horse” of Internet security:
• Most Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) products.
• SSL/TLS: Certificates and key-exchange.
• Secure e-mail: PGP, Outlook, …

Page 2

The RSA trapdoor 1-to-1 function

 Parameters: N=pq. N 1024 bits. p,q 512 bits.
e – encryption exponent. gcd(e, (N) ) = 1 .

 1-to-1 function: RSA(M) = Me (mod N) where M ZN*

 Trapdoor: d – decryption exponent.
Where e d = 1 (mod (N) )
d (N)+1
 Inversion: RSA(M) = Med = Mk = M (mod N)

 (n,e,t, )-RSA Assumption: For any t-time alg. A:

Pr[ A(N,e,x) = x ]<
1/e p,q R n-bit primes,
(N) :
N pq, x R ZN*
Page 3

Textbook RSA is insecure

 Textbook RSA encryption:
• public key: (N,e) Encrypt: C = Me (mod N)
• private key: d Decrypt: Cd = M (mod N)
(M Z N* )

 Completely insecure cryptosystem:
• Does not satisfy basic definitions of security.
• Many attacks exist.

 The RSA trapdoor permutation is not a cryptosystem !

Page 4

A simple attack on textbook RSA
Rando CLIENT HELLO
m
session- Web SERVER HELLO (e,N) Web d
key K Browser Server
C=RSA(K)

 Session-key K is 64 bits. View K {0,…,264}
Eavesdropper sees: C = Ke (mod N) .

 Suppose K = K1 K2 where K1, K2 < 234 . (prob. 20%)
Then: C/K1e = K2e (mod N)

 Build table: C/1e, C/2e, C/3e, …, C/234e . time: 234
For K2 = 0,…, 234 test if K2e is in table. time: 234 34

 Attack time: 240 << 264 Page 5

Common RSA encryption

 Never use textbook RSA.
 RSA in practice:

Preprocessing RSA

ciphertext
msg

 Main question:
• How should the preprocessing be done?
• Can we argue about security of resulting system?

Page 6

PKCS1 V1.5

 PKCS1 mode 2: (encryption)
16 bits

02 random pad FF msg

1024 bits

 Resulting value is RSA encrypted.

 Widely deployed in web servers and browsers.
 No security analysis !!

Page 7

Attack on PKCS1

 Bleichenbacher 98. Chosen-ciphertext attack.
 PKCS1 used in SSL: C= ciphertext

d C
Is this
PKCS1? Web Attacker
Yes: continue
Server
02 No: error

attacker can test if 16 MSBs of plaintext = ’02’.

 Attack: to decrypt a given ciphertext C do:
e
• Pick r ZN. Compute C’ = C = (r PKCS1(M)) .
re
• Send C’ to web server and use response.
Page 8

Chosen ciphertext security (CCS)
 No efficient attacker can win the following game:
(with non-negligible advantage)

M0 , M1

C=E(Mb) b Decryption
Challenger R
Attacker oracle
Challenge
C
b’

Attacker wins if b=b’

Page 9

PKCS1 V2.0 - OAEP

 New preprocessing function: OAEP (BR94).
M 01 00..0 rand.

+ H
Check pad
on decryption.
Reject CT if invalid.
G +

Plaintext to encrypt with RSA {0,1}n-1

 Thm: RSA is trap-door permutation OAEP is CCS
when H,G are “random oracles”.
 In practice: use SHA-1 or MD5 for H and G.
Page 10

OAEP Improvements

 OAEP+: (Shoup’01) M W(M,R) R

trap-door permutation F + H

F-OAEP+ is CCS when
H,G,W are “random oracles”. G +

 SAEP+: (B’01)
M W(M,R) R
RSA trap-door perm
RSA-SAEP+ is CCS when + H

H,W are “random oracle”.

Page 11

Subtleties in implementing OAEP [M ’00]

OAEP-decrypt(C) {
error = 0;

if ( RSA-1(C) > 2n-1 )
{ error =1; goto exit; }

if ( pad(OAEP-1(RSA-1(C))) != “01000” )
} { error = 1; goto exit; }

 Problem: timing information leaks type of error.
Attacker can decrypt any ciphertext C.
 Lesson: Don’t implement RSA-OAEP yourself …

Page 12

Part II:
Is RSA a One-Way Function?

Is RSA a one-way permutation?

 To invert the RSA one-way function (without d) attacker
must compute:
M from C = Me (mod N).

 How hard is computing e’th roots modulo N ??

 Best known algorithm:
• Step 1: factor N. (hard)
• Step 2: Find e’th roots modulo p and q. (easy)

Page 14

Shortcuts?

 Must one factor N in order to compute e’th roots?
Exists shortcut for breaking RSA without factoring?

 To prove no shortcut exists show a reduction:
• Efficient algorithm for e’th roots mod N
efficient algorithm for factoring N.
• Oldest problem in public key cryptography.

 Evidence no reduction exists: (BV’98)

• “Algebraic” reduction factoring is easy.
• Unlike Diffie-Hellman (Maurer’94).
Page 15

Improving RSA’s performance

 To speed up RSA decryption use
small private key d. Cd = M (mod N)

• Wiener87: if d < N0.25 then RSA is insecure.
• BD’98: if d < N0.292 then RSA is insecure
(open: d < N0.5 )

• Insecure: priv. key d can be found from (N,e).

• Small d should never be used.

Page 16

Wiener’s attack

 Recall: e d = 1 (mod (N) )
k Z : e d = k (N) + 1
e k 1
-
(N) d d (N)

(N) = N-p-q+1 |N- (N)| p+q 3 N
e - k 1
d N0.25/3 N d 2d2

Continued fraction expansion of e/N gives k/d.

e d = 1 (mod k) gcd(d,k)=1
Page 17

RSA With Low public exponent

 To speed up RSA encryption (and sig. verify)
use a small e. C = Me (mod N)

 Minimal value: e=3 ( gcd(e, (N) ) = 1)
 Recommended value: e=65537=216+1
Encryption: 17 mod. multiplies.

 Several weak attacks. Non known on RSA-OAEP.

 Asymmetry of RSA: fast enc. / slow dec.
• ElGamal: approx. same time for both.
Page 18

Implementation attacks

 Attack the implementation of RSA.
 Timing attack: (Kocher 97)
The time it takes to compute Cd (mod N)
can expose d.

 Power attack: (Kocher 99)
The power consumption of a smartcard while
it is computing Cd (mod N) can expose d.

 Faults attack: (BDL 97)
A computer error during Cd (mod N)
can expose d.
OpenSSL defense: check output. 5% slowdown.
Page 19

Key lengths

Security of public key system should be
comparable to security of block cipher.
NIST:
Cipher key-size Modulus size
64 bits 512 bits.
80 bits 1024 bits
128 bits 3072 bits.
256 bits (AES) 15360 bits

 High security very large moduli.
Not necessary with Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
Page 20

RSA криптосистем

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