SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack
Alex Moneger
Agenda
1. TLS attacks timeline
2. Difficulty in reproducing attacks
3. Scapy-ssl_tls goals
4. Quick demo of scapy-ssl_tls capabilities
5. Custom TLS stacks, what to look for?
6. Fuzzing capabilities
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
1
Introduction
• TLS is a critical protocol to the internet
• Very few alternatives
• Session layer protocol for other protocols
• Very complex
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
2
TLS PROTOCOL LEVEL ATTACKS
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
3
Introduction
• Protocol under scrutiny
• Growth of the number of protocol level
attacks
• Numerous implementation bugs
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
4
Timeline
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
5
Renegotiation
2009 20162013
BEAST CRIME
2014 2015201220112010
BREACH
Lucky13
POODLE
POODLE2
FREAK
LOGJAM
SLOTH
THS
Observations
• TLS protocol attacks increase:
– Frequency
– Complexity
• 2 classes:
– Protocol level
– Crypto level
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
6
REPRODUCING ATTACKS
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
7
Problems
• Understand the attack properly
• Practical impact (as opposed to theoretical
problem)
• Reproducibility
• Fix (dev + Q&A)
• Fix for good (regression)
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
8
Response
• Customers do not always understand the practical impact
• Your response team has to provide a definite answer
• 2 solutions for custom implementations:
– Crypto code review:
• Lack of comparison point
• Hard to get the full picture when deep into a crypto routine
– PoC:
• Lack of tooling
• Big difference between regular lib and security focused lib
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
9
SCAPY-SSL_TLS
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
10
Introduction
• TLS & DTLS scriptable stack built above scapy
• Stateless (as much as possible)
• Packet crafting and dissecting
• Crypto session handling
• Sniffing (wire, pcap, …)
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
11
Why bother?
• TLS stacks are built to be robust
• Enforce input parameters to be valid
• Tear down connection on error
• Not very flexible
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
12
Goals
• Easy to install and use
• Simplify discovery and exploitation of TLS vulnerabilities
• Allow full control of any TLS field
• Tries very hard to maintain absolutely no state
• Good documentation and examples
• No checks or enforcements (up to user if desired)
• Sane defaults
• Transparent encryption
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
13
Concepts
• Start scapy
• All classes start with TLS:
– Allows easy autocomplete
• What fields are available in a given TLS record?
– ls(TLSClientHello)
• TLSSocket() is used to wrap the TCP socket
– This is your base element to send/recv traffic
• Build packets scapy style:
– p = TLSRecord()/TLSHandshake()/TLSClientHello()
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
14
DEMO
Packet crafting/parsing
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
15
A simple TLS 1.3 client
with TLSSocket(client=True) as tls_socket:
try:
tls_socket.connect(ip)
print("Connected to server: %s" % (ip,))
except socket.timeout:
print("Failed to open connection to server: %s" % (ip,), file=sys.stderr)
else:
try:
server_hello, server_kex = tls_socket.do_handshake(tls_version, ciphers, extensions)
server_hello.show()
except TLSProtocolError as tpe:
print("Got TLS error: %s" % tpe, file=sys.stderr)
tpe.response.show()
else:
resp = tls_socket.do_round_trip(TLSPlaintext(data="GET / HTTP/1.1rnHOST: localhostrnrn"))
print("Got response from server")
resp.show()
finally:
print(tls_socket.tls_ctx)
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
16
Viewing a packet
###[ TLS Record ]###
content_type= handshake
version= TLS_1_0
length= 0x36
###[ TLS Handshakes ]###
handshakes
|###[ TLS Handshake ]###
| type= client_hello
| length= 0x32
|###[ TLS Client Hello ]###
| version= TLS_1_2
| gmt_unix_time= 1494985553
| random_bytes= 'xa6;x10{x0fx7fUx88xeaHxc6xafxf8xe4xedxd56x07xcfxd6x85xc1^xbdx1fxa3x02x85'
| session_id_length= 0x0
| session_id= ''
| cipher_suites_length= 0x2
| cipher_suites= ['ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384']
| compression_methods_length= 0x1
| compression_methods= ['NULL']
| extensions_length= 0x7
| extensions
| |###[ TLS Extension ]###
| | type= supported_versions
| | length= 0x3
| |###[ TLS Extension Supported Versions ]###
| | length= 0x2
| | versions= ['TLS_1_3_DRAFT_18']
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
17
A TLS 1.3 server
server_hello = TLSRecord() / TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[
TLSHandshake() / TLSServerHello(version=version,
cipher_suite=TLSCipherSuite.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
extensions=[key_share])])
client_socket.sendall(server_hello)
client_socket.sendall(TLSRecord() / TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[
TLSHandshake() / TLSEncryptedExtensions(extensions=[named_groups]),
TLSHandshake() / TLSCertificateList() / TLS13Certificate(
certificates=certificates)]))
client_socket.sendall(TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[
TLSHandshake() / TLSCertificateVerify(alg=TLSSignatureScheme.RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
sig=client_socket.tls_ctx.compute_server_cert_verify())]))
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
18
WHAT TO LOOK FOR
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
19
Recon
• Fingerprint possible fork
• OpenSSL empty plaintext fragment
• JSSE, NSS stacked handshake
• Difference in Alert type when tampering with
Finish message
• Alert is loosely defined, so stack specific
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
20
State machine
• Tricky testing: mostly manual work and
knowledge of RFC
• Automated testing: FlexTLS:
– Example: mono FlexApps.exe -s efin --connect
localhost:8443
• Gives a good starting point for manual testing
• Lot of legacy stuff: server-gated cryptography
anyone?
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
21
Diffie Hellman
• Check the validity of server (EC)DH params
– Group size
– Primality
– Subgroup confinement attack (e.g: Off curve test (EC))
– Signature algo used
– …
• Send interesting values (small, non-prime, …)
• Scapy-ssl_tls uses TinyEC for EC calculation
• Allows to perform EC arithmetic
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
22
Side channels (RSA)
• Pre Master Secret is decrypted
• TLS mandates PKCS1 v1.5 for padding
• This needs to be constant time, see classic
Bleichenbacher
• Time and Check for response difference on invalid
padding (alert vs tcp reset)
• Can use pybleach pkcs1_test_client.py to
generate faulty padding for your PMS
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
23
Side channels (ciphers)
• Padding and MAC checks must be constant
time
• Alert type must be identical
• Time and check response when flipping bytes
in padding and MAC
• Check for nonce reuse
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
24
Proper byte checking
• Some implementation only verify a few bytes
of padding, MAC and verify_data (finish hash)
• All bytes must be checked for obvious reasons
• Send application data packets with flipped
padding, MAC and verify_data
• Make sure you always get an alert
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
25
Fragmentation
• Any packet above 2**14 (16384) bytes must be fragmented
• But any fragment size can be chosen
• Some stacks don’t cope well with TLS re-assembly
• Can be used to bypass devices which parse TLS, but fail-
open
• Server can be requested to fragment using the Maximum
Fragment Length Negotiation extension
• DTLS allows to specify the fragment offset in the handshake
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
26
TLS 1.3 specific
• Spec doesn’t leave a lot of room for
implementation errors
• Handling of 0-RTT, early data, PFS
• Resumption checks (SNI)
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
27
CONCLUSION
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
28
Strengths
• Scapy-ssl_tls can speed up PoC development
• PoC can be re-used as part of testing QA and
regression
• Valuable to reproduce findings & develop
mitigations
• Help in learning & experimenting with TLS
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
29
Thanks
• Thanks to tintinweb who started the project
• Bugs: https://github.com/tintinweb/scapy-
ssl_tls/
• Contact:
– Github: alexmgr
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
30
THANKS
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
31
IF TIME ALLOWS
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
32
Fuzzing
• Provides basic fuzzing through scapy
• Tries to be smart by preserving semantically necessary
fields
• Use fuzz() function on any element
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
33
fuzz(TLSRecord()/TLSHandshake(type=TLSHandshakeType.SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)/TLSAlert()).show2()
###[ TLS Record ]###
content_type= handshake <= preserved
version= 0x7391 <= fuzzed
length= 0x6 <= preserved
###[ TLS Handshake ]###
type= supplemental_data <= overriden
length= 0x2 <= preserved
###[ Raw ]###
load= '(r’ <= fuzzed
Fuzzing
• Only good for basic fuzzing
• Simple to plug in your own fuzzer
• Just generate data, scapy-ssl_tls takes care of
the rest
• Good targets: TLS extensions, certificates, …
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
34
Examples
• The example section contains some useful base tools:
– RSA session sniffer: given a cert, can decrypt wire traffic
(like Wireshark)
– Security scanner: a rudimentary TLS scanner (versions,
ciphers, SCSV, …)
– Downgrade test
– …
• Just baselines to write your own tools
18 May 2017
Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS
1.3 stack
35

More Related Content

PDF
Linux Locking Mechanisms
PDF
Linux Networking Explained
PPTX
How Criteo is managing one of the largest Kafka Infrastructure in Europe
PPTX
PDF
LinuxCon 2015 Linux Kernel Networking Walkthrough
PDF
Using VPP and SRIO-V with Clear Containers
PDF
Making Linux do Hard Real-time
PDF
Disaster Recovery and High Availability with Kafka, SRM and MM2
Linux Locking Mechanisms
Linux Networking Explained
How Criteo is managing one of the largest Kafka Infrastructure in Europe
LinuxCon 2015 Linux Kernel Networking Walkthrough
Using VPP and SRIO-V with Clear Containers
Making Linux do Hard Real-time
Disaster Recovery and High Availability with Kafka, SRM and MM2

What's hot (20)

PDF
Fun with Network Interfaces
PDF
introduction to linux kernel tcp/ip ptocotol stack
PPTX
The TCP/IP Stack in the Linux Kernel
PPTX
How to use packet tracer
PPTX
Sharding Methods for MongoDB
PPTX
Linux Memory Management with CMA (Contiguous Memory Allocator)
PDF
BPF: Tracing and more
PPTX
Data Structures used in Linux kernel
PDF
The linux networking architecture
PDF
The Linux Kernel Scheduler (For Beginners) - SFO17-421
PDF
Intel dpdk Tutorial
PPTX
Wireshark
PDF
LISA2019 Linux Systems Performance
PDF
Understanding performance aspects of etcd and Raft
PPTX
Tcpdump
PPTX
Introduction to HTTP/2
PPTX
Pentesting custom TLS stacks
PDF
Wireshark tutorial
PDF
Android Boot Time Optimization
PPTX
Best Practice TLS for IBM Domino
Fun with Network Interfaces
introduction to linux kernel tcp/ip ptocotol stack
The TCP/IP Stack in the Linux Kernel
How to use packet tracer
Sharding Methods for MongoDB
Linux Memory Management with CMA (Contiguous Memory Allocator)
BPF: Tracing and more
Data Structures used in Linux kernel
The linux networking architecture
The Linux Kernel Scheduler (For Beginners) - SFO17-421
Intel dpdk Tutorial
Wireshark
LISA2019 Linux Systems Performance
Understanding performance aspects of etcd and Raft
Tcpdump
Introduction to HTTP/2
Pentesting custom TLS stacks
Wireshark tutorial
Android Boot Time Optimization
Best Practice TLS for IBM Domino
Ad

Similar to Scapy TLS: A scriptable TLS 1.3 stack (20)

PDF
Why Many Websites are still Insecure (and How to Fix Them)
PDF
Vulnerability-tolerant Transport Layer Security
PDF
Rootconf2019
PPTX
ION Bangladesh - DANE, DNSSEC, and TLS Testing in the Go6lab
PPTX
ION Bucharest - DANE-DNSSEC-TLS
PPTX
Wireless LAN Security Fundamentals
PDF
Linux kernel TLS и HTTPS / Александр Крижановский (Tempesta Technologies)
PDF
wolfSSL and TLS 1.3
PPT
Java 9 Security Enhancements in Practice
PPTX
BlueHat v17 || TLS 1.3 - Full speed ahead... mind the warnings - the great, t...
PPTX
[Wroclaw #8] TLS all the things!
PPTX
ssl-tls-ipsec-vpn.pptx
PPTX
Cours4.pptx
PDF
Primer to Browser Netwroking
PDF
暗認本読書会9
PDF
Go paranoid
PDF
TLS/SSL Protocol Design
PPTX
Random musings on SSL/TLS configuration
PPTX
SSL Checklist for Pentesters (BSides MCR 2014)
PPTX
DANE/DNSSEC/TLS Testing in the go6Lab - ION Cape Town
Why Many Websites are still Insecure (and How to Fix Them)
Vulnerability-tolerant Transport Layer Security
Rootconf2019
ION Bangladesh - DANE, DNSSEC, and TLS Testing in the Go6lab
ION Bucharest - DANE-DNSSEC-TLS
Wireless LAN Security Fundamentals
Linux kernel TLS и HTTPS / Александр Крижановский (Tempesta Technologies)
wolfSSL and TLS 1.3
Java 9 Security Enhancements in Practice
BlueHat v17 || TLS 1.3 - Full speed ahead... mind the warnings - the great, t...
[Wroclaw #8] TLS all the things!
ssl-tls-ipsec-vpn.pptx
Cours4.pptx
Primer to Browser Netwroking
暗認本読書会9
Go paranoid
TLS/SSL Protocol Design
Random musings on SSL/TLS configuration
SSL Checklist for Pentesters (BSides MCR 2014)
DANE/DNSSEC/TLS Testing in the go6Lab - ION Cape Town
Ad

More from Alexandre Moneger (13)

PPTX
BSides LV 2016 - Beyond the tip of the iceberg - fuzzing binary protocols for...
PPTX
NBTC#2 - Why instrumentation is cooler then ice
PPTX
Practical rsa padding oracle attacks
PPTX
Defcon 22 - Stitching numbers - generating rop payloads from in memory numbers
PPTX
03 - Refresher on buffer overflow in the old days
PPTX
07 - Bypassing ASLR, or why X^W matters
PPTX
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack
PPTX
06 - ELF format, knowing your friend
PPTX
05 - Bypassing DEP, or why ASLR matters
PPTX
04 - I love my OS, he protects me (sometimes, in specific circumstances)
PPTX
09 - ROP countermeasures, can we fix this?
PPTX
08 - Return Oriented Programming, the chosen one
PPTX
ROP ‘n’ ROLL, a peak into modern exploits
BSides LV 2016 - Beyond the tip of the iceberg - fuzzing binary protocols for...
NBTC#2 - Why instrumentation is cooler then ice
Practical rsa padding oracle attacks
Defcon 22 - Stitching numbers - generating rop payloads from in memory numbers
03 - Refresher on buffer overflow in the old days
07 - Bypassing ASLR, or why X^W matters
02 - Introduction to the cdecl ABI and the x86 stack
06 - ELF format, knowing your friend
05 - Bypassing DEP, or why ASLR matters
04 - I love my OS, he protects me (sometimes, in specific circumstances)
09 - ROP countermeasures, can we fix this?
08 - Return Oriented Programming, the chosen one
ROP ‘n’ ROLL, a peak into modern exploits

Recently uploaded (20)

PPTX
web development for engineering and engineering
PDF
Operating System & Kernel Study Guide-1 - converted.pdf
PDF
PPT on Performance Review to get promotions
PPTX
additive manufacturing of ss316l using mig welding
PDF
composite construction of structures.pdf
PPTX
UNIT-1 - COAL BASED THERMAL POWER PLANTS
PPTX
Internet of Things (IOT) - A guide to understanding
PPT
CRASH COURSE IN ALTERNATIVE PLUMBING CLASS
PPTX
CYBER-CRIMES AND SECURITY A guide to understanding
PPTX
CARTOGRAPHY AND GEOINFORMATION VISUALIZATION chapter1 NPTE (2).pptx
PDF
Evaluating the Democratization of the Turkish Armed Forces from a Normative P...
PDF
Mitigating Risks through Effective Management for Enhancing Organizational Pe...
PDF
The CXO Playbook 2025 – Future-Ready Strategies for C-Suite Leaders Cerebrai...
PPTX
FINAL REVIEW FOR COPD DIANOSIS FOR PULMONARY DISEASE.pptx
PPTX
Construction Project Organization Group 2.pptx
PDF
R24 SURVEYING LAB MANUAL for civil enggi
PPTX
Sustainable Sites - Green Building Construction
PPTX
MET 305 2019 SCHEME MODULE 2 COMPLETE.pptx
PDF
keyrequirementskkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
PDF
PRIZ Academy - 9 Windows Thinking Where to Invest Today to Win Tomorrow.pdf
web development for engineering and engineering
Operating System & Kernel Study Guide-1 - converted.pdf
PPT on Performance Review to get promotions
additive manufacturing of ss316l using mig welding
composite construction of structures.pdf
UNIT-1 - COAL BASED THERMAL POWER PLANTS
Internet of Things (IOT) - A guide to understanding
CRASH COURSE IN ALTERNATIVE PLUMBING CLASS
CYBER-CRIMES AND SECURITY A guide to understanding
CARTOGRAPHY AND GEOINFORMATION VISUALIZATION chapter1 NPTE (2).pptx
Evaluating the Democratization of the Turkish Armed Forces from a Normative P...
Mitigating Risks through Effective Management for Enhancing Organizational Pe...
The CXO Playbook 2025 – Future-Ready Strategies for C-Suite Leaders Cerebrai...
FINAL REVIEW FOR COPD DIANOSIS FOR PULMONARY DISEASE.pptx
Construction Project Organization Group 2.pptx
R24 SURVEYING LAB MANUAL for civil enggi
Sustainable Sites - Green Building Construction
MET 305 2019 SCHEME MODULE 2 COMPLETE.pptx
keyrequirementskkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
PRIZ Academy - 9 Windows Thinking Where to Invest Today to Win Tomorrow.pdf

Scapy TLS: A scriptable TLS 1.3 stack

  • 1. Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack Alex Moneger
  • 2. Agenda 1. TLS attacks timeline 2. Difficulty in reproducing attacks 3. Scapy-ssl_tls goals 4. Quick demo of scapy-ssl_tls capabilities 5. Custom TLS stacks, what to look for? 6. Fuzzing capabilities 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 1
  • 3. Introduction • TLS is a critical protocol to the internet • Very few alternatives • Session layer protocol for other protocols • Very complex 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 2
  • 4. TLS PROTOCOL LEVEL ATTACKS 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 3
  • 5. Introduction • Protocol under scrutiny • Growth of the number of protocol level attacks • Numerous implementation bugs 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 4
  • 6. Timeline 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 5 Renegotiation 2009 20162013 BEAST CRIME 2014 2015201220112010 BREACH Lucky13 POODLE POODLE2 FREAK LOGJAM SLOTH THS
  • 7. Observations • TLS protocol attacks increase: – Frequency – Complexity • 2 classes: – Protocol level – Crypto level 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 6
  • 8. REPRODUCING ATTACKS 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 7
  • 9. Problems • Understand the attack properly • Practical impact (as opposed to theoretical problem) • Reproducibility • Fix (dev + Q&A) • Fix for good (regression) 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 8
  • 10. Response • Customers do not always understand the practical impact • Your response team has to provide a definite answer • 2 solutions for custom implementations: – Crypto code review: • Lack of comparison point • Hard to get the full picture when deep into a crypto routine – PoC: • Lack of tooling • Big difference between regular lib and security focused lib 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 9
  • 11. SCAPY-SSL_TLS 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 10
  • 12. Introduction • TLS & DTLS scriptable stack built above scapy • Stateless (as much as possible) • Packet crafting and dissecting • Crypto session handling • Sniffing (wire, pcap, …) 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 11
  • 13. Why bother? • TLS stacks are built to be robust • Enforce input parameters to be valid • Tear down connection on error • Not very flexible 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 12
  • 14. Goals • Easy to install and use • Simplify discovery and exploitation of TLS vulnerabilities • Allow full control of any TLS field • Tries very hard to maintain absolutely no state • Good documentation and examples • No checks or enforcements (up to user if desired) • Sane defaults • Transparent encryption 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 13
  • 15. Concepts • Start scapy • All classes start with TLS: – Allows easy autocomplete • What fields are available in a given TLS record? – ls(TLSClientHello) • TLSSocket() is used to wrap the TCP socket – This is your base element to send/recv traffic • Build packets scapy style: – p = TLSRecord()/TLSHandshake()/TLSClientHello() 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 14
  • 16. DEMO Packet crafting/parsing 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 15
  • 17. A simple TLS 1.3 client with TLSSocket(client=True) as tls_socket: try: tls_socket.connect(ip) print("Connected to server: %s" % (ip,)) except socket.timeout: print("Failed to open connection to server: %s" % (ip,), file=sys.stderr) else: try: server_hello, server_kex = tls_socket.do_handshake(tls_version, ciphers, extensions) server_hello.show() except TLSProtocolError as tpe: print("Got TLS error: %s" % tpe, file=sys.stderr) tpe.response.show() else: resp = tls_socket.do_round_trip(TLSPlaintext(data="GET / HTTP/1.1rnHOST: localhostrnrn")) print("Got response from server") resp.show() finally: print(tls_socket.tls_ctx) 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 16
  • 18. Viewing a packet ###[ TLS Record ]### content_type= handshake version= TLS_1_0 length= 0x36 ###[ TLS Handshakes ]### handshakes |###[ TLS Handshake ]### | type= client_hello | length= 0x32 |###[ TLS Client Hello ]### | version= TLS_1_2 | gmt_unix_time= 1494985553 | random_bytes= 'xa6;x10{x0fx7fUx88xeaHxc6xafxf8xe4xedxd56x07xcfxd6x85xc1^xbdx1fxa3x02x85' | session_id_length= 0x0 | session_id= '' | cipher_suites_length= 0x2 | cipher_suites= ['ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384'] | compression_methods_length= 0x1 | compression_methods= ['NULL'] | extensions_length= 0x7 | extensions | |###[ TLS Extension ]### | | type= supported_versions | | length= 0x3 | |###[ TLS Extension Supported Versions ]### | | length= 0x2 | | versions= ['TLS_1_3_DRAFT_18'] 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 17
  • 19. A TLS 1.3 server server_hello = TLSRecord() / TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[ TLSHandshake() / TLSServerHello(version=version, cipher_suite=TLSCipherSuite.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, extensions=[key_share])]) client_socket.sendall(server_hello) client_socket.sendall(TLSRecord() / TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[ TLSHandshake() / TLSEncryptedExtensions(extensions=[named_groups]), TLSHandshake() / TLSCertificateList() / TLS13Certificate( certificates=certificates)])) client_socket.sendall(TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[ TLSHandshake() / TLSCertificateVerify(alg=TLSSignatureScheme.RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, sig=client_socket.tls_ctx.compute_server_cert_verify())])) 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 18
  • 20. WHAT TO LOOK FOR 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 19
  • 21. Recon • Fingerprint possible fork • OpenSSL empty plaintext fragment • JSSE, NSS stacked handshake • Difference in Alert type when tampering with Finish message • Alert is loosely defined, so stack specific 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 20
  • 22. State machine • Tricky testing: mostly manual work and knowledge of RFC • Automated testing: FlexTLS: – Example: mono FlexApps.exe -s efin --connect localhost:8443 • Gives a good starting point for manual testing • Lot of legacy stuff: server-gated cryptography anyone? 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 21
  • 23. Diffie Hellman • Check the validity of server (EC)DH params – Group size – Primality – Subgroup confinement attack (e.g: Off curve test (EC)) – Signature algo used – … • Send interesting values (small, non-prime, …) • Scapy-ssl_tls uses TinyEC for EC calculation • Allows to perform EC arithmetic 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 22
  • 24. Side channels (RSA) • Pre Master Secret is decrypted • TLS mandates PKCS1 v1.5 for padding • This needs to be constant time, see classic Bleichenbacher • Time and Check for response difference on invalid padding (alert vs tcp reset) • Can use pybleach pkcs1_test_client.py to generate faulty padding for your PMS 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 23
  • 25. Side channels (ciphers) • Padding and MAC checks must be constant time • Alert type must be identical • Time and check response when flipping bytes in padding and MAC • Check for nonce reuse 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 24
  • 26. Proper byte checking • Some implementation only verify a few bytes of padding, MAC and verify_data (finish hash) • All bytes must be checked for obvious reasons • Send application data packets with flipped padding, MAC and verify_data • Make sure you always get an alert 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 25
  • 27. Fragmentation • Any packet above 2**14 (16384) bytes must be fragmented • But any fragment size can be chosen • Some stacks don’t cope well with TLS re-assembly • Can be used to bypass devices which parse TLS, but fail- open • Server can be requested to fragment using the Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation extension • DTLS allows to specify the fragment offset in the handshake 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 26
  • 28. TLS 1.3 specific • Spec doesn’t leave a lot of room for implementation errors • Handling of 0-RTT, early data, PFS • Resumption checks (SNI) 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 27
  • 29. CONCLUSION 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 28
  • 30. Strengths • Scapy-ssl_tls can speed up PoC development • PoC can be re-used as part of testing QA and regression • Valuable to reproduce findings & develop mitigations • Help in learning & experimenting with TLS 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 29
  • 31. Thanks • Thanks to tintinweb who started the project • Bugs: https://github.com/tintinweb/scapy- ssl_tls/ • Contact: – Github: alexmgr 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 30
  • 32. THANKS 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 31
  • 33. IF TIME ALLOWS 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 32
  • 34. Fuzzing • Provides basic fuzzing through scapy • Tries to be smart by preserving semantically necessary fields • Use fuzz() function on any element 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 33 fuzz(TLSRecord()/TLSHandshake(type=TLSHandshakeType.SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)/TLSAlert()).show2() ###[ TLS Record ]### content_type= handshake <= preserved version= 0x7391 <= fuzzed length= 0x6 <= preserved ###[ TLS Handshake ]### type= supplemental_data <= overriden length= 0x2 <= preserved ###[ Raw ]### load= '(r’ <= fuzzed
  • 35. Fuzzing • Only good for basic fuzzing • Simple to plug in your own fuzzer • Just generate data, scapy-ssl_tls takes care of the rest • Good targets: TLS extensions, certificates, … 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 34
  • 36. Examples • The example section contains some useful base tools: – RSA session sniffer: given a cert, can decrypt wire traffic (like Wireshark) – Security scanner: a rudimentary TLS scanner (versions, ciphers, SCSV, …) – Downgrade test – … • Just baselines to write your own tools 18 May 2017 Alex Moneger - Scapy TLS: a scriptable TLS 1.3 stack 35

Editor's Notes

  • #10: I’m quite slow, so to fully understand something, I need to repro and play with it
  • #11: Customer don’t always understand the practical impact. No kidding, sometimes as a security engineer it takes you a few hours/days But your response team has to provide a statement quickly Both approaches require you to understand the issue in depth. But it’s harder to make a mistake with a PoC. It’s also easier to perform code review with a PoC PoC provides reproducibility, which provides Q&A and regression for free
  • #14: Writing an offensive stack is very different. All recommendations you normally provide to devs should be ignored. Do not validate length, format, signatures, … All validation is up to you, scapy-ssl_tls only reports data
  • #17: cd /Users/amoneger/projects/contrib/scapy-ssl_tls tests/integration/openssl_tls_server.sh tls1_2 Enter TLS and press tab to autocomplete Craft a TLSRecord with a TLSHandshake. Do a show(), do a ls() Modify length field of the record
  • #18: With transparent decryption p = TLSRecord() / TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[TLSHandshake() / TLSClientHello(extensions=[TLSExtension() / TLSExtSupportedVersions(versions=[tls_draft_version(18)])])])
  • #19: p = TLSRecord() / TLSHandshakes(handshakes=[TLSHandshake() / TLSClientHello(cipher_suites=[TLSCipherSuite.ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384], extensions=[TLSExtension() / TLSExtSupportedVersions(versions=[tls_draft_version(18)])])])
  • #22: Custom stacks seem to generally be forks of OSS projects at one stage. It is interesting to try and fingerprint where it comes from, to then try and look for known implementation vulnerabilities on the stack You can probably pinpoint to the version with some research
  • #23: FlexTLS is based on miTLS which is A Verified Reference Implementation of TLS It implements a number of know attacks against the TLS state machine. Source code was only very recently released. A great reference tool to go after TLS state machine server-gated cryptography: client renegotiation based on server cert
  • #24: TLS 1.3 killed this
  • #25: Mention that PMS should start by handshake client version. Prevents rollback attacks TLS 1.3 killed this
  • #26: TLS 1.3 killed this
  • #27: Padding in TLS can be any length upto 255 bytes. Check that implementation respects that.
  • #28: DTLS is like IP from the old days ;) Possible values start at 2**9 = 512. Only active after Server Hello is received.