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The officer outlines the policy and purpose behind the Department's circular telegram to Ambassador Peurifoy regarding Central America. The policy aims to 1) secure advance approval of a resolution from OAS members to make the meeting brief, 2) limit the resolution to a minimum authorization that is likely to gain consensus to ensure success, and 3) halt trade effectively between countries through the resolution's examination of commerce in both directions. This approach is believed to achieve the desired ends through an easier and quicker route than specific economic sanctions. Confidence is high that this policy will resolve the issue satisfactorily.
![FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954, THE
AMERICAN REPUBLICS, VOLUME IV
TOP SECRET
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL
[Page 1157]
714.00/6–554
The O!icer in Charge of Central America and Panama A!airs (Leddy) to the
Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy)
[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1954.
DEAR JACK : Your puzzlement over the Department’s circular telegram 442 of May 291 as outlined in your
letter of June 12 is readily understood. You should have received an individual message to clarify it, and I am only sorry
that in the rush of things here (which, believe me, surpasses all understanding) we did not think to give this proper
consideration.
The policy outlined has a very definite purpose. First, by asking for advance OAS concurrence on a specific
resolution, it is hoped that we may be assured of the votes in advance of a meeting and limit the meeting to the merest
formality of approval, thereby avoiding a long drawn out debate and resulting bitterness and disunity. Second, by limiting
the resolution to one authorization, believed to be the minimum step in the present circumstances, and one on which
general concurrence is most likely to be obtained, it is hoped that success will be certain. Third, since the resolution is so
drawn as to permit examination of tra!c in both directions, it will be possible to halt e"ectively the normal flow of
commerce. Fourth, this halting or interruption will be as e"ective as the most specific economic sanctions, which if
proposed on their own would fall into certain opposition. Thus, in total, it is expected that we will achieve the ends
desired by an easier and quicker route.
The matter was given pretty thorough consideration at the highest levels, here and the decision is pretty solid. Further, it
is one which has so far been easily sold to our colleagues in Washington missions, and replies from the field are so far
entirely encouraging.
There is one thing which I think you can be assured of and that is that we are on the road of settling this problem, either
by the means now devised or by some other means should these not succeed. There is 100 percent determination here,
from the top down, to get rid of this stinker and not to stop until that is done. For this reason, our morale is rather high
and I am sure the Embassy’s will correspond as the methods utilized become more understandable.
With all our good wishes and regards,
Sincerely yours,
RAYMOND G. LEDDY
1. Ante, p. 1149 .↩
2. Not found in Department of State files.↩
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Americ... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d462
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- 1. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954, THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS, VOLUME IV TOP SECRET OFFICIAL–INFORMAL [Page 1157] 714.00/6–554 The O!icer in Charge of Central America and Panama A!airs (Leddy) to the Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) [WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1954. DEAR JACK : Your puzzlement over the Department’s circular telegram 442 of May 291 as outlined in your letter of June 12 is readily understood. You should have received an individual message to clarify it, and I am only sorry that in the rush of things here (which, believe me, surpasses all understanding) we did not think to give this proper consideration. The policy outlined has a very definite purpose. First, by asking for advance OAS concurrence on a specific resolution, it is hoped that we may be assured of the votes in advance of a meeting and limit the meeting to the merest formality of approval, thereby avoiding a long drawn out debate and resulting bitterness and disunity. Second, by limiting the resolution to one authorization, believed to be the minimum step in the present circumstances, and one on which general concurrence is most likely to be obtained, it is hoped that success will be certain. Third, since the resolution is so drawn as to permit examination of tra!c in both directions, it will be possible to halt e"ectively the normal flow of commerce. Fourth, this halting or interruption will be as e"ective as the most specific economic sanctions, which if proposed on their own would fall into certain opposition. Thus, in total, it is expected that we will achieve the ends desired by an easier and quicker route. The matter was given pretty thorough consideration at the highest levels, here and the decision is pretty solid. Further, it is one which has so far been easily sold to our colleagues in Washington missions, and replies from the field are so far entirely encouraging. There is one thing which I think you can be assured of and that is that we are on the road of settling this problem, either by the means now devised or by some other means should these not succeed. There is 100 percent determination here, from the top down, to get rid of this stinker and not to stop until that is done. For this reason, our morale is rather high and I am sure the Embassy’s will correspond as the methods utilized become more understandable. With all our good wishes and regards, Sincerely yours, RAYMOND G. LEDDY 1. Ante, p. 1149 .↩ 2. Not found in Department of State files.↩ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Americ... https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d462 2 of 2 8/3/20, 4:05 PM