SIR_Journal_2016
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This document contains the Spring 2016 issue of the Journal of International Relations published by Sigma Iota Rho Honor Society. It includes an editor's letter, a letter from the National President of SIR, and the keynote speech from Michael Doyle on overcoming the global refugee crisis. The issue also features 10 student articles on various topics in international relations and a graduate corner section.
![xiv
Spring 2016 | Volume 18
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT]
Dear Reader,
As a graduate student I was fortunate to have studied with Dr. Henry Teune who later became
a colleague, collaborator, and friend, who was famous among his students and a bit infamous
among some of his colleagues for his sarcastic witticisms and at times sweeping generalizations
about the disciplines and the state of higher education. Henry was a titan in the field of political
science—a founding member and driver of the International Political Science Association and
one-time President of the International Studies Association. He saw great hope for social
science to better the lives of people and to create better institutional and social structures to
manage our political and economic life, and the power of good theory to advance knowledge.
But he also despaired at the trivialization of so much in the professional literature, the futility
of excessive reductionism (yet he steadfastly championed the philosophical requirement to
confront it), and the faddishness which seemed to plague social science. He once acerbically
observed that there was a “square law of productivity” in social science—that if you took the
square root of either the number of social scientists or their publications you would get the
actual number of scholars making a real contribution to their field. He also once noted, in a
rare moment of self-congratulation, “…if a book is still in print after six years, it’s a classic,” in
reference to his and Adam Pzreworski’s The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. This landmark
work is still in print 46 years after its release.
These anecdotes came to mind following a keynote address by Dr. Michael Doyle at an all-day
student research conference at the Sheraton University City Hotel on Friday, April 29, 2016
hosted by the Epsilon Chapter of Sigma Iota Rho and the International Relations Program
at the University of Pennsylvania. Michael Doyle is one of those rare academics who can
move seamlessly between the abstract and theoretical world of the Ivy Tower to the world of
policy making and the operational demands of setting and implementing goals and agenda
within government and international organizations. Currently serving as the Director of the
Columbia Global Policy Initiative and as University Professor of International Affairs, Law
and Political Science, he has also served as Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations
and Special Advisor to Secretary-General Kofi Annan. His work helped to spearhead the
development of the Millennium Development Goals, coordinated outreach to multinational
corporations in support of the U.N.’s Global Compact, while also serving as the liaison
between the U.N. and the U.S. government. Any one of these positions would be considered
a career capstone for most people.
But perhaps what he will be best remembered for in academic circles is his contribution
to democratic peace theory. His “Liberalism in World Politics”1
meets the Teune criteria of
falling within the “square law” as it stands now as the sixteenth most cited article in the 100-
plus year publication history of The American Political Science Review. Eight of his books are
1 Doyle, Michael W. (Dec 1986). “Liberalism and World Politics”. The American Political Science Review 80 (4):
1151–1169.doi:10.2307/1960861. JSTOR 1960861](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-14-320.jpg)
![Journal of International Relations
A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 25
as the Taewŏn’gun - the young king Kojong’s de facto regent - took power in 1864.4 5 6
The
foreign incursions of the regency period exposed the decline of regional stability as disruptive
actors entered the interstate arena. Instead of modernizing its military to deter foreign
aggressors, the Korean state promulgated a conservative agenda with a deeply isolationist
stance towards the West. As the Qing dynasty faced increasing internal difficulties, Korea
sought to extirpate the influence of foreigners, especially Christianity. Chosŏn’s introspection
masked China’s diminishing power projection ability as the balance of power in Northeast
Asia shifted towards the Westerners and the Japanese. This meant that as China’s relative
power declined, Korea’s lack of deterrence was exposed.
Confrontations between Western powers and the Chosŏn dynasty revealed the disintegration
of Korean security in the face of foreign aggression. The 1866 General Sherman crisis, in which
an American ship was attacked near Pyongyang and French missionaries were executed,
prompted armed responses and limited Western interventions in 1866 and 1871.7
The conduct
of Western-Korean diplomacy through Chinese channels reflected the isolationist tone of
the Taewŏn’gun’s government and the foreign perception that Korea was attached to Qing
as a former “tributary.”8
In his response to Henri de Bellonet, the French Consul in Beijing,
Prince Kung attempted to distance Beijing from Chosŏn’s provocations, writing that it is
not “the intention of the Emperor’s government to screen and protect the Coreans [sic]—a
most strange and surprising assertion.”9 10
If the French were to invade Korea, as they had
threatened, Qing appeared unwilling to come to the aid of the Korean government. This
shows that the tribute system was a medium of bilateral foreign relations between China
and Korea, rather than an alliance or traditional patron-client system predicated on security
assurances.
Unfortunately for Korean conservatives, the backwards Korean military simply could not
4 The Taewŏn’gun, whose name was Yi Ha-ŏng, was Kojong’s father and a mercurial figure in Korean history.
He enjoyed domestic successes but ironically became a puppet for the very foreign forces which he so ardently
opposed. Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 192-193.
5 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From ‘Land of the Morning Calm’ to States in Conflict (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 2012), 279.
6 King Kojong (1852-1919) was the 26th
monarch of the Chosŏn dynasty. His reign saw the implosion of the
Korean state due to foreign pressure and internal failure to mobilize resources to defend national sovereignty.
Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 192.
7 The 1866 French incursion and the 1871 American incursion were forced to withdraw, heightening the
conservatives’ and the Taewŏn’gun’s overconfident beliefs in their martial capabilities. Eckert et al., Korea Old a New:
A History, 195.
8 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Executive documents printed by order of the
House of Representatives, during the second session of the fortieth Congress, 1867-’68, Vol. I (Washington, DC: GPO, 1867-
1868), 426.
9 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Executive documents printed by order of the
House of Representatives, during the second session of the fortieth Congress, 1867-’68, Vol. I (Washington, DC: GPO, 1867-
1868), 423.
10 Prince Kung, or Gong Qinwang (1833-1898), was a major political figure in the late Qing Dynasty who led the
suppression of the Taiping Rebellion and tried to rejuvenate the country despite the opposition of Cixi, Dowager
Empress. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Gong Qinwang.”](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-25-320.jpg)
![Journal of International Relations
A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 27
momentinEastAsiangeopolitics.AsChinasteppedbackfromtheroleof regionalpowerbroker,
Japan sought to replace it. Article I of the Treaty states: “Chosŏn, as an independent state,
enjoys the same sovereign rights as Japan does.”19
This “independent” moniker was hardly an
admission to the Westphalian System. Rather, it was a legalistic method to peel back China’s
influence over Korea. The 1882 Treaty of Chemulp’o allowed the Japanese to station troops
in Seoul.20
1882 also witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and
Navigation between Chosŏn and the United States. Apart from the stereotypical unequal
treaty provisions of the period such as guarantees of extraterritoriality, the most important
geostrategic component of the U.S.-Korea treaty was Article I:
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United
States and the King of Chosen [sic] and the citizens and subjects of their respective
governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government,
the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about
an amicable agreement, thus showing their friendly feelings.21
The dissonance in the interpretation of this Article between Washington D.C. and Seoul
would have serious ramifications for Korea’s foreign policy.
The concord between Chosŏn and the United States was heralded in both Seoul and
Washington. In 1883, Lucius Foote, the U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
to Korea wrote to Kojong, “In this progressive age there is a moral power more potent than
standing armies, and the weakness of a nation is sometimes its strength.”22 23
This diplomatic
rhetoric would do little to shield Korea from the encroachment of Japan. Furthermore, it
perpetuated the feeling in Seoul that the United States would serve as a new patron state for
Chosŏn. The most incriminatory evidence is from President Chester A. Arthur himself, who
wrote, “We seek no monopoly of its commerce, but as the Chosunese [sic] in reaching for
a higher civilization, have confided in this Republic, we cannot regard with indifference any
encroachment on their rights.”24
To the Chosŏn court, this statement would seem to be direct
reinforcement of Article I, especially since it originated with the U.S. President.
In Washington, there was little concern for Korea’s welfare. A pro-Japan narrative was
advanced by authors such as William Elliot Griffis in “The Statesmanship of Ito,” praising
future Japanese governor-general of Korea, Ito Hirobumi.25
The exchange of correspondence
19 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 287.
20 Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 207.
21 U.S.-Korea Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, United States Department of State, 1882.
22 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Index to the executive documents of the House
of Representatives for the second session of the forty-seventh Congress, 1882-’83, Vol. I, No. 1, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1882-1883), 243.
23 “Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission, By Year: 1884,” United States Department of State.
24 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Index to the executive documents of the House
of Representatives for the second session of the forty-seventh Congress, 1882-’83, Vol. I, No. 1, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1882-1883), viii.
25 William Elliot Griffis, “The Statesmanship of Ito,” North American Review 191 (January 1910): 127.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-27-320.jpg)
![30 Joseph Kiernan
Spring 2013 | Volume 15
was not a vital interest for Beijing or Tokyo.43
The Russians were vested in preserving Korea’s
status as a check on Japanese expansion. However, their priority was to establish an ice-free
port at Port Arthur in the Liaodong Peninsula. When this was accomplished, there was a
Russian exodus from Seoul, quickly leading to the presence of Japanese officials in the capital.
Korea’s fate was sealed following the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War.
Arbitrated by Theodore Roosevelt in New Hampshire, the Treaty guaranteed an international
recognition of Japan’s “paramount political, military and economical interests” in Korea.44 45
The abandonment of the terms of the 1883 Treaty became clear. Secretary Root notes the
official communication from the charge d’affaires in Korea and wrote to Min Yeung-Tehan, the
Korean Special Envoy:
In view of this official communication, it is difficult to see how the Government of
the United States can proceed in any manner upon the entirely different view of the
facts which you tell us personally you have been led to take by the information which
you have received.46
From this, the U.S. government is shown to view that the delegation of state control of Japan
in February 1904 and August 1904 prior to the establishment of the protectorate over Korea
negated Article I of the 1883 Treaty. The notion that the Americans had been unaware of the
Japanese intentions is dubious. Gozo Tatento, the Japanese Minister to the U.S., had admitted
that Japan would “violate its treaties with Korea and upset the peace in East Asia in order to
stabilize its own government.”47
Many Koreans felt betrayed by the United States’ actions,
including Syngman Rhee. This was not unlike the Chinese revolutionaries’ feelings of betrayal
by Wilson in the aftermath of World War I.48
As the Japanese increased its influence and
control over Korea, it would seem that the words of Article I and of President Arthur were
empty.
THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE
On January 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson may have provoked the Korean
War. In a speech, Acheson said that the United States’ “defense perimeter of the Pacific
[...] will be held.”49
He traced a defense line from the Aleutians to Japan to Okinawa to the
43 Seok, “International Rivalry and Russia’s East Asian Policy,” 244.
44 “Treaty of Portsmouth” WWI Document Archive.
45 Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 239.
46 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Papers relating to the foreign relations of
the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 5, 1905 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1905), 629.
47 Jeffrey M. Dorwart, “The Independent Minister: John M.B. Sill and the Struggle against Japanese Expansion
in Korea,” Pacific Historical Review 44 (November 1975): 493.
48 John Edward Wilz, “Did the United States Betray Korea in 1905?,” Pacific Historical Review 54, no. 3 (August
1985): 244.
49 The Truman Library, “Secretary Acheson and the Defense of Korea,” The Korean War and Its Origins, 1945-
53.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-30-320.jpg)
![32 Joseph Kiernan
Spring 2013 | Volume 15
Robert McNamara illustrate Washington’s optimism for the new regime: “The [Chang]
Government is moderate, conservative, and striving to meet the natural and justifiable
expectations of its people.”55
However, this pluralistic intermission in Korean politics was
short-lived; the military, led by the ambitious Park, overthrew the Chang government on May
16, 1961.56 57
In May 17, 1961 General Magruder, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked in
a telegram that Park Chung-hee, though formerly convicted “as a Communist”, had loyalties
that “[remained] to be determined”; furthermore, he wrote that “if the coup is permitted to
be successful, [Park]…may emerge as the most powerful man in Korea.”58
Magruder went
on to suggest that he could authorize a suppression of the coup, but the State Department
decided to let the situation play out.59
Robert Johnson, a member of the U.S. National Security
Council (NSC), noted that it was crucial to “make it absolutely clear that U.S. assistance in the
future, above a minimum maintenance level, will be conditional upon Korean performance, in
accordance with the Administration’s new aid concepts.”60
Park enticed the U.S. to provide the
resources for the ROK’s industrialization and the “establishment of a dirigiste state.”61
Park
provided the authority and the vision, and the capitalist West provided the resources.
Park could not have disagreed more with the words of Lucius Foote. In Park’s mind - due to
Korea’s humiliation, destruction, and subjugation at the hands of foreign states - weakness
was not strength and morality was not power. Martial and economic empowerment were
the clear objectives. Following Mearsheimer’s maxim, because Korea could not achieve great
population size, it would have to achieve great wealth in order to build its strength. Throughout
the 1960s, Park worked tirelessly to ensure that South Korea and his regime were central to
American strategic interests in the East.
55 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 201. Letter From Secretary of State
Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara,” March 2, 1961, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume
XXII, Northeast Asia.
56 Yong-Sup Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” (2011), 35.
57 The coup’s Military Revolutionary Committee promised a number of governing principles inter alia: anti-
communism, stabilization of the economy, and observation of the UN Charter as well as its agreements with the
United States and other nations.
United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 213. Telegram From the Commander
in Chief, U.S. Forces Korea (Magruder) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” May 16, 1961 in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia.
58 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 218. Telegram from the Commander
in Chief, United Nations Command (Magruder) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer),” May 17,
1961, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia.
59 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 219. Telegram From the Department
of State to the Embassy in Korea,” May 17, 1961, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII,
Northeast Asia.
60 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 221. Memorandum From Robert H.
Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Rostow),” May 23, 1961 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia.
61 Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” in The Park Chung Hee
Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2011), 133-134.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-32-320.jpg)
![Journal of International Relations
A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 33
Beginning in 1961, the Kennedy Administration enhanced its assistance to South Korea by
sending economic advisers to coordinate with Korean officials. Gregg Brazinsky outlines
this balancing act between U.S. economic pressures and Park’s responsive adaptations. Park’s
contributions to the Vietnam War reduced American economic leverage over Seoul.62
Security
priorities overrode American attempts to use aid to dictate to Seoul. For Washington, an
independent ally was better than no ally at all.
Park’s concerns over U.S. disengagement were well-founded. In a 1964 memorandum from
Secretary to President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara argued for the relocation of a
division stationed in South Korea. Rusk advised against this in order to maintain the strength of
the U.S.-ROK alliance.63
Park rightfully feared declining American commitment to the alliance
in the face of draining costs in Southeast Asia. In a memorandum to President Johnson dated
January 22, 1964, Robert Komer, a member of the National Security Council staff, argued,
“It would be a pity to postpone entirely once again a long-needed shift which would also save
some money. There is never a good time to cut, but the plain fact of the matter—no longer
denied by anyone—is that we’re over-insured [sic] militarily in Korea at a time when we need
strength much more elsewhere. The big danger area is in Southeast Asia not Northeast Asia,
and has been ever since the Korean War.”64
Decreasing American prioritization of South Korea from a security standpoint was doubly
dangerous for Park. The more distance from the frontlines against Communism attached
more conditionality to American aid. Furthermore, this would likely lead to more criticism of
Park’s regime and its human rights abuses and autocratic policies. Three unique military theatre
threats underpinned the security value of Park’s Korea: North Korea, Communist China, and
the USSR. These three theaters attracted the attention of State Department strategists and
Pentagon planners to Korea. While Acheson’s 1949 NSC-48/2 document called for a less
aggressive stance against the fledgling Maoist regime, the events of the Korean War, the First
Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954, and the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958 positioned Beijing
as a hardline opponent to the U.S. and raised the stakes.65
Unlike the jockeying of the pre-
WWI era, an escalating conflict in Northeast Asia could “chain-gang” superpower patrons
into global thermonuclear war. Until the Vietnam War’s escalation, Korea could operate as a
relatively autonomous linchpin in America’s Pacific chain of defense.
The Vietnam War was a major stumbling block for Park’s development agenda. The shift
62 Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, “From Pupil to Model: South Korea and American Development Policy during the
Early Park Chung Hee Era,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (January 2005): 83-115.
63 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 17. Draft Memorandum From
Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson,” June 8, 1964 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume
XXIX, Part 1, Korea.
64 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 2. Memorandum From Robert W.
Komer of the National Security Staff to President Johnson,” January 22, 1964, in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea.
65 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012): 119, 153, 172.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-33-320.jpg)
![56 Samuel NatboNy
Spring 2016 | Volume 18
including] construction, operation, research, and nuclear-related international sanctions totaled
around $100 billion.”16
Therefore, excluding the immaterial costs related to nuclear sanctions
and accounting for the cost-cutting nature of technological improvements since 2013, Iran’s
regime would gain an increase in liquid assets greater than the full amount of its existing
program, which currently includes 17 facilities. This money is not merely a lump sum, rather,
much of it derives from increased oil revenues, which the regime will indefinitely continue to
receive on an annual basis after sanctions are lifted. A proponent of the deal might claim that
since Iran scaled back its oil program while undergoing strict sanctions, actualizing these oil
revenues will still require a significant capital investment over the long-term. However, Iran
has hastily been crafting deals totaling over $100 billion to source investment from Western
oil companies since the deal was struck.17
These deals will allow the regime to produce over
1 million barrels per day, fronted through foreign funds.18
These foreign private sector oil
investments will leave the regime highly liquid and unhindered to invest most of its newly
acquired capital in the nuclear sector without fear of sanctions or over-investment in oil
expenditures.
Accordingly, Iran could be choosing to suffer minor costs in the first stage of JCPA compliance
as a means of acquiring assets to later allocate to a more rapidly progressing nuclear program.
Iran’s patience for its nuclear program augments this problem: it is not under immediate threat
of an attack from any of its most actively declared enemies, Israel or the United States. And
so, the time value of political and military benefits offered by its nuclear program is quite
constant. That is, the present value of a nuclear program is almost identical to its future value
to the Iranian regime. Given this theoretical political patience, the regime logically would be
willing to pay immediate costs out of necessity, to preserve a long-term potential to create a
successful weapons program.
FAULTY IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
The deal does not have foolproof measures of ensuring Iran’s compliance. Specifically, in
relation to tests of centrifuges with higher enriching power, the deal requires Iran to: 1)
conduct all such testing in the PFEP; and 2) dispose of all highly-enriched uranium produced
as a part of such research & development.19
However, if Iran decides to cheat on the deal,
there is little that the IAEA or the U.S. can do to observe non-compliance. This cheating could
take the form of either producing highly enriched uranium at a hidden facility or producing it
at PFEP, but illegally holding it in hidden stockpiles instead of properly disposing it. American
political officials claim that such defections can be detected through continuous surveillance
by the IAEA due to “intelligence reports, suspicious purchases, and isotope readings across
Iran.”20
However, such measures are likely to be insufficient. First, given the high economic
16 Armin Rosen, “Iran’s Nuclear Program May have Cost the Country $500 Billion,” Business Insider, June 30,
2015.
17 Evan Kelly, “Iran Sweetens the Deal for Foreign Oil Companies,” Yahoo Finance, November 27, 2015.
18 Ibid.
19 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Washington Post, July 14, 2015.
20 Eyder Peralta, “Six Things you Should Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal,” NPR, July 15, 2015.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-56-320.jpg)
![Journal of International Relations
Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive plan of aCtion 59
a joint $600 billion trade deal to take effect over the next decade.30
This means that some
nations will be economically incentivized to halt any adverse decisions against Iran. Even if
sanctions are successfully re-instituted, there would be no increase in their severity (given the
current text of the provision), and consequently no additional penalty to defection relative
to Iran’s current status quo circumstances. Therefore, there is not great marginal economic
risk to an Iranian strategy of signing the deal with the intention of defecting. Moreover,
Ayatollah Khamenei has directly responded to the deal’s reversibility provision by stating, “[I]
f the sanctions are to be suspended, the actions we are supposed to take will be limited to the
level of suspension and will not [amount to] a fundamental measure on the ground.”31
The
Ayatollah is implying that Iran plans to restart all nuclear operations ceased by the deal if either
the UN or Washington re-imposes sanctions. Accordingly, given the political and economic
consequences of snapback, unless Iran egregiously violates inspection standards, sanctions
would likely remain dormant. More importantly, the very fact that the Ayatollah felt the need
to issue such a statement indicates his lack of trust in the West, which in turn speaks to his
willingness to dissolve the deal or possibly defect after the first inspections round.
Finally, the deal improperly treated the nuclear issue as mutually exclusive from all other issues.
Certain topics considered off the table, such as the negotiated release of four American
prisoners, Iran’s support for Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, Iran’s support for Assad’s
regime, as well as the substantial role that Iran plays in the continuing conflicts in Syria and
Iraq provide evidence to this improper separation. The Obama Administration acknowledged
the lack of discussion on these issues by claiming that the JCPA merely represents the
beginning of future talks with Iran and that non-nuclear issues would have detracted from
the discussions.32
Interestingly, however, the U.S. allowed Iran to bring separate non-nuclear issues to the
negotiating table, such as lifting the ban on purchasing anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles.
Since the U.S. agreed to this provision, Iran has already started importing anti-aircraft
technology from Russia.33
These supposedly separate issues are all indirectly linked to the
nuclear issue. Once Iran can purchase anti-aircraft missiles, it will have the ability to better
defend any future nuclear facilities from pre-emptive strikes. In the short-term, once Iran
receives approximately $100 billion in liquid assets after the first round of inspections, it will
have more capital at its disposal to continue to prop up Assad and to arm Hezbollah and
Hamas with more advanced weapons technology if it chooses to do so. In fact, since signing
the deal, Iran has actually increased its funding to both terror organizations.34
In Syria, Iran
has provided $6 billion in annual military aid, opened revolving credit facilities, and provided
30 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran’s Leader Seeks Closer Ties with China,” Reuters, January 23, 2016.
31 “Iran Leader: If the Sanctions are Not Lifted, There will be No Deal,” AWD News, September 6, 2015.
32 Joshua Berlinger, “Iran Nuclear Deal: What Does it Mean for Americans Held in Iran?,” CNN, July 15, 2015.
33 Avi Lewis, “Russia, Iran Close Deal on Delivery of Advanced Anti-Aircraft Weapons,” Times of Israel, August
19, 2015.
34 Avi Issacharoff, “Boosted by Nuke Deal, Iran Ups Funding to Hezbollah, Hamas,” Times of Israel, September
21, 2015.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-59-320.jpg)
![Journal of International Relations
The DiscarDeD PeoPle 79
ABSTRACT
The Rohingya are a stateless people originating from the Arakan state in northwestern Myanmar. Widespread
persecution has caused half to flee their homeland, and an increasing number of the Rohingya now seek
refuge in Malaysia and Thailand. This article analyzes the treatment of the Rohingya by the Thai and
Malaysian governments and addresses why the two nations continuously have abused the Rohingya’s human
rights. In order to fully understand the plight of the Rohingya, this paper examines the current and historical
situation of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia and Thailand. Finally, this article considers the international and
regional forces shaping government policy: identity, politics, and corruption. In conclusion, this paper argues
that Thai and Malaysian human rights abuses against the Rohingya are caused by realist politics, popular
misconceptions, and corruption. Change is inhibited by international and regional dynamics of power and a
national population engaged in widespread political struggle.
INTRODUCTION
“The navy is exploring a deserted island to place Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority group from Burma
who illegally slipped into the country… To stop the influx, we have to keep them in a tough place. […] We’re
dealing with a time bomb. We must defuse it before it explodes into a greater problem.” - Samak Sundaravej,
Prime Minister of Thailand 2008
Since Myanmar’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, the Rohingya, a stateless
and persecuted ethnic group from northern Arakan in western Myanmar, have suffered from
The Discarded People: An Analysis of Malaysia
and Thailand’s Treatment of Rohingya Refugees
by Anton WideRoth
univeRsity of cAlifoRniA, beRKeley](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-79-320.jpg)
![Journal of International Relations
OttOman Orientalism 97
raised up by the Turkish race.”24
Although Arabs and Turks shared the practice of Islam,
neither unity nor equality existed between the two peoples. Remarks from Halide Edib Adivar,
an Ottoman elite and leader in the field of women’s education, demonstrate this tension.
In the final decades of the Ottoman Empire, Aldivar characterized the Arabs as “naturally
corrupt” and “mired in local passions,” needing the “calm [and] impartial” Turk who was a
“natural leader.”25
The Turkish perception of the Arabs as unruly and uneducated was evident
in 1898 when Kaiser Wilhelm II visited the Temple of Bacchus, which was discovered by
through Ottoman archaeological excavations. The plaque commemorating the visit was
inscribed in Ottoman Turkish and German, but not Arabic, the language of the locals, who
were “apparently not deemed worthy (or capable perhaps) of reading or understanding
the significance of the imperial visit.”26
Additionally, entry tickets were written in Ottoman
Turkish, French, and Arabic, but only the Arabic text included a warning not to steal.27
This
“genteel racism” and “imperial paternalism” characterized Ottoman Orientalism and was a
dominant viewpoint within the community of Turkish elites who self-identified the Turkish
race as the “foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire.”28
BIRTH OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC – COLD WAR | (1920 – 1965)
While Ottoman Orientalism took form during the Ottoman Empire, its full fruition came
during the first decades of the Turkish Republic. With its establishment in the early 1920s,
the Turkish Republic created a nation-state not unlike a European nation-state—secular, and
demographically and religiously more homogenous than the Ottoman Empire.29
The new
Turkish state, under Kemal Ataturk, adopted secularist policies, changed its Arabic alphabet
to Latin, and expunged the Turkish language of any Arabic words.30
The Turks felt betrayed
by their Arab neighbors, while the Arabs viewed Turkey as desperately eager to appear as a
“pure European country.”31
This severe divide and distrust between the Turks and the Arabs
continued throughout the twentieth century, reaching its pinnacle during the height of the
Cold War as Turkey disengaged from the Middle East and firmly cemented itself into the
Western world. Turkish perceptions of Arabs in Turkish culture, including film, education,
and journalism, demonstrated the divide between the two peoples and can be seen in Turkey’s
corresponding pro-Western foreign policy, particularly in the first decades of the Cold War.
A June 2010 report from the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA)
examined the image of Arabs in Turkey, analyzing the roots of contemporary perceptions.
SETA claims there is a “serious lacuna in research” on the Turkish public’s perception of
24 Ibid., 792.
25 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 793.
26 Ibid., 784.
27 Ibid., 784-785.
28 Ibid., 793-794.
29 Eldem, “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism,” 28.
30 Ofra Bengio and Gencer Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and
its Alignment with Israel,” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (2001): 52, 55.
31 Ibid., 52.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-97-320.jpg)
![102 Luke Zaro
Spring 2016 | Volume 18
unleashed” as many Turks rediscovered “Oriental music and belly dancing, [and] reveled in a
nostalgic reinterpretation of Ottoman history.”71
After identifying for decades as a secularist,
European state, the Turks were reinventing a new identity based on their Islamic, Ottoman,
and Oriental history.72
This rediscovery and the natural connection it brought to the Arabs can
be seen in other cultural aspects. More neutral language depicting the Arabs in Turkish history
books and more positive coverage of Arabs (especially Saudi Arabia) in the Turkish press in
the 1970s and 1980s exemplified these shifting attitudes.73
During this period, foreign policy
affected perceptions rather than vice-versa.
POST-COLD WAR TURKEY | (1991 – 2001)
The end of the Cold War was an unprecedented time for Turkey, as it was for most of Europe
and the Middle East. The bipolar balance of power framework that had dominated international
relations for over four decades collapsed. The U.S. was the world’s sole superpower, but U.S.-
Turkish relations were not without issues. It is difficult to generalize Turkish perceptions of
the Arabs during this time, as there were many crises, some of which brought Turkey closer to
the Arabs while others created greater alienation. Of the crises in the 1990s, this section will
focus on the Gulf War, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurds, water problems,
and Turkish-Israeli relations. The goal will not be to analyze these crises specifically, but rather
to evaluate how they affected Turkish perception of the Arabs and Turkish foreign policy.
Turkey continued to have poor relations with some Arab states in the post-Cold War era
despite the progress made in the previous decades. Turkey sided with the U.S. and other
coalition states against Iraq in 1991, allowing the U.S. to use the Incirlik air base in southeast
Turkey and shutting off the pipelines that carried Iraq’s oil exports.74
This instance of Western
support did not translate into closer relations with the West for Turkey or even any economic
benefits.75
In fact, the economic sanctions enforced on Iraq cost Turkey almost $20 billion
and directly led to more problems with the Kurdish population in the region.76
A no-fly zone
in northern Iraq essentially created an autonomous Kurdish province (thousands of Kurdish
refugees fled to Turkey during the war), and it was not long until Syria and Turkey were at
odds over Syria’s support of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.77,78
In October 1998, the two
nations were on the brink of a conflict with Syria eventually backing down and expelling
Ocalan.79
Other conflicts arose with Iraq and Syria due to water issues, which contributed to
the “general Arab perception regarding the strategic threat posed by Turkey in the 1990s.”80
71 Eldem, “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism,” 31.
72 Ibid.
73 Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey, 10, 13.
74 Sayari, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 45-46.
75 Ibid., 46.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Bengio & Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 77.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 65.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-102-320.jpg)
![Journal of International Relations
TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 121
ABSTRACT
The Middle East faces regional security concerns regarding nuclear proliferation and there is heightened
discussion surround international arms treaties as Israel is the only state in the region suspected of possessing
a nuclear arsenal. This paper addresses Israel’s cooperation with the international community via the signing
and ratifying of international arms control treaties. This paper investigates why Israel makes the decision to
sign international arms control treaties within a historical context despite not signing or ratifying the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Qualitative data such as government statements, United Nations (UN)
statements, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) country profile documents, NPT Review Conference
documents and media content are analyzed to map context surrounding the time period during which significant
treaties were signed. This case study and narrative analysis data shows patterns of significant historical events,
or triggering events, prior to the signing of these treaties. To finalize the data, this paper examines] Israel’s
commitments to significant treaties. The international community, particularly Middle Eastern states focused
on establishing a potential Nuclear Free Weapon Zone, may benefit from these findings to understand Israel’s
motivation and cooperation regarding nuclear weapons.
INTRODUCTION
The international community has been struggling to address the potential threat of nuclear
weapons, which are arguably the most ruinous weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Despite
these ongoing discussions, the Middle East has yet to establish a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Treaties and Trust: The Potential for Israeli Nuclear
Cooperation
by lili dAlton
syRAcuse univeRsity](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-121-320.jpg)
![James michael Garrity
Spring 2016 | Volume 18
156
final report, it was responsible for up to 275,000 additional tourist visits and €170 million in
additional revenue.54
The Global Irish Economic Forum was first held in Dublin in 2009 by bringing together “over 350
of the most senior Irish and Irish connected business people based in some 40 countries,”
such as executives from Coca-Cola and other global enterprises, with Irish government and
trade officials presenting Ireland as a business destination, exporter and location worthy
of promotion.55
When Gilmore visited New York City for St. Patrick’s Day 2011, several
participants of the 2009 forum complained that no one had followed up on their ideas.56
The
Forum was re-launched in 2011 as an active institution that generated or supported ideas and
initiatives, such as the Gathering 2013 and Global Greenings (which became significant public
relations successes for Ireland). It held strategic events such as “Invest in Ireland,” hosted by
former President Bill Clinton in New York in 2012. This networking resulted in long term
relationships between the participants and Ireland.57
Global Greenings58
was generated by one of the diaspora networking groups. The goal was to
prompt various states around the world to illuminate their iconic global or national monuments
in green for the evening of St. Patrick’s Day. Tourism Ireland and the Irish Embassy network
accepted the challenge and began securing commitments, which was essential as the project
was operating at no cost to Ireland since there was no budget. Having started in 2013, the list
of sites thus far is impressive, including landmarks such as the Sydney Opera House, Great
Wall of China, Niagara Falls (both sides), Leaning Tower of Pisa, Roman Colosseum, Empire
State Building, Great Pyramid and Sphinx in Egypt, and the Christ the Redeemer statue in
Brazil.59
Joseph Nye contends that the “soft power of a country rest on three resources: its
culture…its political values…and its foreign policies.”60
These Global Greenings tributes are
the ultimate manifestation of Ireland’s soft power. The visual honor that so many nations
willingly practice reveals the esteem they hold for Ireland.
CONCLUSION: RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Ireland successfully exited the Troika bailout program in December 2013. The OECD noted
that its economy rebounded strongly in 2014 and that GDP is projected to grow at a healthy
rate through 2016.61
Ibec, the Irish business lobby, predicts that the Irish economy will be the
54 “The Gathering Ireland,” National Tourism Development Authority, December 29, 2013.
55 “Global Irish Network,” Global Irish Economic Forum.
56 Gilmore, interview.
57 Ibid.
58 Discover Ireland, “Tourism Ireland Global Greening Campaign 2015,” filmed [March 2015], YouTube video,
04:29, Posted [March 2015].
59 “Global Greening 2013,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 17, 2013.
60 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
616 (March 2008): 96.
61 “Ireland - Economic forecast summary (November 2014),” Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-156-320.jpg)
![James michael Garrity
Spring 2016 | Volume 18
158
Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy.” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 2008): 10-30.
“Global Greening 2013.” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. March 17, 2013. https://
www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/media-gallery/all-image-galleries/global-
greenings-2013/.
“Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Statement of Strategy 2011-2014.” Ireland
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. May 2011. https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/
alldfawebsitemedia/aboutus/dfat-statement-of-strategy-2011-2014.pdf.
Discover Ireland. “Tourism Ireland Global Greening Campaign 2015.” filmed [March 2015].
YouTube video. 04:29. Posted [March 2015]. https://youtu.be/21uRW2xTHFg.
Eichengreen, Barry. “The Irish Crisis and the EU from a Distance.” Paper presented for the
CBI-CEPR-IMF Conference: Ireland—Lessons from its Recovery from the Bank-
Sovereign Loop. Dublin, Ireland. January 19, 2015.
Ferriter, Diarmaid. Ambiguous Republic, Ireland in the 1970s. London: Profile Books, Ltd, 2012.
“Ireland - Economic forecast summary (November 2014).” Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Last modified November 2015. http://www.oecd.org/
economy/ireland-economic-forecast-summary.htm.
“The Gathering Ireland.” National Tourism Development Authority. December 29, 2013. http://
www.thegatheringireland.com/.
Gilmore, Eamon (former Deputy Prime Minister of Ireland), interview by James Garrity,
April 18, 2015.
“Programme for Government 2011.” Office of the Taoiseach. March 6, 2011. http://www.
taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/
Programme_for_Government_2011.pdf.
Ibec for Irish Business. “Q4 2015 Ibec Quarterly Economic Outlook: Growing Pains.” Irish
Business and Employers Confederation. December 20, 2015. http://www.ibec.ie/IBEC/
Publications.nsf/vPages/Economic_Outlook~economic-outlook---december-
2015-11-12-2015/$File/Ibec_Q4_2015.pdf.
“Global Irish Network.” Global Irish Economic Forum. Last modified 2015. https://www.
globalirishforum.ie/GlobalIrishNetwork.aspx.
Howlin, Gerard. “A Nation Once Again, Free to Abuse and Misuse Our](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/6b6ee306-e672-4a71-a542-6fd4a5cac8b2-160919011449/85/SIR_Journal_2016-158-320.jpg)
SIR_Journal_2016
- 1. Journal of International Relations Joseph Kiernan| A Forbidden Land of Great Importance: The Diplomatic History of Patron-Client Relations in Korea Dominic chiu|A Study of Colonial Cultural Influences on Lee Teng-Hui’s Domestic and Foreign Policies samuel natbony|Strategic Concerns for the Inevitable Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action amy Walsh|The Perils of Decentralization: A Case Study of Potential Secession in the United Kingdom and Spain anton WiDeroth|The Discarded People: An Analysis of Malaysia and Thailand’s Treatment of Rohingya Refugees neil misra|Immigration: The Growing Gap Between Public Opinion and Policy Outcomes luKe Zaro|Ottoman Orientalism: A Guiding Principle of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East connor phillips|A New Strategy for the Middle East: Why and How the United States Should Engage Islamists lili Dalton|Treaties and Trust: The Potential for Israeli Nuclear Cooperation James Garrity|Deliberately Designed Diplomacy: How Ireland Rebuilt its Positive International Reputation After its Debt Crisis of 2008-2014 MICHAEL DOYLE | Overcoming the Global Refugee and Migrant Crisis: The Middle East, Europe and the World Director, columbia Global Policy initiative & Former u.n. assistant secretary General Sigma Iota Rho Honor Society for International Studies Volume 18 | Spring 2016
- 2. sais-jhu.edu GRADUATE DEGREE AND NON-DEGREE PROGRAMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS — DEBORAH BRÄUTIGAM, PhD Director of the International Development program and the China-Africa Research Initiative “In a world where problems of growth, poverty, governance, inequality, and vulnerability persist as central questions of global affairs, the demand for advanced study in international relations has never been higher. Johns Hopkins SAIS graduates play key roles solving critical global problems.” PURPOSE STUDY WITH EUROPE WASHINGTON CHINA
- 3. Generous merit based fellowships are available to those who wish to pursue careers in international banking and finance, public service or with private international relief and development organizations. For additional information please visit: iped.fordham.edu or contact us at: Dealy Hall E 517 441 East Fordham Road Bronx, New York 10458 Telephone: (718) 817 4064 Fax: (718) 817 4565 Email: iped@fordham.edu Fordham University’s MA Program in International Political Economy and Development offers a unique and innovative interdisciplinary approach to studying international economic relations. Students may specialize in: Global Finance & Emerging Markets International & Development Economics International Development Studies Global Environment & Resource Management
- 5. Sigma Iota Rho National Honor Society for International Studies Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Journal of InternatIonal relatIons
- 6. vi EXECUTIVE BOARD Editor-in-Chief AbigAil RichARdson Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Print AlexAndeR KRAiK Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Online bAiley scott Copy Editor Alex nAcht Business Manager sARAh Winton Layout Editor beRbeR xue Dr. FranK plantan nAtionAl PResident of sigmA iotA Rho Dr. tomoharu nishino fAculty AdvisoR of the sigmA iotA Rho JouRnAl of inteRnAtionAl RelAtions mr. marK castillo senioR liAison officeR, sigmA iotA Rho SPECIAL THANKS TO:
- 7. vii ONLINE Assistant Copy Editor chRistoPheR d’uRso nicKi ghAzARiAn Social Media Coordinator michAel KARAm vAleRyiA AKsiAniuK COPY Assistant Copy Editor donAld dAvis Associate Editors Alev eRhAn AmAndA nARt AnAR bAtA coRnell oveRfield eRin gAllAgheR KAthRyn duRA KAtie stRAzzA eRic Wilcox RAchel bRocK sAbine cARdio cRistinA uRquidi PeRciA veRlin cAtheRine sAid Justin smith RyAn PeteRs AnnA hess The JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS is a non-profit publication produced by un- dergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania. All inquiries and comments should be addressed to the Editor-in-Chief, 635 Williams Hall, 255 S. 36th Street, Philadelphia PA 19104. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or part without permission is prohibited. Copyright 2016, Journal of International Relations. Cover Design by BerBer Xue MANAGING Treasurer iAn hutton Outreach Coordinator PetRA nichols STAFF
- 8. The Fletcher School’s breadth of coursework and customizable curriculum allowed Huria to explore her passions while sharpening her skills. Her multidisciplinary training from Fletcher provided the ideal preparation for a flexible, long-term career with the United Nations. Transform yourself. Transform the world. Visit fletcher.tufts.edu or email fletcheradmissions@tufts.edu “Coming to Fletcher was a life changing experience.” -Huria Ogbamichael, MALD ’05
- 9. All the Tools for a Rewarding, Global Career Our MA in International Relations offers both cutting-edge knowledge and practical skills in leadership, management, and policy. The curriculum integrates workplace learning experiences. Most students spend two semesters away from Syracuse — in Washington, New York, or overseas. During the past three years, our IR students have worked in more than 50 nations. The program connects you to our global network of highly engaged, successful alumni. The result is diverse, satisfying careers, in the U.S. and around the world. A Home in D.C. Our headquarters in Washington is located at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,a highly regarded think tank where students can base their study, research, and networking. Master’s in International Relations
- 10. eDitor’s note letter From the PresiDent michAel doyle| oveRcoming the globAl Refugee And migRAnt cRisis: the middle eAst, euRoPe And the WoRld JosePh KieRnAn| A foRbidden lAnd of gReAt imPoRtAnce: the diPlomAtic histoRy of PAtRon-client RelAtions in KoReA dominic chiu|A study of coloniAl cultuRAl influences on lee teng-hui’s domestic And foReign Policies sAmuel nAtbony|stRAtegic conceRns foR the inevitAble collAPse of the Joint comPRehensive PlAn of Action Amy WAlsh|the PeRils of decentRAlizAtion: A cAse study of PotentiAl secession in the united Kingdom And sPAin Anton WideRoth|the discARded PeoPle: An AnAlysis of mAlAysiA And thAilAnd’s tReAtment of RohingyA Refugees neil misRA|immigRAtion: the gRoWing gAP betWeen Public oPinion And Policy outcomes xiii xiv 16 23 43 53 65 78 85 table of
- 11. luKe zARo|ottomAn oRientAlism: A guiding PRinciPle of tuRKish foReign Policy in the middle eAst connoR PhilliPs|A neW stRAtegy foR the middle eAst: Why And hoW the united stAtes should engAge islAmists lili dAlton|tReAties And tRust: the PotentiAl foR isRAeli nucleAR cooPeRAtion GraDuate corner JAmes gARRity|delibeRAtely designed diPlomAcy: hoW iRelAnd Rebuilt its Positive inteRnAtionAl RePutAtion AfteR its debt cRisis of 2008-2014 93 105 120 144 contents
- 12. Call for Online Submissions to the online journal The online edition of the SIR Journal, SIRJournal.org, maintains an interactive discussion of current affairs in international relations, with regular posts, updates, announcements and comment features throughout the academic year; submissions are rolling. GET PUBLISHED! Guidelines for online submissions Work must be relevant to the field of international relations. We accept op-eds, academic articles, and, in some cases, relevant photographs. Topics and lengths are flexible. With submissions, authors should include their name, university, email address in the submission. Submissions should be emailed to Bailey Scott @ sirjournal.online@gmail.com Blogging Blogging provides a platform for students to publish monthly about a thematic or regional subject that particu- larly interests them. Potential areas are flexible, but some examples include security studies, international economics, and human rights. Guidelines for blogging: Bloggers must commit to producing one blog per calendar month. Blog posts must be related to the field of international relations and fall between 500-1,200 words Applications must include student's name, email address, phone number, university information, and a sample blog post. Applications should be emailed to Bailey Scott @ sirjournal.online@gmail.com
- 13. Journal of International Relations xiii LETTER FROM THE EDITOR Dear Reader, I am proud to present the eighteenth edition of the Sigma Iota Rho Journal of International Relations. This edition reflects the hard work of the Journal staff, high caliber of applicant essays, and continued relevance of international relations in addressing contemporary geopolitical challenges. I am honored to announce that this year we received a record number of innovative and insightful submissions from an extremely diverse array of higher education institutions in the United States and abroad. I would like to draw special attention to our revitalized online platform, SIRjournal.org. This year, we have seen an increase in article submissions from all over the world. This increase in volume demonstrates the growing success of the Journal across multiple platforms. I encourage you to visit SIRjournal.org, where you will find additional research articles, op-ed pieces, and blog posts on a wide variety of topics. This year, the Journal is honored to feature Michael W. Doyle, University Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University and the director of the Columbia Global Policy Initiative. Professor Doyle’s remarks, adopted from a speech given at the University of Pennsylvania in Spring 2016, address the global refugee crisis. With nearly 20 million refugees and asylum seekers throughout the world today, Professor Doyle discusses the roots of the crisis, current policy debates and potential solutions. The ten student articles that follow focus on some of the most pressing issues in global relations. Anton Wideroth discusses Malaysian and Thai treatment of Rohingya refugees in the context of existing international treaties. Anton’s piece highlights the ever-pressing issues in the discussion of refugees worldwide. Neil Misra discusses the gap between public demands and government policy regarding immigration. The Journal also contains a “Graduate Corner” featuring James Garrity’s piece on Ireland’s campaign to rebuild its international reputation following the financial crisis. Overall, the Journal contains a wide array of articles that address diverse geographic and thematic topics, displaying the strength and relevance of international relations scholarship. I would like to recognize the important contributions of numerous individuals in ensuring another excellent publication of the Journal. I wish to thank Dr. Frank Plantan, National President of SIR, Tomoharu Nishino, Journal Faculty Advisor, and Mark Castillo, SIR Senior Liaison Officer, for their endless guidance and support. Above all, I am incredibly thankful for fellow Executive Board members and the entire Journal staff for their outstanding commitment. Congratulations to all. Sincerely, Abigail Richardson Editor In Chief, Journal of International Relations
- 14. xiv Spring 2016 | Volume 18 LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT] Dear Reader, As a graduate student I was fortunate to have studied with Dr. Henry Teune who later became a colleague, collaborator, and friend, who was famous among his students and a bit infamous among some of his colleagues for his sarcastic witticisms and at times sweeping generalizations about the disciplines and the state of higher education. Henry was a titan in the field of political science—a founding member and driver of the International Political Science Association and one-time President of the International Studies Association. He saw great hope for social science to better the lives of people and to create better institutional and social structures to manage our political and economic life, and the power of good theory to advance knowledge. But he also despaired at the trivialization of so much in the professional literature, the futility of excessive reductionism (yet he steadfastly championed the philosophical requirement to confront it), and the faddishness which seemed to plague social science. He once acerbically observed that there was a “square law of productivity” in social science—that if you took the square root of either the number of social scientists or their publications you would get the actual number of scholars making a real contribution to their field. He also once noted, in a rare moment of self-congratulation, “…if a book is still in print after six years, it’s a classic,” in reference to his and Adam Pzreworski’s The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. This landmark work is still in print 46 years after its release. These anecdotes came to mind following a keynote address by Dr. Michael Doyle at an all-day student research conference at the Sheraton University City Hotel on Friday, April 29, 2016 hosted by the Epsilon Chapter of Sigma Iota Rho and the International Relations Program at the University of Pennsylvania. Michael Doyle is one of those rare academics who can move seamlessly between the abstract and theoretical world of the Ivy Tower to the world of policy making and the operational demands of setting and implementing goals and agenda within government and international organizations. Currently serving as the Director of the Columbia Global Policy Initiative and as University Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science, he has also served as Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and Special Advisor to Secretary-General Kofi Annan. His work helped to spearhead the development of the Millennium Development Goals, coordinated outreach to multinational corporations in support of the U.N.’s Global Compact, while also serving as the liaison between the U.N. and the U.S. government. Any one of these positions would be considered a career capstone for most people. But perhaps what he will be best remembered for in academic circles is his contribution to democratic peace theory. His “Liberalism in World Politics”1 meets the Teune criteria of falling within the “square law” as it stands now as the sixteenth most cited article in the 100- plus year publication history of The American Political Science Review. Eight of his books are 1 Doyle, Michael W. (Dec 1986). “Liberalism and World Politics”. The American Political Science Review 80 (4): 1151–1169.doi:10.2307/1960861. JSTOR 1960861
- 15. Journal of International Relations xv LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT still immediately available as Amazon Prime selections, so his work meets Teune’s “classic” test as well. Prior to his speech, he spoke with conviction over lunch about his latest work that involves mobilizing scholars and policy-makers to address the increasingly transnational, borderless, multi-dimensional problems of global significance and the interconnectivity of what we once thought were disparate issues—climate change, security, poverty, economic development, disease, migration. His passion for his work and his genuine humanity filled the room during his public remarks, reprinted here, about the migration and refugee crisis, its global scope and of our inability to ignore it or leave action to others. He shows us that this is not merely a moral imperative--it is a rational choice and pragmatic policy for any nation concerned about the permeability of its borders, its economic well-being, and the myriad national security impacts from counterterrorism to dealing with failed states, to the promotion of democracy and liberal market-oriented economies. That at least was my take away from his remarks—you may draw your own conclusions. I want to give a special thanks to our remarkable editorial board this year. Editor-in-Chief Abigail Richardson raised the bar for standards of excellence and leadership. Deputy Editors- in-Chief, Alex Kraik and Bailey Scott kept staff motivated, productive and on-time. Bailey’s work expanding the reach of the Online Journal has opened new opportunities for Sigma Iota Rho members to be published. We saw greater participation of more members in more chapters this year in terms of contributions and serving as Associate Editors. Thank you all. And a special thanks to all SIR Faculty Advisors who mobilize their students and help SIR to thrive around the world. Finally, I want to give a special shout out too to our newest chapter, the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani. AUIS is working to give students in Iraq a future, a chance to engage the world and is training the next generation of diplomats that we can only hope will bring peace to that war-torn region. Welcome to Sigma Iota Rho! Frank Plantan, Jr. President, Sigma Iota Rho
- 16. 16 Michael Doyle Spring 2016 | Volume 18 The following was given as the Keynote address at the 2016 University of Pennsylvania International Relations Program Senior Thesis Conference.1 Good afternoon. I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak at the International Relations Program’s Student Research Conference because I believe in the importance of the interdisciplinary approach your program embodies, and that is evident in your senior thesis projects. In my own work, at times I straddle the fields of political science, philosophy, law, and economics— admittedly, at times a long stretch -- but I believe that finding solutions to some of our most pressing problems requires just such an interdisciplinary perspective. Observing the rapid collapses of the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian dictatorships in the Arab Spring, only those who knew the Assad regime well could have anticipated that the peaceful protests against his regime would spark violent repression which in turn would sow the seeds of a five year civil war and produce one of the worst humanitarian disasters in recent history. The U.N. estimates that 6.6 million people are internally displaced in Syria. Another 4.7 million are in neighboring countries and another million have applied for asylum in Europe. 1 I thank Tomoharu Nishino and Frank Plantan for their many helpful suggestions in revising the lecture. Overcoming the Global Refugee and Migrant Crisis: The Middle East, Europe and the World by michAel doyle diRectoR, columbiA globAl Policy initiAtive, And univeRsity PRofessoR in the school of inteRnAtionAl And Public AffAiRs, the lAW school, And the dePARtment of PoliticAl science At columbiA univeRsity & foRmeR u.n. AssistAnt secRetARy geneRAl
- 17. Journal of International Relations OvercOming the glObal refugee and migrant crisis 17 The continent, still recovering from the economic fall out of the “Great Recession,” is in the midst of a refugee crisis of a scale that we have rarely seen. The European crisis, which is straining infrastructures, social safety nets, and the political and social harmony of the European experiment, is part of a wider crisis in the global refugee regime. By the end of 2014, there were about 59.5 million forcibly displaced persons around the globe—19.5 million refugees, 38.2 million internally displaced persons, and 1.8 million asylum seekers. Over half of these displaced are children 18 and younger. 2014 also saw the largest increase in the numbers of displaced in a single year—nearly double the numbers seen in the previous decade, and a level not seen since World War II. These numbers continued to climb in 2015. Confounding the problem, the number of people returning home is at a 30 year low. The headlines we see every day are European. But this is not a European issue, or even a Western one. 85% of the displaced are being hosted by developing countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan and Kenya. The barbed wire fences that overwhelmed nations erected along their borders in 2015 are not adequate responses. It is an immutable principle that the obligation to provide protection for refugees is general and global—by all countries and for all refugees. And yet, their movement across borders today is a perilous tangle of regulations that leave the refugees and migrants unprotected, governments frustrated, and their citizens outraged. Today, refugees face a set of contradictions and obstacles embedded in an outdated regulatory regime, overwhelmed by this human tide. Together, these contradictions shape behavior in such a way as to create a cascade of moral hazards—the rules and policies encourage just the sort of actions that one would wish to prevent. In my talk today, I will comment on these contradictions and obstacles, discuss the three “standard” durable solutions offered in response to refugee crises, and then propose four new measures that can mitigate the crisis. THE SOURCES OF THE CURRENT REFUGEE CRISIS: But first, let’s start with the basics. The problems are deeply rooted in the dual principles of national sovereignty and universal human rights embedded in the post World War II global regime. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has a right to leave a country. Yet the principle of national sovereignty holds that no one has a right to enter a country without its
- 18. 18 Michael Doyle Spring 2016 | Volume 18 sovereign permission. Second, there is the landmark commitment to the protection of refugee rights, which stands as a profound rebuke to the indifference that met the refugees of the 1930s fleeing the impending Holocaust. This is the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Additional Protocol, both implemented by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Convention clearly states that no one with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” can be expelled and returned to a country that threatens to harm him or her. This is the hallowed principle of non-refoulement. But this, too, contains contradictory implications, creating a “catch-22” for millions of refugees. The Convention forbids the expulsion of any such refugees. However, the Convention contains no provision for the refugees to enter another country legally. And furthermore, any determination as to their refugee status can only be made once they reach the country of asylum. Here, we see an enormous invitation to, and an indirect funding scheme for, illegal border crossing and smuggling. How else can refugees get into a country and establish their presence there in order to make a claim to asylum? Third, few of today’s asylum seekers fit the classic 1951 model of individuals fleeing state persecution—remember, for example, the courageous dissenters fleeing the wrath of Stalin. Those forced to move as a result of severe economic devastation, gang violence, civil wars, natural disasters, or climate change do not always meet the “persecution…on grounds of religion, race, etc.” criteria established by the Convention, and are, therefore, not guaranteed protection even if the threats to their lives are manifestly present. Fortunately, neither the UNHCR nor many asylum-granting countries apply a strict reading of the 1951 Convention. However, the confusion as to which standards they will apply in deciding cases of refugee status are real. As flows of labor migrants seeking better economic prospects mix with refugees fleeing threats to their safety, this confusion has become the source of crisis in the asylum-determination process. Fourth, last year the sheer volume of asylum seekers was simply overwhelming the EU asylum process. Greece, Italy, and Hungary bore the brunt of the first arrivals. Germany was facing up to a million applications for asylum. The EU then sought to redistribute 120,000 asylum- seekers across member countries using a formula that attempted to gauge assimilative capacity by taking each country’s population, income, unemployment rates, and past asylum loads into consideration. But many members, particularly Eastern European countries, simply rejected the scheme. The 120,000 figure represents just one tenth of one percent of the EU’s population. The U.S.,
- 19. Journal of International Relations OvercOming the glObal refugee and migrant crisis 19 in contrast, offered to take in just 10,000 Syrians—much less than even the European ratio to population—and up to 100,000 total asylum seekers in 2017. At the root of the problem for the EU is a fundamental contradiction in the EU migration regime itself. On the one hand, the EU guarantees freedom of movement and employment inside the Schengen Convention and Dublin Regulation zone, and has dismantled border controls within the region. On the other, the EU leaves the task of asylum determination in the hands of the governments at the borders of the EU. Guarding the borders—determining refugee status and returning labor migrants—is difficult and costly. The governments tasked to do so—Greece, Hungary, and Italy—had little incentive to do it well. They were well aware that the vast majority of the asylum seekers wanted to migrate to Germany, the UK and the Scandinavian countries. With the advantages of hindsight, it is now obvious that refugee reception and status determination was a function that ought to have been performed by the EU itself, with direct EU involvement in the Greek Islands, Italy and Hungary. Now, in order to stem the flow of refugees, EU has come to an arrangement with Turkey. Part of that arrangement is a deal that the EU will take a Syrian asylum seeker directly from Turkey, for every claimant that Turkey accepts back from Greece. This deal, however, creates a real danger of refoulement unless each asylum-seeker gets a full and adequate hearing. It will also have the effect of deflecting the flow of asylum seekers away from Turkey and Greece, to Libya and the even more perilous crossing from there to Italy. THREE DURABLE SOLUTIONS Let’s now turn to solutions. In responding to refugee crises, there are generally three so called “durable solutions”—return, local integration, and resettlement. The best solution—quickly resolving the Syrian crisis itself, and creating an environment in which the refugees can return home safely—is, unfortunately, a mirage. Most refugee generating crises are hard to resolve in a way that leads to rapid return of displaced persons. Myron Wiener has estimated that the typical “fast solution” length is 10 years. The current average is 17 years. There are still 1.5 million Afghans who fled the Taliban 20 years ago living in Pakistan. There are more than 400,000 Somalis who fled their homeland in the 1990s, who are still in Kenya. Local integration in countries of first asylum, with the hope of eventual return, has some attractive features. There are currently 4 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. To be sure, they are housed in difficult conditions. But refuge at the border with the hope of eventual return to a peaceful Syria is, in many respects, a better solution than resettlement in Europe or the United States. For this solution to be effective, it requires that
- 20. 20 Michael Doyle Spring 2016 | Volume 18 resources are made available to the refugees that would allow them to establish decent lives with employment, education, healthcare and self-governance, while at the same time not eroding the quality of life of the local communities that host them. However, these resources have not been forthcoming—only 40% of the recent UNHCR appeal for the region has been met. A recent World Bank study documents the impact and severe problems the refugee crisis has created for Jordan and Lebanon. Today, nearly one-tenth of Jordan’s population and one- quarter of Lebanon’s population are refugees. In some towns in north Jordan, the refugee population is greater than the local population. The mass influx of refugees has resulted in the severe overcrowding of schools, now often running on double shifts. Children 18 and under need education, and they need that education now. Otherwise, they will become yet another generation lost to conflict. The refugee population is also doubling the pressure on civil infrastructure like sewage treatment in host communities. And the influx of refugees has also resulted in a shock to local informal labor markets. The World Bank estimated the direct costs to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to be as much as 1–1.4% of total GDP per annum. This large cost has been covered locally through reductions in services to the population at large. This has led to severe tensions—some even becoming violent—between the impacted communities and the refugees. These host countries and the refugees they care for need help now. Resettlement to safe third-party countries such as Europe, or the U.S., is also an important option. According to the UNHCR, 480,000 of the 4 million refugees now on Syria’s borders, urgently need resettlement. So far, only 130,000 have found countries willing to host them. There are numerous examples of refugees becoming productive, and having a positive effect on host economies. Like all immigrants, their productivity depends on rapid and thorough integration into local labor markets. Without a proactive policy of integration, refugees and migrants tend to have a mixed impact—both harmful and helpful. They provide increased labor flexibility, but this benefit if offset by the wage competition with the indigenous lower- skilled worker. To minimize the negative effects, and maximize the benefits, host countries must work towards a rapid integration of refugees, while offering adequate compensation (through income support and job training) to nationals who are adversely affected.
- 21. Journal of International Relations OvercOming the glObal refugee and migrant crisis 21 MITIGATING THE CRISIS Let’s now turn to ways in which the current crisis might be mitigated and better managed. Ultimately, we need a comprehensive international agreement that recognizes the human dignity of all migrants and refugees while promoting the interests of countries of origin, transit and destination. If you will permit me a moment to advertise here, I am working, along with colleagues Alex Aleinikoff, the former Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, Gregory Maniatis, the senior advisor to Peter Sutherland, others such as Rey Koslowski at SUNY Albany, Randall Hansen at Toronto and Cathryn Costello at the Oxford Refugee Center, and a wide commission of experts on the development of a model international mobility treaty that would address these goals. Unfortunately, a better legal regime will take a very long time to realize. In the meantime, four measures would help meet the general obligation to protect the refugees, and help us to overcome the obstacles they face every day. First, we should hold the perpetrators liable. The Syrian Government and Islamic State are victimizing the people of Syria. Their abuses qualify for referral to the International Criminal Court, but in the interim, as Guy Goodwin Gill and Selim Sazak have argued, the UN Security Council would be justified in seizing the overseas financial assets of the Syrian state and ISIS and using them to pay for the maintenance of refugee camps on the Syrian border. Such measures will likely not stop Assad. The Russian veto on the Security Council will see to that. But this may be an effective tool in dealing with crises created by perpetrators without a superpower patron. Second, we should mobilize the private sector to address problems created in countries of first asylum from taking in long term refugees. As Alex Betts and Paul Collier have argued, special economic zones can be created to foster employment, and help make displacement tolerable and productive. To make such a plan viable, private companies will require political risk insurance, perhaps underwritten by the World Bank. And the output of such economic zones will have duty free access to the markets of OECD economies. If structured to provide jobs both for nationals and refugees—for example, on a one-to-one basis—such zones could help make refugees economically self-sustaining. Moreover, employment in these special economic zones will equip refugees with the skills necessary to incubate an economic recovery for their home countries when they eventually return home. Third, we should strengthen the capacity of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and national governments to make preliminary refugee determinations so that countries can issue
- 22. 22 Michael Doyle Spring 2016 | Volume 18 travel visas for individuals and families that cannot find adequate refuge on Syria’s borders. Many of these families can then be processed for resettlement in countries like Canada with its 25,000 quota for Syrian refugees. Presently, the U.S. takes two years to determine an individual’s refugee status. This is simply too long a period to wait. Surely we can come up with a more expeditious system that balances the humanitarian needs of refugees with the security demands of the host countries. These UNHCR-vetted visas would free families from having to place their lives in the hands of smugglers by certifying them for legal travel to potential asylum countries. The final determination of asylum can then be made once the families have arrived. Fourth, refugee asylum responsibility must be shared globally. For example, we could apply the EU formula to the 40 richest countries, and determine each country’s share of the global responsibility to protect refugees. The EU criteria—population, GDP, unemployment, and past refugee loads—are the right criteria in determining each country’s responsibility. (Adjustments can be made to ensure that the outsized populations of China and India do not produce outsized burdens.) Such a system could result in a broader and fairer distribution of the burden of hosting refugees. Steven Nam, a colleague in the Global Policy Initiative and professor of law at UC Davis, and we have calculated that the US share of the current 400,000 refugees needing resettlement would be 29,000 individuals. China would have a quota of 26,000 and Japan, 15,300. All completely manageable numbers. In principle, every country has a responsibility to accept asylum seekers who make a valid claim at their borders. But any top 40 GDP country with a political aversion to accepting refugees for resettlement can substitute a voucher that provides ten years of economic support (approximately $3,500 per person per year) to a refugee family on the Syrian border. The current refugee crisis in Europe demands that the international community reaffirm its commitment to protecting refugees. There are more than 20 million refugees and asylum seekers in the world today. This is a level not seen since World War II. This is a large number to be sure. But 20 million is also just 3 tenths of one percent of the current global population of over 7 billion. Given the proper incentives, the right amount of resources, and the proper distribution of the burdens, this should be a manageable responsibility.
- 23. Journal of International Relations A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 23 ABSTRACT Korea occupies a strategic position in a region rife with great power contestation. Northeast Asian hegemons have long dictated how Korean regimes manage their national security and negotiate in defense of their sovereignty. The disparity in strength between the Korean states and their overbearing neighbors has forced Korean leaders to establish interstate patron-client relations. The ability to form advantageous arrangements with patron powers has shaped Korea’s ability to fulfill a variety of goals ranging from the most basic, deterrence of foreign aggression, to the more ambitious, economic modernization and self-strengthening. This paper addresses two seminal periods of Korea’s diplomatic history in regards to patron-client relations, the dangerous multipolarity of the late nineteenth century and the bipolar world of the Cold War. Exploring the linear development of Korean foreign relations facilitates a valuable discussion on the constraints facing Korean governments in the pursuit of their priorities and the domestic political factors that either inhibited or enhanced their capacity for strategic positioning in the shifting power politics of Northeast Asia. INTRODUCTION “A state’s potential power is based on the size of its population and the level of its wealth. These two assets are the main building blocks of military power” – John J. Mearsheimer.1 Not all states are created equal. Global diplomatic history recounts the clash of great powers. 1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 43. A Forbidden Land of Great Importance: The Diplomatic History of Patron-Client Relations in Korea by JosePh KieRnAn univeRsity of PennsylvAniA
- 24. 24 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 Often, the subtleties of clientelistic interstate relations are overlooked. By consequence of geography, few states have been forced to grapple with patron-client relationships as consistently as Korea. Wedged in the heart of Northeast Asia, this peninsular country has been the cradle and tomb of empires and the epicenter of a myriad of great power conflicts throughout history. Korea is critical to the security of its neighboring states—China, Russia, and Japan—and, due to its relative size, is vulnerable to their aggressive foreign policies. In response to precarious geopolitical conditions, Korea has developed a clientelistic repertoire of diplomatic and security policies to mitigate conflict and attenuate the vagaries of the anarchic international system. This paper argues that Korea attempted to safeguard its sovereignty by establishing various patron-client relations with great powers. Korea’s historical success or failure in forming advantageous patron-client relationships generated profound, and often disastrous effects, for its government and people. The fusions of Waltzian third-image structural factors and second-image domestic political forces dictated Korea’s ability to adapt to evolving geostrategic conditions. However, the pursuit of patronage carried serious caveats for both Korean states - to varying degrees - as their leadership faced traditional challenges of assuming a client role in an unequal relationship. Drawing on Christopher Shoemaker and John Spanier’s seminal Patron-Client State Relationships, Christopher Carney outlines the distinguishing features of a clientelistic interstate relationship: (1) military asymmetry and tendency towards unidirectional security transfer, (2) importance of the client state to patronal interstate competition, and (3) the appearance of the relationship for purposes of deterrence.2 This paper examines how Korea exploited the patronal goals of “ideological convergence, international solidarity, and strategic advantage” to leverage a suitable patron-client modus vivendi in two interstate power architectures: the great power competition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the Cold War bipolar system.3 SEARCHING FOR A PATRON STATE The roots of Korean subordination through interstate clientage lie in the country’s millennia- long relationship with China. The lack of a robust security arrangement in the Sino-Korean relationships opened the door to instability in Korea once China’s hegemonic position in East Asia became precarious. Korea’s ability to ensure its domestic security position became increasingly important in the rapidly changing geopolitical environment of the late nineteenth century. The changing geopolitical environment also revealed how the absence of a firm security element to the Sino-Korean relationship exposed Korea to foreign threats. Korea’s initial exposure to significant Western pressure occurred during a period of internal uncertainty 2 Christopher Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework,” Studies in Comparative International Development 24, no. 2 (1989): 46-47. 3 Carney, International Patron-Client Relationships, 49.
- 25. Journal of International Relations A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 25 as the Taewŏn’gun - the young king Kojong’s de facto regent - took power in 1864.4 5 6 The foreign incursions of the regency period exposed the decline of regional stability as disruptive actors entered the interstate arena. Instead of modernizing its military to deter foreign aggressors, the Korean state promulgated a conservative agenda with a deeply isolationist stance towards the West. As the Qing dynasty faced increasing internal difficulties, Korea sought to extirpate the influence of foreigners, especially Christianity. Chosŏn’s introspection masked China’s diminishing power projection ability as the balance of power in Northeast Asia shifted towards the Westerners and the Japanese. This meant that as China’s relative power declined, Korea’s lack of deterrence was exposed. Confrontations between Western powers and the Chosŏn dynasty revealed the disintegration of Korean security in the face of foreign aggression. The 1866 General Sherman crisis, in which an American ship was attacked near Pyongyang and French missionaries were executed, prompted armed responses and limited Western interventions in 1866 and 1871.7 The conduct of Western-Korean diplomacy through Chinese channels reflected the isolationist tone of the Taewŏn’gun’s government and the foreign perception that Korea was attached to Qing as a former “tributary.”8 In his response to Henri de Bellonet, the French Consul in Beijing, Prince Kung attempted to distance Beijing from Chosŏn’s provocations, writing that it is not “the intention of the Emperor’s government to screen and protect the Coreans [sic]—a most strange and surprising assertion.”9 10 If the French were to invade Korea, as they had threatened, Qing appeared unwilling to come to the aid of the Korean government. This shows that the tribute system was a medium of bilateral foreign relations between China and Korea, rather than an alliance or traditional patron-client system predicated on security assurances. Unfortunately for Korean conservatives, the backwards Korean military simply could not 4 The Taewŏn’gun, whose name was Yi Ha-ŏng, was Kojong’s father and a mercurial figure in Korean history. He enjoyed domestic successes but ironically became a puppet for the very foreign forces which he so ardently opposed. Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 192-193. 5 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From ‘Land of the Morning Calm’ to States in Conflict (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2012), 279. 6 King Kojong (1852-1919) was the 26th monarch of the Chosŏn dynasty. His reign saw the implosion of the Korean state due to foreign pressure and internal failure to mobilize resources to defend national sovereignty. Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 192. 7 The 1866 French incursion and the 1871 American incursion were forced to withdraw, heightening the conservatives’ and the Taewŏn’gun’s overconfident beliefs in their martial capabilities. Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 195. 8 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Executive documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, during the second session of the fortieth Congress, 1867-’68, Vol. I (Washington, DC: GPO, 1867- 1868), 426. 9 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Executive documents printed by order of the House of Representatives, during the second session of the fortieth Congress, 1867-’68, Vol. I (Washington, DC: GPO, 1867- 1868), 423. 10 Prince Kung, or Gong Qinwang (1833-1898), was a major political figure in the late Qing Dynasty who led the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion and tried to rejuvenate the country despite the opposition of Cixi, Dowager Empress. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Gong Qinwang.”
- 26. 26 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 compete with Qing, Japanese, or Western forces and the Taewŏn’gun’s conservatism and entrenched interests in Seoul precluded a Meiji-style modernization.11 This Korean relative weakness elucidates the emerging problem with the traditional Sino-Korean patron-client relationship. As foreign states applied pressure to Korea, the Qing either had to make peace with its loss of influence or tighten its grip. And, if China was willing to prop up Korea, its martial capabilities seemed inadequate to deter foreign influence in the Peninsula. While Japan stunned the world with its Meiji Restoration reforms, Korea struggled to determine how to deal with violations of its sovereignty. Within two decades, the scholar-officials in Seoul would come to realize that the greatest threat lay not from Western interlopers, but from Korea’s neighbors across the narrow Tsushima Strait. In 1874, Kojong succeeded the Taewŏn’gun, and his successful xenophobic policies were the result of a fortuitous sequence of geopolitical events.12 While Kojong reorganized his government, Japanese ministers discussed an invasion of Korea. Marching towards modernity under the banner of “wealthy country and strong arms,” Meiji officials echoed sentiments similar to their sixteenth century invasions of Korea. For aggressive ministers, Korea was the natural first step in the construction of a Japanese overseas empire. While a contingent led by Saigŏ Takamori pushed for war, driven by the Taewŏn’gun’s prior provocations, cooler heads prevailed. Soejima Taneomi, the foreign minister, argued that “war with Korea would be a calamity to Japan at a moment when she should concentrate her energies upon internal affairs.”13 14 Although the invasion failed to materialize, Soejima worked to establish a foundation for Japanese expansionism throughout Asia in what James Bradley terms the “Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia.”15 16 In the Sino-Japanese Treaty of September 1871, the Japanese opted to interpret the clause prohibiting intrusion on each other’s territories as excluding dependent states.17 This language displays reciprocity and equality between the powers, distinct from the so-called unequal treaties forced upon the Asian states by the West.18 Perhaps this was because 1871 Meiji Japan was in no position to challenge Qing China, weakened as it may be, for now. Increasing Japanese pressure on Korea culminated in the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa, a seminal 11 Yi Hangno, “Memorial to Express Private Thoughts,” in Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two, eds. Yŏngho Ch’oe, Peter H. Lee, and Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 236-239. 12 James Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1997), 270. 13 Marlene J. Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 4 (August 1972): 799. 14 Wayne C. McWilliams, “East Meets East: The Soejima Mission to China, 1873,” Monumenta Nipponica 30, no. 3 (Autumn 1975): 237-275. 15 James Bradley, The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2015), 51-84. 16 McWilliams, “East Meets East: The Soejima Mission to China, 1873.” 17 Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy,” 808. 18 National University of Singapore, “Sino-Japanese Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty, 1871,” Empire in Asia: A New Global History.
- 27. Journal of International Relations A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 27 momentinEastAsiangeopolitics.AsChinasteppedbackfromtheroleof regionalpowerbroker, Japan sought to replace it. Article I of the Treaty states: “Chosŏn, as an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as Japan does.”19 This “independent” moniker was hardly an admission to the Westphalian System. Rather, it was a legalistic method to peel back China’s influence over Korea. The 1882 Treaty of Chemulp’o allowed the Japanese to station troops in Seoul.20 1882 also witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between Chosŏn and the United States. Apart from the stereotypical unequal treaty provisions of the period such as guarantees of extraterritoriality, the most important geostrategic component of the U.S.-Korea treaty was Article I: There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen [sic] and the citizens and subjects of their respective governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable agreement, thus showing their friendly feelings.21 The dissonance in the interpretation of this Article between Washington D.C. and Seoul would have serious ramifications for Korea’s foreign policy. The concord between Chosŏn and the United States was heralded in both Seoul and Washington. In 1883, Lucius Foote, the U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Korea wrote to Kojong, “In this progressive age there is a moral power more potent than standing armies, and the weakness of a nation is sometimes its strength.”22 23 This diplomatic rhetoric would do little to shield Korea from the encroachment of Japan. Furthermore, it perpetuated the feeling in Seoul that the United States would serve as a new patron state for Chosŏn. The most incriminatory evidence is from President Chester A. Arthur himself, who wrote, “We seek no monopoly of its commerce, but as the Chosunese [sic] in reaching for a higher civilization, have confided in this Republic, we cannot regard with indifference any encroachment on their rights.”24 To the Chosŏn court, this statement would seem to be direct reinforcement of Article I, especially since it originated with the U.S. President. In Washington, there was little concern for Korea’s welfare. A pro-Japan narrative was advanced by authors such as William Elliot Griffis in “The Statesmanship of Ito,” praising future Japanese governor-general of Korea, Ito Hirobumi.25 The exchange of correspondence 19 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 287. 20 Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 207. 21 U.S.-Korea Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, United States Department of State, 1882. 22 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Index to the executive documents of the House of Representatives for the second session of the forty-seventh Congress, 1882-’83, Vol. I, No. 1, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1882-1883), 243. 23 “Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission, By Year: 1884,” United States Department of State. 24 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Index to the executive documents of the House of Representatives for the second session of the forty-seventh Congress, 1882-’83, Vol. I, No. 1, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1882-1883), viii. 25 William Elliot Griffis, “The Statesmanship of Ito,” North American Review 191 (January 1910): 127.
- 28. 28 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 between the State Department and its ambassador in Seoul reflects the pro-Japanese sentiment that permeated the American government at that time. John Sill - the U.S. Minister Resident/ Consul-General in Korea from April 1894-September 1897 - advocated on the behalf of Korea and against Japan during a period of rapacious Japanese activity in the peninsula.26 He provided refuge for Korean officials opposed to Japan and he was horrified by the Japanese treatment of Korea and its inhabitants. However, Sill’s story is an exception, and he was frequently castigated by his superior, Secretary of State Richard Olney ( 1895-1897) for his forbidden “intermeddling with Korean political affairs.”27 28 29 As Tokyo’s acquisitive gaze fixed on Korea, Russia also saw value in a Northeast Asian presence. Unlike Tokyo however, St. Petersburg felt that the “acquisition of Korea...was undesirable.”30 Some in Russia, such as the Easterners who believed that Russia should integrate with Northeast Asia, promoted increased involvement in the region. It was these people, including Prince Ukthomskii, tutor to the future Nicholas II, who lobbied Tsar Alexander III to augment Russian diplomatic and economic penetration into greater Manchuria and Qing China.31 Russian Minister of Finance, Sergei Witte, championed the Trans-Siberian Railroad and closer relations with the court in Beijing.32 Domestic politics in Korea grew more fractious as officials, instead of uniting around a national cause, aligned themselves with foreign factions. This undermined government solidarity and opened opportunities for foreign powers to involve themselves in the operations of the Chosŏn state.33 Russia’s territorial ambitions triggered fears in Qing China and Meiji Japan. The Sino-Japanese Tianjin Convention on April 18, 1885 epitomized Sino-Japanese apprehension of Russian encroachment in Manchuria and marked a fleeting convergence of interests between Beijing and Tokyo. Huajeong Seok provides an alternative incentive for engaging Russia more fully in the Korean Peninsula. Seok asserts that Paul Georg von Möllendorf, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Kojong’s Government, wanted to increase Russian involvement in the Far East to relieve Russian pressure on Germany in the West.34 Regardless of motivation, Möllendorf desired a Russian protectorate over Korea.35 Initial Korean attitudes towards Russia were less than congenial and rife with assumptions that “barbarian” Russia, like the U.S. and Japan, had 26 “John Mahelm Berry Sill (1831-1901),” United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. 27 “Biographies of the Secretaries of State, Richard Olney,” United States Department of State, Office of the Historian. 28 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president, transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895, Part II (Washington, DC: GPO, 1895), 971-978. 29 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president, transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895, Part II (Washington, DC: GPO, 1895), 975. 30 Huajeong Seok, “International Rivalry and Russia’s East Asian Policy in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Korea Journal 50, no. 3 (Autumn 2010): 186. 31 George A. Lensen, Russia’s Eastern Expansion (New York: Prentice Hall, 1964): 93. 32 Ibid., 94. 33 Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, 285. 34 Seok, “International Rivalry and Russia’s East Asian Policy,” 182. 35 Ibid., 183.
- 29. Journal of International Relations A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 29 designs on the Korean Peninsula.36 Japan’s strategic priorities were a mounting threat to Korea. Writing the wake of the First Sino- Japanese War, Mark Dunnell, the former U.S. deputy counsel-general at Shanghai, noted the crucial nature of Manchuria and its lucrative attraction to foreign powers.37 Furthermore, he argued that the conditions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki - the treaty that ended the war and ceded the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan - was unacceptable for the Western powers, especially Russia.38 This prompted the Triple Intervention, which denied Japan access to Liaodong. The Triple Intervention represented one of the few instances in which the Western nations stood firm against Japanese interference. In 1894, U.S. Representative John Sill, along with the British, French, and Russian representatives called for the “simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops from Korean territory.”39 The Russian objective was clear: secure an ice-free port in the Far East. This conflict would boil over during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Regionally, the Japanese objectives were more ambitious: the wealth of resources in Manchuria and the ability to block Russian access to the East China Sea were strong incentives for Tokyo to augment its presence. To this end, Korea was the route to access Manchuria and China40 For Japan, controlling Korea was a geopolitical necessity in its quest to further Soejima’s imperial efforts. For Korea, Japan’s expansionism threatened centuries of Chosŏn’s independence. The 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance - an alliance born from Russia’s stationing of troops in Manchuria to check the tumult of the Boxer Rebellion - anchored Britain as an ally of the Meiji regime.41 With this new alliance, the prospect of united Western action against Japanese aggression vanished. Thus, between an avaricious Japan, an indifferent West, and a disintegrating China, only Russia seemed to have the resources and the will to shield Korea. With its sinuous steel lifeline to the West, Russia’s economic and political percolation into Manchuria prompted Japan to hasten its counter efforts. Writing in 1898, Dunnel notes that “Under the wise guidance of Russia, Manchuria is destined in the near future to astonish the world by her development.”42 Russian foreign policy makers fretted over Japanese intrusion into their sphere of influence in Northeast Asia. Generally, St. Petersburg regarded Korea as a buffer zone for a burgeoning presence in Manchuria, so the promotion of Korean state capacity and stability aligned with Russia’s larger regional goals. Conversely, Korea’s autonomy 36 Yi Manson, “Memorial Submitted by Ten Thousand Men,” in Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two, eds. Yŏngho Ch’oe, Peter H. Lee, and Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 244. 37 Mark B. Dunnell, “Our Policy in China,” The North American Review 167, no. 503 (October 1898). 38 Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 220. 39 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1894, Appendix I (Washington, DC: GPO, 1894), 23-24. 40 Dunnell, “Our Policy in China.” 41 Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 237. 42 Dunnell, “Our Policy in China,” 397.
- 30. 30 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 was not a vital interest for Beijing or Tokyo.43 The Russians were vested in preserving Korea’s status as a check on Japanese expansion. However, their priority was to establish an ice-free port at Port Arthur in the Liaodong Peninsula. When this was accomplished, there was a Russian exodus from Seoul, quickly leading to the presence of Japanese officials in the capital. Korea’s fate was sealed following the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War. Arbitrated by Theodore Roosevelt in New Hampshire, the Treaty guaranteed an international recognition of Japan’s “paramount political, military and economical interests” in Korea.44 45 The abandonment of the terms of the 1883 Treaty became clear. Secretary Root notes the official communication from the charge d’affaires in Korea and wrote to Min Yeung-Tehan, the Korean Special Envoy: In view of this official communication, it is difficult to see how the Government of the United States can proceed in any manner upon the entirely different view of the facts which you tell us personally you have been led to take by the information which you have received.46 From this, the U.S. government is shown to view that the delegation of state control of Japan in February 1904 and August 1904 prior to the establishment of the protectorate over Korea negated Article I of the 1883 Treaty. The notion that the Americans had been unaware of the Japanese intentions is dubious. Gozo Tatento, the Japanese Minister to the U.S., had admitted that Japan would “violate its treaties with Korea and upset the peace in East Asia in order to stabilize its own government.”47 Many Koreans felt betrayed by the United States’ actions, including Syngman Rhee. This was not unlike the Chinese revolutionaries’ feelings of betrayal by Wilson in the aftermath of World War I.48 As the Japanese increased its influence and control over Korea, it would seem that the words of Article I and of President Arthur were empty. THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE On January 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson may have provoked the Korean War. In a speech, Acheson said that the United States’ “defense perimeter of the Pacific [...] will be held.”49 He traced a defense line from the Aleutians to Japan to Okinawa to the 43 Seok, “International Rivalry and Russia’s East Asian Policy,” 244. 44 “Treaty of Portsmouth” WWI Document Archive. 45 Eckert et al., Korea Old a New: A History, 239. 46 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 5, 1905 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1905), 629. 47 Jeffrey M. Dorwart, “The Independent Minister: John M.B. Sill and the Struggle against Japanese Expansion in Korea,” Pacific Historical Review 44 (November 1975): 493. 48 John Edward Wilz, “Did the United States Betray Korea in 1905?,” Pacific Historical Review 54, no. 3 (August 1985): 244. 49 The Truman Library, “Secretary Acheson and the Defense of Korea,” The Korean War and Its Origins, 1945- 53.
- 31. Journal of International Relations A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 31 Philippines, conspicuously excluding the nascent Republic of Korea. Six months later, on June 25, 1950, the North Korean military flooded over the 38th Parallel, blasting its way down to Pusan.50 Contemporary critics of the Truman Administration, including Dwight Eisenhower, blamed Acheson’s rhetorical demarcation for the escalation of Korean hostilities.51 Officials in the Truman Administration countered by maintaining that the UN-based defense of South Korea perfectly echoed Acheson’s statements.52 Beyond the historical jockeying, it was clear that Korea was once again on the frontlines of great power conflict, a pawn in the global game for hegemony. With the advent of the Cold War, Korea came to participate in a new patron-client paradigm. Ironically, like the Sino-Korean relationship of the past, common ideologies rooted this strategic partnership. However, the foundation of this affiliation was primarily strategic: checking the worldwide advance of Communism. Unlike its previous misadventures, the Korean Government, located in the South, established unprecedented advantages within its patron-client system with the United States. This enabled Seoul to strengthen economically and militarily and ultimately lessened its need for American assistance. Mediated dependence was the path to prosperous independence. Park Chung-hee, the ROK president from 1961 to 1979, deftly manipulated American strategic needs in East Asia to serve his domestic agenda. On the home front, Park led Korea in one of the most spectacular economic booms in history, pulling itself from the desperate poverty of the 1950s to a period of export-led growth and better living standards. To achieve this ambitious program of growth, Park needed to play a canny game in a flammable international system. The vicissitudes of the bipolar Cold War ensured that developing states chose sides, especially in tense neighborhoods such as Northeast Asia. Park’s regime worked to transform South Korea from a forward base in America’s Pacific Rim defense network to valuable partner in the fight against international communism, maximizing South Korean benefits along the way. During the course of his rule, he used the foundation of the 1953 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to cultivate a bilaterally beneficial arrangement with Washington.53 Following the horrors of Japanese occupation, the tumult of the Korean War, and the authoritarian and inept presidency of Syngman Rhee, South Koreans overthrew the Rhee Government and elected a new democratic administration under Chang Myŏn.54 March 1961 correspondences between U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and U.S. Secretary of Defense 50 Michael E. Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey: A Short History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007): 114-115. 51 James I. Matray, “Dean Acheson’s Press Club Speech Reexamined,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 22, no. 1 (Spring 2002). 52 “Remarks by Dean Acheson Before the National Press Club, ca. 1950,” The Truman Library. 53 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 90. Letter from the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy),” August 26, 1966,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XXIX, Part 1, Korea. 54 Yong-Sup Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 35.
- 32. 32 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 Robert McNamara illustrate Washington’s optimism for the new regime: “The [Chang] Government is moderate, conservative, and striving to meet the natural and justifiable expectations of its people.”55 However, this pluralistic intermission in Korean politics was short-lived; the military, led by the ambitious Park, overthrew the Chang government on May 16, 1961.56 57 In May 17, 1961 General Magruder, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked in a telegram that Park Chung-hee, though formerly convicted “as a Communist”, had loyalties that “[remained] to be determined”; furthermore, he wrote that “if the coup is permitted to be successful, [Park]…may emerge as the most powerful man in Korea.”58 Magruder went on to suggest that he could authorize a suppression of the coup, but the State Department decided to let the situation play out.59 Robert Johnson, a member of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), noted that it was crucial to “make it absolutely clear that U.S. assistance in the future, above a minimum maintenance level, will be conditional upon Korean performance, in accordance with the Administration’s new aid concepts.”60 Park enticed the U.S. to provide the resources for the ROK’s industrialization and the “establishment of a dirigiste state.”61 Park provided the authority and the vision, and the capitalist West provided the resources. Park could not have disagreed more with the words of Lucius Foote. In Park’s mind - due to Korea’s humiliation, destruction, and subjugation at the hands of foreign states - weakness was not strength and morality was not power. Martial and economic empowerment were the clear objectives. Following Mearsheimer’s maxim, because Korea could not achieve great population size, it would have to achieve great wealth in order to build its strength. Throughout the 1960s, Park worked tirelessly to ensure that South Korea and his regime were central to American strategic interests in the East. 55 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 201. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara,” March 2, 1961, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia. 56 Yong-Sup Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” (2011), 35. 57 The coup’s Military Revolutionary Committee promised a number of governing principles inter alia: anti- communism, stabilization of the economy, and observation of the UN Charter as well as its agreements with the United States and other nations. United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 213. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Korea (Magruder) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” May 16, 1961 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia. 58 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 218. Telegram from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Magruder) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer),” May 17, 1961, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia. 59 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea,” May 17, 1961, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia. 60 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 221. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow),” May 23, 1961 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia. 61 Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 133-134.
- 33. Journal of International Relations A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 33 Beginning in 1961, the Kennedy Administration enhanced its assistance to South Korea by sending economic advisers to coordinate with Korean officials. Gregg Brazinsky outlines this balancing act between U.S. economic pressures and Park’s responsive adaptations. Park’s contributions to the Vietnam War reduced American economic leverage over Seoul.62 Security priorities overrode American attempts to use aid to dictate to Seoul. For Washington, an independent ally was better than no ally at all. Park’s concerns over U.S. disengagement were well-founded. In a 1964 memorandum from Secretary to President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara argued for the relocation of a division stationed in South Korea. Rusk advised against this in order to maintain the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance.63 Park rightfully feared declining American commitment to the alliance in the face of draining costs in Southeast Asia. In a memorandum to President Johnson dated January 22, 1964, Robert Komer, a member of the National Security Council staff, argued, “It would be a pity to postpone entirely once again a long-needed shift which would also save some money. There is never a good time to cut, but the plain fact of the matter—no longer denied by anyone—is that we’re over-insured [sic] militarily in Korea at a time when we need strength much more elsewhere. The big danger area is in Southeast Asia not Northeast Asia, and has been ever since the Korean War.”64 Decreasing American prioritization of South Korea from a security standpoint was doubly dangerous for Park. The more distance from the frontlines against Communism attached more conditionality to American aid. Furthermore, this would likely lead to more criticism of Park’s regime and its human rights abuses and autocratic policies. Three unique military theatre threats underpinned the security value of Park’s Korea: North Korea, Communist China, and the USSR. These three theaters attracted the attention of State Department strategists and Pentagon planners to Korea. While Acheson’s 1949 NSC-48/2 document called for a less aggressive stance against the fledgling Maoist regime, the events of the Korean War, the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954, and the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958 positioned Beijing as a hardline opponent to the U.S. and raised the stakes.65 Unlike the jockeying of the pre- WWI era, an escalating conflict in Northeast Asia could “chain-gang” superpower patrons into global thermonuclear war. Until the Vietnam War’s escalation, Korea could operate as a relatively autonomous linchpin in America’s Pacific chain of defense. The Vietnam War was a major stumbling block for Park’s development agenda. The shift 62 Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, “From Pupil to Model: South Korea and American Development Policy during the Early Park Chung Hee Era,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (January 2005): 83-115. 63 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 17. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson,” June 8, 1964 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea. 64 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 2. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Staff to President Johnson,” January 22, 1964, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea. 65 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012): 119, 153, 172.
- 34. 34 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 of U.S. focus from Northeast to Southeast Asia resulted in a transfer of economic and military resources to the SEATO states. Furthermore, the war spurred domestic resistance to a substantial American security commitment to its Asian allies. Also, American tolerance of authoritarianism waned as détente rather than containment became the watchword of Washington’s foreign policy. Park had to ensure that America’s step back was not a step forward for his enemies. As the cynosure of American strategic operations migrated from the Korean DMZ to its Vietnamese counterpart, Park sought to keep South Korea on the frontline. He dispatched 300,000 troops to assist American and South Vietnamese forces fighting the NVA and Viet Cong.66 During the early 1970s, the Pentagon drew down the U.S. military presence in South Korea. A 1971 report by John Holdrige, a member of the NSC outlines the terms of the American withdrawal of forces and the capabilities. He notes that American military commanders in Korea believed that “the ROK armed forces as they presently stand could ‘defeat’ a North Korean attack.”67 Apart from military modernization, the Korean presence in Vietnam brought economic benefits to South Korea. U.S. military aid to the ROK increased almost threefold after the dispatch of troops to Vietnam.68 The U.S. also paid South Korean firms to construct vital infrastructure, totaling a billion dollars from 1965 to 1970.69 The overall economic benefit from ROK intervention jumpstarted the South Korean economy and ignited a period of advanced industrialization. Another challenge to Park’s autocratic rule came from the growing prominence of democratic and pluralistic values. Despite the U.S.-ROK alliance, Korean governance did not resemble Western democratic values. As with the Sino-Korean relationship, common values carried less weight than core state objectives. Park’s façade of democracy gave way to explicit authoritarianism in October 1972 with the formulation of the Yushin Constitution. Consequently, this new policy strained ROK’s relations with the human rights-focused Carter administration.70 Carter and his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, pressured Park to lessen his oppressive grip, fearing potential damages to their vital strategic relationship.71 Nevertheless, American dissatisfaction continued to grow, reaching its apogee as Park spearheaded a secret program to develop nuclear weapons. 66 Min Yong Lee, “The Vietnam War: South Korea’s Search for National Security,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 426. 67 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 90. Report by John H. Holdrige of the National Security Council Staff,” April 16, 1971, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972. 68 Min Yong Lee, “The Vietnam War: South Korea’s Search for National Security,” 420. 69 Brazinsky, “From Pupil to Model,” 110. 70 Hyug Baeg Im, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 233. 71 Yong-Jick Kim, “The Security, Political, and Human Rights Conundrum, 1974-1979,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 480.
- 35. Journal of International Relations A Forbidden LAnd oF GreAt importAnce 35 President Richard Nixon’s 1969 Guam Doctrine troubled the members of the Park Government.72 73 As American appetite for military presence in East Asia began to fade, the ROK government began to fear of abandonment. This time, their concerns caused Korean leaders to leverage national defense capabilities.74 According to Sung Gul Hong, the innately military-based U.S.-ROK relationship was necessitated by the Viet Cong threat. Thus, the waning NVA/Viet Cong threats prompted the Park regime to seek insurance against American disengagement and develop nuclear weapons.75 The possession of nuclear strike capability would be the ultimate liberation from the patron-client paradigm; however, it also threatened to lead to regional proliferation. Park’s atomic ambitions tested the goodwill of the U.S. and as relations warmed with Communist China, the South Korean nuclear pursuits aggravated American policymakers who aimed to prevent Seoul’s acquisition of such capabilities. The U.S. repeatedly warned Park to abandon his nuclear objectives and threatened to redefine the U.S.-ROK relationship.76 Eventually with Park’s assassination in 1979, South Korea deferred its dreams, satisfactorily assured of protection under the American missile shield. The ROK would not take the final step to free itself from voluntary clientage. CONCLUSION Ultimately, Korea adapted its foreign policy in order to ensure its independence in light of a changing international environment. The Sino-Korean patron-client relationship is unique because it challenges the traditional IR understanding of patron-client relations. Korea achieved its core interests and resolved foreign relations issues through this relationship. Resultant regime stability generated security benefits for both parties. However, the emergence of multipolarity in the nineteenth century challenged the viability of this paradigm, however. The Qing were unable and unwilling to expend the necessary resources to check growing Japanese influence over Korea. Of the potential patron states, Russia had the greatest interest in preserving Korean autonomy and limiting competition from Meiji Japan. For Korea, Russian patronage deterred Japanese aggression and provided space for Korean modernization. However, other powers, seeking to balance Russia’s seeming ascendancy, endorsed Japanese regional expansion at Korea’s expense. Thus, it was nigh impossible for Chosŏn to find a patron with enough power to deter Japan and protect Korean 72 President Nixon’s so-called “Guam Doctrine” responded to the ongoing crisis in Vietnam by outlining that Asian allied nations must bear more responsibility for their own defense barring “the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons.” United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 29. Editorial Note,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972. 73 J.L.S. Girling, “The Guam Doctrine,” International Affairs 46, no. 1 (January 1970). 74 Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 2000). 75 Sung Gul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011). 76 Ibid., 507.
- 36. 36 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 autonomy. Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War forced the great powers to accept Japan’s claims over Korea, effectively annexing the Peninsula. The Cold War paradigm presented a unique opportunity to South Korea for a beneficial patron- client relationship that promised to deter foes and enable industrialization. Park Chung-hee recognized the ROK’s value to the United States’ overarching Containment doctrine. With a real and justified fear of abandonment, Park brilliantly ensured that South Korea remained a crucial security partner through its involvement in Vietnam. Meanwhile, this shielded Park from Western ideological critiques of his authoritarian leadership and enabled him to oversee one of the greatest development successes in history. By the time that America’s foreign policy shifted from containment to détente, South Korea’s defense capabilities had improved markedly. Park’s strategy to become an indispensable ally to the United States allowed him to extract optimal returns via unidirectional security (and economic) transfers and to deter North Korean aggression.77 78 While domestic politics played a role, structural constraints largely dictated Korea’s ability to utilize patron-client relations to achieve its security goals. A unified Japan, whose immediate expansionism focused on Korea, proved to be the primary threat in the late nineteenth century. Ultimately, structural constraints led to Chosŏn’s decline in the nineteenth century. Unable to muster deterrent capabilities domestically, Korea was forced to pursue a patron state. Unfortunately for Chosŏn, the lack of a solid security commitments from Qing, rising pro-Japanese sentiments in the West, and Russia’s overextension fomented an impossible situation. But, Park Chung-hee learned from the lessons of Korea’s past and made Korea central to American security. To preserve his power and strengthen his state, he volunteered his nation as an integral ally in a bipolar system where international solidarity and strategic advantage were key. WORKS CITED Agarwal, B.S. “Korea as an Epicentre of Northeast Asian Power Politics: A Historical and Geopolitical Perspective.” The Indian Journal of Political Science 67, no. 2 (April-June 2006): 261-278. Bradley, James. The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia. New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2015. Brazinsky, Gregg Andrew. “From Pupil to Model: South Korea and American Development Policy during the Early Park Chung Hee Era.” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (January 2005): 83-115. Carney, Christopher. “International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework.” 77 Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998). 78 Peter Rudloff, “Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and the Role of Constraints,” The Midsouth Political Science Review 14 (December 2013).
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- 42. 42 Joseph Kiernan Spring 2013 | Volume 15 Congress, December 5, 1905. Washington DC: GPO, 1905. http://digital.library.wisc. edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1905. United States Department of State. U.S.-Korea Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce Navigation, 1882. http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/June_2012/1- 1822%20Treaty.pdf. Wilz, John Edward. “Did the United States Betray Korea in 1905?.” Pacific Historical Review 54, no. 3 (August 1985): 243-270. Yi Hangno. “Memorial to Express Private Thoughts.” In Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two, edited by Yŏngho Ch’oe, Peter H. Lee, and Wm. Theodore de Bary, 236-239. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Yi Manson. “Memorial Submitted by Ten Thousand Men.” In Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume Two, edited by Yŏngho Ch’oe, Peter H. Lee, and Wm. Theodore de Bary, 242-244. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Joseph Kiernan is a junior studying diplomatic history and political science at the University of Pennsylvania. He has broad interests in international political economy, international security, and U.S. foreign policy with a focus on East Asia. His current research includes a senior history honors thesis on the diplomatic history of the American economic, expatriate, and governmental response to Japan’s annexation of Manchuria in the 1930s and a project exploring the state-led development of Cold War-era anti-communist authoritarian states. Outside of his studies, Joe directs the Penn Forum for Legislative Action, a student-led federal advocacy program which he co-founded.
- 43. Journal of International Relations Lee Teng-hui’s DomesTic anD Foreign PoLicies 43 ABSTRACT Taiwan’s foreign policy towards Mainland China has changed over the last twenty years. Notwithstanding the peculiar circumstances surrounding Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation as a result of the One-China Policy, the island has, on many occasions, relinquished opportunities to improve relations with Mainland China in order to preserve a perceived sense of Taiwanese identity. This paper argues that the colonial background of President Lee Teng-hui has substantially influenced his diplomatic strategy and differentiated it from that of his Kuomintang (KMT) predecessors and colleagues from the mid-1990s onwards. This paper begins by focusing on the effects of Japanese colonial heritage on Lee’s domestic and foreign goals during his presidency. Significant attention is paid to Lee’s vision of a Taiwanese identity and the colonial cultural characteristics that influenced his ideals, made apparent either overtly through statements or covertly through policy decisions. INTRODUCTION Since its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, Taiwan’s diplomatic strength has been in freefall. The Republic of China went from being the United Nations Charter’s first signatory in 19451 to having formal ambassadorial relations with only twenty-two countries by 2014.2 Analysis of the island’s diplomacy must first take into account Taiwan’s difficult circumstances at the time of Lee Teng-hui election as President of the Republic of China in 1988. Frustration 1 “Part 1, Chapter 1: Origin and Evolution of the United Nations,” The Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47, 33. 2 “Diplomatic Allies of the ROC,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan). A Study of Colonial Cultural Influences on Lee Teng-hui’s Domestic and Foreign Policies by dominic chiu univeRsity of chicAgo
- 44. 44 Dominic chiu Spring 2016 | Volume 18 with the lack of diplomatic recognition and representation on the international stage has commonly been identified as a root cause of independence movements on the island. The expression of a particular “Taiwanese identity” as opposed to a Chinese one is most apparent in the remarks and policies of the independence movement’s unofficial figurehead, former President Lee Teng-hui. In fact, evidence suggests that the vision of Taiwanese identity as one distinct from its Mainland Chinese heritage was already present in the domestic and foreign policies of Lee’s presidency from 1988 to 2000.3 This paper argues that Lee’s ambition to establish a unique Taiwanese identity, independent from the Mainland, has aggravated Taiwan’s isolation in the region, rather than vice versa. Samuel Huntington believes that the cultural patterns of a nation-state are externally expressed in their domestic models and international outlook.4 By extension, knowing the cultural characteristics and upbringing of political leaders is crucial to understanding a nation’s foreign policy. The case study presented is an analysis of Taiwanese policies under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui. Despite being an economic Asian Tiger with an identity more or less formed by traditional Chinese culture, Lee’s policies that have contributed to the Taiwan localization movement can be partially accounted for by his particular cultural background, upbringing, and education. His colonial Japanese upbringing and continuous interaction with the Japanese ethos of isolationism and independence from China has informed much of his political ideals, most noticeably in cross-Strait relations. First, this paper will discuss the specific cultural characteristics of Japanese society which were imprinted upon Taiwan in the Kominka colonial years between 1895 and 1945. Second, this paper examines two categories of evidence pointing to how Lee’s formative education under this colonial background contributed to policies that increased tensions in cross- Strait relations. The first concerns statements and activities made by Lee, in which he increasingly admired Yamato-Damashii, or Japanese spirit,5 and used this sentiment to support a politically and culturally independent Taiwan. The second are key domestic and foreign policy decisions implemented during his presidency that have informed the emergence of the Taiwanese localization movement, the principal ideology undergirding the push for Taiwanese independence. These policies and their short-term consequences have also led to significant but preventable tensions with the Mainland which cumulated in the 1995 cross-Strait crisis. THE JAPANESE SPIRIT AND THE KOMINKA MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN In his partition of the world into civilizations, Samuel Huntington classified Japan as a “lone country”6 distinct from the Sinic civilization. This contrasts with George Yeo’s assertion that 3 Chien-min Chao and Bruce J. Dickson, “Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy,” in Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics, eds. Bruce J. Dickson and Chao Chien-min (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 5. 4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 237. 5 Yi-shen Chen, “Lee Teng-hui, in His Own Words,” Taipei Times, September 17, 2015. 6 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 133.
- 45. Journal of International Relations Lee Teng-hui’s DomesTic anD Foreign PoLicies 45 Japan should normatively be seen as part of a larger East Asian cultural sphere.7 Furthermore, Huntington’s assertion is derived not only from an observation of the nation-civilization’s cultural insularity throughout history, but also from Japan’s historical economic isolation that precluded the country from creating Japanese-led regional trade organizations.8 The phenomenon of entrepreneurs operating exclusively from their home base, alongside other cultural barriers resisting import9 and inbound acquisitions, have nurtured protectionist interests among trading partners and failed to create significant trading constituencies10 analogous to ASEAN or NAFTA. It is therefore reasonable to ascribe notions of cultural and economic insularity to the contemporary Japanese state.11 The Sakoku era between the 17th and 19th centuries led to a national distinction between the elite culture and the nation’s indigenous culture.12 Herein arises the concept of Yamato-Damashii –– or the ‘Japanese Spirit’ –– which is the Japanese conviction of a distinct cultural and national identity independent from China.13 An emphasis on cultural independence sustaining the Japanese national body, or Kokutai, was systematically indoctrinated into the country and its colonies during the 1930s under the direction of the newly established Education Reform Council. The trinity of “Shintoism, state, and indoctrination,”14 along with propaganda15 convincing colonial subjects to be citizens of the Japanese emperor, was imposed upon Taiwan during the Kominka16 movement. Systematic exposure to Japanese literature and martial arts was typical under wartime indoctrination17 and in the formative years of Lee’s education. Lee himself admitted to have always considered himself a Japanese until he was 22 years of age18 and was a Bushido enthusiast in his youth.19 A colonial educational background, combined with a significant number of pro-Japanese statements and writings made it common for Lee’s detractors to brand him as a “zealous convert to Nipponism.”20 7 George Yeo, George Yeo on Bonsai, Banyan and the Tao (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2015), 411. 8 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 134. 9 Mayumi Itoh, Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 36. 10 Gary R. Saxonhouse, “Economic Growth and Trade Relations: Japanese Performance in Long-Term Perspective,” Trade and Protectionism NBER-EASE 2 (1993): 176. 11 Shunsuke Tsurumi, An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan, 1931-1945 (London: Routledge, 1986), 18. 12 Ibid., 16. 13 Gilbert Rozman, “Japanese National Identity: A Six-Dimensional Analysis,” in East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), 34. 14 Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 31. 15 Ibid., 33. 16 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japanese National Identity: Evolution and Prospects,” in East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), 153. 17 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, 39. 18 Ibid., 35. 19 Ibid., 45. 20 Ibid., 35.
- 46. 46 Dominic chiu Spring 2016 | Volume 18 THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND DOMESTIC POLICIES OF LEE TENG- HUI Although statements explicitly appreciating the effects of Japanese rule on Taiwan were limited during his presidency, Lee affirmed the importance of Western democratic values in contradiction to the “feudal and authoritarian” nature of traditional Chinese culture.21 His belief that Taiwan was fortunate to free itself from this “pernicious influence” as a result of historical exposure to different foreign influences marked a clear endorsement of the benefits of modernization.22 In the later years of his presidency, Lee downplayed the exploitative history of Japanese colonialism23 and hinted at the desirability of a new Taiwanese cultural identity independent from Mainland China.24 His adherence to Bushido, a traditional form of Japanese chivalry used to enforce militaristic morale in Japan during World War II, was consistent throughout his political career. Lee’s affinity with Japanese philosophy grew to the extent that he recommended the cultivation of “spiritual discipline” among Japanese politicians, the lack of which he saw as a cause of Japan’s economic and social decline at the turn of the century.25 A consistent cultural affinity towards Japan also extends into Lee’s retirement years. This is shown through his authoring of a guide on Bushido in 2004,26 frequent statements supporting Japanese sovereignty over the contested Senkaku Islands,27 and a close correspondence with the known Japanese revisionist author Ryotaro Shiba.28 In an encounter with Shiba in March 1994, Lee openly discussed the idea of Taiwan bearing a cultural and national identity independent from the Mainland and demonstrated anti-Chinese sentiments. Although Lee did not explicitly endorse Taiwanese independence, he did not deny nor object to Shiba’s assertion that the Taiwanese and the Chinese share a common ancestral heritage in the same way as the Germans and the Swedes do. This implies that the vast cultural and political differences that currently exist between the two distinct European nations also similarly exist for the two societies across the Strait.29 Pro-Japanese political philosophy has implicitly manifested itself in policy decisions made during Lee’s presidency. The first is reflected in the democratic transition of the Taiwanese government, which began before Lee’s presidency under his predecessor, Chiang Ching-Kuo.30 21 Ya-li Lu, “Lee Teng-hui’s Role in Taiwan’s Democratization,” in Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics, eds. Bruce J. Dickson and Chao Chien-min (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 67. 22 Ibid., 67. 23 Teng-hui Lee, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1999), 139. 24 Lu, “Lee Teng-hui’s Role in Taiwan’s Democratization,” 68. 25 Teng-hui Lee, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity, 156. 26 Teng-hui Lee, Wu Shi Dao Jie Ti: Zuo Ren De Gen Ben, (Taipei: Qian Wei Chu Ban, 2004). 27 Shannon Tiezzi, “Taiwan’s Former President Causes Controversy in Japan,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2015. 28 Junyan Wang, Zhan Hou Tai Ri Guan Xi Mi Shi (Fuzhou: Fujian Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2000), 230. 29 “The Grief of Being Born a Taiwanese,” Asahi Weekly, May 6-13, 1994, reprinted in Congressional Record 140, 96, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, July 21, 1994, p. S9340. 30 Ching-fen Hu, “Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 5, no.1 (Winter 2005).
- 47. Journal of International Relations Lee Teng-hui’s DomesTic anD Foreign PoLicies 47 Lee’s role in democratizing Taiwan is centered on constitutional reform, which occurred six times from 1990 to 2000.31 In this period, Lee engaged in a series of power struggles against conservative KMT leaders over two major issues: electoral reforms and the status of provincial governments. KMT leaders advocated for electoral reforms in ways which should not give the Mainland government the impression that Taiwan was to abandon the “One- China principle.”32 The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) proposal for universal suffrage in electing the President stems from the belief that direct elections were the best way to demonstrate Taiwan’s status as a sovereign state.33 As a reaction, conservative KMT leaders proposed an alternative method by which election were to be mediated –– and hence, in their view, stabilized –– by the National Assembly. In this case, the National Assembly would function similarly to the Electoral College in the United States. Although Lee initially gave his consent to the KMT proposal, a few days before enacting the constitutional amendment he suddenly announced his support for another, created by the DPP.34 This strategy, as this paper will argue, was extremely damaging to party unity and led to the election of pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian in 2000. Lee employed similar strategies in liaising with liberal KMT members and –– as the KMT chairman –– with the DPP on the issue of reforming provincial government. The popularity of James Soong, first an appointed and then a popularly elected governor of Taiwan, begot speculation of a ‘Yeltsin Effect,’ where the Mainland-born Soong would overpower the Taiwanese Lee.35 Under the ostensible reason of improving administrative efficiency, Lee moved the National Assembly in 1997 –– with significant evidence of political coercion involved36 –– to disband the provincial assembly and to curb the powers of the governor. This move, along with Lee’s strategy in reforming the presidential election system, had enormous political symbolism in the history of Taiwanese independence. By concentrating power in the presidency and downgrading the notion of the island being a “province,” Lee aimed to legitimize the idea that Taiwan is the Republic of China, not a subset it. Conferring electoral rights onto the people of the island further strengthens this notion of a Taiwanese government with the popular mandate of Taiwanese citizens. By contrast, the National Assembly claims mandate over the entire Mainland. By overtly eliminating a potential rival37 through his constitutional reforms, Lee also alienated Soong from the KMT. He eventually ran as an independent presidential candidate in 2000, taking most of the pro-Mainland supporters with him and splitting the KMT’s electoral base.38 31 Lu, “Lee Teng-hui’s Role in Taiwan’s Democratization,” 58. 32 Ibid., 56. 33 Ibid., 70. 34 Ibid., 57. 35 Ibid., 60. 36 Ramon H. Myers, Linda Chao, and Tai-chun Kuo, “Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1996-2000,” in Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics, eds. Bruce J. Dickson and Chao Chien-min (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 76. 37 Chao and Dickson, “Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy,” 8. 38 Myers, Chao, and Kuo, “Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1996-2000,” 74.
- 48. 48 Dominic chiu Spring 2016 | Volume 18 The division led to a three-way election and ultimately paved the way for Chen Shui-bian’s election by a narrow plurality of thirty-nine percent.39 It is important to note that Lee refused to support Soong’s bid for the KMT nomination and insisted on backing the unpopular Lien Chan,40 with the former candidate actually gaining a wider margin of votes than the latter. This splintering of votes in 2000 resulted in further divisions within the anti-independence coalition; James Soong has since run against the KMT twice as a presidential candidate in 2012 and 2016. Lee himself was forced to resign from the KMT chairmanship and was ultimately expelled from the party in March 2001.41 Without the obligations of officially representing the KMT, his advocacy for a distinct Taiwanese identity became even more apparent. He condoned the formation of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, a political party even more pro- independence and pro-Taiwanization than the DPP. Lee’s admirable efforts to democratize the island should therefore always be seen under the context of his political philosophy. These policies, though not conducive to liberal democracy, reflected his pro-Taiwanization beliefs because they legitimized and mainstreamed Taiwanese independence movements and parties by undermining the KMT’s political monopoly. His continual support of President Chen and other pan-Green parties after retirement from government further indicates his desire to achieve sovereignty for Taiwan in a way that is politically independent and culturally distinct from the Mainland.42 INFLUENCES ON FOREIGN POLICIES While the democratization of Taiwan did not facilitate improvements in cross-Strait relations, Lee’s foreign policies led to more identifiable tensions with the Mainland government. His demand for a “special state-to-state” diplomatic status with the Mainland in July 1999 unpleasantly surprised Washington,43 particularly given that no government agencies in Taiwan consulted the Americans about Lee’s unilateral declaration.44 It is important to remember that incremental improvements in cross-Strait relations were largely unimpeded since the late 1980s, and in spite of the Tiananmen Incident, the Wang-Koo Summit allowed for the solidifying of the 1992 Consensus. Adherence to the “One-China principle” by governments on both sides of the Strait is crucial in order for negotiations and consensus to take place. Although the precise definition of “China” qua government was contingent upon each side of the Strait to assert, the Mainland has remained remarkably consistent in its position on the One-China policy as a consensus aimed at eventual political unification. Taiwan under Lee, on the other hand, shifted Taiwan’s policy goals away from the One-China policy,45 leaving cross-Strait relations in jeopardy by 1999. Lee characterized “One-China” not as a political concept –– contrary to the expectations laid down by both polities in 1992 –– but a historical and cultural 39 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, 212. 40 Chao and Dickson, “Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy,” 21. 41 Ibid., 17. 42 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, 214. 43 Ibid., 211. 44 Myers, Chao, and Kuo, “Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1996-2000,” 86. 45 Julian J. Kuo, “Cross-Strait Relations: Buying Time without Strategy,” in Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics, eds. Bruce J. Dickson and Chao Chien-min (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 204.
- 49. Journal of International Relations Lee Teng-hui’s DomesTic anD Foreign PoLicies 49 one in a white paper issued in July 1994.46 This implicit denial in the need or hope for any political reunification is in effect a slap in the face of previously agreed-upon negotiations. The publication of this white paper combined with Lee’s meeting with Ryotaro Shiba described above further gave the Mainland government the impression of Lee as a separatist, not in the traditional sense of maintaining the existence of a government independent from the Mainland (as the KMT has done after 1949) but rather for violating the consensus on the One- China principle.47 Lee’s inconsistency in bridging the 1992 Consensus with his vision of a Taiwanese state cumulated in a provocative speech at Cornell University, which catalyzed a cross-Strait military crisis and a souring of Sino-U.S. relations in June 1995.48 Lee’s “purposeful ambivalence”49 in committing to the Consensus during his presidency was also evaluated by the Mainland government alongside his “Pragmatic Policy” on the international stage. Lee embarked upon a diplomatic odyssey in the latter years of his presidency to strengthen both official and unofficial relations with other countries. A combination of strategies - bribing representatives of developing countries, hiring lobbying firms in the United States to win favors from the government, and even offering one billion U.S. dollars to the United Nations in 1995 for a seat separate from that of Mainland China’s - were employed within the span of a year.50 To the Mainland, these measures indicated that Lee was attempting to buy time after the formulation of the Consensus in order to gain greater legitimate influence in his foreign policies, adding accusations of conspiracy to existing ambiguity. Lee would eventually deny the existence of the 1992 Consensus with the Mainland government altogether after his retirement,51 making his intentions on the objective of cross-Strait relations clear. Lee’s failure to stall concrete unification negotiations is also apparent in his “go-slow, be patient” or jie ji yong yin policies, which aimed to restrict cross-Strait economic and financial cooperation with the Mainland.52 Under these policies, enacted between 1995 and 1996, investments in Mainland China by Taiwanese financiers and businessmen were capped at 50 million U.S. dollars, and investments in several high growth sectors such as infrastructure and technology industries were strictly regulated or prohibited altogether.53 This move - aimed primarily at preventing capital outflow from Taiwan and preserving economic independence from China - demonstrated isolationism similar to Japanese isolationism that aimed to preserve corporate and financial sovereignty. Lee’s secondary aim in enacting this policy was to diversify Taiwanese investments away from Mainland China and redirect incentives to Southeast Asia and Latin American countries.54 Pragmatically, this also bolstered Taiwan’s economic clout and 46 Ibid., 207. 47 Ibid., 205. 48 Ibid., 210. 49 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, 202. 50 Ibid., 196. 51 Alison Hsiao, “No Such Thing as the ‘1992 Consensus’: Lee Teng-hui,” Taipei Times, May 3, 2015. 52 Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity, 209. 53 Julian J. Kuo, “Cross-Strait Relations: Buying Time without Strategy,” 214. 54 Chao and Dickson, “Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy,” 13.
- 50. 50 Dominic chiu Spring 2016 | Volume 18 contributed to semi-official recognition of its sovereignty. Neither of the two aims, however, bore fruit because they failed to reflect the economic reality across the Straits at the time. Taiwanese investments in the Mainland were reaching unprecedented levels in spite of the the military crisis; moreover, immediately after the crisis, the Taiwanese entrepreneur Wang Yung- ching pledged 3 billion U.S. dollars to develop a Fujian power plant.55 After the implementation of go-slow policies, Taiwanese entrepreneurs became further alienated from the government and simply turned a blind eye to capital outflow restrictions. The discrepancy in investment statistics kept by the Mainland and the Taiwanese officials demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the go-slow policies.56 Though Taiwan’s state-sponsored investments in ASEAN countries were set back by the Asian financial crisis,57 close economic and trade ties eventually deterred countries such as the Bahamas and South Africa from breaking formal diplomatic relations with the island. Lee sacrificed good economic sense in the face of nationalism. Despite geographic proximity, high economic growth and cultural affinity with Mainland China, Lee ignored the promising investment opportunities for Taiwanese entrepreneurs. By prioritizing international diplomacy over Mainland policy development, Lee signaled that he intended to solidify Taiwan’s reputation abroad as a sovereign state independent from and without consultation with the People’s Republic.58 Perhaps more ironically, Lee’s reluctance to encourage investment on the Mainland cost his government an important bargaining chip in cross-Strait negotiations. In the 1980s, Taiwan contributed to 20 percent of Mainland China’s total foreign direct investment (FDI); that number shrank to 9.5 percent in the 1990s.59 This left military strength and pre-existing sovereignty as the only deterrents from Mainland aggression. CONCLUSION It is difficult to trace a causal relationship between the decisionmaking and the upbringing and education of political leaders. However, this is not impossible in the case of Lee Teng- hui, given his unique place in the history of Taiwanese politics and his eclectic background as a Japanese-born politician in a culturally Chinese polity. Despite being the President of a Chinese republic, Lee identifies with Japanese culture and admires Japan’s sense of national unity and cultural cohesion. His beliefs informed many significant policies and resulted in greater political clout for the Taiwanese independence movement. Despite these moves toward independence, Lee’s inconsistent policies concerning Mainland China and restriction of capital outflow alienated both Taiwanese entrepreneurs and the Mainland, strained cross- Strait relations, and fragmented popular support for the pro-unification KMT. As Taiwan 55 Julian J. Kuo, “Cross-Strait Relations: Buying Time without Strategy,” 213. 56 Yusuo Zheng, “The Role of Hong Kong in Cross-Strait Relations,” in The Return of HK and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations, eds. Jiaying Wang and Chiyan Zheng (Hong Kong, research Center on Cross-Strait Relations, 1999), 19-30. 57 Chien-min Chao, “The Republic of China’s Foreign Relations under President Lee Teng-hui,” in Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics, eds. Bruce J. Dickson and Chao Chien-min (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 193. 58 Ibid., 200. 59 Julian J. Kuo, “Cross-Strait Relations: Buying Time without Strategy,” 215.
- 51. Journal of International Relations Lee Teng-hui’s DomesTic anD Foreign PoLicies 51 elects its second pan-Green president in 2016, to preserve peace across the Strait, it is crucial to reflect on other historical-cultural factors influencing the rise of a Sinosceptic Taiwan. BIBLIOGRAPHY Chen, Yi-shen. “Lee Teng-hui, in His Own Words.” Taipei Times. September 17, 2015. http:// www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/09/17/2003627882. Dickson, Bruce J., and Chien-min Chao. Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. “Diplomatic Allies of the ROC.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan). Accessed January 9, 2016. http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_M_1.aspx?n=E2D9 960510149240&sms=11A1988B544F2155. Hsiao, Alison. “No Such Thing as the ‘1992 Consensus’: Lee Teng-hui.” Taipei Times. May 3, 2015. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ archives/2015/05/03/2003617348. Hu, Ching-fen. “Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan.” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 5, no 1 (Winter 2005): 26–44. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Itoh, Mayumi. Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Lee, Teng-hui. The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity. Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1999. Lee, Teng-hui. Wu Shi Dao Jie Ti: Zuo Ren De Gen Ben. Translated by Zhiqiang Xiao. Chu Ban edition. Taipei: Qian Wei Chu Ban, 2004. “Part 1, Chapter 1: Origin and Evolution of the United Nations.” The Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47. Accessed January 17, 2106. http://cdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/ chapter_pdf/1946-47YUN/1946-47_P1_SEC1.pdf. Rozman, Gilbert. East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012. Saxonhouse, Gary R. “Economic Growth and Trade Relations: Japanese Performance in Long-Term Perspective.” Trade and Protectionism NBER-EASE 2 (1993): 149-82.
- 52. 52 Dominic chiu Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Tiezzi, Shannon. “Taiwan’s Former President Causes Controversy in Japan.” The Diplomat. July 30, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/taiwans-former-president-causes- controversy-in-japan/. “The Grief of Being Born a Taiwanese.” Asahi Weekly. May 6-13, 1994. Reprinted in Congressional Record 140. 96. 103rd Congress. 2nd Session. July 21, 1994. p. S9340. Accessed January 17, 2016. http://fas.org/news/taiwan/1994/s940721- taiwan2.htm Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Tsurumi, Shunsuke. An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan, 1931-1945. London: Routledge, 1986. Wang, Jiaying and Chiyan Zheng. The Return of HK and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations. Hong Kong: Research Center on Cross-Strait Relations, 1999. Wang, Junyan. Zhan Hou Tai Ri Guan Xi Mi Shi. Fuzhou: Fujian Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2000. Yeo, George. George Yeo on Bonsai, Banyan and the Tao. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2015. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dominic Chiu is a senior at the University of Chicago double majoring in Economics and Philosophy. An international student from Hong Kong, he is interested in East Asian politics and the Chinese political economy. On campus, Dominic served as the President of the Hong Kong Students Association from 2014 to 2015, during which he hosted an international symposium on the city’s Umbrella Movement. Dominic has also completed internships at Prudential and PricewaterhouseCoopers, and will start his M.A. at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C. this fall.
- 53. Journal of International Relations Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive plan of aCtion 53 ABSTRACT Using North Korea as a case study, this paper argues that Iran agreed to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, as a disingenuous approach to nuclear proliferation. This paper argues that the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action did not mark an end to Iran’s nuclear intentions, but rather demonstrated a calculated deferral of its destructive political aims. It is also argued that the JCPA enables Iran to cheat on its non-proliferation promises. INTRODUCTION Historically, during the Cold War, countries bent on acquiring nuclear weapons have done so successfully, even in the face of mounting international pressure. North Korea, an initial signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), eventually reneged on its international obligations and produced a weapons program. The purpose of the NPT was to actively prevent such attempts at horizontal proliferation. From 1992-2000, the U.S. imposed six rounds of sanctions against North Korea.1 Throughout this period of severe domestic economic turmoil, North Korea still pursued a “military-first” policy, whereby it gave the military preferential access to public resources, while at the same time neglecting its citizens.2 This policy caused mass domestic famine and starvation throughout the 1990s. Conservative estimates indicate between 2-3 million North Korean civilians died.3 In channeling resources 1 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, May 2015. 2 Jordan Weissman, “How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea,” The Atlantic, December 20, 2011. 3 Ibid. Strategic Concerns for the Inevitable Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action By Samuel Natbony University of Pennsylvania
- 54. 54 Samuel NatboNy Spring 2016 | Volume 18 to the military and starving its citizens, North Korea covertly restarted its nuclear program. However, under the belief that the state had credibly committed to non-proliferation, the U.S. eased sanctions in 2000. Later, in the summer of 2002, once the U.S. discovered the nuclear restart efforts, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. By early 2003, it publicly announced the completion of its first nuclear weapon.4 During this period, North Korea pursued what this paper refers to as a “two steps forward, one step back approach,” during which the nation made secret progress on its nuclear program while making occasional marginal concessions to the West to maintain a façade of legitimacy. For example, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) charged North Korea with violating the NPT through suspected weapons production in 1992, the country threatened to withdraw from the NPT.5 Instead of withdrawing, it negotiated with the U.S. by pledging to end its weapons program in exchange for a $4.8 billion commitment to building two additional peaceful nuclear reactors. As a part of the agreement, North Korea promised to render the reactors involved in the weapons process temporarily inoperable.6 By submitting to inspections, North Korea gained two benefits: a material benefit in the form of the monetary commitment and the other, an intangible benefit of perceived cooperative behavior amongst the international community. However, the state utilized the facility at Yongbyon, the very reactor that the IAEA confirmed was shut down and rendered unusable during the 1990s, ten years later to produce its first weapon. The facility remains active in producing current nuclear weapons.7 In this process, the U.S. placed too much trust in its negotiations with North Korea in the 1990s. This paper argues that the Washington is likely falling into a similar trap with Iran. IRANIAN STRATEGY THROUGH A NORTH KOREAN LENS When given the choice between making concessions in the short-term or forfeiting its program altogether, North Korea made disingenuous commitments with a long-run strategy of eventually restarting production. For them, concessions simply delayed the program nine years from the point of its initial 1994 joint framework agreements. In the deal struck in the summer of 2015, Iran similarly agreed to a series of concessions related to various aspects of its nuclear program. Proponents of the deal tout the securement of an Iranian commitment to reduce its number of operable centrifuges down to a maximum of 5,060 R1-type centrifuges, a decrease from approximately 19,000 initially.8 Additionally, the deal allows any non-R1 Centrifuges, which have higher Uranium enrichment capacities, only to enrich Uranium at a singular location, the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), for research and developmental purposes.9 The deal further binds Iran to promptly dispose of any uranium enriched at PFEP once testing is complete, a provision which is intended to prevent buildup of highly enriched fissile material. Since Iran met the initial reduction, reporting, and redesign requirements of 4 Davenport, “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association. 5 “North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts,” CNN, May 22, 2015. 6 Davenport, “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association. 7 Stephen Evan, “North Korea Yongbyon Site in Operation,” BBC, September 15, 2015. 8 Jennifer Williams, “A Comprehensive Timeline of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Brookings Institute, July 21, 2015. 9 Ibid.
- 55. Journal of International Relations Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive plan of aCtion 55 the deal during IAEA inspections in early 2016, the international community is beginning to phase out its first round of non-missile related sanctions, which will amount to an approximate $100 billion gain through possible oil sales and the liquidation of previously frozen assets.10 The deal by no means rules out the possibility that Iran acquires a bomb and faces a large number of obstacles to successfully prevent proliferation. First, the very fact that Iran permitted a centrifuge ceiling of approximately 5,000 units is largely indicative of its intent for weaponization. Creating a sustainable, industrial-sized energy program requires a significantly larger network of centrifuges. Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morrell believes that “by limiting them to a small number of centrifuges, we are limiting them to the number you need for a weapon.”11 Iran’s willingness to shrink its centrifuge capacity down so significantly discredits its purported intentions of generating a self-sufficient nuclear energy state. This is not to say that the U.S. ought to encourage Iran to increase its centrifuge capacity. If Iran is pursuing a weapons program, a lower centrifuge capacity is better than a higher capacity. Despite lowering the regime’s ability for short-term weapons production, these capacity cuts lend more probability to the view that Iran’s long-term political intentions are to proliferate weapons. Three other aspects of Iran’s existing program strongly signal its intention to create nuclear weapons technology. First, the regime built its Fordow nuclear facility underground, intentionally concealing the plant from satellite imaging and possible pre-emptive military strikes.12 If the facility were being used exclusively for civilian purposes then there would be no credible reason to bear the extra construction costs of building the facility underground.13 Additionally, although part of the deal is to deconstruct such a capacity, the Arak heavy-water reactor was designed with the ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.14 Plutonium can be used as fuel for nuclear power plants, even though uranium is the international standard. Merely building Arak, with its added, costly capacity to generate large stockpiles of plutonium, indicates a desire to use fissile material for militaristic purposes. Second, the deal allows Iran to pursue a similar strategy to what this paper termed as North Korea’s “two steps forward, one step back” strategy. In this case, by submitting to the regulations pronounced in the agreement, Iran gains two benefits: 1) increased international legitimacy through program transparency; and 2) access to nearly $100 billion after the first round of inspections. This gain is close to ten times the size of Iran’s total 2015 military budget of $10-12 billion.15 Additionally, in “A 2013 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” Iran analyst Karim Sadjapour estimated that “the total cost of [Iran’s current nuclear program 10 Jackie Northam, “Lifting Sanctions will Release $100B to Iran,” NPR, July 21, 2015. 11 Adam Kredo, “The Current Nuclear Deal Will Leave Iran with 5000 Centrifuges,” Business Insider, June 30, 2015. 12 “Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant,” Nuclear Threat Institute, December 14, 2013. 13 Samor, “Decoding the Nuclear Deal,” Harvard Kennedy School, April 2015. 14 Michelle Moghtader, “Iran Says it is Redesigning Arak Reactor to Cut Plutonium Capacity,” Reuters, June 12, 2014. 15 Anthony Cordesman, “The Conventional Military,” United States Institute of Peace, August 2015.
- 56. 56 Samuel NatboNy Spring 2016 | Volume 18 including] construction, operation, research, and nuclear-related international sanctions totaled around $100 billion.”16 Therefore, excluding the immaterial costs related to nuclear sanctions and accounting for the cost-cutting nature of technological improvements since 2013, Iran’s regime would gain an increase in liquid assets greater than the full amount of its existing program, which currently includes 17 facilities. This money is not merely a lump sum, rather, much of it derives from increased oil revenues, which the regime will indefinitely continue to receive on an annual basis after sanctions are lifted. A proponent of the deal might claim that since Iran scaled back its oil program while undergoing strict sanctions, actualizing these oil revenues will still require a significant capital investment over the long-term. However, Iran has hastily been crafting deals totaling over $100 billion to source investment from Western oil companies since the deal was struck.17 These deals will allow the regime to produce over 1 million barrels per day, fronted through foreign funds.18 These foreign private sector oil investments will leave the regime highly liquid and unhindered to invest most of its newly acquired capital in the nuclear sector without fear of sanctions or over-investment in oil expenditures. Accordingly, Iran could be choosing to suffer minor costs in the first stage of JCPA compliance as a means of acquiring assets to later allocate to a more rapidly progressing nuclear program. Iran’s patience for its nuclear program augments this problem: it is not under immediate threat of an attack from any of its most actively declared enemies, Israel or the United States. And so, the time value of political and military benefits offered by its nuclear program is quite constant. That is, the present value of a nuclear program is almost identical to its future value to the Iranian regime. Given this theoretical political patience, the regime logically would be willing to pay immediate costs out of necessity, to preserve a long-term potential to create a successful weapons program. FAULTY IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES The deal does not have foolproof measures of ensuring Iran’s compliance. Specifically, in relation to tests of centrifuges with higher enriching power, the deal requires Iran to: 1) conduct all such testing in the PFEP; and 2) dispose of all highly-enriched uranium produced as a part of such research & development.19 However, if Iran decides to cheat on the deal, there is little that the IAEA or the U.S. can do to observe non-compliance. This cheating could take the form of either producing highly enriched uranium at a hidden facility or producing it at PFEP, but illegally holding it in hidden stockpiles instead of properly disposing it. American political officials claim that such defections can be detected through continuous surveillance by the IAEA due to “intelligence reports, suspicious purchases, and isotope readings across Iran.”20 However, such measures are likely to be insufficient. First, given the high economic 16 Armin Rosen, “Iran’s Nuclear Program May have Cost the Country $500 Billion,” Business Insider, June 30, 2015. 17 Evan Kelly, “Iran Sweetens the Deal for Foreign Oil Companies,” Yahoo Finance, November 27, 2015. 18 Ibid. 19 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Washington Post, July 14, 2015. 20 Eyder Peralta, “Six Things you Should Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal,” NPR, July 15, 2015.
- 57. Journal of International Relations Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive plan of aCtion 57 and political costs of being caught, Iran logically would invest significant capital into designing an elaborate system that prevents detection of its cheating measures.21 The $100 billion in liquified assets Iran will continue to receive since successfully passing the first inspections round would make it quite easy to design such a system. Under this strategy, Iran would cooperate with the agreement through the first round of inspections, defect, and then begin covertly restarting its weapons operations. Second, the international community’s track record on nuclear weapons detection is subpar. North Korea’s ability to deceive the U.S. for years on end is a case in point. Third, inspections, even at undeclared facilities, must be announced at least 24 days in advance, providing the Iranians ample time to figure out how to remove any fissile material. Fourth, even though the IAEA has the ability to declare an inspection of any non-nuclear- specified area it deems suspicious, Western officials are unlikely to act quickly on incomplete intelligence for fear of the public political costs of such rash accusations. In the case of North Korea, CIA reports in 2001 clearly indicated evidence that “North Korea began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities… and equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems… that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year.”22 If the U.S. government didn’t act on strong evidence of North Korean defection until over one year later, they would be even less likely to do so in the context of the JCPA, which was struck under politically sensitive circumstances and is the culmination of years of previously failed talks. Prematurely acting on intelligence in a situation in which Iran actually was complying could enrage the regime and lead to the dissolution of the agreement. Dissolution of the deal on the basis of under-developed intelligence would create massive political consequences for Washington, incentivizing an optimistic reading of compliance measures. Since perfect intelligence is tough to find, by the time the U.S. or IAEA found intelligence proving Iran’s defection with a high enough probability to overcome possible political costs, the regime could already have a bomb. Or, similar to North Korea’s situation, the regime could be in the process of bomb production and already past the point of no return. The implementation issues surrounding the deal’s restrictions on highly-enriched uranium are drastically compounded by the requirement that inspections of declared nuclear sites be announced at least 24 days in advance.23 Accordingly, Iran has a dual ability to defect: first, by producing fissile material at undeclared locations and second, by cheating at declared locations and hiding any evidence of such cheating. Although proponents of the deal claim that sanctions can still be “snapped back”24 at any time, they neglect the reality that a rationally- calculating Iran likely will not defect until it receives its $100 billion in frozen assets. Slapping on sanctions for defection caught after the first round could prevent Iran from collecting revenue 21 Blaise Misztal, “Can Iran Gain Nuclear Weapons Capability Without Complying with Deal?,” Bipartisan Policy Center, August 2015. 22 Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2013. 23 Teresa Welsh, “Monitoring Iran: A Hopeless Task,” US News, July 24, 2015. 24 Michele Kelemen, “A Look at How Sanctions Would ‘Snap Back’ if Iran Violates Nuke Deal,” July 20, 2015.
- 58. 58 Samuel NatboNy Spring 2016 | Volume 18 from existing oil contracts, but would still leave much of the $100 billion in liquified assets at the disposal of the regime. Also, after the first phase of inspections, the West has agreed to remove ballistic missile sanctions, and five years later to remove conventional weapons sanctions. Adding sanctions back, especially after the five-year mark, would do nothing to reverse the conventional weapon and anti-ballistic missile stockpile Iran could build up to protect any non-declared nuclear sites from possible strikes by the West or Israel. IMPACT OF POLITICAL SENSITIVITY ON IRANIAN INCENTIVES Although the deal allows the United Nations (UN) to re-institute sanctions for any violation, it is highly unlikely from a political perspective that such measures would be taken due to minor violations. Yet, the red line for what differentiates minor and major violations of the agreement is unclear. For violations of the agreement that occur in the gray area between the two, the decision to re-apply sanctions would subjectively appear as largely arbitrary and disproportionate to Iran. The UN and the West desperately want the deal to work out (as indicated by many of the unpopular concessions they were willing to accept as part of the deal) and so could tolerate more mild violations of the deal to preserve political capital. In early 2016, Iran started testing ballistic missiles and the U.S. has tolerated such launches to date.25 While these tests were not in violation of the explicit text of the JCPA, they did violate other UN resolutions regarding Iranian missile conduct and therefore were inconsistent with the spirit of international cooperation.26 Allowing for these smaller and moderate violations of the deal is highly problematic since they could eventually cascade into more serious violations. The Obama administration achieved support from more conservative members of Congress by emphasizing the idea that sanction elimination was temporary, meaning that it could be reversed at any moment.27 However, existing UN procedure would allow more pro-Iranian members of the Security Council (UNSC), such as China and Russia, to try to block any amendments. The need to achieve multilateral consensus from other world powers, who have a plethora of conflicting interests, further complicates the political calculus of sanctions. Taking a step back, a theoretical determination that Iran did in fact defect would also have to be agreed upon unilaterally before sanction “slap back” would occur. However, by this time, UNSC members will have restarted profitable economic relations with Iran by the time any additional sanction talks would occur, and would therefore be forced to reconcile conflicting political and economic incentives. In particular, with the Ruble rapidly decreasing in value, Moscow has become increasingly reliant on missile trades to Iran for cash premiums.28 In fact, Iranian missile demand is anticipated to total $13 billion over the next couple years.29 China and Iran also announced 25 Tim Hume, “Iran Fires Ballistic Missiles a Day After Test,” CNN, March 9, 2016. 26 Ibid. 27 Kelemen, “A Look at How Sanctions would Snap Back if Iran Violates Deal.” 28 Gabriela Baczynska, “Russia Opens Way to Missile Delivery to Iran,” Reuters, April 14, 2015. 29 Richard Spencer, “Arms Dealers Set to Profit from End to Iran Embargo,” The Telegraph, July 14, 2015.
- 59. Journal of International Relations Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive plan of aCtion 59 a joint $600 billion trade deal to take effect over the next decade.30 This means that some nations will be economically incentivized to halt any adverse decisions against Iran. Even if sanctions are successfully re-instituted, there would be no increase in their severity (given the current text of the provision), and consequently no additional penalty to defection relative to Iran’s current status quo circumstances. Therefore, there is not great marginal economic risk to an Iranian strategy of signing the deal with the intention of defecting. Moreover, Ayatollah Khamenei has directly responded to the deal’s reversibility provision by stating, “[I] f the sanctions are to be suspended, the actions we are supposed to take will be limited to the level of suspension and will not [amount to] a fundamental measure on the ground.”31 The Ayatollah is implying that Iran plans to restart all nuclear operations ceased by the deal if either the UN or Washington re-imposes sanctions. Accordingly, given the political and economic consequences of snapback, unless Iran egregiously violates inspection standards, sanctions would likely remain dormant. More importantly, the very fact that the Ayatollah felt the need to issue such a statement indicates his lack of trust in the West, which in turn speaks to his willingness to dissolve the deal or possibly defect after the first inspections round. Finally, the deal improperly treated the nuclear issue as mutually exclusive from all other issues. Certain topics considered off the table, such as the negotiated release of four American prisoners, Iran’s support for Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, Iran’s support for Assad’s regime, as well as the substantial role that Iran plays in the continuing conflicts in Syria and Iraq provide evidence to this improper separation. The Obama Administration acknowledged the lack of discussion on these issues by claiming that the JCPA merely represents the beginning of future talks with Iran and that non-nuclear issues would have detracted from the discussions.32 Interestingly, however, the U.S. allowed Iran to bring separate non-nuclear issues to the negotiating table, such as lifting the ban on purchasing anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles. Since the U.S. agreed to this provision, Iran has already started importing anti-aircraft technology from Russia.33 These supposedly separate issues are all indirectly linked to the nuclear issue. Once Iran can purchase anti-aircraft missiles, it will have the ability to better defend any future nuclear facilities from pre-emptive strikes. In the short-term, once Iran receives approximately $100 billion in liquid assets after the first round of inspections, it will have more capital at its disposal to continue to prop up Assad and to arm Hezbollah and Hamas with more advanced weapons technology if it chooses to do so. In fact, since signing the deal, Iran has actually increased its funding to both terror organizations.34 In Syria, Iran has provided $6 billion in annual military aid, opened revolving credit facilities, and provided 30 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran’s Leader Seeks Closer Ties with China,” Reuters, January 23, 2016. 31 “Iran Leader: If the Sanctions are Not Lifted, There will be No Deal,” AWD News, September 6, 2015. 32 Joshua Berlinger, “Iran Nuclear Deal: What Does it Mean for Americans Held in Iran?,” CNN, July 15, 2015. 33 Avi Lewis, “Russia, Iran Close Deal on Delivery of Advanced Anti-Aircraft Weapons,” Times of Israel, August 19, 2015. 34 Avi Issacharoff, “Boosted by Nuke Deal, Iran Ups Funding to Hezbollah, Hamas,” Times of Israel, September 21, 2015.
- 60. 60 Samuel NatboNy Spring 2016 | Volume 18 free oil to Assad since the start of the civil war.35 Ratcheting up support for these two regional objectives would ease the process of producing a bomb in the future by diverting attention away from its own nuclear program to more pressing issues of terrorism and Iraqi-Syrian stability. The likelihood of a transition in U.S. international policy focus is inevitable due to the upcoming 2016 presidential elections.36 If the West perceives a low probability that Iran is defecting, due to its consistent compliance with regulations at declared facilities, it could divert some of its resources to the civil war in Syria. In essence, Iran’s shadow funding of Middle Eastern instability could influence any subsequent decision to focus political, economic, and military efforts away from Iran to other Middle Eastern issues. Iran has significant incentives for shadow-funding this instability since privately financing it and then subsequently offering public international assistance to combat these issues would strengthen Iran’s international image.37 CONCLUSION Iran possesses sufficient motives and already has the nuclear infrastructure in place to enable production of a bomb. A rationally calculating Iran, facing international pressure to negotiate and a lack of financial liquidity, could have reasonably accepted the proposed arrangement with the intention of preserving its ability to rapidly build a nuclear bomb at a future date. In the event that Iran is pursuing this defection strategy, its timeline could be shorter or longer than North Korea’s. However, the scholarly consensus is that of a one-year breakout capacity in the case that the Iranians decide to defect.38 U.S. military analysts have also corroborated this one-year capacity.39 Regardless of whether Iran is secretly building its weapons program or following the terms of the deal, it is most prudent for the U.S. to prepare for a world in which Iran has a bomb. If Washington begins preparing now for such a scenario, it can act to preemptively to mitigate the international risks of a nuclear-armed Iran. Some theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue that if Iran were to acquire a bomb, the U.S. ought to welcome Iran into the nuclear community.40 These scholars believe that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is in fact beneficial to international security, as it stabilizes asymmetric deterrent balances. For example, the Pakistan-India and U.S.-Russia balances have yet to lead to direct nuclear conflict. Many scholars argue that the Middle East lacks a clear deterrent balance. Although still officially opaque, Israel almost certainly has nuclear weapons.41 However, there is no state in the Middle East that possesses the nuclear capability 35 Michael Weiss, “Syria’s Butcher Really Won the Iran Deal,” The Daily Beast, July 15, 2015. 36 Ilan Goldenberg, “US Strategy After the Iran Deal,” Center for New American Security, June 2015. 37 Jon Alterman, “Hoping for Trouble in Iraq,” Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 2014. 38 Bilal Saab, “The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security,” Atlantic Council, July 2015. 39 Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Deal Reached, Obama Hails Step Towards ‘More Hopeful World’,” Reuters, July 15, 2015. 40 Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2012. 41 Douglas Birch, “Israel’s Worst Kept Secret,” The Atlantic, September 16, 2014.
- 61. Journal of International Relations Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive plan of aCtion 61 that could balance against Israel’s forces. While it is possible that Iran could be the balancing force that the region requires, its nuclear status would also pose significant challenges for the international community, including: a Middle Eastern arms race, a pre-emptive attack on Israel, or a nuclear accident due to primitive command and control issues.42 In the short-term, the U.S. should remain committed to ensuring Iranian compliance to the JCPA, but also ought to recognize that long-term vigilance is required to hedge against the possible consequences of defection. WORKS CITED Alterman, Jon. “Hoping for Trouble in Iraq.” Center for International and Strategic Studies. June 2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/0614_MENC.pdf. Baczynska, Gabriela. “Russia Opens Way to Missile Delivery to Iran.” Reuters. April 14, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-russia- idUSKBN0N40YX20150413. Berlinger, Joshua. “Iran Nuclear Deal: What does it mean for Americans held in Iran?.” CNN. July 15, 2015.http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/politics/iran-american- detainees/. Birch, Douglas. “Israel’s Worst Kept Secret.” The Atlantic. September 16, 2014. http://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/israel-nuclear-weapons-secret- united-states/380237/. Cordesman, Anthony. “The Conventional Military.” United States Institute of Peace. August 2015. http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/conventional-militaryhttp://iranprimer. usip.org/resource/conventional-military. Davenport, Kelsey. “Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” Arms Control Association. May 2015. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ dprkchron. Evan, Stephen. “North Korea Yongbyon Site in Operation.” BBC. September 15, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34254634. “Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.” Nuclear Threat Institute. Last Modified December 14, 2013. http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/165/. Goldenberg, Ilan. “US Strategy After the Iran Deal.” Center for New American Security. June 2015. http://www.cnas.org/after-the-iran-deal#.VyUGkKMrIWI. 42 Matthew Kroenig, “Mitigating the Security Risks Posed by a Nuclear Iran,” Atlantic Council, November 2014.
- 62. 62 Samuel NatboNy Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Hafezi, Parisa. “Iran Deal Reached, Obama Hails Step Towards ‘More Hopeful World’.” Reuters. July 15, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear- idUSKCN0PM0CE20150714. Hume, Tim. “Iran Fires Ballistic Missiles a Day After Test.”CNN. March 9, 2016. http:// www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/middleeast/iran-missile-test/. “Iran Leader: If the Sanctions are Not Lifted, There Will be No Deal.” AWD News. September 6, 2015. http://www.awdnews.com/political/iran-leader-if-the- sanctions-are-not-lifted,-then-there-will-be-no-deal. Issacharoff, Avi. “Boosted by Nuke Deal, Iran Ups Funding to Hezbollah, Hamas.” Times of Israel. September 21, 2015. http://www.timesofisrael.com/boosted-by-nuke-deal- iran-ups-funding-to-hezbollah-hamas/. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” Washington Post. July 14, 2015. http://apps. washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear- deal/1651/. Kelemen, Michele. “A Look at How Sanctions Would ‘Snap Back’ if Iran Violates Nuke Deal.” July 20, 2015. http://www.npr.org/2015/07/20/424571368/if-iran- violates-nuke-deal-a-look-at-how-sanctions-would-snap-back. Kelly, Evan. “Iran Sweetens the Deal for Foreign Oil Companies.” Yahoo Finance. November 27, 2015. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Iran-Sweetens-The-Deal- For-Foreign-Oil-Companies.html. Kredo, Adam. “The Current Nuclear Deal Will Leave Iran with 5000 Centrifuges.” Business Insider. June 30, 2015. http://freebeacon.com/issues/iran-nuke-deal-ensures- iranian-centrifuges-continue-spinning/. Kroenig, Matthew. “Mitigating the Security Risks Posed by a Nuclear Iran.” Atlantic Council. November 2014. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/ mitigating-the-security-risks-posed-by-a-near-nuclear-iran. Lewis, Avi. “Russia, Iran Close Deal on Delivery of Advanced Anti-Aircraft Weapons.” Times of Israel. August 19, 2015. http://www.timesofisrael.com/russia-iran-close- deal-on-delivery-of-advanced-anti-aircraft-weapons/. Misztal, Blaise. “Can Iran Gain Nuclear Weapons Capability Without Complying with Deal?.” Bipartisan Policy Center. August 2015. http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/can- iran-gain-nuclear-weapons-capability-while-complying-with-the-deal/.
- 63. Journal of International Relations Collapse of the Joint Comprehensive plan of aCtion 63 Moghtader, Michelle. “Iran Says it is Redesigning Arak Reactor to Cut Plutonium Capacity.” Reuters. June 12, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-arak- idUSKBN0EN0WK20140612. Nikitin, Mary Beth. “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues.” Congressional Research Service. April 3, 2013. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf. Northam, Jackie. “Lifting Sanctions will Release $100B to Iran.” NPR. July 21, 2015. http:// www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/07/16/423562391/lifting-sanctions-will- release-100-billion-to-iran-then-what. “North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts.” CNN. May 22, 2015. http://www.cnn. com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/. Peralta, Eyder. “Six Things you Should Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal.” NPR. July 15, 2015. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/14/422920192/6- things-you-should-know-about-the-iran-nuclear-deal. Rosen, Armin. “Iran’s Nuclear Program May have Cost the Country $500 Billion.” Business Insider. June 30, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/irans-nuclear-program-has- been-an-astronomical-waste-for-the-country-2015-6. Saab, Bilal. “The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security.” Atlantic Council. July 2015. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/ the-new-containment-changing-america-s-approach-to-middle-east-security. Samor, Gary. “Decoding the Nuclear Deal.” Harvard Kennedy School. April 2015. http:// belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Decoding%20the%20Iran%20Nuclear%20Deal. pdf. Sharafedin, Bozorgmehr. “Iran’s Leader Seeks Closer Ties with China.” Reuters. January 23, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-china-idUSKCN0V109V. Spencer, Richard. “Arms Dealers Set to Profit from End to Iran Embargo.” The Telegraph. July 14, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ iran/11738813/Arms-dealers-set-to-profit-from-end-to-Iran-embargo.html. Waltz, Kenneth. “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2012. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get- bomb. Weiss, Michael. “Syria’s Butcher Really Won the Iran Deal.” The Daily Beast. July 15, 2015. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/15/syria-s-butcher-really-won-
- 64. 64 Samuel NatboNy Spring 2016 | Volume 18 the-iran-deal.html. Weissman, Jordan. “How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea.” The Atlantic. December 20, 2011. http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/how-kim-jong-il- starved-north-korea/250244/. Welsh, Teresa. “Monitoring Iran: A Hopeless Task.” US News. July 24, 2015. http:// www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/24/iaea-monitoring-irans-nuclear- compliance-a-hopeless-task. Williams, Jennifer R. “A Comprehensive Timeline of the Iran Nuclear Deal.” Brookings Institute. July 21, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/ posts/2015/07/21-comprehensive-timeline-iran-nuclear-deal ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sam is currently a junior at the University of Pennsylvania studying political science and concentrating in international relations. His international affairs interests focus primarily on the Middle East and China. In addition to his political coursework, Sam is also pursuing a personalized finance and accounting coursework concentration. In addition to his academic pursuits, Sam is passionate about entrepreneurship, private equity, golf, tennis and cooking.
- 65. Journal of International Relations The Perils of DecenTralizaTion 65 this article has been amenDeD From an oriGinal research PaPer that incluDes a Discussion oF Decentralization in yuGoslavia. ABSTRACT During their development, the United Kingdom and Spain absorbed peripheral, ethnic actors to evolve into larger, unified states. Such changes frustrated these groups; minorities felt as if their cultural differences had been ignored. In response, the United Kingdom and Spanish governments used devolved and federalist systems to reduce these tensions. This paper discusses how institutional arrangements and social pressures caused secession movements in the European Union. Today, Scotland and Catalonia are seeking secession from the United Kingdom and Spain, respectively. Each region asserts that gaining independence would enable it to secure greater economic freedom, promote cultural differences, and better address regional issues. This paper argues that the negative implications of independence, such as potential economic failure and loss of European Union membership, outweigh the potential benefits. Rather than supporting decentralized systems, this paper argues that European Union members should focus on government centralization and avoid state fragmentation in order to decrease the possibility of a “Europe of the Regions.” INTRODUCTION The establishment of a decentralized government system can assist states that have extreme The Perils of Decentralization: A Case Study of Potential Secession in the United Kingdom and Spain by Amy WAlsh dicKinson college
- 66. 66 Amy WAlsh Spring 2016 | Volume 18 tension among their peoples. The United Kingdom and Spain have incorporated such systems to appease tensions between core and peripheral actors. Spain has implemented a federalist government, while the United Kingdom has instilled a devolved system. Although decentralization was incorporated to remedy these tensions, it is questionable whether these methods strengthened their governmental institutions. In order for a state to increase its power, it is essential that more dominant forces overtake weaker ones. Michael Hechter discusses this phenomenon in Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development. He argues that a core and a periphery exist in all states. The core refers to the more dominant culture and the periphery refers to the less developed group. Hechter claims, “The establishment of regular interaction between the core and the periphery is seen to be crucial for national development.”1 Ultimately, as the core and periphery come together, a state’s potential for greatness increases.2 This study will describe the institutional arrangements and social pressures that permeated throughout the United Kingdom and Spain and discusses how these pressures caused their government institutions to shift. As linguistic, religious, and ethnic pressures grew, these countries adopted policies of decentralization, augmenting regional autonomy. Scotland’s desire to secede has escalated due to the United Kingdom’s implementation of devolution. Additionally, Catalonia’s frustrations with Spain have increased its yearning for independence. Although devolution and federalism were intended to mitigate tensions in the U.K. and Spain, their systems gave too much power to their respective regions. This phenomenon, also known as a move towards a “Europe of the Regions,” has put the European Union in jeopardy.3 Rather than supporting decentralization, Europe’s countries should implement policies that reduce the possibility of state fragmentation. THE UNITED KINGDOM The Formation of the United Kingdom In the mid-sixteenth century, Great Britain began to subsume Ireland, Scotland, and Wales into the “Celtic system.”4 The peoples of these regions spoke Irish Gaelic, Scottish Gaelic, and Welsh and practiced different religious traditions than their English rulers. The English attempted to anglicize these Celtic regions in order to foster economic development and promote English nationalism.5 After the Reformation, the English strengthened their autonomy by eliminating Papal 1 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 22. 2 Ibid. 3 Alexis Daj, “From Decentralization to Independence in 21st Century Europe: Economic and Legal Challenges of Developing the EU’s Institutional Framework on the Backdrop,” Transylvanian Review 24, no. 2 (2015): 123. 4 Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 109. 5 Ibid.
- 67. Journal of International Relations The Perils of DecenTralizaTion 67 oversight, breaking from the Roman Catholic Church, and forming the national Church of England.6 This rise in Protestant culture created a stronger sense of nationalism and gave England the ability to control the Celtic nations. England first annexed Wales under the Act of Union in 1536.7 King Henry VIII of England seized Wales because “it represented an obstacle to the full development of the internal security of England since it was a land where law and order was in short supply.”8 Great Britain finalized its union with Scotland in 1707.9 This union “led to the creation of a single parliament, based in London that would cover the United Kingdom.”10 James II, Scotland’s king, was in favor of unity in order to protect his country’s economic structure and maintain cordial relations with the English.11 In fact, the English Parliament had threatened to boycott Scottish exports if the Scottish did not adhere to the new ruling.12 This pressure caused the Scottish to accept Great Britain’s authority. The English completed the Act of Union with Ireland in 1801.13 The English first attempted to colonize Ireland in the late 12th century. By the end of the 18th century, the English government declared that “its Irish Protestant counterpart was incapable of maintaining any semblance of order and hence tried to arrange for the same kind of union which had so successfully, to that time, integrated both Scotland and Wales.”14 Rather than viewing the Irish as equal counterparts, the English denounced the Catholic-dominated state. They marginalized the Irish and limited their involvement in parliamentary politics, increasing Irish discontent with England.15 Regionalism in the United Kingdom The rise in English control over the Celtic territories resulted in both political and cultural changes. Increased integration allowed the peripheral nations to gain access to advanced agricultural devices. This technology assisted the Celtic nations in increasing their agrarian productivity.16 Although technological advancements increased the production efficiency of peripheral Celtic states, they did not result in greater Celtic autonomy.17 Rather, the states lost economic control to the British. As a result, the ability of Celtic countries to promote their 6 Ibid., 66. 7 Ibid., 114. 8 Ibid., 70. 9 Cornelius O’Leary, “Celtic Nationalism: A Study of the Ethnic Movements in the British Isles,” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 2, no. 2 (1976): 53. 10 Russell Deacon and Alan Sandry, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), eBook edition, 50. 11 Ibid. 12 O’Leary, “Celtic Nationalism,” 72. 13 Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 72. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 80. 17 Ibid., 81.
- 68. 68 Amy WAlsh Spring 2016 | Volume 18 own economic agendas decreased. This aggravated the Celtic population. Additionally, the loss of sovereignty in the Celtic lands resulted in political dependency upon England and a loss in Celtic cultural practices. Members of the peripheral elite often embraced English customs, which heightened tensions among the Celtic population.18 With a central government system, the Scottish, Welsh, and Irish did not feel adequately represented in the British government, leading to antagonism between these powers for centuries. Devolution in the United Kingdom Beginning in the second half of the 20th century, threats to the United Kingdom’s central governance system increased. According to John Loughlin: “The United Kingdom is definitely unitary in the sense that the traditional locus of sovereignty is the Westminster Parliament, although there is a high degree of administrative decentralization especially with regard to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.”19 The U.K. began to decentralize its government following World War II to reduce tensions between Westminster and Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. Wales gained a level of autonomy with the creation of the Welsh Assembly in 1998.20 Although the creation of this governing body granted the Welsh a level of self-determination, they were not allowed to implement laws without Westminster’s approval and “lacked any widespread tradition of being treated as a separate administrative unit.”21 Thus, Welsh regionalism remained largely under the influence of Westminster’s powerful policy machine. Westminster showcased further devolution in Ireland and Scotland during the second half of the 20th century. After the Irish War of Independence and the subsequent partitioning of Ireland between the north and south in 1922, Northern Ireland became part of the United Kingdom.22 After decades of hostility between the followers of Catholicism and Protestantism, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged in Northern Ireland in 1969. Fighting for a unified, sovereign nation, the IRA employed methods of violence to advocate for Irish independence from Westminster.23 In 1998, the British implemented the Good Friday Agreement with Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to reduce these tensions.24 This agreement acted as a peace measure between the British and the Irish. To instill peace, the Northern Ireland Assembly was established, permitting Northern Ireland to enact 18 Ibid., 110. 19 John Loughlin, “‘Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions,” Regional & Federal Studies 6, no. 2 (1996): 152. 20 Deacon and Sandry, Devolution in the United Kingdom, 108. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., 150. 23 Ibid., 157. 24 Ibid., 166.
- 69. Journal of International Relations The Perils of DecenTralizaTion 69 primary legislation.25 Scotland maintained a level of separation from the U.K.’s policies. Even though James II agreed to the Act of Union in 1701, a “civic tradition of ‘Scottishness’” remained in the country.26 The Scottish Office was established in 1885, creating a form of self-government in which the Secretary for Scotland, who had previously been tasked with managing Scotland-English relations, supervised the nation’s policies.27 Although Scotland was under the jurisdiction of the British Parliament, this step increased their autonomy. Scottish desire for political independence increased during the 20th century. In 1934, the Scottish National Party (SNP) was founded.28 Their goal was, and remains to be, Scottish independence from the United Kingdom. Calls for autonomy were heightened in the 1970s when oil and gas were discovered in the North Sea.29 The SNP views these natural resources as a potential financial engine to support an independent economy. Parliament’s Conservative leaders, however, have never wanted to accept Scottish devolution. Margaret Thatcher, for example, “swiftly adopted a hostile stance to any talk of diminishing the role of Westminster” in 1975.30 Although Conservatives in Westminster opposed devolution, the British Parliament granted Scotland its own parliament and permitted it to create primary legislation on September 11, 1997.31 Although Scotland’s Secretary of State still reports to Westminster, the creation of this governing system illustrates how the United Kingdom’s central government gave peripheral regions more independence during the 1990s. The Implications of Scottish Devolution The movement for Scottish independence has been bolstered by the United Kingdom’s devolution of power to Scotland. Advocates for independence, such as the SNP, advocate for secession on several grounds. Firstly, the Scottish government would like to adopt more socially democratic economic principles, rather than support English neoliberalism.32 Scotland also wants to increase its economic abilities. In the North Sea, there are significant oil deposits that the country could use to advance its economy.33 Desires for more political autonomy, separate ideological values, and economic independence are all fueling Scotland’s desire to secede. On September 18, 2014, Scotland’s population voted on whether they should separate from 25 Ibid., 169. 26 Ibid., 50. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 51. 29 Ibid., 52. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 62. 32 L’udmila Lipkova, Martin Gress, and L’ubica Harakal’ova, “Analysis of the Causes and Results of the Referendum on the Secession of Scotland from the UK,” Actual Problems of Economics 169, no. 7 (2015): 72. 33 Ibid., 73.
- 70. 70 Amy WAlsh Spring 2016 | Volume 18 the Westminster.34 Although there were potential positive aspects for Scottish independence, the population’s vote to stay in the Union suggested that the negative implications outweighed the positives. For example, most foreign investors were hesitant of this potential shift and indicated that they would transfer their accounts to banks within the U.K. if Scotland seceded.35 Additionally, while proponents of Scottish independence believe that the North Sea’s resources will stimulate the Scottish economy, such economic specialization could make Scotland liable for economic failure. Independence from the U.K. might force Scotland to create a separate monetary system from the European Union as well. This would not only be a harsh process for the Scottish government, but also make trade with other European countries more costly.36 Although the U.K. made efforts to devolve its power and permit Scotland to act as a more independent state during the 1990s, these shifts have inadvertently increased nationalist sentiments and calls for independence. Despite Scotland’s rejection of secession in 2014, lingering independence movements continue to shape political discourse, and it is possible that the country will again seek to separate from the United Kingdom. SPAIN A History of Spanish Government Since the unification of Castile’s territories at the end of 15th century, regional tensions have plagued Spain. Ferdinand and Isabella, Catholic monarchs, established supremacy over the Muslim-dominated kingdoms of Granada, Naples, and Navarre.37 This religious domination, also known as the Reconquista, concluded in 1492 under the terms of the Treaty of Granada.38 Their subsequent control led to the “establishment of a mono-confessional society,”39 which was characterized by Catholic dominion. Ferdinand and Isabella sent royal officers to peripheral towns to act as “representatives of the central government and the defenders of its rights, claims, and missions” to ensure Catholic prominence throughout the state.40 These extensive controls caused discontent among Muslim regions. Ultimately, multiple civil wars erupted over the following centuries. In the 19th century, Spain’s governance system shifted in order to settle these calamitous disputes. The Constitution of 1812 created a constitutional monarchy. The implementation of this 34 Ibid., 72. 35 Ibid., 75. 36 Ibid., 76. 37 José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini, “Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy,” Journal of Modern History 81, no. 3 (2009): 501. 38 Robert Agranoff, Local Governments and their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain (Montreal: MQUP, 2010), eBook edition, 23. 39 Ibáñez and Sabatini, “Monarchy as Conquest,” 510. 40 Agranoff, Local Governments and their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain, 26.
- 71. Journal of International Relations The Perils of DecenTralizaTion 71 institutional system caused the monarchy’s control to wane.41 Local towns were granted their own municipal governments that reported back to parliamentary overseers.42 Additionally, the constitution provided universal male suffrage and freedom of the press. This liberalization was not permanent however, as efforts were reduced in the 1930s. During Francisco Franco’s dictatorial regime, which began in 1939, he severely limited the powers of regional governments. Local bodies were considered direct agents of the central regime, rather than as systems that could act as separate societies.43 He was concerned with regions that displayed high levels of linguistic differences. For example, he focused on putting an end to the “Catalan problem” - an issue marked by strong Catalan secessionist sentiments.44 Franco additionally attempted to increase Spanish homogeneity, as Ferdinand and Isabella had done at the end of the Reconquista, by supporting and facilitating the extermination of Jews.45 Franco’s iron-fisted regime greatly emphasized centralization because he sought to create a stronger, more nationalistic Spain. The Introduction of Federalism Franco’s centralization efforts ended concomitantly with his fall from power. In December 1978, Spain promulgated another constitution.46 After this passed parliament, the “Estado de las Autonomias” was put into effect. This government system was inspired by several historical factors. This culmination of extended debate and regime reform built upon the traditions of autonomy, which were represented in the Constitution of 1812, the short-lived federal First Republic of the 19th century, and the regional autonomy movement of the Second Republic in the 1930s.47 In effect, this new system granted autonomous regional communities a series of rights. For example, they gained control over their own health and education systems.48 After facing years of dictatorship under Franco, the Spanish government sought to incorporate a system that would appease its people and provide liberal policies. The current Spanish Constitution articulates many guidelines to promote “a highly inter- governmentalized system of local, regional, state, and European-level relations.”49 Today, similar to the United Kingdom, Spain uses a decentralized distribution of power, but with control ultimately kept in the capital. In this, Spain’s central government holds a higher level 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., 150. 44 Daj, “From Decentralization to Independence in 21st Century Europe,” 131. 45 Agranoff, Local Governments and their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain, 151. 46 Ibid., 57. 47 Ibid. 48 Antoni Castells, “Catalonia and Spain at the Crossroads: Financial and Economic Aspects,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30, no. 2 (2014): 281. 49 Agranoff, Local Governments and Their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain, 57.
- 72. 72 Amy WAlsh Spring 2016 | Volume 18 of supremacy over their regional counterparts. For example, the Constitutional Tribunal, a national form of law, extends Madrid’s power nationwide over autonomous communities. An example of this ability includes the handling of disputes between autonomous communities and the country’s central government.50 Further, when the central government sees that a region has implemented an unjust law, it has the ability to intervene.51 These rights limit autonomous powers’ abilities, but assist in maintaining the country’s stability. When comparing the United Kingdom’s system with Spain’s, there are several differences. The Spanish Constitution grants autonomous communities a much greater level of separate authority than the U.K. granted its Celtic states. For example, local governments take legal issues to their regional government, rather than to the central government in Spain.52 If the legal issue becomes further exacerbated, it can then be discussed at a national level. Also, the use of autonomous communities in Spain showcases that the country recognizes its population’s “ethnic geography.”53 As discussed earlier, Spain’s population historically rebelled against the implementation of centralized policies and yearned for their separate identities to be recognized. The federalist system implemented by the Constitution of 1978 provides this recognition. Attendant to the implementation of autonomous regional communities was the creation of sectoral conferences.54 These meetings bring Spain’s regional governments together to plan funding for joint projects, share information between central and regional governments, and create decisions that the Madrid may discuss with the European Union. This process differs from United Kingdom’s integration process of Welsh, Scottish, and Irish populations. Although those states hold a level of autonomy, Spain provides its regions with more independence. This fact is pertinent to Scotland’s independence aspirations. The Catalan Secessionist Movement Catalonia’s population has displayed that it no longer wants to be connected to Spain’s central government. Since the 1950’s, the idea of “Catalanism” has existed.55 People who support “Catalanism” focus on achieving self-government and helping to modernize Spain as a whole.56 Catalans are frustrated about their current relationship with the Spanish government for several reasons. Importantly, their economic system uses methods that have enabled it to supersede other Spanish regions. For example, the Catalan economy is more industry-focused 50 Ibid., 68. 51 Ibid., 65. 52 Ibid., 70. 53 O’Leary, “The Elements of Right-Sizing and Right-Peopling the State,” 367. 54 Sandra León and Mónica Ferrín Pereira, “Intergovernmental Cooperation in a Decentralised System: The Sectoral Conferences in Spain,” South European Society and Politics 16, no. 4 (2011): 515. 55 Castells, “Catalonia and Spain at the Crossroads,” 280. 56 Ibid.
- 73. Journal of International Relations The Perils of DecenTralizaTion 73 than Andalusia.57 Clearly, differences in economic abilities can cause powerful regions to feel frustrated and weighed down in federalist states. Catalonia is also seeking secession because of the speed it gained autonomy with the Spanish Constitution’s adoption. Catalans, along with the populations in Basque Country, Galicia, and Andalusia, were labeled as a unique “nationalities.”58 This immediately granted Catalonia autonomy, while other regions had to request, and then wait five years, to establish this status. Due to its economic and political superiority, many Catalans feels that the province deserves to be regarded separately from the other autonomous regions in Spain.59 Catalonia’s desire for secession increased with the advent of Europe’s economic crisis in 2008 that severely harmed the Spanish economy. Many regions looked to the central government for bailouts. As part of its federalist system, Spain uses an “equalization mechanism.”60 This requires each region to pay the central government a tax to ensure that it can help other area with high debt levels. These taxes fluctuate based upon each region’s economic success. In 2010, it was reported that Catalonia was paying 23 percent above the mean and over- distributing its resources to assist other Spanish regions.61 This fact greatly angered Catalonia’s population and increased its people’s desire for independence. Linguistic unity is another force that unites Catalans and augments separatist aims.62 It uses a different dialect, known as Catalan, than the rest of Spain. It is reported that the language is used by about eight million, known by ten million and widely spoken at all levels of society.63 This linguistic difference is an inherent part of Catalonia’s culture and demonstrates why it sees itself as distinct from the rest of the state. The Basque Country has also exhibited efforts to separate from Spain. Its nationalist sentiments began in the late 18th century.64 Similar to the IRA, a group known as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was formed in 1958.65 The ETA advocated for separation from Madrid. The ETA used guerilla warfare as a means to fight against Franco’s centralized system.66 Upon Franco’s death, the ETA dissolved as Spain moved towards their federalist system.67 Although this group is no longer prominent, nationalist sentiments still plague the region. This is because many feel that their economy is superior to the rest of the nation. They also 57 Castells, “Catalonia and Spain at the Crossroads,” 278. 58 Loughlin, “Representing Regions in Europe,” 153. 59 Ibid., 154. 60 Caroline M. Gray, “Smoke and Mirrors: How Regional Finances Complicate Spanish-Catalan relations,” International Journal of Iberian Studies 27, no. 1 (2014): 23. 61 Ibid., 26. 62 Josep Desquens, “Europe’s Stateless Nations in the Era of Globalization: The Case for Catalonia’s Secession from Spain,” John Hopkins University. 63 Ibid. 64 Urko Aiartza and Julen Zabalo, The Basque Country: The Long Walk to a Democratic Scenario (Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, 2010), 8. 65 Ibid., 13. 66 Ibid., 17. 67 Ibid., 16.
- 74. 74 Amy WAlsh Spring 2016 | Volume 18 want to ensure that their dying dialect persists.68 While Catalonia and the Basque Country act as autonomous communities underneath Spain’s federalist system, calls for independence continue to dominate regional discourse. According to data provided by the Spanish Ministry of Territorial Policy, there were plans for 38 Sectoral Conferences to meet and discuss a broad range of national policy issues in 2012. These meetings intended to unite the regions around national concerns. However, it was reported that the majority of them barely met once during that year.69 This statistic showcases how autonomous communities, such as Catalonia and Basque Country, are not concerned with maintaining a strong, national Spain. Although the state has a federalist system, the fact that these communities are unwilling to work with other Spanish regions showcases its fragility. Potential Consequences of Catalan Secession Wish secession, Catalonia could implement its own public policies and design its own institutions without the central government’s approval.70 This political power is appealing to Catalonian nationalists. However, the economic risks of secession would harm both the region and entire country. If it gained independence, the so-called “Border effect” could occur. This principle predicts a decrease in trade between Catalonia and Spain. It is estimated that the secession of Catalonia would produce a reduction of 3.3% of the joint GDP of Catalonia and Spain, consisting of a 9% decrease in Catalan GDP and a 2 percent% in Spanish GDP.71 This form of market fragmentation may put labor or service markets at risk for failure.72 Additionally, because Catalonia is one of the strongest regions in Spain, it is essential that the country focus on maintaining governance over this region to function as a strong state. Without it, the country’s overall economic value would deteriorate.73 Another potential issue is similar to one that resonates in Scotland. If Catalans were to declare independence, they would then have to decide whether or not they wanted to remain within the European Union.74 Without membership, foreign investors would not be as willing to maintain relations with Catalonian banks.75 Additionally, it would no longer use the Euro. This could cause its currency to face devolution, making the potential for debt to skyrocket.76 If Catalonia chose to separate from Spain, it would not have the security from Madrid to assist in bailing out this region from a debt crisis. Even though Catalonia has a strong economic 68 Ibid., 17. 69 León and Pereira, “Intergovernmental Cooperation in a Decentralised System,” 516. 70 Castells, “Catalonia and Spain at the Crossroads,” 292. 71 Ibid., 289. 72 Ibid., 293. 73 Ibid., 292. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., 293.
- 75. Journal of International Relations The Perils of DecenTralizaTion 75 system, it would be risky to fully depend on itself. Catalonia voted on a referendum vis-à-vis independence in 2014. Over 80% voted in favor.77 Although it is clear that this region supports secession, Catalans must consider the potential negative economic consequences of independence. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONALIZATION The EU’s Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 recognized secessionist desires. This legislation acknowledged that Europe might evolve into a “Europe of the regions” because of decentralized governmental systems, like those found the United Kingdom and Spain. It ultimately led to the creation of the Committee of the Regions in 1994. This committee provided an avenue for decentralized agents to have a larger role in decision-making and consensus-building within the EU. Although the Committee gave regions a greater sense of recognition, such a system complicates regional organization and interpretation of national laws. Despit this, Europe has continuously been pressure to create a system that functions well with regionalization. The Treaty of Lisbon, promulgated in 2009, sought to improve EU governance. It allows EU law to coexist with member state law, permits regions to have access to structural funds, and fights discrimination against minority regions in member states. However, its support for devolution has increased member states’ regions desires for independence, which are evident in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia. The Treaty of Lisbon has negative implications. A member state will maintain its membership even if one of its territories chooses to secede. However, the territory must then apply for membership separately. This process can be lengthy and reentry is not guaranteed. There is also a question of legality when considering the secession of regions from their states. According to EU law, secession can be used only as a means of last resort to counter oppression of minority populations. Catalonia and Scotland are requesting secession to increase their economic potential and cultural recognition, not because of human rights violations. It is therefore questionable whether they could be granted membership in the EU in the result of independence. The Treaty of Lisbon attempted to improve relations between Europe’s regions, their member states, and the European Union. It followed a similar method to those countries that have implemented decentralization. Although these efforts grant regions a greater say in decision-making, supporting decentralization has caused such entities to aspire to secede. Such secessions can lead to monetary issues, as well as a decrease continental or national stability. Rather than supporting decentralization, the European Union must make strides towards creating a more centralized and universally accepted governance system. 77 Ibid., 294.
- 76. 76 Amy WAlsh Spring 2016 | Volume 18 CONCLUSION The United Kingdom and Spain each used internal colonialism to bring peripheral regions and their core actors together. First, each system brought disparate populations together and established a centralized state. However, due to cultural, economic, political, and linguistic dissimilarities, their governments were forced to appease to pressure for greater autonomy. Spain chose a federalist government system, while the United Kingdom chose devolution. Although such shifts were used to provide a more equitable system, they have latterly led regions to seek greater independence. In 2014, Scotland and Catalonia voted in referendums for secession. Although both regions have not declared independence, it is clear that separation is at the forefront of their political discourse. If achieved, this could lead to decreases in trade, high levels of debt, and the rigorous and uncertain process of re-entering the EU. Although decentralization can appease tensions for countries that have high levels of heterogeneity and rebellious regions, this shift in governance can lead to negative outcomes and greater tension. WORKS CITED Agranoff, Robert. Local Governments and their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain. Montreal: MQUP, 2010. eBook edition. Aiartza, Urko, and Julen Zabalo. The Basque Country: The Long Walk to a Democratic Scenario. Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, 2010. Castells, Antoni. “Catalonia and Spain at the Crossroads: Financial and Economic Aspects.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30, no. 2 (2014): 277-296. Critchley, Harriet. “The Failure of Federalism in Yugoslavia.” International Journal 48 no. 3 (1993): 434-447. Daj, Alexis. “From Decentralization to Independence in 21st Century Europe: Economic and Legal Challenges of Developing the EU’s Institutional Framework on the Backdrop.” Transylvanian Review 24, no. 2 (2015): 122-138. Deacon, Russell and Alan Sandry. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. eBook edition. Desquens, Josep. “Europe’s Stateless Nations in the Era of Globalization: The Case for Catalonia’s Secession from Spain.” John Hopkins University. Last modified Spring 2003. http://www.jhubc.it/bcjournal/articles/desquens.cfm. Gray, Caroline M. “Smoke and Mirrors: How Regional Finances Complicate Spanish-Catalan
- 77. Journal of International Relations The Perils of DecenTralizaTion 77 Relations.” International Journal of Iberian Studies 27, no. 1 (2014): 21-42. Hechter, Michael. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999. Ingeborg, Tömmel. “Transformation of Governance: The European Commission’s Strategy for Creating a ‘Europe of the Regions.’” Regional & Federal Studies 8, no. 2 (1998): 52-80. Ibáñez, José Javier Ruiz and Gaetano Sabatini. “Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy.” Journal of Modern History 81, no. 3 (2009): 501-556. León, Sandra, and Mónica Ferrín Pereira. “Intergovernmental Cooperation in a Decentralised System: The Sectoral Conferences in Spain.” South European Society and Politics 16, no. 4 (2011): 513-532. Loughlin, John “‘Representing Regions in Europe’: The Committee of the Regions.” Regional & Federal Studies 6, no. 2 (1996): 147-165. Lipkova, L’udmila, Martin Gress, and L’ubica Harakal’ova. “Analysis of the Causes and Results of the Referendum on the Secession of Scotland from the UK.” Actual Problems of Economics 169, no. 7 (2015): 71-78. O’Leary, Brendan. “The Elements of Right-Sizing and Right-Peopling the State.” In Right- sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders edited by Brendan O’Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, 15-72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. O’Leary, Cornelius. “Celtic Nationalism: A Study of the Ethnic Movements in the British Isles.” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 2, no. 2 (1976): 51-73. Sekulic, Dusko. “The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The Case of Yugoslavia.” Nations and Nationalism 3, no. 2 (1997): 165-179. Sekulic, Dusko, Garth Massey, and Randy Hodson. “Who were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia.” American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (1997): 83-97
- 78. 78 Amy WAlsh Spring 2016 | Volume 18 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Amy Walsh is a senior at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. She is an International Studies major with a concentration in Western Europe and a Spanish minor. She studied abroad in Malaga, Spain, where she completed four classes at the University of Malaga and lived with a host family during the spring semester of her junior year. During the summer of 2015, she interned in the legal services department at Covenant House International in New York City. She discovered her passion for combating social justice issues during this experience. Upon graduating in May, she hopes to find a job at a nonprofit organization that creates initiatives to combat homelessness and assist disenfranchised youth living in urban areas.
- 79. Journal of International Relations The DiscarDeD PeoPle 79 ABSTRACT The Rohingya are a stateless people originating from the Arakan state in northwestern Myanmar. Widespread persecution has caused half to flee their homeland, and an increasing number of the Rohingya now seek refuge in Malaysia and Thailand. This article analyzes the treatment of the Rohingya by the Thai and Malaysian governments and addresses why the two nations continuously have abused the Rohingya’s human rights. In order to fully understand the plight of the Rohingya, this paper examines the current and historical situation of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia and Thailand. Finally, this article considers the international and regional forces shaping government policy: identity, politics, and corruption. In conclusion, this paper argues that Thai and Malaysian human rights abuses against the Rohingya are caused by realist politics, popular misconceptions, and corruption. Change is inhibited by international and regional dynamics of power and a national population engaged in widespread political struggle. INTRODUCTION “The navy is exploring a deserted island to place Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority group from Burma who illegally slipped into the country… To stop the influx, we have to keep them in a tough place. […] We’re dealing with a time bomb. We must defuse it before it explodes into a greater problem.” - Samak Sundaravej, Prime Minister of Thailand 2008 Since Myanmar’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, the Rohingya, a stateless and persecuted ethnic group from northern Arakan in western Myanmar, have suffered from The Discarded People: An Analysis of Malaysia and Thailand’s Treatment of Rohingya Refugees by Anton WideRoth univeRsity of cAlifoRniA, beRKeley
- 80. 80 Anton Wideroth Spring 2016 | Volume 18 what Syed Serajul Islam terms “state terrorism.” State terrorism includes unfair trials, torture, extrajudicial execution, intimidation, and forced labor. The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law prohibited the Rohingya from obtaining citizenship in Myanmar, leaving them stateless in their own country. Continued persecution has forced an estimated 800,000 (roughly half of the Rohingya population) to flee the land of their ancestors and live as refugees or illegal migrants. Today, Malaysia is the most desirable refugee destination for the Rohingya, as a result of its high demand for foreign labor and increased migration control in Bangladesh. In 2013 alone, approximately 19,500 Rohingya fled by boat from the Bay of Bengal towards Malaysia. To reach Malaysia, the Rohingya travel through Southern Thailand (where some Rohingya choose to stay). Many human rights violations occur on this journey. This paper argues that Malaysian and Thai human rights violations are caused by popular misconceptions, realist national politics, and widespread corruption. They have persisted due to failures of international law, misguided regional policies, and a population struggling for national change. POLICY Neither Thailand nor Malaysia has ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees. Therefore, neither country is legally obligated to recognize the Rohingya as refugees or grant them corresponding rights. Moreover, neither country has national refugee laws. The Rohingya are thereby treated as illegal immigrants. As illegal immigrants, the Rohingya receive little support or protection. This article will refer to the Rohingya as refugees even though neither the Malaysian nor Thai government receives or recognizes them as such. In Malaysia, Rohingya experience discrimination, deportation, and insufficient protection. Roughly 15,000 Rohingya fled to Malaysia in the early 1990s. They received legal protection and temporary shelter from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and limited financial support from the Malaysian Red Crescent Society. Tacit acceptance of the Rohingya ended in 2002 when the Immigration Act was amended, imposing stricter punishments on illegal foreigners in Malaysia. In 2009, the government increased prevention of incoming refugee boats from landing on Malaysian shores. As a result of international criticism in response to such policies, the Malaysian government has refrained from arresting or deporting the Rohingya. That being said, the Malaysian government continues to direct the registration, status determination, and protection of the Rohingya to the UNHCR, and refuses to grant them citizenship or work permits. Roughly 340,000 refugees from Myanmar currently reside in Thailand, yet only a small portion are Rohingya. The treatment of refugees differs widely amongst regions in Thailand. Refugees entering from the Thai-Myanmar border receive limited protection and assistance in refugee camps, whereas the Rohingya who enter on boats in southern Thailand are often sent back to sea or detained and deported. Although Human Rights Watch considers actions in southern Thailand to be violations of international human rights norms, the Thai government has done little to improve the situation.
- 81. Journal of International Relations The DiscarDeD PeoPle 81 INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS International and regional agencies are also complicit in the treatment of Rohingya refugees. According to international law, the Rohingya are a stateless people. As such, they should be protected by the UN Conventions on Statelessness. Yet, if the stateless exist within a nation that has not signed the convention, such rights have no practical meaning. Hence, due to state sovereignty, the limited rights granted to the stateless under the UN Convention on Statelessness cannot be granted to the Rohingya in Thailand, Malaysia, or Myanmar. As aforementioned, international law relating to the treatment of refugees does not apply in Thailand and Malaysia as neither has signed the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees. Scholars have argued that the Malaysian and Thai governments are not solely to blame for their failure to sign the refugee convention. These scholars argue that the convention has a Eurocentric focus and places a disproportionate responsibility on nations proximate to refugees. Because of these issues, the failure of Malaysia and Thailand to sign the treaties is understandable. However, such arguments do not address the lack of national laws protecting refugees in Malaysia and Thailand. As such, it is unlikely that the countries have a genuine wish to protect refugee rights but are unable to do so. Because these states have failed to uphold international norms, the international community has applied pressure on Thailand and Malaysia by naming and shaming the countries. This tactic has achieved limited results. In 2015, Indonesia and Malaysia refused to allow the same group of boats entry to their shores in what the International Organization for Migration described as a “maritime Ping-Pong with human lives.” International backlash to the event pushed Malaysia to permit the UNHCR to conduct interviews of the refugees in migration detention centers. Due to the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) commitment to non-interference in members’ domestic affairs, it does not have the jurisdiction to protect the Rohingya. Because the status of Rohingya refugees is considered a national affair, the organization will not pressure Myanmar, Thailand, or Malaysia to grant legal rights to the Rohingya. Interestingly, Thailand and Malaysia blame Myanmar for failing to address the plight of the Rohingya. However, Myanmar denies responsibility for the Rohingya as, in its opinion, the Rohingya are not from Myanmar. The trafficking of the Rohingya follows a larger ASEAN trend of framing human trafficking issues as questions of security and crime control rather than issues of human rights. In so doing, ASEAN member states often criminalize victims of trafficking and fail to adequately protect them. In summary, the international and regional communities are incapable of properly protecting the Rohingya in Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia. As a result, international law and ASEAN’s principles are complicit in the continued human rights violations against the Rohingya. That being said, Malaysia and Thailand must take primary responsibility for the plight of the Rohingya. The failure of the Thai and Malaysian governments to protect the human rights of the Rohingya stems from issues of identity, national politics, and corruption.
- 82. 82 Anton Wideroth Spring 2016 | Volume 18 NATIONAL ANALYSIS In Malaysia, issues of national politics and identity are often intertwined. Many Rohingya seek refuge in Malaysia because the country has a Muslim majority and, according to the Quran, people fleeing persecution should be able to seek protection in an Islamic nation. However, in modern Malaysia, ruled by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Islamic identity is secondary to Malay identity. Since independence, the primary goal of UMNO has been to foster Malaysian nationalism. Promoting Islamic identity has been central to this project but not superior to the strengthening Malaysian ideals. A person of ethnic Indian origin who practices Islam is, for example, still considered Indian and thereby inferior to a Malaysian person. In addition, capitalist ideals place greater importance on economic capability over Islamic religious solidarity. Economic growth is central to UMNO’s policies. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) has employed economic policies to appease ethnic minorities while also empowering Malays. In effect, ethnicity and economic productivity are more important to the Malaysian government than religious solidarity. The Malaysian government is not concerned with granting the Rohingya citizenship because they are not ethnically Malaysian. They would not be expected to vote for UMNO since they are not Malay. Granting them formal work permits would not benefit the overall economy, since without work permits the Rohingya supply needed labor in Malaysia’s unskilled, informal economy. The Rohingya, who expect to be greeted with open arms by their Muslim brethren, therefore find themselves stuck in the informal economy and without citizenship, clinging to their sense of religious belonging. In Thailand, the treatment of the Rohingya is influenced by their Muslim and Myanmarese identity. Scholars most commonly cite security issues as the primary motive for Thailand’s policies towards the Rohingya. Thailand has long faced a violent secessionist movement from Thai Muslims in the southern Pattani province and military officials have continuously accused theRohingyaof beingmercenarysoldiersmovingtoThailandtojointhisinsurgency.Themedia and Thai citizen propagate this false charge. For example, people from the coastal province of Ranong protested against granting asylum to Rohingya refugees in 2009. The Ranong people believed that the Rohingya might join the insurgency in the south. In fact, although foreign labor contributes substantially to the Thai economy, the Thai people believe that the Rohingya disrupt the Thailand’s social and economic dynamics. The contrast between perception and reality creates a situation in which the government and the military are incentivized to prevent Muslim and Myanmar refugees from entering Thailand. The government wants to keep the existing refugees as unregistered workers in the informal economy. Forcefully keeping the Rohingya out allows the Thai military to paint the Rohingya as insurgents. Keeping Rohingya refugees unregistered allows the government to benefit from their labor without assuming social or legal responsibility for the Rohingya people. Malaysia and Thailand are consumed by high-level political conflict. In Malaysia, the past fifteen years have been characterized by the slow fall of UMNO and the rise of Anwar Ibrahim, a power struggle in which the political system is being questioned and challenged.
- 83. Journal of International Relations The DiscarDeD PeoPle 83 In Thailand, the citizenry is deeply divided between supporters and opponents of populist ex-president Thaksin Shinawatra. Such conflict has resulted in numerous military coups, the current military regime, and a political climate in which the structure of Thai government is contested. Given these political struggles, the Thai and Malaysian governments place little importance on dealing with the Rohingya. Trafficking and human rights violations against the Rohingya are exacerbated by rampant corruption in both countries. Malaysia and Thailand have been on the “Tier Two Watch List” in the US Trafficking in Persons Report since at least 2011, meaning that the US believes that neither government has been doing enough to combat human trafficking. The 2007 United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee report also confirmed that Malaysian government officials have been involved in the human trafficking of Myanmarese refugees. Policemen in both Thailand and Malaysia have been arrested for smuggling Rohingya across state borders. CONCLUSION As the people of Malaysia and Thailand are involved in struggles for political change, ASEAN is restricted by its own policies, and the international community has been reduced to naming and shaming, the Rohingya continue to suffer. The governments who allow this suffering continue to profit. Unfortunately, the Rohingya are victims of forces beyond their control. The Rohingya are a people who wish to practice their religion in peace, work hard, and live in their ancestral land. Instead, they risk their lives fleeing from state sponsored violence, face being nationless as a result of border controls, and live without rights as undocumented migrants even though their status as refugees is clear. WORKS CITED Azis, Avyanthi. “Urban Refugees in a Graduated Sovereignty: The Experience of the Stateless Rohingya in the Klang Valley.” Citizenship Studies 18, no. 8 (2014): 839- 54. Balazao, Patrick. “Truth & Rights: Statelessness, Human Rights and the Rohingya.” Undercut Journal XI, no. I (Fall/Winter 2015). Beech, Hananah. “The Nowhere People.” Time, June 15, 2015, http://time.com/3908627/ burmas-nowhere-people/. Blitz, Brad K. “Refugees in Burma, Malaysia and Thailand: Rescue for the Rohingya.” The World Today 66, no. 5 (2009): 30-31. Brees, Inge. “Burden or Boon: The Impact of Burmese Refugees on Thailand.” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 11, no. 1 (2010). Cheung, Samuel. “Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience.” Journal of Refugee Studies 25, no. 1 (March 2012).
- 84. 84 Anton Wideroth Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Coates, Eliane. “Rohingya Boat People: A Challenge for Southeast Asia.” Nanyang Technological University, February 21, 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/ myanmar/rohingya-boat-people-challenge-southeast-asia. Han, David Guo Xiong. “Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Testing Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship.” RSIS Commentaries: Nanyang Technological University 128 (2015). Hayeemad, Mahmood, and Rathakarn Buasri. “Impact of the AEC on Migrant Workers: A Case Study of the Rohingya in Khon Kaen Thailand.” Journal of Asian Development 1, no. 1 (2015). Iyengar, Rishi. “Burma’s Rohingya Facing ‘Final Stages of Genocide.’” TIME.com. Accessed March 1, 2016. http://time.com/4089276/burma-rohingya-genocide-report- documentary/. Khoo, Olivia. “Regional Approaches to Trafficking in Women in South-East Asia: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions and the New ASEAN Human Rights Body.” Australian Journal of Human Rights 15, no. 2 (2010). Lewa, Chris. “Asia’s New Boat People.” Forced Migration Review (2008): 40-42. “Malaysia/Burma: Living in Limbo.” Human Rights Watch, August 2000, https://www.hrw. org/reports/2000/malaysia/. “Perilous Plight: Burma’s Rohingya Take to the Seas.” Human Rights Watch, May 26, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/26/perilous-plight/burmas-rohingya-take- seas. Saltsman, Adam. “Beyond the Law: Power, Discretion, and Bureaucracy in the Management of Asylum Space in Thailand.” Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no. 3 (2014). Seet, Matthew. “Can Islam and ‘Islamization’ Be a Force for Refugee Rights in Malaysia?” Pacific Basin Law Journal 31, no. 1 (2013). Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Trafficking and Extortion of Burmese Migrants in Malaysia and Southern Thailand. United States Senate. 111th Congress. S. Prt. NO. 111-18. (2009). Tan, Andrew T. H., ed. A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007. “UN Convention on Statelessness.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Accessed March 1, 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2535c3d.html. Wood, Graeme. “A Country of Concentration Camps.” The New Republic, February 2014. Zook, Darren C. “Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, September 2, 2015. Zook, Darren C. “Malaysia I.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, September 9, 2015.
- 85. Journal of International Relations The DiscarDeD PeoPle 85 Zook, Darren C. “Malaysia II.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, September 14, 2015. Zook, Darren C. “Malaysia III.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, September 16, 2015. Zook, Darren C. “Malaysia IV.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, September 21, 2015. Zook, Darren C. “Thailand I.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, November 18, 2015. Zook, Darren C. “Thailand II.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, November 30, 2015. Zook, Darren C. “The Rise of ASEAN: Region and Nation.” Lecture at UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, August 31, 2015. “2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Thailand.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Accessed February 27, 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/ pages/49e489646.html. “2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile - South-East Asia.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Accessed February 27, 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/ pages/49e4884c6.html. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Anton is a senior studying Political Economy with a concentration in the political and economic development of Asia and a minor in Peace and Conflict Studies. At UC Berkeley, he is the treasurer of Sigma Iota Rho, a writer for the Berkeley Political Review and Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies, and a former Head Delegate for Berkeley’s Model United Nations team. He is interested in peacebuilding, post-conflict transitions, and human rights as well as the social impact of private corporations. These interests are currently guiding his honors research into the role of the international private sector in post-conflict Liberia. In addition to his studies, Anton is a passionate debater, political writer, and lover of adrenaline, food, and craft brews.
- 86. 86 Neil Misra Spring 2016 | Volume 18 ABSTRACT Immigration is a strikingly contentious political issue in many Western, industrialized democracies. Indeed, the recent prominence of the right-wing National Front in France, the euroskeptic (and anti-EU migration) UK Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain, and the nativist presidential campaign of Donald Trump in the United States reify the notion that opposition to immigration is both vigorous and widespread. In spite of such pervasive anti-immigration sentiment, government efforts to restrict migrant inflows have often proven inefficacious. This “gap” between public demands and government policy outcomes is the product of a combination of factors acting in concert to impede anti-immigration measures, including: activist courts, client politics, limitations on available policy options created by “path dependencies,” specific “structural factors,” and various international influences inhibiting the capacity of states to manage their own migration policies. INTRODUCTION Vigorous opposition to immigration is commonplace in the populations of many liberal, industrialized states.1 In fact, according to Randall Hansen, there is no country in which “a 1 Marc R. Rosenblum and Wayne A. Cornelius, “Immigration and Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 99. Immigration: The Growing Gap Between Public Opinion and Policy Outcomes by neil misRA geoRge WAshington univeRsity
- 87. Journal of International Relations ImmIgratIon 87 majority of citizens have positive feelings about their current cohort of immigrants.”2 Given these circumstances, governments would be expected to adopt more restrictionist policies towards incoming migrants. However, efforts to curb immigration have often proven to be impotent or inefficacious.3 What, then, is the cause of this evident “gap” between public demands for tighter immigration control and actual immigration policy outcomes? Here, it will be argued that the gap is a product of (a) certain domestic constraints against implementing effective anti-immigration policy (e.g. intervention by courts and client politics), (b) limitations to available policy options created by “path dependence,” (c) “structural” factors diminishing the usefulness of migration laws, and (d) various international influences restricting the capacity of states to manage migration flows. This study specifies which of, and explicates how, these causes are applicable to the cases of the France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS TO LIMITING IMMIGRATION Activist courts (i.e. courts that influence the formulation and application of government policy in an ostensibly intrusive manner) often play a significant role in blocking the implementation of policies intended to limit the rights of resident aliens and thus discourage additional immigration inflows. Since judges typically do not have to contend directly with pressures exerted by the general public, as elected politicians must do, they have the capability to interpret the laws and constitution of their country in the manner that they see most objective or fitting. Their views may not necessarily be congruent to the manner that most citizens see fitting.4 In many cases, judges have been able to use their authority to undermine government attempts to limit the rights of migrants. Acknowledging this, Christian Joppke concludes, “The legal process is crucial to explaining why…states continued accepting immigrants despite explicit zero immigration policies.”5 Here, the examples of the United States and Germany shall be examined to better understand how courts can thwart anti-immigrant measures. Following the American Civil Rights movement, which sought to enhance the protection of minority groups, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of immigrant interests (and against state government efforts to encroach on the rights of immigrants) in two landmark cases. In Graham v. Richardson (1971), the Court stipulated that the state of Arizona could not enact a law that refused welfare benefits to resident aliens.6 Amendment XIV of the American Constitution, which dictates that all people are entitled to equal protection under the 2 Randall Hansen, “Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 3 (2002): 260. 3 Rosenblum and Cornelius, “Immigration and Politics,” 99. 4 Hansen, “Globalization,” 263. 5 Christian Joppke, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 271. 6 Christian Joppke, “The Legal-domestic Sources of Immigration Rights: The United States, Germany, and the European Union,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 4 (2001): 344.
- 88. 88 Neil Misra Spring 2016 | Volume 18 law, was used as justification.7 Evidently, the Court had interpreted this to mean that even non- citizens were subject to legal protections and that an immigrant’s status as a U.S. resident took precedence over their status as a foreign national. The case of Plyler v. Doe (1982) concerned a Texas state statute that withheld public education from the children of illegal immigrants.8 Once again, the court ruled in favor of immigrants’ rights and employed Amendment XIV in their justification, asserting that on the basis of equal protection a state cannot deprive any resident child, including illegal aliens, of its right to a free public education.9 In both of these cases, the court system stymied the implementation of government policies intended to discourage immigration (in this case, policies formulated by the state governments of Texas and Arizona, two states that share a border with Mexico), which can partially account for the “gap” described in the introduction. Germany’s courts have also stifled attempts to reduce migrant rights through their interpretations of German laws. In a prominent case from 1978, an Indian national who had been residing in Germany since 1961 had his residency renewal application denied (foreign residents of Germany were required to renew their residence permits annually) and subsequently appealed to the German court system.10 The German Constitutional Court ruled in his favor and grounded their legal justification on three principles. First, when a foreigner resides in Germany for an extended period of time, it becomes increasingly infeasible for them to simply return to his or her country of origin. Therefore, the foreigner becomes wholly dependent on Germany for “existential protection.”11 As such, the Constitutional Court argued that longtime immigrant residents are entitled to the rights and protections of German citizens, or Deutschenrechte.12 Second, Articles I through VII of the Basic Law ensure the protection of certain universal human rights, regardless of whether a person is a German citizen or not.13 Therefore, the arbitrary deportation of a longtime resident could be perceived as inhumane.14 Third, the Basic Law also established the principle of individual rights taking precedence over the interests of the state, which in this case was the state enacting its “no immigration” policies.15 Thus, the state could not place its own interests above the legal rights of immigrants. Again, as in the examples from the United States, the court system prevented the government from enforcing measures intended to reduce immigration. In the German case in particular, the courts essentially permitted guest workers to become permanent residents, who thereafter were legally entitled to bring their family members to Germany despite persisting opposition to immigration.16 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., 345. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 349. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Joppke, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” 284. 15 Joppke, “Legal-domestic Sources,” 349. 16 Joppke, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” 281-282.
- 89. Journal of International Relations ImmIgratIon 89 Client politics, when interest groups exert political pressure on legislators and policymakers, can also impede the enactment of meaningful anti-immigration controls.17 Powerful interest groups have the ability to influence politicians and coerce them into adhering to the group’s agenda, even if this entails defying the demands of the general public. Among the most compelling examples of client politics shaping immigration policy is the response of certain lobbyists to the United States Congress’s Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). When the IRCA was originally introduced, several interest groups mobilized effective campaigns against the bill, as they all had a vested interest in maintaining lax immigration laws. Firstly, Hispanic interest groups were able to deter politicians from supporting the original bill by characterizing it as ethnically discriminatory.18 Since Hispanics comprised the majority of undocumented immigrants in the United States, any legislation limiting illegal immigration was perceived to be an affront to the Hispanic community.19 Following the inroads made by the Civil Rights Movement, politicians have considered policy measures that discriminate against a minority group to be taboo. Secondly, interest groups representing large employers also objected to the IRCA, although for different reasons than Hispanic activists. Multinational firms resented the bill’s requirement that employers “pay a heavy tax on each foreign worker they sponsor,” while they concomitantly possessed an insatiable demand for more cheap labor.2021 Lastly, civil rights interest groups protested against the original act’s inclusion of a provision calling for a “national identification card,” which was regarded as an infringement on the liberties of the American people.22 As the tangible influence of interest groups in shaping this piece of legislation became increasingly apparent, one official described the debate over the IRCA as “Washington groups against the American people.”23 Here, it is important to consider why the interests of the American people were not adequately represented. Since a relatively small segment of the population directly receives the benefits of loose immigration controls, those against the bill had to coalesce into a tight, organized, and unified opposition in order to have any chance of success.24 The costs of immigration (e.g. increased expenditures on government benefits and education for migrants), on the other hand, are diffused across a far broader segment of society.25 Thus, the proponents of the bill were significantly more divided and had less incentive to coalesce into a unified force. Within this context, politicians were more inclined to acquiesce to interest groups.26 17 Ibid., 270. 18 Ibid., 273. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., 274. 23 Ibid., 279. 24 Rosenblum and Cornelius, “Immigration and Politics,” 107. 25 Ibid. 26 Hansen, “Globalization,” 263.
- 90. 90 Neil Misra Spring 2016 | Volume 18 This section has described how judicial systems and their interpretations of previously established laws, in addition to client politics can constrain a government’s ability to accommodate its citizens’ demands for decreased immigration. These two constraints are part of the “embedded realist theory,” defined as a model that seeks to explicate the aforementioned “gap” by emphasizing the role of domestic institutions in formulating policy.27 PATH DEPENDENCE Path dependence, when previous decisions limit the policy options available to the government, can also help to explain the gap between public opinions on immigration and immigration policy outcomes.28 In many cases, the government is not only constrained by domestic courts or client politics, but also by the decisions made by previous governments. Decisions (e.g. the decision to pass a particular law) that are difficult to overturn in the future essentially result in path dependency.29 Here, this section examines how path dependence is relevant to migration policies in France and the United Kingdom. The inability of the French to expel Algerian immigrants was a result of two institutional choices: (1) the passing of a provision in 1889 dictating that French citizenship cannot be rejected if it is automatically granted to an individual and (2) the legal classification of Algeria as a part of France instead of a colony in 1830.30 As a result of these decisions, the children of Algerian immigrants to France were automatically considered French citizens, and they could not immediately have their citizenships revoked. Typically, only the grandchild of an immigrant to France can be accorded French citizenship at birth, but Algerian migrants were able to circumvent this rule through France’s classification of Algeria as a French territory.31 Since these French-born Algerians had become citizens and were entitled to the same rights and protections as other French people, the government could not arbitrarily expel them from the country.32 Any potential anti-immigration policy specifically targeting French Algerians would, therefore, be ineffective.33 Thus, despite any public opposition to Algerian immigration, previous political decisions severely limited the policy measures available to the government. The influx of Asian immigrants from Africa into the United Kingdom in 1968 was a direct result of decisions made by the British government twenty years prior. In 1948, the government consolidated both inhabitants of the United Kingdom and colonial subjects into a single citizenship classification: Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC).34 27 Ibid., 262. 28 Ibid., 269. 29 Ibid., 270. 30 Ibid., 273. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 265. 33 Ibid., 274. 34 Ibid., 275.
- 91. Journal of International Relations ImmIgratIon 91 Those designated as CUKC were permitted to freely enter the United Kingdom until 1962, when popular resistance against immigration led to a withdrawal of the CUKC system.35 From that point onwards, individuals holding a passport distributed by a colonial authority were subject to immigration restrictions, while those with passports issued from London were not.36 Ordinarily, this plan might have succeeded in curbing migration from the colonies. However, due to pervasive anti-Asian sentiments in East Africa, many Asians opted to retain CUKC status following the independence of Kenya instead of claiming Kenyan citizenship.37 Their passports were, therefore, still issued from London. Thus, when many of them decided to leave Kenya, they possessed the legal right to enter the United Kingdom free of immigration controls. In this case, it is evident that the government’s establishment of the CUKC system in 1948 inadvertently prevented the British authorities of 1968 from implementing policies that could have otherwise blocked the inflow of Asian migrants. This is a classic example of path dependency. STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE Certain “structural factors,” defined as historic, economic, geographic, and other institutional factors that provide incentives for migration,can inhibit a state’s ability to control immigration.38 Here, four examples shall be briefly enumerated. First, colonial ties to a specific country can influence where a migrant ultimately elects to reside.39 The aforementioned flows of migrants from Kenya to Britain and from Algeria to France serve as evidence of this. Second, the amount of economic opportunities available in a destination country frequently affect the decision-making process of migrants.40 Third, the “length and openness of a country’s borders” is a key factor for immigration.41 The relatively porous border between the United States and Mexico serves to illustrate how penetrable international boundary lines can reduce the costs of migration; borders that are relatively easy to traverse reduce the risks and dangers associated with migration. Last, greater perceived liberalness (i.e. the extent to which civil liberties are protected and social diversity is deemed tolerable) can encourage immigration inflows into a country.42 Since governments do not exercise much direct influence over these structural factors (e.g. a country cannot sever its colonial connection to a country on a whim, nor can it sabotage its own economy for the sake of deterring migrants), they serve as considerable obstacles to the formulation of anti-immigrant policies. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Eiko R. Thielemann, “The Effectiveness of Governments’ Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration,” in Immigration and the Transformation of Europe, ed. Craig A. Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 451-465. 39 Ibid., 450-451. 40 Ibid., 465. 41 Ibid., 452. 42 Ibid., 468.
- 92. 92 Neil Misra Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Internationalinfluencesalsoplayaroleinfacilitatingmigration.Prevailinghumanrightsregimes implore liberal, democratic governments to accept legitimate asylum-seekers.43 Furthermore, policy harmonization, especially within the EU, restricts a state’s ability to autonomously pass legislation that constricts migration flows.44 However, both Hansen and Joppke assert that international influence is an incomplete explanation for the “gap,” as examples exist of states successfully controlling immigration in spite of external pressures.45 Thus, the previous three explanations are needed to compensate for the shortcomings of the international influence explanation. CONCLUSION This piece furnished specific answers to the question of why there is often a gap between public demands for immigration control and actual policy outcomes. Domestic courts can overturn measures intended to halt migration. Interest groups can influence politicians and coerce them into creating more lax immigration legislation. Path dependence limits the amount of policy measures available to the government to address migration inflows. Structural factors make it impractical for the state to eliminate certain incentives for migration. Finally, international pressures can deter a state from pursuing anti-immigration policies. Taken collectively, each of these individual factors can, to a great extent, explain why states continue to tolerate undesired immigration. WORKS CITED Cornelius, Wayne A., and Marc R. Rosenblum. “Immigration and Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 99-119. Hansen, Randall. “Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 3 (2002): 259-283. Joppke, Christian. “The Legal-domestic Sources of Immigration Rights: The United States, Germany, and the European Union.” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 4 (2001): 339-366. Joppke, Christian. “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration.” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 266-293. 43 Rosenblum and Cornelius, “Immigration and Politics,” 109. 44 Hansen, “Globalization,” 261-262. 45 Ibid., 263-264.
- 93. Journal of International Relations ImmIgratIon 93 Thielemann, Eiko R. “The Effectiveness of Governments’ Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration.” In Immigration and the Transformation of Europe, edited by Craig A. Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding, 451-465. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Neil Misra was initiated to the Alpha Iota chapter of Sigma Iota Rho at the George Washington University (GW) in 2012. At GW, he majored in international affairs with a concentration in international politics. During his junior year, he studied abroad at the London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), where he was affiliated with the international relations department. He has traveled to fifteen different countries across three continents. The power of the world’s regions is shifting. lauder.wharton.upenn.edu In the coming decade, emerging economies will be the largest manufacturers of goods and consumer markets. Seven of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. India and China will soon outgrow the EU and US’s share of the global consumer market. The Lauder Institute continues to shape global business education in embracing the rebalancing of the global economy and in preparing for the skillset needed to be effective in a global context. Since 1983, the Lauder Institute has offered a joint-degree MBA/MA that merges the best of The Wharton School with the expertise of the International Studies Program in the School of Arts & Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. The world is changing fast. Get ready.
- 94. 94 Luke Zaro Spring 2016 | Volume 18 ABSTRACT This paper argues that Ottoman Orientalism heavily influenced Turkish self-identity and perception of Arabs from its inception in the mid-nineteenth century through the twentieth century. Introduced by Ussama Makdisi, Ottoman Orientalism is the “complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth-century age of Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theater of backwardness.”1 This essay examines the extent to which Ottoman Orientalism affected Turks’ self-perception and their perception of Arabs. It also examines the ramifications Ottoman Orientalism has had on Turkish foreign policy in four periods of history: 1) the “ordering” of the Ottoman Empire until its collapse following World War I, 2) the birth of the Turkish Republic through the height of the Cold War, 3) the 1960s to 1980s, and 4) the post-Cold War 1990s. INTRODUCTION Perception is reality. This axiom commonly pertains to foreign policy, including the complicated historical relationship between the Turks and the Arabs. From the beginnings of the Ottoman Empire to the Arab Spring, the Turkic and Arab peoples have interacted for centuries, resulting in alliances and betrayals, conquest and rebellion, and cultural semblance and estrangement. This essay will focus on the time period from the Tanzimat Reorganization Decree of 1839 through the dawn of the twenty-first century. This paper argues that Ottoman Orientalism, from its inception during the mid-nineteenth century through much of the twentieth century, heavily influenced Turkish self-identity and perception of the Arabs, and that these perceptions 1 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” The American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (2002): 769. Ottoman Orientalism: A Guiding Principle of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East by luKe zARo foRdhAm univeRsity
- 95. Journal of International Relations OttOman Orientalism 95 shaped Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East.2 Introduced by Ussama Makdisi, Ottoman Orientalism is the “complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth-century age of Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theater of backwardness.”3 This essay examines the extent to which Ottoman Orientalism affected Turks’ self-perception and their perception of Arabs. It also examines the ramifications Ottoman Orientalism has had on Turkish foreign policy in four periods of history: 1) the “ordering” of the Ottoman Empire until its collapse following World War I, 2) the birth of the Turkish Republic through the height of the Cold War, 3) the 1960s to 1980s, and 4) the post-Cold War 1990s. TANZIMAT – WORLD WAR I | (1839 -1919) The Ottoman Empire reached the height of its power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when its territory stretched “from Hungary to Crimea and from Tunis to the Persian Gulf.”4 At that time, the Empire was considered “equal if not superior” to any of the European powers in terms of military strength, economic advances, and administrative efficiency.5 Over the next two hundred years, however, the Ottomans slowly started to lose territory to growing European powers as they began to accelerate their modernization efforts at a much faster rate than the aging Empire. Labeled “the sick man of Europe,” the Ottoman Empire recognized the growing disparity between the West and the East. In response, it instituted the Tanzimat reforms in 1839.6 Interestingly, in Turkish, Tanzimat means “reorganization.”7 The Tanzimat reforms (1839–1876) recognized that the most effective strategy for the Ottomans to narrow the West’s material and military advantages was Westernization, namely transitioning from a religious dynasty to a “modern, bureaucratic, and tolerant” state on par with the rest of Europe.8 By acknowledging the Europeans as advanced, the Turks were conceding Ottoman inferiority.9 Ottoman elites wanted the Empire to parallel European powers in order to ensure the Empire’s survival.10 The Ottoman elites instituted the Tanzimat reforms in order to “catch up” to the rest of Europe and re-establish itself as an equal power.11 The reforms included modernizing the administrative bureaucracy based on the Napoleonic model, establishing a modern army (instituted after the destruction of the Janissary corps by Sultan Mahmud II), and introducing 2 Ibid., 770. 3 Ibid., 769. 4 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 8. 5 Ibid. 6 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 770. 7 Ibid. 8 Edhem Eldem, “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism,” Architectural Design (Special Issue: Turkey: At the Threshold) 80, no. 1 (2010): 27. 9 Ibid. 10 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 772. 11 Eldem, “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism,” 27.
- 96. 96 Luke Zaro Spring 2016 | Volume 18 conscription of Muslim males in 1869.12 Cautious diplomatic practices that balanced the interests of European powers with those of the Empire also contributed to Ottoman survival. Ottoman elites viewed themselves as undergoing a “tardy renaissance” as their empire embraced “Eurocentric modernity.”13 The Ottoman Empire was formally recognized as a member of the European state system in the 1856 Treaty of Paris.14 To further assimilate to a European model, Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1908) expanded the European concepts of nationalization and modernization. Culturally, the Ottomans advanced archaeological interests in the “pre-Islamic Phoenician and Hellenistic past.”15 They promoted the ideals of tolerance and equality, products of the European Enlightenment. Ottoman statesman and Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, for instance, had many “ignorant” Muslims executed after they had massacred Christians in Damascus following a Mount Lebanon clash between the Druze and Maronites.16 The severity of their punishment was justified by claims that the attack was unthinkable and ignorant. The Foreign Minister argued that such ignorance created a “stain” on Ottoman modernization.17 Fuad Pasha and other Ottoman elites wanted the world to know that the Ottoman Empire was tolerant.18 In Ottoman Orientalism, the Ottomans acknowledged a dichotomy between the West and East. The West was modern and progressing; the East was stagnant and a “theater of backwardness.” The Ottoman ruling elite considered their fellow Turks to be part of the progressive West, while denouncing those of the “pre-modern” empire, particularly Arabs, as belonging to the “backwards” East.19 The Ottoman Turkish elites embraced the European, Orientalist claim that some peoples were further advanced than others. Istanbul was viewed as the “basis for a modernized empire.”20 It stood as “temporally segregated and…racially differentiated” from the rest of the pre-modern, “not-yet-Ottomanized” Arabs.21 This identity infrastructure strengthened in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire and guided Turkish and Arab perceptions throughout the 20th century. The Ottoman Elite considered the Empire “capable of its own renaissance.”22 They believed that the “Ottoman man’s burden” was to reform the Empire so that it could become a “civilized power.”23 Although the Turks viewed the Arabs as fellow Muslims, some believed that Arabs were “once noble members of the race of the Prophet” who could only be “redeemed and 12 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 9-12. 13 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 793, 795. 14 Ibid., 778. 15 Ibid., 793. 16 Ibid., 780-781. 17 Ibid., 781. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 769-770. 20 Ibid., 769-771. 21 Ibid., 769-771. 22 Ibid., 782. 23 Ibid.
- 97. Journal of International Relations OttOman Orientalism 97 raised up by the Turkish race.”24 Although Arabs and Turks shared the practice of Islam, neither unity nor equality existed between the two peoples. Remarks from Halide Edib Adivar, an Ottoman elite and leader in the field of women’s education, demonstrate this tension. In the final decades of the Ottoman Empire, Aldivar characterized the Arabs as “naturally corrupt” and “mired in local passions,” needing the “calm [and] impartial” Turk who was a “natural leader.”25 The Turkish perception of the Arabs as unruly and uneducated was evident in 1898 when Kaiser Wilhelm II visited the Temple of Bacchus, which was discovered by through Ottoman archaeological excavations. The plaque commemorating the visit was inscribed in Ottoman Turkish and German, but not Arabic, the language of the locals, who were “apparently not deemed worthy (or capable perhaps) of reading or understanding the significance of the imperial visit.”26 Additionally, entry tickets were written in Ottoman Turkish, French, and Arabic, but only the Arabic text included a warning not to steal.27 This “genteel racism” and “imperial paternalism” characterized Ottoman Orientalism and was a dominant viewpoint within the community of Turkish elites who self-identified the Turkish race as the “foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire.”28 BIRTH OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC – COLD WAR | (1920 – 1965) While Ottoman Orientalism took form during the Ottoman Empire, its full fruition came during the first decades of the Turkish Republic. With its establishment in the early 1920s, the Turkish Republic created a nation-state not unlike a European nation-state—secular, and demographically and religiously more homogenous than the Ottoman Empire.29 The new Turkish state, under Kemal Ataturk, adopted secularist policies, changed its Arabic alphabet to Latin, and expunged the Turkish language of any Arabic words.30 The Turks felt betrayed by their Arab neighbors, while the Arabs viewed Turkey as desperately eager to appear as a “pure European country.”31 This severe divide and distrust between the Turks and the Arabs continued throughout the twentieth century, reaching its pinnacle during the height of the Cold War as Turkey disengaged from the Middle East and firmly cemented itself into the Western world. Turkish perceptions of Arabs in Turkish culture, including film, education, and journalism, demonstrated the divide between the two peoples and can be seen in Turkey’s corresponding pro-Western foreign policy, particularly in the first decades of the Cold War. A June 2010 report from the Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA) examined the image of Arabs in Turkey, analyzing the roots of contemporary perceptions. SETA claims there is a “serious lacuna in research” on the Turkish public’s perception of 24 Ibid., 792. 25 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 793. 26 Ibid., 784. 27 Ibid., 784-785. 28 Ibid., 793-794. 29 Eldem, “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism,” 28. 30 Ofra Bengio and Gencer Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel,” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (2001): 52, 55. 31 Ibid., 52.
- 98. 98 Luke Zaro Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Arabs and their report analyzes these perceptions in a cultural and historical context.32 For instance, SETA identifies “six types of Arab characters depicted in Turkish cinema”: 1) Arabs in a religious context where Muslims are good and pagans are “cruel,” 2) Arabs as traditional characters such as “eunuchs, executioners, tutors, and servants,” 3) Arabs as traitors in a historical context, 4) Arabs often depicted as “unmannered, alcoholic, lustful, criminal, and fraudulent” and as “oil-rich businessmen and arms traders” in post-1960s films, 5) Arabs as rich relatives and former members of the Ottoman Empire, and 6) Arabs as oppressed victims, a representation particularly prevalent after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.33 These portrayals of Arabs in Turkish film—particularly the first five—can be attributed to the Turkish perception of Arabs as part of the “Orient,” per Ottoman Orientalism. Magazine and album covers of the 1930s and 1940s depict Arabs as significantly darker than the lighter – almost white – Turks. For instance, the cover of Salih Ermiz’s 1941 Tarihten Cizgiler shows a menacing, dark and fully-bearded “Muslim priest abusing young women under the guise of exorcism.”34 The October 10, 1936 cover of Karikatur shows two white, European-looking, young Turkish women spurning the advances of a dark-skinned, Arab sweet seller.35 This white-dark, Turkish-Arab dichotomous imagery continues with the 1937 ‘Le visage turc’ from La Turquie Kamaliste, which shows a young Turkish girl resembling a white European to show that “Turks have European physiognomy.”36 There are other instances of Ottoman Orientalism pervading Turkish culture and affecting Turkish perception of Arabs. In twentieth century Turkish history books, for instance, SETA claims that Arabs are depicted negatively as “traitorous, dirty…male-dominant…plunderers, and oppressors,” before beginning to introduce neutral and more positive depictions of Arabs in the 1990s.37 Other sources have supported this, such as Arab scholar Ibrahim al-Daquqi, who notes that each of the ten Turkish history textbooks he analyzed between 1931 and 1990 “carried the negative image of the Arabs as traitors.”38 Conversely, Turkish scholar Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu notes that Egyptian history books published between 1912 and 1980 contained negative perceptions of Turks and Ottomans.39 In the “Turkish imagination,” the Middle East was often described as a “bog” or a “trap” and a “backward, underdeveloped area” that “evoked uneasiness and fear since it was equated with fundamental Islam.”40 In the Turkish press, SETA found that Turkish reports of the Arab world predominately focused on “wars and crises,” with Turkish media sending correspondents to the region only during times of conflict.41 The Turkish press began to follow other aspects of Arab society during 32 Talip Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey, 1st ed. (Ankara: SETA | Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research, 2010), 7. 33 Ibid., 12. 34 Eldem, “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism,” 28. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey, 10. 38 Bengio and Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 53. 39 Ibid., 51. 40 S. Gülden Ayman, “The Arab Upheavals and the Turkish Perception Vis-à-vis the West,” Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2013): 307. 41 Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey, 12.
- 99. Journal of International Relations OttOman Orientalism 99 the 1970s, a trend that has continued through present day.42 The continued influence of Ottoman Orientalism in Turkish society can be seen throughout much of the twentieth century, as popular media and film depicted Arabs as darker and through an Oriental perspective, history books identified the Arabs as traitors, and the Turkish press reported on Arab society only during times of conflict. These negative perceptions of Arabs shaped Turkish perspectives not only of the Arabs, but also of themselves. Turks developed a self-perception as being particularly distinct from Arabs and more like a people with a European history, secular culture, and Western values. This development, which expanded during the early decades of the Turkish Republic and built on the views of the Turkish elite from the era of the Ottoman Empire, can be seen as simultaneously occurring with developments in Turkish foreign policy during the mid-twentieth century. Turkish foreign policy during this period was characterized by continued disengagement from the Middle East and alignment with the Western, anti-Communist camp during the Cold War.43 The newly founded Turkish Republic tried to avoid any alliances that could drag it into another European conflict while still maintaining relationships with the European powers as a form of security.44 In 1928, Turkish foreign minister Tevfik Rustu Aras declared, “Turkey is now a Western power.”45 This identity would be instrumental over the coming decades in formulating Turkish perception of changes in the balance of power, threats, and its own strength in Europe, the Middle East, and during the Cold War. In the mid-1930s, Turkey began to have concerns about the ambitions of Italy, and eventually, Germany.46 With the memory of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse following its entry into World War I fresh in their minds, the Turkish government maintained neutrality throughout most of the World War II in an effort to avoid any commitment that could destroy their young Republic.47 At the very end of the war, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan to ensure it could attain membership into the proposed United Nations.48 Upon the war’s conclusion, Turkey recognized that only two great superpowers remained— the United States and the Soviet Union—and its previous strategy of balancing European powers would no longer work in the new bipolar geopolitical system.49 Over the next twenty years, Turkey took several steps that placed it on the Western side of the Iron Curtain and allowed it to progress in many respects as a European state. In 1949 (de jure in January 1950), Turkey recognized the state of Israel, becoming the the first majority Muslim state to do so. This foreign policy decision mirrored the rest of Europe but stood in stark contrast to the rest 42 Ibid., 12-13. 43 Ayman, “The Arab Upheavals,” 307. 44 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 41. 45 Ibid., 42. 46 Ibid., 46. 47 Ibid., 56. 48 Ibid., 75. 49 Ibid., 78.
- 100. 100 Luke Zaro Spring 2016 | Volume 18 of the Middle East.50 In 1947, Turkey (along with Greece) fell under the Truman Doctrine and received aid, as Turkey was viewed as essential to Western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.51 By 1948, Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan, receiving further aid, and became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.52 However, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, creating NATO, Turkey was left out, leaving Turks concerned as to whether or not they could rely on the West to protect them against the Soviet Union.53 In 1950, Turkey assisted the United States during the Korean War and eventually helped to convince the Americans that Turkish membership in NATO was necessary for Western interests and security against the Soviet Union.54 With U.S. support, Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952.55 By 1959, Turkey was applying for associate membership to the European Economic Community, the predecessor to today’s European Union.56 At the same time, Turkey “maintained a non-activist and low-profile posture” in the Arab world.57 Thus, during the early Cold War period, between receiving Marshall Plan aid, obtaining NATO membership, and falling on the Western side of the Iron Curtain, Turkey, a secular nation-state, was a European state diplomatically, economically, and politically. A decades-old self-perception was finally being realized. ENGAGEMENT WITH THE MIDDLE EAST & DISTANCING FROM THE WEST | (1965 – 1991) After a string of successes in foreign policy during the first decades of the Cold War, Turkey began to find itself less in tune with the West and became more involved with the Middle East. A series of foreign policy incidents throughout the 1960s and 1980s began to change Turkish perception of the Arabs. While perceptions may have dictated foreign policy previously in the Republic’s history, foreign policy began to affect Turkish perceptions as the paradigm of Ottoman Orientalism weakened. There were two main crises in the 1960s that extended into the 1970s that began this phenomenon. The first caused the Turks to drift away from the West, while the second brought them closer to the Arabs. The first problem was the Cyprus crisis. The first flare-up of the Cyprus problem between the U.S. and Turkey was in 1964, when President Lyndon Johnson warned Turkey that the other members of NATO “have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention.”58 The Turks felt that the U.S. favored the Greeks, 50 Bengio & Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 57. 51 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 83. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., 84. 54 Ibid., 85-86. 55 Ibid., 87. 56 Hannah Q. Young, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or Reality?,” Claremont- UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union, no. 11 (2013): 144. 57 Sabri Sayari, “Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s,” Journal of Palestine Studies XXVI, no. 3 (1997): 44-55. 58 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 107.
- 101. Journal of International Relations OttOman Orientalism 101 straining relations between the two nations.59 Then, in July of 1974, Turkey occupied the northern part of Cyprus, which led to a rebuff by the West and a U.S. arms embargo.60 This drifting from the West consequently brought Turkey closer towards its Arab neighbors. At the same time, events in the Middle East were already bringing Turkey closer to the Arabs. In 1967, Turkey protested the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.61 Then, in June 1975, Turkey recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”62 That same year, Turkey voted for the UN resolution “which condemned Zionism as racism.”63 In 1980, Turkey “strongly condemned” Israel’s declaration that Jerusalem was the capital of the Israeli state.64 While Turkey-Israel relations would become problematic, especially in the 1990s, these pro-Palestinian foreign policy steps brought the Arabs and Turks together for the first time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Another significant development during this era was the oil crisis of the early 1970s, which increased Turkey’s economic relations with Arab countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iraq.65 The economic crisis Turkey experienced, along with the world oil crisis, prompted Turkey to begin to develop economic and political ties with some its Arab neighbors.66 67 After the crisis, Turkey’s exports into the Arab region increased.68 Turkish companies were welcomed into Saudi markets in particular, especially “those in the construction sector.”69 These economic ties, coupled with Turkey’s drifting from the West, particularly the U.S., brought the Turks and the Arabs to their closest point in the history of the Turkish Republic. In a cultural context, these foreign policy advances began to affect Turkish perceptions of the Arabs, weakening decades-old beliefs founded in Ottoman Orientalism. Pro-Palestinian steps brought Turks and Arabs together as Muslims – ties that had been used to unify these groups together in the Ottoman Empire before the Tanzimat reforms. While perceptions did not change overnight, there were instances that suggested the beginnings of new views. The oil crisis was considered a “breaking point” in Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world.70 After many years of considering itself a European state, Turkey began to recognize the importance of establishing economic and political ties in the Middle East, especially in a world economy dominated by oil. Moreover, in Turkish culture, “Orient ‘demons’…were 59 Ibid. 60 Bengio and Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 61. 61 Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey, 9. 62 Bengio and Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 61. 63 Ibid. 64 Gokhan Bacik, “The Limits of an Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited,” Arab Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2001): 59. 65 Bengio and Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 60. 66 Ibid. 67 Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey, 9. 68 Sayari, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 45. 69 Adel Al-Toraifi, “Is There Really a Saudi – Turkish Divide?,” Al Arabiya News, May 25, 2012. 70 Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey.
- 102. 102 Luke Zaro Spring 2016 | Volume 18 unleashed” as many Turks rediscovered “Oriental music and belly dancing, [and] reveled in a nostalgic reinterpretation of Ottoman history.”71 After identifying for decades as a secularist, European state, the Turks were reinventing a new identity based on their Islamic, Ottoman, and Oriental history.72 This rediscovery and the natural connection it brought to the Arabs can be seen in other cultural aspects. More neutral language depicting the Arabs in Turkish history books and more positive coverage of Arabs (especially Saudi Arabia) in the Turkish press in the 1970s and 1980s exemplified these shifting attitudes.73 During this period, foreign policy affected perceptions rather than vice-versa. POST-COLD WAR TURKEY | (1991 – 2001) The end of the Cold War was an unprecedented time for Turkey, as it was for most of Europe and the Middle East. The bipolar balance of power framework that had dominated international relations for over four decades collapsed. The U.S. was the world’s sole superpower, but U.S.- Turkish relations were not without issues. It is difficult to generalize Turkish perceptions of the Arabs during this time, as there were many crises, some of which brought Turkey closer to the Arabs while others created greater alienation. Of the crises in the 1990s, this section will focus on the Gulf War, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurds, water problems, and Turkish-Israeli relations. The goal will not be to analyze these crises specifically, but rather to evaluate how they affected Turkish perception of the Arabs and Turkish foreign policy. Turkey continued to have poor relations with some Arab states in the post-Cold War era despite the progress made in the previous decades. Turkey sided with the U.S. and other coalition states against Iraq in 1991, allowing the U.S. to use the Incirlik air base in southeast Turkey and shutting off the pipelines that carried Iraq’s oil exports.74 This instance of Western support did not translate into closer relations with the West for Turkey or even any economic benefits.75 In fact, the economic sanctions enforced on Iraq cost Turkey almost $20 billion and directly led to more problems with the Kurdish population in the region.76 A no-fly zone in northern Iraq essentially created an autonomous Kurdish province (thousands of Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey during the war), and it was not long until Syria and Turkey were at odds over Syria’s support of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.77,78 In October 1998, the two nations were on the brink of a conflict with Syria eventually backing down and expelling Ocalan.79 Other conflicts arose with Iraq and Syria due to water issues, which contributed to the “general Arab perception regarding the strategic threat posed by Turkey in the 1990s.”80 71 Eldem, “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism,” 31. 72 Ibid. 73 Küçükcan, Arab Image in Turkey, 10, 13. 74 Sayari, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 45-46. 75 Ibid., 46. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Bengio & Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 77. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid., 65.
- 103. Journal of International Relations OttOman Orientalism 103 These perceptions continued to worsen as Turkish-Israeli relations strengthened. Turkish- Israeli relations reached their “zenith” in the late 1990s.81 Economic and security agreements brought the two non-Arab, Middle Eastern nations together, with Turkey actually benefitting more than Israel economically from agreements in the 1990s.82 Arms deals, a combination of trade and security, exemplified closer ties between the two countries.83 The U.S. and other European countries were considering arms embargos or conditional weapons’ sales during the mid-1990s as Turkey’s relationship with the West became strained over Cyprus and other issues.84 Israel, on the other hand, was happy to sell weapons to Turkey and to further develop a relationship with an ally in the Middle East.85 While the U.S. remained allies with Turkey and supported relations between its two allies (Israel and Turkey), the days of Turkish loyalty to the West had clearly passed as Turkey set about its own foreign policy agenda, which did not always align with the U.S. or other Western allies.86 While this major step reduced Turkish self- perception as a purely Western state, it did not necessarily improve Turkish-Arab relations as Arabs distrusted Turkey because of its relations with Israel.87 In short, Turkish self-perceptions and perceptions of the Arabs were complicated in the 1990s. Turkey had specific foreign policy gripes with Syria and Iraq over a number of issues. Additionally, closer ties with Israel led to a general distrust of the Turks by the Arabs. Despite these crises, there were instances of Turkish-Arab relations being amended. The rise of the Islamist Refah party in 1996 could be perceived in two opposing ways: 1) the rise of a pro- Islamic party would contribute to Turkish-Arab relations or 2) this rise of political Islam could be viewed as an internal threat in secularist Turkey and ultimately hurt Turkish-Arab relations.88,89 In respect to Turkish self-identity, the rise of the Refah party complicated the historical self-image of Turks, as Ottoman Orientalism no longer dominated and Islamic elements entered mainstream culture.90 Furthermore, Turkey no longer felt as obligated toward its U.S./Western allegiances as its foreign policy became more independent. The confusion of the 1990s led to even more complicated relations beginning at the dawn of the new millennium. CONCLUSION Ottoman Orientalism originated during the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire recognized a need to modernize in light of a progressing, more 81 Bacik, “The Limits of an Alliance,” 50. 82 Meliha Altunisik, “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era,” Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): 186. 83 Ibid., 181. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., 187. 87 Bengio & Ozcan, “Old Grievances, New Fears,” 67. 88 Ibid., 56. 89 Sayari, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 44, 51. 90 Ibid., 51.
- 104. 104 Luke Zaro Spring 2016 | Volume 18 powerful Europe. Using traditional Orientalism, the Ottoman Turkish elite created a paradigm that labeled themselves as modern, progressive Westerners and the rest of the Empire as “not- yet-Ottomanized” and still stagnant in the Orient. While these modernization efforts were too late to save the anachronistic empire, they laid the foundation for the eventual prosperity of the Turkish Republic. A secularist nation-state, Turkey began a path of Western-oriented foreign policy shaped by its perceptions of Europe, itself, and the Arabs. By the height of the Cold War, Turkey was firmly in the Western Camp as a NATO member and largely disengaged from the Middle East. From the 1960s to the 1980s, events in the region including Cyprus, Palestine, and the oil crisis forced Turkey into Middle Eastern affairs and led to the establishment of economic and political ties with some Arab countries. The post-Cold War 1990s were a complicated time for Turkey. The Gulf War, water issues, the PKK, and relations with Israel complicated Turkish relations with some or all of the Arab states. At the same time, Turkey drifted away from the U.S. and other Western partners while still formally remaining allied to them. With the rise of political Islam within Turkey, it became clear that Turks’ self- image and Turkish perception of the Arabs derived out of Ottoman Orientalism no longer reigned in Turkish imaginations. The uncovering of different aspects of Turkish self-identity, complicated Turkish-Arab perceptions and relations, and a post-Cold War foreign relations shift left Turkey and the Arab states with the opportunity for more positive integration, as well as the potential for more conflicts and distrust. WORKS CITED Al-Toraifi, Adel. “Is There Really a Saudi – Turkish Divide?.” Al Arabiya News. May 25, 2012. http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/05/25/216374.html. Altunisik, Meliha. “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era.” Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): 172-191. Ayman, S. Gülden. “The Arab Upheavals and the Turkish Perception Vis-à-vis the West.” Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2013): 305-23. Bacik, Gokhan. “The Limits of an Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited.” Arab Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2001): 49-60. Bengio, Ofra, and Gencer Ozcan. “Old Grievances, New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (2001): 50-92. Eldem, Edhem. “Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism.” Architectural Design (Special Issue: Turkey: At the Threshold) 80, no. 1 (2010): 26-31. Findley, Carter V. The Turks in World History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge Taylor &
- 105. Journal of International Relations OttOman Orientalism 105 Francis Group, 2013. Küçükcan, Talip. Arab Image in Turkey. Ankara: SETA | Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research. 2010. Makdisi, Ussama. “Ottoman Orientalism.” The American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (2002): 768-96. Sayari, Sabri. “Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s.” Journal of Palestine Studies XXVI, no. 3 (1997): 44-55. Young, Hannah Q. “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or Reality?.” Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 2013, no. 11 (2013): 143-61. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Luke is currently a senior at Fordham University in the Rose Hill Honors Program majoring in International Political Economy and minoring in Middle East Studies and Philosophy. He is attending Fordham on an academic, full-ride scholarship as a Presidential Scholar. He was published in the Fall 2015 edition of the Yale Review of International Studies, and is a member of the Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Iota Rho, and Alpha Sigma Nu Honor Societies. This past summer, Luke was one of six Department of State interns selected by the Council of American Ambassadors for the Annenberg Fellowship. He interned in the State Department’s Transportation Affairs office in the Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs. Junior year, Luke studied abroad at the Fordham London Centre in the fall and at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar in the spring. Sophomore year, he served as President of Fordham University’s College Republicans and Secretary of the Economics Society. Originally from Scottsdale, Arizona, Luke graduated as salutatorian of his high school and was a National Merit Scholar Finalist. He has worked as a District Representative and an intern at Congressman David Schweikert’s (AZ-6) District Office in Scottsdale.
- 106. 106 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 ABSTRACT Islamist parties gained considerable influence in the Middle East during the Arab Spring and its aftermath, and this influence seems likely to expand in the future. Although the United States has engaged Islamist parties on a country-by-country basis in the past, engagement with such groups has not been uniform. In particular, the U.S. has often failed to engage the most influential Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This failure has hurt the U.S.’s ability to impact events in the Middle East. The U.S. was a spectator in the Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt in 2012 and was unable to prevent it from triggering a military coup and return to dictatorship in 2013. For the U.S. to effectively pursue its goals in the Middle East, it must broaden its outreach to political Islamists. Such a strategy would entail expanding regional civil society initiatives, building official ties with Islamist groups that have renounced violence, and pressuring Arab regimes to allow more political space for Islamists and other opposition parties. Although this strategy could hurt relationships with U.S. allies and would require overcoming suspicions about Islamist intentions, such initiatives are essential to maintaining Washington’s influence in the Middle East. INTRODUCTION Many organizations in the Middle East aim to construct a society based on the principles of Shari‘a, or Islamic law. Scholars refer to this movement as “Islamism,” also known as “Political Islam.”1 Islamist groups range from moderate, mainstream political parties such as the Justice and Development Party in Morocco to radical militias such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Mahdi Army in Iraq. Jihadists such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the 1 Quinn Mecham, “The Rise of Islamist Actors: Formulating a Strategy for Sustained Engagement,” Project on Middle East Democracy, April 27, 2012, 1-2. A New Strategy for the Middle East: Why and How the United States Should Engage Islamists By Connor PhilliPs Duke university
- 107. Journal of International Relations A New StrAtegy for the Middle eASt 107 Levant (ISIL) espouse an extreme form of Islamism. Despite decades of repression by Arab monarchs and secular autocrats, Islamists have been resilient political forces in the Middle East. So far, these groups have won electoral victories in Jordan in 1989, Algeria in 1991, Egypt in 2005, the Palestinian territories in 2006, and both Tunisia and Egypt in 2011.2 Islamist parties have gained political power because they oppose Arab regimes in a manner that few other opposition movements can replicate. Their primary advantage is their invocation of religion: Islam-based politics appeal to devout voters and those who feel uncomfortable with secular modernity. In addition, Islamists’ use of mosques as an organizing space has enabled them to survive where more secular groups have been shut down or co-opted by the state.3 Many Islamist groups also have large charitable arms that support the poor when the state does not.4 Beyond Islam itself, Islamists in nondemocratic countries often present their parties as alternatives to unpopular ruling parties, ideologies, and secular elites, channelling discontent with the current system.5 Thus, in the event of future political liberalization in the region, Islamists are likely to gain the most power and influence. As the United States learned during the Arab Spring, political change can occur unexpectedly in the Middle East. Thus, it would be foolhardy for the U.S. not to plan for the potential, rapid elevation of Islamist actors to governmental control. Further, this paper argues that engagement with Islamists is an essential public diplomacy strategy. Currently, the Islamist movement gives voice to Arab resentment of U.S. foreign policy and suspicion of American motives in the Middle East.6 Establishing a relationship with Islamists would promote mutual understanding and appease Islamists’ suspicions about American intentions. Further, as a result of engagement, the U.S. would become more familiar with the nuances of Islamist beliefs and practices. Such an understanding would assist policymakers in achieving goals in the region by persuading Islamists in government and civil society to consider American priorities. Accordingly, outreach to Islamists promises three major potential benefits: 1) Improved relationships with the likely successors of existing Arab regimes, 2) Improved relations with the Arab society, and 3) Increased understanding of the nature and goals of political Islam. The federal government should evaluate strategies for engagement by the extent to which they achieve each of these goals. 2 Stephan Rosiny, “The Arab Spring: Triggers, Dynamics, and Prospects,” German Institute of Global and Area Studies, no. 1 (2012). 3 Ibid. 4 Kenneth M. Pollack, A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 2008), 127-130. 5 Ibid. 6 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Islamist Perceptions of US Policy in the Middle East,” in The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, ed. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 468-469.
- 108. 108 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 This paper describes a potential agenda to constructively engage Islamists in the Middle East. It begins with a brief overview of issues inherent in dealing with political Islam and then assesses current policies towards Islamists. Although current engagement efforts are promising, their lack of uniformity prevents them from being effective. In this discussion, the situation in Egypt is presented as a clear case of the shortcomings of current U.S. policy towards Islamists. The paper then proposes a set of criteria by which to select Islamist groups to engage and the means by which Washington should reach out to them. Next, it assesses potential shortcomings of these proposals, arguing that while options in the region are far from ideal, a diplomatic strategy emphasizing engagement with Islamists has the greatest likelihood of yielding results that reflect long-term U.S. interests. This paper concludes with a discussion of how an engagement initiative might be integrated into broader Middle East strategy. CHALLENGES FACING U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH ISLAMISTS The United States cannot afford to support a group that, if elected to office, might restrict democratic freedoms.7 Such a situation would be a setback to the spread of democracy and also a threat to American interests, which entrenched Islamist rulers might not be inclined to protect.8 Because commitment to democratic norms, such as free and fair elections, the rule of law, equality for women, toleration of opposing viewpoints, and the protection of minority rights varies among Islamist groups, some (though not all) may be prone to anti- democratic behavior.9 Thus, whether Islamists will be effective partners in promoting U.S. interests depends on the specific party to which the Islamists in question belong. Gauging the intentions of Islamist parties, however, can be difficult. These parties may contain many competing ideological factions, without a clearly dominant message.10 Because most Islamist parties have not held governmental power, it is hard to ascertain how their ideological diversity will affect public policy in practice. Furthermore, many Islamist groups value secrecy, making it difficult to obtain general information about them. In order to engage with political Islamists, the American government needs to overcome these difficulties and identify easily observable characteristics to differentiate between moderate and extreme Islamists. One such characteristic is whether the group in question has expressed admiration for the West and its values. Unfortunately, it would be counterproductive to limit engagement to these groups, because they already trust the U.S. and often have limited sway domestically. As Peter Mandaville notes, secular liberals and Sufi orders (the traditional targets of U.S. and Western 7 Steven Heydemann, “The Challenge of Political Islam: Understanding the U.S. Debate,” in Conflict, Identity, and Reform in the Muslim World: Challenges for U.S. Engagement, ed. Daniel Brumberg and Dina Shehata (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 396. 8 John L. Esposito, “It’s the Policy Stupid: Political Islam and US Foreign Policy,” Prince Alaweed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: Georgetown University, August 19, 2006. 9 Pollack, Path out of the Desert, 130. 10 Mona Yacoubian, “Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy: A Preliminary Assessment,” United States Institute of Peace, August 2007.
- 109. Journal of International Relations A New StrAtegy for the Middle eASt 109 engagement) lack popular followings and espouse “highly progressive interpretations of Islam that…lack any legitimacy within Muslim communities.”11 The affinity of these groups for Western ideals raises suspicion amongst the Arab population that the groups are subservient to the West. As such, it is unlikely that they can achieve any degree of political power. Connections with such groups thus would not promote U.S. interests in or understanding of the Middle East in any meaningful sense. Conversely, Islamists who do command popular legitimacy may be reluctant to engage with the U.S., as they have been hesitant to work with autocratic regimes for fear of losing the trust of the people. Thus, when it comes to engaging Islamists, the United States finds itself in a dilemma: the more productive targets for engagement are less willing to participate in dialogue. At the same time, U.S. allies in the Middle East—particularly Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi’s Egypt—treat Islamism as an existential threat.12 In Israel’s case, violent Islamist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas do actively plot against the state and its people. However, for most of America’s Arab allies, domestic Islamist opposition movements present security threats primarily to the governing regime. Since the Arab Spring, Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s rulers have harshly repressed Islamist groups for fear the groups will undermine their authority. This reality complicates outreach to Islamists. U.S. officials who attempt engagement must agitate friendly regimes and in some cases contravene local laws. Moreover, autocratic Middle Eastern governments use counterterrorism policies and laws to target nonviolent, Islamist opposition groups. As such, the U.S. must lobby against these policies to engage constructively with Islamists. DISCUSSION OF CURRENT POLICIES Historically, the U.S. has engaged Islamist groups infrequently and as a means to achieve immediate policy goals rather than as a long-term strategy. For example, Washington coordinated with Islamists during the Iraq counterinsurgency and involved Syrian Islamists in the effort to topple President Bashar al-Assad.13 These actions aligned with security objectives, namely a stable Iraq and the containment of Iranian influence in the region. In contrast, the U.S. avoided contact with Islamist groups such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood prior to the Arab Spring.14 When Islamists are not immediately involved in security concerns, patterns of engagement vary by country and can be categorized according to two dimensions: outreach at the civil-society level and outreach at the political level. U.S.-sponsored civil society groups have had contact with moderate Islamist political parties in states where the parties are allowed to participate in politics. For example, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a taxpayer-funded organization under the auspices of the 11 Peter Mandaville, “Engaging Islamists in the West,” CTC Sentinel 1 (2008): 5. 12 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Arab Leaders, Viewing Hamas as Worse Than Israel, Stay Silent,” New York Times, July 31, 2014. 13 Steven Brooke, “U.S. Policy and the Muslim Brotherhood,” in The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring, ed. Lorenzo Vidino (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2013), 17-18. 14 Mecham, “Islamist Actors,” 3.
- 110. 110 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 National Endowment for Democracy, worked with Islamists (as well as representatives of more secular parties) in Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen under the Bush Administration.15 The International Republican Institute (IRI), a similar organization, also formed comparable alliances with Islamists during this time.16 Mona Yacoubian reports that such projects were generally successful; members of Islamist parties engaged well with their mentors and often formed relationships with members of secular parties at networking events. However, even moderate Islamists temporarily ceased contact at times in order to protest U.S. and Israeli foreign policies that they found objectionable.17 In such instances, working through the NDI and IRI had both positive and negative consequences. Although Islamists were willing to engage with the NDI and IRI in part because of their semi-independence from the U.S. government, this status also meant that these organizations’ outreach efforts were not central to policy discussions in Washington. Therefore, the U.S. did not pursue outreach efforts on a systematic basis when the federal government was distracted by other foreign policy initiatives, particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the political sphere, contact with Islamists languished during the Bush Administration and modestly expanded during the first two years of the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration coordinated meetings between U.S. embassy officials and representatives from respective Islamist parties in Morocco and Jordan. One such party, the Islamic Action Front (the political arm of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood), had refused to work with the NDI and IRI under the Bush Administration.18 However, U.S. allies in the region limited such outreach as a result of their concerns that domestic Islamists would become empowered to challenge the regime status quo. Events surrounding the Arab Spring in Egypt demonstrate the limitations of these engagement policies. Egypt is not only the largest country in the Middle East, but also the home of the Muslim Brotherhood, one of a few Islamist groups to have held political power in the region.19 Further, most influential Islamist organizations in the region are either offshoots of or inspired by the Brotherhood. As in other Middle Eastern countries, prior to the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the U.S. appeased Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak by refraining from establishing high-level contacts20 with the Brotherhood.21 When the Muslim Brotherhood replaced Mubarak in power, the United States sought normal relations with the group as 15 Yacoubian, “Engaging Islamists,” 3-4, 8-10, 12-13. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Brooke, “U.S. Policy,” 25-26. 19 Tarek Masoud, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 475-476. 20 U.S. officials did make some contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood’s nominally independent parliamentary delegation before this time. For example, according to diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, a U.S. congressional delegation met with the head of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc in 2007, although this was not a regular occurrence. 21 Brooke, “U.S. Policy,” 14-15.
- 111. Journal of International Relations A New StrAtegy for the Middle eASt 111 the governing party of a democracy.22 However, these contacts vanished amid the military government’s crackdown on the Brotherhood following the group’s removal from power. Weak ties with the Muslim Brotherhood stemming from the U.S.’s inconsistent engagement efforts disrupted the relationship between the Obama Administration and the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which ruled Egypt from 2012 to 2013. Upon entering office, President Mohamed Morsi of the FJP pledged to respect the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, despite the Brotherhood’s long-term affiliation with the militant Palestinian organization Hamas. With American assistance, Morsi brokered a ceasefire to end the 2012 conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.23 There were limits to this cooperation, however. Concerned about the close relationship between the Department of Defense and the Egyptian military, the Brotherhood was wary of American intentions in Egypt. As discontent with Morsi brewed within the Egyptian public, the Brotherhood rejected Western suggestions that the FJP broaden its governing coalition to include the political opposition. This failure ultimately resulted in the Brotherhood’s overthrow at the hands of the Egyptian military. The Brotherhood’s suspicion of international intentions led its leadership to view the prospective grand coalition as an attempt to undermine the Brotherhood’s rule rather than preserve it.24 This experience serves as a crucial sign that Obama’s engagement policies did not go far enough. Morsi proved in the Gaza conflict that the Brotherhood can be a productive partner for the U.S. Yet it was the lack of trust between the two entities that led Morsi to reject advice that could have saved his regime. Thus, while the Obama administration made the right decision to engage Morsi, it erred by not establishing contacts earlier and more comprehensively. The example of Egypt marks a stark contrast with that of Morocco, whose Justice and Development Party (PJD) came to power around the same time as Egypt’s. Unlike the Brotherhood, the PJD had worked with U.S. civil society organizations, and again unlike the Brotherhood, it has consistently cooperated with the ruling establishment and remains a notable success story of engagement with Islamists.25 The difference in engagement is not the proximate cause of the different outcomes in these countries; Islamists had played a larger and more cooperative role in Morocco for years before the formal political opening in 2011. In fact, these circumstances influenced the differences in U.S. policy, rather than vice versa. Because the Moroccan monarchy allowed Islamists to participate in the political process, the Obama Administration was able to engage with them meaningfully and fruitfully. Outreach to the banned and secretive Brotherhood in Egypt, conversely, was much more limited. Consequently, the U.S. struggled to establish a working 22 David D. Kirkpatrick and Steven Lee Myers, “Overtures to Egypt’s Islamists Reverse Longtime U.S. Policy,” New York Times, January 3, 2012. 23 Hamza Hendawi, “Morsi’s Gaza Ceasefire Deal Role Secures Egypt’s President As Major Player,” Huffington Post, November 21, 2012. 24 Shadi Hamid, “The Enduring Challenge of Engaging Islamists: Lessons from Egypt,” Project on Middle East Democracy: Brookings Institute, May 2014, 4. 25 Karima Laachir, “Managed Reforms and Deferred Democratic Rule in Morocco and Algeria,” in Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia, ed. Amin Saikal and Amitav Acharya (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2014), 50-52.
- 112. 112 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 relationship when Morsi and the FJP came to power. This comparison illustrates that past U.S. strategies for engaging Islamists have not covered all of the groups with which engagement may be useful. Islamists in different countries vary, and policy should account for these differences. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between solely making decisions based on the immediate political context within a particular country and developing a consistent policy framework whose implementation is flexible given on- the-ground circumstances and constraints. Such an approach would also translate insights gleaned from dealing with groups in one country into policies for engagement within other countries. Thus, a consistent framework would increase the efficiency and efficacy of outreach. Furthermore, a consistent approach to political Islam would assuage prominent concerns in the Islamist community about American “double standards” and self-interest, a key factor in Islamists’ mistrust of the West.26 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Selecting Candidates for Engagement In light of these experiences with Islamist groups, the U.S. needs to develop and implement a unified policy for outreach to Islamists across the Middle East. The first task is to develop criteria for determining which Islamist groups to engage. This paper suggests two such criteria: 1. A group’s willingness to renounce violence and participate in a democratic system. Washington should only engage with groups willing to renounce violence. Such a condition takes advantage of a historical divergence between moderate and extreme Islamists. Following the September 11th attacks, more moderate groups feared being conflated with jihadists like al-Qaeda and renounced violence. Consequently, these groups began to accept a swath of modern democratic norms.27 The Bush Administration’s concomitant “Freedom Agenda” in the Middle East added a positive incentive to do so as political reform offered Islamist groups a chance of real political influence. Accordingly, several of the most prominent groups embarked on a charm offensive to advertise their openness to engaging with the West.28 Although this outreach has decreased in recent years, this experience demonstrates that peaceful Islamists are prepared to engage with Western governments if offered incentives to do so. Of course, these groups may not hold beliefs completely in line with American ideals, but as argued above, the U.S. should be searching for interlocutors with genuine influence rather than pro-Western liberals with little popular legitimacy. The renunciation- of-violence criterion offers a relatively straightforward dividing line that excludes the most extreme elements of the Islamist community while including most moderate groups. Within this framework, engagement occurs with the most influential groups, including the Egyptian 26 Esposito, “Policy.” 27 Amr Hamzawy, “The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2005, 2. 28 Hamid and Kadlec, “Engaging Political Islam,” 4.
- 113. Journal of International Relations A New StrAtegy for the Middle eASt 113 Muslim Brotherhood and most of its political affiliates. 2. The prominence of the group in question. At the same time, the United States should not seek to cultivate high-level ties with all nonviolent groups. While all of these entities should be eligible for NDI and IRI outreach programs, U.S. officials should focus their attention on the largest and most influential Islamist organizations in each country. In most countries, this would be the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate; nevertheless, the U.S. should welcome engagement with prominent non-Brotherhood entities to prevent the Brotherhood from monopolizing Islamist discourse. Dialogue with more minor groups should be either a secondary action that flows from these more prominent relations or a stepping-stone to engagement with the larger groups, not an end in itself. Bolstering largely inconsequential groups will only lead to the perception that they are American clients, thereby cutting them off from the domestic population and frustrating the objectives of outreach. In particular, officials must avoid a focus on the Islamists they “want” as opposed to the Islamists they have. Again, an illustrative example comes from Egypt, where officials have dealt more with the moderate al-Wasat party (a Brotherhood splinter group) than with the more conservative Salafist al-Nour party.29 However, al-Nour won nearly a fifth of the vote in the open 2011 parliamentary elections while al-Wasat only earned a tiny proportion, a clear indication of the locus of popular support.30 By engaging in a more targeted approach, the U.S. will foster relationships with more politically powerful groups, satisfying both the foreign policy and public diplomacy goals of the outreach initiative. As discussed above, these groups may be less open to engagement. Nevertheless, given the importance of reaching genuinely influential actors, the US should make every effort to build ties with them. Methods for Outreach To ease the process of engagement, the NDI and IRI programs along with the Middle East Partnership Initiative begun by President Bush should remain active and expand. These programs offer avenues to reach groups with which the U.S. does not have historical ties. They have produced tangible benefits for Islamist parties across the region, and the NDI and IRI can build on these pre-existing links to contact new groups. Particularly fruitful outreach mechanisms have been political programs, including party development and recruitment, parliamentary training, media relations, and outreach to constituents, especially women and minorities.31 Further, these initiatives should be expanded in two main ways: first, they should go beyond political parties to include charitable organizations, such as civil-society groups and 29 Mecham, “Islamist Actors,” 5. 30 “Egypt’s Islamist parties win elections to Parliament,” BBC News, January 21, 2012. 31 Yacoubian, “Engaging Islamists,” 3-4, 8-10, 12-13.
- 114. 114 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 professional syndicates, where Islamists are also influential.32 Programs like the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Middle Eastern Policy Institute can play a role alongside the NDI and IRI in assisting these organizations with service provisions and community leadership. This broadened focus is especially important in countries where Islamists are not permitted to operate openly, as it provides a foundation for links with these groups that would not be otherwise possible. Second, these initiatives should relax the prominence criterion for formal engagement, thereby making resources available to both minor and major groups. Such openness provides a foundation for the development of political pluralism and encourages new strains of thought within the Islamist movement. Once relationships have been established with Islamist organizations on the grassroots level, they can be expanded into low-level contacts between American officials and representatives of these organizations.33 Such contacts are of limited use in isolation, but they do allow basic information-gathering on the attitudes and workings of Islamist organizations. They can also help build trust and foster collaboration in areas of mutual agreement (primarily civil-society initiatives where officials could receive feedback from Islamists on their participation in NGO efforts and offer additional help). The real purpose of such ties, however, will be to initiate higher-level, consistent contacts between the parties. Low-level discussions can help set the agenda for future communication between higher-level officials on each side. These individuals would engage in what Shadi Hamid and Amanda Kadlec call a “strategic dialogue,” with officials from both sides presenting priorities and discussing points of common interest and disagreement.34 Such dialogue also constitutes an opportunity for the two sides to outline their worldviews: Washington would be able to explain the nature and motivations of its Middle East policy, and Islamists could present their vision for their country and region. Ultimately, both parties could participate in a give-and-take dialogue. While these exchanges will not erase the underlying rifts between the U.S. the Arab world, they will foster mutual understanding that can benefit future coordination and help the U.S. re-position itself in the Arab imagination. While these programs can be applied transnationally, the fate of future ties ultimately depends on national contexts. In most Middle Eastern states, Islamists do not hold sufficient power to merit a true strategic partnership (one in which the U.S. actively supports and funds the party in question). Moreover, many Islamists would not desire one, fearing a clientelistic relationship. Parties that are active participants in the political scene may receive training and resources from NDI and IRI, but outright backing would expose the U.S. to charges of favoritism and interference in regional politics, further damaging relations with the Middle East. In short, within each country, Washington should seek to cultivate a strategic dialogue with the party or parties that are most prominent. Enhanced partnership should be an option if any of these 32 Emad El-Din Shahin, “Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?,” (working paper, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2005). 33 Shadi Hamid and Amanda Kadlec, “Strategies for Engaging Political Islam,” Project on Middle East Democracy: Brookings Institution, January 2010. 34 Ibid., 12-13.
- 115. Journal of International Relations A New StrAtegy for the Middle eASt 115 parties comes to control political power, but such parties should not be treated any differently than non-Islamists would be. If the U.S. were perceived as overtly favoring Islamists, then cooperation with secular parties in the region would likely suffer. Ultimately, a delicate balance is a crucial element of this strategy. Addressing Regimes’ Concerns Arab allies, as well as Israel, still would strenuously oppose any sort of outreach to Islamist parties. While Islamists are part of the political space in Tunisia and Turkey and tolerated in Morocco and Jordan, key U.S. allies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have banned and repressed these groups under the guise of counter-terrorism.35 As this paper has argued, tailoring policy on Islamism in order to placate regional allies has only frustrated the goals of engagement. The negative repercussions of current policy, however, extend beyond that to U.S. national security interests. Heavy-handed repression generates resentment among Islamists, thereby empowering more radical elements within these organizations who urge retaliation against Arab autocrats and their Western backers.36 This behavior is particularly concerning in nations that are American counterterrorism partners and use expansive anti- terrorism laws to prosecute peaceful Islamists and all manner of dissidents and civil society groups (Saudi Arabia is a prominent example).37 Accordingly, the U.S. should pressure its allies to repeal or narrow such laws, creating a more open public space for all civil society organizations, including nonviolent Islamists. In such an environment, the federal government should be freer to engage with Islamists, particularly in more informal settings on matters of mutual concern. This step is also a vital component of sustainable and effective counterterrorism strategies. The repression of nonviolent opposition movements frustrates counterterrorism efforts, both by producing radicalization (as discussed above) and by taking time and resources away from the task of combating legitimate terrorists, such as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in Egypt.38 Thus, the U.S. should press its Arab allies to concentrate their efforts on actual threats and not the political opposition. The last such substantial effort in this direction came with President Bush’s Freedom Agenda, which was deemphasized soon after the Muslim Brotherhood made substantial gains in Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary elections and Hamas won the 2006 elections in the Palestinian territories. This brief period did, however, see the widening of a space for the political opposition, indicating that American pressure can produce dividends in this direction.39 In the past, Arab states have reacted to such pressure by vowing to cease counterterrorism 35 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Saudis Put Terrorist Label on Muslim Brotherhood,” New York Times, March 7, 2014. 36 Nathan J. Brown and Michele Dunne, “Unprecedented Pressures, Uncharted Course for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 29, 2015. 37 “Challenging the Red Lines: Stories of Rights Activists in Saudi Arabia,” Human Rights Watch, December 17, 2013. 38 Michele Dunne and Frederic Wehrey, “U.S.-Arab Counterterrorism Cooperation in a Region Ripe for Extremism,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2014. 39 Hamid and Kadlec, “Engaging Political Islam.”
- 116. 116 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 cooperation unless the U.S. relents.40 However, this is not a credible threat. It is unlikely that Arab regimes facing a real terrorist threat would stop counterterrorism and military assistance solely because they are annoyed by American engagement with Islamists.41 Now that the region is facing a renewed terrorist threat in the form of ISIL, denying cooperation would be especially foolish. Thus, the United States can use its assistance in the anti-ISIL coalition as an opportunity to extract concessions from its Arab partners. Policy Trade-Offs No strategy addressing this volatile region will be perfect, and this one is no exception. Increased engagement with Islamists will undoubtedly hurt relations with Arab partners, due to American pressures to conform to this engagement tactic. The fallout will be limited, especially because cooperation on counterterrorism and other matters is too vital to the interests of both parties to be held hostage to disputes over political reform. However, the change in policy will definitely strain bilateral ties. Although this shift may temporarily reduce U.S. power and influence in the region, this is primarily a short-term concern. In the long run, engagement with Islamists will pay an enormous dividend by producing a plausible alternative to the current regimes acceptable to the U.S. This, of course, is precisely what Middle Eastern regimes fear. Nevertheless, while they can frustrate individual policy objectives, they cannot alter the U.S.’ long-term strategic calculus. Relations with Israel are also likely to worsen in the short term, but the U.S. will remain Israel’s most loyal and powerful patron, mitigating any rift. Overall, the strain of such a change will be relatively minor. A more significant concern is that engagement could legitimize the Islamist agenda, which at least in part differs from Western notions of liberal democracy. This paper has emphasized the importance of engaging with Islamist groups who genuinely speak for their populations, a status that often comes at the expense of complete acceptance of liberal democratic norms. Although most nonviolent Islamist groups have largely accepted democratic principles, their beliefs still remain unclear at best and illiberal at worst on issues ranging from the rights of women and non-Muslims to the nature of the education system.42 These beliefs remain a concern, and not one that should be taken lightly. However, several considerations outweigh the potential negative impact of engaging with illiberal groups. First, this step would not depart from current policy. It would be unrealistic to expect actors from a completely different political context to adhere to all the norms of Western liberalism. The United States already engages with actors like the Saudi monarchy, which legitimizes a clerical establishment far more conservative than many Islamists. In addition, clear limits to the level and scope of U.S. engagement would be set, so establishing contacts with certain groups would not constitute an unconditional endorsement of all forms of political Islam. Most notably, the U.S. would eschew contact with any Islamist organization that has not 40 Michele Dunne, “Integrating Democracy Promotion into Middle East Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2004, 8. 41 Ibid. 42 Hamzawi, “Arab Reform,” 2-3.
- 117. Journal of International Relations A New StrAtegy for the Middle eASt 117 conclusively rejected violence. In addition, engagement allows Washington to impress its own values and beliefs on the Islamists with whom it deals. This strategy does not advocate ceasing to promote equal political and social rights for all. In fact, it requires that such advocacy continues and intensifies. The U.S. will have much more influence over groups with which it already has a working relationship. In short, engaging with Islamists, while publicly clarifying that engagement is not wholehearted endorsement, would be a productive strategy. Finally, the renunciation-of-violence criterion may be an imperfect indicator of a potential partner’s reliability. As previously discussed, the secrecy and ideological diversity of many Islamist movements means that the U.S. can never be sure of their ultimate intentions, especially if they assume political power. Many opponents of engagement worry that Islamists are concealing their ultimate intentions in order to gain power under the guise of democracy and then construct an authoritarian Shari‘a state.43 While this may be true, engagement is best mechanism to assess the underlying intentions of these Islamist movements. Furthermore, if the government has developed closer ties with Islamist organizations, it will be better able to dissuade them from taking steps that endanger the political rights of their citizens if they are in power (as it was not able to do in the case of Morsi’s government). As the Arab Spring and countless political openings before it revealed, Islamists will come to power given the chance, whether engagement occurs or not. Engagement offers the best opportunity to make sure that empowerment does not have unwanted results. CONCLUSIONS Islamists will be important players in future Middle Eastern power dynamics, whether regimes democratize or attempt to maintain power. Consequently, the U.S. needs to face this reality with a sustained outreach effort. The Bush and Obama administrations have already sown the seeds of such an endeavor, and the U.S. now must build them into a coherent regional initiative. Such an initiative would be consistent with a variety of different grand strategies for the Middle East. Of course, engagement with Islamists serves quite naturally as the centerpiece of democratic promotion strategies. However, as argued above, it would also serve traditional American goals such as Israeli security and counterterrorism. The U.S. by and large has worked with the regimes in power to accomplish these tasks. With the ongoing turmoil in the region eroding state power, however, the U.S. must broaden its engagement to a variety of actors, including Islamists, in order to best guard its interests. At the same time, integrating engagement with Islamists into a broader Middle Eastern grand strategy requires incorporating several complementary policy shifts to ensure that engagement is effective. Specifically, the U.S. must address Islamists’ foremost concerns about American policy in the region without sacrificing national interests. By far the most important would be a major push for Israeli-Palestinian peace led by the international community along the 43 Heydemann, “Challenge of Political Islam,” 396.
- 118. 118 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 lines of a negotiated two-state solution (rethinking the currently stalled “peace process”). Resentment of Israel is a primary source of Islamist antipathy toward the West, and a major initiative in this arena would present the U.S. as a potential partner to Islamists. Facilitating Israeli-Palestinian negotiations may require breaking some “rules” and working with Hamas, an Islamist organization which has decidedly not renounced violence. This, however, does not contradict the broader strategy because the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is distinct from engagement with Islamists. Furthermore, the unique and debilitating circumstances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict surely warrant any potentially productive actions. The reputational boost the U.S. would receive among Islamists in the region would be enormous if a comprehensive peace were achieved between Israel and the Palestinians. Despite proclamations of a so-called “pivot to Asia,” the U.S. presence in the Middle East will likely not diminish in the near future. There are simply too many pressing American interests in the region—the nuclear deal with Iran, the war in Syria, and the security of Israel, to name a few. However, the nature of this presence needs to change. While the U.S. will retain a military footprint in the region, it should also invest in diplomatic initiatives. This is already occurring on the government level in the Iranian and Syrian arenas and should be expanded to push for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But Washington also needs to focus on public diplomacy, specifically a concerted, region-wide effort to engage with Middle Eastern civil society, with a special emphasis on political Islam. Despite President Obama’s pledge to open a new chapter in the history of U.S. relations with the Arab world, much of the Middle East still regards the United States with distrust, especially in the Islamist community. Engagement holds the potential to alleviate that distrust and thereby promote U.S. interests in the region and around the world. WORKS CITED Brooke, Steven. “U.S. Policy and the Muslim Brotherhood.” In The West and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring, edited by Lorenzo Vidino, 6-31. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2013. Brown, Nathan J., and Michele Dunne. “Unprecedented Pressures, Uncharted Course for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July 29, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/29/unprecedented-pressures- uncharted-course-for-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood/ifby. “Challenging the Red Lines: Stories of Rights Activists in Saudi Arabia.” December 17, 2013. https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/17/challenging-red-lines/stories- rights-activists-saudi-arabia. Dunne, Michele. “Integrating Democracy Promotion into Middle East Policy.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. October 2004. http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/CP50FINAL.pdf.
- 119. Journal of International Relations A New StrAtegy for the Middle eASt 119 Dunne, Michele, and Frederic Wehrey. “U.S.-Arab Counterterrorism Cooperation in a Region Ripe for Extremism.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. October 23, 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/23/u.s.-arab-counterterrorism- cooperation-in-region-ripe-for-extremism. “Egypt’s Islamist parties win elections to Parliament.” BBC News. January 21, 2012. http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748. Esposito, John L. “It’s the Policy Stupid: Political Islam and US Foreign Policy.” Prince Alaweed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: Georgetown University. August 19, 2006. https://acmcu.georgetown.edu/the-policy-stupid. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. “Islamist Perceptions of US Policy in the Middle East.” In The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies, edited by David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas, 467-490. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012. Hamid, Shadi. “The Enduring Challenge of Engaging Islamists: Lessons from Egypt.” Project on Middle East Democracy: Brookings Institute. May 2014. 4. http://www.brookings. edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/30-engaging-islamists-egypt- hamid/30-engaging-islamists-egypt-hamid.pdf. Hamid, Shadi, and Amanda Kadlec. “Strategies for Engaging Political Islam.” Project on Middle East Democracy: Brookings Institution. January 2010. http://pomed.org/pomed- publications/hamid2010/. Hamzawy, Amr. “The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. August 2005. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb40. hamzawy.FINAL.pdf. Hendawi, Hamza. “Morsi’s Gaza Ceasefire Deal Role Secures Egypt’s President As Major Player.” Huffington Post. November 21, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2012/11/21/morsi-gaza-ceasefire_n_2173589.html. Heydemann, Steven. “The Challenge of Political Islam: Understanding the U.S. Debate.” In Conflict, Identity, and Reform in the Muslim World: Challenges for U.S. Engagement, edited by Daniel Brumberg and Dina Shehata, 395-400. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. Kirkpatrick, David D. “Arab Leaders, Viewing Hamas as Worse Than Israel, Stay Silent.” New York Times. July 31, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/world/ middleeast/fighting-political-islam-arab-states-find-themselves-allied-with-israel. html. Kirkpatrick, David D. “Saudis Put Terrorist Label on Muslim Brotherhood.” New York Times.
- 120. 120 Connor PhilliPs Spring 2016 | Volume 18 March 7, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/world/middleeast/saudis- put-terrorist-label-on-muslim-brotherhood.html. Kirkpatrick, David D., and Steven Lee Myers. “Overtures to Egypt’s Islamists Reverse Longtime US Policy.” New York Times. January 3, 2012. http://www.nytimes. com/2012/01/04/world/middleeast/us-reverses-policy-in-reaching-out-to- muslim-brotherhood.html. Laachir, Karima. “Managed Reforms and Deferred Democratic Rule in Morocco and Algeria.” In Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia, edited by Amin Saikal and Amitav Acharya, 43-63. London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2014. Mandaville, Peter. “Engaging Islamists in the West.” CTC Sentinel 1 (2008): 5-7. Masoud, Tarek. “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.” In The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, edited by John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 475-497. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013. Mecham, Quinn. “The Rise of Islamist Actors: Formulating a Strategy for Sustained Engagement.” Project on Middle East Democracy. April 27, 2012. http://pomed.org/ pomed-publications/mecham2012/. Pollack, Kenneth M. A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East. New York: Random House, 2008. Rosiny, Stephan. “The Arab Spring: Triggers, Dynamics, and Prospects.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies, no. 1 (2012). Shahin, Emad El-Din. “Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?.” Working Paper. Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior. 2005. US Embassy in Cairo. “Codel Price Meeting at Parliament Elicits Public Criticism from Presidential Palace.” Diplomatic Cable. 31 May 2007. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/07CAIRO1641_a.html. Yacoubian, Mona. “Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy: A Preliminary Assessment.” United States Institute of Peace. August 2007. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Connor Phillips is a junior at Duke University, majoring in political science with a certificate in philosophy, politics, and economics. Born and raised in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, he hopes to pursue a Ph.D. in political science.
- 121. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 121 ABSTRACT The Middle East faces regional security concerns regarding nuclear proliferation and there is heightened discussion surround international arms treaties as Israel is the only state in the region suspected of possessing a nuclear arsenal. This paper addresses Israel’s cooperation with the international community via the signing and ratifying of international arms control treaties. This paper investigates why Israel makes the decision to sign international arms control treaties within a historical context despite not signing or ratifying the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Qualitative data such as government statements, United Nations (UN) statements, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) country profile documents, NPT Review Conference documents and media content are analyzed to map context surrounding the time period during which significant treaties were signed. This case study and narrative analysis data shows patterns of significant historical events, or triggering events, prior to the signing of these treaties. To finalize the data, this paper examines] Israel’s commitments to significant treaties. The international community, particularly Middle Eastern states focused on establishing a potential Nuclear Free Weapon Zone, may benefit from these findings to understand Israel’s motivation and cooperation regarding nuclear weapons. INTRODUCTION The international community has been struggling to address the potential threat of nuclear weapons, which are arguably the most ruinous weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Despite these ongoing discussions, the Middle East has yet to establish a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and Trust: The Potential for Israeli Nuclear Cooperation by lili dAlton syRAcuse univeRsity
- 122. 122 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 (MENWFZ).1 Many states see Israel as the main hindrance, because it is the only state in the region believed to have a nuclear arsenal and is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty.2 In spite of these claims, this paper argues that Israel has responded to international criticism through other international arms control treaties. The purpose of this single case study is to understand the historical context in which Israel signs arms treaties. RESEARCH QUESTION & THESIS The key concepts in my research include the Middle East, international arms control treaties, and a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). The Middle East will be defined as states within the Arab League, not including those geographically located on the African continent and including Iran and Israel. International treaties are defined by the 1969 Vienna Convention as “international agreements concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”3 I focus on international arms control or nuclear non-proliferation weapon treaties designated by the UN, IAEA, Arms Control Association, and the NTI. A NWFZ is “a proposed regional arrangement that prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, control, along with assistance in research on the development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device within the zone of application by any contracting party.”4 In 1975, Iran proposed the concept of a MENWFZ at the UN.5 HYPOTHESIS By analyzing the historical context and commitment to international arms treaties and safeguards, I posit that international arms treaties are significant to Israel and drive foreign policy. I argue that these commitments are driven by the rational desire to be positively recognized by the international community, a recognition that produces a mutual gain. As liberal international relations scholars have noted, states cooperate when they experience interdependence and shared interests.6 In line with liberal principles, states such as Israel seek to create a positive international image by following international laws that moderate or constrain state behavior. International treaties are a mechanisms by which states can minimize conflict while concomitantly maximizing stability and peace. Thus, even without the existence of a MENWFZ, it is possible for the region to prevent nuclear attacks or wars. 1 “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2 “Nuclear Disarmament Israel,” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 3 “Definition of Key Terms used in the UN Treaty Collection,” United Nations Treaty Collection. 4 “NWFZ: Questions and Answers,” International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project (IONP): James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 25, 1997. 5 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate, 30th Session, 1974, New York City. 6 Eric B. Shiraev and Vladislav M. Zubok, International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- 123. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 123 LITERATURE REVIEW Scholarly literature focuses on hindrance of the establishment of a MENWFZ, yet neglects Israel’s cooperation. Overall, the literature has underestimated the importance of other non- proliferation treaties and safeguards other than the NPT; moreover, scholars overlook the significance of Israel’s desire to adhere to these safeguards in the hopes of regional peace and national security. In regards to a MENWFZ and Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, scholars Gerald Steinberg and Gawdat Bahgat conclude the zone is not a possibility in the near future. Steinberg7 argues that despite diplomatic risk, Israel will maintain its ambiguity strategy, while Bahgat8 historically analyzes the existing NWFZs to compare them to the Middle East. Bennett Ramberg agrees with Steinberg and Bahgat, arguing Israel will not denuclearize in the near future due to its security concerns.9 Furthermore, in “A Declaration of U.S. independence From Israel,” scholar Chris Hedges examines the U.S. non-response to Israel’s nuclear arsenal and their complex relationship. Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham explain Israel’s relationship with the NPT and the historical taboo of opacity and ambiguity while suggesting Israel share its nuclear capabilities to gain more legitimacy.10 In “Removing Weapons of Mass Destruction From the World’s Most Volatile Region: How to Achieve a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East,” Abraham Shanedling outlines a comprehensive framework for establishing a MENWFZ, highlighting the need for treaty adoption, declaration, and transparency.11 Steinberg’s thesis is similar to my argument: although Israel uses its arsenal as a deterrence strategy, it maintains stable relations with both allies and enemies. However, he concludes that Israel will continue to face diplomatic pressure and its current deterrence strategy is a diplomatic risk.12 I aim to add to the discourse by focusing on Israel’s motivation to sign non-proliferation treaties and comply with safeguards. RESEARCH DESIGN In conducting my research I ask under what conditions does Israel sign international arms treaties, specifically nuclear non-proliferation treaties? I analyze the historical domestic and international events that occurred in the year(s) prior to Israel’s commitment to treaties. In 7 Gerald Steinberg, “Examining Israel’s NPT Exceptionality: 1998-2005,” The Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 1 (2006). 8 Gawdat Bahgat, “A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East-A Pipe Dream?,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 36, no. 3 (2011): 360. 9 Bennett Ramberg, “The Promise of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” International Relations 22, no. 3 (2008). 10 Avner Cohen and Thomas Jr. Graham, “An NPT for Non-Members: A Separate Agreement for Israel, India, and Pakistan Would Bolster Nonproliferation Efforts From Outside the NPT, but Would Require Israel to Acknowledge its Nuclear Status,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, no. 3 (2004). 11 Abraham Shanedling, “Removing Weapons of Mass Destruction From the World’s Most Volatile Region: How to Achieve a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 46, no. 1 (2014): 315. 12 Gerald Steinberg, “Israel’s Limited NPT Options,” Israel Studies Bulletin 10, no. 2 (1995).
- 124. 124 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 doing so, I look for patterns of external pressures on Israel’s actions surrounding these treaties, including calls for establishment of a NWFZ and commitment to the NPT. I hypothesize that, although it may not give up its nuclear arsenal or sign the NPT, thereby hindering a MENWFZ, Israel acts positively through other commitments. My case study uses documents and narrative analysis to contextualize and map out the events surrounding Israel’s commitment to the legal framework of these treaties. This analysis focuses on two areas: first, domestic politics, including leadership and the actions of Prime Ministers, particularly their decisions vis-à-vis the U.S. administration; and, second, international politics, including the UN, NPT and the IAEA. ISRAEL’S NUCLEAR FOREIGN POLICY Despite lack of official confirmation, a majority of international relations scholars assert Israel has possessed a nuclear arsenal since the late 1950s. Mainly to protect against neighboring Arab states, Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben Gurion established the nuclear weapons program with assistance from the French.13 In 1958, the building of a reprocessing facility began secretly in the Negev Desert near Dimona.14 These actions were done quietly, and, today, Israel still maintains its policies of deterrence through ambiguity and opacity. These foreign policy strategies are due to Israel’s perceived threats from its Arab neighbors as well as a lack of official security assurance from the U.S.15 Nevertheless, as an ally, the U.S. pressures Israel the structure its defense policies and extends unofficial security promises. According to Avner Cohen, a secret understanding between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir known as the Nixon-Meir deal was established in September 1969.16 The deal concluded Israel would neither declare nor test its nuclear weapon capabilities. In exchange, the U.S. would not inspect Israel’s program or pressure Israel to sign the NPT.17 The Yom Kippur War, or the Ramadan War, in 1973 affected Israel’s nuclear policy and Israel determined it would only use its nuclear weapons in the most dire situation under a complete threat.18 Likewise, the 1981 Begin Doctrine, Israel’s preventive strike counter-proliferation policy, remains a central part of security planning today.19 When the NPT was introduced in 1970, Israel made it clear it would not commit to the treaty. According to “Israel Crosses the Threshold,” on February 23, 1970, Israeli Ambassador Rabin informed U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that, “…in light of President 13 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 41-56. 14 “Profile for Israel,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 15 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 327. 16 Avner Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Colombia University Press, 2010). 17 Ibid., 26. 18 Avner Cohen, “Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy: Israel and the 1967 and 1973 Wars,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), 120-122. 19 Gerald M. Steinberg, “The Begin Doctrine at 25,” Jerusalem Post, June 4, 2006.
- 125. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 125 Nixon’s conversation with Meir in September 1969, Israel ‘has no intention to sign the NPT’.”20 Overall, Israel’s official position on the establishment of a Middle East WMD-Free Zone has remained unchanged with Israel insisting regional peace as a precondition. States in the Middle East have declared peace will only be possible after Israel has renounced the right to possess nuclear weapons.21 In recent years, Israel’s concerns have been diverted towards Iran and its suspected ability to develop nuclear weapon capabilities.22 HISTORY OF ISRAEL Since Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948, it has defined itself as a Jewish state. Despite this identity as a Jewish State, Israel is the only democratic state in the region operating a parliamentary system of governance. Israel contains holy sites and has experienced conflict because the Palestinian people also claim the territory. Additionally, Israel has had strained relations with its Arab neighbors, but has maintained a strong relationship with the United States. Israel gained widespread international recognition by joining the UN on May 11, 1949. Despite representation at the UN, the pathway to ratify international conventions is entirely unique in Israel. Israel’s parliament, or the Knesset, is not required to approve the signature of a treaty. Therefore, individual leadership plays a strong role, as a majority vote is not needed in the Knesset to approve of treaties, unless they are deemed of utmost importance.23 Major International Arms Treaties Regarding Nuclear Proliferation Recognized by Israel The following chart displays the six international arms treaties Israel has signed in regards to nuclear weapons portraying significant dates such as when the treaties were signed, ratified, and entered into force. TREATY SIGNED RATIFIED EFFECTIVE PTBT 8/8/63 1/15/64 10/10/63 Outer Space Treaty 1/27/67 2/18/77 10/10/67 CPPNM 6/17/83 3/16/12 2/21/02 Convention on Nuclear Safety 9/22/94 No 10/24/96 CTBT 9/25/96 No No 20 “Israel Crosses the Nuclear Threshold,” The National Security Archive. 21 “WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, June 2015. 22 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran-Or I Will,” The Atlantic. 23 “Ratification of International Accords,” The Knesset.
- 126. 126 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 12/27/06 No 7/7/07 PRIMARY RESEARCH ON TREATIES Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) FOCUS EVENTS Domestic Concerns December 26, 1963: Reactor goes active, but has no immediate weapons making capability (McKesson 1964). Domestic Leadership Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (1963-1969) June 1963: Prime Minister Eshkol made a statement to the Knesset regarding the armament of other Arab states including stating “…we must regard the maintenance of Israel’s deterrent force as the decisive guarantee for the preservation of peace in the area” (Eshkol 1963). United States President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) 1961: President Kennedy pressures Israel to bilateral inspections of Dimona facility (NSA). July 5, 1963: In a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol President Kennedy demands that the U.S. be allowed to inspect Dimona facility (NSA). NPT Review Conference Not applicable, NPT did not enter into force until 1970 (UNODA 2015). United Nations September/October 1963: 18th Session of UNGA General Debate: None of the states mention Israel in regards to nuclear weapons or a MENWFZ in their statements (UNGA 1963). NWFZ: Not applicable, the concept of a MENWFZ is not proposed until 1975 by Iran (UNGA 1974). The 1960s was a critical decade for Israel because it had recently established nuclear weapons capability. Israel signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty; hereafter PTBT) on August 8, 1963. The PTBT, “… requires Parties to prohibit, prevent, and abstain from carrying out nuclear weapons tests
- 127. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 127 or any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater, or in any other environment…”24 Israel also ratified the PTBT on January 15, 1964. Israel’s goal was to keep its nuclear program a secret, even from the U.S., given that much of the pressure on its program came from American leadership. President John F. Kennedy made non- proliferation a priority from the beginning of his administration and pressured Israel to agree to inspections of the Dimona nuclear facility.25 On July 5, 1963, in a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol, President Kennedy demanded that the U.S. be allowed to inspect Dimona.26 U.S. officials visited Dimona in January 1964, finding that Israel’s reactor went critical on December 26, 1963, although it initially operated at low power therefore having no immediate weapon making ability.27 The domestic leadership of Israel at this time was important because Prime Minister Eshkol played a role in continuing Israel’s contradictory nuclear policies. On June 1963, Eshkol made a statement to the Knesset regarding the armament of Arab states. In the statement Eshkol highlighted the “aggression” of Arab states and their acquisition of offensive armaments, while suggesting Israel would maintain deterrence. Eshkol stated: “…in view of the aggressive policy followed by the leaders of the Arab countries today, and their actions in acquiring and developing the most modern types of offensive armaments – which are designed for the destruction of Israel – we must maintain a state of constant security preparedness. …we must regard the maintenance of Israel’s deterrent force as the decisive guarantee for the preservation of peace in the area.”28 From the international perspective, states in the Middle East mentioned Israel frequently in their 18th Session UN General Assembly (UNGA) General Debate speeches at the United Nations in 1963, but statements did not discuss nuclear weapons. Rather, statements in this session referred to Israel’s aggressions against the Palestinians in the 1960’s.29 The international community was most likely not aware of Israel’s nuclear actions and capabilities at this time. 24 “Profile for the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Water,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 25 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb. 26 “Israel Crosses the Nuclear Threshold,” The National Security Archive. 27 John McKesson, “Memorandum from the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, 18, Doc. 12. 28 Levi Eshkol, “7 Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol- June 24, 1963,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1-2. 28 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate, 1963, 18th Session, New York City.
- 128. 128 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Outer Space Treaty (1967) FOCUS EVENTS Domestic Concerns November 1965: Accident occurs at Dimona, resulting in a cleanup (Cohen 1999). 1967: Six-Day War. 1967-1970: War of Attrition. Domestic Leadership Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (1963-1969). May 20, 1964: Prime Minister Eshkol made a statement to the Knesset stating Israel’s nuclear development was for peaceful purposes (Eshkol 1964). March 10, 1965: Prime Minister Eshkol signed a memorandum which stated Israel would not be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons to the Middle East (Ben-Zvi 2004). May 18, 1966: Prime Minister Eshkol made a statement to the Knesset stating, “Israel has no atomic arms and will not be the first to introduce them into our region” (Eshkol 1966). United States President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) January 18, 1964: Team is sent to inspect Dimona facility. U.S. still does not confirm until 1968/1969 that Israel’s nuclear weapon capability was “a physical and political reality” (National Security Archive). NPT Review Conference Not applicable, NPT did not enter into force until 1970 (UNODA 2015). United Nations September/October 1967: 22nd Session of UNGA General Debate: None of the countries mention Israel in regards to nuclear weapons or a MENWFZ in their statements. There are some positive statements in regards to the Outer Space Treaty (UNGA 1967). NWFZ Not applicable, the concept of a MENWFZ is not proposed until 1975 by Iran (UNGA 1974). Israel signed the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) on January 1, 1967 and ratified it on February 18, 1977. Continuing the history of treaty alignment, the U.S. also
- 129. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 129 signed and ratified the treaty. The Outer Space Treaty obligates parties to not place any objects carrying nuclear weapons in orbit around Earth and to not install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station them in outer space.30 There were domestic political concerns during the late 1960’s and 1970’s, primarily due to the major Arab-Israeli conflict escalations. The leadership focus during this time was essential to Israel’s foreign policy objectives in regards to its nuclear arsenal. Prime Minister Eshkol from the liberal and progressive Mapai political party was still focused on Israel’s deterrence, but cautious in actions and policies regarding Israel’s nuclear arsenal. On March 10, 1965 Eshkol signed a memorandum with Robert Comer, member of President Lyndon Johnson’s national security team, which stated Israel would not be the first to “introduce nuclear weapons” to the Middle East.31 On May 20, 1964, Eshkol made a statement to the Knesset that Israel’s nuclear development was for peaceful purposes: “As far as concerns nuclear development in Israel, I can only repeat the statement made by my predecessor in the Knesset on December 22, 1960, when he said that nuclear development in Israel is designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, for scientific and technological study and research, and to serve the needs of industry, agriculture, health and science in Israel.”32 Almost exactly two years later on May 18, 1966, Eshkol made a statement to the Knesset stating, “Israel has no atomic arms and will not be the first to introduce them into our region.”33 This phrase became a component of the nuclear advancement taboo that Israel would repeat when Arab states accused it of hindering peace in the region. In 1967 at the 22nd Session of the UNGA General Debate, Middle Eastern states did not mention Israel and their nuclear capabilities in their statements.34 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1983) FOCUS EVENTS Domestic Concerns June 7, 1981: Attacks against Iraq’s nuclear installation at Osiraq led to international protest (Spector and Cohen 2008). 1982: Lebanon War 30 “Profile for the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 31 Abraham Ben-Zvi, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel: In the Shadow of the Hawk (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 65. 32 Levi Eshkol, “10 Israel’s Position on the Middle East Arms Race-Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol-May 20 1964,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1-2. 33 Levi Eshkol, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol-May 18, 1966,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1-2. 33 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate, 1967, 22nd Session, New York City.
- 130. 130 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Domestic Leadership: Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1977-1983) 1981: Begin Doctrine, a doctrine for Israel’s preventative strike policy, is established after the bombing of Osiraq (Begin 1981). United States President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) President Reagan criticized Israel’s attack on Osiraq and consequently suspended planned shipments of military aircraft (Spector and Cohen 2008). NPT Review Conference 1980: NPT Review Conference mentions Israel in final documents several times as a hindrance to a MENWFZ. United Nations June 19, 1981: UN Security Council passed resolution 487 condemning Israel’s attack on Osiraq (UNSC 1981). September 1983: 38th Session of UNGA General Debate: Yemen is the only state to accuse Israel of manufacturing of nuclear weapons in its statement (UNGA 1981). NWFZ 1980: Israel joins international consensus allowing the General Assembly to pass a resolution supporting the goal of MENWFZ without a vote (Arms Control Association 2015). Israel signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on June 17, 1983. Israel ratified the CPPNM on March 16, 2012, a treaty which applies to “…nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport.”35 Similar to previous treaty alignments, the U.S. also signed and ratified this treaty. Israel had several domestic political concerns during this time. On June 7, 1981, Israel attacked Iraq’s nuclear installation at Osiraq which led to international protest.36 U.S. President Reagan criticized Israel’s attack on Osiraq and consequently suspended planned shipments of military aircraft.37 These events strained relations and Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s role in developing Israel’s nuclear policy increased. Begin set the principle for the Begin Doctrine, or Israel’s preventive strike policy. In an interview with CBS Television on June 14, 1981, Begin stated, 35 “Profile for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 36 Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today, August 7, 2008. 37 Ibid.
- 131. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 131 “But I am absolutely sure that, based on the precedent we created, any prime minister of any government of Israel will destroy that reactor before it is operational.”38 The Begin doctrine was again applied in 2007, when Israel carried out another preventative bombing on a nuclear reactor in Syria.39 At the UN, the international community reacted promptly to Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear installation. On June 19, 1981, the Security Council passed Resolution 487 condemning Israel’s attack on Osiraq.40 The first operative clause of the Security Council resolution stated, “Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”41 Israel knew the international community would disapprove of its actions and signed the CPPNM on June 17, 1983. Subsequently, Yemen was the only state to criticize Israel and its manufacture of nuclear weapons at the UN in September 1983, at the 38th Session of the UNGA General Debate. Yemen stated, “We also view with profound concern the increasing cooperation between the racist regimes of Pretoria and Tel Aviv in the manufacture of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, since this constitutes provocation and a threat to the stability and security of the Arab and African States.”42 The 1980 NPT Review Conference - held August 11-September 7 - occurred three years before Israel signed the CPPNM, but was still significant. According to the NPT Review Conference Final Document Part I, the parties had “…expressed concern about the nuclear- weapon capability of Israel.”43 In Part II, Israel was mentioned several times with concern expressed about its nuclear weapons capabilities and suspected nuclear dealings with South Africa.44 Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994) FOCUS EVENTS Domestic Concerns Post 1991 Gulf War, Israel’s concern with WMD in the Middle East was heightened. Domestic Leadership Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1992-1995) Rabin wanted to limit Israel’s nuclear profile and strive for international cooperation while remaining wary of proliferation in the region (Inbar 1999). 38 “CBS News: An Interview with Prime Minister Menachem Begin,” Face the Nation, June 14, 1981. 39 “Profile for Israel,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 40 United Nations Security Council, 1981, Resolution 487. 41 Ibid. 42 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate, 1983, 38th Session, New York City. 43 NPT Parties, “Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Final Document, Part 1-2, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1980, 2. 44 Ibid.
- 132. 132 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 United States President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) NPT Review Conference 1990: NPT Review Conference calls on states to hinder the transfer of weapons or capabilities to Israel and calls on Israel to comply with the NPT and IAEA safeguards (NPT Parties 1990). United Nations September 1994: 49th Session of UNGA General Debate: Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE criticize Israel in statements (UNGA 1994). NWFZ Increase in calls for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. 1991: Security Council Resolution 687 endorses goal of establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East (Arms Control Association 2015). Israel signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety on September 22, 1994. Israel has yet to ratify the treaty, while the U.S. has signed and ratified the treaty. The domestic leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was unique in that he focused on decreasing Israel’s nuclear profile, making him more sensitive to international pressure. According to Inbar, in “Rabin and Israel’s National Security”, Rabin’s administration “…displayed a greater willingness than had any of its predecessors to engage in arms control schemes.”45 At a lecture at the National Security College, Rabin referred to the dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation and stated, “The longer it takes the better it will be for the Jews and for the whole world.46 During the 1990’s, there was an increase in calls for a MENWFZ. In 1991, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 687 endorsing the goal of establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East.47 In September 1994, at the 49th Session of UNGA General Debate Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE criticized Israel’s nuclear capabilities.48 Iran’s statement suggests Israel created a sense of nuclear threat in the region: “…the nuclear threat posed by Israel. Israel’s nuclear programme has exacerbated the arms race in the region and has forced others within the area to turn to more advanced conventional weaponry.”49 45 Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), 118. 46 Ibid., 132. 47 “WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance,” Arms Control Association. 48 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate, 1994, 49th Session, New York City. 49 Ibid.
- 133. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 133 The NPT Review Conference held in 1990, was four years before Israel signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, but still had significance. According to the “NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons Final Document Part II,” in review of the NPT, Israel’s proliferation of nuclear weapons was viewed as a failure to limit proliferation worldwide.50 The document stated: “The Conference expresses particular concern about the nuclear capabilities of Israel, and expresses its condemnation of any attempt to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.”51 The document also called upon states, particularly Israel, to adhere to the NPT and IAEA safeguards system. Israel was criticized specifically in relation to the hindrance of a NWFZ: “The conference considers that the unsafeguarded nuclear capability of Israel complicates the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.”52 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) FOCUS EVENTS Domestic Concerns June 1996: Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot, publishes photos of Dimona reactor obtained from the U.S. CIA (UPI 1996). Domestic Leadership Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (June 1996- July 1999) During this time, Netanyahu notably had no major statements regarding Israel’s nuclear weapons. United States President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) September 24, 1996: U.S. signed the CTBT, and never ratified the treaty (Kimball & Taheran 2015). 50 NPT Parties, “Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Final Document, Part 1-3, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1990, 4. 51 Ibid., 8. 52 Ibid., 289.
- 134. 134 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 NPT Review Conference 1995: NPT Review Conference: state parties adopted the Resolution on the Middle East calling upon all states in the region to accede to the NPT and place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards (NPT Parties 1995). United Nations September 1996: 51st Session of UNGA General Debate: Qatar, UAE and Yemen criticize Israel in statements (UNGA 1996). NWFZ Increase in calls for the establishment of a MENWFZ. 1995: The NPT Review Conference adopts a Resolution on the Middle East calling on states to take practical steps to make progress in the establishment of WMDFZ in the region. Member agreement on resolution is seen as key to securing the indefinite extension of the NPT (NPT Parties 1995). Israel signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 25, 1996. The CTBT “is a legally binding global ban on nuclear explosive testing.”53 The CTBT was signed under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from the conservative Likud political party, which was exceptionally quiet during this time. The U.S. signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996, but like Israel has never ratified the treaty.54 In the year prior at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, there was a push for a MENWFZ with state parties adopting the Resolution on the Middle East calling upon all states in the region to accede to the NPT and place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.55 The focus of this push was primarily on Israel. Therefore, within almost a year Israel would sign the CTBT, a major treaty. Israel felt pressure to sign the CTBT when the treaty opened for signature, but has still not ratified the treaty today and neither has its ally the U.S.56 Furthermore at the 51st session of the UNGA General Debate, Qatar, UAE, and Yemen condemned Israel in their statements.57 All three states called on Israel to cooperate and join the NPT in order to free the region of nuclear weapons. For example, representatives from Qatar specifically called for Israel to contribute to regional non-proliferation: 53 “Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),” U.S. Department of State. 54 Daryl G. Kimball and Shervin Taheran, “Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Timeline,” Arms Control Association, September 22, 2015. 55 NPT Parties, “Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Final Document, Part 1-3, UNODA, 1995. 56 “Profile for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 57 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate, 1996, 51st Session, New York City.
- 135. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 135 “The State of Qatar reaffirms the need for Israel to join the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an initial step towards establishing a Middle East free from nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. We believe that the interests of the stability and security of the region should compel Israel to do this.”58 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2006) FOCUS EVENTS Domestic Concerns 2005: Second intifada. Israeli Palestinian conflict coming to an end. Withdrawal from Gaza. Summer 2006: Israel at war with Lebanon/Hezbollah. July 2006: Israel signs a contract with Germany for two Type 800 Dolphin Class diesel-electric attack submarines (Katz 2006). Domestic Leadership Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (2006-2009) December 11, 2006: In an interview with German cable news channel Olmert admits Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons (Horner 2010). United States President George W. Bush 2006: Initiation of the U.S.-India nuclear deal eventually led Israel to explore seeking a similar pact with the U.S., but was denied this opportunity (Baker 2006, Horner, 2010). NPT Review Conference 2005: Final Documents again claim Israel is a threat to international and regional security and shame Israel’s as a non-member to the NPT (NPT Parties 2005). United Nations September 2006: 61st Session of UNGA General Debate: Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE and Yemen criticize Israel (UNGA 2006). NWFZ March 2005: The WMD Commission Final Report calls for an intensification of international efforts to establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East (Arms Control Association 2015). 58 Ibid.
- 136. 136 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Israel signedtheInternational Convention for theSuppressionof Actsof Nuclear Terrorismon December 27, 2006, a year with increased discussion surrounding nuclear non-proliferation. Israel was in a negative spotlight due to the five year Second Intifada; however, Israel withdrew from Gaza during this period as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cooled. Israel also attracted attention in July 2006, when it signed a contract with Germany for two Dolphin Class diesel-electric attack submarines.59 Reports speculated that Israel may have developed nuclear submarine missiles and modified the submarines from the Germans to launch them. The submarines would provide for “superior second-strike nuclear capabilities.”60 The domestic leadership made another decision that created international discontent when on December 11, 2006, on German television Prime Minister Ehud Olmert subtly admitted to the existence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal stating: “Iran, openly, explicitly and publicly, threatens to wipe Israel off the map. Can you say that this is the same level, when they are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as America, France, Israel and Russia?”61 On an international level, Israel became aware of the initiation of the U.S.-India nuclear deal in 2006 and eventually sought to create a similar pact. The deal circumvents U.S. law, the Atomic Energy Act, providing India with access to peaceful nuclear assistance in the absence of NPT membership.62 U.S. President George W. Bush and future administrations rejected Israel’s proposal.63 The U.S. has also signed and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In March 2005, the “WMD Commission Final Report” called for the intensification of international efforts to establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East.64 In September 2006 at the 61st Session of UNGA General Debate, the countries of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen called out Israel in their statements.65 Saudi Arabia mentioned the double standard role that Israel plays stating: “Effectively preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will require abandoning double standards and emphasizing the importance of making the entire Middle East, including the Arab Gulf region, a zone free from nuclear weapons. Israel is the only country 59 Yaakov Katz, “Exclusive: Israel buys 2 German subs,” Jerusalem Post, August 22, 2006. 60 Ibid. 61 Luke Harding and Duncan Campbell, “Calls for Olmert to Resign After Nuclear Gaffe,” The Guardian, December 12, 2006. 62 Peter Baker, “Bush signs India Nuclear Law,” Washington Post, December 19, 2006. 63 Daniel Horner, “Prospect of Nuclear Deal with Israel Dismissed,” Arms Control Association, September 3, 2010. 64 “WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance,” Arms Control Association. 65 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate, 2006, 61st Session, New York City.
- 137. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 137 in the region that is known to possess weapons of mass destruction but is not subjected to any form of monitoring.”66 The NPT Review Conference of 2005 appeared to augment the conversation and, in the Final Documents from the 2005 review conference, various states called Israel a threat to international and regional security and shamed Israel’s non-membership to the NPT.67 TREATY COMMITMENTS Israel’s Treaty Commitments While Israel has shown goodwill through signatures, adherence to these treaties is also necessary. According to international law norms, Israel must not violate the treaties to which it is a party. However, Israel has shown further cooperation and is a “unilateral adherent” to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has adopted national export control regulations on chemical and biological materials consistent with Australia Group standards.68 Israel has been a participant in the Nuclear Security Summits to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. Reports such as the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report, show Israel’s compliance with current treaties. The 2014 report stated that the nuclear material, facilities, or other items to which safeguards applied, were applied in Israel.69 Israel has addressed criticism from the IAEA Board of Governors in respect to its rejection to sign the NPT and adhere to the IAEA Safeguards. “The IAEA safeguards are a set of technical measures that are applied by the IAEA on nuclear material and activities, and through which the IAEA seeks to independently verify that nuclear facilities are not misused and nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses.”70 According to the “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East,” Israel: “…takes the view that Agency safeguards, as well as all other regional security issues, cannot be addressed in isolation from the creation of stable regional security conditions and that these issues should be addressed in the framework of a regional security and arms control dialogue that could be resumed in the context of a multilateral peace process.”71 This further affirms Israel’s unwillingness to sign the NPT until there is peace in the region. 66 Ibid. 67 NPT Parties, “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Final Document, Part 1-3, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2005. 68 “Profile for Israel,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 69 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Safeguards Statement 2014,” 2014. 70 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Safeguards Explained,” 2015. 71 Director General, Board of Governors, “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East,” International Atomic Energy Agency, July 28, 2015, 3.
- 138. 138 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 Additionally, Israel has not performed any confirmed nuclear weapons tests, although there was suspicion regarding a detected test in 1979.72 Israel’s Non-Commitments I argue Israel signed these treaties to show cooperation with the international community; however, it is noteworthy that Israel has not adhered to other international arms treaties and bodies. Furthermore, Israel has not signed the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, is also not a full member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and is not a participating state of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Additionally, although the internationally legally-binding Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) have only been proposed, Israel has shown preemptive non-commitment. According to The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb, Israel has stated its concerns with the FMCT and its unwillingness to agree to it.73 Also, NTI’s page “Nuclear Disarmament Israel,” states that Israel has not committed to attend the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East WMD-Free Zone proposed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which is postponed indefinitely.74 OVERALL FINDINGS Since the 1950’s, Israel has operated under a policy of opacity and ambiguity with regards to their nuclear weapons program. Israel has ratified half of the international arms treaties it has signed to feign cooperation. The U.S., a key ally to Israel, has signed all of the treaties Israel has signed, but has not ratified the CTBT. The U.S. has remained quiet and not taken action in regards to Israel’s nuclear program, but has pressured Israel to cooperate. There was a lack of cooperation during the 1970’s, the decade after the NPT entered into force in March 1970. However, Israel was facing other foreign policy decisions as they were involved in conflicts such as the Yom Kippur War and were building relations through the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. In the 1960’s, Israel’s relationship with the U.S. and the exchanges between the leadership of the states affected nuclear decisions. The international community was less of a source of pressure because it was unaware of Israel’s nuclear development. During the 1990’s, the relationship between the leadership of the two states was strained. However, the international community pressured Israel to a great extent at the UN and the NPT Review Conferences due to the increase in calls for the establishment of a MENWFZ. CONCLUSION Information from my research can be significant for policy makers in negotiations with Israel 72 “Profile for Israel,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 73 Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret, 233. 74 “Nuclear Disarmament Israel,” Nuclear Threat Initiative.
- 139. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 139 regarding the establishment of a MENWFZ. It appears Israel will not relinquish its nuclear weapons capability soon due to its security concerns. Israel’s deterrence and opacity policies are essential for its protection, and it will continue to refuse to sign the NPT. However, Israel’s cooperation and commitment to treaties and safeguards may create peace in the region without the immediate establishment of a MENWFZ. To take steps towards non-proliferation and to avoid sanctions or isolation, Israel could commit to the treaties, bodies, and arrangements it currently does not adhere to. Israel may not approve of the Iranian Nuclear Deal, but if Iran continues to cooperate in the future, Israel may feel less threatened. Simultaneously, the U.S. may work to maintain its relationship with Israel and ease its concerns of perceived threats. It is essential that the international community continue to work diplomatically with Israel and its Arab neighbors, especially through the UN, to maintain peace in the region in the hopes of establishing a NWFZ. WORKS CITED Bahgat, Gawdat . “A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East-A Pipe Dream?.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 36, no. 3 (2011): 360-383. Baker, Peter. “Bush signs India Nuclear Law.” Washington Post. December 19, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/18/ AR2006121800233.html. Ben-Zvi, Abraham. Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel: In the Shadow of the Hawk. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004. “CBS News: An Interview with Prime Minister Menachem Begin.” CBS: Face the Nation. June 14, 1981. http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/ Pages/31%20Interview%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin%20on%20 CBS%20Tele.aspx. Cohen, Avner, and Thomas Jr. Graham. “An NPT for Non-Members: A Separate Agreement for Israel, India, and Pakistan Would Bolster Nonproliferation Efforts From Outside the NPT, but Would Require Israel to Acknowledge its Nuclear Status.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, no. 3 (2004): 40-44. Cohen, Avner. Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Cohen, Avner. “Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy: Israel and the 1967 and 1973 Wars.” In Planning the Unthinkable: How Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, edited by Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, 104-24. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000. Cohen, Avner. The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb. New York: Colombia University Press, 2010. “Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).” U.S. Department of State. http://www.
- 140. 140 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 state.gov/t/avc/c42328.htm. Creswell, John W. Research Design. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2014. Director General, Board of Governors. “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East.” International Atomic Energy Agency. July 28, 2015. https://www.iaea.org/ About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59Documents/English/gc59-15_en.pdf. Eshkol, Levi. “10 Israel’s Position on the Middle East Arms Race-Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol-May 20 1964.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1-2. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook1/ pages/10%20israel-s%20position%20on%20the%20middle%20east%20arms%20 race.aspx. Eshkol, Levi. “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol-May 18, 1966.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1-2. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/ mfadocuments/yearbook1/pages/20%20statement%20to%20the%20knesset%20 by%20prime%20minister%20eshk.aspx. Eshkol, Levi. “7 Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol- June 24, 1963.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1-2. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/ MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/7%20Statement%20to%20the%20 Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Eshko.aspx. Goldberg, Jeffrey. “Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran-Or I Will.” The Atlantic. March 2009. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/03/netanyahu-to-obama- stop-iran-or-i-will/307390/. Harding, Luke and Duncan Campbell. “Calls for Olmert to Resign After Nuclear Gaffe.” The Guardian, December 12, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/12/ germany.israel. Hedges, Chris. “A Declaration of U.S. independence From Israel.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 27, no. 6 (2008): 10-13. Horner, Daniel. “Prospect of Nuclear Deal with Israel Dismissed.” Arms Control Association. September 3, 2010, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_09/Israel. Inbar, Efraim. Rabin and Israel’s National Security. Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 1999. “Israel Crosses the Nuclear Threshold.” The National Security Archive. April 28, 2006. http:// nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm. “Israel’s Foreign Policy-Historical Documents.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2013. http:// mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Pages/Documents_Foreign_
- 141. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 141 Policy_Israel.aspx. Katz, Yaakov. “Exclusive: Israel buys 2 German subs.” Jerusalem Post. August 22, 2006. http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Exclusive-Israel-buys-2-German-subs. Kimball, Daryl G. and Shervin Taheran. “Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Timeline.” Arms Control Association. September 22, 2015. http:// www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclear-Testing-and-Comprehensive-Test-Ban- Treaty-CTBT-Timeline. McKesson, John. “Memorandum from the Department of State’s Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy).” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. 18. Doc. 12. “NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2015. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT_Review_ Conferences.shtml. NPT Parties. “Resolution on the Middle East.” Part 1. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 1995. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/ Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf. NPT Parties. “Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Final Document, Part 1-3. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 1990. NPT Parties. “Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Final Document, Part 1-2. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 1980. NPT Parties. “Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Final Document, Part 1-3. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 1995. NPT Parties. “2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Final Document, Part 1-3. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2005. “Nuclear Disarmament Israel.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Last modified May 2015, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/israel/. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Overview.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2015. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.
- 142. 142 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 “Nuclear Weapons.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2015. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/. “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2015. http:// www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml. “NWFZ: Questions and Answers.” International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. July 25, 1997. http://www.nonproliferation. org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/nuclear-weapon-free-zones-nwfzs-qna-tariq- rauf-july-1997.pdf. “Profile for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/convention-physical- protection-nuclear-material-cppnm/. “Profile for Israel.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Last modified May 2015. http://www.nti. org/country-profiles/israel/. “Profile for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty- ctbt/. “Profile for the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Water.” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Last modified February 2008. http://www.nti. org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-banning-nuclear-test-atmosphere-outer-space-and- under-water-partial-test-ban-treaty-ptbt/. “Profile for the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty- principles-governing-activities-states-exploration-and-use-outer-space-including- moon-and-other-celestial-bodies-outer-space-treaty/. Ramberg, Bennett. “The Promise of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.” International Relations 22, no. 3 (2008): 386-90. “Safeguards Explained.” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Accessed November 10, 2015. https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/basics-of-iaea-safeguards/ iaea-safeguards-explained. “Safeguards Statement 2014.” International Atomic Energy Agency. 2014. https://www. iaea.org/sites/default/files/sir_2014_statement.pdf. “Secret Nuclear Reactor Photos Published.” United Press International. June 25, 1996. http://www.upi.com/Archives/1996/06/25/Secret-nuclear-reactor-photos-
- 143. Journal of International Relations TreaTies and TrusT: The PoTenTial for israeli nuclear cooPeraTion 143 published/3227835675200/. Shanedling, Abraham. “Removing Weapons of Mass Destruction From the World’s Most Volatile Region: How to Achieve a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East.” Georgetown Journal of International Law 46, no. 1 (2014): 315-361. Shiraev, Eric B., and Vladislav M. Zubok. International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Spector, Leonard S. and Avner Cohen. “Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime.” Arms Control Today. August 7, 2008, http://www. armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/SpectorCohen. State of Israel. “Ratification of International Accords.” The Knesset. 2014. http://knesset. gov.il/constitution/ConstP3_eng.htm. Steinberg, Gerald M. “The Begin Doctrine at 25.” Jerusalem Post. June 4, 2006. http://www. jpost.com/Features/The-Begin-Doctrine-at-25. Steinberg, Gerald. “Examining Israel’s NPT Exceptionality: 1998-2005.” The Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 1 (2006): 117-141. Steinberg, Gerald. “Israel’s Limited NPT Options.” Israel Studies Bulletin 10, no. 2 (1995): 10- 14. “Treaties, Conventions, and Agreements Related to the IAEA’s Work.” International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Last modified February 3, 2016. https://ola.iaea.org/ola/ treaties/multi.html. United Nations General Assembly, General Debate. 1963. 18th Session. New York City. http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/. United Nations General Assembly, General Debate. 1967. 22nd Session. New York City. http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/. United Nations General Assembly, General Debate. 1974. 30th Session. New York City. http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/. United Nations General Assembly, General Debate. 1983. 38th Session. New York City. http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/. United Nations General Assembly, General Debate. 1994. 49th Session. New York City. http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/. United Nations General Assembly, General Debate. 1996. 51st Session. New York City. http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/. United Nations General Assembly, General Debate. 2006. 61st Session. New York City.
- 144. 144 LiLi DaLton Spring 2016 | Volume 18 http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/. United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 3263. “Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon- Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East.” December 9, 1974. http://daccess- dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/65/IMG/NR073865. pdf?OpenElement. “Definition of Key Terms used in the UN Treaty Collection.” United Nations Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_ en.xml. United Nations Security Council. 1981. Resolution 487. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/487(1981). “WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance.” Arms Control Association. Last modified 2015. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lili Dalton will graduate from Syracuse University in May of 2016 with a Bachelors of Arts degree in International Relations. She will also receive credit for minors in Economics and Global Security Studies. Lili is Vice President of Sigma Iota Rho, a volunteer for Big Brothers Big Sisters, and a global ambassador for the Syracuse University Abroad Office. She participated as a delegate in the National Model United Nations Conference in the spring of 2016 in New York and in the fall of 2015 in Washington DC. She is assistant head delegate for the team participating in the conference this spring in New York. Lili’s principle interests in international relations are American foreign policy and international law.
- 145. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 145 ABSTRACT In February 2011, the newly formed Fine Gael-Labour coalition government began rebuilding Ireland’s international reputation. The coalition did this on several levels. Structurally, Ireland created new institutions within the government to coordinate domestic and foreign policy decision-making. For foreign policy, it drafted a three-year strategic diplomatic plan with measurable objectives. Operationally, the coalition government successfully implemented the austerity measures imposed under the terms of the sovereign debt bailout, while concomitantly negotiating more favorable terms. By early 2014, Ireland became the first eurozone country to exit the bailout. The Irish recovery was deliberate and designed. Recovery from the bailout and the restoration of Ireland’s reputation were deliberate, as declared in the Programme for Government, promulgated on the coalition’s first day in office. Recovery was designed through the creation of new institutions, a strategic foreign affairs roadmap, and diplomacy. In the process, the power of economic diplomacy was utilized, the impact of public diplomacy was maximized, and Ireland’s multilateralism was strengthened. Ireland’s experience yields lessons for other states. In times of domestic crisis, states should engage internationally, expand on domestic strengths, and maintain flexibility. INTRODUCTION: THE CELTIC TIGER IS DEAD Throughout the 1990s, the Irish economy grew at a healthy rate. This growth was the result of significant foreign direct investment, low corporate tax rates, and export-led manufacturing growth in strategic sectors, such as information technology, pharmaceuticals, and life Deliberately Designed Diplomacy: How Ireland Rebuilt its Positive International Reputation After its Debt Crisis of 2008-2014 by JAmes michAel gARRity noRWich univeRsity
- 146. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 146 sciences.1 Industry-university partnerships created regional specializations, such as life sciences and medical technology in the Galway area and pharmaceuticals around Cork. Technology firms established European headquarters or call centers in Ireland. Moreover, the country’s European Union membership and adoption of the Euro assisted in its growth. In the early 2000s, Ireland experienced a housing bubble, similar to that of the United States. Between 2002-2008 housing prices doubled.2 Banks offered higher risk credit to higher risk borrowers, including mortgages with no down payments. To this end, development seemed unstoppable. Banks were viewed as inviting risk, exemplified by telling business owners that they couldn’t borrow €20,000, but could borrow €200,000.3 Many farmers left the agricultural industry to join the better-paying construction trades.4 Government tax revenues grew steadily due to appreciating property values and transfer taxes, as did government spending. The few economists who warned that the Celtic Tiger rested on shaky fundamentals were scorned. The Irish economy was the fastest growing in Europe, a success story envied worldwide. By 2005, the Celtic Tiger was its own global brand.5 Business schools, economists, and other states, fascinated by Ireland’s success, tried to replicate it. A basic internet search of “celtic tiger” for the years “1995-2008” found almost 200 books and articles on the subject, with titles such as “Foreign Investment, Development, and Globalization: Can Costa Rica become Ireland?,” “The Celtic Tiger: Ireland’s Economic Miracle explained,” and “The Making of the Celtic Tiger: the Inside Story of Ireland’s Boom Economy.” One book, by Anthony Sweeney, hinted at events to come: “Irrational Exuberance: the Myth of the Celtic Tiger.” Irrational exuberance was ubiquitous before the bust and many Europeans grew tired of what they perceived as Irish arrogance. Historian and columnist Fintan O’Toole indicted the political leaders from 2002–2008: “They blew it. They allowed an unreconstructed culture of cronyism, self-indulgence and, at its extremes, of outright corruption, to remain in place, with fatal long-term consequences. They fostered, alongside the real economy in which people created goods and sold them, a false economy of facades and fictions.”6 Fianna Fáil Party leader Taoiseach Bertie Ahern epitomized the era in 2006, dressing in a tuxedo with a gold chain and gold rings in a “Pimp my Party” recruiting poster.7 By late 2007, the boom ended. Property prices and tax revenues fell, unemployment spiked, and the government tapped bond markets to fund its existing operations. Irish banks, along with those in the U.S. and the UK, were in trouble. In mid-September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, rocking global financial markets and spreading fears of contagion. On 1 Eamon Gilmore, interview by James Garrity, April 18, 2015. 2 Dirk Schoenmaker, “Stabilising and Healing the Irish Banking System: Policy Lessons,” paper presented for the CBI-CEPR-IMF Conference: Ireland—Lessons from its Recovery from the Bank-Sovereign Loop, Dublin, Ireland, January 19, 2015. 3 Josephine O’Neill, interview by James Garrity, August 30, 2011. 4 Gilmore, interview. 5 Fintan O’Toole, Ship of Fools: How Stupidity and Corruption Sank the Celtic Tiger (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 37. 6 Ibid., 21. 7 Bertie Ahern, “Pimp my Party,” The Daily Edge.
- 147. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 147 September 30, the Irish government, after an all-night meeting with its banks, issued a blanket bank guarantee valued at €440 billion. It did so without consulting the EU.8 Under the terms of the guarantee, senior bondholders would be protected, ensuring that the Central Bank of Ireland, and by extension the Irish taxpayer, would bear the costs of any losses. From 2007-2011, government debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 32-108%9 and the government was borrowing to finance current budget obligations and fund the bank guarantee. If the bond markets lost confidence in Ireland’s creditworthiness, Ireland would lose access to borrowing and face default. Those fears were realized in 2010, a period that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) described as a “sovereign-bank loop.” This loop occurred when doubts about banks led to doubts about the ability of the nation to afford its debt, reinforcing fears about the ability of the banks to survive. By November 2010, Ireland was locked out of the bond markets, had no access to funds, and had applied to the EU and IMF for relief.10 Professor Morgan Kelly of University College Dublin, who warned of such dangers during the boom period, wrote that “sovereign nations get to make policy choices, and we are no longer a sovereign nation in any meaningful sense of that term. From here on, for better or worse, we can only rely on the kindness of strangers.”11 REPUTATION IN RUINS In a recent interview, Eamon Gilmore, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade from March 2011-July 2014, listed four primary causes for the damage done to Ireland’s international reputation by March 2011.12 First, the bank guarantee of September 30, 2008 was issued without consulting other EU states about the terms. Caught by surprise, many member states, including neighbor and key trading partner the United Kingdom, lost trust in the Irish government and doubted its stability. Second, as the crisis deepened, the government retreated from multilateral engagement, especially within the EU. Ireland was not fulfilling its ministerial obligations to EU bureaucracies.13 There were practical reasons for these absences. Prime Minister Brian Cowen announced on November 21, 2010 that Ireland was applying for a Troika assistance program in order to prevent sovereign bankruptcy.14 The “Troika” is the common nickname given to the European Commission, European Central Bank (ECB), and IMF, which jointly coordinated the sovereign debt bailouts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus. The Green Party announced on November 22 that it would 8 Barry Eichengreen, “The Irish Crisis and the EU from a Distance,” paper presented for the CBI-CEPR-IMF Conference: Ireland—Lessons from its Recovery from the Bank-Sovereign Loop, Dublin, Ireland, January 19, 2015. 9 Stephen Kinsella and G. Tiou-Tagba Aliti, “Modeling Moments of Crisis: The Case of Ireland,” Journal of Economic Issues 47, no. 2 (2013): 562. 10 Philip Lane, “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 57. 11 Morgan Kelly, “If You Thought the Bank Bailout was Bad, Wait until the Mortgage Defaults Hit Home,” Irish Times, November 8, 2010. 12 Gilmore, interview. 13 Ibid. 14 Pat Leahy, The Price of Power: Inside Ireland’s Crisis Coalition (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 75.
- 148. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 148 withdraw from the government, leaving the cabinet with only seven ministers. December and January saw further government defections and Cowen’s resignation as leader of the Fianna Fáil Party. A general election was called for February 25, 2011, and Parliament was dissolved on February 1. Thus, through December and January, Ireland’s political system imploded and from February 1 to March 9 Ireland had no government. During this tumultuous political period, attendance at EU ministerial meetings was not a priority of the Irish government. Third, the global media frequently covered Ireland’s woe, starting from the beginning of its recession in 2007, with “Celtic Tiger is slain” motifs and headlines. Pictures of half-finished Irish abandoned building projects were visual metaphors for boom-to-bust Ireland. Fourth, Ireland’s diplomats had been instructed to quell the fears of their international counterparts . After Reuters reported that Ireland was in talks for a bailout, Minister for Justice Dermot Ahern told the press it was “fiction.”15 This message persisted until the surprise announcement of the aid package on November 21, 2010.16 Foreign officials, again caught by surprise, expressed their displeasure to Irish diplomats, causing reputational damage to the diplomatic corps. CRISIS RESPONSE In the February 2011 General Election, the Fine Gael Party, led by Enda Kenny, won the most seats, but not the requisite number for a majority government. The Labour Party, led by Eamon Gilmore, won the second most seats. On February 28, Gilmore gained approval from Labour’s Central Council to enter negotiations with Fine Gael to form a coalition government.17 An agreement was reached and the new coalition government was formed on March 9, 2011 with Kenny as Taoiseach (prime minister) and Gilmore as Tánaiste (deputy prime minister). Fine Gael held ten cabinet seats to Labour’s six. The negotiation period was compressed, Gilmore recalls, due to the time constraints the participants faced from critical meetings and high profile events coming in March.18 Negotiators assembled the new government and crafted the 57 page Programme for Government in five days.19 An EU Summit was scheduled for March 11 with Ireland on the agenda; Ireland needed a government and an EU strategy in place before then. In addition, St. Patrick’s week came on the heels of the summit. The St. Patrick’s holiday is one of the most significant Irish public relations tools because cabinet ministers disperse around the globe for meetings with foreign leaders, such as the Taoiseach’s presentation of a bowl of shamrocks to President Obama in 2011. In May, Ireland welcomed Queen Elizabeth II on the first state visit of a British monarch to Ireland since Irish independence in 1922. The new government needed to act fast and in a coordinated fashion; it created a new institution for that purpose. STRUCTURAL CHANGES 15 Ibid., 74. 16 Gilmore, interview. 17 Gavin Reilly, “Opposition ‘Still an Option’ for Labour, Chiefs Believe,” The Journal, March 1, 2011. 18 Gilmore, interview. 19 “Programme for Government 2011,” Office of the Taoiseach, March 6, 2011.
- 149. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 149 The Programme for Government, the strategic governing plan of the new administration, promised to restore our country’s finances, reform an outdated system of administration, and rebuild Ireland’s reputation on the international stage.20 %he Economic Management Council (EMC), consisting of Kenny, Gilmore, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public Expenditure and Reform, and senior advisors and civil servants, was the new decision-making institution created to carry out these reforms. Although officially a cabinet subcommittee, Gilmore and others referred to the EMC as the war cabinet.21 Foreign Affairs had a leading role within the EMC. Gilmore was joined by David Cooney, secretary general of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and was instrumental in having Geraldine Byrne Nason, a seasoned EU diplomat, assigned to the office of the Taoiseach to support the EMC and to co- ordinate European policy. Byrne Nason came from DFAT, where she had served in Ireland’s permanent mission to the EU in Brussels. The EMC was unique in several ways. First, as opposed to the cabinet in which Fine Gael held a 2:1 advantage, the EMC was a 1:1 split between the Fine Gael and Labour parties. Second, only the most senior cabinet ministers who dealt with the economy or Troika program were members. Third, only the economic and policy advisors of Kenny and Gilmore were included. Fourth, the Troika approved of the initiative.22 In the EMC, Kenny and Gilmore guided most of the strategic decisions. There was no dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy in the EMC. The conditions of the Troika bailout program framed Ireland’s domestic budget, but any attempts to renegotiate the agreement were done via diplomatic channels. This was because the key players of the Troika were based abroad. In all, diplomacy was at the center of the operation.23 The Programme for Government also promised the creation of an “Export Trade Council (ETC) to strengthen cooperation and coordination across all key departments and agencies involved in promotion and development of trade and exports.”24 The ETC, chaired by Gilmore, was DFAT’s responsibility. From the government, it included DFAT and the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport, and the Minister of State for Trade and Development. Private sector members included Ibec, the Irish equivalent to a national chamber of commerce, and appointees with expertise in trade and export. The ETC was not intended to weaken any specific ministry, but rather to coordinate disparate efforts to maximize export potential, since exports were critical to Ireland’s economic health. STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY Gilmore chose foreign affairs as the focus of his new cabinet ministry in the new government, 20 Ibid. 21 Gilmore, interview. 22 Leahy, The Price of Power: Inside Ireland’s Crisis Coalition, 135. 23 Gilmore, interview. 24 “Programme for Government 2011,” Office of the Taoiseach.
- 150. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 150 against the wishes of a small group within the Labour party who felt that ministers should focus on domestic social welfare and jobs. To Gilmore, the success of the Labour party’s domestic agenda required a restored economy dependent on exports, trade, and foreign direct investment.25 Expanding the economy would depend on re-establishing global confidence in Ireland as a sound place to do business. This confidence would only come by restoring Ireland’s international reputation, mainly through successful diplomacy. The Department of Foreign Affairs was renamed the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The addition of trade to the department did not change the functions of cabinet ministers responsible for trade, agriculture, or tourism; rather, it was to coordinate all external contacts and communications in a single strategy “to promote and protect abroad the values, interests and economic well-being of Ireland and its people.”26 DFAT would coordinate diplomatic efforts of all kinds: traditional, public, economic, development-aid, and cultural. After Gilmore took office, the diplomatic campaign began. Gilmore and senior officials visited resident ambassadors in Ireland, such as U.S. Ambassador Rooney, pledged Ireland’s renewed commitment to multilateralism, and explained the Programme for Government.27 Ireland’s diplomats were recalled back to Dublin for a pep-talk by Kenny, a tutorial on the Programme for Government and a new remit for the future.28 DFAT crafted a new foreign policy strategy for the period of 2011-2014, resulting from an organizational study of its mission and method – the first in many years.29 The crisis forced DFAT to prioritize what it could achieve to quickly revitalize Ireland’s reputation in the next three years. The Statement of Strategy 2011-2014 was published in Autumn 2011 and laid out five high level goals. First, DFAT would promote Ireland’s economic interests globally. Second, DFAT would continue its commitment to global development focused on poverty and hunger. Third, DFAT would continue its decades-old efforts of reconciliation with Northern Ireland. Fourth, DFAT would continue Ireland’s tradition of international peacekeeping and promotion of human rights. Fifth, DFAT would improve its efficiency in serving Irish citizens abroad and expand its outreach and engagement to the global Irish diaspora. Of the five goals, the promotion of economic interests through economic diplomacy was the government’s top priority. Economic diplomacy was considered paramount to Ireland’s survival. Each goal supported the others; executing them successfully would restore Ireland’s reputation and bring economic benefits. Gilmore credits the crisis for this refocus. The luck of the Irish came into play early for the new government with successful high profile visits, such as that of Enda Kenny to the White House for St. Patrick’s Day and the official state visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Ireland (May 17-20, 2011). This was followed by President 25 Gilmore, interview. 26 “Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Statement of Strategy 2011-2014,” Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1 , May 2011. 27 Gilmore, interview. 28 Leahy, The Price of Power: Inside Ireland’s Crisis Coalition, 165. 29 “Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Statement of Strategy 2011-2014,” Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 6.
- 151. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 151 Barack Obama’s visit on May 23 during which he visited his great-great-grandfather’s village of Moneygall and spoke to a crowd of 25,000 in Dublin.30 The visits were considered major public relations successes. EXECUTING THE STRATEGY DFAT Goal #1: Promote Ireland’s economic interests in Europe and abroad Ireland needed to accomplish two major economic milestones if it hoped to exit the Troika program, rebuild its credit rating, and regain economic sovereignty. It needed the interest rate reduced on loans from the ECB, and it needed to convert the promissory note debt into traditional sovereign debt. Diplomacy drove these effort. The Programme for Government promised to “seek a reduced interest rate” from international lenders and “keep the corporate tax rate at 12.5%.”31 These two issues were linked on March 11. Enda Kenny, on just his third day in office, was in Brussels for the EU Summit. Ireland was living with the terms of the Troika bailout and needed to obtain a reduction in interest rates from the ECB. Meanwhile, European leaders, especially France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, resented Ireland’s low corporate tax rate and sought changes due to the fact that it offered Ireland a competitive advantage. Kenny was called to a meeting with European Council President Herman Van Rompuy. After his arrival, and to his surprise, they were joined by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy; Kenny was outnumbered. They made it clear to him that no interest rate cut would occur unless he did something about the corporate tax rate.32 Kenny told them the tax rate was non-negotiable. Later, Van Rompuy suggested to Kenny that the EU may be satisfied with a non-committal agreement from Ireland to merely consider changes to the corporate tax rate. However, neither side budged. Between March and July, Kenny, Gilmore and Irish diplomats in European capitals lobbied that a reduced interest rate was not only healthy for Ireland, but good for the EU and Eurozone. Circumstances aligned to reinforce Ireland’s argument; Greece and Portugal were facing the same struggles with bailout loans. In late July, the EU cut the interest rate by 2% on its loans to Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In return Kenny agreed to “constructively discuss” tax cooperation, the idea Van Rompuy had floated in March.33 The rate cut saved Ireland €800 million per year. Ireland had gained breathing room and would continue its diplomacy to gain further restructuring from the Troika. In 2010, the Cowen government replaced the two year bank guarantee with a promissory notes program, which was intended to provide confidence to the ECB that Ireland would fund its Central Bank, and by extension, the ECB would be paid back. €3.1 billion would be 30 “Obama Gets In Touch With His Irish Roots,” NPR, May 23, 2011. 31 “Programme for Government 2011,” Office of the Taoiseach. 32 Leahy, The Price of Power: Inside Ireland’s Crisis Coalition, 138. 33 Ibid., 166.
- 152. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 152 payable each March. Minister of Finance Michael Noonan and the EMC determined in 2011 that under these term,s Ireland would not repay its bank debt, even though the fundamentals of the economy were pointing toward recovery.34 The debt burden, coupled with austerity budgets, would be unsustainable. Noonan developed several plans to transition the promissory notes to long term sovereign debt, but the Troika was cool to the idea. Ireland paid its €3.1 billion in 2012, but the EMC determined that Ireland would be unable to do so in 2013, and ramped up an aggressive campaign of economic diplomacy. Gilmore and DFAT led the coordinated effort and kept the EMC informed. Irish ambassadors in European capitals monitored public perceptions about Ireland and provided feedback. If a problem was identified, an appropriate Irish government official would be dispatched to address it, such as Kenny to Merkel, Noonan to Draghi (the ECB President), or minister to minister.35 Proactively, Gilmore and DFAT sought to craft the narrative in Europe along the following lines: Yes, Ireland had been reckless and found itself in a bad condition, but it had dutifully followed the Troika’s austerity program and its problems were part of a pan- European banking problem. Ireland’s banks were not isolated, but interconnected with all European banks, and Ireland’s taxpayers could not be expected to bear the burden alone. This European problem required a European solution. Weekly conference calls were conducted at DFAT headquarters in which all ambassadors provided feedback on their contacts and reactions and follow-up actions were assigned. If there was a problem, a call was arranged. If there was an opportunity, a high level visit was made. Throughout 2012, proactive diplomacy, favorable circumstances and a change in actors combined for eventual success. Enda Kenny and Angela Merkel had a respectful, working relationship; their domestic parties both aligned with the center-right European People’s Party. Kenny used the relationship to obtain a joint declaration from Merkel that Ireland was a “special case,” a sure signal to other European leaders that Merkel had softened.36 At the ECB, Mario Draghi replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as President and Draghi was more sensitive than Trichet to political and banking issues. As angst over the Euro dragged on and Eurosceptic parties experienced increasing popularity, European leaders needed a success. Kenny and Gilmore reminded Merkel that Ireland’s success was good for Germany.37 Greece was stumbling in its Troika-imposed plan, but Ireland had been executing its plan on all levels. Ireland made it clear that, if allowed to restructure its bank debt, it could be in a position to successfully exit the bailout by the end of 2013. In January 2013, Ireland began its six month Presidency of the Council of the European Union. To coincide with the Irish Presidency, Gilmore published an op-ed in a number of European newspapers, entitled “Ireland Out of the Crisis,” in which he made the case that Ireland’s banking problem was Europe’s too. The coordinated placing of the article in nine different 34 Ibid., 232. 35 Gilmore, interview. 36 Leahy, The Price of Power: Inside Ireland’s Crisis Coalition, 240. 37 Ibid., 240.
- 153. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 153 papers was a result of Irish resident diplomats lobbying their contacts in the press, exemplifying a usage of direct diplomacy to express public diplomacy. In Cowan’s and Arsenault’s three layers of public diplomacy, Gilmore’s op-ed would be considered a monologue used to inform and influence the public of other states.38 In early 2013, Ireland used its EU Presidency to deliver its message at all levels that it needed to transition the promissory note debt to long term sovereign debt. In February, the Irish government crafted a plan to restructure the promissory note debt. Their diplomatic goal was to get the ECB to approve the restructuring, or simply not object. The ECB could have rejected the arrangement by ruling that it violated Article 123 of the European treaty, which prohibits ECB credit facilities in favor of central governments. The Dáil approved the restructuring plan in February 2013 during an all-night session.39 The ECB governing council met the next day and was silent on the issue.40 The government moved forward with the plan and the deal was done. Refinancing the debt saved €1 billion and set the stage for the exit from the Troika bailout by the end of 2013. DFAT Goal #2: Deliver on Ireland’s global development commitments with a focus on poverty and hunger As mentioned previously, Ireland has long enjoyed a global reputation as a leader in foreign aid. Gilmore and DFAT built on those strengths to refine the aid program. The “Africa strategy” targeted aid where it was most needed and could have the longest impact. Although austerity had cut the overall aid budget, Gilmore was determined to provide the same level of direct aid and forgo administrative, consulting or other overhead expenses as long as possible.41 DFAT introduced a concept Gilmore called “aid to trade” as the logical progression of aid programs in fast developing economies. In addition to traditional aid, Ireland would use the talents and expertise of its own trade sectors, in areas such as agriculture, engineering, education, and pharmaceuticals, to assist states in building their own economic capacity. Ireland benefited by obtaining “value for money” in its aid investment, and also through opportunities in which its companies gained access to new markets in rapidly growing economies. “Aid to trade” was good for Irish business. The concept allowed Gilmore to sell Ireland’s continued foreign-aid engagement to a domestic public that was suffering through austerity and perhaps wondering if that money could have been better spent at home. Ireland continues to be recognized as a global leader in aid programs, and won high praise in a 2014 OECD peer-review. “Ireland punches above its weight on global development issues. It has a talent for building political networks, alliances and coalitions to support development. This was perhaps best exemplified by its presidency of the (EU) in 2013,” in which new EU policies on environment, development, nutrition, accounting and transparency were passed.42 Cowan and Arsenault would recognize these accomplishments as a result of the third layer of 38 Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 2008): 11. 39 Eichengreen, “The Irish Crisis and the EU from a Distance,” 8. 40 Ibid., 9. 41 Gilmore, interview. 42 “OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Ireland 2014,” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- 154. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 154 public diplomacy, collaboration, characterized by people working together on a joint venture or project toward a common goal.43 In late June 2014, independent policy advisor Simon Anholt released what he called “The Good Country Index.” The index is based on multiple data points for individual countries, ranked by overall “goodness.” Ireland was ranked first on the list.44 Gilmore was pleased. “That was released the week I left office. It was very gratifying.”45 DFAT Goal #3: Advance Irish reconciliation and cooperation In comparison to the Irish government that served during the Troubles (the civil and terrorist strife of the 1970s to 1990s), the Fine Gael-Labour coalition had the advantage of peace in Northern Ireland. DFAT now uses the history of the Troubles and on-going reconciliation efforts to assist other states facing similar civil, sectarian or ethnic tensions. Ireland’s negative experiences and lessons learned are used to promote positive change in other states. The comparison between the Troubles and today is best demonstrated in two state visits. Queen Elizabeth II’s visit from May 17 to 20, 2011 was the first state visit to Ireland by a British monarch since Irish independence. The Anglo-Irish foreign affairs teams scripted each event for maximum visual and symbolic effect. The Queen was gracious in acknowledging the suffering that had resulted from Anglo-Irish relations in the past and expressed her hope and optimism for a warm, lasting partnership in the future. The Irish public loved it and enthusiastically welcomed her. Her short speeches, composed of carefully chosen words, were received with standing ovations and even praised by Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams. “The Queen’s visit to Ireland was generally regarded as a diplomatic and cultural success.”46 Irish President Michael Higgins’ visit to the UK from April 7-11, 2014 was the first state visit of an Irish President since independence. Ireland had exited the Troika bailout on December 13, 2013, so Higgins was able to represent an economically sovereign nation.47 These events were meticulously scripted. The Queen greeted President Higgins at Windsor Castle. He paid his respects at the tomb of Lord Louis Mountbatten (who was assassinated by the IRA in 1979), addressed the British Parliament, and was honored with a banquet by the Queen at Windsor Castle. Kenny, British Prime Minister David Cameron, Gilmore, and Martin McGuiness (former IRA Commander and now Deputy-Leader of Northern Ireland) shared a table with the Queen. McGuiness and the Queen shook hands, which most of the world took delight in, although hardliners on both sides viewed it as appeasement to oppressors. 43 Cowan and Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” 11. 44 Simon Anholt, “The Good Country Index: Ireland,” The Good Country, July 2014. 45 Gilmore, interview. 46 Nuala C. Johnson, “A Royal Encounter: Space, Spectacle and the Queen’s Visit to Ireland 2011,” Geographical Journal 178, no. 3 (September 2012): 198. 47 Gerard Howlin, “A Nation Once Again, Free to Abuse and Misuse Our Sovereignty,” Irish Examiner, November 20, 2013.
- 155. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 155 These visits demonstrated the power of dialogue, the second level of public diplomacy, and Ireland’s reputation was enhanced.48 DFAT Goal #4: Contribute to international peace, security and human rights49 Gilmore cited retreat from multilateralism as one of the causes of Ireland’s reputational damage.50 Hence, the new government set out to swiftly restore full multilateral engagement. Participation on a ministerial level would be active, and Ireland would prepare to assume the EU Presidency in 2013. Irish multilateralism also expressed itself in the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), in which Ireland held the Chairmanship in 2012 and Gilmore served as Chairman-in-Office. By holding the gavel of the OSCE in 2012 and the EU Presidency in the first half of 2013, Ireland was able to set both the agenda and policy priorities.51 52 The prestige of these terms of office, the power to set the agenda, and the deep level of interaction with other member states at all levels embedded Irish presence and policy ideas in multilateral institutions. At the UN, Ireland was elected to the Human Rights Council in 2013, along with Germany and the U.S. Ireland sought the seat because human rights advocacy was viewed as an Irish tradition and stronghold, and the general assembly agreed.53 Multilateral Ireland was back. DFAT Goal #5: Provide consular and passport services for Irish citizens and engage with Irish communities abroad The new government realized that it needed to expand its use of soft power in order to enhance its cultural reputation. Engaging with Irish communities abroad was accomplished in a variety of ways, several of which will be highlighted here. The Emerald Isle Classic (September 1, 2012) was an American football game between Notre Dame and Navy played at the 50,000 seat Aviva Stadium in Dublin. It was a marketing and tourism success, a sell-out in which 35,000 Americans (and their money) traveled to Ireland for the game. Taoiseach Enda Kenny and U.S. Ambassador Dan Rooney presided over the ceremonial coin toss. The Gathering 2013 was an Irish Tourism initiative aimed at the global Irish diaspora, estimated at 70 million, encouraging them to visit their ancestral homeland in 2013. According to its 48 Cowan and Arsenault. “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” 11. 49 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Statement of Strategy 2011-2014,” Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 15. 50 Gilmore, interview. 51 OSCE Secretariat, “Irish Deputy Prime Minister Presents 2012 OSCE Chairmanship Priorities,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, January 12, 2012. 52 Gilmore, interview. 53 Ibid.
- 156. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 156 final report, it was responsible for up to 275,000 additional tourist visits and €170 million in additional revenue.54 The Global Irish Economic Forum was first held in Dublin in 2009 by bringing together “over 350 of the most senior Irish and Irish connected business people based in some 40 countries,” such as executives from Coca-Cola and other global enterprises, with Irish government and trade officials presenting Ireland as a business destination, exporter and location worthy of promotion.55 When Gilmore visited New York City for St. Patrick’s Day 2011, several participants of the 2009 forum complained that no one had followed up on their ideas.56 The Forum was re-launched in 2011 as an active institution that generated or supported ideas and initiatives, such as the Gathering 2013 and Global Greenings (which became significant public relations successes for Ireland). It held strategic events such as “Invest in Ireland,” hosted by former President Bill Clinton in New York in 2012. This networking resulted in long term relationships between the participants and Ireland.57 Global Greenings58 was generated by one of the diaspora networking groups. The goal was to prompt various states around the world to illuminate their iconic global or national monuments in green for the evening of St. Patrick’s Day. Tourism Ireland and the Irish Embassy network accepted the challenge and began securing commitments, which was essential as the project was operating at no cost to Ireland since there was no budget. Having started in 2013, the list of sites thus far is impressive, including landmarks such as the Sydney Opera House, Great Wall of China, Niagara Falls (both sides), Leaning Tower of Pisa, Roman Colosseum, Empire State Building, Great Pyramid and Sphinx in Egypt, and the Christ the Redeemer statue in Brazil.59 Joseph Nye contends that the “soft power of a country rest on three resources: its culture…its political values…and its foreign policies.”60 These Global Greenings tributes are the ultimate manifestation of Ireland’s soft power. The visual honor that so many nations willingly practice reveals the esteem they hold for Ireland. CONCLUSION: RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED Ireland successfully exited the Troika bailout program in December 2013. The OECD noted that its economy rebounded strongly in 2014 and that GDP is projected to grow at a healthy rate through 2016.61 Ibec, the Irish business lobby, predicts that the Irish economy will be the 54 “The Gathering Ireland,” National Tourism Development Authority, December 29, 2013. 55 “Global Irish Network,” Global Irish Economic Forum. 56 Gilmore, interview. 57 Ibid. 58 Discover Ireland, “Tourism Ireland Global Greening Campaign 2015,” filmed [March 2015], YouTube video, 04:29, Posted [March 2015]. 59 “Global Greening 2013,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 17, 2013. 60 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008): 96. 61 “Ireland - Economic forecast summary (November 2014),” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- 157. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 157 fastest growing in Europe in 2016.62 IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has praised Ireland repeatedly for its execution of the Troika program, stressing the most important factor in Ireland’s successful exit was “the human factor,” those who had conducted the program and built trust.63 Analysts now hold Ireland in high esteem for the way in which it maneuvered through the crisis. How did the Irish succeed in reforming their international reputation so substantially in only a few years? They planned it. Recovery from the bailout and restoration of reputation were deliberate, as declared in the Programme for Government on day one. It was designed, as evidenced by the creation of new governmental institutions and a strategic foreign affairs roadmap. Finally, it was achieved through diplomacy, whether by negotiating the promissory note refinancing or convincing Brazil to “green” Christ the Redeemer. In the process, the power of economic diplomacy was appreciated, the impact of public diplomacy was maximized and multilateralism was invigorated. Ireland’s experience holds lessons for other states. In times of domestic crisis, re-engage with the global community, do not retreat from it; expand on state strengths, like foreign aid and culture, and do not contract them; execute plans with flexibility as circumstances change, and do not forget that there is a finish line. WORKS CITED Ahern, Bertie. “Pimp my Party.” The Daily Edge. Last modified 2006. http://cdn.thejournal. ie/media/2013/09/bertie-2-4.jpg. Anholt, Simon. “The Good Country Index: Ireland.” The Good Country. July 2014. http:// www.goodcountry.org/country/IRL. Bayne, Nicholas, and Stephen Woolcock. The New Economic Diplomacy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011. Bergeijk, Peter A.G., Jan Melissen, and Maaike Okano-Heijmans. Economic Diplomacy: Economic and Political Perspectives. Leiden: BRILL, 2011. Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. “International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism.” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 509-524. Coakley, Christopher. “Ireland Shares Lessons after its Recovery from the Sovereign-Bank Loop.” International Monetary Fund. February 6. 2015. http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/CAR020615A.htm. Cowan, Geoffrey, and Amelia Arsenault. “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to 62 Ibec for Irish Business, “Q4 2015 Ibec Quarterly Economic Outlook: Growing Pains,” Irish Business and Employers Confederation, December 20, 2015. 63 Christopher Coakley, “Ireland Shares Lessons after its Recovery from the Sovereign-Bank Loop,” International Monetary Fund, February 6, 2015.
- 158. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 158 Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 2008): 10-30. “Global Greening 2013.” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. March 17, 2013. https:// www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/media-gallery/all-image-galleries/global- greenings-2013/. “Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Statement of Strategy 2011-2014.” Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. May 2011. https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/ alldfawebsitemedia/aboutus/dfat-statement-of-strategy-2011-2014.pdf. Discover Ireland. “Tourism Ireland Global Greening Campaign 2015.” filmed [March 2015]. YouTube video. 04:29. Posted [March 2015]. https://youtu.be/21uRW2xTHFg. Eichengreen, Barry. “The Irish Crisis and the EU from a Distance.” Paper presented for the CBI-CEPR-IMF Conference: Ireland—Lessons from its Recovery from the Bank- Sovereign Loop. Dublin, Ireland. January 19, 2015. Ferriter, Diarmaid. Ambiguous Republic, Ireland in the 1970s. London: Profile Books, Ltd, 2012. “Ireland - Economic forecast summary (November 2014).” Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development. Last modified November 2015. http://www.oecd.org/ economy/ireland-economic-forecast-summary.htm. “The Gathering Ireland.” National Tourism Development Authority. December 29, 2013. http:// www.thegatheringireland.com/. Gilmore, Eamon (former Deputy Prime Minister of Ireland), interview by James Garrity, April 18, 2015. “Programme for Government 2011.” Office of the Taoiseach. March 6, 2011. http://www. taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/ Programme_for_Government_2011.pdf. Ibec for Irish Business. “Q4 2015 Ibec Quarterly Economic Outlook: Growing Pains.” Irish Business and Employers Confederation. December 20, 2015. http://www.ibec.ie/IBEC/ Publications.nsf/vPages/Economic_Outlook~economic-outlook---december- 2015-11-12-2015/$File/Ibec_Q4_2015.pdf. “Global Irish Network.” Global Irish Economic Forum. Last modified 2015. https://www. globalirishforum.ie/GlobalIrishNetwork.aspx. Howlin, Gerard. “A Nation Once Again, Free to Abuse and Misuse Our
- 159. Journal of International Relations Deliberately DesigneD Diplomacy 159 Sovereignty.” Irish Examiner. November 20, 2013. http://www.irishexaminer.com/ viewpoints/columnists/guest-columnist/a-nation-once-again-free-to-abuse-and- misuse-our-sovereignty-250086.html. Johnson, Nuala C. “A Royal Encounter: Space, Spectacle and the Queen’s Visit to Ireland 2011.” Geographical Journal 178, no. 3 (September 2012): 194-200. Kelly, Morgan “If You Thought the Bank Bailout was Bad, Wait until the Mortgage Defaults Hit Home.” Irish Times. November 8, 2010. http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/ if-you-thought-the-bank-bailout-was-bad-wait-until-the-mortgage-defaults-hit- home-1.674081. Kinsella, Stephan and G. Tiou-Tagba Aliti. “Modeling Moments of Crisis: The Case of Ireland.” Journal of Economic Issues 47, no. 2 (2013): 561-566. Lake, David A. “The New Sovereignty in International Relations.” International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (September 2003): 303-323. Lane, Philip. “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 49-67. Leahy, Pat. The Price of Power: Inside Ireland’s Crisis Coalition. New York: Penguin Books, 2013. Nye, Joseph. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008): 94-109. “Obama Gets In Touch With His Irish Roots.” NPR. May 23, 2011. http://www. npr.org/2011/05/23/136580099/obama-gets-in-touch-with-his-irish-roots. “OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Ireland 2014.” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/ oecd/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-ireland- 2014_9789264225114-en#page1. O’Neill, Josephine, interview by James Garrity, August 30, 2011. OSCE Secretariat. “Irish Deputy Prime Minister Presents 2012 OSCE Chairmanship Priorities.” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. January 12, 2012. http://www.osce.org/cio/86960. O’Toole, Fintan. Ship of fools: How Stupidity and Corruption Sank the Celtic Tiger. New York: Public Affairs, 2010. Reilly, Gavin. “Opposition ‘Still an Option’ for Labour, Chiefs Believe.” The Journal. March
- 160. James michael Garrity Spring 2016 | Volume 18 160 1, 2011. http://www.thejournal.ie/opposition-still-an-option-for-labour-chiefs- believe-93789-Mar2011/. Robbins, Geraldine and Lapsley, Irvine. “The Success Story of the Eurozone Crisis? Ireland’s Austerity Measures.” Public Money & Management 34, no. 2 (2014): 91-98. Schoenmaker, Dirk. “Stabilising and Healing the Irish Banking System: Policy Lessons.” Paper presented for the CBI-CEPR-IMF Conference: Ireland—Lessons from its Recovery from the Bank-Sovereign Loop. Dublin, Ireland. January 19, 2015. ABOUT THE AUTHOR James Michael Garrity is a member of Sigma Iota Rho. He is enrolled in the Master of Diplomacy (MDY) program at Norwich University, while employed full-time as a Consultant with a global technology firm. Since graduating from the University of Massachusetts with a History degree, he has worked in private industry, nonprofits, and government. He has been deeply involved in volunteer public service. He served 4 terms (8 years) in the New Hampshire House of Representatives, and was Chair of the Science, Technology and Energy Committee, where he was also able to advocate for NH on several regional and national task forces such as the National Nuclear Task Force. Locally, he serves as Town Moderator in a small New Hampshire town, where he facilitates the annual traditional Town Meeting, and supervises the elections to ensure they are free, fair and legal. He holds dual citizenship (USA and Ireland). His goals for the diplomacy program are to become a more effective communicator with global peers in the private sector, and perhaps lend his services in the public sector to make the world a better place.
- 161. bu.edu/pardeeschool @BUPardeeSchool Advancing Human Progress 9 Graduate Programs (MA) International Affairs Global Development Policy International Relations & Environmental Policy International Relations & International Communication International Relations, Mid Career International Relations & Religion Latin American Studies International Relations & Juris Doctor International Relations & Master of Business Administration 2Graduate Certificates African Studies Certificate Asian Studies Certificate 5 Undergraduate Majors (BA) International Relations Asian Studies European Studies Latin American Studies Middle East & North Africa Studies 8 7 Centers and Programs African Studies Center Center for the Study of Asia Center for the Study of Europe Institute for the Study of Muslim Societies & Civilizations Latin American Studies Middle East & North Africa Studies Institute on Culture, Religion & World Affairs FREDERICK S. PARDEE SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES Global Vision Local Impact International Perspective Regional Insight 1 School Undergraduate Minors International Relations African Languages & Literature African Studies East Asian Studies European Studies Latin American Studies Muslim Cultures Muslim Societies
- 162. Funding Opportunities with Sigma Iota Rho SIR Crest Scholarship merit-based award up to $1000 rewarding achievement in the study of international relations Odysseus Awards need-based award up to $500 to further the pursuit of international studies SIR Research amd Travel Grants up to $500 to support research in the area of international studies Please be advised that awards may not be applied toward tuition or study abroad. Visit http://www.sigmaiotarho.org/resources/funding/ to learn more. ISSN 2159-1741