Smart Grid Maturity Model

ELECTRICITY SUBSECTOR
CYBERSECURITY CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL (ES-C2M2)
Version 1.1
February 2014

Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................................ iii
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Intended Audience........................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Document Organization................................................................................................................... 2
2. Background ............................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Model Development Approach ....................................................................................................... 4
3. About the Electricity Subsector ................................................................................................................ 5
4. Core Concepts........................................................................................................................................... 7
4.1 Maturity Models .............................................................................................................................. 7
4.2 Critical Infrastructure Objectives..................................................................................................... 7
4.3 IT and OT Assets............................................................................................................................... 7
4.4 Relationship to the Risk Management Process............................................................................... 8
4.5 Function ........................................................................................................................................... 8
5. Model Architecture................................................................................................................................. 10
5.1 Domains ......................................................................................................................................... 10
5.2 Maturity Indicator Levels............................................................................................................... 12
5.2.1 Approach Progression ........................................................................................................ 13
5.2.2 Institutionalization Progression.......................................................................................... 14
5.2.3 Summary of MIL Characteristics......................................................................................... 17
5.3 Practice Reference Notation.......................................................................................................... 18
6. Using the Model...................................................................................................................................... 19
6.1 Prepare To Use the Model............................................................................................................. 19
6.2 Perform an Evaluation ................................................................................................................... 20
6.3 Analyze Identified Gaps ................................................................................................................. 20
6.4 Prioritize and Plan.......................................................................................................................... 21
6.5 Implement Plans and Periodically Reevaluate............................................................................... 21
7. Model Domains....................................................................................................................................... 23
7.1 Risk Management .......................................................................................................................... 23
7.2 Asset, Change, and Configuration Management........................................................................... 26
7.3 Identity and Access Management ................................................................................................. 29
7.4 Threat and Vulnerability Management.......................................................................................... 31
7.5 Situational Awareness.................................................................................................................... 34
7.6 Information Sharing and Communications.................................................................................... 37
7.7 Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations............................................................... 39
7.8 Supply Chain and External Dependencies Management............................................................... 43
7.9 Workforce Management ............................................................................................................... 46
7.10 Cybersecurity Program Management............................................................................................ 50
APPENDIX A: References............................................................................................................................. 53
APPENDIX B: Glossary ................................................................................................................................. 63

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX C: Acronyms............................................................................................................................... 77
APPENDIX D: Revision History..................................................................................................................... 79
APPENDIX E: Acknowledgments for ES-C2M2 V1.0................................................................................... 80
Notices ........................................................................................................................................................ 83
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: An Abstract Topology of the Electric Grid Energy Delivery System............................................... 5
Figure 2: NIST Smart Grid Framework Conceptual Model............................................................................ 6
Figure 3: Risk Management Process............................................................................................................. 8
Figure 4: Model and Domain Elements ...................................................................................................... 11
Figure 5: Referencing an Individual Practice, Example: RM-1a................................................................ 18
Figure 6: Recommended Approach for Using the Model........................................................................... 19
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Example of Approach Progression in the Cyber Program Management Domain........................ 14
Table 2: Mapping of Management Practices to Domain-Specific Practices............................................... 15
Table 3: Summary of Maturity Indicator Level Characteristics................................................................... 17
Table 4: Recommended Process for Using Evaluation Results................................................................... 22

Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Department of Energy (DOE) developed the Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability
Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) Version 1.0 to support a White House initiative led by the DOE, in
partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and in collaboration with private-
and public-sector experts.
The DOE acknowledges the dedication and technical expertise of all the organizations and
individuals who participated in the development of Version 1.0, as well as the organizations and
individuals who provided the critiques, evaluations, and modifications in order to produce
Version 1.1 of ES-C2M2. Detailed acknowledgments for Version 1.0 of the ES-C2M2 can be
found in Appendix D of this document.
Program Technical Lead
Jason D. Christopher
Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE)
Program Support Team
Fowad Muneer, ICF International
John Fry, ICF International
Paul Skare, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Model Architect
Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute – CERT Division

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Cautionary Note
Intended Scope and Use of This Publication
The guidance provided in this publication is intended to address only the implementation and
management of cybersecurity practices associated with information technology (IT) and
operations technology (OT) assets and the environments in which they operate. This guidance is
not intended to replace or subsume other cybersecurity-related activities, programs, processes,
or approaches that electricity subsector organizations have implemented or intend to
implement, including any cybersecurity activities associated with legislation, regulations,
policies, programmatic initiatives, or mission and business requirements. Additionally, this
guidance is not part of any regulatory framework and is not intended for regulatory use. Rather,
the guidance in this publication is intended to complement a comprehensive enterprise
cybersecurity program.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) cybersecurity standards provide specific requirements that apply to the bulk power
system and were used as a reference by the model development team. Although it is
anticipated that entities subject to compliance with NERC CIP standards would use this model,
compliance requirements are not altered in any way by this model. Please consult your NERC
CIP compliance authority for any questions on NERC CIP compliance.

Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 INTRODUCTION
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1. INTRODUCTION
Repeated cyber intrusions into organizations of all types demonstrate the need for improved
cybersecurity. Cyber threats continue to grow, and represent one of the most serious
operational risks facing modern organizations. The national and economic security of the
United States depends on the reliable functioning of the Nation’s critical infrastructure in the
face of such threats. Beyond critical infrastructure, the economic vitality of the nation depends
on the sustained operation of organizations of all types. The Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity
Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) can help electricity subsector organizations of all types
evaluate and make improvements to their cybersecurity programs.
The ES-C2M2 is part of the DOE Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) Program and
was developed to address the unique characteristics of the electricity subsector. The program
supports the ongoing development and measurement of cybersecurity capabilities within the
electricity subsector, and the model can be used to:
 Strengthen cybersecurity capabilities in the electricity subsector.
 Enable utilities to effectively and consistently evaluate and benchmark cybersecurity
capabilities.
 Share knowledge, best practices, and relevant references within the subsector as a means
to improve cybersecurity capabilities.
 Enable utilities to prioritize actions and investments to improve cybersecurity.
The ES-C2M2 is designed for use with a self-evaluation methodology and toolkit (available by
request) for an organization to measure and improve its cybersecurity program.1
A self-
evaluation using the toolkit can be completed in one day, but the toolkit could be adapted for a
more rigorous evaluation effort. Additionally, the model can inform the development of a new
The ES-C2M2 provides descriptive rather than prescriptive industry focused guidance. The model
content is presented at a high level of abstraction so that it can be interpreted by subsector
organizations of various types, structures, and sizes. Broad use of the model is expected to
support benchmarking of the subsector’s cybersecurity capabilities. These attributes also make
the ES-C2M2 an easily scalable tool for the subsector’s implementation of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cyber Security Framework.
1
The ES-C2M2 Toolkit may be obtained by sending a request to ES-C2M2@doe.gov.

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1.1 Intended Audience
The ES-C2M2 enables electricity subsector organizations to evaluate cybersecurity capabilities
consistently, communicate capability levels in meaningful terms, and prioritize cybersecurity
investments. The model can be used by any electricity subsector organization, regardless of
ownership, structure, or size. Within the organization, various stakeholders may benefit from
familiarity with the model. This document specifically targets people in the following
organizational roles:
 Decision makers (executives) who control the allocation of resources and the management
of risk in organizations; these are typically senior leaders.2
 Leaders with responsibility for managing organizational resources and operations
associated with the domains of this model (see Section 5.1 for more information on the
content of each ES-C2M2 domain).
 Practitioners with responsibility for supporting the organization in the use of this model
(planning and managing changes in the organization based on the model).3
 Facilitators with responsibility for leading a self-evaluation of the organization based on this
model and the associated toolkit and analyzing the self-evaluation results.4
1.2 Document Organization
This document, along with several others supports organizations in the effective use of the ES-
C2M2, and it introduces the model and provides the ES-C2M2’s main structure and content.
Stakeholders may benefit by focusing on specific sections of this document, as outlined in the
table below. Beyond these recommendations, all readers may benefit from understanding the
entire document.
Role Recommended Document Sections
Decision makers Chapter 1 and 2
Leaders or managers Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
Practitioners Entire document
Facilitators Entire document
Chapter 2 presents background information on the model and its development. Chapter 3
provides an overview of the U.S. electricity subsector. Chapter 4 describes several core
concepts that are important for interpreting the content and structure of the ES-C2M2. Chapter
5 describes the architecture of the ES-C2M2. Chapter 6 provides guidance on how to use the
model. Chapter 7 contains the model itself - the model’s objectives and practices, organized
into 10 domains. Appendix A includes references that were either used in the development of
2
The sponsor of the self-evaluation should be a decision maker from the organization. For more information about the Sponsor role, please
refer to the C2M2 Facilitator Guide. The Facilitator Guide may be downloaded from http://energy.gov/node/795826.
3
Subject matter experts (SMEs) for the self-evaluation should be leaders or practitioner. For more information about the SME role, please
refer to the C2M2 Facilitator Guide. The Facilitator Guide may be downloaded from http://energy.gov/node/795826.
4
For more information about the facilitator role, please refer to the C2M2 Facilitator Guide. The Facilitator Guide may be downloaded from
http://energy.gov/node/795826.

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this document or provide further information about the practices identified within the model.
Appendix B is the Glossary. Appendix C defines the acronyms used in this document. Appendix
D summarizes the revision history of the ES-C2M2 document. Appendix E acknowledges ES-
C2M2 v1.0 contributors.

Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 BACKGROUND
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2. BACKGROUND
The model was developed in support of the Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk
Management Maturity Initiative, a White House initiative, led by the DOE in partnership with
the DHS and in collaboration with private- and public-sector experts, and representatives of
asset owners and operators within the electricity subsector. The initiative used the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan framework as a public–private partnership mechanism to
support the development of the model.
The initiative leveraged and built upon existing efforts, models, and cybersecurity best practices
and is aligned with the White House’s 2010 Cyberspace Policy Review, the DOE’s Roadmap to
Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity, the Energy Sector-Specific Plan, and the
Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group’s (ICSJWG) Cross-Sector Roadmap for
Cybersecurity of Control Systems.
2.1 Model Development Approach
The initial version of this model was developed from January through May 2012. The following
themes characterize the development approach:
 Public–private partnership: Numerous government, industry, and academic organizations
participated in the development of this model, bringing a broad range of knowledge, skills,
and experience to the team. The model was developed collaboratively with an industry
advisory group through a series of working sessions, and it was revised based on feedback
from more than 40 industry experts and 17 pilot evaluations at utilities.
 Best practices and sector alignment: The model builds upon and ties together a number of
existing cybersecurity resources and initiatives and was informed by a review of cyber
threats to the subsector. Leveraging related works shortened the development schedule
and helped to ensure that the model would be relevant and beneficial to the subsector.
 Descriptive, not prescriptive: This model was developed to provide descriptive, not
prescriptive, guidance to help organizations develop and improve their cybersecurity
capabilities. As a result, the model practices tend to be abstract so that they can be
interpreted for utilities of various structures, functions, and sizes.
 Pilot to test, validate, and improve: A draft of this model was piloted at 17 utilities test,
evaluate, and improve it.
 Fast-paced development: The development effort focused on quickly developing a model
that would provide value to the subsector and be available as soon as possible. The
electricity subsector has widely adopted the model and provided valuable feedback for
improvements.

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Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 ABOUT THE ELECTRICITY SUBSECTOR
3. ABOUT THE ELECTRICITY SUBSECTOR
The electricity portion of the energy sector includes the generation, transmission, distribution,
and marketing of electricity. The use of electricity is ubiquitous, spanning all sectors of the U.S.
economy. The electric power subsector accounts for 40 percent of all energy consumed in the
United States. Electricity system facilities are dispersed throughout the North American
continent. Although most assets are privately owned, no single organization represents the
interests of the entire subsector. An abstract topology of the electric grid energy delivery
system showing the power system (primary equipment) alongside IT and OT systems
(information management) is shown in Figure 1. This architecture was developed
collaboratively by the NIST Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) GridWise Architecture
Council (GWAC); the European Union M/490 Reference Architecture Working Group (RAWG);
and the International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Committee 57, Working Group 19.
Figure 1: An Abstract Topology of the Electric Grid Energy Delivery System
Throughout this model, the term function is used to describe the set of activities performed by
the utility to which the model is being applied. For the purpose of applying this model to the
electricity subsector, the advisory group focused on four high-level functions performed by
electric utilities: generation, transmission, distribution, and markets. However, the model can
be applied to other functions or subfunctions performed by the organization. An alternate
depiction of the relationship of the functions is provided in Figure 2.

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Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 ABOUT THE ELECTRICITY SUBSECTOR
Figure 2: NIST Smart Grid Framework Conceptual Model

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Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 CORE CONCEPTS
4. CORE CONCEPTS
This chapter describes several core concepts that are important for interpreting the content
and structure of the model.
4.1 Maturity Models
A maturity model is a set of characteristics, attributes, indicators, or patterns that represent
capability and progression in a particular discipline. Model content typically exemplifies best
practices and may incorporate standards or other codes of practice of the discipline.
A maturity model thus provides a benchmark against which an organization can evaluate the
current level of capability of its practices, processes, and methods and set goals and priorities
for improvement. Also, when a model is widely used in a particular industry (and assessment
results are shared), organizations can benchmark their performance against other
organizations. An industry can determine how well it is performing overall by examining the
capability of its member organizations.
To measure progression, maturity models typically have “levels” along a scale — ES-C2M2 uses
a scale of maturity indicator levels (MILs) 0–3, which are described in Section 5.2. A set of
attributes defines each level. If an organization demonstrates these attributes, it has achieved
both that level and the capabilities that the level represents. Having measurable transition
states between the levels enables an organization to use the scale to:
 Define its current state
 Determine its future, more mature state
 Identify the capabilities it must attain to reach that future state
4.2 Critical Infrastructure Objectives
The model makes regular reference to critical infrastructure objectives. These are objectives
found in the sector-specific infrastructure protection plans5
of the 16 United States critical
infrastructure sectors defined in Presidential Policy Directive 21, “Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience.”6
The referenced objectives serve as a reminder that many of the functions
provided by potential adopters of the model support the Nation’s critical infrastructure and
that the broader cybersecurity objectives of the sector-specific plans should be considered.
4.3 IT and OT Assets
Many ES-C2M2 practices refer to assets. When evaluating how completely a practice is
performed, be sure to consider both traditional and emerging enterprise IT assets and any
5
http://www.dhs.gov/sector-specific-plans
6
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil

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industrial control systems (ICS) in use, including process control systems, supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, and other OT.
4.4 Relationship to the Risk Management Process
The phrase “commensurate with risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives” is
used throughout the model. This phrase reminds the organization to tailor its implementation
of the model content to address its unique risk profile. This supports the model intent of
providing descriptive rather than prescriptive guidance. In order to effectively follow this
guidance, the organization should use the model as part of a continuous enterprise risk
management process like that depicted in Figure 3: Risk Management Process.
Figure 3: Risk Management Process
The ES-C2M2 Risk Management domain (see Section 7.1) suggests establishing a cybersecurity
risk management strategy that aligns with the enterprise risk management strategy.
Cybersecurity risk is an important component of the overall business risk environment. ES-
C2M2’s cybersecurity risk management activities should feed into the enterprise risk
management strategy and program, so that cybersecurity risk is considered in and benefits
from corporate decisions based on risk impact, tolerance for risk, and risk response approaches.
The implementation of practices in the Risk Management domain provides supporting elements
used by other practices in the model as part of the overall risk management process.
Throughout the model, these Risk Management practices are referenced in related practices
using the notation described in Section 5.3.
4.5 Function
In this model, the term function is used as a scoping mechanism; it refers to the subset of the
operations of the organization that are being evaluated based on the model.
Risk
Framing
Risk
Assessment
Risk
Response
Risk
Monitoring

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It is common for an organization to use the model to evaluate a subset of its operations. This
subset, or function, will often align with organizational boundaries. Therefore, common
examples of functions for evaluation include departments, lines of business, or distinct
facilities. Organizations have also successfully used the model to evaluate a specific system or
technology thread that crosses departmental boundaries.
For example, an organization uses the model to evaluate its enterprise IT services, including
email, Internet connectivity, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telecommunication. In
the Threat and Vulnerability Management domain, practice 2b states, “Cybersecurity
vulnerability information is gathered and interpreted for the function.” When evaluating the
implementation of this practice, the organization should interpret function to mean the
operations of the enterprise IT services. In this example, the practice means that
cybersecurity vulnerability information is gathered and interpreted for the enterprise IT
services—information about vulnerabilities that would affect the enterprise email services,
network devices, and the VoIP system.

Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 MODEL ARCHITECTURE
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5. MODEL ARCHITECTURE
The model arises from a combination of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks,
programs, and initiatives. The model provides flexible guidance to help organizations develop
and improve their cybersecurity capabilities. As a result, the model practices tend to be at a
high level of abstraction, so that they can be interpreted for organizations of various structures
and sizes.
The model is organized into 10 domains. Each domain is a logical grouping of cybersecurity
practices. The practices within a domain are grouped by objective—target achievements that
support the domain. Within each objective, the practices are ordered by MIL.
The following sections include additional information about the domains and the MILs.
5.1 Domains
Each of the model’s 10 domains contains a structured set of cybersecurity practices. Each set of
practices represents the activities an organization can perform to establish and mature
capability in the domain. For example, the Risk Management domain is a group of practices that
an organization can perform to establish and mature cybersecurity risk management capability.
For each domain, the model provides a purpose statement, which is a high-level summary of
the intent of the domain, followed by introductory notes, which give context for the domain
and introduce its practices. The purpose statement and introductory notes offer context for
interpreting the practices in the domain.
The practices within each domain are organized into objectives, which represent achievements
that support the domain. For example, the Risk Management domain comprises three
objectives:
 Establish Cybersecurity Risk Management Strategy
 Manage Cybersecurity Risk
 Management Practices
Each of the objectives in a domain comprises a set of practices, which are ordered by MIL.
Figure 4 summarizes the elements of each domain.

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Model
Domain
Approach ObjectiveszApproach Objectives
Practices at MIL1
Practices at MIL2
Practices at MIL3
Management Objective
Practices at MIL2
Practices at MIL3
Model contains 10 domains
(one or more per domain)
Unique to each domain
Approach objectives are
supported by a progression of
practices that are unique to
the domain
Each management objective is
supported by a progression of
practices that are similar in
each domain and describe
institutionalization activities
(one per domain)
Similar in each domain
Figure 4: Model and Domain Elements
A brief description of the 10 domains follows in the order in which they appear in the model.
Risk Management
Establish, operate, and maintain an enterprise cybersecurity risk management program to
identify, analyze, and mitigate cybersecurity risk to the organization, including its business
units, subsidiaries, related interconnected infrastructure, and stakeholders.
Asset, Change, and Configuration Management
Manage the organization’s OT and IT assets, including both hardware and software,
commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
Identity and Access Management
Create and manage identities for entities that may be granted logical or physical access to the
organization’s assets. Control access to the organization’s assets, commensurate with the risk
to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
Threat and Vulnerability Management
Establish and maintain plans, procedures, and technologies to detect, identify, analyze,
manage, and respond to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, commensurate with the risk
to the organization’s infrastructure (e.g., critical, IT, operational) and organizational objectives.

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Situational Awareness
Establish and maintain activities and technologies to collect, analyze, alarm, present, and use
operational and cybersecurity information, including status and summary information from the
other model domains, to form a common operating picture (COP).
Information Sharing and Communications
Establish and maintain relationships with internal and external entities to collect and provide
cybersecurity information, including threats and vulnerabilities, to reduce risks and to increase
operational resilience, commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational
objectives.
Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations
Establish and maintain plans, procedures, and technologies to detect, analyze, and respond to
cybersecurity events and to sustain operations throughout a cybersecurity event,
Supply Chain and External Dependencies Management
Establish and maintain controls to manage the cybersecurity risks associated with services and
assets that are dependent on external entities, commensurate with the risk to critical
infrastructure and organizational objectives.
Workforce Management
Establish and maintain plans, procedures, technologies, and controls to create a culture of
cybersecurity and to ensure the ongoing suitability and competence of personnel,
Cybersecurity Program Management
Establish and maintain an enterprise cybersecurity program that provides governance, strategic
planning, and sponsorship for the organization’s cybersecurity activities in a manner that aligns
cybersecurity objectives with the organization’s strategic objectives and the risk to critical
infrastructure.
5.2 Maturity Indicator Levels
The model defines four maturity indicator levels, MIL0 through MIL3, which apply
independently to each domain in the model. The MILs define a dual progression of maturity: an
approach progression and an institutionalization progression, which are explained in the
following sections.

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Four aspects of the MILs are important for understanding and applying the model:
1. The maturity indicator levels apply independently to each domain. As a result, an
organization using the model may be operating at different MIL ratings for different
domains. For example, an organization could be operating at MIL1 in one domain, MIL2 in
another domain, and MIL3 in a third domain.
2. The MILs are cumulative within each domain; to earn a MIL in a given domain, an
organization must perform all of the practices in that level and its predecessor level(s). For
example, an organization must perform all of the domain practices in MIL1 and MIL2 to
achieve MIL2 in the domain. Similarly, the organization would have to perform all practices
in MIL1, MIL2, and MIL3 to achieve MIL3.
3. Establishing a target MIL for each domain is an effective strategy for using the model to
guide cybersecurity program improvement. Organizations should become familiar with the
practices in the model prior to determining target MILs. Gap analysis activities and
improvement efforts should then focus on achieving those target levels.
4. Practice performance and MIL achievement need to align with business objectives and the
organization’s cybersecurity strategy. Striving to achieve the highest MIL in all domains may
not be optimal. Companies should evaluate the costs of achieving a specific MIL against
potential benefits. However, the model was developed so that all companies, regardless of
size, should be able to achieve MIL1 across all domains.
5.2.1 Approach Progression
The domain-specific objectives and practices describe the progression of the approach to
cybersecurity for each domain in the model. Approach refers to the completeness,
thoroughness, or level of development of an activity in a domain. As an organization progresses
from one MIL to the next, it will have more complete or more advanced implementations of the
core activities in the domain. At MIL1, while only the initial set of practices for a domain is
expected, an organization is not precluded from performing additional practices at higher MILs.
Table 1 provides an example of the approach progression in the Cyber Program Management
domain. At MIL1, a cybersecurity program strategy exists in any form. MIL2 adds more
requirements to the strategy, including the need for defined objectives, alignment with the
overall organization’s strategy, and approval of senior management. Finally, in addition to
requiring performance of all MIL1 and MIL2 practices, MIL3 warrants that the strategy be
updated to reflect business changes, changes in the operating environment, and changes to the
threat profile (developed in the Threat and Vulnerability Management domain).

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Table 1: Example of Approach Progression in the
Cyber Program Management Domain
MIL0
MIL1 a. The organization has a cybersecurity program strategy
MIL2 b. The cybersecurity program strategy defines objectives for the organization’s cybersecurity activities
c. The cybersecurity program strategy and priorities are documented and aligned with the
organization’s strategic objectives and risk to critical infrastructure
d. The cybersecurity program strategy defines the organization’s approach to provide program
oversight and governance for cybersecurity activities
e. The cybersecurity program strategy defines the structure and organization of the cybersecurity program
f. The cybersecurity program strategy is approved by senior management
MIL3 g. The cybersecurity program strategy is updated to reflect business changes, changes in the operating
environment, and changes in the threat profile (TVM-1d)
5.2.2 Institutionalization Progression
Institutionalization describes the extent to which a practice or activity is ingrained in an
organization’s operations. The more deeply ingrained an activity, the more likely it is that the
organization will continue to perform the practice over time, the practice will be retained
under times of stress, and the outcomes of the practice will be consistent, repeatable, and of
high quality.
The progression of institutionalization is described by a set of practices that can be performed
to institutionalize the domain-specific practices. These practices are similar across domains and
are called the Management Objective and Practices. The progression of the practices within a
domain-specific objective corresponds to the progression of the management practices, though
not necessarily practice to practice. Table 2 shows an example mapping of the management
practices to the practices in the second objective of the Risk Management domain.

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Table 2: Mapping of Management Practices to Domain-Specific Practices
2 Manage Cybersecurity Risk Management Practices
MIL0
MIL1 a. Cybersecurity risks are identified
b. Identified risks are mitigated, accepted, tolerated,
or transferred
1. Initial practices are performed but may be
ad hoc
MIL2 c. Risk assessments are performed to identify risks
in accordance with the risk management strategy
d. Identified risks are documented
e. Identified risks are analyzed to prioritize response
activities in accordance with the risk management
strategy
f. Identified risks are monitored in accordance with
the risk management strategy
g. Risk analysis is supported by network (IT and/or
OT) architecture
1. Practices are documented
2. Stakeholders of the practice are identified
and involved
3. Adequate resources are provided to
support the process (people, funding,
and tools)
4. Standards and/or guidelines have been
identified to guide the implementation of
the practices
MIL3 h. The risk management program defines and
operates risk management policies and
procedures that implement the risk management
strategy
i. A current cybersecurity architecture is used to
support risk analysis
j. A risk register (a structured repository of
identified risks) is used to support risk
management
1. Activities are guided by policies (or other
organizational directives) and
governance
2. Policies include compliance requirements
for specified standards and/or guidelines
3. Activities are periodically reviewed to
ensure they conform to policy
4. Responsibility and authority for
performing the practices are assigned to
personnel
5. Personnel performing the practices have
adequate skills and knowledge
A description of the management practices of each MIL can be found in the list below.
Maturity Indicator Level 0 (MIL0)
The model contains no practices for MIL0. Performance at MIL0 simply means that MIL1 in a
given domain has not been achieved.
In each domain, MIL1 contains a set of initial practices. To achieve MIL1, these initial activities
may be performed in an ad hoc manner, but they must be performed. If an organization were
to start with no capability in managing cybersecurity, it should focus initially on implementing
the MIL1 practices.
MIL1 is characterized by a single management practice:
1. Initial practices are performed but may be ad hoc. In the context of this model, ad hoc (i.e.,
an ad hoc practice) refers to performing a practice in a manner that depends largely on the

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initiative and experience of an individual or team (and team leadership), without much in
the way of organizational guidance in the form of a prescribed plan (verbal or written),
policy, or training.
The quality of an outcome may vary significantly depending on who performs the practice,
when it is performed, and the context of the problem being addressed, the methods, tools,
and techniques used, and the priority given a particular instance of the practice. With
experienced and talented personnel, high-quality outcomes may be achieved even if
practices are ad hoc. However, at this MIL, lessons learned are typically not captured at the
organizational level, so approaches and outcomes are difficult to repeat or improve across
the organization.
Four management practices are present at MIL2, which represent an initial level of
institutionalization of the activities within a domain:
1. Practices are documented. The practices in the domain are being performed according to a
documented plan. The focus here should be on planning to ensure that the practices are
intentionally designed (or selected) to serve the organization.
2. Stakeholders of the practice are identified and involved. Stakeholders of practices are
identified and involved in the performance of the practices. This could include stakeholders
from within the function, from across the organization, or from outside the organization,
depending on how the organization implemented the practice.
3. Adequate resources are provided to support the process (people, funding, and tools).
Adequate resources are provided in the form of people, funding, and tools to ensure that
the practices can be performed as intended. The performance of this practice can be
evaluated by determining whether any desired practices have not been implemented due
to a shortage of resources. If all desired practices have been implemented as intended by
the organization, then adequate resources have been provided.
4. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to guide the implementation of the
practices. The organization identified some standards and/or guidelines to inform the
implementation of practices in the domain. These may simply be the reference sources the
organization consulted when developing the plan for performing the practices.
Overall, the practices at MIL2 are more complete than at MIL1 and are no longer performed
irregularly or are not ad hoc in their implementation. As a result, the organization’s
performance of the practices is more stable. At MIL2, the organization can be more confident
that the performance of the domain practices will be sustained over time.
At MIL3, the activities in a domain have been further institutionalized and are now being
managed. Five management practices support this progression:

17
1. Activities are guided by policies (or other organizational directives) and governance.
Managed activities in a domain receive guidance from the organization in the form of
organizational direction, as in policies and governance. Policies are an extension of the
planning activities that are in place at MIL2.
2. Policies include compliance requirements for specified standards and/or guidelines.
3. Activities are periodically reviewed to ensure they conform to policy.
4. Responsibility and authority for performing the practices are assigned to personnel.
5. Personnel performing the practices have adequate skills and knowledge. The personnel
assigned to perform the activities have adequate domain-specific skills and knowledge to
perform their assignments.
At MIL3, the practices in a domain are further stabilized and are guided by high-level
organizational directives, such as policy. As a result, the organization should have additional
confidence in its ability to sustain the performance of the practices over time and across the
organization.
5.2.3 Summary of MIL Characteristics
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of each MIL. At MIL2 and MIL3, the characteristic
associated with the approach progression is distinguished from the characteristics associated
with the institutionalization progression.
Table 3: Summary of Maturity Indicator Level Characteristics
Level Characteristics
MIL0 • Practices are not performed
MIL1 • Initial practices are performed but may be ad hoc
MIL2 Institutionalization characteristics:
• Practices are documented
• Stakeholders are identified and involved
• Adequate resources are provided to support the process
• Standards or guidelines are used to guide practice implementation
Approach characteristic:
• Practices are more complete or advanced than at MIL1
MIL3 Institutionalization characteristics:
• Activities are guided by policy (or other directives) and governance
• Policies include compliance requirements for specified standards or guidelines
• Activities are periodically reviewed for conformance to policy
• Responsibility and authority for practices are assigned to personnel
• Personnel performing the practice have adequate skills and knowledge
Approach characteristic:
• Practices are more complete or advanced than at MIL2

18
5.3 Practice Reference Notation
A number of practices within the domains are connected to other model practices. When this
occurs, the connecting practice is referenced using a notation that begins with the domain
abbreviation, a hyphen, the objective number, and the practice letter. Figure 5 shows an
example from the Risk Management domain: the domain’s first practice, “There is a
documented cybersecurity risk management strategy,” would be referenced elsewhere in the
model using the notation “RM-1a.”
Example: RM-1a
Domain Abbreviation-Objective Number Practice Letter
1. Establish Cybersecurity Risk Management Strategy
MIL1 No practice at MIL1
MIL2 a. There is a documented cybersecurity risk management strategy
b. The strategy provides an approach for risk prioritization, including consideration of impact
MIL3 c. Organizational risk criteria tolerance for risk, and risk response approaches) are defined
d. The risk management strategy is periodically updated to reflect the current threat
environment
e. An organization-specific risk taxonomy is documented and is used in risk management
activities
Figure 5: Referencing an Individual Practice, Example: RM-1a

Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 USING THE MODEL
19
6. USING THE MODEL
The ES-C2M2 is meant to be used by an organization to evaluate its cybersecurity capabilities
consistently, to communicate its capability levels in meaningful terms, and to inform the
prioritization of its cybersecurity investments. Figure 6 summarizes the recommended
approach for using the model. An organization performs an evaluation against the model, uses
that evaluation to identify gaps in capability, prioritizes those gaps and develops plans to
address them, and finally implements plans to address the gaps. As plans are implemented,
business objectives change, and the risk environment evolves, the process is repeated. The
following sections discuss the preparation activities required to begin using the model in an
organization and provide additional details on the activities in each step of this approach.
Figure 6: Recommended Approach for Using the Model
6.1 Prepare To Use the Model
A design goal of the model was to enable organizations to complete a self-evaluation for a
single function in less than one day without extensive study or preparation. This goal is
achieved in part because the model is supported by an evaluation survey and scoring
mechanism and the evaluation survey itself is performed in a workshop setting, led by a
facilitator who is familiar with the model content. An important component of successfully
completing the self-evaluation in one day is the selection of an effective facilitator. Generally
speaking, a ES-C2M2 facilitator is not only someone who is familiar with the model and its
supporting artifacts but also someone who is effective at helping a group of people understand
their common objectives and assisting them in planning to achieve these objectives without
taking a particular position in the discussion.

20
In addition to helping to execute the self-evaluation and interpret the results, the facilitator
helps the organization establish a scope for the model application. Though the ES-C2M2 and its
supporting survey apply to an entire organization, the self-evaluation survey is typically applied
to a single function to maintain focus. Recall that the term function refers to the subset of the
operations of the organization that is being evaluated. The facilitator must work with the
organization to determine the survey scope—the part of the organization’s operations to which
the model and survey will be applied and the organizations supporting IT and OT. Selecting and
documenting the scope before completing the survey ensures that users of the survey results
understand to which part of the organization the results apply.
More thorough guidance on using the model, selecting a facilitator, and scoping the evaluation
can be found in the supporting C2M2 Facilitator Guide.7
6.2 Perform an Evaluation
The organization should select the appropriate personnel to evaluate the function in scope
against the model practices. Participation by a broad representation across the parts of the
organization being evaluated yields the best results and enables internal information sharing
about the model practices. Personnel selected to participate in the evaluation should include
operational personnel, management stakeholders, and any others who could provide useful
information on the organization’s performance of cybersecurity practices in the model.
Upon completion of the evaluation, a scoring report is generated that shows maturity indicator
level results for each domain. This report provides a picture of the current state of practices
relative to the model for the unit evaluated. The report should be reviewed with the evaluation
workshop participants, and any discrepancies or questions should be addressed.
6.3 Analyze Identified Gaps
The scoring report from the evaluation will identify gaps in the performance of model practices.
The first analysis step for the organization is to determine whether these gaps are meaningful
and important for the organization to address.
It is not typically optimal for an organization to strive to achieve the highest MIL in all domains.
Rather, the organization should determine the level of practice performance and MIL
achievement for each domain that best enables it to meet its business objectives and
cybersecurity strategy. The organization should identify its desired capability profile—a target
MIL rating for each domain in the model. This collection of desired capabilities is the
organization’s target profile.
For organizations using the model for the first time, a target capability profile is typically
identified after the initial evaluation. This gives the organization an opportunity to develop
more familiarity with the model. Organizations that have more experience with the model have
often identified a target capability profile before undergoing an evaluation. The appropriate
organizational stakeholders should select the desired profile. This might be a single individual
7
The C2M2 Facilitator Guide may be downloaded from http://energy.gov/node/795826.

21
with expertise in the function’s operations and management, but it is likely to be a collection of
individuals.
The desired profile can then be examined against the results from the evaluation workshop to
identify gaps that are important to the organization because they represent differences from
the desired capability profile.
6.4 Prioritize and Plan
After the gap analysis is complete, the organization should prioritize the actions needed to fully
implement the practices that enable achievement of the desired capability in specific domains.
The prioritization should be done using criteria such as how gaps affect organizational
objectives, the importance of the business objective supported by the domain, the cost of
implementing the necessary practices, and the availability of resources to implement the
practices. A cost-benefit analysis for gaps and activities can inform the prioritization of the
actions needed.
Next, a plan should be developed to address the selected gaps. These plans can span a period
of weeks, months, or years, depending on the extent of improvements needed to close the
selected gaps and achieve the desired capability.
6.5 Implement Plans and Periodically Reevaluate
Plans developed in the previous step should be implemented to address the identified gaps.
Model evaluations are particularly useful in tracking implementations and should be conducted
periodically to ensure that desired progress is achieved. Reevaluations should also be
considered in response to major changes in the business, technology, market, or threat
environments to ensure that the current profile matches the organization’s desired state.

22
Table 4 presents a more detailed outline of the ES-C2M2 process as described in this chapter.
Table 4: Recommended Process for Using Evaluation Results
Inputs Activities Outputs
Perform
Evaluation
1. ES-C2M2 Self-Evaluation
2. Policies and procedures
3. Understanding of
cybersecurity program
1. Conduct ES-C2M2 Self-Evaluation
Workshop with appropriate attendees
ES-C2M2 Self-
Evaluation
Report
Analyze
Identified
Gaps
1. ES-C2M2 Self-Evaluation
Report
2. Organizational objectives
3. Impact to critical infrastructure
1. Analyze gaps in organization’s context
2. Evaluate potential consequences from
gaps
3. Determine which gaps need attention
List of gaps
and potential
consequences
Prioritize
and Plan
1. List of gaps and potential
consequences
2. Organizational constraints
1. Identify actions to address gaps
2. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on actions
3. Prioritize actions (CBA and
consequences)
4. Plan to implement prioritize actions
Prioritized
implementation
plan
Implement
Plans
1. Prioritized implementation
plan
1. Track progress to plan
2. Reevaluate periodically or in response
to major change
Project tracking
data

23
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 RISK MANAGEMENT
7. MODEL DOMAINS
7.1 Risk Management
Purpose: Establish, operate, and maintain an enterprise
cybersecurity risk management program to identify, analyze,
and mitigate cybersecurity risk to the organization, including its
business units, subsidiaries, related interconnected
infrastructure, and stakeholders.
Cybersecurity risk is defined as risk to organizational
operations (including mission, functions, image, and
reputation), resources, and other organizations due to the
potential for unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information, IT, and/or OT.
Cybersecurity risk is one component of the overall business risk
environment and feeds into an organization’s enterprise risk
management strategy and program. Cybersecurity risk cannot
be completely eliminated, but it can be managed through
informed decision-making processes.
The Risk Management (RM) domain comprises three
objectives:
2. Manage Cybersecurity Risk
3. Management Activities
A cybersecurity risk management strategy is a high-level
strategy that provides direction for analyzing and prioritizing
cybersecurity risk and defines risk tolerance. The cybersecurity
risk management strategy includes a risk assessment
methodology, risk monitoring strategy, and cybersecurity
governance program. This includes defining the enterprise risk
criteria (e.g., impact thresholds, risk response approaches) that
guide the cybersecurity program discussed in the Cybersecurity
Program Management domain later in this model. The
cybersecurity risk management strategy should align with the
enterprise risk management strategy to ensure that
cybersecurity risk is managed in a manner that is consistent
with the organization’s mission and business objectives.
Example: Risk Management
Anywhere Power has developed an
enterprise risk management strategy
that identifies its risk tolerance and
strategy for assessing, responding to,
and monitoring cybersecurity risks. The
board of directors reviews this strategy
annually to ensure that it remains
aligned with the strategic objectives of
the organization.
Within this program, risk tolerances,
including compliance risk and risk to the
delivery of essential services, are
identified and documented. Identified
risks are recorded in a risk register to
ensure that they are monitored and
responded to in a timely manner and to
identify trends.
Anywhere Power maintains a network
architecture diagram that identifies
critical assets and shows how they are
connected and which ones are exposed
to the Internet. Resources like Web
servers that take requests from the
Internet are considered at higher risk
than those that do not. Assets that
directly support ones with direct
exposure, like the database server
behind a Web server, are in the second
risk tier and so on. Anywhere Power
augments the risk assessment derived
from the network architecture with its
cybersecurity architecture. Since its
network diagram includes elements like
firewalls and intrusion detection devices,
an asset’s base risk is refined,
depending on how it is protected by
security controls.
Final risk for each asset is a combination
of the asset’s importance in delivering
essential services and its exposure,
based on the network and cybersecurity
architectures.

24
Managing cybersecurity risk involves framing, identifying and assessing, responding to
(accepting, avoiding, mitigating, transferring), and monitoring risks in a manner that aligns with
the needs of the organization. Key to performing these activities is an organization-wide
understanding of the cybersecurity risk management strategy discussed above. With defined
risk criteria, organizations can consistently respond to and monitor identified risks. A risk
register—a list of identified risks and associated attributes—facilitates this process. Other
domains in this model, including Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations, Threat
and Vulnerability Management, and Situational Awareness, refer to the risk register and
illustrate how the practices in the model are strengthened as they connect through a
cybersecurity risk management program. The DOE Risk Management Process Guidelines
document provides a flexible risk management process for framing, assessing, responding to,
and monitoring risk across all levels of an organization.
Objectives and Practices
MIL2 a. There is a documented cybersecurity risk management strategy
b. The strategy provides an approach for risk prioritization, including consideration of impact
MIL3 c. Organizational risk criteria (objective criteria that the organization uses for evaluating, categorizing,
and prioritizing operational risks based on impact, tolerance for risk, and risk response
approaches) are defined and available
d. The risk management strategy is periodically updated to reflect the current threat environment
e. An organization-specific risk taxonomy is documented and is used in risk management activities
2. Manage Cybersecurity Risk
MIL1 a. Cybersecurity risks are identified
b. Identified risks are mitigated, accepted, tolerated, or transferred
MIL2 c. Risk assessments are performed to identify risks in accordance with the risk management strategy
d. Identified risks are documented
e. Identified risks are analyzed to prioritize response activities in accordance with the risk
management strategy
f. Identified risks are monitored in accordance with the risk management strategy
g. Risk analysis is informed by network (IT and/or OT) architecture
MIL3 h. The risk management program defines and operates risk management policies and procedures
that implement the risk management strategy
i. A current cybersecurity architecture is used to inform risk analysis
j. A risk register (a structured repository of identified risks) is used to support risk management
activities

25
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for risk management activities
b. Stakeholders for risk management activities are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support risk management activities
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform risk management activities
MIL3 e. Risk management activities are guided by documented policies or other organizational directives
f. Risk management policies include compliance requirements for specified standards and/or
guidelines
g. Risk management activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of risk management activities are assigned to
personnel
i. Personnel performing risk management activities have the skills and knowledge needed to perform
their assigned responsibilities

26
ASSET, CHANGE, AND
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
7.2 Asset, Change, and Configuration Management
Purpose: Manage the organization’s IT and OT assets, including
both hardware and software, commensurate with the risk to
critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
An asset is something of value to an organization. For the
purposes of this model, assets to be considered are IT and OT
hardware and software assets, as well as information essential
to operating the function.
The Asset, Change, and Configuration Management (ACM)
domain comprises four objectives:
1. Manage Asset Inventory
2. Manage Asset Configuration
3. Manage Changes to Assets
An inventory of assets important to the delivery of the function
is an important resource in managing cybersecurity risk.
Recording important information, such as software version,
physical location, asset owner, and priority, enables many
other cybersecurity management activities. For example, a
robust asset inventory can identify the deployment location of
software that requires patching.
Managing asset configuration involves defining a configuration
baseline for IT and OT assets and ensuring that assets are
configured according to the baseline. Most commonly, this
practice applies to ensuring that similar assets are configured
in the same way. However, in cases where assets are either
unique or must have individual configurations, managing asset
configuration involves controlling the configuration baseline of
the asset when it is deployed for operation and ensuring that
the asset remains configured according to the baseline.
Managing changes to assets includes analyzing requested changes to ensure they do not
introduce unacceptable vulnerabilities into the operating environment, ensuring all changes
follow the change management process, and identifying unauthorized changes. Change control
applies to the entire asset life cycle, including requirements definition, testing, deployment and
maintenance, and retirement from operation.
Example: Asset Change and
Configuration Management
Anywhere Power has an asset
database. Within that database,
technology assets are identified and
prioritized based on importance to the
generation function. The database
includes attributes that support
cybersecurity operations, such as
hardware and software versions,
physical location, security requirements
(business needs for the asset’s
confidentiality, integrity, and
availability), asset owner, and version
of applied configuration baseline.
Anywhere Power uses this information
for cybersecurity risk management
activities, including identifying which
systems may be affected by software
vulnerabilities, prioritizing cybersecurity
incident response, and planning
disaster recovery.
To maintain change traceability and
consistency, Anywhere Power’s change
management activities ensure that the
asset database remains current as
configurations change. All important
decisions about assets are
communicated to stakeholders,
including the asset owner, so that
potential impacts to the function are
efficiently managed.

27
ASSET, CHANGE, AND
1. Manage Asset Inventory
MIL1 a. There is an inventory of OT and IT assets that are important to the delivery of the function
b. There is an inventory of information assets that are important to the delivery of the function (e.g.,
SCADA set points, customer information, financial data)
MIL2 c. Inventory attributes include information to support the cybersecurity strategy (e.g., location, asset
owner, applicable security requirements, service dependencies, service level agreements, and
conformance of assets to relevant industry standards)
d. Inventoried assets are prioritized based on their importance to the delivery of the function
MIL3 e. There is an inventory for all connected IT and OT assets related to the delivery of the function
f. The asset inventory is current (as defined by the organization)
2. Manage Asset Configuration
MIL1 a. Configuration baselines are established for inventoried assets where it is desirable to ensure that
multiple assets are configured similarly
b. Configuration baselines are used to configure assets at deployment
MIL2 c. The design of configuration baselines includes cybersecurity objectives
MIL3 d. Configuration of assets are monitored for consistency with baselines throughout the assets’ life cycle
e. Configuration baselines are reviewed and updated at an organizationally-defined frequency
3. Manage Changes to Assets
MIL1 a. Changes to inventoried assets are evaluated before being implemented
b. Changes to inventoried assets are logged
MIL2 c. Changes to assets are tested prior to being deployed, whenever possible
d. Change management practices address the full life cycle of assets (i.e., acquisition, deployment,
operation, retirement)
MIL3 e. Changes to assets are tested for cybersecurity impact prior to being deployed
f. Change logs include information about modifications that impact the cybersecurity requirements of
assets (availability, integrity, confidentiality)

28
ASSET, CHANGE, AND
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for asset inventory, configuration, and change management
activities
b. Stakeholders for asset inventory, configuration, and change management activities are identified
and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support asset inventory,
configuration, and change management activities
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform asset inventory, configuration, and
change management activities
MIL3 e. Asset inventory, configuration, and change management activities are guided by documented
policies or other organizational directives
f. Asset inventory, configuration, and change management policies include compliance requirements
for specified standards and/or guidelines
g. Asset inventory, configuration, and change management activities are periodically reviewed to
ensure conformance with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of asset inventory, configuration, and change
management activities are assigned to personnel
i. Personnel performing asset inventory, configuration, and change management activities have the
skills and knowledge needed to perform their assigned responsibilities

29
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT
7.3 Identity and Access Management
Purpose: Create and manage identities for entities that may
be granted logical or physical access to the organization’s
assets. Control access to the organization’s assets,
commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and
organizational objectives.
For the purposes of this domain, access control applies to
logical access to assets used in the delivery of the function,
physical access to cyber assets relevant to the function, and
automated access control systems (logical or physical)
relevant to the function. Improper access management
practices can lead to unauthorized use, disclosure,
destruction, or modification, as well as unnecessary
exposure to cybersecurity risks.
The Identity and Access Management (IAM) domain
comprises three objectives:
1. Establish and Maintain Identities
2. Control Access
Establishing and maintaining identities begins with the
provisioning and deprovisioning (removing available identities
when they are no longer required) of identities to entities.
Entities may include individuals (internal or external to the
organization) as well as devices, systems, or processes that
require access to assets. In some cases, utilities may need to
use shared identities. Management of shared identities may
require compensatory measures to ensure an appropriate
level of security. Maintenance of identities includes
traceability (ensuring that all known identities are valid) as
well as deprovisioning.
Controlling access includes determining access requirements, granting access to assets based
on those requirements, and revoking access when it is no longer required. Access requirements
are associated with assets and provide guidance for which types of entities are allowed to
access the asset, the limits of allowed access, and authentication parameters. For example, the
access requirements for a specific asset might allow remote access by a vendor only during
specified and preplanned maintenance intervals, and might also require multifactor
authentication for such access. At higher maturity indicator levels, more scrutiny is applied to
the access being granted. Access is granted only after considering risk to the function, and
regular reviews of access are conducted.
Example: Identity and Access
Management
Anywhere Power decides to upgrade
multiple identity and access
management systems to a system that
is capable of supporting multifactor
authentication. The utility believes that
reducing the number of IAM systems
that it manages will enable more
effective access management.
As Anywhere Power prepares to migrate
legacy systems to the new IAM system, it
discovers that some former employees
still have active accounts, some current
employees have more access than is
required for their role, and some
employees who have changed roles
within the organization still have active
accounts on systems to which they no
longer require access.
Anywhere Power updates its identity
management processes to include
coordination with the organization’s
human resources processes to help
ensure that whenever a user changes
roles or leaves the organization, his or
her access will be reviewed and
updated appropriately.
Anywhere Power also institutes a
quarterly review to ensure that access
granted to the utility’s assets aligns with
access requirements.

30
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT
1. Establish and Maintain Identities
MIL1 a. Identities are provisioned for personnel and other entities (e.g., services, devices) who require access
to assets (note that this does not preclude shared identities)
b. Credentials are issued for personnel and other entities that require access to assets (e.g., passwords,
smart cards, certificates, keys)
c. Identities are deprovisioned when no longer required
MIL2 d. Identity repositories are periodically reviewed and updated to ensure validity (i.e., to ensure that the
identities still need access)
e. Credentials are periodically reviewed to ensure that they are associated with the correct person or entity
f. Identities are deprovisioned within organizationally defined time thresholds when no longer required
MIL3 g. Requirements for credentials are informed by the organization’s risk criteria (e.g., multifactor
credentials for higher risk access) (RM-1c)
2. Control Access
MIL1 a. Access requirements, including those for remote access, are determined (access requirements are
associated with assets and provide guidance for which types of entities are allowed to access the
asset, the limits of allowed access, and authentication parameters)
b. Access is granted to identities based on requirements
c. Access is revoked when no longer required
MIL2 d. Access requirements incorporate least privilege and separation of duties principles
e. Access requests are reviewed and approved by the asset owner
f. Root privileges, administrative access, emergency access, and shared accounts receive additional
scrutiny and monitoring
MIL3 g. Access privileges are reviewed and updated to ensure validity, at an organizationally defined frequency
h. Access to assets is granted by the asset owner based on risk to the function
i. Anomalous access attempts are monitored as indicators of cybersecurity events
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed to establish and maintain identities and control access
b. Stakeholders for access and identity management activities are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support access and identity
management activities
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform access and identity management activities
MIL3 e. Access and identity management activities are guided by documented policies or other organizational
directives
f. Access and identity management policies include compliance requirements for specified standards
and/or guidelines
g. Access and identity management activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of access and identity management activities are
assigned to personnel
i. Personnel performing access and identity management activities have the skills and knowledge needed
to perform their assigned responsibilities

31
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 THREAT AND VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT
7.4 Threat and Vulnerability Management
Purpose: Establish and maintain plans, procedures, and
technologies to detect, identify, analyze, manage, and
respond to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities,
commensurate with the risk to the organization’s
infrastructure (e.g., critical, IT, operational) and
A cybersecurity threat is defined as any circumstance or
event with the potential to adversely impact organizational
operations (including mission, functions, image, or
reputation), resources, and other organizations through IT,
OT, or communications infrastructure via unauthorized
access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information,
and/or denial of service. Threats to IT, OT, and
communication infrastructure assets vary and may include
malicious actors, malware (e.g., viruses and worms),
accidents, and weather emergencies.
A cybersecurity vulnerability is a weakness or flaw in IT, OT,
communications systems or devices, procedures, or internal
controls that could be exploited by a threat.
The Threat and Vulnerability Management (TVM) domain
comprises three objectives:
1. Identify and Respond to Threats
2. Reduce Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
Threat identification and response begins with collecting
useful threat information from reliable sources, interpreting that information in the context of
the organization and function, and responding to threats that have the means, motive, and
opportunity to affect the delivery of functions. A threat profile includes characterization of
likely intent, capability, and target of threats to the function. The threat profile can be used to
guide the identification of specific threats, the risk analysis process described in the Risk
Management domain, and the building of the COP described in the Situational Awareness
domain.
Reducing cybersecurity vulnerabilities begins with collecting and analyzing vulnerability
information. Vulnerability discovery may be performed using automatic scanning tools, network
penetration tests, cybersecurity exercises, and audits. Vulnerability analysis should consider the
vulnerability’s local impact (the potential effect of the vulnerability on the exposed asset) as
well as the importance of the exposed asset to the delivery of the function. Vulnerabilities may
Example: Threat and Vulnerability
Management
Anywhere Power has examined the types
of threats that it normally responds to,
including malicious software, denial-of-
service attacks, and activist cyber-attack
groups. This information has been used to
develop Anywhere Power’s documented
threat profile.
Anywhere Power identified reliable sources
of information to enable rapid threat
identification and is able to consume and
analyze published threat information from
sources such as the electricity sector
information sharing and analysis center (ES-
ISAC) and the Industrial Control Systems
Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-
CERT) and begin an effective response.
When reducing cybersecurity
vulnerabilities, Anywhere Power uses the
Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams (FIRST) Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) to better identify
the potential impacts of known software
vulnerabilities. This allows the organization
to prioritize reduction activities according to
the importance of the vulnerabilities.

32
be addressed by implementing mitigating controls, monitoring threat status, applying
cybersecurity patches, or through other activities.
1. Identify and Respond to Threats
MIL1 a. Information sources to support threat management activities are identified (e.g., ES-ISAC, ICS-
CERT, US-CERT, industry associates, vendors, federal briefings)
b. Cybersecurity threat information is gathered and interpreted for the function
c. Threats that are considered important to the function are addressed (e.g., implement mitigating
controls, monitor threat status)
MIL2 d. A threat profile for the function is established that includes characterization of likely intent, capability,
and target of threats to the function
e. Threat information sources that address all components of the threat profile are prioritized and
monitored
f. Identified threats are analyzed and prioritized
g. Threats are addressed according to the assigned priority
MIL3 h. The threat profile for the function is validated at an organization-defined frequency
i. Analysis and prioritization of threats are informed by the function’s (or organization’s) risk criteria
(RM-1c)
j. Threat information is added to the risk register (RM-2j)
2. Reduce Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
MIL1 a. Information sources to support cybersecurity vulnerability discovery are identified (e.g., ES-ISAC,
ICS-CERT, US-CERT, industry associations, vendors, federal briefings, internal assessments)
b. Cybersecurity vulnerability information is gathered and interpreted for the function
c. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are considered important to the function are addressed (e.g.,
implement mitigating controls, apply cybersecurity patches)
MIL2 d. Cybersecurity vulnerability information sources that address all assets important to the function are
monitored
e. Cybersecurity vulnerability assessments are performed (e.g., architectural reviews, penetration
testing, cybersecurity exercises, vulnerability identification tools)
f. Identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities are analyzed and prioritized (e.g., NIST Common Vulnerability
Scoring System could be used for patches; internal guidelines could be used to prioritize other types
of vulnerabilities)
g. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities are addressed according to the assigned priority
h. Operational impact to the function is evaluated prior to deploying cybersecurity patches

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2. Reduce Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities (cont.)
MIL3 i. Cybersecurity vulnerability assessments are performed for all assets important to the delivery of the
function, at an organization-defined frequency
j. Cybersecurity vulnerability assessments are informed by the function’s (or organization’s) risk
criteria (RM-1c)
k. Cybersecurity vulnerability assessments are performed by parties that are independent of the
operations of the function
l. Analysis and prioritization of cybersecurity vulnerabilities are informed by the function’s (or
organization’s) risk criteria (RM-1c)
m. Cybersecurity vulnerability information is added to the risk register (RM-2j)
n. Risk monitoring activities validate the responses to cybersecurity vulnerabilities (e.g., deployment of
patches or other activities)
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for threat and vulnerability management activities
b. Stakeholders for threat and vulnerability management activities are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support threat and vulnerability
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform threat and vulnerability management
activities
MIL3 e. Threat and vulnerability activities are guided by documented policies or other organizational
directives
f. Threat and vulnerability management policies include compliance requirements for specified
standards and/or guidelines
g. Threat and vulnerability management activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance
with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of threat and vulnerability management activities
are assigned to personnel
i. Personnel performing threat and vulnerability management activities have the skills and knowledge
needed to perform their assigned responsibilities

34
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
7.5 Situational Awareness
Purpose: Establish and maintain activities and technologies to
collect, analyze, alarm, present, and use power system and
cybersecurity information, including status and summary
information from the other model domains to form a COP,
commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and
Situational awareness involves developing near real-time
knowledge of a dynamic operating environment. In part, this is
accomplished through the logging and monitoring of IT, OT,
and communication infrastructure assets essential for the
delivery of the function. It is equally important to maintain
knowledge of relevant, current cybersecurity events external
to the enterprise. Once an organization develops a COP, it can
align predefined states of operation to changes in the
operating environment. Rapid shifts among predetermined
emergency operations can enable faster and more effective
response to cybersecurity events.
The Situational Awareness (SA) domain comprises four
objectives:
1. Perform Logging
2. Perform Monitoring
3. Establish and Maintain a Common Operating Picture
Logging should be enabled, based on the assets’ potential
impact to the function. For example, the greater the potential
impact of a compromised asset, the more data an organization
might collect about the asset.
The condition of assets, as discovered through monitoring,
contributes to an operating picture. Effectively communicating
the operating picture to relevant decision makers is the
essence of a COP. While many implementations of a COP may
include visualization tools (e.g., dashboards, maps, and other
graphical displays), they are not necessarily required to achieve
the goal. Organizations may use other methods to share a
function’s current state of cybersecurity.
Example: Situational Awareness
Anywhere Power identified the assets
that are essential to the delivery of the
organization’s functions. Additionally,
the personnel monitor a number of
resources that provide reliable
cybersecurity information, including their
vendors, ES-ISAC and US-CERT.
Further, they determined that indicators
of an emerging threat often reside in
different parts of the organization.
Building security tracks visitors, the
helpdesk responds to strange laptop
behavior, shipping knows about
packages, and the security team
monitors network events and external
sources. Each day, the security team
gathers information from other
departments, adds their own data, and
produces a COP for the rest of the
organization. The COP summarizes the
current state of operations, using a
color-coded scale, and is posted on the
wall of the control room as well as on
the corporate intranet site.
When the COP suggests a need for
heighted security, visitors are screened
more carefully, the Helpdesk conducts
malware scans on misbehaving laptops,
and HR sends out reminders about
phishing. Senior management reviews
the COP and is prepared should
extraordinary action—like shutting down
the Web site—be required. At the
highest state of alert, they change
firewall rule sets to restrict non-essential
protocols like video conferencing, delay
all but emergency change requests, and
put the cybersecurity incident response
team on standby.

35
1. Perform Logging
MIL1 a. Logging is occurring for assets important to the function where possible
MIL2 b. Logging requirements have been defined for all assets important to the function (e.g., scope of
activity and coverage of assets, cybersecurity requirements [confidentiality, integrity, availability])
c. Log data are being aggregated within the function
MIL3 d. Logging requirements are based on the risk to the function
e. Log data support other business and security processes (e.g., incident response, asset management)
2. Perform Monitoring
MIL1 a. Cybersecurity monitoring activities are performed (e.g., periodic reviews of log data)
b. Operational environments are monitored for anomalous behavior that may indicate a cybersecurity
event
MIL2 c. Monitoring and analysis requirements have been defined for the function and address timely review
of event data
d. Alarms and alerts are configured to aid in the identification of cybersecurity events (IR-1b)
e. Indicators of anomalous activity have been defined and are monitored across the operational
environment
f. Monitoring activities are aligned with the function’s threat profile (TVM-1d)
MIL3 g. Monitoring requirements are based on the risk to the function
h. Monitoring is integrated with other business and security processes (e.g., incident response, asset
management)
i. Continuous monitoring is performed across the operational environment to identify anomalous activity
j. Risk register (RM-2j) content is used to identify indicators of anomalous activity
k. Alarms and alerts are configured according to indicators of anomalous activity
3. Establish and Maintain a Common Operating Picture (COP)
MIL2 a. Methods of communicating the current state of cybersecurity for the function are established and
maintained
b. Monitoring data are aggregated to provide an understanding of the operational state of the function
(i.e., a common operating picture; a COP may or may not include visualization or be presented
graphically)
c. Information from across the organization is available to enhance the common operating picture
MIL3 d. Monitoring data are aggregated to provide near-real-time understanding of the cybersecurity state
for the function to enhance the common operating picture
e. Information from outside the organization is collected to enhance the common operating picture
f. Predefined states of operation are defined and invoked (manual or automated process) based on
the common operating picture

36
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for logging, monitoring, and COP activities
b. Stakeholders for logging, monitoring, and COP activities are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support logging, monitoring, and
COP activities
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform logging, monitoring, and COP activities
MIL3 e. Logging, monitoring, and COP activities are guided by documented policies or other organizational
directives
f. Logging, monitoring, and COP policies include compliance requirements for specified standards
and/or guidelines
g. Logging, monitoring, and COP activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of logging, monitoring, and COP activities are
assigned to personnel
i. Personnel performing logging, monitoring, and COP activities have the skills and knowledge needed
to perform their assigned responsibilities

37
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 INFORMATION SHARING
AND COMMUNICATIONS
7.6 Information Sharing and Communications
Purpose: Establish and maintain relationships with internal and
external entities to collect and provide cybersecurity
information, including threats and vulnerabilities, to reduce
risks and to increase operational resilience, commensurate with
the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
The objective of information sharing is to strengthen
cybersecurity by establishing and maintaining a framework for
interaction among utilities, as well as between utilities and the
government.
The Information Sharing and Communications (ISC) domain
comprises two objectives:
1. Share Cybersecurity Information
Sharing cybersecurity information begins with gathering
cybersecurity information relevant to the function. This
information is available from many sources, including vendors,
government entities, and peers. Secure sharing of different
types of risk-related information is essential to the well-being
of individual organizations and the subsector. As threats are
responded to and vulnerabilities are discovered, utilities should
ensure that relevant data is effectively and appropriately
shared so that peers may also reduce their risk and improve
grid resilience. Forums such as the ES-ISAC can facilitate this
sharing.
Example: Information Sharing and
Communications
Anywhere Power worked with its
regional entity, its regional transmission
organization, and trade groups to find
and maintain informal connections with
other utilities. This worked sufficiently
well for a variety of issues without
critical deadlines. However, new
security and cyber-related issues with
critical deadlines have strained this
informal method of sharing and
communications.
Recognizing the need for more
significant relationships, the utility
decided to formalize ties to industry
groups that will inform it of news and
issues; engage with vendors with
whom they have significant investment;
and participate with regional, State,
and government organizations that
advance thought leadership and
practical guidance.
As part of this effort, Anywhere Power
partners with others to establish a
secure, confidential, information-
sharing environment that enables
utilities to share cybersecurity
information without attribution. Within
this environment, utilities are free to
disclose cybersecurity information as
well as share technical expertise to
overcome cybersecurity challenges.

38
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 INFORMATION SHARING
AND COMMUNICATIONS
1. Share Cybersecurity Information
MIL1 a. Information is collected from and provided to selected individuals and/or organizations
b. Responsibility for cybersecurity reporting obligations are assigned to personnel (e.g., internal
reporting, DOE Form OE-417, ES-ISAC, ICS-CERT, law enforcement)
MIL2 c. Information-sharing stakeholders are identified based on their relevance to the continued operation of
the function (e.g., connected utilities, vendors, sector organizations, regulators, internal entities)
d. Information is collected from and provided to identified information-sharing stakeholders
e. Technical sources are identified that can be consulted on cybersecurity issues
f. Provisions are established and maintained to enable secure sharing of sensitive or classified information
g. Information-sharing practices address both standard operations and emergency operations
MIL3 h. Information-sharing stakeholders are identified based on shared interest in and risk to critical
infrastructure
i. The function or the organization participates with information sharing and analysis centers
j. Information-sharing requirements have been defined for the function and address timely
dissemination of cybersecurity information
k. Procedures are in place to analyze and de-conflict received information
l. A network of internal and external trust relationships (formal and/or informal) has been established to
vet and validate information about cyber events
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for information-sharing activities
b. Stakeholders for information-sharing activities are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support information-sharing activities
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform information-sharing activities
MIL3 e. Information-sharing activities are guided by documented policies or other organizational directives
f. Information-sharing policies include compliance requirements for specified standards and/or guidelines
g. Information-sharing activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of information-sharing activities are assigned to
personnel
i. Personnel performing information-sharing activities have the skills and knowledge needed to perform
their assigned responsibilities
j. Information-sharing policies address protected information and ethical use and sharing of
information, including sensitive and classified information as appropriate

39
EVENT AND INCIDENT RESPONSE,
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
7.7 Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations
Purpose: Establish and maintain plans, procedures, and
technologies to detect, analyze, and respond to cybersecurity
events and to sustain operations throughout a cybersecurity
event, commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and
A cybersecurity event in a system or network is any observable
occurrence that is related to a cybersecurity requirement
(confidentiality, integrity, or availability of assets). A
cybersecurity incident is an event or series of events that
significantly affects or could significantly affect critical
infrastructure and/or organizational assets and services and
that requires the organization (and possibly other
stakeholders) to respond in some way to prevent or limit
adverse impacts.
The Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations (IR)
domain comprises five objectives:
1. Detect Cybersecurity Events
2. Escalate Cybersecurity Events and Declare Incidents
3. Respond to Incidents and Escalated Cybersecurity Events
4. Plan for Continuity
Detecting cybersecurity events includes designating a forum for reporting events and
establishing criteria for event prioritization. These criteria should align with the cybersecurity
risk management strategy discussed in the Risk Management domain, ensure consistent
valuation of events, and provide a structure to differentiate between cybersecurity events and
cybersecurity incidents.
Escalating cybersecurity events involves applying the criteria discussed in the Detect
Cybersecurity Events objective and identifying when cybersecurity events need to be managed
according to a response plan. These escalated cybersecurity events, including incidents, may
trigger external obligations, including reporting to regulatory bodies or notifying customers.
Correlating multiple cybersecurity events and incidents and other records may uncover
systemic problems within the environment.
Responding to escalated cybersecurity events requires the organization to have a process to
limit the impact of cybersecurity events to subsector functions. The process should describe
how the organization manages all phases of the incident life cycle (e.g., triage, handling,
communication, coordination, and closure). Conducting lessons-learned reviews as a part of
Example: Event and Incident
Response, Continuity of Operations
Anywhere Power purchased a helpdesk
tracking system to log and track
important cybersecurity events. On the
wall in their shared working area,
Anywhere Power posted a chart that
identifies criteria for escalating
cybersecurity events, which include who
must be notified and response time
objectives. When the utility experiences
a cybersecurity incident, the incident
response plan requires that the incident
be logged and communicated to key
stakeholders. The reporting process
includes those responsible for
communicating the COP described in
the Situational Awareness domain.
Anywhere Power tests its disaster
recovery plan annually to ensure that it
can continue to meet recovery time
objectives for the subsector functions
and that it has a good understanding of
the restoration path for its assets.

40
cybersecurity event and incident response helps the organization eliminate the exploited
vulnerability that led to the incident.
Planning for continuity involves the necessary activities to sustain the subsector function in the
event of an interruption, such as a severe cybersecurity incident or a disaster. Business impact
analyses enable the organization to identify essential assets and associated recovery time
objectives. Continuity plans should be tested and adjusted to ensure they remain realistic and
practicable.
1. Detect Cybersecurity Events
MIL1 a. There is a point of contact (person or role) to whom cybersecurity events could be reported
b. Detected cybersecurity events are reported
c. Cybersecurity events are logged and tracked
MIL2 d. Criteria are established for cybersecurity event detection (e.g., what constitutes an event, where to
look for events)
e. There is a repository where cybersecurity events are logged based on the established criteria
MIL3 f. Event information is correlated to support incident analysis by identifying patterns, trends, and other
common features
g. Cybersecurity event detection activities are adjusted based on information from the organization’s risk
register (RM-2j) and threat profile (TVM-1d) to help detect known threats and monitor for identified risks
h. The common operating picture for the function is monitored to support the identification of
cybersecurity events (SA-3a)
2. Escalate Cybersecurity Events and Declare Incidents
MIL1 a. Criteria for cybersecurity event escalation are established, including cybersecurity incident declaration
criteria
b. Cybersecurity events are analyzed to support escalation and the declaration of cybersecurity incidents
c. Escalated cybersecurity events and incidents are logged and tracked
MIL2 d. Criteria for cybersecurity event escalation, including cybersecurity incident criteria, are established
based on the potential impact to the function
e. Criteria for cybersecurity event escalation, including cybersecurity incident declaration criteria, are
updated at an organization-defined frequency
f. There is a repository where escalated cybersecurity events and cybersecurity incidents are logged
and tracked to closure
MIL3 g. Criteria for cybersecurity event escalation, including cybersecurity incident declaration criteria, are
adjusted according to information from the organization’s risk register (RM-2j) and threat profile (TVM-1d)
h. Escalated cybersecurity events and declared cybersecurity incidents inform the common operating
picture (SA-3a) for the function
i. Escalated cybersecurity events and declared incidents are correlated to support the discovery of
patterns, trends, and other common features

41
3. Respond to Incidents and Escalated Cybersecurity Events
MIL1 a. Cybersecurity event and incident response personnel are identified and roles are assigned
b. Responses to escalated cybersecurity events and incidents are implemented to limit impact to the
function and restore normal operations
c. Reporting of escalated cybersecurity events and incidents is performed (e.g., internal reporting, DOE
Form OE-417, ES-ISAC, ICS-CERT)
MIL2 d. Cybersecurity event and incident response is performed according to defined procedures that address
all phases of the incident life cycle (e.g., triage, handling, communication, coordination, and closure)
e. Cybersecurity event and incident response plans are exercised at an organization- defined frequency
f. Cybersecurity event and incident response plans address OT and IT assets important to the delivery
of the function
g. Training is conducted for cybersecurity event and incident response teams
MIL3 h. Cybersecurity event and incident root-cause analysis and lessons-learned activities are performed,
and corrective actions are taken
i. Cybersecurity event and incident responses are coordinated with law enforcement and other
government entities as appropriate, including support for evidence collection and preservation
j. Cybersecurity event and incident response personnel participate in joint cybersecurity exercises with
other organizations (e.g., table top, simulated incidents)
k. Cybersecurity event and incident response plans are reviewed and updated at an organization-defined
frequency
l. Cybersecurity event and incident response activities are coordinated with relevant external entities
m. Cybersecurity event and incident response plans are aligned with the function’s risk criteria (RM-1c)
and threat profile (TVM-1d)
n. Policy and procedures for reporting cybersecurity event and incident information to designated
authorities conform with applicable laws, regulations, and contractual agreements
o. Restored assets are configured appropriately and inventory information is updated following execution
of response plans
4. Plan for Continuity
MIL1 a. The activities necessary to sustain minimum operations of the function are identified
b. The sequence of activities necessary to return the function to normal operation is identified
c. Continuity plans are developed to sustain and restore operation of the function
MIL2 d. Business impact analyses inform the development of continuity plans
e. Recovery time objectives (RTO) and recovery point objectives (RPO) for the function are incorporated
into continuity plans
f. Continuity plans are evaluated and exercised
MIL3 g. Business impact analyses are periodically reviewed and updated
h. RTO and RPO are aligned with the function’s risk criteria (RM-1c)
i. The results of continuity plan testing and/or activation are compared to recovery objectives, and plans
are improved accordingly
j. Continuity plans are periodically reviewed and updated
k. Restored assets are configured appropriately and inventory information is updated following execution
of continuity plans

42
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for cybersecurity event and incident response as well as
continuity of operations activities
b. Stakeholders for cybersecurity event and incident response as well as continuity of operations
activities are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support cybersecurity event and
incident response as well as continuity of operations activities
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform cybersecurity event and incident
response as well as continuity of operations activities
MIL3 e. Cybersecurity event and incident response as well as continuity of operations activities are guided
by documented policies or other organizational directives
f. Cybersecurity event and incident response as well as continuity of operations policies include
compliance requirements for specified standards and/or guidelines
g. Cybersecurity event and incident response as well as continuity of operations activities are
periodically reviewed to ensure conformance with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of cybersecurity event and incident response as
well as continuity of operations activities are assigned to personnel
i. Personnel performing cybersecurity event and incident response as well as continuity of operations
activities have the skills and knowledge needed to perform their assigned responsibilities

43
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 SUPPLY CHAIN AND
EXTERNAL DEPENDENCIES MANAGEMENT
7.8 Supply Chain and External Dependencies Management
Purpose: Establish and maintain controls to manage the
cybersecurity risks associated with services and assets
that are dependent on external entities, commensurate
with the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational
objectives.
As the interdependencies among infrastructures, operating
partners, suppliers, service providers, and customers
increase, establishing and maintaining a comprehensive
understanding of key relationships and managing their
associated cybersecurity risks is essential for the secure,
reliable, and resilient delivery of the function.
This model classifies external dependencies as supplier or
customer. Supplier dependencies are external parties on
which the delivery of the function depends, including
operating partners. Customer dependencies are external
parties that depend on the delivery of the function,
including operating partners.
Supply chain risk is a noteworthy example of a supplier
dependency. The cybersecurity characteristics of products
and services vary widely. Without proper risk
management, they pose serious threats, including
software of unknown provenance and counterfeit
(possibly malicious) hardware. Utilities’ requests for
proposal often give suppliers of high-technology systems,
devices, and services only rough specifications, which may
lack adequate requirements for security and quality
assurance. The autonomy utilities often give to their
individual business units further increases the risk, unless
procurement activities are constrained by plan or policy
to include cybersecurity requirements.
The Supply Chain and External Dependencies
Management (EDM) domain comprises three objectives:
1. Identify Dependencies
2. Manage Dependency Risk
Identifying dependencies involves establishing and
maintaining a comprehensive understanding of the key
Example: Supply Chain and External
Dependencies Management
Anywhere Power receives products and
services from multiple vendors. As part of a
recent initiative to support advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI), the utility began to work
with a new AMI vendor that, during the normal
course of business, will have access to
sensitive data and systems.
Within the contract for the project, Anywhere
Power mandated the nondisclosure of
sensitive data. Anywhere Power also specified
cybersecurity requirements for the handling,
communication, and storage of its information,
requiring that it be encrypted both in transit
and in storage. The cybersecurity
requirements also stated that passwords and
cryptographic keys would be properly
managed, and they specified strict limits and
controls on the vendor personnel and systems
that will have access to Anywhere Power’s
systems and data during deployment,
operations, and maintenance. Additionally,
Anywhere Power conducted a review of the
vendor’s practices (including the vendor’s
cybersecurity practices with respect to its
suppliers), participated in a security design
review of the vendor’s proposed system, and
plans to conduct periodic audits of the
delivered AMI system to ensure that the
vendor continues to meet its obligations.
When the vendor supplied the meters and
supporting infrastructure components,
Anywhere Power carried out an inspection to
verify that the hardware, software, and
firmware were authentic and that initial
configurations were as agreed upon. To
accomplish this, Anywhere Power conducted
random sample audits, which included visually
confirming serial numbers with the hardware
manufacturer (to help detect counterfeits),
verifying digital signatures for associated
software and firmware, and checking initial
configuration settings for conformance.

44
external relationships required for the delivery of the function.
Managing dependency risk includes approaches, such as independent testing, code review,
scanning for vulnerabilities, and reviewing demonstrable evidence from the vendor that a
secure software development process has been followed. Contracts binding the utility to a
relationship with a partner or vendor for products or services should be reviewed and approved
for cybersecurity risk mitigation, such as contract language that establishes vendor
responsibilities for meeting or exceeding specified cybersecurity standards or guidelines.
Service level agreements can specify monitoring and audit processes to verify that vendors and
service providers meet cybersecurity and other performance measures.
1. Identify Dependencies
MIL1 a. Important IT and OT supplier dependencies are identified (i.e., external parties on which the delivery
of the function depend, including operating partners)
b. Important customer dependencies are identified (i.e., external parties that are dependent on the
delivery of the function including operating partners)
MIL2 c. Supplier dependencies are identified according to established criteria
d. Customer dependencies are identified according to established criteria
e. Single-source and other essential dependencies are identified
f. Dependencies are prioritized
MIL3 g. Dependency prioritization and identification are based on the function’s or organization's risk criteria
(RM-1c)
2. Manage Dependency Risk
MIL1 a. Significant cybersecurity risks due to suppliers and other dependencies are identified and addressed
b. Cybersecurity requirements are considered when establishing relationships with suppliers and other
third parties
MIL2 c. Identified cybersecurity dependency risks are entered into the risk register (RM-2j)
d. Contracts and agreements with third parties incorporate sharing of cybersecurity threat information
e. Cybersecurity requirements are established for suppliers according to a defined practice, including
requirements for secure software development practices where appropriate
f. Agreements with suppliers and other external entities include cybersecurity requirements
g. Evaluation and selection of suppliers and other external entities includes consideration of their ability
to meet cybersecurity requirements
h. Agreements with suppliers require notification of cybersecurity incidents related to the delivery of the
product or service
i. Suppliers and other external entities are periodically reviewed for their ability to continually meet the
cybersecurity requirements

45
2. Manage Dependency Risk (cont.)
MIL3 j. Cybersecurity risks due to external dependencies are managed according to the organization’s risk
management criteria and process
k. Cybersecurity requirements are established for supplier dependencies based on the organization’s
risk criteria (RM-1c)
l. Agreements with suppliers require notification of vulnerability-inducing product defects throughout
the intended life cycle of delivered products
m. Acceptance testing of procured assets includes testing for cybersecurity requirements
n. Information sources are monitored to identify and avoid supply chain threats (e.g., counterfeit parts,
software, and services)
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for managing dependency risk
b. Stakeholders for managing dependency risk are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support dependency risk
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform managing dependency risk
MIL3 e. Dependency risk management activities are guided by documented policies or other organizational
directives
f. Dependency risk management policies include compliance requirements for specified standards
and/or guidelines
g. Dependency risk management activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of dependency risk management are assigned to
personnel
i. Personnel performing dependency risk management have the skills and knowledge needed to
perform their assigned responsibilities

46
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT
7.9 Workforce Management
Purpose: Establish and maintain plans, procedures,
technologies, and controls to create a culture of cybersecurity
and to ensure the ongoing suitability and competence of
personnel, commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure
and organizational objectives.
As utilities increasingly adopt advanced digital technology, it is
a challenge to enhance the skill sets of their existing workforce
and hire personnel with the appropriate level of cybersecurity
experience, education, and training. Utilities’ reliance on
advanced technology for digital communications and control
continues to grow, and workforce issues are a crucial aspect of
successfully addressing cybersecurity and risk management for
these systems.
Collective bargaining agreements may challenge some aspects
of the practices in this domain as written, so organizations may
need to implement alternative practices that meet the intent
of the model practices and align with those agreements.
The Workforce Management (WM) domain comprises five
objectives:
1. Assign Cybersecurity Responsibilities
2. Control the Workforce Life Cycle
3. Develop Cybersecurity Workforce
4. Increase Cybersecurity Awareness
An important aspect of assigning cybersecurity responsibilities
is ensuring adequacy and redundancy of coverage. For
example, specific workforce roles with significant cybersecurity
responsibilities are often easy to determine, but they can be
challenging to maintain. It is vital to develop plans for key
cybersecurity workforce roles (e.g., system administrators) to provide appropriate training,
testing, redundancy, and evaluations of performance. Of course, cybersecurity responsibilities
are not restricted to traditional IT roles; for example, some operations engineers may have
cybersecurity responsibilities.
Controlling the workforce life cycle includes personnel vetting (e.g., background checks) and
assigning risk designations to positions that have access to assets needed to deliver an essential
service. For example, system administrators (who typically have the ability to change
configuration settings, modify or delete log files, create new accounts, and change passwords)
Example: Workforce Management
Anywhere Power determines that it will
invest in advanced digital technology.
Part of this investment will be a long-
term program for workforce training and
management to help personnel keep the
new systems running efficiently and
securely. Anywhere Power finds it much
harder than expected to recruit, train,
and retain personnel with the necessary
skill sets, particularly personnel with
cybersecurity education and experience.
Furthermore, Anywhere Power finds that
its brand of new digital technology has
been compromised at another utility due
to poor security practices.
Anywhere Power analyzes this
information through a risk assessment
of its systems, practices, and policies.
The organization determines that
employee training is paramount to
addressing system and social
engineering vulnerabilities as well as
insider threats to the company’s goals
and objectives. As a result, Anywhere
Power begins investing in technical and
security training and in certification for
management and personnel to instill the
awareness and skills necessary to
manage and protect the company’s
assets, which may also contribute to the
protection of interconnected critical
infrastructure external to the utility.

47
on critical systems are given a higher risk designation, and specific measures are taken to
protect these systems from accidental or malicious behavior by this category of personnel.
Developing a cybersecurity workforce includes training and recruiting to address identified skill
gaps. For example, hiring practices should ensure that recruiters and interviewers are aware of
cybersecurity workforce needs. Also, newly recruited personnel (and contractors) should
receive security awareness training to reduce their vulnerability to social engineering and other
threats.
Increasing the cybersecurity awareness of the workforce is as important as implementing
technological approaches to improving the cybersecurity of the organization. The threat of a
cyber attack to an organization often starts with gaining some foothold into a company’s IT or
OT systems — for example by gaining the trust of an unwary employee or contractor who then
introduces media or devices into the utility’s networks. The organization should share
information with its workforce on methods and techniques to identify suspicious behavior,
avoid spam or spear phishing, and recognize social engineering attacks to avoid providing
information about the utility to potential adversaries. For example, an internal web site could
provide information about new threats and vulnerabilities in the utility industry. If information
on threats, vulnerabilities, and best practices is not shared with the workforce, personnel may
become more lax about security processes and procedures.
1. Assign Cybersecurity Responsibilities
MIL1 a. Cybersecurity responsibilities for the function are identified
b. Cybersecurity responsibilities are assigned to specific people
MIL2 c. Cybersecurity responsibilities are assigned to specific roles, including external service providers
d. Cybersecurity responsibilities are documented (e.g., in position descriptions)
MIL3 e. Cybersecurity responsibilities and job requirements are reviewed and updated as appropriate
f. Cybersecurity responsibilities are included in job performance evaluation criteria
g. Assigned cybersecurity responsibilities are managed to ensure adequacy and redundancy of coverage

48
2. Control the Workforce Life Cycle
MIL1 a. Personnel vetting (e.g., background checks, drug tests) is performed at hire for positions that have
access to the assets required for delivery of the function
b. Personnel termination procedures address cybersecurity
MIL2 c. Personnel vetting is performed at an organization-defined frequency for positions that have access
to the assets required for delivery of the function
d. Personnel transfer procedures address cybersecurity
MIL3 e. Risk designations are assigned to all positions that have access to the assets required for delivery
of the function
f. Vetting is performed for all positions (including employees, vendors, and contractors) at a level
commensurate with position risk designation
g. Succession planning is performed for personnel based on risk designation
h. A formal accountability process that includes disciplinary actions is implemented for personnel who
fail to comply with established security policies and procedures
3. Develop Cybersecurity Workforce
MIL1 a. Cybersecurity training is made available to personnel with assigned cybersecurity responsibilities
MIL2 b. Cybersecurity knowledge, skill, and ability gaps are identified
c. Identified gaps are addressed through recruiting and/or training
d. Cybersecurity training is provided as a prerequisite to granting access to assets that support the
delivery of the function (e.g., new personnel training, personnel transfer training)
MIL3 e. Cybersecurity workforce management objectives that support current and future operational needs
are established and maintained
f. Recruiting and retention are aligned to support cybersecurity workforce management objectives
g. Training programs are aligned to support cybersecurity workforce management objectives
h. The effectiveness of training programs is evaluated at an organization-defined frequency and
improvements are made as appropriate
i. Training programs include continuing education and professional development opportunities for
personnel with significant cybersecurity responsibilities
4. Increase Cybersecurity Awareness
MIL1 a. Cybersecurity awareness activities occur
MIL2 b. Objectives for cybersecurity awareness activities are established and maintained
c. Cybersecurity awareness content is based on the organization’s threat profile (TVM-1d)
MIL3 d. Cybersecurity awareness activities are aligned with the predefined states of operation (SA-3f)
e. The effectiveness of cybersecurity awareness activities is evaluated at an organization-defined
frequency and improvements are made as appropriate

49
Note: In the following practices, “cybersecurity workforce management activities” refers
collectively to all of the above practices in this domain.
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for cybersecurity workforce management activities
b. Stakeholders for cybersecurity workforce management activities are identified and involved
c. Adequate resources (people, funding, and tools) are provided to support cybersecurity workforce
d. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform cybersecurity workforce management
activities
MIL3 e. Cybersecurity workforce management activities are guided by documented policies or other
organizational directives
f. Cybersecurity workforce management policies include compliance requirements for specified
standards and/or guidelines
g. Cybersecurity workforce management activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance
with policy
h. Responsibility and authority for the performance of cybersecurity workforce management activities
are assigned to personnel
i. Personnel performing cybersecurity workforce management activities have the skills and knowledge

50
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 CYBERSECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
7.10 Cybersecurity Program Management
Purpose: Establish and maintain an enterprise cybersecurity
program that provides governance, strategic planning, and
sponsorship for the organization’s cybersecurity activities in a
manner that aligns cybersecurity objectives with the
organization’s strategic objectives and the risk to critical
infrastructure.
A cybersecurity program is an integrated group of activities
designed and managed to meet cybersecurity objectives for
the organization and/or the function. A cybersecurity program
may be implemented at either the organization or the function
level, but a higher level implementation and enterprise
viewpoint may benefit the organization by integrating activities
and leveraging resource investments across the entire
enterprise.
The Cybersecurity Program Management (CPM) domain
comprises five objectives:
1. Establish Cybersecurity Program Strategy
2. Sponsor Cybersecurity Program
3. Establish and Maintain Cybersecurity Architecture
4. Perform Secure Software Development
The cybersecurity program strategy is established as the
foundation for the program. In its simplest form, the program
strategy should include a list of cybersecurity objectives and a
plan to meet them. At higher levels of maturity, the program
strategy will be more complete and include priorities, a
governance approach, structure and organization for the
program, and more involvement by senior management in the
design of the program.
Sponsorship is important for implementing the program in
accordance with the strategy. The fundamental form of
sponsorship is to provide resources (people, tools, and
funding). More advanced forms of sponsorship include visible
involvement by senior leaders and designation of responsibility
and authority for the program. Further, sponsership includes
organizational support for establishing and implementing
policies or other organizational directives to guide the program.
Example: Cybersecurity Program
Management
Anywhere Power decided to establish
an enterprise cybersecurity program. To
begin, Anywhere Power formed a board
with representation from each of the
functional areas. This cybersecurity
governance board will develop a
cybersecurity strategy for the utility and
will recruit a new vice president of
cybersecurity to implement a program
based on the strategy. The vice
president will also report to the board of
directors and will work across the
enterprise to engage business and
technical management and personnel to
address cybersecurity.
The new vice president’s first action will
be to expand and document the
cybersecurity strategy for Anywhere
Power, ensuring that it remains aligned
to the utility’s business strategy and
addresses its risk to critical
infrastructure. Once the strategy is
approved by the board, the new vice
president will begin implementing the
program by reorganizing some existing
compartmentalized cybersecurity teams
and recruiting additional team members
to address skill gaps in the organization.
The head of customer service and vice
president of accounting will depend on
the new program to address both
immediate and collateral damage from
potential incidents and the public
relations issues that would follow. The
head of IT and the vice president for
engineering will expect guidance on
systems development and methods to
mitigate risks.

51
A cybersecurity architecture is an integral part of the enterprise architecture. It describes the
structure and behavior of an enterprise’s security processes, cybersecurity systems, personnel,
and subordinate organizations and aligns them with the organization’s mission and strategic
plans. An important element of the cybersecurity architecture is effective isolation of IT
systems from OT systems.
Performing and requiring secure software development for assets that are important to the
delivery of the function is important to help reduce vulnerability-inducing software defects.
1. Establish Cybersecurity Program Strategy
MIL1 a. The organization has a cybersecurity program strategy
MIL2 b. The cybersecurity program strategy defines objectives for the organization’s cybersecurity activities
c. The cybersecurity program strategy and priorities are documented and aligned with the organization’s
strategic objectives and risk to critical infrastructure
d. The cybersecurity program strategy defines the organization’s approach to provide program oversight
and governance for cybersecurity activities
e. The cybersecurity program strategy defines the structure and organization of the cybersecurity program
f. The cybersecurity program strategy is approved by senior management
MIL3 g. The cybersecurity program strategy is updated to reflect business changes, changes in the operating
environment, and changes in the threat profile (TVM-1d)
2. Sponsor Cybersecurity Program
MIL1 a. Resources (people, tools, and funding) are provided to support the cybersecurity program
b. Senior management provides sponsorship for the cybersecurity program
MIL2 c. The cybersecurity program is established according to the cybersecurity program strategy
d. Adequate funding and other resources (i.e., people and tools) are provided to establish and operate a
cybersecurity program aligned with the program strategy
e. Senior management sponsorship for the cybersecurity program is visible and active (e.g., the
importance and value of cybersecurity activities is regularly communicated by senior management)
f. If the organization develops or procures software, secure software development practices are
sponsored as an element of the cybersecurity program
g. The development and maintenance of cybersecurity policies is sponsored
h. Responsibility for the cybersecurity program is assigned to a role with requisite authority
MIL3 i. The performance of the cybersecurity program is monitored to ensure it aligns with the cybersecurity
program strategy
j. The cybersecurity program is independently reviewed (i.e., by reviewers who are not in the program)
for achievement of cybersecurity program objectives
k. The cybersecurity program addresses and enables the achievement of regulatory compliance as
appropriate
l. The cybersecurity program monitors and/or participates in selected industry cybersecurity standards
or initiatives

52
3. Establish and Maintain Cybersecurity Architecture
MIL1 a. A strategy to architecturally isolate the organization’s IT systems from OT systems is implemented
MIL2 b. A cybersecurity architecture is in place to enable segmentation, isolation, and other requirements that
support the cybersecurity strategy
c. Architectural segmentation and isolation is maintained according to a documented plan
MIL3 d. Cybersecurity architecture is updated at an organization-defined frequency to keep it current
4. Perform Secure Software Development
MIL2 a. Software to be deployed on assets that are important to the delivery of the function is developed using
secure software development practices
MIL3 b. Policies require that software that is to be deployed on assets that are important to the delivery of the
function be developed using secure software development practices
MIL2 a. Documented practices are followed for cybersecurity program management activities
b. Stakeholders for cybersecurity program management activities are identified and involved
c. Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to inform cybersecurity program management activities
MIL3 d. Cybersecurity program management activities are guided by documented policies or other
organizational directives
e. Cybersecurity program management activities are periodically reviewed to ensure conformance with
policy
f. Personnel performing cybersecurity program management activities have the skills and knowledge

Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 REFERENCES
53
APPENDIX A: REFERENCES
The right-hand columns of the reference table below show where each referenced source was either
used in the development of this document or may serve as a source for further information regarding
the practices identified within the model in one or more domains or in the glossary. References that
informed the document more broadly have no marker in any of the right-hand columns.
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[CEII]
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2010). Critical energy
infrastructure information (CEII) regulations. Retrieved from
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/ceii-rule.asp
• •
[CERT CSIRT FAQs]
Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. (2012).
CSIRT FAQ. Retrieved from
http://www.cert.org/csirts/csirt_faq.html
• • •
[CERT CSIRTs]
West Brown, M., Stikvoort, D., Kossakowski, K., Killcrece, G.,
Ruefle, R., & Zajicek, Mark. (2003). Handbook for computer
security incident response teams (CSIRTs) (CMU/SEI-2003-HB-
002). Retrieved from Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie
Mellon University website:
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/03hb002.cfm
•
[CERT RMM]
Caralli, R. A., Allen, J. H., & White, D. W. (2011). CERT resilience
management model: A maturity model for managing operational
resilience (CERT-RMM Version 1.1). Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
• • • • • • • • • • •
[CERT SGMM]
The SGMM Team. (2011, version 1.2). Smart grid maturity model:
Model definition (CMU/SEI-2011-TR-025). Retrieved from
Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
website: http:// www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/11tr025.pdf
• • • • • • •
[CERT State of the Practice of CSIRTs]
Killcrece, G., Kossakowski, K., Ruefle, R., & Zajicek, M. (2003).
State of the practice of computer security incident response teams
(CSIRTs) (CMU/SEI-2003-TR-001). Retrieved from Software
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University website:
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/03tr001.pdf
•

54
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[CNSSI 4009]
Committee on National Security Systems. (2010). National
information assurance (IA) glossary (CNSS Instructions No. 4009).
Retrieved from
https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm
• • •
[DHS Cross-Sector Roadmap]
Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group. (2011, revision
3.0). Cross-sector roadmap for cybersecurity of control systems.
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team.
• • •
[DHS ICS-CERT]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2012, May). Industrial
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. Retrieved
from http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/ics-cert/
• •
[DHS ICSJWG]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2012, May). Industrial
Control Systems Joint Working Group. Retrieved from
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_ systems/icsjwg/
• •
[DHS PCII]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2012, May). Who can
access Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII).
Retrieved from
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1193089801658.shtm
• •
[DHS Procurement]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Control Systems Security
Program, National Cyber Security Division. (2009). U.S.
Department of Homeland Security: Cyber security procurement
language for control systems.
• •
[DOE RMP]
U.S. Department of Energy. (2012). Electricity subsector
cybersecurity risk management process.
• • •
[DOE Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems
Cybersecurity]
Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group. (2011). Roadmap
to achieve energy delivery systems cybersecurity. Retrieved from
Department of Energy website:
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Energy%20Delivery%20Systems
%20Cybersecurity%20Roadmap_finalweb.pdf
• • • • • •
[EIA Glossary]
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (n.d.). Glossary. Retrieved
from http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/
•

55
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[EOPUS Policy Framework]
Executive Office of the President of the United States. (2011). A
policy framework for the 21st Century grid: Enabling our secure
energy future. Retrieved from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-
smart-grid-june2011.pdf
[ES-C2M2]
Definitions labeled ES-C2M2 were produced by the Electric
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model team
during the development of the model definition document. (2012).
•
[ES-ISAC]
Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center. (2012).
[Home page] Retrieved from
http://www.esisac.com/SitePages/Home.aspx
• • •
[ES-SPP]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of
Energy. (2010). Energy sector-specific plan: An annex to the
national infrastructure protection plan. Retrived from
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-energy-2010.pdf
• • • • • •
[FERC]
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (n.d.). Glossary.
Retrieved from http://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/guide/glossary.asp
•
[FIRST]
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). (2012).
CSIRT case classification (Example for enterprise CSIRT).
Retrieved from
http://www.first.org/_assets/resources/guides/csirt_case_classificat
ion.html
• • •
[HSPD-7]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.). Homeland Security
Presidential Directive – 7. Retrieved from
http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7#1
• • •
[IACCM BRM3]
International Association for Contract & Commercial Management
(IACCM). (2003). The IACCM business risk management maturity
model (BRM3).
• •
[ISA 99]
International Society of Automation (ISA). (2009). Industrial
automation and control systems security: Establishing an industrial
automation and control systems security program (ANSI/ISA-
99.02.01-2009).

56
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[ISACs]
National Council of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs). (2012). [Home page]. Retrieved from
http://www.isaccouncil.org/
• • • •
[ISO/IEC 2:2004]
International Organization for Standardization. (2004).
Standardization and related activities -- General vocabulary
(ISO/IEC 2:2004).
•
[ISO 27005:2011]
International Organization for Standardization. (2011). Information
security risk management (ISO 27005:2011)
• •
[ISO/IEC 21827:2008]
International Organization for Standardization. (2008). Systems
Security Engineering – Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM)
(ISO/IEC 21827:2008).
• • • •
[ISO/IEC 27001:2005]
International Organization for Standardization. (2008). Information
security management systems (ISO/IEC CD 27001:2005).
• • • • • • •
[ISO/IEC 27002:2005]
International Organization for Standardization. (2008). Code of
practice for information security management
(ISO/IEC27002:2005).
• • • • • • •
[ISO 28001:2007]
International Organization for Standardization. (n.d.). Security
management systems for the supply chain - Best practices for
implementing supply chain security, assessments and plans -
Requirements and guidance (ISO/ IEC20001:2007).
• •
[MIT SCMM]
Rice, Jr., J. B., & Tenney, W. (2007). How risk management can
secure your business future. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Supply Chain Strategy, 3(5), 1-4. Retrieved from
http://web.mit.edu/scresponse/repository/rice_tenney_SCS_RMM_j
une-july_2007.pdf
•
[NASA RMMM]
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2005). NASA
RMC VI: Continuous Risk Management Maturity Assessment (pp.
5-7). Retrieved from
http://www.rmc.nasa.gov/presentations/Powell_CRM_Maturity_Ass
essment.pdf
• •
[NDIA ESA]
National Defense Industrial Association, System Assurance
Committee. (2008, version 1.0). Engineering for system assurance.
• • •

57
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[NERC CATF]
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2012). Cyber
attack task force final report. Retrieved from http://www.nerc.com/
docs/cip/catf/12-CATF_Final_Report_BOT_clean_Mar_26_2012-
Board%20Accepted%200521.pdf
• • •
[NERC CIP-001]
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2007). Standard
CIP-001-1 – sabotage reporting. Retrieved from
http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-001-1.pdf
• • •
[NERC CIP-002]
CIP-002-3 – Cyber security - Critical cyber asset identification.
Retrieved from http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-002-3.pdf
• • • • •
[NERC CIP-003]
CIP-003-3 – Cyber security – Security management controls.
• • •
[NERC CIP-004]
CIP-004-3 – Cyber security – Personnel and training. Retrieved
from http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-004-3.pdf
• •
[NERC CIP-005]
CIP-005-3 – Cyber security – Electronic security perimeter(s).
• • • • •
[NERC CIP-006]
CIP-006-3 – Cyber security – Physical security perimeter(s).
• • • • •
[NERC CIP-007]
CIP-007-3 – Cyber security –Systems security management.
• • • • • • • •
[NERC CIP-008]
CIP-008-3 – Cyber security – Incident reporting and response
planning. Retrieved from http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-008-3.pdf
• • • •
[NERC CIP-009]
CIP-009-3 – Cyber security –Recovery plans for critical cyber
assets. Retrieved from http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-009-3.pdf
• • •

58
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[NERC CRPA]
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2012). NERC
cyber risk preparedness assessment: Improving the cyber security
posture of the North American bulk power system. Retrieved from
http://www.esisac.com/Public%20Library/Reports/
CRPA%202010%20Report.pdf
• • • • •
[NERC RTSA]
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Real-Time Tools
Best Practices Task Force. (2008). Reliability Tools for Situational
Awareness (Section 2.0). Retrieved from
http://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/Pages/RTBPTF/Real-time-Tools-
Best-Practices-Task-Force.aspx
• • •
[NERC Security Guideline: Information Protection]
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2011). Security
guideline for the electricity sector: Protecting potentially sensitive
information. Retrieved from
http://www.nerc.com/docs/cip/sgwg/Protecting%20Sensitive%20Inf
ormation%20Guideline%20Draft%20Revision%208-30-
11%20v04.pdf
• • •
[NERC Security Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting]
North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2011).
Security guideline for the electricity sector: Threat and incident
reporting. Retrieved from http://www.nerc.com/files/Incident-
Reporting.pdf
• • • •
[NESCO Logging]
Bromberger, S., & Maschino, C. (2012). Security logging in the
utility sector: Roadmap to improved maturity. National Electric
Sector Cybersecurity Organization, Southern California Edison.
• • • • •
[NESCOR Failure Scenarios]
National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource.
(2011). Electric sector representative failure scenarios by domain.
• • • • • • • • •
[NIST Framework]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2012). NIST
framework and roadmap for smart grid interoperability standards,
Release 2.0. Retrieved from
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[NIST Security Considerations in SDLC]
Radack, S. (2008). Security considerations in the information
system development life cycle. National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Retrieved from
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• •

59
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[NIST SP800-16]
Wilson, M., Stine, K., & Bowen, P. (2009). Information security
training requirements: A role- and performance-based model (NIST
Special Publication 800-16, revision 1.0). National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Retrieved from
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rev1/draft_sp800_16_rev1_2nd-draft.pdf
• •
[NIST SP800-37]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Joint Task Force
Transformation Initiative. (2010). Guide for applying the risk
management framework to federal information systems (NIST
Special Publication 800-37 ). Retrieved from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-
rev1-final.pdf
• • • • •
[NIST SP800-40]
Mell, P., Bergeron, T., & Henning, D. (2005). Creating a patch
management and vulnerability management program (NIST
Special Publication 800-40, version 2.0). National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Retrieved from
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40v2.pdf
• •
[NIST SP800-50]
Wilson, M., & Hash, J. (2003). Building an information technology
security awareness and training program (NIST Special Publication
800-50 ). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
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50/NIST-SP800-50.pdf
•
[NIST SP800-53]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Joint Task Force
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rev3-final_updated-errata_05-01-2010.pdf
• • • • • • • •
[NIST SP800-61]
Scarfone, K., Grance, T., & Masone, K. (2008). Computer security
incident handling guide (NIST Special Publication 800-61, revision
1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved from
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61r2.pdf
• •
[NIST SP800-64]
Kissel, R., Stine, K., Scholl, M., Rossman, H., Fahlsing, J., &
Gulick, Jessica. (2008). Security considerations in the system
development life cycle (NIST Special Publication 800-64, revision
• • •

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2). National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved from
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[NIST SP800-82]
Stouffer, K., Falco, J., & Scarfone, K. (2011). Guide to industrial
control systems (ICS) security (NIST Special Publication 800-82).
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdf
•
[NIST SP800-83]
Mell, P., Kent, K., & Nusbaum, J. (2005). Guide to malware
incident prevention and handling (NIST Special Publication 800-
83). National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved
from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-83/SP800-83.pdf
•
[NIST SP800-128]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2011). Guide for
security-focused configuration management of information systems
(Special Publication 800-128). Retrieved from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-128/sp800-128.pdf
• •
[NIST SP800-137]
Dempsey, K., Chawla, N. S., Johnson, A., Johnston, R., Jones,
A.C., Orebaugh, A. ... Stine, K. (2011). Information security
continuous monitoring (ISCM) for federal information systems and
organizations (NIST Special Publication 800-137). National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-137/SP800-137-
Final.pdf
• • • •
[NIST NVD]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2012). National
vulnerability database. Retrieved from http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm
• • • • •
[NISTIR 7622]
Swanson, M., Bartol, N., & Moorthy, R. (2010). Piloting supply
chain risk management for federal information systems (Draft
NISTIR 7622). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Retrieved from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-
7622/draft-nistir-7622.pdf
• •

61
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[NISTIR 7628 Vol. 1]
The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel – Cyber Security Working
Group. (2010). Guidelines for smart grid cyber security: Vol. 1,
smart grid cyber security strategy, architecture, and high-level
requirements (NISITIR 7628). National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Retrieved from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7628/nistir-7628_vol1.pdf
• • • •
[NISTIR 7628 Vol. 3]
The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel – Cyber Security Working
Group. (2010). Guidelines for smart grid cyber security: Vol. 3,
Supportive analyses and references (NISITIR 7628 ). National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved from
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7628/nistir-7628_vol3.pdf
• • • •
[NRECA Guide to Developing a Cyber Security and Risk Mitigation
Plan] National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. (2011).
Guide to developing a cyber security and risk mitigation plan.
Retrieved from
http://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/files/doc/files/CyberSecurity
GuideforanElectricCooperativeV11-2[1].pdf
• • • • • •
[NRECA Interoperability and Cyber Security Plan]
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. (2010).
Interoperability and cyber security plan. Retrieved from
https://groups.cooperative.com/smartgriddemo/public/CyberSecurit
y/Documents/InteroperabilityandCyberSecurityPlan.pdf
• •
[NRECA Security Questions for Vendors]
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. (2012). Security
questions for vendors. Retrieved from
https://groups.cooperative.com/smartgriddemo/public/CyberSecurit
y/Pages/default.aspx
• •
[OE-417]
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy
Reliability. (2011). The electric emergency incident and
disturbance report (Form OE-417). Retrieved from
http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/oe417.aspx
• •
[OECD Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk]
Sommer, P., & Brown, I. (2011). Reducing systemic cybersecurity
risk. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/44/46889922.pdf
• •
[SANS Securing a Smarter Grid]
Luallen, M. (2009). Securing a smarter grid: Risk management in
power utility networks. SANS. Retrieved from
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/analysts_program/NitroSecurity
_Securing_Smarter_Grid.pdf
• •

62
References
RM
ACM
IAM
TVM
SA
ISC
IR
EDM
WM
CPM
Glossary
[SEI CMM]
Paulk, M., Weber, C., Garcia, S., Chrissis, M.B., & Bush, M.
(1993). Key practices of the capability maturity
model (Version 1.1, Technical Report CMU/SEI-93-TR-25).
Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University.
Retrieved from http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/93tr025.pdf
• •
[SCADA AU RMF]
IT Security Expert Advisory Group. (2012). Generic SCADA risk
management framework for Australian critical infrastructure.
Retrieved from http://www.tisn.gov.au/Documents/SCADA-
Generic-Risk-Management-Framework.pdf
• •
[Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems]
Endsley, M. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in
dynamic systems. Human Factors, pp. 32-64.
• • •
[Supply Chain Risk Management Awareness]
Filsinger, J., Fast, B., Wolf, D.G., Payne, J.F.X., & Anderson, M.
(2012). Supply chain risk management awareness. Armed Forces
Communication and Electronics Association Cyber Committee.
Retrieved from
http://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/Supplychain.pdf
• • • •
[WH Trusted Identities in Cyberspace]
The White House. National strategy for trusted identities in
cyberspace. (2011). Retrieved from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/NSTICstra
tegy_041511.pdf
• •

63
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 GLOSSARY
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
Term Definition Source
access Ability and means to enter a facility, to communicate with or otherwise interact
with a system, to use system resources to handle information, to gain
knowledge of the information the system contains, or to control system
components and functions.
Adapted from
CNSSI 4009
access control Limiting access to organizational assets only to authorized entities (e.g., users,
programs, processes, or other systems). See asset.
Adapted from
CNSSI 4009
access
management
Management processes to ensure that access granted to the organization’s
assets is commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and
organizational objectives. See access control and asset.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
ad hoc In the context of this model, ad hoc (i.e., an ad hoc practice) refers to
performing a practice in a manner that depends largely on the initiative and
experience of an individual or team (and team leadership), without much in the
way of organizational guidance in the form of a prescribed plan (verbal or
written), policy, or training. The methods, tools, and techniques used, the
priority given a particular instance of the practice, and the quality of the
outcome may vary significantly depending on who is performing the practice,
when it is performed, and the context of the problem being addressed. With
experienced and talented personnel, high-quality outcomes may be achieved
even though practices are ad hoc. However, because lessons learned are
typically not captured at the organizational level, approaches and outcomes are
difficult to repeat or improve across the organization.
ES-C2M2
advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI)
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) refers to systems that measure,
collect, and analyze energy usage, from advanced devices such as “smart”
electricity meters, gas meters, and/or water meters, through various
communication media on request or on a predefined schedule.
Adapted from
SGMM v1.1
Glossary
anomalous/anomaly Inconsistent with or deviating from what is usual, normal, or expected. Merriam-
Webster.com
architecture See cybersecurity architecture.
assessment See risk assessment.
asset Something of value to the organization. Assets include many things, including
technology, information, roles performed by personnel, and facilities. For the
purposes of this model, assets to be considered are IT and OT hardware and
software assets, as well as information essential to operating the function.
asset, change, and
configuration
management
(ACM)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to manage the organization’s OTand
IT assets, including both hardware and software, commensurate with the risk to
critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
ES-C2M2
asset owner A person or organizational unit, internal or external to the organization, that has
primary responsibility for the viability, productivity, and resilience of an
organizational asset.
CERT RMM

64
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 ACRONYMS
Authentication Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to
allowing access to resources in an IT or ICS.
DOE RMP
Authenticator The means used to confirm the identity of a user, processor, or device (e.g.,
user password or token).
NIST 800-53
Availability Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. For an asset, the
quality of being accessible to authorized users (people, processes, or devices)
whenever it is needed.
DOE RMP &
CERT RMM
business impact
analysis
A mission impact analysis that prioritizes the impact associated with the
compromise of an organization’s information assets, based on a qualitative or
quantitative assessment of the sensitivity and criticality of those assets.
Adapted from
NIST SP800-30
change control
(change
management)
A continuous process of controlling changes to information or technology
assets, related infrastructure, or any aspect of services, enabling approved
changes with minimum disruption.
CERT RMM
common operating
picture
Activities and technologies to collect, analyze, alarm, present, and use
cybersecurity information, including status and summary information from the
other model domains.
ES-C2M2
computer security
incident
A computer security incident is a violation or imminent threat of violation of
computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security
practices. An “imminent threat of violation” refers to a situation in which the
organization has a factual basis for believing that a specific incident is about to
occur. For example, the antivirus software maintainers may receive a bulletin
from the software vendor, warning them of new malware that is rapidly
spreading across the Internet. Also, see incident.
NIST 800-61
(computer
security
incident)
confidentiality The preservation of authorized restrictions on information access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information. For an information asset, confidentiality is the quality of being
accessible only to authorized people, processes, and devices.
DOE RMP &
Adapted from
CERT RMM
configuration
baseline
A documented set of specifications for an IT or OT system or asset, or a
configuration item within a system, that has been formally reviewed and agreed
upon at a given point in time, and which should be changed only through
change control procedures. The baseline configuration is used as a basis for
future builds, releases, and/or changes.
Adapted from
NIST 800-53
Glossary
configuration
management
A collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of
assets, through control of the processes for initializing, changing, and
monitoring the configurations of those assets throughout their life cycle.
NIST SP 800-
128
contingency plan Management policy and procedures used to guide an enterprise response to a
perceived loss of mission capability. The contingency plan is the first plan used
by the enterprise risk managers to determine what happened, why, and what to
do. It may point to the continuity of operations plan or disaster recovery plan for
major disruptions.
CNSSI 4009
continuous
monitoring
Maintaining ongoing awareness of the current cybersecurity state of the
function throughout the operational environment by collecting, analyzing,
alarming, presenting, and using power system and cybersecurity information to
identify anomalous activities, vulnerabilities, and threats to the function in order
to support incident response and organizational risk management decisions.
Adapted from
NIST 800-137

65
controls The management, operational, and technical methods, policies, and
procedures—manual or automated—(i.e., safeguards or countermeasures)
prescribed for an IT and ICS to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the system and its information.
DOE RMP
critical infrastructure Assets that provide the essential services that underpin American society. The
Nation possesses numerous key resources, whose exploitation or destruction by
terrorists could cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable
to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction, or could profoundly affect
our national prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical infrastructure so vital
that its incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction through terrorist attack could
have a debilitating effect on security and economic well-being.
HSPD-7
current Updated at an organization-defined frequency (e.g., as in the asset inventory is
kept “current”) that is selected such that the risks to critical infrastructure and
organization objectives associated with being out-of-date by the maximum
interval between updates are acceptable to the organization and its
stakeholders.
ES-C2M2
cyber attack An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the
purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a
computing environment/infrastructure, or for destroying the integrity of the data
or stealing controlled information.
DOE RMP
cybersecurity The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks.
Measures taken to protect a computer or computerized system (IT and OT)
against unauthorized access or attack.
DOE RMP and
Merriam-
Webster.com
cybersecurity
architecture
An integral part of the enterprise architecture that describes the structure and
behavior for an enterprise’s security processes, cybersecurity systems,
personnel, and subordinate organizations, showing their alignment with the
organization’s mission and strategic plans. See enterprise architecture and
network architecture.
DOE RMP
cybersecurity event Any observable occurrence in a system or network that is related to a
cybersecurity requirement (confidentiality, integrity, or availability). See also event.
ES-C2M2
cybersecurity
impact
The effect on the measures that are in place to protect from and defend against
cyber attack.
ES-C2M2
cybersecurity
incident
See incident.
cybersecurity
incident life cycle
See incident life cycle.
cybersecurity plan Formal document that provides an overview of the cybersecurity requirements
for an IT and ICS and describes the cybersecurity controls in place or planned
for meeting those requirements.
DOE RMP
cybersecurity policy A set of criteria for the provision of security services. DOE RMP

66
cybersecurity
program
A cybersecurity program is an integrated group of activities designed and
managed to meet cybersecurity objectives for the organization and/or the
function. A cybersecurity program may be implemented at either the
organization or the function level, but a higher-level implementation and
enterprise viewpoint may benefit the organization by integrating activities and
leveraging resource investments across the entire enterprise.
ES-C2M2
cybersecurity
program
management
(CPM)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to establish and maintain an enterprise
cybersecurity program that provides governance, strategic planning, and
sponsorship for the organization’s cybersecurity activities in a manner that
aligns cybersecurity objectives with the organization’s strategic objectives and
the risk to critical infrastructure.
ES-C2M2
cybersecurity
program strategy
A plan of action designed to achieve the performance targets that the
organization sets to accomplish its mission, vision, values, and purpose for the
CERT RMM
cybersecurity
requirements
Requirements levied on an IT and OT that are derived from organizational
mission and business case needs (in the context of applicable legislation,
Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, instructions, regulations,
procedures) to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
services being provided by the organization and the information being
processed, stored, or transmitted.
Adapted from
DOE RMP
cybersecurity
responsibilities
Obligations for ensuring the organization’s cybersecurity requirements are met. ES-C2M2
cybersecurity risk The risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image,
reputation), resources, and other organizations due to the potential for
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of
information and/or IT and ICS. See risk.
DOE RMP
cybersecurity
workforce
management
objectives
Performance targets for personnel with cybersecurity responsibilities that the
organization sets to meet cybersecurity requirements.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
defined practice A practice that is planned (i.e., described, explained, made definite and clear,
and standardized) and is executed in accordance with the plan.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
dependency risk Dependency risk is measured by the likelihood and severity of damage if an IT or
OT system is compromised due to a supplier or other external party on which
delivery of the function depends. Evaluating dependency risk includes an
assessment of the importance of the potentially compromised system and the
impact of compromise on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other
organizations, and the Nation. See upstream dependencies and supply chain risk.
Adapted from
NIST 7622, pg.
10
deprovisioning The process of revoking or removing an identity’s access to organizational
assets. See also provisioning.
CERT RMM
distribution The delivery of energy to retail customers (e.g., homes, businesses, industry,
government facilities).
Adapted from
EIA Glossary
domain In the context of the model structure, a domain is a logical grouping of
cybersecurity practices.
ES-C2M2

67
domain objectives The practices within each domain are organized into objectives. The objectives
represent achievements that support the domain (such as “Manage Asset
Configuration” for the ACM domain and “Increase Cybersecurity Awareness”
for the WM domain). Each of the objectives in a domain comprises a set of
practices, which are ordered by maturity indicator level.
ES-C2M2
downstream
dependencies
External parties dependent on the delivery of the function, such as customers
and some operating partners.
ES-C2M2
electricity sector
information sharing
and analysis center
(ES-ISAC)
The Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC)
shares critical information with industry participants about infrastructure
protection. The ES-ISAC serves the electricity sector by facilitating
communications between electricity sector participants, federal governments,
and other critical infrastructures. It is the job of the ES-ISAC to promptly
disseminate threat indications, vulnerabilities, analyses, and warnings, together
with interpretations, to help electricity sector participants take protective
actions. See Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC).
Adapted from
Electricity
Sector
Information
Sharing and
Analysis Center
(ES-ISAC)
website home
page
electricity subsector A portion of the energy sector that includes the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electricity.
ES-SPP
enterprise The largest (i.e., highest-level) organizational entity to which the organization
participating in the ES-C2M2 survey belongs. For some participants, the
organization taking the survey is the enterprise itself. See organization.
Adapted from
SGMM v1.1
Glossary
enterprise
architecture
The design and description of an enterprise’s entire set of IT and OT: how they
are configured, how they are integrated, how they interface to the external
environment at the enterprise’s boundary, how they are operated to support the
enterprise mission, and how they contribute to the enterprise’s overall security
posture. See cybersecurity architecture and network architecture.
DOE RMP (but
changed ICS to
OT)
Entity Something having separate or distinct existence. Merriam-
Webster.com
establish and
maintain
The development and maintenance of the object of the practice (such as a
program). For example, “Establish and maintain identities” means that not only
must identities be provisioned, but they also must be documented, have
assigned ownership, and be maintained relative to corrective actions, changes
in requirements, or improvements.
CERT RMM
Event Any observable occurrence in a system or network. Depending on their
potential impact, some events need to be escalated for response. To ensure
consistency, criteria for response should align with the organization’s risk
criteria.
NIST 800-61
event and incident
response, continuity
of operations (IR)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to establish and maintain plans,
procedures, and technologies to detect, analyze, and respond to cybersecurity
events and to sustain operations throughout a cybersecurity event,
ES-C2M2

68
function The high-level electricity system activity or set of activities performed by the
utility to which the model is being applied. Generally, the function will be
generation, transmission, distribution, and/or markets. When using the ES-
C2M2 evaluation survey, the function is the organizational line-of-business
(generation, transmission, distribution, or markets) that is being evaluated by
completing the model.
ES-C2M2
generation The process of producing electric energy by transforming other forms of
energy; also, the amount of electric energy produced, expressed in kilowatt-
hours.
EIA Glossary
governance An organizational process of providing strategic direction for the organization
while ensuring that it meets its obligations, appropriately manages risk, and
efficiently uses financial and human resources. Governance also typically
includes the concepts of sponsorship (setting the managerial tone), compliance
(ensuring that the organization is meeting its compliance obligations), and
alignment (ensuring that processes such as those for cybersecurity program
management align with strategic objectives).
Adapted from
CERT RMM
guidelines A set of recommended practices produced by a recognized authoritative
source representing subject matter experts and community consensus, or
internally by an organization. See standard.
ES-C2M2
identity The set of attribute values (i.e., characteristics) by which an entity is
recognizable and that, within the scope of an identity manager’s responsibility,
is sufficient to distinguish that entity from any other entity.
CNSSI 4009
identity and access
management (IAM)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to create and manage identities for
entities that may be granted logical or physical access to the organization’s
assets. Control access to the organization’s assets, commensurate with the
risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
ES-C2M2
impact Negative consequence to subsector functions. ES-C2M2
incident An event (or series of events) that significantly affects (or has the potential to
significantly affect) critical infrastructure and/or organizational assets and
services and requires the organization (and possibly other stakeholders) to
respond in some way to prevent or limit adverse impacts. See also computer
security incident and event.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
incident life cycle The stages of an incident from detection to closure. Collectively, the incident
life cycle includes the processes of detecting, reporting, logging, triaging,
declaring, tracking, documenting, handling, coordinating, escalating and
notifying, gathering and preserving evidence, and closing incidents. Escalated
events also follow the incident life cycle, even if they are never formally
declared to be incidents.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
information assets Information or data that is of value to the organization, including diverse
information such as operational data, intellectual property, customer
information, and contracts.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
information sharing See Information Sharing and Communications (ISC).

69
information sharing
and analysis center
(ISAC)
An Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) shares critical information
with industry participants on infrastructure protection. Each critical
infrastructure industry has established an ISAC to communicate with its
members, its government partners, and other ISACs about threat indications,
vulnerabilities, and protective strategies. ISACs work together to better
understand cross-industry dependencies and to account for them in emergency
response planning. See Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ES-ISAC).
Adapted from
Electricity
Sector
Information
Sharing and
Analysis Center
(ES-ISAC)
website home
page
information sharing
and
communications
(ISC)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to establish and maintain relationships
with internal and external entities to collect and provide cybersecurity
information, including threats and vulnerabilities, to reduce risks and to
increase operational resilience, commensurate with the risk to critical
ES-C2M2
information
technology (IT)
A discrete set of electronic information resources organized for the collection,
processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of
information. In the context of this publication, the definition includes
interconnected or dependent business systems and the environment in which
they operate.
DOE RMP
institutionalization The extent to which a practice or activity is ingrained into the way an organization
operates. The more an activity becomes part of how an organization operates,
the more likely it is that the activity will continue to be performed over time, with a
consistently high level of quality. (“Incorporated into the ingrained way of doing
business that an organization follows routinely as part of its corporate culture.” –
CERT RMM). See also maturity indicator level.
ES-C2M2
Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction. Integrity
includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity. For an asset,
integrity is the quality of being in the condition intended by the owner and
therefore continuing to be useful for the purposes intended by the owner.
DOE RMP &
CERT RMM
least privilege A security control that addresses the potential for abuse of authorized
privileges. The organization employs the concept of least privilege by allowing
only authorized access for users (and processes acting on behalf of users) who
require it to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational
missions and business functions. Organizations employ the concept of least
privilege for specific duties and systems (including specific functions, ports,
protocols, and services). The concept of least privilege is also applied to
information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege
levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions
and/or functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes,
roles, and information system accounts as necessary to achieving least
privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege concepts to the design,
development, implementation, and operations of IT and OT systems.
Adapted from
NIST 800-53

70
Logging Logging typically refers to automated recordkeeping (by elements of an IT or OT
system) of system, network, or user activity. Logging may also refer to keeping a
manual record (e.g., a sign-in sheet) of physical access by personnel to a
protected asset or restricted area, although automated logging of physical access
activity is commonplace. Regular review and audit of logs (manually or by
automated tools) is a critical monitoring activity that is essential for situational
awareness (e.g., through the detection of cybersecurity events or weaknesses).
ES-C2M2
logical control A software, firmware, or hardware feature (i.e., computational logic, not a
physical obstacle) within an IT or OT system that restricts access to and
modification of assets only to authorized entities. For contrast, see physical
control.
Adapted from
CNSSI 4009
definition of
“internal security
controls”
Markets Venues where participants buy and sell products and services. In the context of
this model, markets refers to trading involving wholesale electricity.
FERC
Maturity The extent to which an organization has implemented and institutionalized the
cybersecurity practices of the model.
ES-C2M2
maturity indicator
level (MIL)
A measure of the cybersecurity maturity of an organization in a given domain of
the model. The model currently defines four maturity indicator levels (MILs) and
holds a fifth level in reserve for use in future versions of the model. Each of the
four defined levels is designated by a number (0 through 3) and a name, for
example, “MIL3: managed.” A MIL is a measure of the progression within a
domain from individual and team initiative, as a basis for carrying out
cybersecurity practices, to organizational policies and procedures that
institutionalize those practices, making them repeatable with a consistently
high level of quality. As an organization progresses from one MIL to the next,
the organization will have more complete or more advanced implementations
of the core activities in the domain.
ES-C2M2
Monitoring Collecting, recording, and distributing information about the behavior and
activities of systems and persons to support the continuous process of
identifying and analyzing risks to organizational assets and critical
infrastructure that could adversely affect the operation and delivery of services.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
(monitoring
and risk
management)
monitoring
requirements
The requirements established to determine the information gathering and
distribution needs of stakeholders.
CERT RMM
multifactor
authentication
Authentication using two or more factors to achieve authentication. Factors
include (i) something you know (e.g., password/PIN), (ii) something you have
(e.g., cryptographic identification device, token), (iii) something you are (e.g.,
biometric), or (iv) you are where you say you are (e.g., GPS token). See
authentication.
Adapted from
NIST 800-53
network
architecture
A framework that describes the structure and behavior of communications
among IT and/or OT assets and prescribes rules for interaction and
interconnection. See enterprise architecture and cybersecurity architecture.
Adapted from
CNSSI 4009 (IA
architecture)
objective(s) See domain objectives and organizational objectives.

71
operating picture Real-time (or near-real-time) awareness of the operating state of a system or
function. An operating picture is formed from data collected from various
trusted information sources that may be internal or external to the system or
function (e.g. temperature, weather events and warnings, cybersecurity alerts).
The operating picture may or may not be presented graphically. It involves the
collection, analysis (including fusion), and distribution of what is important to
know to make decisions about the operation of the system.
A common operating picture (COP) is a single operating picture that is
available to the stakeholders of the system or function so that all stakeholders
can make decisions based on the same reported operating state. See common
operating picture.
ES-C2M2
operational
resilience
The organization’s ability to adapt to risk that affects its core operational
capacities. Operational resilience is an emergent property of effective
operational risk management, supported and enabled by activities such as
security and business continuity. A subset of enterprise resilience, operational
resilience focuses on the organization’s ability to manage operational risk,
whereas enterprise resilience encompasses additional areas of risk such as
business risk and credit risk. See the related term operational risk.
CERT RMM
operating states See pre-defined states of operation. ES-C2M2
operational risk The potential impact on assets and their related services that could result from
inadequate or failed internal processes, failures of systems or technology, the
deliberate or inadvertent actions of people, or external events. In the context of
this model, our focus is on operational risk from cybersecurity threats.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
operations
technology (OT)
Programmable systems or devices that interact with the physical environment
(or manage devices that interact with the physical environment). Examples
include industrial control systems, building management systems, fire control
systems, and physical access control mechanisms.
ES-C2M2
organization An organization of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational
structure that is charged with carrying out assigned mission and business
processes and that uses IT and OT in support of those processes. In the
context of the model, the organization is the entity using the model or that is
under examination.
Adapted from
DOE RMP
organizational
objectives
Performance targets set by an organization. See strategic objectives. Adapted from
CERT RMM
periodic
review/activity
A review or activity that occurs at specified, regular time intervals, where the
organization-defined frequency is commensurate with risks to organizational
objectives and critical infrastructure.
Adapted from
SEI CMM
Glossary
personal
information
Information that reveals details, either explicitly or implicitly, about a specific
individual’s household dwelling or other type of premises. This is expanded
beyond the normal "individual" component because there are serious privacy
impacts for all individuals living in one dwelling or premise. This can include
items such as energy use patterns or other types of activities. The pattern can
become unique to a household or premises just as a fingerprint or DNA is
unique to an individual.
NISTIR 7628
Vol. 3, Glossary

72
physical control A type of control that prevents physical access to and modification of information
assets or physical access to technology and facilities. Physical controls often
include such artifacts as card readers and physical barrier methods.
CERT RMM
plan A detailed formulation of a program of action. Merriam-
Webster.com
policy A high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable
procedures of an organization.
Merriam-
Webster.com
position description A set of responsibilities that describe a role or roles filled by an employee. Also
known as a job description.
ES-C2M2
practice An activity described in the model that can be performed by an organization to
support a domain objective. The purpose of these activities is to achieve and
sustain an appropriate level of cybersecurity for the function, commensurate
with the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
ES-C2M2
pre-defined states
of operation
Distinct operating modes (which typically include specific IT and OT
configurations as well as alternate or modified procedures) that have been
designed and implemented for the function and can be invoked by a manual or
automated process in response to an event, a changing risk environment, or
other sensory and awareness data to provide greater safety, resiliency,
reliability, and/or cybersecurity. For example, a shift from the normal state of
operation to a high-security operating mode may be invoked in response to a
declared cybersecurity incident of sufficient severity. The high-security
operating state may trade off efficiency and ease of use in favor of increased
security by blocking remote access and requiring a higher level of
authentication and authorization for certain commands until a return to the
normal state of operation is deemed safe.
ES-C2M2
procedure In this model, procedure is synonymous with process.
process A series of discrete activities or tasks that contribute to the fulfillment of a task
or mission.
CERT RMM
(Business
Process)
provisioning The process of assigning or activating an identity profile and its associated
roles and access privileges. See also deprovisioning.
CERT RMM
recovery time
objectives
Documented goals and performance targets the organization sets for recovery
of an interrupted function in order to meet critical infrastructure and
ES-C2M2
risk A measure of the extent to which an organization is threatened by a potential
circumstance or event, and typically a function of (1) the adverse impacts that
would arise if the circumstance or event occurs and (2) the likelihood of
occurrence.
DOE RMP
risk analysis A risk management activity focused on understanding the condition and
potential consequences of risk, prioritizing risks, and determining a path for
addressing risks. Determines the importance of each identified risk and is used
to facilitate the organization’s response to the risk.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
risk assessment The process of identifying risks to organizational operations (including mission,
functions, image, reputation), resources, other organizations, and the Nation,
resulting from the operation of an IT and ICS.
DOE RMP

73
risk criteria Objective criteria that the organization uses for evaluating, categorizing, and
prioritizing operational risks based on impact, tolerance for risk, and risk
response approaches.
ES-C2M2
risk designation, as
in “position risk
designation”
An indication, such as high, medium, or low, of the position’s potential for
adverse impact to the efficiency, integrity, or availability of the organization’s
services.
Adapted from
OPM
risk disposition A statement of the organization’s intention for addressing an operational risk.
Typically limited to “accept,” “transfer,” “research,” or “mitigate.”
CERT RMM
risk management
program
The program and supporting processes to manage cybersecurity risk to
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation),
resources, other organizations, and the Nation. It includes (1) establishing the
context for risk-related activities, (2) assessing risk, (3) responding to risk once
determined, and (4) monitoring risk over time.
DOE RMP
risk management
(RM)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to establish, operate, and maintain an
enterprise cybersecurity risk management program to identify, analyze, and
mitigate cybersecurity risk to the organization, including its business units,
subsidiaries, related interconnected infrastructure, and stakeholders.
ES-C2M2
risk management
strategy
Strategic-level decisions on how senior executives manage risk to an
organization’s operations, resources, and other organizations.
DOE RMP
risk mitigation Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing appropriate risk-reducing controls. DOE RMP
risk mitigation plan A strategy for mitigating risk that seeks to minimize the risk to an acceptable
level.
CERT RMM
risk parameter/risk
parameter factors
Organization-specific risk tolerances used for consistent measurement of risk
across the organization. Risk parameters include risk tolerances and risk
measurement criteria.
CERT RMM
risk register A structured repository where identified risks are recorded to support risk
management.
ES-C2M2
risk response Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk to organizational
operations, resources, and other organizations.
DOE RMP
risk taxonomy The collection and cataloging of common risks that the organization is subject
to and must manage. The risk taxonomy is a means for communicating these
risks and for developing mitigation actions specific to an organizational unit or
line-of-business if operational assets and services are affected by them.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
role A group attribute that ties membership to function. When an entity assumes a
role, the entity is given certain rights that belong to that role. When the entity
leaves the role, those rights are removed. The rights given are consistent with
the functionality that the entity needs to perform the expected tasks.
CNSSI 4009
secure software
development
Developing software using recognized processes, secure coding standards,
best practices, and tools that have been demonstrated to minimize security
vulnerabilities in software systems throughout the software development life
cycle. An essential aspect is to engage programmers and software architects
who have been trained in secure software development.
ES-C2M2

74
separation of duties [A security control that] “addresses the potential for abuse of authorized
privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion.
Separation of duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and
information system support functions among different individuals and/or roles;
(ii) conducting information system support functions with different individuals
(e.g., system management, programming, configuration management, quality
assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security
personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit
functions. Organizations with significant personnel limitations may compensate
for the separation of duty security control by strengthening the audit,
accountability, and personnel security controls.”
NIST 800-53,
pp. 31, F-13
service level
agreement (SLA)
Defines the specific responsibilities of the service provider, including the
satisfaction of any relevant cybersecurity requirements, and sets the
customer’s expectations regarding the quality of service to be provided.
Adapted from
CNSSI 4009
situational
awareness
A sufficiently accurate and up-to-date understanding of the past, current, and
projected future state of a system (including its cybersecurity safeguards), in
the context of the threat environment and risks to the system’s mission, to
support effective decision making with respect to activities that depend on
and/or affect how well a system functions. It involves the collection of data
(e.g., via sensor networks), data fusion, and data analysis (which may include
modeling and simulation) to support automated and/or human decision making
(for example, concerning power system functions). Situational awareness also
involves the presentation of the results of the data analysis in a form (e.g.,
using data visualization techniques, appropriate use of alarms) that aids human
comprehension and allows operators or other personnel to quickly grasp the
key elements needed for good decision making.
Adapted from
SGMM
Glossary
situational
awareness (SA)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to establish and maintain activities and
technologies to collect, analyze, alarm, present, and use cybersecurity
information, including status and summary information from the other model
domains, to form a common operating picture (COP), commensurate with the
risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
ES-C2M2
sponsorship Enterprise-wide support of cybersecurity objectives by senior management as
demonstrated by formal policy or by declarations of management’s
commitment to the cybersecurity program along with provision of resources.
Senior management monitors the performance and execution of the
cybersecurity program and is actively involved in the ongoing improvement of
all aspects of the cybersecurity program.
ES-C2M2
stakeholder An external organization or an internal or external person or group that has a
vested interest in the organization or function (that is being evaluated using this
model) and its practices. Stakeholders involved in performing a given practice
(or who oversee, benefit from, or are dependent upon the quality with which
the practice is performed) could include those from within the function, from
across the organization, or from outside the organization.
Adapted from
CERT RMM
standard A standard is a document, established by consensus, that provides rules,
guidelines, or characteristics for activities or their results. See guidelines.
Adapted from
ISO/IEC Guide
2:2004

75
states of operation See pre-defined states of operation.
strategic objectives The performance targets that the organization sets to accomplish its mission,
vision, values, and purpose.
CERT RMM
strategic planning The process of developing strategic objectives and plans for meeting these
objectives.
CERT RMM
supply chain The set of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources for
creating and moving a product or service (including its sub-elements) from
suppliers through to an organization’s customers.
The supply chain encompasses the full product life cycle and includes design,
development, and acquisition of custom or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
products, system integration, system operation (in its environment), and
disposal. People, processes, services, products, and the elements that make
up the products wholly impact the supply chain.
NISTIR 7622
Source of 1st
paragraph cited
as [NDIA ESA]
supply chain risk Supply chain risk is measured by the likelihood and severity of damage if an IT
or OT system is compromised by a supply chain attack, and takes into account
the importance of the system and the impact of compromise on organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
Supply chain attacks may involve manipulating computing system hardware,
software, or services at any point during the life cycle. Supply chain attacks are
typically conducted or facilitated by individuals or organizations that have
access through commercial ties, leading to stolen critical data and technology,
corruption of the system/ infrastructure, and/or disabling of mission-critical
operations. See risks and supply chain.
Adapted from
NIST 7622, pg.
7 & pg. 10
supply chain and
external
dependencies
management
(EDM)
The ES-C2M2 domain with the purpose to establish and maintain controls to
manage the cybersecurity risks associated with services and assets that are
dependent on external entities, commensurate with the risk to critical
ES-C2M2
threat Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), resources, and
other organizations through IT, OT, or communications infrastructure via
unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information,
and/or denial of service.
Adapted from
DOE RMP
threat and
vulnerability
management (TVM)
procedures, and technologies to detect, identify, analyze, manage, and
respond to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, commensurate with the
risk to the organization’s infrastructure (e.g., critical, IT, operational) and
ES-C2M2
threat assessment The process of evaluating the severity of threat to an IT and ICS or
organization and describing the nature of the threat.
DOE RMP
threat profile A characterization of the likely intent, capability, and targets for threats to the
function. It is the result of one or more threat assessments across the range of
feasible threats to the IT and OT of an organization and to the organization
itself, delineating the feasible threats, describing the nature of the threats, and
evaluating their severity.
ES-C2M2

76
threat source An intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or
a situation, or a method that may accidentally exploit a vulnerability.
DOE RMP
traceability The ability to determine whether or not a given attribute of the current state is
valid (e.g., the current configuration of a system or the purported identity of a
user) based on the evidence maintained in a historical record showing how the
attribute was originally established and how it has changed over time.
ES-C2M2
transmission The movement or transfer of electric energy over an interconnected group of
lines and associated equipment between points of supply and points at which it
is transformed for delivery to consumers or is delivered to other electric
systems. Transmission is considered to end when the energy is transformed
for distribution to the consumer.
EIA Glossary
upstream
dependencies
External parties on which the delivery of the function depends, including
suppliers and some operating partners.
ES-C2M2
validate Collect and evaluate evidence to confirm or establish the quality of something
(e.g., information, a model, a product, a system, or component) with respect to
its fitness for a particular purpose.
ES-C2M2
vulnerability A cybersecurity vulnerability is a weakness or flaw in IT, OT, or
communications systems or devices, system procedures, internal controls, or
implementation that could be exploited by a threat source. A vulnerability class
is a grouping of common vulnerabilities.
Adapted from
NISTIR 7628
Vol. 1, pp. 8
vulnerability
assessment
Systematic examination of an IT or product to determine the adequacy of
cybersecurity measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which
to predict the effectiveness of proposed cybersecurity measures, and confirm
the adequacy of such measures after implementation.
DOE RMP
workforce life cycle For the purpose of this model, the workforce life cycle comprises the distinct
phases of workforce management that apply to personnel both internal and
external to the organization. Specific cybersecurity implications and requirements
are associated with each life cycle phase. The workforce life cycle includes
recruiting, hiring, onboarding, skill assessments, training and certification,
assignment to roles (deployment), professional growth and development, re-
assignment and transfers, promotions and demotions, succession planning, and
termination or retirement. The phases may not be in strict sequences, and some
phases (like training, re-assignment, and promotions) may recur.
ES-C2M2
workforce
management (WM)
procedures, technologies, and controls to create a culture of cybersecurity and
to ensure the ongoing suitability and competence of personnel, commensurate
with the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives.
ES-C2M2
workforce
management
objectives
See cybersecurity workforce management objectives.

77
APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS
Acronym Definition
C2M2 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model
CBA cost benefit analysis
CERT®-RMM CERT® Resilience Management Model
CIP critical infrastructure protection
COP common operating picture
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
CRPA Cyber Risk Preparedness Assessment
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
ES-C2M2 Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model
ES-ISAC Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center
FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
GWAC GridWise Architecture Council
HR human resources
IAM identity and access management
ICS industrial control system
ICS-CERT Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
ICSJWG Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
IT Information Technology
MIL maturity indicator level
NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OT operations technology
RAWG [European Union M/490] Reference Architecture Working Group
RPO recovery point objective
RTO recovery time objective

78
RMP Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk Management Process Guideline
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition
SEI Software Engineering Institute
SGIP Smart Grid Interoperability Panel
SLA service level agreement
US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol

79
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 REVISION HISTORY
APPENDIX D: REVISION HISTORY
Version Date Changes
1.0 May 2012 Developed original document
1.1 January 2014 1. Cover Page – Changed version number and date
2. Acknowledgments – Updated section
3. General – Updated content to correct typos and grammar errors
4. General – Updated content to ensure consistent approach in using acronyms
5. General – Tweaked the language of a few of the practices for clarity and
conciseness
6. Appendix A – Updated reference hyperlinks
7. Appendix B – Added a few glossary terms and updated a few existing terms for
clarity and source information
8. Appendix C – Updated acronyms
9. Appendix D – Added revision history
10. Appendix E – Added appendix acknowledging ES-C2M2 v1.0 contributors
11. Notices – Updated copyright notice.

80
Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FOR ES-C2M2 V1.0
APPENDIX E: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FOR
ES-C2M2 V1.0
Advisory Group
Mike Assante
National Board of
Information Security
Examiners
David Batz
Edison Electric Institute
Gary Bell
Southern California Edison
Jim Brenton
Electric Reliability Council of
Texas
Seth Bromberger
National Electric Sector
Cybersecurity Organization
Larry Buttress
Bonneville Power
Administration
Kevin Dillon
Department of Homeland
Security
Rhonda Dunfee
Department of Energy, Office
of Electricity Delivery and
Energy Reliability
Mark Engels
Dominion Resources Services
Lisa Kaiser
Security
Akhlesh Kaushiva
Energy Reliability
Henry Kenchington
Energy Reliability
Carlos Kizzee
Security
David Kuipers
Idaho National Laboratory
Barry Lawson
National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association
Annabelle Lee
Electric Power Research
Institute, representing
NESCOR
Suzanne Lemieux
BCS Incorporated (Contract
support of Department of
Energy, Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy
Reliability)
Craig Miller
National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association
Nathan Mitchell
American Public Power
Association
Samara Moore
Energy Reliability
Tim Roxey
North American Electric
Reliability Corporation,
Electricity Sector Information
Sharing and Analysis Center
James W. Sample
Pacific Gas & Electric
Company
Sean Sherman
Arctic Slope Regional
Corporation (Contract
Delivery and Energy
Reliability)
Gal Shpantzer
National Electric Sector
Cybersecurity Organization
Paul Skare
Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory
James Stevens
Carnegie Mellon University
Software Engineering
Institute - CERT Program

81
Kevin Stogran
American Electric Power
Marianne Swanson
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
David W. White
Model Development Team
Matthew Butkovic
John Fry
ICF International (Contract
Support of Department of
Delivery and Energy
Reliability)
Matthew Light
Energy Reliability
Howard Lipson, PhD
Samuel A. Merrell
Samara Moore
Energy Reliability
Fowad Muneer
ICF International (Contract
Delivery and Energy
Reliability)
Paul Ruggiero
Anthony David Scott
Accenture (Contract Support
of Department of Energy,
Office of Electricity Delivery
and Energy Reliability)
Sean Sherman
Arctic Slope Regional
Corporation (Contract
Delivery and Energy
Reliability)
Paul Skare
Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory
James Stevens
Barbara Tyson, PhD
David W. White
Initiative Working Session
Facilitation Team
Jack Eisenhauer
Nexight Group (Contract
Delivery and Energy
Reliability)
Lindsay Kishter
Nexight Group (Contract
Delivery and Energy
Reliability)
Subject Matter Expert Team
Andy Bochman
IBM
Rich Caralli
Dr. Les Cardwell
Central Lincoln PUD
Douglas M. DePeppe
Information Security &
Center for Information Age
Transformation
Tim Dierking
Aclara
Mark Fabro
Lofty Perch
Ed Goff
Progress Energy Service
Company
Baiba Grazdina
Duke Energy

82
Neil Greenfield
American Electric Power
Casey Groves
Department of Defense
David Hallquist
Vermont Electric Cooperative
Donny Helm
Oncor
Darren Reece Highfill
UtiliSec
Fred Hintermister
North American Electric
Reliability Corporation,
Electricity Sector Information
Sharing and Analysis Center
Dennis Holstein
Opus Consulting Group
Charles Hunt
Smart Grid Interoperability
Panel, Cyber Security
Working Group
William Keagle
Baltimore Gas and Electric
Justin Kelly
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
Heath Knakmuhs
UL LLC
Barry Kuehnle
Commission
Alex Kunz
Sempra Energy
Steven Latham
South Plains Electric Coop
Jeff Lowder
Society of Information Risk
Analysts
Trevor MacCrae Clifford
Maraschino
Southern California Edison
Ken Modeste
UL Communications
Paul Mohler
Law Offices of Paul Mohler
Donald Morris
Centerpoint Energy
Bruce Oliver
Sacramento Municipal Utility
District
Ward Pyles Austin
Rappeport
Commission
Evelyn Remaley Hasch
Department of Defense
Scott Saunders
Sacramento Municipal Utility
District
Daniel Taft
Consolidated Edison
Dr. David H. Tobey
National Board of
Information Security
Examiners
Ben Tomhave
Lock Path
Daniel Yagudayev
Consolidated Edison
Victoria Yan Pillitteri
Booz Allen Hamilton

83
NOTICESElectricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model Version 1.1
NOTICES
This material is based on the Technical Report, “Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability
Maturity Model Version 1.0 (ES-C2M2)” © 2012 Carnegie Mellon University. This version of ES-
C2M2 is being released and maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The U.S.
Government has, at a minimum, unlimited rights to use, modify, reproduce, release, perform,
display, or disclose this version the ES-C2M2 or corresponding toolkits provided by DOE, as well
as the right to authorize others, and hereby authorizes others, to do the same.
ES-C2M2 was created with the funding and support of DOE under the Federal Government
Contract Number FA8721-05-C-0003 between the U.S. Department of Defense and Carnegie
Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally-funded
research and development center.
Capability Maturity Model® is a registered trademark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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