SURVEY ON LINK LAYER ATTACKS IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS

International Journal of Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology (IJCSEIT), Vol.3,No. 6,December 2013

SURVEY ON LINK LAYER ATTACKS IN COGNITIVE
RADIO NETWORKS
S.Rajalakshmi and K.Saravanan
Dept of Computer Science Engineering, Erode Sengunthar Engg College, India

ABSTRACT
Cognitive Radio Network (CRNs) is a novel technology for improving the future bandwidth utilization.
CRNs have many security threats due its opportunistic exploitation of the bandwidth. Each layer of the
CRNs consisting of several attacks starting from the physical layer and moving up to the transport layer.
This paper concentrates on the Link layer attacks. The future work uses Signature based Authentication
Coded Intrusion Detection Scheme to detect the Byzantine attack. It works in asynchronous system like
Internet and incorporates optimization to improve detection response time.

KEYWORDS
COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK (CRN), BYZANTINE ATTACK, FUSION CENTRE, MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE(MAC).

1. INTRODUCTION
Due to increasing demand of the spectrum, because of the explosive growth of wireless services,
the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has approved the unlicensed users to access the
unused portion of the licensed band. This feature makes the Cognitive Radio Network.
A cognitive radio network is an intelligent radio that can be programmed and configured
dynamically. Its transceiver is designed to use the best wireless channels in its vicinity. Such a
radio automatically detects available channels in wireless spectrum, then accordingly changes
its transmission or reception parameters to allow more concurrent wireless communications in a
given spectrum band at one location. This process is a form of dynamic spectrum management.
Due to this dynamic nature there are many security threats in CRN. In this we present a solution
to detect the link layer attacks such as spectrum sensing data falsification also known as
Byzantine attack. As there is an IDS for the detection of attacks in physical layer, we then move
on to the next layer i.e. link layer attacks. The Byzantines are the attackers and they produce a
false spectrum sensing result to the secondary user and do not allow the unlicensed user to use the
free spectrum band. This is also one of the Denials of service attack (DoS), so to detect this type
of Byzantine attack signature based Authentication Coded Intrusion Detection Scheme is
employed.

2. CATEGORIES OF THREATS IN CRN
The threats in CRN are categorized based on their layers. The physical layer attacks are of
primary user emulation (PUE) attack, Objective Function attack and jamming attack. The link
layer attacks comprise of spectrum sensing data falsification attack and Denial of service attack.
The attacks against the network layer are sinkhole attack and HELLO flood attacks. Transport
layer consisting of the Lion attack.
DOI : 10.5121/ijcseit.2013.3602

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3. DEFENDING AGAINST LINK LAYER ATTACK
Many data fusion techniques were proposed to detect the Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
(SSDF) Attack.
In [2], a Decision fusion technique is proposed in which all local spectrum-sensing results are
collected and summed then it is compared to a threshold to detect an attack. Threshold value will
be in between 1 and the number of sensing terminals If the sum is greater than or equal to the
threshold then the result will be “Busy” i.e., it denotes the presence of the primary user.
Otherwise, the result will be “free” i.e., it denotes the absence of the primary user. The major
drawback in this is using of fixed thresholds. In this a problem is increasing and decreasing the
threshold has major impact on the decision. Moreover, the method is ineffective in many
scenarios that include multiple attackers.
In [3] Weighted Sequential Ratio Test (WSRT) is used and the Solution is composed of 2 steps: a
reputation maintenance step and the actual hypothesis test. In the reputation maintenance step
initially every node is assigned with the reputation value equal to zero, upon each correct
spectrum report the reputation value gets increased by one. The second step is based on the
Sequential Probability Ratio Test [4]. Unlike the ordinary SPRT this WSRT approach uses a trust
based data fusion schemes. The drawback that exists here is there is no analytical studies have
been conducted, but performance is good.
In [5] a Weight based fusion scheme is used to encounter the malicious node which transmits
false sensing signals. It uses trust approach and pre-filtering techniques. Permanent malicious
nodes are usually of two types such as, “Always Yes” and the “Always No”. The “always Yes”
type advertises the presence of the primary user and thus increasing the probability of false alarm.
The other type “Always No” advertises the absence of the primary user and thus decreasing the
probability of detection. This approach mainly concentrates on the pr-filtering of the data to
identify the malicious user and assigning the trust factor to each user. It shows good performance
result.
In [6] a Detection mechanism that runs in the fusion center. The fusion center identifies the
attackers by counting mismatches between their local decision and the global decision and
removes them from the data fusion process. It is robust against Byzantine attack and removes the
Byzantines in a very short time span, but it works only when a centralized fusion center exists.
In [7] a Bayesian detection mechanism that requires the knowledge of priori conditional
probabilities of the local spectrum sensing result and also the knowledge of priori conditional
probabilities of the final sensing result. There are several combination cases exist between these
two cases either correct or wrong and cost are assigned. A large cost is assigned to the wrong
ones and a small cost is assigned to the correct ones. Then the overall cost is calculated by sum of
all the costs weighted by the probabilities of the corresponding cases. The major drawback is that
when there is an SSDF attacker the prior knowledge becomes not trustworthy, and thus the
suggested detection mechanism becomes no longer optimal in terms of minimizing the overall
cost.
In [8] the Neyman-Pearson Test is proposed that does not require the priori probabilities of final
sensing or any cost associated with each decision case. It needs to define either maximum
acceptable probability of false alarm or a maximum acceptable probability of miss detection. The
other probability is minimized and the defined probability is acceptable. But, it still requires a
priori conditional probabilities of the local sensing.
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In [9] a detection mechanism is used to detect the malicious user and it is based on the past
reports. This algorithm detects the suspicious level of the secondary user based on their past
reports. It calculates the trust values and the consistency values. Trust value indicator can
effectively differentiate honest and the malicious secondary user. When a user turns bad then the
trust value indicator reduces the trust value. If the user behaves badly for few times then after a
large number of good behaviors the trust value gets increased. If the bad behavior is consistent
then it is impossible to recover. The major drawback is that the scheme cannot be applied to
multiple malicious users’ scenario.

4. TABLE
Table 1. Link Layer Threats, Countermeasures and Evaluations

Threats
Spectrum Sensing
Data Falsification
(Byzantine attack)

Countermeasures

Evaluation

Decision fusion technique
where all collected local
spectrum-sensing results are
summed and compared to a
threshold to detect an attack
[2]

The major drawback is in
using fixed thresholds. In
this
particular
countermeasure increasing
and
decreasing
the
threshold has major impact
on the decision. Moreover,
the method is ineffective in
many
scenarios
that
include multiple attackers

Weighted Sequential Ratio
Test [3]

Solution is composed of 2
steps:
a
reputation
maintenance step and the
actual hypothesis test. No
analytical studies have
been
conducted,
but
performance is good.

Weight based fusion scheme
[5]

Uses trust approach and
pre-filtering techniques.
Shows good performance.

Detection mechanism that
runs in the fusion center [6]

The fusion center identifies
the attackers and removes
them from the data fusion
process. Only works when
a centralized fusion center
exists.

Detection mechanism that
requires a priori knowledge

The major drawback is
that
the
a
priori
knowledge becomes not
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[7]

trustworthy when a
network is under SSDF
attack, and thus the
suggested
detection
mechanism becomes no
longer optimal in terms
of
minimizing
the
overall cost

Neyman-Pearson Test
[8]

Works by defining either a
maximum
acceptable
probability of false alarm
or a maximum acceptable
probability
of
miss
detection. It still requires a
priori
conditional
probabilities of the local
sensing

Detection mechanism based
on trust

The major drawback is that
the scheme cannot be
applied
to
multiple
malicious users’ scenario.

Control Channel
Saturation DoS Attack

on trust [9]

The
suggested
countermeasure adapts a
trusted architecture where
any suspicious CR host
will be monitored and
evaluated by its neighbors.
A neighbor can then
perform
Sequential
Probability Ratio Test to
reach a final decision
whether it is misbehaving
or not. Its performance is
proven to be good

Selfish Channel
Negotiation

on trust [9]

Same
countermeasure
suggested for Control
Channel Saturation DoS
Attack works for this
attack.

5. CONCLUSION
Signature based Authentication detects byzantine Attacks generated by malicious users and it
reject false sensed data. It also reduces incorrect sensing results.CRN is less vulnerable to
intrusion generated by Byzantine attacks and improves intrusion detection performance gain.

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FUTURE WORK
The Proposed system uses a Signature based Authentication Coded Intrusion Detection Scheme
to combat Byzantine Attacks in Cognitive Radio Networks. It works in asynchronous systems
like the Internet and it incorporates optimizations to improve detection response time.
Optimization replaces public-key signatures by vectors of message authentication codes during its
normal operation and overcomes fundamental limitation on power of message authentication
codes. Authentication has two orders of magnitude faster and providing the same level of
security. Message authentication codes (MAC) uses a symmetric cryptography to authenticate
communication between two parties and shares a secret session key during the communication.
Sender of a message m computes a small bit string function of m and this is the key it shares with
the receiver. It then appends the string (MAC) to the message.
The receiver check the authenticity by computing the MAC in the same way and then comparing
it to the one appended to the message. To compute MAC each replica and each (active) client
shares a secret session key with each replica. Actually a pair of session keys for each pair of
replicas. Each replica has secret session key for each client that is used for communication in both
directions. Rather than a single session key it use a pair of keys for communication between
replicas and also to allow replicas to change independently. These keys are use to verify incoming
messages.

REFERENCES
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[9]

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SURVEY ON LINK LAYER ATTACKS IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS

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