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The Hardcore Shit I Hack
www.vantagepoint.sg | office@vantagepoint.sg
1
• Hi everyone my name is Paul Craig.
• My entire career has been hacking.
• Originally from New Zealand
• Stolen three times the net worth of Bill Gates.
• Now I lead the penetration testing team at Vantage Point.
• Boutique Singaporean Security Consultancy
• Strongest technical team in Singapore!
• We have Published Works, Referenced
Research, Accolades, Hall Of Fames, in SG
TV/Radio.
• Hackers who are passionate about hacking.
2
You told me you wanted hard-core hacking…
Today I want to share my most memorable jobs.
• Some are simple, some are hard-core.
• Some are subtle tweaks that produce real money.
• Some just took balls of steel….
3
• We break things at VP.
“We hack everything with a flashing light”
• A level above most “pen-testing” companies.
• We tackle jobs most companies shy away from.
• ATMs, Wireless, Reverse Engineering, Hardware, Software,
Mobile.
• Bleeding Edge technology
• FIPS3 Military compliant solutions.
• Polymorphic, cryptographically secure, virtualized..
I started pen-testing at 22, boy was my job was stressful.
4
 For the last three years the client has been developing a new
“secure” banking application.
 Development team 10+ years experience.
 Developers size me up..
 They have spent 3 years making sure I fail today.
 I have 1 week to prove myself, win, defeat the product.
 No one thinks I will accomplish anything.
5
“If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him.”
 First understand implicitly how the technology works.
 I go very quiet… and I just play.
 Click, Click, Click, Watch.
 Commit the technology to memory.
 Understand the risk profile.
 “what am I not allowed to do”
 “what do you care most about?”
 Understand the developers and how they work.
6
Hacking gets personal, fast.
• Developer 1 wrote this, Developer 2 wrote that..
• 10 year coding veteran
• Old school Java developer
• No knowledge of new technology
• “Phones call people”
• 3 years professional exp.
• Understands modern security
threats.
• Lacks experience.
7
• Understand the development style.
• Consistency:
• Does Developer 1 & Developer 2 write code
the same way.
• Work out who wrote what.
• Standardised:
• Do they follow security guidelines ?
• Are these guidelines up to date ?
8
 Developers are the key.
 People make vulnerabilities, not code.
 People are very predictable…
 Vulnerabilities occur in knowledge or skill gaps
 These gaps often stem from education and culture.
 Developers from China make different mistakes to those from India.
 Two developers from India make similar mistakes.
 Similar education, similar experience, similar mistakes.
9
Knowing is power.
Once you understand
• How the Technology works.
• How the Environment works.
• How the Developers work.
• You can hack anything, really, anything.
10
Mobile Applications
• Mobile has changed everything..
• Mobile apps are fundamentally differently to web applications
• Different risks, attack vectors and concerns.
• Web and Mobile may look similar - They are worlds apart.
11
Application Programmable Interfaces (APIs)
• Developers who wrote API’s in the past had more trust in
requests sent from Web Servers.
• The didn’t need to perform much validation or security.
• API’s now communicate directly to phones.
12
Web App Developers are now Mobile Developers
• In 2007, the job title “mobile app developer” didn’t exist. In 2012, there are
approximately 466,000 jobs in the growing “app economy” in the United States
alone.
• Mobile Application Developer Named “Best Computer Job For The Future”
• The job market for mobile application developers is expected to skyrocket by
32% from 2010 through 2020, creating close to 300,000 new positions and
heralding one of the decade’s largest increases for any occupation.
• Web Application developers just started coding Mobile.
• More work, better pay.
• They don’t go back to school to learn Mobile Development.
• Mobile applications are developed like Web Applications.
13
• Testing Mobile Communications.
• VP Laptop creates an access point
• Mobile Device VPN’s to VP laptop via WiFi
• Laptop Bridges WiFi VPN to Eth0
• iptables Pre-Route NAT requests to a Proxy
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ppp0 -p tcp --dport 80 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080 192.168.1.1
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ppp0 -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080 192.168.1.1
14
• Developers don’t seem to take Mobile Application security seriously.
• Usernames and Passwords stored in text files (plist)
• Encryption keys kept in local databases
• Hard coded passwords kept in binaries
• Lazy, sloppy, very hackable.
• At best a developer will use the Apple Key-Chain, albeit badly..
CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked;
CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock;
CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAlways;
CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly;
CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly;
CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly;
Most permissive
option
The option most
developers pick.
15
Developers think you cant change what is on the screen.
• Drop down menu - How many options do you see?
• A: Five? B: One? C: Options? Hackers don’t care about options!
155
158
Change verb to any customer ID
- Direct Object Reference
- 1-200 = All customers
“Really? Really?? Cant you just play a little hard to get?
138
16
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography
• Developers like to use cryptography as a method of
keeping secrets safe.
• Cryptography is often implemented incorrectly.
• Often it’s the only security implemented.
• This developer has made it hard! Encryption!
17
Mobile Technology Supports Asymmetric and Symmetric Cryptography
• When using Symmetric Algorithms, both parties share the same
key for encryption and decryption.
• Asymmetric algorithms use pairs of keys. One is used for
encryption and the other one for decryption.
• Developers in this case used symmetric cryptography.
AES128 Encrypted using
CCCrypt and a Preshared key.
Thx for the AES Key..
18
Encryption Used Foolishly
/process = Process Payment
• GET /process?=F5D82E4AD10287EF71B27C28D881FEA
GET /process?s=5191&t=2&a=100
• GET /process?=16A5CDE830F0638E530C8912F6231A
• GET /process?= EF5A98230FE152E6348D671A728C0320F
s = UserID
t = Transaction Type
a = Amount Transfer
GET /process?s=5190&t=2&a=100.
User 5190 just purchased $100
GET /process?s=5191&t=2&a=-100
User 5191 just purchased -$100 worth..
Double Negative = Positive.. Account credited
Hi Singapore!
I'm in your banks,
stealing your cash...
谢谢
Paul
19
Mobile API End Points
There is a huge list of crazy things we see:
CreateMoney(“ToAccount”, “Amount”) – You are kidding me right.?.”
• Extra API function left over from the testing period.
• Migrated to production, IM RICH!!!
ExportSales(“AccountID”,”format”)
ExportSales(“00001”,”csv”)
ExportSales(“00002”,”csv”)
ExportSales(“00003”,”csv”) …
ResetPassword(“username”, “newpassword”)
20
You probably know this App!
• Popular apps are still written by developers.
• Developers make the same mistakes, world-wide.
• “Status: Hacked by Vantage Point”
21
• Web Applications
• I have 15+ years of hacking web applications.
• Like Mobile applications the exploits are many.
• Stealing money / access / information
• Web is now mature, most developers know our tricks.
• OWASP, PCIDSS, MAS TRM
• Web applications use to take minutes to hack.
• Now they can take hours, even days in some cases.
22
• Our Setup:
• Web application – Burp - Internet
• Intercept and modify the traffic.
• HSTS: Strict HTTPS Transport Security
• Certificate is not trusted, thou shall not pass!
• No traffic intercept.
23
Install Burp Proxy Certificate in Laptop
• Proxy now Trusted CA
• Now we see data right?
24
End-To-End Encryption for FI’s
 Part of the MAS TRM is that all FI’s should implement application layer level
end-to-end encryption.
5.5.2 E2E encryption is required for online financial services, whether the systems are managed by the FI or outsourced to intra-group
or third party service providers. Sensitive information such as customer PINs and passwords should be protected with E2E encryption.
 JavaScript in the browser encrypts all POST values.
 Designed for only “Sensitive Information”
 Most developers simply encrypt everything.
 Using asymmetric encryption (Private / Public Keys)
 Another hoop we must jump through 9am Monday morning.
25
They love to make it harder…
 We must now replace the Public Key during the Crypto Initiation
 Decrypt subsequent data with our own matching Private Key
26
Security Stops when Developers Feel Safe.
And we Find Amazing Vulnerabilities!
• Control every aspect of an application.
• Steal billions of dollars!!!
• Thousands of Cross Site Scripting (over 6000)
• Hundreds of SQL Injection (over 200)
• E2E encryption actually lowers the security posture.
27
My most satisfying job was a Web Application.
• Insurance company in NZ
• Remote penetration test of the environment
• Discovered the HR/payroll system is exposed
• SQL Injection in the Authentication
• Very simple bug, easily exploited.
• It took seconds.
• Once inside I called the client.
• One problem, he didn’t believe me.
28
Pffttt.. Mobile is not hard core Paul.
I thought you were hard core, wtf do you got?
How about an ATM ?
29
The Job: Test if you can hack an ATM
Attack Vector:
• Service maintenance staff install a Trojan on the ATM.
• Attacker gains physical access to the ATM computer & installs Trojan.
• Platform:
• Hardened Windows 7 – already logged on.
• Running full screen ATM Software
• New USB devices disabled
• Running McAfee Solidcore (McAfee Application Control)
30
• File System Filter Driver – Ring 0
• Swin
• All binaries on the system are white-listed
• Once locked down, only white-listed binaries can run.
• Even if you get access to the ATM, you cant run anything.
• You can copy your Trojan to the ATM, you cannot run it.
31
McAfee Task Scheduler.
• C:/users/all users/McAfee/Scheduler
• Scheduling files for automated tasks
• “Run this command”
• “Unlock / Relock the System”
• Custom “INI” Style files.
• Writeable to all users.
32
Mass Pwnage – Hacking Indonesia
• Our Indonesian neighbours need some help 
• Engaged to pen-test a local bank in Jakarta
• “Anything goes” Penetration Test.
• Internal / External Network
• Wireless
• ATM’s
• Physical, Social, anything.
33
34
• No firewalls within the network
• Desktop users can talk to anything / everything
• Including other offices, servers, even the ATM’s!
• Windows 2000 and XP still in use.
• Wireless only for executives.
• WEP Security, only accessible from 6th floor.
• Employees relativity annoyed by this
• No reception at the kopitiam!
• Installed their own Access Point with big antenna.
• Soto Betawi & Wireless.
35
• I wanted impact, so we sat outside at the Kopitiam
• Dressed very formally at the road side on the little chairs.
• Everyone stared at us.
• My colleague busted the WEP in minutes.
• We had an Internal IP address
• Nmap for servers, services, devices.
• NBT (NetBios) names began to appear
• MailServer, ProxyServer, ATM21, ATM11..
• “The ATM, we must hack the ATM”
36
• “We are not the first people here.”
• ATM’s were already running Russian Malware
• Sending external information to host in Russia
• Dang, that’s a first….
• We continued hacking for two weeks:
• Domain Administrator
• root@ on all servers (shared SSH keys)
• Payroll, Audit, Commercial Banking, Retail Banking
• All ATM’s
• Routers
• All common passwords on all servers
• “12345password”, ‘bankname’, ‘password’, ‘passw0rd’
37
In Conclusion: We hack way too many things!
• At Vantage Point we live IT Security, it is our passion.
• I could spend hours talking about hacking.
• Its a passion, and we take it very seriously.
• We don’t just run 10 tools and ‘scan’ technology.
• We hack, using the most powerful tool – our minds.
If you also feel the same way, we are always hiring.
paul@vantagepoint.sg
38
Thank you
Paul @ vantagepoint.sg
Are there any questions ?

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The hardcore stuff i hack, experiences from past VAPT assignments

  • 1. The Hardcore Shit I Hack www.vantagepoint.sg | office@vantagepoint.sg
  • 2. 1 • Hi everyone my name is Paul Craig. • My entire career has been hacking. • Originally from New Zealand • Stolen three times the net worth of Bill Gates. • Now I lead the penetration testing team at Vantage Point. • Boutique Singaporean Security Consultancy • Strongest technical team in Singapore! • We have Published Works, Referenced Research, Accolades, Hall Of Fames, in SG TV/Radio. • Hackers who are passionate about hacking.
  • 3. 2 You told me you wanted hard-core hacking… Today I want to share my most memorable jobs. • Some are simple, some are hard-core. • Some are subtle tweaks that produce real money. • Some just took balls of steel….
  • 4. 3 • We break things at VP. “We hack everything with a flashing light” • A level above most “pen-testing” companies. • We tackle jobs most companies shy away from. • ATMs, Wireless, Reverse Engineering, Hardware, Software, Mobile. • Bleeding Edge technology • FIPS3 Military compliant solutions. • Polymorphic, cryptographically secure, virtualized.. I started pen-testing at 22, boy was my job was stressful.
  • 5. 4  For the last three years the client has been developing a new “secure” banking application.  Development team 10+ years experience.  Developers size me up..  They have spent 3 years making sure I fail today.  I have 1 week to prove myself, win, defeat the product.  No one thinks I will accomplish anything.
  • 6. 5 “If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him.”  First understand implicitly how the technology works.  I go very quiet… and I just play.  Click, Click, Click, Watch.  Commit the technology to memory.  Understand the risk profile.  “what am I not allowed to do”  “what do you care most about?”  Understand the developers and how they work.
  • 7. 6 Hacking gets personal, fast. • Developer 1 wrote this, Developer 2 wrote that.. • 10 year coding veteran • Old school Java developer • No knowledge of new technology • “Phones call people” • 3 years professional exp. • Understands modern security threats. • Lacks experience.
  • 8. 7 • Understand the development style. • Consistency: • Does Developer 1 & Developer 2 write code the same way. • Work out who wrote what. • Standardised: • Do they follow security guidelines ? • Are these guidelines up to date ?
  • 9. 8  Developers are the key.  People make vulnerabilities, not code.  People are very predictable…  Vulnerabilities occur in knowledge or skill gaps  These gaps often stem from education and culture.  Developers from China make different mistakes to those from India.  Two developers from India make similar mistakes.  Similar education, similar experience, similar mistakes.
  • 10. 9 Knowing is power. Once you understand • How the Technology works. • How the Environment works. • How the Developers work. • You can hack anything, really, anything.
  • 11. 10 Mobile Applications • Mobile has changed everything.. • Mobile apps are fundamentally differently to web applications • Different risks, attack vectors and concerns. • Web and Mobile may look similar - They are worlds apart.
  • 12. 11 Application Programmable Interfaces (APIs) • Developers who wrote API’s in the past had more trust in requests sent from Web Servers. • The didn’t need to perform much validation or security. • API’s now communicate directly to phones.
  • 13. 12 Web App Developers are now Mobile Developers • In 2007, the job title “mobile app developer” didn’t exist. In 2012, there are approximately 466,000 jobs in the growing “app economy” in the United States alone. • Mobile Application Developer Named “Best Computer Job For The Future” • The job market for mobile application developers is expected to skyrocket by 32% from 2010 through 2020, creating close to 300,000 new positions and heralding one of the decade’s largest increases for any occupation. • Web Application developers just started coding Mobile. • More work, better pay. • They don’t go back to school to learn Mobile Development. • Mobile applications are developed like Web Applications.
  • 14. 13 • Testing Mobile Communications. • VP Laptop creates an access point • Mobile Device VPN’s to VP laptop via WiFi • Laptop Bridges WiFi VPN to Eth0 • iptables Pre-Route NAT requests to a Proxy iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ppp0 -p tcp --dport 80 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080 192.168.1.1 iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i ppp0 -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080 192.168.1.1
  • 15. 14 • Developers don’t seem to take Mobile Application security seriously. • Usernames and Passwords stored in text files (plist) • Encryption keys kept in local databases • Hard coded passwords kept in binaries • Lazy, sloppy, very hackable. • At best a developer will use the Apple Key-Chain, albeit badly.. CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked; CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock; CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAlways; CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly; CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly; CFTypeRef kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly; Most permissive option The option most developers pick.
  • 16. 15 Developers think you cant change what is on the screen. • Drop down menu - How many options do you see? • A: Five? B: One? C: Options? Hackers don’t care about options! 155 158 Change verb to any customer ID - Direct Object Reference - 1-200 = All customers “Really? Really?? Cant you just play a little hard to get? 138
  • 17. 16 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography • Developers like to use cryptography as a method of keeping secrets safe. • Cryptography is often implemented incorrectly. • Often it’s the only security implemented. • This developer has made it hard! Encryption!
  • 18. 17 Mobile Technology Supports Asymmetric and Symmetric Cryptography • When using Symmetric Algorithms, both parties share the same key for encryption and decryption. • Asymmetric algorithms use pairs of keys. One is used for encryption and the other one for decryption. • Developers in this case used symmetric cryptography. AES128 Encrypted using CCCrypt and a Preshared key. Thx for the AES Key..
  • 19. 18 Encryption Used Foolishly /process = Process Payment • GET /process?=F5D82E4AD10287EF71B27C28D881FEA GET /process?s=5191&t=2&a=100 • GET /process?=16A5CDE830F0638E530C8912F6231A • GET /process?= EF5A98230FE152E6348D671A728C0320F s = UserID t = Transaction Type a = Amount Transfer GET /process?s=5190&t=2&a=100. User 5190 just purchased $100 GET /process?s=5191&t=2&a=-100 User 5191 just purchased -$100 worth.. Double Negative = Positive.. Account credited Hi Singapore! I'm in your banks, stealing your cash... 谢谢 Paul
  • 20. 19 Mobile API End Points There is a huge list of crazy things we see: CreateMoney(“ToAccount”, “Amount”) – You are kidding me right.?.” • Extra API function left over from the testing period. • Migrated to production, IM RICH!!! ExportSales(“AccountID”,”format”) ExportSales(“00001”,”csv”) ExportSales(“00002”,”csv”) ExportSales(“00003”,”csv”) … ResetPassword(“username”, “newpassword”)
  • 21. 20 You probably know this App! • Popular apps are still written by developers. • Developers make the same mistakes, world-wide. • “Status: Hacked by Vantage Point”
  • 22. 21 • Web Applications • I have 15+ years of hacking web applications. • Like Mobile applications the exploits are many. • Stealing money / access / information • Web is now mature, most developers know our tricks. • OWASP, PCIDSS, MAS TRM • Web applications use to take minutes to hack. • Now they can take hours, even days in some cases.
  • 23. 22 • Our Setup: • Web application – Burp - Internet • Intercept and modify the traffic. • HSTS: Strict HTTPS Transport Security • Certificate is not trusted, thou shall not pass! • No traffic intercept.
  • 24. 23 Install Burp Proxy Certificate in Laptop • Proxy now Trusted CA • Now we see data right?
  • 25. 24 End-To-End Encryption for FI’s  Part of the MAS TRM is that all FI’s should implement application layer level end-to-end encryption. 5.5.2 E2E encryption is required for online financial services, whether the systems are managed by the FI or outsourced to intra-group or third party service providers. Sensitive information such as customer PINs and passwords should be protected with E2E encryption.  JavaScript in the browser encrypts all POST values.  Designed for only “Sensitive Information”  Most developers simply encrypt everything.  Using asymmetric encryption (Private / Public Keys)  Another hoop we must jump through 9am Monday morning.
  • 26. 25 They love to make it harder…  We must now replace the Public Key during the Crypto Initiation  Decrypt subsequent data with our own matching Private Key
  • 27. 26 Security Stops when Developers Feel Safe. And we Find Amazing Vulnerabilities! • Control every aspect of an application. • Steal billions of dollars!!! • Thousands of Cross Site Scripting (over 6000) • Hundreds of SQL Injection (over 200) • E2E encryption actually lowers the security posture.
  • 28. 27 My most satisfying job was a Web Application. • Insurance company in NZ • Remote penetration test of the environment • Discovered the HR/payroll system is exposed • SQL Injection in the Authentication • Very simple bug, easily exploited. • It took seconds. • Once inside I called the client. • One problem, he didn’t believe me.
  • 29. 28 Pffttt.. Mobile is not hard core Paul. I thought you were hard core, wtf do you got? How about an ATM ?
  • 30. 29 The Job: Test if you can hack an ATM Attack Vector: • Service maintenance staff install a Trojan on the ATM. • Attacker gains physical access to the ATM computer & installs Trojan. • Platform: • Hardened Windows 7 – already logged on. • Running full screen ATM Software • New USB devices disabled • Running McAfee Solidcore (McAfee Application Control)
  • 31. 30 • File System Filter Driver – Ring 0 • Swin • All binaries on the system are white-listed • Once locked down, only white-listed binaries can run. • Even if you get access to the ATM, you cant run anything. • You can copy your Trojan to the ATM, you cannot run it.
  • 32. 31 McAfee Task Scheduler. • C:/users/all users/McAfee/Scheduler • Scheduling files for automated tasks • “Run this command” • “Unlock / Relock the System” • Custom “INI” Style files. • Writeable to all users.
  • 33. 32 Mass Pwnage – Hacking Indonesia • Our Indonesian neighbours need some help  • Engaged to pen-test a local bank in Jakarta • “Anything goes” Penetration Test. • Internal / External Network • Wireless • ATM’s • Physical, Social, anything.
  • 34. 33
  • 35. 34 • No firewalls within the network • Desktop users can talk to anything / everything • Including other offices, servers, even the ATM’s! • Windows 2000 and XP still in use. • Wireless only for executives. • WEP Security, only accessible from 6th floor. • Employees relativity annoyed by this • No reception at the kopitiam! • Installed their own Access Point with big antenna. • Soto Betawi & Wireless.
  • 36. 35 • I wanted impact, so we sat outside at the Kopitiam • Dressed very formally at the road side on the little chairs. • Everyone stared at us. • My colleague busted the WEP in minutes. • We had an Internal IP address • Nmap for servers, services, devices. • NBT (NetBios) names began to appear • MailServer, ProxyServer, ATM21, ATM11.. • “The ATM, we must hack the ATM”
  • 37. 36 • “We are not the first people here.” • ATM’s were already running Russian Malware • Sending external information to host in Russia • Dang, that’s a first…. • We continued hacking for two weeks: • Domain Administrator • root@ on all servers (shared SSH keys) • Payroll, Audit, Commercial Banking, Retail Banking • All ATM’s • Routers • All common passwords on all servers • “12345password”, ‘bankname’, ‘password’, ‘passw0rd’
  • 38. 37 In Conclusion: We hack way too many things! • At Vantage Point we live IT Security, it is our passion. • I could spend hours talking about hacking. • Its a passion, and we take it very seriously. • We don’t just run 10 tools and ‘scan’ technology. • We hack, using the most powerful tool – our minds. If you also feel the same way, we are always hiring. paul@vantagepoint.sg
  • 39. 38 Thank you Paul @ vantagepoint.sg Are there any questions ?