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The Real Incident of
     Stealing
a Droid App & Data

Akash Mahajan and Ankur Bhargava @ DroidCon Bangalore 2012
What we stole

   The Android Application Package File

      All the encrypted files found in the
                external storage

© Akash Mahajan      DroidCon Bangalore 2012   2
Not only we successfully
                 the app + data we
                    it on another
          device which was rooted

© Akash Mahajan   DroidCon Bangalore 2012   3
Them devs made it more secure?

   A device ID check was added

   We reversed the applications added our
   device ID and compiled it again.

   Able to execute again, yay!

© Akash Mahajan   DroidCon Bangalore 2012   4
THE DROID JOB
A standard Chinese made Tablet
running Android 4.0 (Indian Brand)

The application contained encrypted
data along with other resources.

 © Akash Mahajan       DroidCon Bangalore 2012   5
We had written
                  permission to
                      steal!

© Akash Mahajan       DroidCon Bangalore 2012   6
All your data are belong to us


All the encrypted data was with us

We didn’t have the encryption key

But we had the device with the key in
internal storage

 © Akash Mahajan   DroidCon Bangalore 2012   7
GONE IN 300 SECONDS

Android Backup API using Android Debug
Bridge because we had the package name.

ADB pull command, YAY!

> adb pull <remote> <local>

 © Akash Mahajan         DroidCon Bangalore 2012   8
DISCLAIMER


                  It is not Rocket
                       Science

                  Simple common
                  security testing
© Akash Mahajan       DroidCon Bangalore 2012   9
The Simple Hack

We knew find an exploit to root the device
might take some time and skill

Application written for the same version of
Android will run in all devices


 © Akash Mahajan       DroidCon Bangalore 2012   10
If the device having the
              application can’t be
            rooted, let us take the
          application to the rooted
                    device.
© Akash Mahajan   DroidCon Bangalore 2012   11
The Simple Hack

Once copied to the rooted device we could see
what the application was doing using DDMS.

Dalvik Debug Monitor Server provides among
other things process information about apps
running on a device connected in USB debug
mode.

 © Akash Mahajan       DroidCon Bangalore 2012   12
The key to everything
In this particular case, the encryption key was
required to decrypt the data.

We didn’t have file permissions to reach the key.

We decided not to go after the key. We weren’t
being paid enough for that.

 © Akash Mahajan          DroidCon Bangalore 2012   13
The Encryption Conundrum

If you give away your device, the only way you
can ensure safety of the data is by ensuring that
the symmetric encryption key isn’t stolen.

At any given point depending on the application
the key might be available in memory, temp
file/storage or on the chip itself.

 © Akash Mahajan    DroidCon Bangalore 2012     14
The Encryption Conundrum

But because the device is with the thieves, they
have all the time in the world to find it.

If nothing works, they can always break open
the device and steal the key from the storage.



 © Akash Mahajan   DroidCon Bangalore 2012         15
FREE CONSULTING /Checklist

Disable USB debugging port

Disable USB itself

Don’t give internet access in the device.

Obfuscate the source code.

Provide a unique key for each device.
© Akash Mahajan      DroidCon Bangalore 2012   16
SUCCESS KIDZ

Client felt assured about their device security

Dev had a more secure solution

We get to pretend that we are Android security
experts. We are not, just love the challenge.


© Akash Mahajan      DroidCon Bangalore 2012      17
WANTED
              DROID CHORS


                  @ankurbhargava87               @makash


© Akash Mahajan            DroidCon Bangalore 2012         18

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The real incident of stealing android app data

  • 1. The Real Incident of Stealing a Droid App & Data Akash Mahajan and Ankur Bhargava @ DroidCon Bangalore 2012
  • 2. What we stole The Android Application Package File All the encrypted files found in the external storage © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 2
  • 3. Not only we successfully the app + data we it on another device which was rooted © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 3
  • 4. Them devs made it more secure? A device ID check was added We reversed the applications added our device ID and compiled it again. Able to execute again, yay! © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 4
  • 5. THE DROID JOB A standard Chinese made Tablet running Android 4.0 (Indian Brand) The application contained encrypted data along with other resources. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 5
  • 6. We had written permission to steal! © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 6
  • 7. All your data are belong to us All the encrypted data was with us We didn’t have the encryption key But we had the device with the key in internal storage © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 7
  • 8. GONE IN 300 SECONDS Android Backup API using Android Debug Bridge because we had the package name. ADB pull command, YAY! > adb pull <remote> <local> © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 8
  • 9. DISCLAIMER It is not Rocket Science Simple common security testing © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 9
  • 10. The Simple Hack We knew find an exploit to root the device might take some time and skill Application written for the same version of Android will run in all devices © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 10
  • 11. If the device having the application can’t be rooted, let us take the application to the rooted device. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 11
  • 12. The Simple Hack Once copied to the rooted device we could see what the application was doing using DDMS. Dalvik Debug Monitor Server provides among other things process information about apps running on a device connected in USB debug mode. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 12
  • 13. The key to everything In this particular case, the encryption key was required to decrypt the data. We didn’t have file permissions to reach the key. We decided not to go after the key. We weren’t being paid enough for that. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 13
  • 14. The Encryption Conundrum If you give away your device, the only way you can ensure safety of the data is by ensuring that the symmetric encryption key isn’t stolen. At any given point depending on the application the key might be available in memory, temp file/storage or on the chip itself. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 14
  • 15. The Encryption Conundrum But because the device is with the thieves, they have all the time in the world to find it. If nothing works, they can always break open the device and steal the key from the storage. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 15
  • 16. FREE CONSULTING /Checklist Disable USB debugging port Disable USB itself Don’t give internet access in the device. Obfuscate the source code. Provide a unique key for each device. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 16
  • 17. SUCCESS KIDZ Client felt assured about their device security Dev had a more secure solution We get to pretend that we are Android security experts. We are not, just love the challenge. © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 17
  • 18. WANTED DROID CHORS @ankurbhargava87 @makash © Akash Mahajan DroidCon Bangalore 2012 18