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Understanding
CryptoLocker
(ransomware) with a
Case Study
Who Am I..?
Forensics Investigator
M.Tech (Information Security) in 2014, IIIT – Delhi
Former Intern at CIRT-India.
Interest : Any type of Cyber Forensics
Email : adarshagarwal91@gmail.com
LinkedIn : https://www.linkedin.com/in/adarshagarwal91
Disclaimer
• Entire analysis is done on individual basis.
• The information in this presentation and opinion are mine
alone and do not reflect those of my current employer.
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Ransomware
(CryptoLocker)
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
CryptoLocker a.k.a Ransomware
• CryptoLocker is a ransomware Trojan.
• Believed to have first been posted to the Internet on 5 September 2013.
• Smart enough to travel across your network and encrypt any files
located on shared network drives.
• Uses AES-265 or RSA public-key cryptography, with the private key
stored only on the malware's control servers.
CryptoLocker a.k.a Ransomware
• After Encryption, displays a message and popup which offers to
decrypt the data if payment is made within stated deadline, and
threatened to delete the private key if the deadline passes.
• Ransomwares generally has a 48-72 hour deadline which, once
passed, causes the ransom to increase or leads to key deletion.
• Most ransoms start in the $100-$500 area or 0.5 BTC to 4 BTC.
• 1 BTC = $ 430 (approx.) = 28600 INR.
Symptoms
• You suddenly cannot open normal files and get errors such as
the file is corrupted or has the wrong extension.
• An alarming message has been set to your desktop background
with instructions on how to pay to unlock your les.
• The program warns you that there is a countdown until the
ransom increases or you will not be able to decrypt your les.
• A window has opened to a ransomware program and you cannot
close it.
• You have files with names such as HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.TXT
or DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.HTML
Symptoms
You see a files similar to:
• %PUBLIC% desktophelp_restore_files_<random text>.html
• %PUBLIC% desktoprestore_files_<random text>.txt
• %PUBLIC% documentshelp_restore_files _<random text>.txt
• %PUBLIC% documentsrestore_files_<random text>.html
• %PUBLIC% favoritesrestore_files_<random text>.html
• %PUBLIC% favoritesrestore_files_<random text>.txt
• CryptoLocker.lnk
• HELP_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.TXT
• HELP_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.BMP
• HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.bmp
• HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt
• key.dat
• log.html
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
CryptoLocker Propagation
• Propagate via
phishing emails
unpatched programs
compromised websites
online advertising
free software downloads
Prior existing Botnet
Droppers file Path
• The file paths that have been used by this infection and its
droppers are:
• C:Users<User>AppDataLocal<random>.exe (Vista/7/8)
• C:Users<User>AppDataLocal<random>.exe (Vista/7/8)
• C:Documents and Settings<User>Application Data<random>.exe (XP)
• C:Documents and Settings<User>Local Application
Data<random>.exe (XP)
This ransomware can
search for files in all of
the folders with the
following extensions and
then encrypt them
Excluded directories, filenames & extensions
Source: Sophos
Variants of CryptoLocker
• TeslaCrypt
• Cryptowall
• Torrent Locker
• CTB-Locker
• CryptoVault
• PowerShell based
• Locky
• Ransom32 ( JavaScript based)
• Petya (Encrypts MBR)
• Many many more…
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
In 2016 (Jan to Mid April)
Week 2 – May, 2016
• May 9th 2016 - CryptXXX 2.0
• May 9th 2016 - The Enigma Ransomware (Russian)
• May 10th, 2016 - The Shujin Ransomware (Chinese)
• May 11th, 2016 - GNL Locker (German Netherlands Locker)
• May 12th, 2016 - CryptoHitman ( Jigsaw v2)
• May 12th, 2016 - Crypren Ransomware
• May 12th, 2016 - Mischa Ransomware (Petya variant)
• May 13th, 2016 - Offering Ransomware as a Service
• May 13th, 2016 - Decryptor for CryptXXX Version 2.0
May 9th 2016 - CryptXXX 2.0
May 9th 2016 - The Enigma Ransomware
(Russian)
May 10th, 2016 - The Shujin Ransomware
(Chinese)
May 11th, 2016 - GNL Locker (German
Netherlands Locker)
May 12th, 2016 - CryptoHitman
Jigsaw  CryptoHitman with Porno Extension
Jigsaw  CryptoHitman with Porno Extension
May 12th, 2016 - Crypren Ransomware
May 12th, 2016 - Mischa Ransomware (Petya variant)
May 13th, 2016 - Offering Ransomware as a Service
May 13th, 2016 - Decryptor for CryptXXX Version 2.0
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/teslacrypt-shuts-down-and-releases-master-decryption-key/
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/teslacrypt-shuts-down-and-releases-master-decryption-key/
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/ne
ws/security/emsisoft-releases-
decryptors-for-the-xorist-and-777-
ransomware/
I’m Infected, Now What?
• Disconnect Network, USB, Network Share
• Determine the Scope (Level of compromise or encryption)
• Determine type of infection
• Evaluate Your Responses
• Restore from a recent backup
• Decrypt your files using a 3rd party decryptor (this is a very slim chance)
• Do nothing (lose your data)
• Negotiate / Pay the ransom
Understanding CryptoLocker
Working
Source: Sophos
Anatomy of CryptoLocker
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Anatomy of CryptoLocker
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
CryptoLocker
Case Study - Teslacrypt
Generic Questions
• The initial infection vector (how the malware got on the system).
• The propagation mechanism (how the malware moves between
systems, if it does that).
• The persistence mechanism (how the malware remains on the
system, and survives reboots and when the user logs out).
• Artifacts (what traces the malware leaves on a system as a result
of its execution) that you can look for during an examination.
Case Study : TeslaCrypt
• Malware sample extracted from malwr.com.
• Used all open source tool to preform analysis.
• Tools used
• Volatility Framework 2.4
• “VolDiff” (REMnux OS)
• Regshot
• Log2timeline (SIFT)
• Virustotal.com
• Process Explorer (Windows SysInternals)
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Case Study : References
• [1] Zorabedian, John “Anatomy of a ransomware attack” https://blogs.sophos.com/2015/03/03/anatomy-of-a-
ransomware-attack-cryptolocker-cryptowall-and-how-to-stay-safe-infographic/; Last accessed on Oct 25, 2015.
• [2] James, Lance & Bambenek, John “The New Scourge of Ransomware: A Study of CryptoLocker and Its Friends”
https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/archives.html#the-new-scourge-of-ransomware-a-study-of-cryptolocker-and-its-
friends ; Last accessed on Oct 25, 2015.
• [3] Mustaca, Sorin "Are your IT professionals prepared for the challenges to come?"Computer Fraud & Seurity 2014.3
(2014): 18-20.
• [4] Allievi, Andrea et al. “Threat Spotlight: TeslaCrypt – Decrypt It Yourself”
http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/teslacrypt ; Last accessed on Oct 25, 2015.
• [5] Malwr.com (https://goo.gl/psdf5e) and Virustotal.com (https://goo.gl/D0o78x) analysis.
Prevention Measures
• Backup your files.
• Apply windows and other software updates regularly.
• Avoid clicking untrusted e-mail links or opening unsolicited e-mail attachments.
• Disable ActiveX content in Microsoft Office applications such as Word, Excel etc.
• Install Firewall and block Tor and restrictions for specific ports.
• Disable remote desktop connections.
• Block binaries running from %APPDATA%, %TEMP% paths.
"I am your enemy, the first one you've ever had who was smarter
than you. There is no teacher but the enemy. No one but the enemy
will tell you what the enemy is going to do. No one but the enemy
will ever teach you how to destroy and conquer. Only the enemy
shows you where you are weak. Only the enemy tells you where he is
strong. And the rules of the game are what you can do to him and
what you can stop him from doing to you. I am your enemy from
now on. From now on I am your teacher.”
Source : Ender’s Game
Conclusion
• Lots of googling
• Trendmicro blog
• Sophos
• Kaspersky Blog
• US – CERT
• http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/
• http://www.infoworld.com/
• https://blog.knowbe4.com/
References
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study
Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study

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Understanding CryptoLocker (Ransomware) with a Case Study

  • 2. Who Am I..? Forensics Investigator M.Tech (Information Security) in 2014, IIIT – Delhi Former Intern at CIRT-India. Interest : Any type of Cyber Forensics Email : adarshagarwal91@gmail.com LinkedIn : https://www.linkedin.com/in/adarshagarwal91
  • 3. Disclaimer • Entire analysis is done on individual basis. • The information in this presentation and opinion are mine alone and do not reflect those of my current employer.
  • 18. CryptoLocker a.k.a Ransomware • CryptoLocker is a ransomware Trojan. • Believed to have first been posted to the Internet on 5 September 2013. • Smart enough to travel across your network and encrypt any files located on shared network drives. • Uses AES-265 or RSA public-key cryptography, with the private key stored only on the malware's control servers.
  • 19. CryptoLocker a.k.a Ransomware • After Encryption, displays a message and popup which offers to decrypt the data if payment is made within stated deadline, and threatened to delete the private key if the deadline passes. • Ransomwares generally has a 48-72 hour deadline which, once passed, causes the ransom to increase or leads to key deletion. • Most ransoms start in the $100-$500 area or 0.5 BTC to 4 BTC. • 1 BTC = $ 430 (approx.) = 28600 INR.
  • 20. Symptoms • You suddenly cannot open normal files and get errors such as the file is corrupted or has the wrong extension. • An alarming message has been set to your desktop background with instructions on how to pay to unlock your les. • The program warns you that there is a countdown until the ransom increases or you will not be able to decrypt your les. • A window has opened to a ransomware program and you cannot close it. • You have files with names such as HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.TXT or DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.HTML
  • 21. Symptoms You see a files similar to: • %PUBLIC% desktophelp_restore_files_<random text>.html • %PUBLIC% desktoprestore_files_<random text>.txt • %PUBLIC% documentshelp_restore_files _<random text>.txt • %PUBLIC% documentsrestore_files_<random text>.html • %PUBLIC% favoritesrestore_files_<random text>.html • %PUBLIC% favoritesrestore_files_<random text>.txt • CryptoLocker.lnk • HELP_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.TXT • HELP_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.BMP • HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.bmp • HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt • key.dat • log.html
  • 28. CryptoLocker Propagation • Propagate via phishing emails unpatched programs compromised websites online advertising free software downloads Prior existing Botnet
  • 29. Droppers file Path • The file paths that have been used by this infection and its droppers are: • C:Users<User>AppDataLocal<random>.exe (Vista/7/8) • C:Users<User>AppDataLocal<random>.exe (Vista/7/8) • C:Documents and Settings<User>Application Data<random>.exe (XP) • C:Documents and Settings<User>Local Application Data<random>.exe (XP)
  • 30. This ransomware can search for files in all of the folders with the following extensions and then encrypt them
  • 31. Excluded directories, filenames & extensions Source: Sophos
  • 32. Variants of CryptoLocker • TeslaCrypt • Cryptowall • Torrent Locker • CTB-Locker • CryptoVault • PowerShell based • Locky • Ransom32 ( JavaScript based) • Petya (Encrypts MBR) • Many many more…
  • 34. In 2016 (Jan to Mid April)
  • 35. Week 2 – May, 2016 • May 9th 2016 - CryptXXX 2.0 • May 9th 2016 - The Enigma Ransomware (Russian) • May 10th, 2016 - The Shujin Ransomware (Chinese) • May 11th, 2016 - GNL Locker (German Netherlands Locker) • May 12th, 2016 - CryptoHitman ( Jigsaw v2) • May 12th, 2016 - Crypren Ransomware • May 12th, 2016 - Mischa Ransomware (Petya variant) • May 13th, 2016 - Offering Ransomware as a Service • May 13th, 2016 - Decryptor for CryptXXX Version 2.0
  • 36. May 9th 2016 - CryptXXX 2.0
  • 37. May 9th 2016 - The Enigma Ransomware (Russian)
  • 38. May 10th, 2016 - The Shujin Ransomware (Chinese)
  • 39. May 11th, 2016 - GNL Locker (German Netherlands Locker)
  • 40. May 12th, 2016 - CryptoHitman
  • 41. Jigsaw  CryptoHitman with Porno Extension
  • 42. Jigsaw  CryptoHitman with Porno Extension
  • 43. May 12th, 2016 - Crypren Ransomware
  • 44. May 12th, 2016 - Mischa Ransomware (Petya variant)
  • 45. May 13th, 2016 - Offering Ransomware as a Service
  • 46. May 13th, 2016 - Decryptor for CryptXXX Version 2.0
  • 50. I’m Infected, Now What? • Disconnect Network, USB, Network Share • Determine the Scope (Level of compromise or encryption) • Determine type of infection • Evaluate Your Responses • Restore from a recent backup • Decrypt your files using a 3rd party decryptor (this is a very slim chance) • Do nothing (lose your data) • Negotiate / Pay the ransom
  • 59. Generic Questions • The initial infection vector (how the malware got on the system). • The propagation mechanism (how the malware moves between systems, if it does that). • The persistence mechanism (how the malware remains on the system, and survives reboots and when the user logs out). • Artifacts (what traces the malware leaves on a system as a result of its execution) that you can look for during an examination.
  • 60. Case Study : TeslaCrypt • Malware sample extracted from malwr.com. • Used all open source tool to preform analysis. • Tools used • Volatility Framework 2.4 • “VolDiff” (REMnux OS) • Regshot • Log2timeline (SIFT) • Virustotal.com • Process Explorer (Windows SysInternals)
  • 62. Case Study : References • [1] Zorabedian, John “Anatomy of a ransomware attack” https://blogs.sophos.com/2015/03/03/anatomy-of-a- ransomware-attack-cryptolocker-cryptowall-and-how-to-stay-safe-infographic/; Last accessed on Oct 25, 2015. • [2] James, Lance & Bambenek, John “The New Scourge of Ransomware: A Study of CryptoLocker and Its Friends” https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/archives.html#the-new-scourge-of-ransomware-a-study-of-cryptolocker-and-its- friends ; Last accessed on Oct 25, 2015. • [3] Mustaca, Sorin "Are your IT professionals prepared for the challenges to come?"Computer Fraud & Seurity 2014.3 (2014): 18-20. • [4] Allievi, Andrea et al. “Threat Spotlight: TeslaCrypt – Decrypt It Yourself” http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/teslacrypt ; Last accessed on Oct 25, 2015. • [5] Malwr.com (https://goo.gl/psdf5e) and Virustotal.com (https://goo.gl/D0o78x) analysis.
  • 63. Prevention Measures • Backup your files. • Apply windows and other software updates regularly. • Avoid clicking untrusted e-mail links or opening unsolicited e-mail attachments. • Disable ActiveX content in Microsoft Office applications such as Word, Excel etc. • Install Firewall and block Tor and restrictions for specific ports. • Disable remote desktop connections. • Block binaries running from %APPDATA%, %TEMP% paths.
  • 64. "I am your enemy, the first one you've ever had who was smarter than you. There is no teacher but the enemy. No one but the enemy will tell you what the enemy is going to do. No one but the enemy will ever teach you how to destroy and conquer. Only the enemy shows you where you are weak. Only the enemy tells you where he is strong. And the rules of the game are what you can do to him and what you can stop him from doing to you. I am your enemy from now on. From now on I am your teacher.” Source : Ender’s Game Conclusion
  • 65. • Lots of googling • Trendmicro blog • Sophos • Kaspersky Blog • US – CERT • http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/ • http://www.infoworld.com/ • https://blog.knowbe4.com/ References