Understanding Justice Systems of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA & Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective | CAMP report

Copyright © CAMP 2013
Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP)
Understanding Justice Systems of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
FATA and Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective
All rights reserved
Citation, reproduction or translation of this publication, in
whole or part, for educational or other non-commercial
purposes is authorised but with written permission,
provided the source is fully acknowledged.
ISBN: 978-969-9534-07-02
Copies and more information available from:
P.O. Box 765
Email: publications@camp.org.pk & camp@camp.pk
Download from: www.camp.org
Authors: Naveed Ahmed Shinwari & Neha Ali Gauhar
Design & Printed by: Waya Communications, Islamabad
Illustrations: Rehan ud Din Khattak
Paper: EU, 100 gm, FSC certified

Table of Contents
Map of Pakistan- showing FATA, KP and Balochistan ii
List of Acronyms iii
Preface V
Executive Summary Vii
Chapter 1: The political and administrative structure of FATA,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan
1
Chapter 2: The Formal Structure of Courts in Pakistan 11
Chapter 3: Nizam-e-Adl – A New Addition To The Formal System 15
Chapter 4: Knowledge of Formal and Informal Justice Systems and
their use
21
Chapter 5: Pakhtun awareness and opinion of the institutions and
actors in KP and Balochistan
27
Chapter 6: The Jirga: A traditional Justice system 43
Chapter 7: The state of Fundamental Rights and Jirga 59
Chapter 8: Women and the Jirga system 77
Chapter 9: Access To Justice and Conflict Dynamics 95
Chapter 10: Legality and Legitimacy; Formal and Informal systems
Compared
111
Chapter 11: The Way Forward – Jirga Evolution 139
Annex I Methodology 152
Annex II Questionnaire 160
Annex III Target Demographics 189

Alternate Dispute Resolution ADR
Anti-Terrorism Courts ATC
Awami National Party ANP
Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC
Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme CAMP
Code of Civil Procedure CPC
District Coordination Officer DCO
District Police Officer DPO
FATA Tribunal FT
Federally Administered Tribal Areas FATA
Federal Board of Revenue FBR
Federal Shariat Court FSC
Focus Group Discussions FGDs
First Information Report FIR
Frontier Regions FRs
Frontier Crimes Regulation FCR
Government of Pakistan GoP
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan HRCP
International Convention for the Elimination of all forms
of Racial Discrimination
ICERD
Internally Displaced Persons IDPs
Key Informant Interviews KIIs
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KP
Musalihati Anjumans MAs
National Assembly NA
National Finance Commission NFC
Nizam-e-Adl Regulation NAR
Non-Governmental Organisations NGOs
North West Frontier Province NWFP
Pakistan Penal Code PPC
Political Agent PA
Peshawar High Court PHC
Post Crisis Needs Assessment PCNA
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas PATA
Supreme Court of Pakistan SCP
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi TNSM
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan TTP
United Nations Development Programme UNDP
List of Acronyms
iii

Preface
Historically, individuals, social groups and
societies have disputed with and competed
against one another over scarce commodities
and resources - land, money, political power,
and ideology. In many parts of the world,
traditional systems of justice and dispute
resolution are being approached to resolve
conflicts, and to ensure peace and stability
within local societies or tribes. Often those
systems are suitable to resolve modern,
current conflicts because they satisfy the
local cultural and religious sentiments. This
aspect, the traditions related to religion and
local codes of justice, often make them more
successful than the contemporary or modern
justice systems. The existing body of literature
confirms that the nature and causes of conflicts
and the mechanisms for resolving them are
deeply rooted in the culture and history of
every society; they are in many important ways
unique to them.
However, such traditional systems are being
criticised for their incongruence with modern
justice systems or their tendency to violate
some very basic principles of human rights,
especially women’s and minority rights.
The Pakhtun Jirga’ is one such traditional or
tribal justice system being practiced by the
Pakhtun or Pashtun ethnic group that lives
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. There are over
forty million Pakhtuns living on both sides of
the Durand Line in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Pakhtuns inhabit an area of more than 100,000
square miles bisected by the Durand Line since
1893. In Pakistan, Pakhtuns reside in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In addition,
Karachi also hosts some 3 to 4 million Pakhtuns
who migrated from different parts of the
Pakhtun dominated areas of Pakistan.
The subject of this report is the opinion of
Pakhtun people living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP) and Balochistan with regard to the systems
of justice in those Provinces. In 2010, similar
research was conducted among the Pakhtuns in
FATA. In this report, comparisons between these
provinces and FATA are presented.
The judicial structure in Pakistan is derived
from the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 1908
and the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance
(II of 1962). However, the formal court system
has evolved to meet circumstances demanding
changes; one of the latest ones was the addition
of the Nizam-e-Adl courts as part of the
agreement to resolve the conflict in Malakand
Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2009.
The approach of Pakhtuns is distinct from
the Pakistani judicial structure when it comes
to accessing justice in those areas where
Pakhtunwali, the “ways of the Pakhtun.”
prevails. To them ‘Jirga’ is still the preferred
form of informal or parallel justice mechanism.
Formally, the Jirga is still the mechanism for
dispensing justice and resolving conflicts in
the FATA under the Frontier Crimes Regulation
(FCR). However, Jirga is informal, i.e., not
codified in Pakistani civil law in other parts of
Pakhtun dominated areas of Pakistan.
On the other hand, in Pakistan, it is generally
perceived, by the Pakhtun, that the formal justice
system does provide a system that is comparable
to the Jirga. Generally, the Pakistani public lacks
confidence in the formal justice system, which
has undermined the Rule of Law and contributed
to rising violence, including crime, terrorism and
human rights abuses. For a majority of Pakistanis,
the formal justice system is seen as expensive;
has no provision for compensation for victims; is
slow and is widely perceived as corrupt, biased
and dominated by the rich. These beliefs provide
v

a conducive environment for the Jirga to remain
the preferred option over the modern justice
system in Pakhtun areas. Hence such a situation
has provided a favourable environment for Jirga
to flourish and remain the only available option
for the Pakhtun community.
The findings of CAMP’s two research studies
on Jirga – this one and the one conducted in
2010 on FATA – suggest that underestimating
the efficiency and effectiveness of Jirga would
be a mistake, especially because it plays an
essential role in the maintenance of social
order and has proved successful in the past.
It is inexpensive, speedy and accessible to
the poor. It is concluded that traditional
approaches to conflict resolution are able to
deal with conflict before they spread because
of their decentralized and local availability, plus
the confidence gained in the cultural context
and belief systems.
In developing this understanding, many
people have contributed to this report. The
compilation of this report would have never
been possible without the active involvement
and intellectual insight of 2,400 men and
women respondents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and Balochistan, who are most familiar with
the subject. They were extremely helpful in
sharing their knowledge of and insight into the
institution and dynamics of Jirga and the tribal
way of life, which have remained a mystery to
the outsiders till this day. Their willingness to
contribute to this report helped Community
Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP)
develop a perspective on various aspects of
Jirga, which is the focus of this report.
I am equally grateful to the key informants and
participants from the focused group discussions,
who willingly shared their knowledge and
experience on the subject, without which it
would not have been easy to develop a Pakhtun
perspective on the justice system.
The enumerators from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and Balochistan, male and female, deserve
special recognition for their commitment
in carrying out the survey in rather difficult
conditions and in some remote areas. We are
extremely grateful to their contribution.
Neha Ali Gauhar, the deputy researcher and
co-author of this report deserves special
appreciation for contributing to this report. A
lawyer by training and a Human Rights activist,
Neha did a wonderful job in highlighting and
comparing the human rights issues in the
informal justice system, especially that of
women and minorities in the Pakhtun region.
Fareeha Sultan, project manager for CAMP’s
Rule of Law Programme, deserves special
appreciation for coordinating numerous
activities and achieving some very ambitious
and difficult targets for the project. I appreciate
the efforts of Naveed Akhtar, field researcher/
consultant, for assisting Riaz-ul-haq, our Senior
Manager Research/surveys in coordinating
field activities in the field.
I am very grateful to Riaz-ul-haq (Sr. Manager
Research), who assisted this research in
terms of coordinating field work, organising
enumerators trainings, and focused group
discussions, supervising and managing the
data gathering and data feeding, and, finally,
providing me with cleaned data sets. Special
thanks to Mariam A. Khan our Director
Programme and Meher Khan for their support
and proof reading the report. My appreciation
goes to Irum Ali Khan and Aezaz Khan for their
help in compiling information on the structure
of formal justice system in Pakistan and their
support in proof reading.
Without the generous financial support of the
German Embassy, Islamabad, this research
would not have been possible; I am extremely
grateful. Special gratitude to Ms. Barbara Voss,
First Secretary Political and Mr. Andreas Dauth,
Third Secretary Political for their constant
support and encouragement.
Finally, Kris Merschrod, deserves recognition
for having provided timely and valuable
services in editing the report. Kris has been
interested in both Pakhtun culture and in
my work since we met in Peshawar when he
was working on a survey of FATA in 2008. He
is a US Sociologist who has been working on
development programmes for over 30 years.
All views expressed in this report are solely mine
and Neha’s, as are any mistakes and errors.
Naveed Ahmad Shinwari
Chief Executive (CAMP) and Principal Author
vi

Executive Summary
This report is an expression of Community
Appraisal and Motivation Programme’s (CAMP)
mission to understand the Pakistani Pakhtun
perspective on access to justice and their way
of resolving conflict.
This report is based on both qualitative
and quantitative data. For the qualitative
information, twenty-four focus-group
discussions (half male and half female) and sixty
key informant interviews were used to gather
insights and opinions. Minutes were recorded,
analysed and utilised to both write this report
and to inform the design of questionnaires.
Because the FGDs were used to inform the
design of the final survey questionnaire, not
all of the questions in the survey were asked
or discussed in the focus groups. Background
and historical material used in the report came
from a review of historical books, newspapers,
reports, articles, journals, and the experience of
CAMP programmes.
The quantitative part was planned to
incorporate the perceptions of 2,400 men
and women on different aspects of justice
and dispute resolution affecting the life of the
people of KP and the Pakhtuns of Balochistan.
The statistics were drawn from interviews and
included the perceptions of 50.27% men and
49.8% women. The objective was to sample
enough adult males and females, urban and
rural, to achieve, a 95% confidence level, a
2% confidence interval for their opinion on
key issues related to Jirgas and the system of
justice for the people of KP and Balochistan.
In this report, the anecdotal findings from
the qualitative methods is followed by the
statistical findings from the quantitative
methods. Often the qualitative findings reflect
generally held beliefs about the traditional
system of justice, but the quantitative findings
show more current opinions weighted by the
percentage of the males and females who hold
the opinions at the present time.
The report begins with an overview and history
of the political and administrative structure of
FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan
- the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan except for
Karachi – where this research was conducted.
Understanding of this context is a necessary
introduction to the formal court system and
its evolution in those same areas. These
two historical and descriptive introductory
chapters are followed by a chapter on the
Nizam-e-Adl as an important, modern,
perhaps, evolutionary, transition that bridges
the traditions of the Pakhtun, Shariah Law,
formal British based systems, and the result of
negotiated conflict resolution. The formation
of the Nizam-e-Adl system received a great
deal of international coverage and generated
heated debate within the Pakistani partisan
political system. The results of the research
are interesting and provide insight that may be
useful for judicial reform and the evolution of
Jirga-like conflict resolution.
After the background, the research begins to
meticulously peel back the many layers that
form the context of justice. The report begins
with a chapter on the knowledge of the people
at the community level concerning the formal
and informal justice systems and their use.
The chapter on awareness is followed by the
opinion of the people towards the justice
system and the key personalities outside of the
immediate community. It is satisfying to know
how aware people are of the systems and it
is also necessary to understand that level of
awareness and the opinions that go with the
awareness when considering reforms.
The chapter on the traditional Jirga is then
vii

presented, describing this traditional and
culturally rooted system, the people’s
awareness and experience with the system,
plus their opinion from perspectives used
throughout the report – fairness, access,
bias, human rights, and concordance with the
Qur’an. A chapter on Fundamental Human
Rights is inserted as a reminder of international
and modern perspectives before returning to
the subject of women’s rights and the Jirga
system as a special chapter.
To bring the Jirga and formal justice systems
into the present context of conflict, a chapter is
devoted to justice and conflict dynamics. This
leads the reader to a comparative chapter on
the legitimacy of the Jirga and formal justice
systems from the opinion of the Pakhtun.
The final chapter returns to the Jirga and
perspective on ways forward toward improving
access and the quality of justice.
The findings and surprises are too numerous
to cite in an executive summary. Instead, the
reader is invited to reflect on the themes
above, chapter by chapter, and to ponder the
dialectic between the qualitative, commonly
held beliefs of both Pakhtun and outsiders,
and the quantitative statistics with which
we weigh the debate between the male and
female Pakhtuns, as they openly shared their
opinions about justice and conflict resolution.
viii

1
The Political and Administrative
Structure of FATA, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan
Chapter: 1

2
THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF FATA,
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA AND BALOCHISTAN
Introduction
This chapter explains the political and administra-
tive framework of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa and Balochistan. It includes a historical
brief on the Pakhtun belt and a description of
various methods of governance in each region.
Furthermore, the chapter also examines the ap-
plicability of Article 246 and 247 of the Constitu-
tion of Pakistan 1973 on FATA and the Provincially
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (PATA).
The structure of FATA Administration
Pakistan’s tribal areas comprise of seven agen-
cies and six frontier regions (FRs). They are:
• Khyber Agency
• Bajaur Agency
• Mohmand Agency
• Orakzai Agency
• Kurram Agency
• North Waziristan
Agency
• South Waziristan
Agency
• FR Peshawar
• FR Kohat
• FR Bannu
• FR Lakki
• FR Tank
• FR D.I Khan
The population of FATA is 3.17 million and its
total area is 27,220 square kilometers.1
The
British moved into the area in the second
half of the 19th
century with the aim to keep
Czarist Russia away from the British India.
The people living in this region used to live
in accordance with their own time honoured
customs and traditions.2
Soon after their ingress into the region, the
British realised the need for a framework of
laws for a more repressive administration
of the area and its people. Consensus was
reached that the existing system be codified
in order that there will be no deviation from
the manner in which the people had lived
for centuries.3
An important aspect of the
administrative system devised by the British
was that the government would not come into
direct confrontation with the tribes on issues
that were contentious and divisive. An indirect
system of administration was thus created for
the FATA region.
To implement the Constitutional provisions de-
scribed above, the President must be linked to lo-
cal, tribal structures through the office of the Polit-
ical Agent (PA).4
In most Colonial structures where
tribal societies existed, the external structure takes
1) Census Report of FATA 1998. http://www.census.gov.pk/ProvinceRegion.htm (accessed 29 October 2012)
2) Interview with Rustam Shah Mohmand, former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Political Agent, dated 12 May 2011
3) Interview with Rustam Shah Mohmand, former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Political Agent, dated 12 May 2011
4) Political Agent is a representative of federal bureaucracy. Unlike his counterpart in the settled districts of Pakistan, he
was appropriately given this title. The incumbents of this office were drawn from the Indian civil or sometime military
service who would have acquired a certain degree of proficiency not only in Pashtu but also in administrative affairs of
the area. Only the most outstanding men of very high caliber were posted as political agents. On one hand he was the
representative of the Crown, charged with ensuring that the area he administered posed no serious security threats for
the government and on the other hand he was an advocate of the tribes vis-à-vis the government

3
control of the local leadership and hence annexes
the tribal structure. The region has a peculiar
system of administration. The people are governed
through their local chieftains called Maliks and
through financial compensation (Nikath) con-
trolled by the Federal Government and exercised
by a Political Agent. It is this structure that has
kept the transition from Colonial to Constitutional
times intact. Each sub-division (Tehsil) is headed by
its Asistant Political Agent. The PA performs several
functions at the same time: he acts as an execu-
tive, a judge and a revenue collector. He also heads
the Agency Council and oversees development
projects while all line departments of the Federal
Government come under his authority.
FATA is divided into the administrative catego-
ries of ‘protected’ and ‘non-protected’ areas.
Protected areas are regions under the direct
control of the government, while ‘non-protect-
ed’ areas are administered indirectly through
local tribes. Protected areas are those areas
where government has invested in infrastruc-
ture such as roads, hospitals, schools, grid
stations, government offices, etc.
The Political Structure of FATA
The Indian Independence Act of 3 June 1947
abrogated all the special treaties. What was
later known as Pakistan opted not to base
troops in the FATA region because 200 Maliks,
during a Loya Jirga, signed an instrument of
accession with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the
founder and first Governor-General of Paki-
stan, in return for continued allowances and
subsidies. On 14 August 1947, when Pakistan
was created as a sovereign Muslim state, it
also recognised the semi-autonomous status
of the Pakhtun tribes of FATA and the instru-
ment of accession. The 1956, 1962 and 1973
Constitutions of Pakistan retained the same
agreements recognising the special status of
the FATA with very few changes.
In Article 1 (c) of the 1973 Constitution of
Pakistan, FATA is included as one of the terri-
tories of Pakistan and Article 246 (c) stipulates
some seven tribal agencies and six frontier
regions (FRs) that comprise the FATA. Article
247 prescribes the manner and method of
administering FATA and states; that the execu-
tive authority of the Federation extends to
FATA and that the Governor of the North West
Frontier Province of Pakistan (now named
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), as directed by the
President of Pakistan, shall administer it.
The other sections of Article 247 state that:
(2) The President may, from time to
time, give such directions to the Governor of
a Province relating to the whole or any part
of a Tribal Area within the Province as he may
deem necessary, and the Governor shall, in
the exercise of his functions under this Article,
comply with such directions.
(3) No Act of Majilis-e- Shoora (Parlia-
ment) shall apply to any Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Area or to any part thereof unless
the President so directs, and no Act of Parlia-
ment or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to
a Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, or to
any part thereof, unless the Governor of the
Province in which the Tribal Area is situated,
with the approval of President, so directs; and
in giving such a direction with respect to any
law the President or, as the case may be, the
Governor, may direct that the law shall, in its
application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified
part thereof, have effect subject to such excep-
tions and modifications as may be specified in
the direction.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained
in the Constitution, the President may, with
respect to any matter within the legislative
competence of and the Governor of a Province,
with the prior approval of the President, may
with respect to any matter within the legislative
competence of the Provincial Assembly make
regulations for the peace and good Government
of Provincially Administered Tribal Area or any
part thereof, situated in the Province.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained
in the Constitution, the President may, with
respect to any matter, make regulations for the
peace and good Government of a Federally
Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof.
(6) The President may, at any time, by
Order, direct that the whole or any part of a
Tribal Area shall cease to be Tribal Area, and
such Order may contain such incidental and
consequential provisions as appear to the
President to be necessary and proper. Pro-
vided that before making any Order under this
clause, the President shall ascertain, in such
manner, as he considers appropriate, the views
of the people of the Tribal Area concerned, as
represented in the Tribal Jirga.
(7) Neither the Supreme Court nor a High
Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the
Chapter1|ThepoliticalandadministrativestructureofFATA,KhyberPakhtunkhwaandBalochistan

4
Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless
Parliament, by law, otherwise provides:
(8) Provided that nothing in this
clause shall affect the jurisdiction, which the
Supreme Court or a High Court exercised in
relation to a Tribal Area immediately before
the commencing day.
Most of the civil, criminal, electoral and fiscal
laws have only been extended to the ‘admin-
istered areas’ or ‘protected areas’ of FATA5
through presidential ordinances; however, no
serious efforts have been initiated to properly
implement these laws.6
Besides, as per the
constitutional arrangement, the President
may, subject to ascertaining the views of the
tribal Jirga, abolish the status of a given FATA
region/Agency and convert it into a settled
area.7
The President may, from time to time,
issue directions to his agent, as stipulated
in Article 145 of the Constitution. No Act of
Parliament or any part thereof is extended
to FATA unless the President so directs, while
Clause 7 of Article 247 bars the extension of
superior courts, including Supreme Court and
High Court to FATA unless the Parliament so
provides under a law.
The President may make regulations with
respect to any matter for the peace and good
governance of FATA or any part thereof. FATA is
represented in the Lower (National Assembly)
and Upper (Senate) Houses of the Parliament
by 12 and 8 members, respectively. However,
because the parliament has no jurisdiction
over FATA, it is not clear what importance the
FATA representatives have. FATA is geographi-
cally contiguous with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa;
however, it has no representation in the pro-
vincial parliament.
On August 12, 2011, the Pakistan People’s
Party government signed an order which in-
troduced amendments to the FCR, including: A
Tribunal was to be reconstituted to serve as an
appellate forum with respect to orders passed
by Political Agents, although critics have
charged that it is staffed by federal bureaucrats
and there is still no independent judiciary in
FATA;8
jail inspections were to be conducted by
the Tribunal and the Political Agents; the right
of bail was extended to every accused; every
accused was to be brought before a judicial
authority – presumably the Political Agents
– within 24 hours; women, children below
16, and elders above 65 years of age, were
exempted from the collective responsibility
provisions9
of the FCR; among other reforms.
However, Human Rights advocates have
countered that the collective responsibility
law should have been completely done away
5) Government property such as offices, hospitals, schools, grid stations, roads, water tube wells, cantonments,
market areas, forts, etc. are areas where FCR is applicable. The rest is called ‘non-protected areas’ where local cul-
ture and traditions regulate the local life
6) In-depth interviews with a legal fraternity from FATA – January – March 2011
7) Settled areas or districts are part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which are represented in the provincial and national parlia-
ment. All normal laws of Pakistan apply to these areas and the superior judiciary is also fully functional there.
8) Taj, Farhat. ‘Analysis: New FATA Reforms – Good but Insufficient’, Daily Times (August 20, 2011)
9) Section 21 and 22 of FCR 2011 deals with “collective responsibility”, they state as: -Section 21) Blockade of hostile or
unfriendly tribe. – In the event of any tribe of Federally Administered Tribal Areas or any section of the tribe or any member
of the tribe, acting in hostile, subversive or offensive manner towards the State or to any person residing within the settled
area of Pakistan, the Political Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, by an order in writing may direct,– (a)
the arrest of hostile members of such tribe wherever they may be, and the attachment of the property both movable and
immovable wherever it may be found, belonging to them or any of them; (b) the detention in safe custody of any person
so arrested or property so attached; and (c) debar all or any such member of the tribe from access into the settled area of
Pakistan by public proclamation: Provided that the above-mentioned actions shall be taken against PLAREENA of the accused
in the first instance, and if the circumstances so warrant, then any or all of the following actions may be taken by a well-rea-
soned order in writing against,- (i) the sub-section of the tribe of the accused; (ii) the section of the tribe of the accused;
(iii) any other section of the tribe of the accused. Provided further that the confiscation of the property so attached shall be
made after public proclamation and holding necessary inquiry: Provided also that women, children less than sixteen years of
age persons over sixty-five years of age shall not be arrested and detained under this section
Section 22) Fines on communities accessory to crime.–(1) Where, from the circumstances of any case, there appears to be
good reason to believe that the inhabitants of any village, or part of a village, or any of them, have - (a) connived at, or in any
way abetted, the commission of any offence; or (b) failed to render any assistance in their power to discover the offenders
or to affect their arrest; (c) connived at the escape of, or harbored, any offender or person suspected of having taken part in
thecommissionofanyoffence;or(d)combinedtosuppressmaterialevidenceofthecommissionofanoffence;thePolitical
Agent or District Coordination Officer, as the case may be, may with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, impose a
fineontheinhabitantsofsuchvillageorpartofavillage,oranyofthemasawhole:Providedthatwomen,childrenlessthan
sixteen years of age and persons over sixty-five years of age shall not be arrested and detained under this section

5
with because the role of the Political Agent
has been retained, “the reforms do not concur
with one of the key principles of Human Rights:
separation of the judiciary and the executive.”10
The structure of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa admin-
istration
The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for-
mally known as NWFP (North West Frontier
Province) is comprised of 24 districts with the
following ‘settled areas:’
• Abbottabad
• Bannu
• Battagram
• Charsadda
• Dera Ismail Khan
• Hangu
• Haripur
• Kohistan
• Kohat
• Karak
• Lakki Marwat
• Mansehra
• Mardan
• Nowshera
• Swabi
• Peshawar
• Tank
In addition to the settled areas of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa direct administrative control is
also over the Provincially Administered Tribal
Areas (PATA) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which
consist of the district of Malakand and parts of
the districts of:
• Upper Dir
• Lower Dir
• Chitral
• Swat
• Buner
• Shangla
• Tor-Ghar
The province is spread over a total area of
74,521 square kilometers. According to the
most recent census report, the total popula-
tion of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is 17.7 million
with an annual growth rate of 2.82 percent and
a gender ratio of 1.05 men to every woman.11
In 1998, population of PATA was reported to be
831,000. Predominately Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and PATA is home to Pashtuns, however there
is a spectrum of ethnic groups and languages
inherent in the region. In addition to Pashtu,
Khowar, Hindko, Kohistani, Seraiki, Shina,
Torwali, Kashmiri, Kalasha and Kaghani are spo-
ken. Nearly all the inhabitants of the province
are Muslim, predominantly Sunni, and minority
Shia (including Ismailis), as well as a small
population of Shamanists in Chitral.12
The political and administrative structure of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
With the accession to the new state of
Pakistan in 1947, and the extension of civil
administration in 1969 in North West Frontier
Province (NWFP), now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
brought an end to the rule of the princely
states (small independent states that be-
came a part of Pakistan during the twentieth
century). The “Dir, Chitral and Swat (Adminis-
tration) Regulation” of 1969 transformed the
powers of rulers to the Government, simulta-
neously incorporating previous laws, regula-
tions, orders, procedures and customs in the
civil administration.13
This created a perplexed
legal system in the region because tribal
codes at times contradicted the law.
10) Ibid. Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment, federal civil bureaucrats within FATA, and tribal elites all stand
to lose significant powers if the Federal Government were to repeal the FCR altogether, establish regular civil and criminal
courts in FATA, and extend the jurisdiction of the Peshawar High Court and Supreme Court of Pakistan to FATA
11) http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/aboutus/Area-Population.php (accessed 18 October 2012)
12)Post Crisis Need Assessment Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Depart-
ments/PnD/mne/MnE/Download/7.%20PCNA%20Report.pdf (accessed 29 October 2012)
13)Sultan-i-Rome, 2006, p.267 Administrative System of the Princely State of Swat, Vol. XXXXIII. No. 2

6
In contrast to the system of governance in
FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been under
the rule of the provincial government since
Pakistan came into being, with active partici-
pation of political parties in elections under
the application of the constitution.14
The
parallel systems of administration in Khy-
ber Pakhtunkhwa include two categories of
distinct legal and administrative structures.
The first category structure includes the set-
tled districts, where the citizens and political
parties are entitled to the same rights and
liberties as those in the rest of the country.15
The second category forms the Provincially
Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) where the
governor extends the laws and rights to the
region with the approval of the President,
based on the provisions of Article 246 (b) of
the Constitution of Pakistan.16
The legal framework of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
is identical to the governance structure of the
rest of the nation. The Chief Minister, elected
as the chief executive of the province, along
with a 124-member Provincial Assembly is
responsible for the administrative governance
of the province. The provincial government is
headed by the Governor who is appointed by
the federal administration. Khyber Pakhtunkh-
wa’s civil bureaucracy is under the authority
of the Chief Secretary who is responsible for
the supervision of the various departments
headed by departmental secretaries. Policing
at the provincial level is in command of the
Provincial Police Officer. At district level, the
District Coordination Officer (DCO) looks after
law and order, with support from the District
Police Officer (DPO).17
The Local Government Ordinance of 2001
provides the legal framework for the settled
districts of the province. However, a new
local government system to replace the 2001
system is being discussed by the Provincial
Assembly; in the interim period, the DCO is
responsible for functions delegated to local
government.18
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA)
Like FATA, justice administration in PATA
of KP was also based on the hierarchy of
forums created under the FCR until the FCR
was repealed in relation to PATA through the
Frontier Crimes Regulation (Repeal) in 1973.
After that date many Pakistani laws – includ-
ing the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898,
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [CPC], and
Evidence Act, 1872 – were extended to the
PATA in KP through various statutes, regula-
tions and notifications. Moreover, the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and
the Peshawar High Court were extended to
the PATA in KP in 1973 through the Supreme
Court and High Court (Extension of Jurisdic-
tion to Certain Tribal Areas) Act, 1973, that
received Presidential assent on February 9,
1973. The 1973 Constitution was approved by
the National Assembly on April 10, 1973, and
as mentioned earlier, Article 247(7) therein
provides that neither the SCP nor a High Court
shall exercise any jurisdiction in relation to a
tribal area, however, the same provision goes
on to add that “provided that nothing in this
clause shall affect the jurisdiction which the
Supreme Court or a High Court exercised in
relation to a Tribal Area immediately before
the commencing day.” Thus, the SCP and the
Peshawar High Court exercise jurisdiction over
the PATA of KP.
Further, the PATA Regulations of 1975 [PATA
Criminal Laws [Special Provisions) Regula-
tion (CrPC); PATA Civil Procedure (Special
Provisions) Regulation; and subsequent
amendments of 1976] vested judicial author-
ity in each District’s Deputy Commissioners,
and empowered Jirga’s to decide civil and
criminal disputes under the supervision of
the revenue officer (tehsildar). As a result of
the Regulations, many of the provisions of
14) Post Crisis Need Assessment Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Depart-
15) Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, http://csis.org/files/publication/120119_
Mehboob_KhyberPakhtunkhwa_Web.pdf (accessed on 1 November 2012)
16) Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, http://csis.org/files/publication/120119_
Mehboob_KhyberPakhtunkhwa_Web.pdf (accessed on 1 November 2012)
18) Post Crisis Needs Assessment Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas , September 2010,
http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Departments/PnD/mne/MnE/Download/7.%20PCNA%20Report.pdf (ac-
cessed of 3 November 2012)

7
the CPC, CrPC, and the Evidence Act, 1872
were not applicable to dispute settlement by
the Jirga’s, although in some cases analogous
provisions referencing those statutes were
created under the Regulations. Any appeal
against the Jirga’s decision would be made
to the Deputy Commissioner and the pro-
vincial Home Secretary. In the late 1980s a
petition was submitted in the Peshawar High
Court pleading for the abolition of the PATA
Regulations. The Peshawar High Court gave its
verdict in favour of the petition; the Federal
Government then appealed to the SCP which
ruled in 1995 that the PATA Regulations were
unconstitutional and struck them down, thus
vesting judicial authority in regular civil and
criminal courts, as well as restoring the full
application of the CPC, CrPC, and Qanun-e-
Shahadat Order, 1984 (Pakistan’s amended
evidence law).
However, by the time the SCP declared
the PATA Regulations to be ultra vires, the
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
[TNSM] had already laid down its demand
for the imposition of Shariah in Malakand Di-
vision, which includes the Districts of Buner,
Chitral, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Malakand,
Shangla and Swat. Thus, in addition to the
aforementioned civil/criminal procedure and
evidence laws, the KP Government enacted
the PATA (Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Shariah ) Regula-
tion, 1994, and accompanying Rules, which
made it compulsory for judicial officers
(deemed Qazis under the Regulation) of civil
and criminal courts in Malakand Division,
as well as Kohistan District, to ask for the
assistance of Islamic clerics (Muavineen-
e-Qazi). The advice of the cleric, however,
was not binding on the court. The TNSM
objected to this arrangement and as a result
the Federal Government promulgated the
Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 1999, which
required Qazis to follow the principles of
Shariah, and to adjudicate all proceedings
on its basis, thereby increasing the cler-
ics’ influence in the courts. A decade later,
following a protracted conflict between the
military and TNSM in Malakand, the provin-
cial Awami National Party acceded to, and
President Zardari signed into law, the Shariah
Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009, which again
affirmed the judicial authority of Qazis and
the influence of clerics. Moreover, the 2009
Regulation constituted a ‘Dar-ul-Qaza’ i.e. an
“appellate or revisional court” in pursuance
of Article 198(4) of the Constitution,19
and
also a ‘Dar ul Dar ul Qaza’ i.e. a “final appel-
late and revisional court” in pursuance of
Article 183(2) of the Constitution.20
As a re-
sult of the Regulation, the jurisdiction of the
SCP and the Peshawar High Court have once
again been ousted in relation to the PATA of
KP. Indeed, under the 2009 Regulation, the
laws which had previously been extended to
PATA – including the CrPC, CPC and Qanun-e-
Shahadat Order – are deemed to be appli-
cable in PATA, subject to the modifications
specified in the 2009 Regulation. The 2009
Regulation applies to all of PATA except the
tribal area adjoining Mansehra District and
the former state of Amb.
Therefore, the second category sets apart
the administrative and political framework
of PATA from that of the rest of the country.
This distinction is based on the provisions of
Article 246(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan,
which states that:
“No Act of the provincial assembly can be ap-
plied to PATA. The Governor of the respective
province has a mandate parallel to that of the
President of Pakistan over FATA. PATA includes
former princely states, tribal areas, and tribal
territories within districts”.21
The provision of the Constitution explicitly
states that the laws of the provincial assembly
do not apply to PATA. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s
Chief Minister exercises control over PATA and
is represented in the provincial legislature.
The Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can
change or extend laws to PATA only with the
President’s approval. In terms of legal frame-
19) See sec. 2(1)(c) of the 2009 Regulation. Article 198(4) of the Constitution deals with the ‘Seat of the High Court’
provides that: “Each of the High Courts may have Benches at such other places as the Governor may determine on
the advice of the Cabinet and in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court.” In other words, the Dar-ul-
Qaza serves as the defacto High Court of the PATA in KP
20) See sec. 2(1)(b) of the 2009 Regulation. Article 183(2) of the Constitution deals with the ‘Seat of the Supreme
Court’ and provides that: “The Supreme Court may from time to time sit in such other places as the Chief Justice
of Pakistan, with the approval of the President, may appoint. In other words, the Dar-ul-Dar-ul-Qazi serves as the
defacto Supreme Court of the PATA in KP
21) The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/ (accessed on 11 October 2012)

8
work, Pakistan’s Criminal Procedure Code is
not applicable to PATA; however, in distinction
to FATA, PATA is subject to the jurisdiction of
Pakistan’s regular court system.22
The structure of Balochistan administration
Balochistan is divided into 29 districts, the
districts in the province are:
• Awaran
• Bolan
• Barkhan
• Chaghi
• Dera-Bugti
• Gawadar
• Jafferabad
• Jhal Magsi
• Qilla Abdullah
• Qilla Saifullah
• Kohlu
• Kharan
• Kalat
• Khuzdar
• Kech
• Lasbela
• Loralai
• Mastung
• Musakhail
• Nushki
• Nasirabad
• Panjgur
• Pishin
• Quetta
• Sibi
• Sherani
• Washuk
• Ziarat
• Zhob
The Province of Balochistan is also divided
between settled and unsettled areas, which
constitute as the Provincially Administered
Tribal Areas (PATA) of Balochistan and consists
of the following districts:
• Zhob District,
• Loralai District (excluding DukiTehail)
• Dalbandin Tehsil of Chaghi district
• Marri and Bugti tribal territories of Sibi district
With a population of 6.6 million23
stretched
over 147,000 square miles, Balochistan
comprises nearly half of the landmass of
Pakistan24
. The province named after the Ba-
loch tribes is the largest but least populated
and underdeveloped province of Pakistan.
Balochistan consists of a plethora of ethnic
groups; the Baloch are a majority in south
and east of the province, where as a Pashtun
majority is found in the north. The capital of
the province, Quetta comprises of a majority
of Pashtuns with Baloch, Hazara and Punjabis
in the minority. A significant number of Brahui
speakers are predominate near the Kalat
region of the province, while Persian-speaking
Dehwars also reside in the region and around
the Iranian border. Makrani Balochis are
found typically living along the coast. Further-
more, Balochistan has now become home to
769,000 Afghans including Pashtuns, Tajiks,
and Hazaras. Many Sindhi farmers have also
moved to the more arable lands in the east of
the province.25
The political and administrative structure of
Balochistan
On June 29, 1947, the Shahi Jirga of the British
Balochistan along with the elected members
23) Census report, http://www.census.gov.pk/ProvinceRegion.htm (accessed 29 October 2012)
24) Balochistan in Turmoil, Alok bansal, Manas publications 2010
25) Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security, Pakistan Insti-
tute for Peace Studies. December 2010

9
26) Pildat, Balochistan: Civil and Military Relations, March 2012, http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/
balochistanconflict/IssuePaperBalochistanConflictCMR.pdf
27) Balochistan Problems and Solutions, Vision 21 Foundation
28) Adeney, Katharine. and Wyatt, Andrew, 2004. Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure-Agency
Dichotomy. Political Studies, Vol. 52, pp.1-18
29-30) Waseem, Mohammad, 1994. Politics and the State in Pakistan. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and
Cultural Research
31) Adeney, Katharine. and Wyatt, Andrew, 2004. Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure-Agency
Dichotomy. Political Studies, Vol. 52, pp.1-18
32-33) Grievances, Rights, and Conflict in Balochistan: Institutional Challenges for the Pakistani State Sameen A.
Mohsin Ali and Hassan E. Ansari http://www.mjpa.umich.edu/uploads/2012/aliansari.pdf
34) Pildat, Balochistan: Civil and Military Relations, March 2012, http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/
balochistanconflict/IssuePaperBalochistanConflictCMR.pdf
35) Government of Balochistan, http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/ (Accessed 1st December 2012)
of Quetta municipal body unanimously passed
a resolution forming part of Pakistan. Later,
on July 18, 1947,26
when the Independence of
India Act was passed by the British Parliament,
the resolution was recognised as the choice of
the people of British Balochistan.
Balochistan has battled with conflict and
insecurity ever since it was fully integrated
with Pakistan in 1971. There have been
five insurgencies in Balochistan since the
creation of Pakistan, which have resulted in
more than five thousand deaths among the
insurgents and almost three thousand among
the Pakistan army.27
The 1947 partition of the
subcontinent left behind two separate nations
who chose to adopt the federal structure to
deal with conflict in their ‘newly carved-out
territories’.28
Balochistan remained “outside
the direct administrative jurisdiction of the
colonial regime” during the British rule.29
Con-
sequently the partition triggered the under-
developed province to lag further behind in
progress and continued to be “largely on the
margins of the state structure”.30
This diver-
gence was exacerbated by the poor execution
of the federal system that centralised power
in the province of Punjab. The civil war in
Balochistan from 1973-1977 further desta-
bilised the province, which resulted in the
loss of nine thousand people by the Pakistan
army operation.31
The most recent resurgence
of conflict and insecurity in the province oc-
curred in 2005 and has continued ever since.
However, violence in the province escalated
when ex-President Musharraf’s convoy was
attacked in Balochistan in December 2005 and
the military launched an operation that led
to the killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, an
influential tribal chief.32
The recurring cycles
of violence and bloodshed in Balochistan,
contrary to what the media has portrayed,
surpasses the level of violence in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa or the Federally Administered
Tribal Agencies.33
Today, Balochistan faces militancy, mayhem
and an increasingly complex network of politi-
cal interests that makes it nearly impossible
for policymakers to bring peace and stability
in the province. The presence of the Quetta
Shura of the Taliban, the positioning of the
Durand Line, the ongoing military operations
and inexorable Human Rights violations in
the region have led to the existence and the
strengthening of militant groups such as the
Baloch Liberation Army, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,
Lashkar-e-Taiba. The signing of the 7th
Na-
tional Finance Commission (NFC) award, the
passage of the 18 Constitutional Amendment,
the adoption of a package of reforms and
concessions called ‘Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balo-
chistan’ were significant, but there were failed
steps taken by the Government in addressing
these longstanding grievances in the region.34
Balochistan has a parliamentary form of
government, which is similar to the rest of
the provinces of Pakistan. The province is
headed by the Governor, who is appointed by
the President of Pakistan on the advice of the
provincial Chief Minister. The Chief Minister,
the province’s chief executive, is normally the
leader of the largest political party or alliance
of parties in the provincial assembly. The
Provincial Assembly of Balochistan consists
of 65 seats of which 4% are reserved for non-
Muslims and 16% exclusively for women. The
legal framework of Balochistan mirrors that of
the rest of the country. The judicial branch of
government is carried out by the Balochistan
High Court, which is based in Quetta and
headed by a Chief Justice.35

10
Conclusion
The chapter builds a basis for the understand-
ing of the legal and political framework of
FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan,
which is essential to highlight the role of
informal justice systems in the region. Lit-
tle has been done to clarify and reform the
judicial and legal system in FATA and PATA, as
multiple systems of justice provisions exist in
the region. It is essential for all actors of the
State to take responsibility for addressing the
underlying concerns of access to justice and
strengthening the linkages between formal
and informal justice mechanisms.

11
The Formal Structure of
Courts in Pakistan
Chapter: 2

12
THE FORMAL STRUCTURE
OF COURTS IN PAKISTAN
Introduction
The judicial structure in Pakistan is derived
from the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 190836
and the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance
(II of 1962). However, the formal court system
has evolved to meet circumstances demanding
changes; one of the latest ones was the addi-
tion of the Nizam-e-Adl courts as part of the
conflict resolution in Malakand in 2009.
Under the West Pakistan Civil Court Ordi-
nance 1962, the power for determining the
class and jurisdiction of Civil Judges lies with
the relevant High Court.37
The courts’ structure of Pakistan, in descending
order, is as follows:
A. Supreme Court of Pakistan (premier court
seated in the federal capital, Islamabad)
B. Federal Shariat Court
C. High Court(s) of Pakistan (provincial and
federal level)
D. District and Sessions Courts (district level)
E. Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate Courts;
these deal with purely civil matters ex-
cept as empowered under Section 30 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)
1898, to hear criminal matters.
F. Special Courts
Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP)
The Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) is the pre-
mier court of the country; it has the final author-
ity in all legal and constitutional matters.38
It is
comprised of a Chief Justice and 16 permanent
judges.39
It has a permanent seat in Islamabad,
with Branch Registries in the capital of each prov-
ince at Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi.40
Justices of the Supreme Court are supervised
by the Supreme Judicial Council, and derive
their authority from Articles 176 to Article 191
of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan 1973, which explain the functions and
powers of the court.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
in disputes involving the federal or provincial
governments under Article 184; it will exercise
original jurisdiction while enforcing fundamen-
tal rights, but only when a question of ‘public
importance’ is involved.41
Appellate jurisdiction
in civil and criminal matters is exercised by the
SCP under Article 185, while Article 186 pro-
vides scope for advisory jurisdiction while ex-
tending advice to government in legal matters.
Federal Shariat Court (FSC) of Pakistan
The Federal Shariat Court (FSC) of Pakistan was
established under a Presidential order in 1980.42
36) Hussain, Faqir (Registrar, Supreme Court of Pakistan) The Judicial System of Pakistan, Revised (15th February 2011)
37) Ibid
38) PLD 2001, S.C. 607, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
39) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, as amended by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act
2010 (Mahmood, M, p 601)
41-42) Ibid

13
The rationale for its establishment is to scrutinise
all laws within the country in order to ascertain
whether they are in line with Islamic values as
expressed in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.43
The FSC is comprised of 8 Muslim judges in-
cluding the Chief Justice.44
Among the judges
at least three must be Islamic Scholars/Ulema
who are well versed in Islamic law.45
The decisions of the FSC are binding on all the
High Courts and other subordinate courts.46
The Supreme Court also has a Shariat Appel-
late Bench which has the power to review
decisions of the FSC.47
High Courts of Pakistan
There is one High Court in each province as well
as one in the federal capital of Islamabad.48
They
are as follows:
1. Lahore High Court, Lahore, Punjab
2. Sindh High Court, Karachi, Sindh
3. Peshawar High Court, Peshawar,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
4. Balochistan High Court, Quetta,
Balochistan
5. Islamabad (Federal) High Court, Islamabad
The High Courts are the appellate forums for all
civil and criminal cases within the territorial lim-
its of each respective province.49
Articles 192 to
203 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan 1973 provide for the functions and
powers of the High Courts in Pakistan.
Under the Constitution, any particular High
Court will exercise both its original and appel-
late jurisdiction under Article 199 for the en-
forcement of Fundamental Rights and review
of judgments/orders of the subordinate courts
in civil and criminal disputes.
District and Session Courts of Pakistan
The District and Session courts are functional
in every district of each province, with civil
jurisdiction under West Pakistan Civil Court
Ordinance 1962 and criminal jurisdiction under
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1898.50
In each District headquarter, there are numer-
ous Additional District and Session Judges who
usually head the courts. A District and Session
Judge has both executive and judicial power all
over the district within his jurisdiction.51
The Session Court is also a trial court for severe
criminal offences such as murder, rape, armed
robbery and others where specific amount of
gold and/or cash is involved. It also serves as an
appellate court for civil suits of lesser value.52
All towns and cities of Pakistan now have a
separate Additional District court and a Session
Judge; they all have equal authority within
their respective jurisdiction. When hearing
criminal cases, it is known as the Session Court,
while adjudicating upon civil cases, it becomes
the District Court.53
The High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction
over the lower courts in each province,54
and,
in turn, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has
authority and appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions of High Court.55
Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate Courts
(with power of Section 30 of Cr.PC 1898 only
in criminal trials)
There are multiple Civil and ‘Judicial Magis-
trates’ Courts in every tehsil and district.56
A
Magistrate under the powers of Section 30,
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1898, has
the authority to hear criminal cases, excluding
those cases that would involve the death pen-
alty as punishment, for example, attempted
murder, banditry, robbery, extortion, etc.57
In relation to awarding penalties, the Magis-
trates’ Courts can only award a punishment
of up to seven years’ imprisonment.58
Where
imprisonment is deemed to be more than
seven years, that particular case must then
be referred to a higher court.59
Each Judicial
43) Article 203D, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
44) Article 203C, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
45) Article 203C, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
47-55) Ibid
56) Section 30, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
57-59) Ibid
Chapter2|TheFormalStructureofCourtsinPakistan

14
Magistrate’s Court is also given a jurisdiction,
normally covering one or more police stations
of any particular locality.60
‘Special Courts’ of Pakistan
In addition to the above mentioned courts
there are some Special Courts or Tribunals and
Boards that deal with ‘specialised’ cases that
require certain expertise for resolution.61
These include the banking/consumer courts;
anti-corruption, anti-terrorism, and anti-narcot-
ics courts; family courts and special magistrate
courts (seated at the District/Session Courts);
Labour Relations Courts; Juvenile Courts; nu-
merous tribunals which include the services
tribunal, and Income Tax Tribunals; and, the
Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).
Nizam-e-Adl in Malakand
One of the most recent additions to the formal
courts system in Pakistan has been the Nizam-
e-Adl. In the case of the Nizam-e-Adl we have
a special mechanism for justice that came
about as part of the negotiations to establish
a settlement to the civil war in the Swat valley
that ended in 2009. Malakand has been part of
PATA since 2007. It had previously been a Tribal
Area known as the “Malakand Protected Area”,
part of the Malakand Agency of PATA. From 1970
to 2000 the District was part of Malakand Divi-
sion, and as part of PATA, has the other systems
of justice described above. As a means to end the
civil war of the mid-2000, the government of Pa-
kistan negotiated a ceasefire by agreeing, in part,
to establish Shariah-based Courts. In 2009 these
Courts were established after legislative approval
of the Presidential proposal.
Hence in an area that had been under the regu-
lations and justice systems previously described
about PATA a new system came into being. In
the following chapters, we describe how Nizam-
e-Adl functions, and the opinion of Malakand’s
citizens toward Nizam-e-Adl in comparison to
the pre-existing systems of justice.
60) Ibid
61) Hussain, Faqir (Registrar, Supreme Court of Pakistan) The Judicial System of Pakistan, Revised (15th
February
2011)
62)The Hanafi school of thought is derived, from the Qur’an, the authentic narrations of the Prophet (Hadith), Con-
sensus (Ijma), and analogical reasoning (qiyas), qiyas only being applied if direct material cannot be found in the
Qur’an or Hadith. It is this last reasoning that makes the Pakistani application considering the beliefs or traditions of
the disputants relevant, but also a point of friction with the TNSM

15
Nizam-e-Adl in
Malakand
Chapter: 3

16
63) These Malakand wars were described from a decidedly colonial perspective by the then, Lt. Winston Churchill,
1898, The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War, Dover Publications
64) Dawn, 3 May 2009 Gohan, Ali
65) The English meaning of this expression is “not according to Shariah.”
Nizam-e-Adl in Malakand
Introduction
Of the systems of justice described in preceed-
ing chapters, all have either evolved from the
Pakhtun culture, e.g., Jirga, from British juris-
prudence, e.g., the Pakistani courts, or from
the colonial FCR. In case of the Nizam-e-Adl
we have a special mechanism for justice that
came about as part of the negotiations to es-
tablish a settlement to the civil war in the Swat
Valley that ended in 2009 and applies only to
Malakand in PATA. Malakand has been part of
PATA since 2007. It had previously been a tribal
area known as the Malakand Protected Area,
part of the Malakand Agency of FATA. From
1970 to 2000 Swat was part of Malakand Divi-
sion, and as part of PATA, Malakand has two,
elected MPAs in the KP Provincial Assembly.
Malakand has always been a strategic area.
During the late 1800s the British tried63
to push
back the controlled area toward the Khyber
Pass so that an assumed Czarist advance from
Afghanistan could be held back. Malakand is
the gateway between the commercial city of
Charsadda in KP and the Swat valley. With the
resurgence of the Taliban in Pakistan in early
2000s and the resulting civil war of the 2000s be-
tween the Pakistani Army and Islamic Militants,
the struggle to control Malakand as the gateway
to the Swat valley after the siege of Lal Masjid
in 2007 required special efforts for a negotiated
settlement. In 2008 the party (Awami National
Party) that led the KP provincial government led
negotiations for a political solution with the Teh-
reek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariaht-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).
It was complicated, but essential, to exchange
their leadership to renounce violence, the central
government of Pakistan passed the Nizam-e-Adl
regulation in 2009, that established the practice
of Shariah law in Malakand division.
Hence in an area that had been under the
regulations and justice systems previously de-
scribed about PATA, a new system came into
being. In this section we will describe how
Nizam-e-Adl functions and the opinion of Mal-
akand’s citizens toward Nizam-e-Adl in compar-
ison with the pre-existing systems of justice.
Structure of the Nizam-e-Adl
The Nizam-e-Adl consists of three levels: 1) ilaqa
(local); 2 zila (district); and 3) darul qaza the
highest court, to which appeals from the lower
courts can be made. To date, only the highest
level (darul qaza) has been established. The
judges (Qazi) at each level are appointed by the
government. This, government appointment,
apparently was not anticipated by the TNSM
because in 200964
Sufi Mohammad said “Dele-
gating Qazis` powers to judges is not according
to Shariah.”65
. We want Qazis in accordance
with Shariah.” He said the TNSM wanted to
transform the judicial system into Islamic Shari-
ah system. “The point is that from early Islamic
times the Qazi had been appointed by the Is-
lamic rulers from among men of confidence and
known to be studied in Islamic jurisprudence,
Sufi Mohammad believed that he would have
been consulted about appointees. Hence, the
appointees would have been stricter. There is
another aspect that comes from the scholarly

17
66) It is derived, from the Qur’an, the authentic narrations of the Prophet (Hadith), Consensus (ijma), and analogical
reasoning (qiyas), qiyas only being applied if direct material cannot be found in the Qur’an or Hadith. It is this last
reasoning that makes the Pakistani application considering the beliefs or traditions of the disputants relevant, but
also a point of friction with the TNSM
debate about the term Ijmā or the consensus of
the Muslim scholars. For some the term refers
to the opinion of the community of Shariah
scholars, for others the term community refers
to the whole Muslim community. Therefore, an
interesting aspect of the system as practiced in
the Malakand context is that these courts do
not conform to the local tradition and religious
interpretation of Shariah law by the disputants
rather than an absolute Shariah code. It is more
in the broader Hanafi66
school of legal thought.
This reminds us of the variation in Jirga conclu-
sions from area to area simply because the local
interpretation of Pakhtunwali varies as does the
interpretation of what applies from Shariah. In
other words, there is a varying jurisprudence,
but, in this case, because the Nizam-e-Adl
began in the context of Malakand in 2009, we
can assume that previous Jirga and also formal
systems of PATA from 1970 onward would tem-
per or influence this system too. Some reports
indicated that what the leaders of Tehreek-e-Na-
faz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi had in mind, e.g.
Sufi Muhammad and Muslim Khan, was the
application of Shariah as practiced and advocat-
ed by the Taliban.
The proceeding of the Nizam-e-Adl is initiated
by an aggrieved party. The complaint can be
filed directly by any citizen. It is not necessary
to employ a lawyer, the filing fee is minor, and
when the parties are brought before the judge
(Qazi), the judge uses both Shariah law and
a negotiated settlement between the parties
to arrive at a conclusion. This aspect, the ne-
gotiated settlement instead of a punishment
brought against a “guilty party” and a fine paid
to the state is an echo of traditional Pakhtun
justice and resolving a dispute rather than the
formal system where the state decides the
punishment or fine. It is a system of mitigation
and conflict resolution.
Another important aspect of the system is that
in Pakistan there is a formal study of Shariah
law among the lawyers. Many have studied
both Shariah and Pakistani jurisprudence
and because they are more urban, as well as
schooled in international law and civil rights,
the use of traditional punishments, that we
have seen above are on the decline such as
hand chopping for robbery, stoning to death
for adultery etc. Their dispute settlements
bring more modern practices into the realm.
Survey Data
Given that background we now turn to survey
data from the sampled Malakand population
comparing their knowledge of, and confidence
in, Nizam-e-Adl compared with the other sys-
tems described earlier in this chapter.
The following figure indicates the percentage
of the respondents who are aware of each
justice institution.
Chapter3|Nizam-e-AdlinMalakand

18
In general we find that the respondents from
Malakand are more aware of the various justice
systems than the rest of the sample. This is un-
derstandable given that other districts includes
more rural districts. Malakand is a commercial
center and is close to major cities and has been
part of PATA since 1970, much earlier than other
PATA districts in the sample. It is interesting that
only 49.8% of the respondents in Malakand
were aware of the Nizam-e-Adl considering all
the debate about its establishment. However,
when the data is separated by gender it is clear
that the males (70%) are more aware than the
females (29.4%). This is an important finding for
future work in gender awareness and also for
managing the data in other responses.
The Character of Justice
The survey data that follows, compares the
opinion of the sample from Malakand with the
overall sample. This comparison will reveal in-
tresting similarities as well as differences in the
Jirga vs. Nizam-e-Adl findings. We will present
the two samples as “(% all; %Malakand).”
This question lies within a general context and
does not only pertain to Jirga, but also to other
forms of informal dispute resolution systems,
such as respected elders or other influential
persons within a family or community to play
as mediators.
Comparing the responses favouring informal
dispute resolution systems over other insti-
tutions, we see a very clear difference. The
majority, (55.1%; 58.7%) of the respondents,
much more than for any other institute men-
tioned earlier, believed that informal dispute
resolution mechanisms are affordable. Since
this was a multiple response question, we
see that the second opinion of respondents
was the quick dispensation of justice, (46.1%;
44.5%). The rest of the opinions, all negative
aspects, are single digits. Only 3.4%; 3% be-
lieved that informal institutions can be influ-
enced by the powerful, the weaker party thus
not receiving due justice.
Surprisingly, only 2.8%; 1.1% respondents
thought that informal institutions are ‘gen-
der equal’. Informal institutions are known
for their gender insensitivity and as a major
limitation however, the survey result shows
that, overwhelming majority is in a state of
denial or do not perceive the gender bias.
Furthermore, only 1.6%; 0.6% feared that
these informal institutions are influenced by
‘bribes’, while equal percentage of respon-
dents, 1.6%; 2.4% believed that informal
institutions lack the ability to ensure Human
Rights standards.
Importantly, in comparison with the other
justice institutions where approximately 80%
of the sample did not offer an opinion, when
it comes to informal systems only 18%; 14.4%
did not respond. With this question we do not
find an important difference in the responses
between the people of Malakand and the Pa-
khtuns in general.

19
The composition and reputation of members
of Nizam-e-Adl
What are the criteria for membership in the
Nizam-e-Adl? (Malakand Division Only)
As stated earlier, Nizam-e-Adl is a newly es-
tablished entity in Malakand Division of KP,
and therefore, people in Pakistan, in general,
do not understand how the system has been
implemented. As shown above, approximately
half of the Malakand sample is not aware of
this system. As with the other major themes of
this research we began with focus groups and
then used the survey to weigh the findings.
Male FGDs
The criteria for a Nizam-e-Adl Qazi, that the
male respondents shared was quite clear.
Overwhelming majority of the male respon-
dents thought that since Nizam-e-Adl is a
Shariah based justice system therefore Qazis
should be graduates of well-reputed religious
institutions in Islamic law and jurisprudence.
However, a few respondents opined that Qazis
are basically judges of formal courts and are
functioning as Qazis in Nizam-e-Adl even though
their formation was not based on Shariah law.
Therefore, they thought that it does not make
any difference whether the case goes before
Nizam-e-Adl or formal courts.
Another criterion to become a Qazi, accord-
ing to the respondents, is that Qazis should
be honest and pious. Another group of re-
spondents believed that Qazis should have
knowledge of local customs so as to deal with
issues of local nature. Some thought that Qazis
should have worldly education too along with
religious education.
Some participants of the FGD believed that rich
parties try to buy people so as to get justice
according to their own will; therefore the mon-
etary element can always play a role. However,
they opined, if a Qazi is honest and not greedy
then there is less likelihood that Qazi would fa-
vour the rich. Therefore, respondents thought
that Qazi should not be a greedy person.
Female FGDs
Females also agreed with the males that one
has to go through religious education to be-
come a Qazi. They believed that Qazis should
be honest so that people have faith in the judg-
ment they deliver.
Survey findings
In the figure below we present two angles: 1)
the respondents weighting on one or more cre-
dentials for selecting or nominating a member
to the Nizam-e-Adl and 2) a comparison of that
weighting with the weighting that the sample
used for members of Jirgas. In these statistics
we find a major difference when compared to
criteria for members of the Jirga.
To compare the two systems we have to keep
in mind the low rate of responses from women
with regard to the Nizam-e-Adl; we also have
to weigh the responses by first only counting
the opinions and then, vertically, the weight of
the opinions as a percent of the total opinions
offered by Jirga or Nizam-e-Adl.
Chapter3|Nizam-e-AdlinMalakand

20
In the figure below we first notice that,
systematically, more emphasis is placed on
formal education (d,e,f) for members of the
Nizam-e-Adl than the Jirga. The second trend
is that more emphasis is placed on traditional
ascribed and cultural characteristics (a,b,c)
for members of Jirgas than for members of
the Nizam-e-Adl. Finally, there is close to the
same and high weight placed on piety (g) for
both systems and uniformly low weight on
political connections (h).
The high ratings for piety and for religious edu-
cation for members of the Nizam-e-Adl is very
relevant because the system is based on Hanafi
school67
of Shariah Law and the member, who is
called Qazi, should be graduated from a well-re-
puted religious educational institution, or, if the
member is from the state’s judiciary system the
they should be well versed in Shariah law.
The conclusion is that although there are dif-
ferences in weights, both systems, in the re-
sponses from Malakand, show a close cultural
fit to each other with similar expectations for
the members and just more formality to the
education for the members of the Nizam-e-Adl.
Despite the debate in the press about the dire
consequences that Nizam-e-Adl would bring to
justice, in the opinion of the sampled popula-
tion with some experience in the area where
the Nizam-e-Adl has been established, the
expectation is similar to Jirga members.
Conclusion
This chapter concludes that the system of Ni-
zam-e-Adl, in general, is new to the Malakand
Division as well as to the people of Pakistan.
However, respondents still gave preference
to Jirga system over the Nizam-e-Adl system.
Other findings also reveal that Pakhtuns gen-
erally respect and prefer their culture and
religion both. When it comes to the selection
of a Jirga member and Qazi, Pakhtuns set up
a very tough criteria for both, such as having
the virtues of piety, wisdom and knowledge of
traditions and customs.
67) There are four schools of legal philosophy in Sunni Islam. The Hanafi school is the most widespread in Asia and
South Asia. It is derived, from the Qur’an, the authentic narrations of the Prophet (Hadith), Consensus (ijma), and
analogical reasoning (qiyas), qiyas only being applied if direct material cannot be found in the Qur’an or Hadith. It is
this last reasoning that makes the Pakistani application considering the beliefs or traditions of the disputants rele-
vant, but also a point of friction with the TNSM

21
Chapter: 4
Knowledge of Formal and Informal
Justice Systems and their use

22
KNOWLEDGE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS AND THEIR USE
Introduction
This chapter intends to document how Pakh-
tuns react when they are faced with conflict
or dispute, both on a personal level as well
as at the family levels. Besides, this chapter
will also provide information on respondents’
perception of the types of issues that instigate
conflicts.
Presence of formal and informal justice systems
We begin by documenting the respondents’
awareness of the formal and informal institu-
tions in their communities, and then investigate
the types of issues they approach these institu-
tions for.
Male FGDs
Male respondents were asked what type of
justice systems exist in their area. This is factual
information and might not be different than
the survey data. It is a known fact that Jirga ex-
ists in each village or community and is repre-
sented by local elders, therefore the majority of
the groups identified the Jirga system, followed
by district administration and police. Nonethe-
less, respondents also identified formal courts.
FGDs organised in districts of D.I.Khan, Loralai
and Quetta identified Musalihati Councils along
with Jirga, followed by formal courts and local
administration and police. Musalihati Councils
were set-up in these districts during the time
when the Local Government Ordinance was
implemented in Pakistan in 2001.
Respondents of district Swat and Lower Dir
FGDs identified Nizam-e-Adl and Peace Jirgas.
Female FGDs
Female respondents were not quite sure of exact
terms of various informal and formal justice sys-
tems; however they were aware of Jirga, police,
and formal courts systems. Some women respon-

23
dents from Swat district identified Nizam-e-Adl
while districts of Loralai and Quetta informed
that Musalihati Councils exist in their areas.
Survey findings
The initial question in the survey was used to
identify the presence of justice systems in the
community of the interviewees. The figure be-
low shows the responses.
Not surprisingly, more than four-fifths of the
sample identified ‘District Administration and
police’ and ‘local Jirga’ - 88.8% and 81.2%
respectively – as being present in thier com-
munities. Formal courts were the third major
institution identified by 42.6% respondents.
Other systems, new and specific to certain
districts were, logically, less known to the
whole population sampled. For example, the
‘Peace Jirga’, which is newly established in
parts of Malakand Division, was identified
by only 16.5% of the respondents, followed
by the ‘Musalihati Anjuman identified by
8.9% and Nizam-e-Adl that are specific to
Malakand as the result of the 2009 peace
agreement 8.5%.
Contacting institutions in case of a dispute
After determining the presence of various
formal and informal dispute resolution sys-
tems, the next question was intended to
document which dispute resolution mecha-
nism respondents contact first in case of any
general dispute.
Male FGDs
Generally, when there is a dispute, people try
to avoid lengthy legal proceedings in Pakhtun
dominated districts of Balochistan and KP.
The majority shared that in minor disputes,
disputants usually approach local elders to
form a Jirga to resolve it peacefully. However,
in complex cases, such as murders, or attempt
of murder, or family disputes, people usually
register First Information Reports (FIRs) and
ultimately approach the formal court system.
Nonetheless, respondents opined, in all such
complex cases disputants ultimately approach
police stations to pressurise the opponent to
help them to come to terms for out of court
settlements. Some of the respondents from
districts of D.I. Khan, Loralai, and Quetta, in-
formed the survey that Musalihati Councils
were set up by the government to coordinate
with the local police and solve disputes of a
petty nature.
Respondents from Swat district were asked
specifically about Nizam-e-Adl courts, and it
was surprising to note that most of them were
not very satisfied and shared that such courts
are not fully functional while they still rely on
local Jirga as last option. The Nizam-e-Adl are
Chapter4|KnowledgeofFormalandInformalJusticeSystemsandtheiruse

24
treated extensively in the chapter “Informal
Justice Systems and Shariah-Based Systems.”
Female FGDs
Female respondents informed the survey team
that their male members generally approached
local elders to form a Jirga in case of a dispute.
They opined that instead of wasting money on
lawyers’ fees and time in courts, the majority
of female respondents believed that it is better
to resolve issues with the help of local elders
and religious leaders who have the wisdom to
come up with solutions that are in accordance
with local culture and religion.
Some female respondents identified Musalihati
Councils as the place where women can get
compensation. They thought that Musalihati
Councils were the best forum, under the cur-
rent circumstances for women to represent
their cases.
As shown in the figure below, 61.7%, identi-
fied ‘local Jirga’ as the most often consulted
institution for resolving a dispute, while 28.9%
of the respondents identified the ‘District
Administration and police’. Generally, dispu-
tants or litigants contact both in order to put
pressure on the party to come to terms. How-
ever, it has been observed that the majority
of the cases are resolved through mediation
by local Jirgas. It has also been observed that
police officials, keeping in view the cultural
context as well as their experience of dealing
with cases of a complex nature, encourage
disputants to resolve their issues through a
Jirga. Ultimately, in majority of the cases, the
solution is found through Jirgas, mediation, or
out of court settlement.
Types of conflicts
The next area of interest for this research
was the types of conflicts encountered in the
Pakhtun areas.
Male FGDs
The types of disputes identified included:
land, shared walls, water distribution for irri-

25
gation, pathways, shared trees/woods, hills,
livestock, etc. Also included were petty dis-
putes over children quarrelling-very common
in Pakhtun areas. Major disputes identified
were murders and honour killing.
Female FGDs
Female respondents also identified similar is-
sues, which lead to conflict, but added disputes
over women, family assets distribution among
heirs, and honour killings in Pakhtun commu-
nities across KP and Balochistan. Respondents
also informed that recently, boys take photos
of girls on mobile phones and this leads to con-
flict that, in some cases led to boys being killed
or injured by the girls’ family members.
Female respondents noted that when girls and
women of their areas worked in NGOs, it was
considered bad (an honour issue) and, in some
cases, led to disputes among families, as villagers
do not like local girls working in NGOs. Female re-
spondents opined that in such cases girls working
in NGOs do not get good marriage proposals.
Survey findings with regard to types of disputes
The survey intended to document the major
issues that generally instigate conflicts in com-
munities. Through a multiple-choice question
2400 respondents were provided with a list
of probable issues that could lead to conflicts.
17 options along with an open ended ‘other’
were provided to respondents to identify one
or more issues in the list. The responses in
the figure below revealed the extent and the
frequency of issues that lead to conflict within
the community.
According to the data, more than half, 53.3%,
are of the opinion that people fight over issues
of youth/children quarrelling within communi-
ties. This is exactly what the general perception
is about people fighting with each other on
children’s petty issues. These quarrels can lead
to violent family feuds lasting for years and
decades if not timely prevented and resolved.
Another major issue cited by 43.1% of the re-
spondents was related to shared property such
as possession of shared wall or property, Hujra,
etc. In rural Pakhtun areas this is a common issue
and people get into fights with each other on a
shared wall, a Hujra and on shared residential
piece of land, etc. Usually, elders of community
intervene and try to avoid any violent conflict.
Pakhtun communities are mainly involved in
agricultural activities and when it comes to
land we see disputes that can lead to violent
conflicts. As a common problem, ‘land culti-
vation’ is third on the list identified by 37.5%
respondents. Again this issue is generally either
prevented or resolved by village elders through
a Jirga; hardly ever does either party file a case
against the opponent in a police station.
Family issues such as forced marriages, divorce,
child custody, shared property, etc. were iden-
tified by more than a quarter of respondents
(27.4%). These are common practices within
Pakhtun society that lead to conflicts. In the
rural part of KP and Balochistan the distribution
of water is also related to agricultural activity
and was identified by a 25.8% as a potential
area of conflict.
The family honour issue is identified by a
quarter (25.2%) of respondents. However, it is
important to mention here that all issues listed
in the figure are seen by the Pakhtun society as
issues of honour. Quarrelling on a petty issue,
such as children’s fights, becomes an issue of
family honour and prestige when elders inter-
vene. Therefore, those issues identified above
should also be assumed to be honour issues.
However, the issue of honour killing, although
not very common, takes place not only in the
Pakhtun community, but also in other provinc-
es and among other ethnic groups in Pakistan.
Theft/robbery in Pakhtun areas is common but
not of great significance as compared to issues
discussed above. Some 20.8% respondents iden-
tified theft/robbery as an issue that instigates
conflict. Theft/robbery is followed by ‘murder/
homicide’ identified by 12.2% of respondents.
However, issues cited above sometime lead to
murder(s) and become complex issues. There-
fore, all these issues are inter-connected and
influence each other.
Since the entire Pakhtun community is inter-
connected, similar issues can and have led
to tribal clashes. However, the latest survey
was conducted in districts of both provinces
that are administered as ‘settled districts’ and
therefore the tribal bond is not as strong as it
is in FATA. Nonetheless, a considerable number
of respondents, 9.9% identified ‘tribal clashes’
as one of the issues, which instigate conflicts.
‘Unequal distribution of aid was identified
by 9.4% of respondents. In recent times,
Malakand Division of KP province has been
through full-fledged and targeted military
operations against hard core militants. There
were more than 2 million IDPs who fled to
Chapter4|KnowledgeofFormalandInformalJusticeSystemsandtheiruse

26
other districts of KP. This man-made catastro-
phe was followed by historic flooding disaster
of 2010 when more than 20% population of
Pakistan was affected in all four provinces and
FATA. In both emergencies the government of
Pakistan and the world contributed generously
and timely to help people recover their lives
and livelihoods. The Government of Pakistan
and national and International NGOs helped
IDPs with health services, food aid, shelter,
protection, etc. During the distribution of aid,
there were several unpleasant incidents where
people were injured or killed. Furthermore,
affected people also complained that aid was
not distributed equally, leading to violence.
Another set of issues were identified by re-
spondents, including ‘grazing animals’ (8.3%)
followed by ‘sectarian violence’ (7.6%), and
‘political violence’ (6.8%). The Afghanistan
conflict has had a direct bearing on issues of
sectarian and political violence. During this
time, small arms were infiltrated into Paki-
stani society, which led to various forms of
lethal conflicts. Nevertheless, some areas of
FATA have been well known for their weapon
manufacturing industry.
There is a denial within male dominated Pa-
khtun community that tribal customs, such
as Swara, bride price and Xhag are practiced
anymore. However, there have been cases
reported in the media and therefore the sur-
vey intended to document how respondents
perceive these issues. 3.9% identified that
these issues are prevalent and could instigate
conflicts, which is still a considerable number
and can be taken seriously.
Finally, only 3.4% respondents identified ‘ter-
rorism’ followed by ‘militancy’ chosen by 1.8%
respondents. This is surprising, as the entire
Pakistani society is faced with the issue of
terrorism while rural communities of Pakhtun
areas are facing the brunt of militancy. It could
be that people cannot react to these issues, as
they seem to be beyond their control and that
people are at the receiving end.
Conclusion
Data for this chapter reveals that Pakhtun men
and women have more knowledge of the ex-
istence of district administration and police in
their areas, followed by traditional Jirga system
while in terms of a first contact, they prefer
Jirga over district administration and police de-
pending on the complexity of the dispute. This
reflects that Pakhtuns have more trust in Jirga
than the district administration and police.

27
Chapter: 5
Pakhtun awareness and opinion of
the institutions and actors in KP and
Balochistan

28
Pakhtun awareness and opinion of the institutions
and actors in KP and Balochistan
Introduction
In Pakistan people have access to various
services that they can turn to for legal needs.
In urban areas most people tend to approach
the state’s legal system, but in rural areas it
has been observed that people are inclined
towards informal or traditional justice systems.
As will be described, there are several reasons
that explain why rural population of Pakistan
usually access this informal, traditional ways
for resolving disputes; it perceives the formal
legal system to be distant from it, expensive,
corrupt and time consuming. It is not due to
a major lack of awareness of formal systems
in rural areas, when compared with the urban
areas, as shown in the following figure:
Awareness of institutions and actors
In this figure, our concern is not the level of
interest, but difference in perception of rural
and urban population. With the exception of
the Ombudsman and the Musalihati Anjuman,
the percentage difference between rural and
urban responses is minor, that is, the level of
awareness about the institutions is similar in
both rural and urban areas.
The following figures summarise the overall

29
level of awareness by institution:
The figure below identifies the level of aware-
ness of the respondents regarding various
formal and informal institutions dispensing
justice and ensuring the rule of law in Paki-
stan. A brief introduction of each institution/
actor is given below so as to inform the read-
er of the background.
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Provincial High
Courts, Supreme Court of Pakistan)
The British created the general criminal courts
in the sub-continent under the CrPC of 1898.
When asked about courts in Pakistan, a distinc-
tion was made between general courts – which
have jurisdiction over a broad range of civil and
criminal matters and specialised courts which
deal with specific issues such as terrorism etc.
The respondents’ awareness of general courts
is discussed here, and their awareness of spe-
cialised courts is addressed in the following
question. Following the quantitative analysis,
the question is further triangulated with data
gathered through KIIs and FGDs.
Looking at the results for this question, eight
out of ten (83%) respondents, claimed that
they were aware of the existence of superior
courts in Pakistan. But less than one-fifth of
the respondents in both KP (17.1%) and Ba-
lochistan (16.6%) were not aware of the formal
court set-up by the Government of Pakistan.
After cross tabulation of province-wise data,
we see that the level of response is identical in
KP, 82.9% respondents knew about the supe-
rior courts and 83.4% of the respondents from
Balochistan were aware of the superior courts.
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrates,
District and Session Courts)
As people in Pakistan have to deal with various
levels of disputes – criminal and civil –, the data
shows that the level of awareness of Pakhtun re-
spondents in both Balochistan and KP provinces
of Lower Courts is high. More than three-quar-
ters of respondents, 78.3%, from both provinces
were aware of the Lower Courts in Pakistan,
while only 21.7% were not aware about the
existance of Lower Courts.
In both KP and Balochistan, respondents’ level
of awareness of the Lower Courts is similar – in
KP 78.6% said they knew about Lower Courts
in Pakistan and 76.5% in Balochistan were
aware about these institutions.
Comparing the present data with the FATA sur-
vey of 2010, we see considerable differences
in opinion. Please note that in the 2010 survey
respondents were asked about the existence
of Lower and Superior Courts in one question.
In responce to this question, the awareness
level among FATA residents is by far lower than
KP and Balochistan when it comes to formal
courts, including Lower Courts, High Courts
and Supreme Court of Pakistan. The 2010 data
Chapter5|PakhtunawarenessandopinionoftheinstitutionsandactorsinKPandBalochistan

30
from FATA on the same question shows that
more than half (53.47%) confirmed that they
were aware of the formal court of Pakistan;
less than half (46.53%) of the sample were
totally unaware. This finding is understandable
because there are no formal courts in FATA and
the Supreme Court of Pakistan does not have
jurisdiction there.
Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts
The Government of Pakistan created Special-
ised Anti-Terrorism courts (ATCs) through the
1997 Anti-Terrorist Act, amended on 24 Octo-
ber 1998 by the Anti-Terrorism [Amendment]
Ordinance. Special Courts (Control of Narcotics
Substances) were constituted under the Con-
trol of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. Special-
ised ATCs deal with offences punishable under
the Anti-Terrorism Act, and specialised Narcot-
ics Courts deal with offences punishable under
the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997.
The respondents were asked whether they
were aware of, or had heard about Specialised
Anti-terrorism or the Narcotics Courts of Paki-
stan. Unsurprisingly, the level of awareness of
respondents on Specialised Anti-Terrorism or
Narcotics Courts was low. Just over one-third
(37.7%) of the respondents were aware of
these courts while two-third (62.3%) had no
knowledge about these courts.
After province-wise cross-tabulation, the data
reveals that although in Balochistan 42.4% of
the respondents were aware of the existence of
these special courts, and in KP 36.7% respon-
dents were aware, the difference is not statisti-
cally significant.68
Comparing the data with the 2010 survey in
FATA, fewer people than in KP and Baloch-
istan, 26.4%, were aware about the Special-
ised Anti-terrorist Courts of Pakistan. Lack
of awareness is mainly because these courts
have no jurisdiction over the FATA region.
Federal Shariat Court (FSC)
The Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was estab-
lished by the President’s Order No.1 of 1980 as
incorporated into the Constitution of Pakistan
of 1973 under chapter 3A. The FSC has the
power to review existing legislation in order to
determine whether it complies with the prin-
ciples of Islam, i.e. Qur’an & Sunnah. The FSC
can respond to Pakistani citizen’s complaints
about suspect laws or it can exercise its suo
moto powers. Although the FSC is approached
by people in certain cases related to Shariah
but a considerable proportion of cases are
brought to trial in other formal courts of Paki-
stan, starting from Lower Courts. It also has ap-
pellate jurisdiction with respect to convictions
for offences under the Hudood Ordinances.69
Two-thirds (65.7%) of respondents were to-
tally unaware of the FSC; while only one-third
(34.3%) of the sample had knowledge about its
existence. Looking at province-wise data, the
difference in responses is insignificant.
In the 2010 FATA survey, only 29.60% were
aware of the Federal Shariat Courts of Pakistan.
Lack of awareness is mainly because these
courts have no jurisdiction over FATA region.
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul
Madaris and other registered Madaris)
Wafaq ul Madaris Al-Arabia of Pakistan was
founded in 1957 in West Pakistan. It is the larg-
est federation of Islamic Madaris in the world.
Religious clerics who sit on these boards often
provide opinion on family law issues based on
Islamic law principles. The ‘Madaris certificates’
they issue can be brought to a general court to
support one’s claim. Some other recognised reli-
gious seminaries are Wafaq/Tanzeem ul Madaris/
Rabit ul Madaris, Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Alhe
Sunnat, Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia, Wafaq-ul-
Madaris Al-Salfia, and Rabita-ul-Madaris Al Isla-
mia. There are thousands of Madaris operating in
Pakistan, most of them under the management
of the above-mentioned organisations.
Male and female respondents from both prov-
inces were asked whether they were aware
of the above-mentioned religious seminary
boards. Half of the respondents (50.7%) knew
about the Wafaq ul Madaris and other regis-
tered Madaris boards.
After cross-tabulation by province, the data re-
veals that the level of awareness in KP regarding
68) The margin of error for Balochistan is 4.7 and in KP is 2.2. If we calculate for Balochistan 42.4 – 4.7 = 37.7 and for
KP 36.7+2.2 = 38.9, the confidence intervals overlap.
69) The Hudood Ordanances were established in 1979 under under the military rule of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq
during the Islamization effort. The intent was to enforce and apply the law against practices prohibited under Shari-
ah law such as the consumption of alchol, extramarital sex, theft and so forth. The reason for change was that some
of the punishments metted out were violations of human rights and also cruel and also biazed against women. This
ordinance was lifted in 2006 when the Women’s Protection Bill was passed.

31
religious seminary boards is higher than in Ba-
lochistan province. 53% of the respondents in KP
were aware and only 40% respondents in Baloch-
istan were aware. It is important to mention here
that most Madaris were set-up in FATA, close to
KP, and KP itself where more people could get to
know about the existence of these institutions.
Comparing this data with the 2010 survey re-
port on FATA, the same number of respondents,
50.6%, was aware of the religious seminary
boards. Thousands of Madaris, registered and
un-registered were set-up in Pakistan, including
FATA, to provide free religious education, espe-
cially during the Soviet-Afghanistan crisis of 1979-
89. The main reason was poverty as the majority
could not afford to bear the cost of modern
education and therefore, sent their children to
religious institutions where education, food and
accommodation were provided free of cost.
Federal Ombudsman
In 1983, the office of the Federal Ombudsman
was established under the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Om-
budsman) Order, (WMOO) 1983. The Ombuds-
man is an independent institution, established
under WMOO, to provide speedy relief to the
general public in case somebody has suffered
‘maladministration’ at the hands of a Federal
Government Agency.
When 2,400 respondents were asked about
their awareness on the existence of the Federal
Ombudsman, only 22.2% answered in the affir-
mative. Comparing the data with the 2010 sur-
vey report on FATA with KP and Balochistan in
2012, almost the same number of respondents,
21.5%, was aware about the Federal Ombuds-
man of Pakistan. Lack of awareness is mainly
because people in Pakistan have little to do with
Federal Ombudsman.
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
(HRCP) was set up in 1987 by some prominent
human right activists. It is not associated or
affiliated with the government or any political
party. It is mandated to spread awareness of
human rights among the people, mobilise public
opinion, collect information and disseminate
knowledge about human rights abuses, and to
monitor and defend human rights in Pakistan.
HRCP also operates a “Complaint Cell” where in-
dividuals can call to lodge a complaint. HRCP has
branches all over the country, including some in
FATA and Frontier Regions.
The survey intended to ascertain the level
of awareness amongst respondents on the
existence of the HRCP in Pakistan. More than
one-quarter (28.2%) was aware of the HRCP
while the rest showed their lack of knowledge.
Being a non-government institution, the re-
sponse level is encouraging because the major-
ity in Pakistan is illiterate and has little access to
sources of information. Furthermore, the term
NGO or CSO is also alien to the general masses
in the rural areas of Pakistan. This finding is a
great success for the HRCP because it shows
that it has enabled itself to be recognised and
known to an important proportion of the soci-
ety in Pakistan.
The provincial data of the survey reveals that
the respondents from Balochistan are more
aware than KP about HRCP as an institu-
tion. This may be because HRCP had several
fact-finding missions to Balochistan on missing
persons, and advocacy seminars/conferences
on its situation, amongst others HRCP has gen-
erated this debate with considerable success,
which has been recognised by local leadership
in Balochistan, especially by Baloch leaders. Chapter5|PakhtunawarenessandopinionoftheinstitutionsandactorsinKPandBalochistan

32
The data in the figure below shows that more
respondents (38.5%) in Balochistan knew about
HRCP compared to KP (26.3%). The 2010 survey
report on FATA shows that only 23.9% of FATA
interviewees were aware of the HRCP. This shows
a perception gap between the provinces and
supports the argument that HRCP has had more
focus on Balochistan compared to KP and FATA.
Jirga system or other informal dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms
The purpose of this research is to confirm
whether the respondents were aware of infor-
mal dispute resolution mechanisms.
The data for both provinces is astonishing,
an overwhelming 98.7% was aware of the
non-formal or traditional dispute resolution
mechanisms (100% in Balochistan and 98.4%
in KP). This does not, in any way, suggest that
98.7% people access such institutions; this only
shows that the majority of people are aware of
the existence of such institutions. In rural soci-
eties there are a considerable number of peo-
ple who have never heard of formal courts and
other entities while they are very much aware
that informal dispute resolution mechanisms
existed in their respective areas.
Police Department(s)
The police administrative structure and func-
tions were laid down in the Police Act of 1861
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as
NWFP). ‘Frontier Police’ is under Police Ser-
vice of Pakistan. The police derives its powers
of arrest, investigation, and search from the
CrPC of 1898. Furthermore, the Pakistani au-
thorities under the Government of India Act
1935 adopted pre-independence laws. Crimes
are reported to the police, who then register
a First Information Report [FIR]. Police author-
ities are responsible for maintaining public
order, investigating crimes, and arresting
offenders. In KP the Provincial Police system
consists of 73,000 employees. The Police De-
partment in Balochistan is called ‘Balochistan
Police’ which was formed in 1946. There, the
Provincial Police consists of 46,018 employees
with its headquarters in Quetta City.
Both the Police Act of 1861 and Criminal Pro-
cedure Code 1898 were not extended to the
FATA region. The Khasadar and Levies force are
responsible for the internal security or police
actions in the protected areas of FATA.
Because the police has a network of stations
in urban and rural areas of Pakistan and has
tried to cover almost every part of the country
except FATA, it was obvious that overwhelming
majority would know about it. Some 96.5% re-
spondents knew about the police department.
Another fact is that patrolling by the police also
makes them visible.
Nizam-e-Adl Courts (Malakand Division only)
Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (NAR) 2009 was
signed into law on April 13, 2009 by the President
of Pakistan; effective backdated i.e. March 15,
2009. This Regulation was extended to Provin-
cially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa excluding Tribal Areas attached to
District Mansehra and earlier state of Amb. This
Regulation was signed as ‘Swat Peace Accord’ be-
tween the Government of Pakistan and the Teh-
rik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) of
Swat valley. According to this regulation Shariah
courts were to be established and Shariah laws
will be enacted in Swat. This regulation is very
similar to the Nifaz-e-ShariahRegulation 1994 and
the Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 1999.
The ANP led provincial government in KP (2008
– 2013) was heavily criticised by the civil society,
international and national media and various
political parties in Pakistan. MQM was very
vocal and fully rejected the ANP government’s
policy for entering this agreement with TNSM,
a small group of armed people enforcing their
ideas on a larger population. There was a global
uproar too, which put the ANP government in
a very awkward situation. However, the deal
between ANP and TNSM did not last long, be-
cause the latter could not convince TTP Swat
chapter to disarm and reintegrate into society.
On the other hand, it was not possible for TTP
to lay down their weapons, because local com-
munities, under the obligations of Pakhtunwali,
would not forgive the blood shed of their loved
ones and would surely opt for the old Pakhtun
tradition of ‘Badal’ (revenge).
The breach of agreement with TTP was followed
by military operations in 2009, which disman-
tled the TTP infrastructure in Swat and other ad-
joining districts, forcing a historic influx of more
than two million people to Peshawar and other
districts of KP. Despite the breach of agreement,
the ANP government kept its promise and con-
tinued with Nizam-e-Adl regulation of 2009.
This question was asked only in the selected
districts of Malakand division. The data shows
that only half of the respondents were aware
of this institution (50%). It is slightly surpris-
ing as the issue of justice was a long awaited

33
commitment that the State of Pakistan made in
1969 – the time when all princely states were
merged into the mainland of Pakistan, includ-
ing Swat. However, the fact that half of the
respondents still do not know of this condition
is a striking revelation.
Musalihati Council/Anjuman (MAs)
Musalihati Councils or Anjuman are Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms for me-
diation and the settlement of disputes, es-
tablished under Local Government Ordinance
2001 notified by the Provincial Governments.
These councils were set-up in 22 districts of Pa-
kistan with the objective of building coopora-
tion among the judiciary, police and Musalihati
Anjuman for dispensation of justice to promote
legal rights of women and the role of men in
ending violence.
UNDP and Government of Pakistan are jointly
implementing a project on Gender Justice
through the Musalihati Anjuman Project (GJT-
MAP) in selected districts of Pakistan. Accord-
ing to UNDP, 1,115 MA’s have been operation-
alised in twenty-two districts of Pakistan. Out
of a total of 19,391 cases received so far by
MAs, 15,095 (78%) disputes have been ami-
cably resolved. 330 District & Session Judges,
Additional District Judges, Civil Judges and
Senior Civil Judges and 20 District Attorneys
have been trained in Alternate Dispute Res-
olution; and more than 19,844 stakeholders
were trained on gender sensitisation, legal
literacy, monitoring, ADR, computer skills and
record keeping/reporting.70
The Musalihati Councils are concentrated in
three districts; one in KP and two in Baloch-
istan. The figure below shows the responses
by the interviewees in those districts regarding
awareness of the Councils.
Overall we find that a third (35.4%) of the re-
spondents did not know or chose not to an-
swer and that another third (30.2%) were not
aware of the council system. There is a fluctua-
tion in the level of awareness among districts,
but the conclusion is that this system has not
received the coverage or promotion needed to
reach the general population.
OpinionS on the effectiveness of
institutions
This section documents the perception of re-
spondents about the effectiveness of formal
justice systems. The dimensions of effectiveness
when seeking justice include: speed, affordabil-
ity, the room for corruption, and the treatment
of women. The question: What is your opinion/
perception of the following institutions and
actors?– Codes: Affordable (01) Speedy (02)
Bribes (03) Influence Peddling (04) Unrespon-
sive to Criticism (05) Ignores Human Rights (06)
70) UNDP Pakistan, http://undp.org.pk/gender-justice-through-musalihat-anjuman-gjtmap.html (accessed 2 January 2013)

34
Gender Equality (07) Class Bias (8) Don’t know
(99). (Multiple-choice question). The findings are
presented below as per institution.
Provincial Police Authorities and their local
representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)
The first institution tested under various op-
tions through this question was provincial
police authorities and their representatives.
It is commonly perceived that the majority in
Pakistan do not like the police system and have
developed ill feelings for it due to numerous
reasons, the most prominent is corruption.
Overall, the survey results show a negative
view of respondents towards the police in
general. Almost half of the respondents,
49.9%, believe that police authorities take
‘bribes’, followed by 43.6% respondents who
opined that the police authorities are involved
in ‘influence peddling’. These two major as-
pects have overshadowed the other negative
opinions towards police authorities, e.g., only
13.5% respondents opined that the police
‘ignore Human Rights.’ There are many media
reports criticising the police for mishandling
people they interact with. This is followed by
‘unresponsive to criticism’, 8.2%, and ‘class
bias’, 7%. Only 16% of respondents thought
that dealing with police authorities is ‘afford-
able’. This involves a heavy cost of bribes and
other expenses, which poor people cannot
afford generally.
Now we compare this data with the 2010 FATA
Survey report by examining how the respon-
dents from FATA felt about the police authorities
and their representatives. For the readers infor-
mation, both the Police Act of 1861 and Crim-
inal Procedure Code 1898 are not extended to
FATA, while Khasadar and Levies force take care
of the internal security in 27% protected areas
of FATA. The FATA respondents’ views of the
police system are also very unfavourable who
might never welcome this institution in their
area. The 1,500 FATA respondents in 2010 sur-
vey were asked in a qualified manner to share
their perceptions or opinions of provincial po-
lice authorities and their local representatives.
41.8% opined that provincial police authorities
take bribes for their services, while 35.3% did
not know much about the provincial police au-
thorities. 7.3% believed that the police depart-
ment is always under immense pressure from its
superiors and representative governments, thus
allowing for most of the cases to go un-settled,
and criminals or offenders to get away. Around
5.5% believed that the police department at
times violates human rights while dealing with
cases and 2.2% believed that the police depart-
ment is unresponsive to criticism.
Only 3.6% believed that the police department
is affordable and should be extended to FATA.
2.6% believed that the police department is
quick in settling cases. 1.1% said that the police
department is ‘class biased’ and always favours
the rich and influential.
Overall, the above data shows that the respon-
dents do not have a favourable view of the
provincial police authorities.
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court of
Pakistan and provincial High Courts)
In recent years the Superior Judiciary, under
the Chief Justice of Pakistan Ifthikhar Mu-
hammad Chaudhry, who stood up against the

35
President General Pervez Musharraf in 2007,
has gained considerable respect nationally and
globally. The Chief Justice’s suo moto actions
on several issues of national interest have also
made him and the superior judiciary popular
amongst the masses.
However, despite the recent fame of the Chief
Justice, the survey data shows that more
than a quarter of respondents believed that
the ‘superior judiciary’ is prone to ‘influence
peddling’ followed by 25.6% respondents who
thought that superior judiciary is ‘affordable’.
About 13% opined that the superior judiciary is
speedy, keeping in view hundreds of thousands
of pending cases. More than one quarter of
the sample did not share their opinion. The
other aspects related to superior judiciary are
negligible and can be seen in the figure.
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate,
District & Sessions Courts)
Generally, Lower Courts in Pakistan have little
credibility due to many of the same reasons
cited about the Higher Courts. Accordingly
as we will show, people tend to find easy and
cheap solutions to solve their problems in
a timely manner. The data reveals that one-
third of the respondents, 33.2%, believed that
Lower Courts are prone to ‘influence ped-
dling’ and 16.3% pointed to ‘bribes’ as anoth-
er negative aspect of these courts.
Only 15.8% respondents believed that Lower
Courts are ‘affordable’ followed by 8.6% who
thought that Lower Courts are ‘unresponsive
to criticism’. It is also believed that the formal
system is slow in dispensing justice. The data
shows that only 8.1% respondents believed
that the lower court system is speedy in de-
livering justice. It is quite a small number of
respondents, as compared to informal dispute
resolution system (46%).
Just 4.7% respondents thought that Lower
Courts are ‘class biased’ in comparison with
what the media has reported so far. It is gener-
ally believed that the court system prefers and
supports the rich class while ignoring those
who could not afford to pay high fees demand-
ed by majority of lawyers.
Comparing the 2010 survey data from FATA
(the question in 2010 was not separated into
the Superior Courts and the Lower Courts),
the responses are not very surprising or
different. Out of 1,500 respondents, 40.5%
said that they did not know the functions of
the courts. 14.4% believed that officials and
judges take bribes when deciding a case in
general courts, and 14% believed that general
courts can be influenced by the powerful, so
the weaker party does not receive due justice.
Only 3.2% believed that general courts are un-
responsive to any criticism and 4.5% believed
that general courts ignore human rights when
deciding a case.
However, 13.4% still believed that general
courts are affordable, and 7.5% opined in a
qualified manner that general courts are quick
in dispensing justice to the people.
Analysing the above results, one can clearly
see that respondents from KP, Balochistan and

36
FATA do not have a favourable view of the gen-
eral courts in Pakistan.
have been introduced in the previous section.
Keeping in consideration the nature and scope
of such courts, it is not surprising to see that
three quarters (74.8%) of the sample did not
know about the existance of such courts. Out
of the remaining one quarter, higher number
of respondents, 8.6%, believed that the ‘influ-
ence peddling’ element is seen in these courts
while only 6.7% believed that these courts are
affordable. The element of ‘bribes’ was identi-
fied by only 5.8% and only 4.9% thought that
these courts do not expedite cases fairly.
More than half of the respondents, 59.6%,
could not form an opinion, as they did not
know much about these specialised courts.
Only 9.3% believed that these courts can be
influenced by the powerful in order to obtain
favourable results. Some 6.7% believed that
these courts do not consider human rights
when deciding a case, while 6.1% opined that
the officials of these courts take bribes and
favour cases. Only 5% believed that these
courts are unresponsive to any criticism.
6.3% believed that these courts are affordable
and 4.6% opined that they are quicker in decid-
ing cases.
Overall, the opinion of respondents in rela-
tion to these courts is not very favourable.
The same sentiments were also echoed in the
qualitative assessment. Very few voices were in
favour of these courts and even fewer believed
that the named courts consider all elements of

37
globalisation, international human rights stan-
dards and gender sensitivities.
Federal Shariat Court (FSC)
The respondents’ level of understanding of the
justice systems in general was gauged in the
previous section; it is assumed that since 95%
of population in Pakistan is Muslim, they would
have an idea of Shariah Courts. However, the
majority do not know about the Federal Shari-
at Court located in Islamabad; three quarters
of the respondents (75.9%) did not have an
opinion. Nevertheless 13.5% believed that
the FSC is ‘affordable’. There were also some
negative opinions about this court. The figure
shows self-explanatory results for other op-
tions, but, in general the surveyed population
was not aware of the FSC.
The following text is a comparision of KP and
Balochistan data gathered from 1,500 respon-
dents through a survey in FATA on Jirga.
Although the Federal Shariat Courts do not exist
in FATA, only 59.1% of respondents, did not have
an opinion compared with 75.9% who did not
know in KP and Balochistan. 14.9% believed that
Federal Shariat Court is affordable for under
privileged, and 7% believed that it is quick in
dispensing justice to the people.
There were also some negative views about the
FSC; 8.3% believed that powerful people can
influence it, while 3.3% believed that this court
is unresponsive to any criticism. 3.1% opined in a
qualified manner that FSC officials receive bribes.
Ombudsman
The majority in Pakistan have little knowledge
of the Office of Ombudsman and its mandate;

38
however the survey aimed to document the
exact perception of the Pakhtuns in KP and Ba-
lochistan. As per the figure 86.0% could not offer
an opinion because they did not know about the
function of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Only 7% of respondents belived that Office of
the Ombudsman is affordable for the people
who access it, while only 4% were of the ope-
nion that this Office can be influenced by the
powerful, thus denying the weaker party due
justice. 3.5% opined that this Office is slow in
providing services to the applicants. Respon-
dents did ponder upon other functions but the
results are negligibly low.
During the FGDs with various age and gender
groups from FATA, it was clear that the majority,
especially illiterate and less educated respon-
dents, were ignorant of these offices and there-
fore could not form opinions of their own.
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Most of the respondents in the focus-group
discussions, including men and women, young
and old, did not have a clear idea of the
HRCP’s role in their areas. Very few people,
including those with a higher education and
better access to information, knew very little
about the institution.
In the previous section, more than one-quarter
of the respondents were aware of the exis-
tence of HRCP and that is mainly, if not en-
tirely, due to its sincere insight on the issue of
missing persons from Balochistan. However in
response to this question respondents seem to
be quite confused when it came to having an
opinion about the functions of HRCP. Overall,
eight out of ten respondents (80.4%) did not
have an opinion. Only 8.9%, who knew about
HRCP could opine that it is ‘affordable’. HRCP
usually takes up cases of high importance
where gross violations of human rights have
occured and do not charge aggrieved parties.
When comparing responses by gender in the
figure below, we find that the majority of both
males (75.2%) and females (85.6%) do not know
enough about the HRCP to offer an opinion.
The conclusion is that very few men and women
are aware of this commission and because of
the small proportion of responses it would not
be sound to draw further conclusions.
Informal Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
This question lies within a general context
and does not only pertain to Jirga, but also
to other forms of informal dispute resolution
systems, such as respected elders or other
influential persons within a family or commu-
nity who act as mediators.
The first observation from the figure below
in comparison with the previous questions is
that the proportion of respondents who did
not know is low (18.3%), and in this regard the
difference between men and women is minor.
Comparing the responses favouring informal dis-
pute resolution systems over other institutions,
we also see a very clear difference. Overall, the
majority (55.1%) of respondents, much more
than for any other institute mentioned earlier,
believed that the informal dispute resolution
mechanisms are affordable. We do not have
an explanation for the fact that males, more
so than females, believe this to be true. Since
this was a multiple response question, we see
that the second opinion of respondents was the
quick dispensation of justice, 46.1%. The rest of
What is your opinion/perception of the
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan?
Gender of the Respondents
Male % (Sample
Size 1205)
Female % (Sample
Size 1195)
Overall % (Sample
Size 2400)
Affordable 13.1 4.7 8.9
Speedy 4 2.8 3.4
Bribes 1.2 0.8 1
Influence Peddling 3.9 1.6 2.8
Unresponsive to Criticism 2.2 1.3 1.8
Ignores Human Rights 0.6 1.8 1.2
Gender Equality 3.2 1.4 2.3
Class Bias 1.2 0.7 0.9
Don’t know 75.2 85.6 80.4

39
the opinions, all negative aspects, are in single
digits. Only 3.4% believed that informal institu-
tions can be influenced by the powerful.
Surprisingly, only 2.8% of the respondents
thought that informal institutions are ‘gender
equal’. Informal institutions are known for their
gender insensitivity and as a major limitation
however, the survey result shows that, an over-
whelming majority are in a state of denial or
do not perceive the known gender bias. Fur-
thermore, only 1.6% feared that these informal
institutions are influenced by ‘bribes’, while an
equal percentage of respondents, 1.6%, be-
lieved that informal institutions lack the ability
to ensure Human Rights standards.
From the 2010 survey data gathered from
1,500 respondents through a survey in FATA on
Jirga we can compare the KP and Balochistan
data on the first two characteristics (affordabil-
ity and speed). There is a difference; in FATA
43.3% of respondents, compared with 55%
above, believed that informal dispute resolution
mechanisms are affordable.
Religious leaders in the community
Religious leaders are well respected within the
communities across Pakhtun residing areas of
Pakistan. People consult them for their petty
issues and family matters, and the media re-
ports that such religious leaders resolve some
complex matters such as cases of robbery/
theft, murders, honour killing, etc. In some cas-
es, it has been observed that verdicts issued by
these religious leaders have violated the norms
of Human Rights.
Looking at the data below, we see that a higher
number of respondents, 45.6%, believed that
resolving disputes by involving religious leaders
What is your opinion/perception of the
informal dispute resolution mechanism?
Male % (Sample
Size 1205)
Female % (Sample
Size 1195)
Overall % (Sample
Size 2400)
Affordable 60.2 49.9 55.1
Speedy 44 48.2 46.1
Bribes 1.3 1.8 1.6
Influence Peddling 3.4 3.4 3.4
Unresponsive to Criticism 2.3 1.1 1.7
Ignores Human Rights 1.2 1.9 1.6
Gender Equality 4.6 1 2.8
Class Bias 2.2 1.7 1.9
Don’t know 17.7 18.8 18.3

40
is an affordable way, while 31.1% thought it is
quicker than other institutions. One-quarter of
the sample could not comment, as they did not
know the answer.
The data for FATA clearly reveals that majority
of respondents identified the positive aspects
of the institution while negative aspects
were negligible. Over half of the respondents
(55.9%) mentioned that the services of a
religious leader in the community could be
acquired without much cost, as they are acces-
sible and affordable for all. This is quite a high
number, even higher than that for informal
dispute resolution systems.
Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only)
Nizam-e-Adl is specific to Malakand division,
as stated earlier. It is a newly established or
half-established institution and has yet to
start functioning. Nonetheless, a significant
number of respondents, 20.9%, still believed
that this institution is affordable while 16.5%
thought it is quick in dispensing justice to the
common man. A high number of respondents
identified positive aspects while negative
aspects are negligible. However, more than
half, 59.1%, could not share their opinion as
they either did not know the answer or did
not respond.
Musalihati Council
As stated earlier, Musalihati Councils were
established in 2001 in selected districts of Pa-
kistan. Therefore, as analysed in the previous
section, the overwhelming majority (8.2%)
of the sample in those three districts was un-
aware of this institution. Another subsequent
question, aimed at finding out how respon-
dents felt about various functions and aspects
of this institution.
Data of three sample districts where MAs oper-
ate (Quetta, Loralai, D.I. Khan)
Again, as shown in the figure below, the major-
ity (87.3%) did not know or could not answer
the opinion question, as they did not know
the answer. As far as commenting on positive
aspects of this institution, only 5.7% and 6.8%
respondents thought that this institution is
affordable and decided cases quickly, respec-
tively. Other negative aspects are extremely
low and are not worth analysing.
Data of three sample districts where MA oper-
ates (Quetta, Loralai, D.I. Khan)
Taliban Shura
Talibanisation in Pakistan is not an old phe-
nomenon. Following the end of the Taliban re-
gime in Afghanistan, the USA forced Pakistan to
guard its borders with Afghanistan and to help
hunt Al Qaeda, foreign fighters, and Afghan
Taliban in Pakistan, more specifically in FATA.
In reaction, the world saw the evolution of vari-
ous Pakistani Taliban factions and other militant
groups – the most damaging is the Tehrek-e-Tal-
iban Pakistan (TTP) which is fighting Pakistani
security forces and attacking civilians. Pakistani
Taliban began their activities in early 2004 when
they dispensed quick and free justice to the
masses in FATA though a Shura. However, later
on, TTP started executing people without a

41
proper trial against all human rights norms and
the law of the land. Since such activities took
place in pockets of FATA and PATA, therefore its
influence is confined to certain areas.
The Taliban Shura was under practice in some
parts of the survey area, specifically, in remote
areas where security was weak. Nevertheless,
the question was asked to observe perceptions
of people about the Taliban and Shura and
their extent. In the figure below we note, that
96.7% of the interviewees did not know or did
not answer.
There could be numerous reasons for the low
response rate, but the most probable reason is
that the sampled area, especially the elimina-
tion of areas where security was a problem, did
not overlap with Taliban Shura presence.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed two main issues –
awareness and opinion about the institutions
which are dispensing and implementing justice
in Pakhtun areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Pakhtun areas of Balochistan. The quantitative
data reveals, which is validated by the quanti-
tative data as well, that Pakhtuns are equally
aware of the Jirga institution and of district
administration and police. Jirga is contacted
by Pakhtuns by choice for resolving their is-
sues while interaction with district adminis-

42
tration and police is by law, which they cannot
avoid, even if they wish to do so. This is linked
to the Pakhtuns’ opinion of formal and infor-
mal justice system and institutions responsible
to ensure law and order. The survey result
show that Pakhtuns value the Jirga systems
due to its quick dispensation of justice, af-
fordability, accessibility and less likelihood of
being influenced. However, Pakhtun respon-
dents also show a clear state of denial when it
comes to inclusiveness, rights compliance and
class biasness. Very few respondents accepted
the reality that Jirga is gender and class biased
and that it violates some basic rights. On the
other hand, Pakhtun respondents shared their
lack of trust in other formal and informal insti-
tutions dispensing justice.

44
The Jirga
Introduction
This chapter deals with the mechanism of Jirga
and its importance for the people of FATA. A
historical review and detailed definition of Jirga
system is provided for understanding it in pres-
ent times. Comparative studies about the legal
frameworks of different types of Jirga are in-
cluded in this chapter. The functions and organ-
isation of FCR Jirga, Olasi Jirga and Loya/Grand
Jirga is also an important subject of this chapter.
The information includes the perception of peo-
ple regarding the existing legal system in FATA,
KP and Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas so that an
analytical view of the Jirga in different contexts
can be obtained.
In FATA, the judicial system enshrined in the
FCR of 1901 has been described as a hybrid of
colonial-era legal frameworks and traditional
customs and norms to which executive direction
was added.71
Because of its repressive set of
rules that violate basic Human Rights such as
freedom from collective punishment, the Fron-
tier Crimes Regulation 1901 (FCR) is regarded as
a ‘Black Law’ or ‘Draconian Law’ when judged
by present-day international Human Rights
standards and principles. Nevertheless, it is the
only system of justice in place in FATA today.
The FCR will be elaborated upon in the coming
chapters. The FATA’s Jirga system has become
institutionalised in the present Constitution of
Pakistan under FCR. In order to implement the
FCR, the British Colonial rule included a system
of administration, that is, a system by which the
Governor-General of India, through the Chief
Commissioner for the Punjab, engaged the local
Pakhtun leaders through a ‘Political Officer’ who
dealt with the Maliks and Lungi holders of the
tribes. The British Colonial structure was similar
to the present constitutional structure and the
parallels are described below.
Defining Jirga
Historically, individuals, social groups and soci-
eties have disputed and competed against one
another over scarce commodities and resources
- land, money, political power, and ideology.72
In
many parts of the world, traditional ways of jus-
tice or locally integrated conflict transformation
or resolution institutions are being approached to
resolve conflicts and to ensure peace and stability
within local societies or tribes. Such institutions
are often suitable in circumstances in which they
operate because they satisfy the local cultural
and religious sentiments. Such circumstances
often make them more successful than contem-
porary or modern justice systems. The existing
body of literature confirms that the nature and
causes of conflicts and mechanisms for resolving
them are deeply rooted in the culture and history
of every society; they are, in many important
ways, unique to each culture.
According to the Pakhtu Descriptive Dictionary
(1978: 1272), Jirga is an original Pakhtu word
that, in its common usage, refers to the gather-
ing of a few or a large number of people; it also
means consultation according to this source.73
71) Testing FCR on the Touchstone of the Constitution” by Dr. Faqir Hussain, October 2004
72) Wardak, A. (2002) ‘Jirga: Power and Traditional Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan’ in Law After Ground Zero,
Edited by John Strawson, London: Cavendish
Note: The Pashtun/Pakhtun Jirga system is almost the same on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.
73) Ali Wardak (2002) ‘Jirga: Power and Traditional Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan’ in Law After Ground Zero,

45
However, in its operation, Jirga refers to a tribal/
local institution of decision-making and dispute
settlement that incorporates the prevalent local
customary law, institutional rituals, headed by a
body of village elders whose collective decisions
about the resolution of a dispute (or local prob-
lem) is binding (socially and morally) on all par-
ties involved.74
According to James W. Spain:
A Jirga in its simplest form is merely an
assembly….. Practically all community
business, both public and private, is
subject to its jurisdiction. In its opera-
tion, it is probably the closest thing to
Athenian democracy that has existed
since original. It exercises executive,
judicial and legislative functions, and
yet frequently acts as an instrument
for arbitration and conciliation.75
Mumtaz A Bangash, a professor at the Area
Study Center, University of Peshawar, and a
resident of Kurram Agency of FATA, describes
Jirga in this way:
The Jirga system ensures maximum
participation of the people in ad-
ministering justice and makes sure
that justice is manifestly done. It also
provides the umbrella of safety and
security to the weaker sections of the
tribal people from the mighty one.76
The traditional Jirga deals with varying issues in
the Pakhtun inhabited areas including conflicts
involving land and property, inheritance, alleged
violation of ‘honour’ and intra-inter-tribal killings,
cases related to business and properties, etc.77
Jirga or community-based traditional mediation
usually leads to a deep sense of satisfaction,
fairness, and ability to move on for both the
parties.78
Pakhtuns, as well as non-Pakhtuns in
Afghanistan have preferred Jirga to formal jus-
tice according to recent research because it is
conducted by respected elders with established
social status with a reputation for piety and
fairness and because it emphasises the compen-
sation of victims and the reintegration of offend-
ers into the community79
.Also, Jirga dispenses
speedy justice and is more transparent, trusted
and accessible compared to the state justice
system.80
Furthermore, during the Jirga process,
elders reach decisions in accordance with ac-
cepted local traditions and values (customary
practices) that are deeply ingrained in the col-
lective conscience of the village/tribe.81
Often
obscured by the quasi-judicial role of the Jirga
its main function is to peacefully settle disputes
rather than to adjudicate or pass a sentence.82
The Pakhtun community generally prefers Jirga as
a means to resolve criminal and civil disputes and
mediate tribal or sectarian conflicts.83
However,
they do actually have the choice to, alternatively,
bring a case before a state court and in some
areas they can even choose to refer to a court
of the Taliban or any other group.84
This “forum
shopping” in reality indicates that there is com-
petition between traditional, fundamentalist, and
state oriented forms of conflict resolution. Only
the state promises (but not necessarily succeeds)
to uphold Human Rights.85
If one wants to pre-
vent the fundamentalist approach from further
gaining acceptance in parts of the population,
then the offer of state justice to the citizens must
be carefully evaluated for improvement.86
74) Ali Wardak (2006) ‘Structures of Authority and Local Dispute Settlement in Afghanistan’ in Conflicts and Conflict
Resolution in Middle Eastern Societies: Between Tradition and Modernity, Edited by Hans-Jörg Albrecht et al, Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot
75) James W Spain, People of the Khyber: The Pathans of Pakistan (New York: Praeger, 1962)
76) Mumtaz A Bangash, “Speedy Justice of Elders”
77) Several KIIs, survey data and FGDs with male and female respondents for this study.
78) Interview with Nawab Ayaz Khan Jogezai, Quetta, 30 April 2012
79) Ali Wardak (with Daud Saba, and Halima Kazem) (2007) Bridging Modernity and Tradition: the Rule of Law and
the Search for Justice, Afghanistan National Human Development Report, UNDP/CPHD, Kabul, Afghanistan.
80) Ali Wardak (with Daud Saba, and Halima Kazem) (2007) Bridging Modernity and Tradition: the Rule of Law and
the Search for Justice, Afghanistan National Human Development Report, UNDP/CPHD, Kabul, Afghanistan.
81) Ali Wardak, (2004) ‘Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan’, Journal of Crime, Law and Social Change,
Vol. 41 (pp 319 – 341)
82) Banerjee, Pathan Unarmed, Paperback SAR Press, 2000
85) Interview with Mr. Tariq Javaid, Additional Inspector General Police of KP, Peshawar, 16 April 2012
86) Interview with Zubaida Noor, Women Rights activist, Noor Education Trust, Peshawar, 17 April 2012
Chapter6|TheJirga

46
Jirga and its types in different contexts
Jirga in practice is an informal, traditional dis-
pute resolution system in Pakhtun populated
areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. FATA is the
only region where the Jirga is institutionalised
formally under the FCR.
This part of the report will present an analysis
of data indicating which system is preferred by
the population in the Pakhtun areas surveyed.
Sarkari or FCR Jirga and its proceedings
In the first chapter we have elaborated on the
administrative and constitutional status of FATA
under the FCR. The Sarkari Jirga is provided in the
FCR and although a brief description is provided
here the reader is referred to “Understanding Jir-
ga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (2011).”87
Sarkari 88
Jirga refers to a Jirga sponsored by
the government, more specifically by the po-
litical administration led by a Political Agent
or his subordinates. It deals with all criminal
and civil cases in the administered areas of any
particular Agency or Frontier Region (FR). The
Political Agent acts as a District Magistrate and
administers the laws.
The political administration nominates two or
more Jirga members depending on the complexi-
ty and importance of a case. This is done with the
consent of disputing parties. Hassan M. Yousafzai
and Ali Gohar elaborated the components and
process of the Sarkari Jirga in their book “To-
wards Understanding Pukhtoon Jirga.”89
● A government representative
● A case registered by one of the
parties or cognisance of a situation by
the government
● Written referral of the case to the Jirga
nominated by the government official
● Recording of statements of the
parties by the Jirga
● Visits to the disputed sites by the
Jirga members
● Recording of further evidence by the
Jirga members
● Presentation of recommendations to
the government agent
● Consideration, approval, or
disapproval of the recommendations
● Reference back to the same Jirga for
reconsideration in light of new facts
● Announcement of the verdict
● Right of parties to appeal
● Implementation of the verdict
The political administrator has the authority
to enforce such decisions though its Khasa-
dar or levies force. In all cases, the decision
of Jirga members is unanimous. However, in
case a party is not satisfied with the verdict,
it can approach the appellate tribunal of the
Commissioner and revision proceedings can be
initiated in the court of the Home and Tribal
Affairs Secretary or Secretary FATA. 90
Olasi Jirga – The Traditional Pakhtun Jirga
The concept of holding a Jirga by the people in
FATA, KP and Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas is an
ancient cultural tradition. In FATA, in non-pro-
tected areas (73% area), people assemble and
invoke Jirgas to settle their criminal and civil dis-
putes.91
These Olasi Jirga sessions are informal
Jirgas in the sense that they do not have govern-
ment support or patronage. But they are infor-
mal in nature from the State judicial perspec-
tive. Nevertheless, they are a respected process
among the people. Olasi Jirga is an assembly of
elders or respected members representing each
household of a certain village or community.92
If the dispute is between sub-tribes or tribes, or
among villages, will be resolved accordingly in
those tribes or villages.
The Olasi Jirga process can be initiated by one
of the aggrieved parties – usually the weaker
of the parties who believes that an offense has
been committed against him, his family, village
or his tribe. The aggrieved goes to a respect-
ed elder, an elder known as a Jirgamaar who
enjoys respect from all parties. The Jirgamaar
87) Available at www.camp.org.pk
88) Sarkari is an Urdu word which means official
89) “Towards Understanding Pukhtoon Jirga: An indigenous way of peacebuilding and more…” by Hassan M.
Yousafzai & Ali Gohar published by Just Peace International, June 2005
90) Interviews with tribal elders of FCR Jirga, March-April 2012
91) Interviews with key informants of FATA, KP and Balochistan, March-April 2012
92) Interviews with key informants of FATA, KP and Balochistan, March-April 2012

47
listens to the case and tries to convince both
parties to submit to the Olasi Jirga process. This
submission is similar to a “binding arbitration”
with the additional weight of the Pakhtun cul-
ture. That is, if parties to a Jirga do not accept
the decision, then they may be shunned by the
community and the force (in case of violence) of
arms may be used against them. Nevertheless,
the cultural purpose of the Jirga is to reduce
tension and avoid violence that may break up a
family or community.
When a dispute of a violent nature or potential
arises, elders approach both parties and set up
a Tigah93
to prevent the situation from aggravat-
ing further.94
The monetory value of Tigah could
be either money or weapons.95
Tigah is usually
maintained for a certain time period and then
followed by proper constitution of a Jirga. The
Jirga then takes time to collect evidence, anal-
yse the evidence, talk to both parties and villag-
ers, takes Waak96
from the parties involved.97
The Jirga members may take time or hold
as many sessions with parties as they deem
necessary to reach a decision.98
Again, Hassan
M. Yousafzai and Ali Gohar elaborate the com-
ponents of Olasi Jirga in their book “Towards
Understanding Pukhtoon Jirga’ 99
An Olasi Jirga can:
● Hold as many sessions as needed
● Undertake any issue of interest or
concern to the community
● Announce any interim decisions
● Make new rules for the tribe, relating
to grazing rights, water rights, etc.
● Call for other ideas
● Invite volunteers as a workforce
● Raise taxes for community work
● Go as a delegation, send delegation
to parties
● Send delegations to the neighbouring
tribe
Decisions made by the Olasi Jirga are rarely
challenged, as it is perceived to be more cred-
ible than the Sarkari Jirga and has legitimacy
within communities. This statement will be
supported by findings from the perception
survey and FGDs.
Loya or Grand Jirga
Although Loya Jirga has not taken place in
FATA, Afghanistan has convened this
form of Jirga for centuries. In the Af-
ghan political culture, Loya Jirga means a
‘grand assembly of tribal and political leaders,
religious scholars, elders and others
who assemble periodically in order to di
scuss important national issues and to
reach collective decisions.100
The issues
that a Loya Jirga focuses on are usually
of vital national interest such as the selection
of a new ruler, declaration of war, the adoption
of peace treaties or a new constitution, and
decisions on vital regional and internation-
al issues affecting Afghanistan. The most
well-known form of this Jirga in the history of
Pakhtun was the 1747 Loya Jirga in Kandahar
which crowned Ahmed Shah Durrani as their
first king of the Pakhtun. Some have described
him as the pioneer king of modern Afghani-
stan.101
However, the crowning was-pre-Durand
and pre-colonial India (1858-1947); indeed, it
was Durrani who united the tribes of the Kanda-
har region with the tribes to the north and east
around Jalalabad and Peshawar and then went
on to conquer as far east as present day Delhi
incorporating Sikh and Mughul leaders into the
empire. This empire, also referred to as the
‘Durrani Federation’, collapsed from over exten-
sion and changes in family leadership capability
93) Tigah is a Pakhtu word, which means ‘stone’. The meaning of Tigah is entering into a ceasefire between the
conflicting parties for a certain timeframe until the Jirga settles a dispute
94) Interviews with Jirga elders in FATA, KP and Balochistan, March-April 2012
95) Ibid
96) Waak is a Pakhtu word which means taking authority from the disputants. That is the disputant agree to cease
and desist and put their trust into the hands of the Jirga or Jirgamaar before the Jirga is convened
97) In-depth interviews with elders – January to March 2011
98) Interviews with Jirga members from FATA, KP and Balochistan, March-April 2012
99) “Towards Understanding Pukhtoon Jirga: An indigenous way of peacebuilding and more…..” by Hassan M.
Yousafzai & Ali Gohar published by Just Peace International, June 2005
Chapter6|TheJirga

48
from generation to generation by the early
1800s before the British arrived in India.102
More recently, examples of Loya Jirgas in Af-
ghanistan include the 2002 Emergency Loya
Jirga and the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003.
The latter decided upon the Post-Taliban Con-
stitution of Afghanistan.103
With the historical and descriptive background in
mind this research posed questions in FGDs and
in the sample survey. The objective is to under-
stand how the Jirga as a system of justice, is per-
ceived by Pakhtun men and women. We will first
present the focus group discussions and follow
with the survey data in order to put weight to the
general opinions gathered in focus groups.
How do Jirgas convene their proceedings?
Usually Jirga proceedings take place in open
areas, such as Hujra, playground or open field
and mosques, etc. They are of a bigger nature
or of higher importance; however, small Jirgas
take place inside homes for resolving petty
family issues, such as divorce, family property
issues, child custody, etc.
Male FGDs
Respondents were asked to share how Jirga
proceedings are convened. The majority shared
that it depends on the complexity or nature of
a dispute. If it is a minor issue then Jirga mem-
bers usually conduct proceedings inside a room.
However, if a major issue arises where the entire
community’s interest is involved, then such Jirga
proceedings take place in the open. Respondents
added that initially Jirga members and parties
negotiate and mediate behind closed doors as
facilitated by the Jirgamaar. When they need to
either consult the community or take a decision,
they convene the Jirga in an open space – such as
a field in a village, Hujra, or mosque.
Furthermore, respondents confirmed that in
such Jirga proceedings, all parties involved in
the dispute should be present. Some of the
respondents did not have a very clear idea and
could not share their experience.
Female FGDs
Women respondents were also requested to
share their knowledge on this topic. Their in-
formation was not different from male respon-
dents, as we know women of Pakhtun society
usually receive this information from their
male family members.
Survey Findings
The data also reinforced the fact that Jirga pro-
ceedings take place in the open, confirmed by
more than three quarter, 77.9%, of respondents.
Only 18% respondents informed that Jirga pro-
ceedings take place behind closed doors.
4% respondents could not share their experi-
ence.
Are both parties to the dispute always present
at the hearing?
The survey posed another basic question to
ascertain whether both disputing parties are
always present at the proceedings. An over-
whelming majority, 87.4%, confirmed that both
parties attend Jirga proceedings while only
9.8% informed that it is unlikely that both par-
ties attend Jirga proceedings.
Composition of Jirgas
Male FGDs
With regard to the composition of Jirga and
102) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durrani_Empire has a brief history of the Duranni empire (Accessed 17 November)
Edited by John Strawson, London: Cavendish.

49
its membership, the FGDs respondents were
asked to share their knowledge. The majority
of the respondents was quite clear and shared
that community elders are generally part of
Jirga institution. Most Jirga members, accord-
ing to the respondents, are rich and influential
people. Some of the Jirga members are asso-
ciated with political parties or have been part
of the provincial assemblies or national Parlia-
ment. Some of the respondents opined that
local imams or mullahs also participate as Jirga
members. Religious leaders are usually consult-
ed for their religious wisdom especially when a
party to the dispute is interested in the Shariah
aspects of the dispute rather than local Riwaj.
Female FGDs
Dispite of the fact that women are not part of
the Jirga system, they were familiar with the
composition of the Jirga, even though such
information, as mentioned earlier, usually
comes from male family members. Women
respondents thought that local elders, includ-
ing Khans (landowners), Imams, councilors,
or political leaders, are part of Jirga process.
Furthermore, they confirmed that there has
not been a woman Jirga member so far in their
knowledge. However, a few women respon-
dents informed that they had participated in
the decision-making of Jirgas that took place
inside homes and discussed matters related
to family issues, such as inheritance, child
custody, etc., but they had not participated in
multi-family, community or tribal disputes.
The research attempted to obtain factual in-
formation about the composition of members
of an informal justice system or Jirga. Howev-
er, there were no hard and fast rules for this
from the FGDs and, therefore, we turn to the
perception survey to tabulate the respondents
answers to this question. A multiple-choice
question was asked, keeping in view the nature
of the question.
Survey Findings
Looking at the multiple responses from the sur-
vey in the figure below, an overwhelming ma-
jority, 81.4%, confirmed that Jirga is composed
of ‘tribal Maliks/elders’ and, in addition, 52%
identified religious leaders as members of Jirgas.
Actually, the membership of both – tribal Maliks/
elders and religious leaders – shows how Riwaj
(local customs) and Shariah work together when
resolving disputes. Jirgas are made up of respect-
ed elders and leaders from all walks of tribal life.
Some 28.9% shared that Jirga is composed
of influential, rich and political leaders. This
is very true and tribal Maliks or other elders
could also be rich or have political stature
which makes them influential. There are a
few religious political parties who have their
grassroots leadership in FATA, which could also
include either a Malik or political leader but
would be performing religious duties as well.
Due to establishment of Musalihati Councils
under the Local Government Ordinance, coun-
cilors of union councils were also mandated
to mediate and resolve petty disputes among
conflicting parties within their areas of jurisdic-
tion. According to the data, 18.2% of respon-
dents shared that councilors also take part in
the Jirga process.
As one of the options of the survey, 14.3% of
respondents identified civil society members
as being involved in resolving disputes and
also being part of Jirga process. Civil Society,
especially NGOs, are active in remote and rural
areas through their development projects and
they are faced with different issues related to
community disputes. Therefore, they have also
learned the art of mediation in their own way
Chapter6|TheJirga

50
through different capacity building programmes
being funded by international donors.
Have you attended Jirga proceedings?
People in Pakhtun populated areas of Pakistan
come across big or small issues and somehow
every family experienced Jirga in some form.
Although, not all members of the Pakhtun family
necessarily take part in Jirga proceedings. Howev-
er, they do have knowledge about the traditional
system. This section begins with a very basic
question asked of the respondents about wheth-
er they have ever attended any Jirga proceedings.
Male FGDs
Because of the belief that in Jirga proceedings
only male members of the community take
part this question was asked only of male re-
spondents of FGDs. The response was mixed.
Some of the respondents shared that they
attended Jirga proceedings as spectator while
others confirmed that they attended Jirga in
the capacity of a Jirga member and were part
of the decision-making process. Quite a large
group of respondents shared that they attend-
ed Jirga proceedings as parties to a dispute.
The disputes were of various nature and major-
ity of disputes mentioned by the respondents
were minor issues.
The participation in Jirgas bodes well for the
opinions that we sought about the process
of Jirgas.
Survey Findings
Despite of the belief that only men participated
in Jirgas, the following data indicates that women
do participate in the proceedings. The data in the
figure below shows that half of the men and ap-
proximately 2% of women participated in Jirgas.
The next question reveals how they participat-
ed in Jirgas.
If yes, in which capacity?
Those respondents who confirmed that they
had participated in a Jirga were asked a sub-
sequent, multiple-choice question, as to the
capacity in which they attended Jirga proceed-
ings. This is shown in the figure below broken
down by gender.
24 of the 1,195 women sampled had attended
Jirga proceedings. The following figure shows
in what capacity the men and women partici-
pated in Jirgas. Because the type of Jirga was
not specified it is not possible to determine
if the participation of women included more
than family-level Jirgas, such as communi-
ty-level dispute resolution, but it is important
to note that they were as likely to be dispu-
tants and observers whereas men were much
more likely to be observers (52.9%) than
disputants (15.5%) and 30% had served on
Jirgas. It is important to keep in mind that
the responses of 24 women cannot be gen-
Have you attended these proceedings?
Balochistan KP
Male Female Male Female
Yes 53.4 2.4 57.6 1.9
No 46.5 97.6 42.4 98.1
Total Cases
217 217 988 978

51
eralised. Nevertheless, it is understandable
because we know that in family matters, such
as domestic violence, child custody issues,
divorce cases, etc., that women elders do par-
ticipate in the decision-making. In addition,
some women do attend Jirga proceedings
inside homes as observers.
Who attends the Jirga Process?
Male and female FGDs
The respondents in all female and male FGDs
were asked the same question. The majority
thought that all parties to the dispute attended
such proceedings generally. In addition every
Jirga has mediators or Jirgamaars who are
supposed to convene Jirga proceedings. Some
respondents opined that it was also depen-
dent on the nature of a dispute, which ensures
participation of individuals. They believed that
matters related to public interest usually have a
larger audience while civil matters have smaller
groups, usually consisting of disputants, close
family members, and elders making up the
Jirga members.
Survey Findings
The survey data reinforces the general findings
of the FGDs as shown in the following figure.
A clear cut majority, 68.5%, confirmed that only
Jirga members attended Jirga proceedings while
55% shared that only heads of families involved
in the dispute attended the proceedings. 17.8%
think that the entire community attends the
Jirga proceedings, except minorities. However,
17.5% believed that the entire communities
attended Jirga proceedings, including minori-
ties. 3% respondents shared that government
officials also attended Jirga proceedings.
Interestingly, 0.9% informed the survey that
women also attended Jirga proceedings. Since
the survey was conducted in settled districts,
including districts where poverty level is low,
the education ratio is higher and female liter-
acy rate is encouraging, therefore it is possible
that women had attended Jirga proceedings as
parties to the dispute, depending on the nature
of the dispute however, we do not have any
example where women could sit in a Jirga and
watch the proceedings. This reinforces the anal-
ysis above from the responses of the 24 women
who stated that they had participated in Jirgas.
Jirga system?
Characteristics and Composition of Jirgas
In this section of the chapter we explore the
Response in % of only the interviewees who indi-
cated that they had participated in a Jirga
Gender of Respondents
Male (n=856) Female (n=24)
As a Jirga member 30.1 45.8
As a Government official 1.2 0
As a disputant 15.5 12.5
As an observer 52.9 41.7
Others (specify) 0.2 0
Chapter6|TheJirga

52
characteristics that people believe members
of Jirgas should have and the confidence in
Jirga members.
Male FGDs
When male respondents were asked what
should be the criteria or qualities for a person to
become a Jirga member or Jirgamaar or Jirgab-
aaz, a number of qualities were identified by the
respondents. They thought that a Jirga member
should be well versed with local Riwaj and his
village history; be straight forward in conveying
his view point no matter how the people feel;
be pious and well versed with Islamic teachings;
and should be honest and trust worthy. Apart
from these qualities, some of the respondents
identified other traits, which a Jirga member
should have before becoming eligible. Some re-
spondents thought that a Jirga member should
also have worldly education along with religious
education. Besides, some suggested that a Jir-
ga member should also have some awareness
of formal legal system to avoid any violation
of law or fundamental rights enshrined in the
Constitution. Furthermore, some of the respon-
dents conveyed that a Jirga member should be
polite, intelligent, hospitable, righteous and well
trained in Hujra manners.
Female FGDs
Female respondents were also given the op-
portunity to share their thoughts on the mem-
bership criteria for Jirga. A higher number of
respondents thought that Jirga members should
be well versed with Hujra manners so as to re-
spect everyone’s point of view. Another group of
respondents thought that Jirga members should
be educated so that they can decide cases in
light of new knowledge and so that both parties
have faith in the Jirga members’ wisdom. An-
other group of respondents thought that hon-
esty should be the main characteristic of a Jirga
member, which would give confidence to both
parties. Some of the respondents believed that
a Jirga member should be polite in negotiating
with the parties to the dispute and treat both
parties equally without any discrimination on
the basis of wealth, family background, or any
other reason.
It seems that common Pakhtun men and
women have a good sense of justice where
they want to see a perfect individual making
decisions for them. If we could find such a
gentleman (Jirgamaar) to convene Jirga pro-
ceedings and members of the Jirga were to
have all of these qualities, then people will re-
cieve proper justice. It is clear that the people
do expect justice to be done and to be seen.
From the FGDs described above a number of
reasons were stated for Jirga composition.
Those reasons or qualifications became the
options for the respondents to choose from.
The following figure shows the weighting of
the multiple responses, i.e., respondents were
able to pick more than one characteristic that
was desired in participants in a Jirga.
Survey Findings
We see traditional values in these responses –
please refer to the first column of percentages;
the differences in gender will follow. Member-
ship belonging to a respected family shows the
importance of ascribed status in the community
(71.4%), in another form that was echoed in
“having a good reputation in the community
(45.4%) and wisdom of culture and forefathers”
(43.6%). Other, non-ascribed characteristics re-
ferred to education, but note that religious ed-
ucation (57.2%) stands above “formal” (41.9%)
and actual “legal education” (26.4%). We see
the combined weight of culture and religion
when it comes to Jirga membership character-
istics that are summarised in “piety” (61.8%). In
Pakhtun Jirga process Riwaj (customs) or Shari-
ah or a combination of both are applied. There-
fore, it is of considerable importance that a Jirga
member should be well versed in these charac-
teristics as shown in the survey data. “Political
back up” (7.3%) shows the clear separation of
justice from the political sphere.
When the responses are partitioned by gender a
slightly different image is revealed. Please refer to
the last two columns “percent by gender” in the
figure below. Coming from a respected family still
holds and the difference is minor, but collectively
females attached much less importance to all of
the education characteristics. Nevertheless, reli-
gious education was indicated more frequently
(52.6%) than the other categories. Again, piety
(55.1%) was rated second only to being from a
respected family (69.6%). What is puzzling, and
reveals that females are not so traditional as
males is that, in spite of not emphasising edu-
cation to the degree that males do, they do not
emphasise the inheritance of wisdom and culture
from forefathers to the degree than men do.
Experience shows that Jirga members are
mostly not schooled who have learned through
experience and inherited knowledge and wis-
dom from their forefathers. However, in recent
times people in rural communities have real-
ised the need for education, and, as we have

53
seen in the figure above, males, more than
females believe that with new knowledge the
Jirga could be influenced and Human Rights vi-
olations could be avoided. This we see in three
responses where respondents have pointed
out that Jirga members should have formal,
religious or legal education.
The options expressed are all-positive and
show the esteem with which Jirga members
are held. Education is important, more so in
the opinion of men than women. The positive
attitude towards education, as a quality for
members of Jirgas would bode well for educa-
tion in society in general. The lower esteem for
“legal education” compared to other educa-
tion, especially religious education, may imply
that the interviewees separate Jirga from the
court system. Perhaps, if the process of Jirga
were part of formal education, or taught as a
jurisprudence in Shariah law, legal knowledge
would be held in higher esteem. In the case of
Nizam-e-Adl courts we look into this perspec-
tive too because the aspect of education is
important for the appointment of formal judg-
es, i.e., with legal education. In this system the
use of local tradition apparently gained local
esteem, and it may indicate a hybrid system
that Jirga could evolve into.
Do disputants pay fee to the Jirga members
when their disputes are resolved through Jirga?
One of the concerns in justice systems is the cost,
perceived honesty, or possibility of influence on
the outcome of the process. Traditionally the
Jirga is contrasted with formal justice systems by
the absence of paid representatives. Neverthe-
less, there is hearsay that fees may be involved.
Male and Female FGDs
Most FGD participants confirmed that Jirga
members or Jirgamaars do not take any fee,
however, respondents shared that Jirgamaars
are provided with food and transport services
as a gesture of hospitality. Those who thought
that Jirga members do take a fee or bribe
however could not confirm rates or fees; these
responses seem speculative. Nonetheless,
when they indicated that Jirga members do
take some money, it is in the form of Machal-
ka104
money, etc. that the Jirgamaar holds to
assure compliance with the process. Hence
those funds are not of a financial benefit to the
person holding the money.
We now turn to the results of the survey and
they are quite surprising, because although
the FGD implied that Jirga members may take
money from the disputants, survey results
show a different picture.
Survey Findings
Through a direct and single response question,
respondents were asked whether disputants pay
a fee to Jirga members. As shown in the figure
below, three quarters of respondents (75.3%)
said that disputants do not pay a fee to Jirga
members. Only 4.4% said they do, but one-fifth
of respondents (20.3%) said they did not know.
To delve into the 106 (4.4%) cases where re-
spondents said that payment was made for
Jirga system?
Frequency Percent Percent by Gender
Whole Sample Male Female
Member should belong to a respected family 1713 71.4 73.1 69.6
Member should have wisdom of local culture and history,
inherited from his forefathers
1047 43.6 49 38.2
Member should have a good reputation in his community 1090 45.4 54.2 36.6
Member should have formal education 1006 41.9 48.7 35.1
Member should have religious education 1373 57.2 61.7 52.6
Member should have legal education 634 26.4 32.4 20.4
Member should be known for his piety 1483 61.8 68.4 55.1
Member should have a political back-up 175 7.3 9.6 4.9
Other (specify) 14 0.6 0.4 0.8
Don’t Know 176 7.3 6.4 8.3
Chapter6|TheJirga

54
Jirga services a follow on, open-ended ques-
tion was asked.
If yes, Please specify amount
The range of the responses in the figure below
show a wide range of monetary amounts.
Immediately one notices that 70.8% of the
5.4% who said that payments were made,
could not make a guess or did not know of an
amount. The conclusion is that although there
may be or may have been cases, the general
rule is that fees are not charged by members
of Jirgas.
Often, in tribal affairs, non-monetary compen-
sation is used for obligations. Other than a
fee, however, Jirga members could be obliged
through other means. To look into this area
of a cost for conducting a Jirga or going to a
Jirga to resolve a dispute an additional ques-
tion was posed.
How do Jirga members receive compensation
for their services?
The following figure provides several options
to the respondents and unsurprisingly, the
majority, 52.1%, again reconfirmed that Jir-
ga members do not take any compensation
for their services. One-fifth of the sample,
21.2%, did not know and could not share
their opinion.
17.1% believe that Jirga members are com-
pensated with travel and food allowances,
understandable and justifiable expenses that
disputants have to cover. This comes under
hospitality and not a fee or bribe.
10.9% opined that a fee should be paid in the
shape of a gift rather than cash while only
3% thought that such fees should be paid as
widely accepted and agreed amounts. Only
2% believed that such fees are bribes and
disputants usually do so to turn the case in
their favour.
The conduct of the Jirga
How are Jirga decisions usually taken?
Jirga decisions are based on consensus, as ex-
plained in the introductory chapter of this study.
After extensive mediation and evidence gath-
ering, parties to the dispute give consent to the
Jirga elders before decisions are announced.
Male FGDs
The male FGDs agreed that Jirga decisions are
reached through consensus. They added that
before announcing a decision, Jirgamaars take
the disputants in confidence through what is
called “power of attorney” in formal jurispru-
dence before announcing a decision. After
gaining a consensus from both the parties, Jirga
decisions are announced, that should be accep-
figure to both disputants. Respondents added
that the decision of a Jirga is considered as the
final word and is respected by all.
However, some respondents informed that some-
times Jirga decisions are imposed on disputants
and any of the disputants might disagree, espe-
cially in cases related to women and children.
Female FGDs
Female respondents provided opinions similar
to that of the male FGDs. This may be because
women usually receive information about
Jirgas from their male family members. A few
female respondents were pessimistic and
shared the opinion that women’s voices are
rarely heard and that decisions usually favour
the male section of Pakhtun society.
Survey Findings
In order to put the FGD opinions into perspec-
tive, that, is proportional opinion from the
population, the question about how Jirga deci-
sions are usually taken was asked in the survey.
Out of 2,400 respondents from both provinc-
es of Pakistan, an overwhelming majority of
87.6% thought that Jirga decisions are based
on consensus. Only 1.8% informed the survey
that Jirga decisions are taken through voting.
Again we see some lack of opinion on the part
of women compared with men, but not as
frequently as with other questions.
What procedures/rules are applied to resolve
conflict/dispute through the Jirga?
As described in the background chapter, Riwaj
and Islamic law or Shariah references are used
to decide disputes. The FGDs and the survey
data shed some light on the balance.
Male FGDs
Before convening Jirga proceedings, Jirga mem-
bers seek permission of both parties whether
Shariah or local Riwaj or customs should be
adopted to reach to a decision. This survey also
104) Bail money

55
intended to seek respondents’ opinion on which
procedures or rules are applied to resolve a dis-
pute through a Jirga. Responses to this question
were mixed. Some respondents thought that
Riwaj should be respected and adopted when
Jirga decisions are taken. They added that their
local Riwaj is according to Islam, which makes it
easy for the Jirga members to mix both.
Another group argued that since Jirga is a lo-
cal custom therefore local customs should be
encouraged. However, they added, in certain
cases where there is a need for religion to play
its part, then Shariah should be interpreted to
reach a decision. Some respondents favoured
the use of both – interpreting local customs
and Shariah.
Some argued that Jirga elders carry historical
knowledge of Riwaj while they are not very
well versed with Shariah and therefore they
are not authorised to interpret Shariah.
Chapter6|TheJirga
How are Jirga decisions usually taken? Balochistan KP
Male Female Male Female Overall
Consensus 97.2 89.4 88.6 84.2 87.6
Voting 2.3 1.4 2.2 1.4 1.8
Do Not Know 0.5 9.2 9.2 14.4 10.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100

56
Female FGDs
The female respondents confirmed that Jirga
decisions are taken in accordance with Shariah
while some confirmed that it’s a combination
of Shariah and Riwaj. There was a group of
females that argued that Jirga decisions are
reached in accordance with local customs.
Survey Findings
The survey was used to gather the perception
and weigh the respondents’ opinion on this
issue. The survey results for this question
shows that a greater proportion of respon-
dents, 48.6%, thought that in Jirga procedures
a combination of both Riwaj and Shariah are
applied to resolve a conflict or dispute, while
29.1% believed that only Riwaj is applied and
19.3% believed that only Islamic law or Sha-
riah is used to resolve a conflict. However, in
the case of Balochistan there is a very large
gender difference with 80.2% of the women
stating that tribal law is used as the basis
while 23% of the men in Balochistan, similar
to men and women in KP, believe that tribal
law is the basis for decisions. We are hard
pressed to explain the difference in gender in
Balochistan except that women may be less in
contact with the system and, hence, believe
that Riwaj is applied.
This shows that the Jirga takes into account
both Shariah and Riwaj.
Is the decision of a Jirga final?
There is some ambiguity on this. Jirga all over
Pakhtun belt, including Balochistan, KP and
FATA, is similar as an institution in Pakhtun
tradition however; the process varies from
place to place and from tribe to tribe. For in-
stance, Jirga decisions are strictly followed in
FATA but in KP and Balochistan parties might
follow decisions voluntarily. However, this
volunteerism has hidden community pressure
and if anyone does not obey the decision of a
Jirga, the party could be either expelled from
that particular community or the community
could declare a social boycott and shun the
person or his family, depending on the nature
and magnitude of a decision/case. In these
cases a Pakhtun family might sacrifice materi-
al belongings, or submit to the ritual of asking
to be forgiven, but a family would never imag-
ine leaving its village/community or being
shunned. However, there are several instanc-
es where one or both the parties disagreed
with Jirga decisions and then went on to ac-
cess other forms of justice. The data reflects a
split of opinion and shows confusion.
The following figure shows the responses to
the question of finality of the Jirga decision,
Appeal against Jirga decisions
Only 20.4% of the responses above indicated that
the decision a Jirga is final. Discussion in the FGDs
about this subject reveals new aspects which are
What procedures/rules are applied to
resolve conflict/dispute through the Jirga?
Balochistan KP
Tribal Law 23.0 80.2 26.7 21.6 29.1
Islamic Law 22.6 4.1 17.9 23.3 19.3
Combination of Both 54.4 15.7 49.7 53.6 48.6
Do Not Know 0.0 0.0 5.7 1.5 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100.0

57
useful for understanding the Jirga process and
that may be useful for justice reforms.
Male FGDs
In all male FGDs in KP and Balochistan, the ma-
jority confirmed that because Jirga decisions
are reached through consensus, they are final
and no party usually approaches another entity.
However, a few respondents pointed out that in
certain cases, either party may not be satisfied
and therefore may request another Jirga for-
mation or the approach formal justice system.
This usually happens when there is a dispute
between a rich and a poor party, respondents
added, and therefore the poor party develops
such feelings against the rich party and feels
that the latter is favoured because of wealth and
influence. In such cases the poor party requests
the local community to form another Jirga or in
case they do not have a faith in the Jirga any-
more they can approach the formal courts.
Female FGDs
The majority of female respondents were also
very clear and confident that Jirga decisions are
final and accepted by both the parties. They con-
firmed that to their knowledge no such appeal
was lodged against a Jirga decision. However,
there were few respondents who feared that in
cases where women’s issues are involved, the
Jirga tends to violate certain women’s rights and
therefore female victims, if allowed by the men,
have had to lodge a request to a formal court.
Therefore, it is confirmed that there may be odd
situations where the aggrieved party has the right
to appeal for formation of another Jirga or can
lodge a formal request in court to get justice.
Although this question was not asked of
interviewees in FATA, it is considered rare
for appeals to be made. Nevertheless, the
question was asked in Balochistan and KP to
see if either party can lodge an appeal to the
community and request for another Jirga to
be formed. The following figure, broken down
by gender shows that appeals are recognised,
but it is far from conclusive.
Survey Findings
According to the majority of respondents;
56.4%, an appeal could be lodged against a Jirga
decision while 21.8% still believe that it cannot
be. A considerable number of respondents,
21.8%, were not sure about their responses.
Again we find that many more women opt for
the opinion ‘do not know’ than do men.
Is there any higher authority/superior court/
tribunal to which you can appeal against a
Jirga decision?
Appeals against a Jirga cannot be lodged in a any
formal court, as in Pakistan’s settled districts Jirga
or any other form of informal dispute resolution is
not recognised and the judiciary discourages this
practice strongly.
However, the survey intended to compare facts
with perception. The results are confusing, and
not clear-cut response is recorded. A higher
number of respondents, 39.6%, believed that
an appeal against Jirga decisions could be
Is there any higher authority/superior
court/tribunal to which you can appeal
against a Jirga decision?
Balochistan KP
Yes 51.61 44.24 56.88 59.71 56.4
No 39.17 23.04 25.30 14.11 21.8
Do Not Know 9.22 32.72 17.81 26.18 21.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Chapter6|TheJirga

58
lodged in formal courts, while more than one
quarter of respondents, 26.5% believed the
opposite. More than one-third of respondents,
34%, did not know.
Comparisons between types of Justice Systems
This part of the chapter begins a transition into
a comparative analysis of the Jirga with other
systems, specifically the Musalihati Anjuman,
and the Nizam-e-Adl.
Are members of the following systems elected/
selected/nominated by the community?
Three (Jirga, Nizam-e-Adl - Malakand Division Only,
Musalihati Councils) systems were listed and vari-
ous options were provided to the respondents.
Jirga system:
Members or mediators of Jirga are usually
local nofigures who have inherited this status
from their forefathers. In the research we did
not come across cases where the community,
through a ballot or show of hands elected a
Jirga member or Jirgamaar. Almost all respon-
dents of the male and Female FGDs confirmed
that Jirga members inherit their status from
their fathers and parties to disputes nominate
or select them for resolving a dispute.
Responses show confusion - One fifth (21.8%)
believed that Jirga members are elected, 22.8%
believed that conflicting parties could nominate
Jirga members or Jirgamaars for resolving their
disputes and one-third of respondents (32.5%)
believed that Jirga members are selected. A con-
siderable number of respondents did not share
their opinion. This is quite surprising and shows
that respondents were not very clear about how
Jirga members become part of the Jirga process.
Nizam-e-Adl: Under the Nizam-e-Adl system,
Qazies are being selected or recruited by
the government itself rather than posted
through election.
Because Nizam-e-Adl was introduced only in
Malakand Division, this question was asked from
male and female respondents there. Very few
respondents offered an opinion on selection of
the Qazi, while the majority was clueless. Some
shared that Qazis are posted by the government
who are government employees.
The data in the figure above shows that only
4.4% believed that Qazis of Nizam-e-Adl were
elected while 14.2% respondents believed that
Qazis are selected. Some 6.5% thought that
Qazis are nominated. Close to three quarters
of respondents did not know showing that the
Nizam-e-Adl regulation has not been sufficient-
ly promoted or explained to the population.
Musalihati Councils: As per the figure above,
surprisingly, very few respondents, 1.8%, shared
that members of Musalihati Councils are elect-
ed while 6.8% of respondents believed that
members are selected. Some 2% thought that
members of Musalihati Councils are nominated.
Factual information differs from perception. In
fact, Musalihati Councils were set up as part of
the local bodies system, and the local govern-
ment selects all members of the Musalihati An-
juman. As will be shown in the next chapter, the
number of districts sampled was too small to
be useful for studying this type of justice system
because it is scattered and not widespread.

59
Chapter: 7
State of Fundamental Rights
in the Pakhtun Belt

60
STATE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
IN THE PAKHTUN BELT
Introduction
This chapter analyses the state of Funda-
mental Rights of the vulnerable segment of
the Pakhtun society, which includes women,
children and minorities, and its interrelation
with mechanisms of justice. It gains the Pakh-
tun perception regarding International Human
Rights, rights protected by the Constitution of
Pakistan and Islam and its interrelation with
the informal justice system.
The national legal framework of Pakistan
or the ‘formal’ legal system is not the sole
regulatory law governing the lives of people
belonging to diverse segments of the society
in Pakistan. Therefore, the survey addresses
the interplay between international law and
the constitutional provisions that recognise
and protect the rights of indigenous groups
in Pakhtun society, the governance structures
that implement the laws formulated at the
provincial level,105
and the local customs and
institutions that ultimately decide the code of
conduct in the region.
The Status of International Law in Pakistan
Traditionally national law governs the domestic
aspects of government, whereas international
law primarily deals with the relations between
States. However, this is no longer true. Human
Rights, for example, are a cross-cutting issue: If
a State is bound to respect and protect Human
Rights through international law, then this
automatically creates a relationship between
the State and individuals who are within its
jurisdiction. Therefore, the legal relationship
between international law and national law
is interdependent. This relationship becomes
particularly relevant where there is a conflict of
obligations, i.e. when the content of national
law and a rule of international law contradict
one another, or, if in national law, a specific
right is not conferred to an individual, it is a
right that the State must provide under inter-
national obligations.106
The legal status of international law in Pa-
kistan is such that international law is only
legally binding and enforceable if it is incorpo-
rated into national law through legislation.107
Therefore, the State fulfils its international
Human Rights obligations by passing national
laws on certain topics. For example, Pakistan
adopted the Juvenile Justice System Ordi-
nance, 2000, to better protect the rights of
children as is demanded by the Child Rights
Convention (CRC). However, even where Paki-
stan has not provided for national legislation
to transform international law into domestic
law, it may be noted that Pakistani courts do
try to implement international law provided
that it is not in conflict with the Constitution
of Pakistan or statutory law.108
Nevertheless,
generally speaking, only where international
law has been incorporated into national law
will a claim derived from international law be
justifiable before a Pakistani court.
On the other hand, in the international con-
text, it must be noted that a State violating
international law which is binding upon it can
105) Shaheen Sardar Ali, Javaid Rehman ‘Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan, Constitutional and
Legal Perspectives’, Rutledge, 08-Jun-2001, p. 3
106) Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th Ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) p. 133
107) Société Générale de Surveillance v Pakistan [2002], Appeal to Supreme Court, Civil Appeal Nos 459, 460 [2002
SCMR 1694] [Paragrahs 23-24].
108) Ms. Shehla Zia & Others v WAPDA [1994], Supreme Court of Pakistan [PLD 1994 SC 693] [para. 9]; Faqir Hus-
sain, ‘Seizure, Confiscation and Asset Recovery’ (Background Paper) 2 (accessed on 13 December 2011 at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/4/35167365.pdf).

61
never justify this neglect of international law.109
If that were to be the case, every State could
easily undermine international law. Such non-
adherence of treaty obligations would amount
to a breach of international law which could
result in counter actions by other States’ par-
ties to the treaty under consideration.
To ascertain the opinion of the Pakhtuns and to
gain an understanding of their perceived rela-
tion of the justice systems under study with re-
gard to international Human Rights standards,
the following questions were asked of all 2,400
interviewees and also raised during FGDs:
Do you agree/disagree that the Jirga process
is at times in conflict with International
Human Rights Standards?
Female FGDs
Despite the global perception of the traditional
Jirga system violating fundamental Human
Rights of the vulnerable in the Pakhtun belt,
a majority of the respondents in FATA, Khy-
ber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan were of
the opinion that the Jirga decisions were in
conformity with international Human Rights
standards. A participant explained that she has
never witnessed or heard of an occasion where
the rights of the underprivileged or marginal-
ised were infringed by the Jirga. She believed
that the Jirga makes judgments and resolves
complex cases based on the notions of equality
and fairness. Another respondent justified the
actions of the Jirga by stating that Jirga deci-
sions are also respected if they are in conform-
ity with the principles of Shariah even if they
are in conflict with international Human Rights
standards. Conversely, several participants
disagreed with this statement on the basis that
certain traditional customs (Riwaj) used by the
Jirga for justice, such as Swara, disregard inter-
national Human Rights when dealing with the
rights of women. However, she further clarified
that the custom of Swara, is almost non exist-
ent in today’s Pakhtun society.
Male FGDs
In contrast to female respondents, there
was a mix of opinions voiced by the male
respondents from Balochistan. Nearly half
of the participants explicitly confirmed that
the Jirga violates fundamental Human Rights
particularly with regard to disputes involving
women and children. Criticising the traditional
Riwaj, a respondent explained that there have
been occasions when three year old girls have
been given to settle blood-feuds. Furthermore,
a participant gave an example of the Jirgas
held by the Taliban in Swat, under which local
people were subjected to inhumane and de-
grading punishments. In contrast, the major-
ity of participants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
disagreed with this notion and asserted that
109) While this rule is explicitly stipulated with regard to international treaty law in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, this rule is also valid for states which are not party to the Vienna Convention as this norm is also
part of international customary law (see Mark E Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2009) 374 et seq), which is why it is also binding on Pakistan.
Chapter7|StateofFundamentalRightsinthePakhtunBelt

62
generally tribal elders make their decisions in
light of Shariah; therefore if a decision is in
conformity with principles of Islam, then it also
upholds and protects the Human Rights of the
aggrieved. A respondent, distinguishing the
Pakhtun Jirga from other national traditional
justice mechanisms such as the Panchayat in
Punjab, explained that the Jirga protects the
general welfare of the society and therefore it
can never defy or be in conflict with interna-
tional Human Rights standards.
Which of the following systems of justice
are in compliance with International Human
Rights (IHRs) standards?
The data in the following figure demonstrates
that the majority of the respondents view the
Jirga system as an instrument of justice dis-
pensation that complies with IHRs standards
as compared to other formal and informal
justice systems.
53.9% of the respondents believed that Jirga
system acts in accordance with International Hu-
man Rights standards in dispute resolution; only
10.9% of the respondents opposed that notion.
Whereas 35.5% of respondents could not answer
the question, which shows the lack of awareness
and knowledge regarding Human Rights and
protection guaranteed by international law.
According to the survey, 51% of the respondents
agreed that the formal judicial system complies
with International Human Rights. While only
10.9% had a negative perception of the formal
justice system, 38.1% of respondents did not
offer an opinion due to lack of understanding of
the legal system’s function. Almost one-third of
respondents (31.2%) agreed that Nizam-e-Adl
provides justice according to international stand-
ards while only 1.5% disagreed with the notion.
However, 67.2% were unable to answer, because
Nizam-e-Adl only applies to the Malakand divi-
sion. Chapter 4 has a section which will specifi-
cally analyse the Nizam-e-Adl in Malakand.
Only 18% believed that the Peace Jirga com-
plies with international Human Rights stand-
ards during its proceedings, whereas just 5.5%
believe that the Peace Jirga does not come up
to International Human Rights standards. Most
of the respondents, 76.5%, could not express
their opinion, as the scope and practice of Peace
Jirgas are restricted to certain areas and people.
Finally, only 9.8% of respondents were of the
opinion that the Musalihati Council makes de-
cisions in conformity with international Human
Rights standards while only 2.4% have a nega-
tive perception. An overwhelming majority,
87.8%, was unaware of this institution of alter-
nate dispute resolution; this may be atributed
to the fact that the institution of Musalihati
Council is relatively new as compared to the
Jirga which has strong historical significance.
These results portray the relative importance
of the Jirga among justice systems in the
Pakhtun belt when compared to International
Human Rights agreements as understood by
the sampled population.
The Constitution of Pakistan 1973
Fundamental Rights are defined as the pres-
ervation of certain indispensable basic Human
Rights to be protected against State interfer-
ence. The inclusion of Fundamental Rights in
Pakistan’s Constitution enunciates the obliga-
tion to protect these inalienable entitlements
or “rights”, which are inviolable under all con-
ditions.110
Article 8(2) protects the sanctity of
the Constitution by prohibiting the legislature
110) The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/ (accessed on 11 October
2012)
System of justice that complies with International Human Rights
Response To a large
extent
To some
extent
Not at some
extent
Not at all Don’t
Know
Total
Formal justice system (Supreme
Court/High Court/Session Court)
17.8 33.2 3.4 7.5 38.1 100.0
Jirga system 27.1 26.8 5.3 5.4 35.5 100.0
Peace Jirga 7.5 10.5 1.8 3.7 76.5 100.0
Nizam-e-Adl(Malakand Division
Only)
7.3 23.9 0.9 0.6 67.2 100.0
Musalihati Council 3.5 6.3 0.7 1.7 87.8 100.0

63
to enact laws that curtail Fundamental Rights
and is immune from executive actions.111
Articles 8-28 of Pakistan’s Constitution provide
‘every citizen’ their inherent and Fundamen-
tal Rights and lays down standard regulatory
norms to protect and promote these substan-
tive rights. The FATA – and PATA as well – are
considered part of the territory of Pakistan
by virtue of Article 1 of the Constitution.112
As such, their inhabitants are subject to the
Constitution so long as they qualify as ‘citizens’
under Pakistani citizenship law.113
Moreover,
it goes without saying that non-citizens within
the state’s territorial jurisdiction, and under
its sovereign authority, are also subject to Pa-
kistani law, including the Constitution. Indeed,
executive and legislative branches of the GoP
have never expressly excluded the residents of
the tribal areas from the ambit of Fundamental
Rights protection guaranteed under the Consti-
tution, and both the Supreme Court of Pakistan
[SCP] as well as the Peshawar High Court af-
firmed that residents of the tribal areas enjoy
all such Fundamental Rights under the Consti-
tution.114
However, a major caveat that must be
borne in mind is that Fundamental Rights can-
not at present be enforced by residents of FATA
or PATA of KP if the right is voilated within the
respective tribal areas, regardless of whether
they are citizens or aliens.
However, in Pakistan’s constitutional and legisla-
tive sphere, the disinclination to address ethnic
diversity has created a vacuum in ensuring legal
protection and entitlement of Fundamental
Rights for tribal societies. The ‘bill of rights’ ap-
plicable to all citizens of Pakistan, discriminates
against the persons from the FATA by excluding
them from its legal sanctuary as seen in Article
247 of the Constitution which proclaims that the
institutions guaranteeing Fundamental Rights
and ensuring legal remedies are not extended
to the tribal areas. The Constitution further
provides that the executive legal authority over
FATA rests with the President. The law legislated
by the Parliament only applies to the FATA after
the approval of President, allowing the President
to formulate exceptions and modifications to the
law.115
This anomaly deprives persons belonging
to FATA from the Fundamental Rights envisaged
by the Constitution because these rights are safe-
guarded and enforced primarily by the judiciary
yet the inhabitants of FATA are denied access to
the State’s justice mechanisms.116
Rather than being granted the rights and privi-
leges as equal citizens of Pakistan, the PATA have
a separate legal status. Under Article 247, the
executive authority of the Federation extends
also to the PATA of KP and Balochistan. This
provision empowered the President to admin-
ister it through the Governor of the KP. Further-
more, Acts of the Parliament or the Provincial
Assembly would apply to the region only if the
President, at his discretion, so directed. The KP
Governor has the right to make regulations, with
the approval of the President, for “peace and
good government” of the region.117
Being an
integral part of the State, this region is governed
by special laws and not by the ordinary national
legal framework of the country. Therefore, any
legislation enacted by Parliament to safeguard
the Fundamental Rights of citizens of Pakistan,
such as the recent “Anti Women Practices Act
2011” will be extended to the tribal region if
only it is so directed by the President.
Therefore, people residing in the FATA and
PATA are not legally entitled to three distinct
categories of rights: 1) right to due process
that protects against abuses of the legal system
111) Ibid
112) The PATA is not expressly mentioned in Article 1. However, all of the tribal areas which constitute FATA & PATA
are named in Article 246 of the Constitution.
113) For an analogous ruling with respect to residents of what used to be known as the Northern Areas, i.e. Azad
Jammu & Kashmir & Gilgit-Baltistan, see: Al-Jehad Trust though Habibul Wahab Al-Khairi v. Federation of Pakistan
through Secretary, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad and 3 others [1990 SCMR 1379].
114) Murad Ali v. Assistant Political Agent, Landi Kotal and 2 others [2009 YLR 2497 (Pesh)]; Ch. Manzoor Elahi v. Federa-
tion of Pak stan etc. [PLD 1975 SC 66]. [hereinafter Elahi].
115) Abdul Malik Khan, The Dispensation of Justice in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan: Its Appli-
cation and Analysis, http://www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issue_62/08-THE_DISPENSATION_OF_JUSTICE_IN_THE_FEDER-
ALLY_ADMINISTERED.html, Research Journal of Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar.
116) The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/ (accessed on 11 October 2012)
117) Ibid

64
such as detention or imprisonment without
trial, secret trials, retrospective or excessive
punishments, and double punishment for the
same crime; 2) right of liberty that protects
freedoms in areas such as belief, expression,
association, assembly, movement, business
and profession are safeguarded; and 3) the
Constitution grants the right of equality that
guarantees equal citizenship, equality before
the law and non-discrimination.
The survey examined the perception of the
respondents regarding the role of the various
justice dispensation mechanisms in protect-
ing the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In order to assess the opinion of the sampled
population with regard to the Fundamental
Rights enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan
1973 that guarantees citizens their inherent
rights, the question asked was:
Which of the following systems of justice are
in compliance with Fundamental Rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution?
The data illustrated that the majority respond-
ents, 55.8% believed that the Jirga system and
the formal justice system, 55.5%, comply with
the rights provided in the Constitution. Only
9.2% and 10.5% of the respondents disagreed
with this statement respectively. Furthermore,
approximately one third of the respondents
could not share their perception due to the
lack of awareness regarding Fundamental
Rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
36.4% of respondents supported Nizam-e-
Adl’s role in safeguarding the Fundamental
Rights provided in the Constitution, while
only 2.5% disagreed with the notion. An
overwhelming majority, 61.1% were unable to
answer, again as Nizam-e-Adl is only extended
to the Malakand division.
Only less than a quarter of the respondents,
18.6%, believed that the Peace Jirga complies
with Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, whereas just 4.6% opposed this
statement. Majority of the respondents, 76.8%
did not answer, as Peace Jirgas are not held
frequently in this region.
10.1% of respondents believed that the Mu-
salihati Council makes decisions in conformity
with international Human Rights standards
while only 2.4% have a negative perception.
However, majority of the respondents, 87.8%,
were unaware of this institution of alternate
dispute resolution; this may be again due to
the recent formation of Musalihati Council (in
2001) compared to other historical mecha-
nisms of dispute resolution. The survey sample
was not able to capture a useful representa-
tion of respondents for obtaining data on the
Musalihati Council because these councils are
too few and too scattered.
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution and
Jirga
Concerns are raised internationally and nation-
ally regarding the Jirga’s weak implementation
of Fundamental Rights as guaranteed by the

65
Constitution. Some respondents, 25.4%, agreed
that this traditional system is at times in conflict
with Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Con-
stitution; including 3.3% who ‘strongly agree’
and 22.1% who ‘somewhat agree’. Whereas
31.4% of the respondents believe that the Jirga
process is in conformity with the rights pro-
tected by the Constitution; including 17.7% who
‘strongly disagree’ and 13.7% who ‘somewhat
disagree’. Analysis of the data by provinces
illustrated that 24.1% of the respondents in KP
and 31.1% in Balochistan agreed with the no-
tion. Conversely, 34.6% of the respondents in KP
and 17.1% in Balochistan did not agree with this
statement.
Female FGDs
Nearly all participants concurred with the no-
tion that the Jirga process made decisions in
conformity with Fundamental Rights protected
by the Constitution; “The Jirga takes into ac-
count all fundamental and legal rights when
resolving local disputes”.118
A participant further
elaborated that since the Constitution of Paki-
stan and domestic legislation is based on the
principles of Shariah and customs; therefore the
Jirga is bound to make decisions which uphold
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A
number of participants acknowledged that the
traditional justice system at times defied the
principles of the Constitution. A participant
defending the traditional justice dispensing
system, reasoned that certain decisions of the
Jirga were in conflict with the Constitution as
majority of the Jirga elders are not aware the
of the principles of the Constitution, therefore
their decisions are solely based on the notions
of Pakhtunwali and principles of Shariah.
Male FGDs
There was a slight discrepancy in the responses
of the male and female participants. While
nearly all were of the opinion that Jirga deci-
sions are based on the notion of fairness and
justice, therefore, they uphold the Fundamen-
tal Rights enshrined in Constitution of Pakistan.
In support of this argument, a respondent
stated that if this was not the case, then the
government would have investigated and taken
steps to ban the Jirga in the Pakhtun region.
To guard the sanctity of the traditional justice
system, a respondent explained that the tribal
elders resolve disputes in accordance to their
perceptive of justice in the best interests of the
parties involved and disregard any constitu-
tion, law or government. Nevertheless, several
participants accepted that certain traditions
protected by the Jirga system were in conflict
with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution,
such as the their right of inheritance, which
is denied to women in the Pakhtun society.
Furthermore, honour crimes, such as honour
killing and Swara have been banned by the
Constitution and the judiciary ; however, these
unjust social practices subsist and are still used
by the Jirga to resolve disputes.
Do you agree/disagree that the Jirga process
is at times in conflict with Fundamental Rights
given by Islam?
Fundamental Rights in Islam as Practiced in Jirgas
118) Swat female interview FGD

66
The Human Rights given by the Quran and Sun-
nah is considered as supreme law in the Islamic
world and is the basis of the Fundamental
Rights enshrined in Pakistan’s Constitution. As
a principle, Islamic law does not discriminate
among humans on the basis of gender, colour,
race and ethnicity and therefore at times it
comes into conflict with the tribal code.
Female FGDs
The majority of the female respondents
believed that the decisions made by the Jirga
were in conformity with the Fundamental Rights
protected in Islam. A participant from Swat
explained that the essence of Islam lies in the
heart of the Jirga; as it is commenced by taking
Allah’s name (through the recitation of the Holy
Quran) and also ends by taking Allah’s name
(through a group prayer for everlasting peace
and harmony amongst the disputants). Tribal
elders are very conscious of making decisions
that adhere to the ideology of Islam, since they
understand the weight of the responsibility
on their shoulders to make just and equifigure
decisions. According to another respond-
ent, tribal elders seek the guidance of Islamic
Scholars when faced with complex disputes to
ensure that their decisions are taken in the light
of Islam and principles of Shariah. Conversely,
a handful of the participants agreed that in
certain cases, the Jirga fails to comply with prin-
ciples of Shariah. For example, in contrast to the
Pakhtun culture and Jirga, Islam gives women
the freedom to marry of their choice.
Male FGDs
Unpredictably, male respondents were more
open in their views in contrast to the female
respondents. There was an apparent divide in
the views of the participants; several believed
that even though tribal elders make decisions
staying within the circle of Pakhtunwali, they
rarely oppose principles of Islam. In support
of this argument, a respondent explained that
Jirga decisions are made by righteous and hon-
est elders of the society, who are well versed in
the teachings of Quran and the Shariah. It was
identified that the conflict between local tradi-
tions and religion typically emerges in cases
concerning women, especially when dealing
with disputes which involve female inheritance
and honour. Conventionally, women are denied
Do you agree/disagree that the Jirga process is at times in conflict with Fundamental Rights given
by the Constitution of Pakistan?
Responce
Male Female Total
Strongly Agree 37 41 78
Somewhat Agree 356 174 530
Somewhat Disagree 196 133 329
Strongly Disagree 285 140 425
Don’t know 331 707 1038
Total 1205 1195 2400

67
their legal and religious share of inheritance in
the Pakhtun belt which defies Islamic princi-
ples. Also, Islam and state law clearly prohibits
the notorious custom of Swara, which is used
by the tribal Jirgas to resolve complex honour
crimes and blood disputes.
Survey Data
The survey results present a different view. In
both KP and Balochistan, 60 % of the respond-
ents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the
notion that the Jirga contradicts the princi-
ples of Islam. In Balochistan, a slightly higher
percentage of respondents agreed that Jirga
conflicts with Islamic rights.
The rights of Children, Women and Minorities
in the context of the Jirga
It has been commented throughout this chapter
that in literature there are disadvantaged sub-
populations when submitting to or involved
in the process of Jirgas. In this section, we will
review three such sub-populations.
Rights of Children and the Jirga System
Violations of the rights of children are preva-
lent in Pakistan, especially in the Pakhtun belt.
Therefore, the survey aimed to gather the
perception of the local population regarding the
Jirga’s role in mitigating disputes that involve
children. According to the Society for the Pro-
tection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC) report,
1,216 cases of child sexual abuse were docu-
mented in the country in the first six months
of 2011. Out of those cases, 125 boys and girls
were sexually abused after abduction and 55
were murdered after sexual assault.119
Children
are frequently victims of mental and physical
abuse in the region, child custody cases are de-
cided without taking into consideration the best
interests of the child and often children have be-
come victims of the harsh decisions in the tribal
justice system, such as Swara and collective
punishments. Furthermore, female children are
forced into early marriages, as under the tribal
custom of Walwar (demand of money from the
bridegroom’s family equal to that of the bride’s
‘head’) young girls (below the age of 18) are
given preference over their sons and are worth
more money to the girl’s family.
International Law
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
The ratification of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) on December 12, 1990,
marked a significant milestone in the efforts
to protect the fundamental Human Rights of
the children of Pakistan. This convention is the
first international instrument that safeguards
the civil, cultural, economic, political and social
rights of children. Moreover, Pakistan no longer
holds any reservations to this Convention. The
CRC imposes binding obligations on the govern-
ment of Pakistan to respect and ensure the
rights of Pakistani children. Several imperative
provisions include:
Substantial Provisions
Article 1 of the CRC defines a child as “every
human being below the age of eighteen years
unless under the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier.”
Article 2 binds the State to respect and ensure
the rights set forth in the Convention to each
child within their jurisdiction without discrimi-
nation of any kind, irrespective of the child’s
or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
119) The State of Pakistan’s Children 2010 http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/04/2010-a-tough-year-for-chil-
dren-in-pakistan/(accessed 2nd August 2012)
Do you agree/disagree that the Jirga process is at times in conflict with rights given in Islam?
Responce
Male Female Total
Don’t know 196 382 578
Total 1205 1195 2400

68
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, prop-
erty, disability, birth or other status120
. Thus,
this Convention applies to every Pakhtun and
non-Pakhtun child in Pakistan.
Article 3 states that in all activities concern-
ing children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts
of law, administrative authorities or legisla-
tive bodies, the best interest of the child shall
be a primary consideration.121
Therefore, the
State is obligated to monitor the decisions of
the Jirga, to ensure that the rights of children
involved in this conflict resolution mechanism
are not violated by the decisions of the tribal
elders.
Article 9 compels the State to ensure that the
child is not separated from his/her parents
against their will, except if the law determines
that it is in the best interest of the child.122
Therefore, the custom of Swara and the giving
of daughters away without their consent to
resolve an enmity is also strictly prohibited by
international law.
Article 12 obliges the State to provide a child
capable of forming his or her own views
the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child, in particular in
any judicial and administrative proceedings
affecting the child, and to give due weight to
the views of the child.123
This provision entitles
the child (female and male) to be heard in the
Jirga process and the State should ensure that
the Jirgamaars take into consideration the best
interests of the child.
Monitoring
The CRC is the only Convention of the ones de-
scribed in this report that provides neither for
a State-to-State nor for an individual complaint
procedure. Only State reports may be consid-
ered by the CRC Committee – another Commit-
tee of 18 independent members. Article 44(1)
of the CRC obliges States Parties to report to
the Committee within two years after acceding
to the treaty and thereafter every five years.
The reporting guidelines established by the
Committee124
follow the well-known format
and demand both a common core and a treaty-
specific document. The Committee convenes
three times a year in Geneva.
The Constitution of Pakistan and domestic laws
Lawmaking bodies have stressed for the
importance of safeguarding the rights of child
by enacting legal provisions over time. This
is apparent by Articles 25(3) & 26 (2) of the
Constitution of Pakistan, which empowers the
State to make special provisions for the protec-
tion of women and children. Several Acts have
also been passed by the Parliament to achieve
this, which include:
Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929, which
extends to the whole of Pakistan and applies
to all citizens of Pakistan. According to the law,
any man above 18 and below the age of 21
marrying a child will be punished with a fine.
Whereas, any man above the age of 21 con-
tacting a marriage with a child will be impris-
oned by the court of law.125
Child Offenders Act 1995 was a significant
step taken by the GoP, to introduce uniform
legislation addressing the protection of the
rights of children involved in criminal legisla-
tion that was applicable to the whole country.
After the ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Child in Novem-
ber 1990, the State was legally bound to
comply with the requirements of the Conven-
tion and introduce changes to Pakistan’s do-
mestic legislation to make it compatible with
international law. This act is applicable to the
whole of Pakistan and the first instance where
special laws dealing with child offenders are
extended to Balochistan and KP. The Child
Offenders Act protects the rights of children
120) The convention on the Rights of child, 1990, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. (accessed 27 August 2012)
121) The convention on the Rights of child, 1990, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. (accessed 27 August 2012)
122) The convention on the Rights of child, 1990, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. (accessed 12 Sep-
tember 2012)
123)The convention on the Rights of child, 1990, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. (accessed 12 Septem-
ber 2012)
124) Http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.C.58.Rev.2.doc (accessed on 17 December 2011). (accessed
12th September 2012)
125) ‘Laws Relating To Children with Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 and Juvenile Justice Rules, 2001’, M.
Ilyas Khan, Advocate, Pakistan Law House 2004.

69
involved in criminal litigation, their rehabilita-
tion in society and re-organizes the Juvenile
Court structure.126
Prevention of Anti-Women Practices (Criminal
La Amendment) Act 2011, banned the custom
of Swara ( Section 310 PPC) and enhances pun-
ishment for the offence of murders carried out
in the name of honour, e.g., honour killing.127
In reference to the legal obligations stated above,
there has been concern regarding the infringe-
ment of the right of survival and development of
children in the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan. The ex-
tremely perilous conditions can be attributed to
the prevailing militancy in the region, population
displacements, and poor health and sanitation
facilities, severe malnutrition128
; concurrently, the
widespread crime of honour killing and practice
of heinous traditions such as Swara are affecting
children of the region.
The survey inquired regarding the role of the
Jirga as a guardian of the rights of children.
Do you agree/disagree with the statement,
that tribal elders take into account the rights
of a child while making Jirga decisions?
The results depicted that an overwhelming
majority of the respondents, 77.8% believed
that the Jirga takes into account the rights of a
child while resolving disputes (54.6% ‘strongly
agree’ and 23.2% ‘somewhat agree’). While
only 6% of the respondents disagreed with the
notion, including 3.3% who ‘strongly disagree’
and 2.7% who ‘somewhat disagree’. There was
not much disparity between the views of the
respondents in the provinces - 77.9% in KP and
77.7% in Balochistan supported the notion.
Whereas, similarly 5.5% in Khyber Pakhtunkh-
wa and 8.1% in Balochistan believed that the
Jirga does not safeguard the rights of children.
126) Laws Relating To Children with Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 and Juvenile Justice Rules, 2001’, M.
Ilyas Khan, Advocate, Pakistan Law House 2004.
127) http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1302061757_301.pdf (accessed 2nd September 2012)
128) The State of Pakistan’s Children 2009,SPARC (Society for the Protection of the rights of The Child)
Chapter7|StateofFundamentalRightsinthePakhtunBeltDo you agree/disagree with the statement, that tribal elders take into account the rights of a
child while making Jirga decisions?
Responce
Male Female Total
Don’t know 89 151 240
No Response 34 114 148
Total 1205 1195 2400

70
The results illustrate the growing legitimacy of
the Jirga system in the region.
Juvenile Justice in Pakistan
The environment in Pakistan, specially within
the Pakhtun belt has never been favorable for
children due to poverty, lack of educational facil-
ities and least economic opportunities. Parents
are forced to send their children to work from a
very young age to support the family. Inevitably,
this exposes the children to a wide range of evils
prevalent in the society and at times, a future
of crime. Juvenile justice is the area of criminal
law applicable to persons who at the time of
commission of an offence have not attained the
age of 18 years. According to a report by SPARC,
in December 2011, there were 1,421 children
in Pakistan’s jails. Only 165 of these had been
convicted and the remaining 1256 children were
still under trial.129
The report further explained
that in December 2011, there were a total
of 241 children in the juvenile cells of the 22
prisons of KP. Of the 241, 211 were under trial
and 30 were convicted. There are presently no
borstal jails for the children of the KP. Whereas,
in Balochistan there are no separate or special
prisons for children in the province; most of the
convicted children are kept in the Central Jail
Mach, and the majority of under trial prisoners
are kept at the District Jail in Quetta. In De-
cember 2011, there were 40 juvenile prisoners
in Balochistan. Out of this, a total of 33 were
convicted and 7 were under trial.130
The survey posed the following question with
reference to the treatment of juveniles:
Do you agree/disagree with the statement,
that the Jirga effectively and fairly solves
juvenile cases?
79.2% of the respondents agreed, including
53.8% who ‘strongly agree’ and 25.4% who
‘somewhat agree’, While only 3% opposed the
notion, including 0.9% who ‘strongly disagree’
and 2.1 % who ‘somewhat disagree’. The cross
tabulation of data by province generated mir-
rored results, as 77.7 % of the respondents in
KP and 85.9% in Balochistan believed that the
Jirga provided justice to underage offenders.
Similarly, 3.1% of the respondents in KP and
2.6% in Balochistan were not content with
Jirga decisions in Juvenile cases in the region.
Male Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
Nearly all participants claimed that the Jirga
system promotes social cohesion and reflects
values of equality and justice accrued over
generations therefore tribal elders guarantee that
the Fundamental Rights of children are taken into
consideration and protected. However, it was
accepted that since the tribal code has no special
law or Riwaj in place to safeguard child rights,
therefore, the future of the child is exclusively
in the hands of tribal elders and Jirgamaars.
Conversely, several respondents raised concerns
regarding the little evidence and precedence
available that proves that the best interests of
the child are taken into account by the Jirga while
they execute their judicial power. It was unani-
mously agreed that children form a vulnerable
fragment of the society and therefore the Jirga
129) Ibid
130) Ibid

71
should sympathise with them and ensure that
their rights are not violated. Children from the
Pakhtun belt become victims of injustices under
the guise of culture and tradition; especially in
cases of Swara, divorce and child custody, where
it is in the best interest of the child to remain with
his/her mother but the Jirga makes decisions
in favour of the father. Furthermore, girls given
in Swara are murdered if they rebel against the
Jirga’s decision. However, certain respondents
disagreed with this statement and claimed that
the tribal Jirga allows the child to remain with
the mother till he is old enough to live with the
father. Advocating for transparency and justice
for human beings of all ages, respondents agreed
that the Jirga and the contesting party refrain
from making callous decisions. The Jirga makes it
clear that since children do not have the capabil-
ity to understand the consequences of their
actions and have no intention to cause harm,
therefore, their punishment should be analogous
to their susceptibility.
Female Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
An overwhelming majority of the respondents
defending the traditional justice system were
of the opinion that the Jirga acts as the guard-
ian of the Fundamental Rights of children in
the Pakhtun belt. In cases of separation and
divorce, the custody of the children is gener-
ally given to the mother. However, if the child
is old enough to make his decisions, then the
Jirga seeks his/her opinion and grants custody
accordingly. A respondent from Qilla Abdullah
explained that a local woman remarried after
her husband’s death. After her marriage, her
former in-laws asked for her child’s guardian-
ship; however the Jirga granted the child’s
custody to his mother till the age of seven.
Justifying Jirga’s just and impartial decisions,
a respondent gave account of the occasion
in their village of two underage children who
were playing with a gun. While doing so, one
boy killed the other accidently firing the gun.
The issue was taken to the Jirga; where the
tribal elders took into account the child’s age
and decided to forgive him. This demonstrates
that the traditional justice system is based
on rehabilitation rather than punishment to
avoid the stigmatization resulting from crimi-
nal conviction. However, several respondents
were of the opinion that sensitive matters
such as these are rarely brought in front of
the Jirga and resolved behind closed doors. If
a child is accused of a crime such as theft, the
Jirga resolves the dispute judiciously with due
consideration to whether the child is mature
enough to understand and judge the nature
and consequences of his or her behaviour.
The Jirga prefers to resolve the conflict itself
and avoids the involvement of police and of-
ficial authorities.
Rights of Minorities
Susceptible to social and psychological pov-
erty, minorities all over Pakistan have always
been a victim of our society’s indifference and
unjust treatment. These vulnerable, marginal-
ised and disempowered segments of our soci-
ety suffer from discrimination, displacement
and poverty, solely based on their gender,
ethnicity, beliefs, language or social class. It is
not rare for the decisions of the tribal council
to affect the fundamental Human Rights, par-
ticularly the rights to life and security of these
marginalised groups.
International Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)
According to the provisions of ICERD, tribal
elders of the Jirga should ensure to make unbi-
ased decisions when dealing with conflicts that
involve minorities of the Pakhtun society.
Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that the Jirga effectively and fairly resolves juve-
nile cases?
Responce
Male Female Total
Don’t know 80 199 279
No Response 12 135 147
Total 1205 1195 2400

72
The ICERD came into force in 1969 and Pakistan
has been a party to it ever since. Significantly,
Pakistan has not entered any reservations to
the ICERD. This convention was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly to define and
condemn racial discrimination and to oblige
states to amend national laws that create or
perpetuate racial discrimination.131
Substantial Provisions
Article 1 of the Convention defines “racial dis-
crimination” to mean “any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on race, color,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of Human Rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.”132
Pakistan ratified this imperative convention to
demonstrate the commitment of the democrat-
ic government to promote Human Rights in the
country, including the rights of women, children,
minorities and the underprivileged.
Article 2 requires State parties to condemn ra-
cial discrimination and pursue by all appropriate
means, including law reform, a policy of elimi-
nating racial discrimination and promoting un-
derstanding among all races. It is worth noting
that, pursuant to Article 2(1) (d), States parties
are under a duty to prohibit and eliminate racial
discrimination not just by public institutions
and actors, but also by private individuals and
organisations.133
Therefore, the State is under
the obligation to ensure that the Jirgamaars,
refrain from making discriminatory decisions
when resolving conflicts which involve women,
minorities or persons with disabilities.
Article 5 obliges the State to ensure that tribunals
and all other organs administering justice treat
everyone equally.134
Therefore, the government is
under the duty to ensure that religious and ethnic
minorities, and women are given representation
in the Jirga decision making process.
Article 6 requires States parties to assure “ef-
fective protection and remedies, through the
competent national tribunals and other State
institutions . . . as well as the right to seek from
such tribunals just and adequate reparation
or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a
result of such discrimination.”135
Therefore, in
cases where the Jirga verdicts are not just and
inclusive of minorities and females, the State is
legally bound to provide justice to the victims.
Article 16 stipulates that “State parties shall take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimi-
nation against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations and in particular
shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women: (a) the same right to enter into marriage;
(b) the same right to freely choose a spouse and
to enter into marriage only with their free and full
consent; (c) the same rights and responsibilities
during marriage and its dissolution.”136
Therefore,
the State should ensure that the Jirgamaars and
tribal elders take into account laws enshrined in
this convention when resolving conflict and mak-
ing Jirga decisions.
The Constitution of Pakistan and domestic laws
The Constitution of Pakistan includes several
Articles that safeguard religious and ethnic mi-
norities against any form of discrimination:137
Article 4 provides that it is the inalienable right
of every citizen to enjoy the protection of law
Article 9 guarantees security of life and liberty
of every citizen.
Articles 15 -20 guarantee freedom of move-
ment, assembly, association, speech, profess
131) http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm. (accessed 25th July 2012)
132) Article 1, International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/cerd.htm. (accessed 25th July 2012)
133) Article 2 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), http://www2.ohchr.org/
136) Article 16, International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/cerd.htm. (accessed of 26th July 2012)
137) http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/, (accessed 14th July 2012)

73
religion and manage religious institutions, to
every citizen.
Articles 21 provides safeguards against any
special tax, the proceeds of which are to be
spent on the propagation or maintenance of
any religion other than his own as well.
Article 22 provides safeguards against receiv-
ing religious instructions or taking part in any
religious ceremony other than her/his own.
Article 25 guarantees equal protection of law
to all citizens, irrespective of their cast, gender
or creed etc.
Article 26 guarantees non-discrimination in
respect of access to public places.
Articles 27 provides safeguards against
discrimination in appointments in the civil
services of Pakistan.
Article 28 guarantees promotion of distinct
language, script or culture to any section of
citizens and establishing institutions for pro-
moting their language, script or culture.
Article 33 states that the State shall discourage
parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial
prejudices among the citizens.
Article 36 guarantees protection of minorities
and states that the State shall safeguard the
legitimate rights and interests of minorities, in-
cluding their due representation in the Federal
and Provincial services.
Article 37 makes it the State’s responsibility to
ensure promotion of educational and econom-
ic interests of backward groups or areas and
make higher education accessible to all on the
basis of merit.
Article 227 While stating that “all existing
laws shall be brought in conformity with the
injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy
Quran and Sunnah”, makes it clear that, “Noth-
ing in this Part (of the Article) shall affect the
personal laws of non-Muslim citizens or their
status as citizens”.
Furthermore, the laws enacted by the govern-
ment to protect and provide justice to minori-
ties include:
Pakistan Penal Code Section 153(A) (PPC)
prohibits promotion of enmity between different
groups, on the basis of race, religion, language,
caste or community or any other ground. Anyone
found promoting such differences, is liable to
imprisonment and heavy fines. Whereas under
Section 505 of thePPC publication of any material
that may incite group differences will be consid-
ered as a criminal offence.138
The New Police Order 2002 contains special
provisions to ensure protection of the rights of
vulnerable sections of society which includes
religious and ethnic minorities.139
Minorities in the Jirga System
After carrying out research on international
and constitutional rights, the research then
focused on the rights of minorities in the
process in the Pakhtun region of Pakistan. The
issues concerning ethnic and religious minori-
ties were approached, the findings of which
are as follows.
138) [153-A. Promoting enmity between different groups, etc.: Whoever, (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by
signs, or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or incites, or attempts to promote or incite, on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony
or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or
communities; or (b) commits, or incites any other person to commit, any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance
of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or any group of
persons identifiable as such on any ground whatsoever and which disturbs or is likely to disturb public tranquility; or (c)
organizes, or incites any other person to organize, and exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that
the participants in any such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely
that the participants in any such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or participates, or incites
any other person to participate, in any such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or
knowing it to be likely that the participants in any such activity will use or be trained, to use criminal force or violence,
against any religious, racial, language .or regional group or caste of community or any group of persons identifiable
as such on any ground .whatsoever and any such activity for any reason whatsoever cause or is likely to cause fear or
alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or com-
munity………..shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine
139) http://www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/Police_order_2002_with_amendment_ordinance_2006.pdf (Accessed
26th September 2012)

74
Ethnic Minorities
Female Focal Group Discussions (FGDs)
Majority of the respondents rejected the no-
tion that Jirga discriminates between ethnic
minorities while resolving disputes. They were
of the opinion that because the Jirga uses
restorative justice, which considers societal
wellbeing, social cohesion and harmony rather
than the individual, the Jirga’s decision is not
affected by a disputant’s language, ethnicity or
religion. However, there were clear tensions
between the respondent’s views regarding
the representation of ethnic minorities in the
traditional justice system. As a result, respond-
ents alleged that ethnic minorities are given
representation in the Jirga as a disputant and
to witness the proceedings. However, they are
not permitted to be part of the decision mak-
ing process.140
Defending the impartiality of the
tribal institution of justice, a participant argued
that in cases of conflict between a Pakhtun and
a non Pakhtun, the Jirga recognizes the neces-
sity of treating both parties equally, and disre-
gards the fact that they are Punjabi or Pakhtun.
In contrast, a few respondents indicated that
generally, under privileged, poor and dispu-
tants from lower castes are not treated equally
and given due representation in the Jirga.
Currently, the Jirga system is not representa-
tive of the communities it serves, since margin-
alised and vulnerable groups, including women
and minorities are excluded from directly
participating in, and influencing Jirga decisions.
The respondents were unable to come up with
a strong argument for their opinions, while
some young voices were heard supporting the
notion and blaming the tribal justice system for
not providing any platform for the minorities
and demanded for their representation in the
decision making process. Although a number of
respondents alleged that they were not aware
of any ethnic minorities or indigenous persons
residing in their community, they were of the
opinion that even if there was a dispute which
involved minorities, it would be dealt with sen-
sitivity and equality. Furthermore, principles of
Shariah place the Jirga elders under the obliga-
tion to grant ethnic and religious minorities
their rights when resolving their disputes.
The FGDs concluded that the institution of Jirga
is a recognized platform, for supporting and
protecting the vulnerable, despite differences in
religion or ethnicity, in the Pakhtun society.
Jirga violates minorities’ rights
The first observation on the statement was that
37.7% did not have an opinion. Considering
that minorities tend to be clustered in some
sub-districts, it is understandable that a third
of the respondents could not offer an opinion.
74.6% of the interviewees said that they did not
believe that the Jirga violated minority rights.
A cross-tabulation of data by region in the
figure below showed that 13.9% of the re-
spondents in FATA, 26.3% in KP and 39.3% in
Balochistan believed that the Jirga violated the
Fundamental Rights of minorities. Whereas,
63.6% of the respondents in FATA, 25.9% in KP
and 32.5% in Balochistan thought that the deci-
sions of the Jirga protected the rights of ethnic
minorities in the Pakhtun belt.
140) Swat female interview FGD

75
Religious Minorities
To further understand the perception of the
Pakhtun belt relating to the role of minorities in
the tribal Jirga, the survey asked the respond-
ents to give their opinion on the inclusion of reli-
gious minorities in the traditional justice system
and their access to justice in the region.
Female Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
There was not much inconsistency between the
views of the female respondents regarding the
inclusivity of ethnic and religious minorities in
the Jirga system. It has been strongly argued re-
peatedly, that the existence of the Jirga is based
on the notion of justice, therefore, whether the
disputants are Punjabi or Pakhtun, Muslim or
Hindu, is irrelevant. The Jirga treats everyone
with equality. It was further elaborated that
tribal elders make decisions based on universal
principles of fundamental right and not on the
disputant’s religious beliefs. The Jirga is the
backbone of the Pakhtun society, tending to its
societal interests; similarly, every region, tribe or
community has their distinct custom and tradi-
tion, which they use to resolve their conflicts.
Therefore, non-Muslims and non-Pakhtuns will
prefer to have their elders mediate and resolve
disputes. However, in cases of conflicts between
Muslims and non-Muslims, the Jirga respects
their rights and makes just decisions. Similar to
the ethnic minorities, religious minorities are
not permitted to be part of the mediation and
decision making process.
The respondents had a similar view to the
question of the inclusivity of religious minori-
ties in the Jirga process. Nearly all respondents
rejected the notion that the grievances of the
religious minorities are not heard and they are
barred from participating in the proceedings
of the traditional justice system. A respondent
explained that Jirga decisions are based on the
Fundamental Rights protected by Islam and its
ideology of justice, which does not discriminate
against religious or ethnic minorities belonging
to the Pakhtun belt. Consequently, a disputant
will be treated with impartiality and equal-
ity regardless of the language he speaks or
beliefs he follows; and there are rare instances
of Jirga failing to provide justice. According to
a participant from Loralai, Jirgas held in their
Responce
Male Female Total
Somewhat Dsiagree 174 123 297
Don’t Know 299 606 905
No Response 5 5 10
Total 1205 1195 2400

76
community also comprise of religious minorities
and their leaders and priests. He believed that
religion is extraneous to dispensation of justice,
therefore, they resolve conflicts according to
their local customs and traditions, at times seek-
ing the help of neighboring tribes to intervene
and mediate between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims of their region. Despite these exceptional
situations, generally, religious minorities are
excluded from the Jirga’s decision making pro-
cess. In their defense, the respondent explained
that in complex disputes if the parties are not
cooperating, then it is essential for the tribal
elder to be socially well connected for the Jirga’s
decision to be accepted.
Survey Data
How strongly do you agree with the state-
ment that: ‘religious minorities have not been
given an equal chance to participate in Jirga
decision-making processes?
The findings are almost uniform with the previ-
ous question, suggesting that 30.2% of the
respondents believe that religious minorities
are given an equal chance to participate in the
Jirga process, including 14.9% who ‘strongly
agree’ and 15.3% who ‘somewhat agree’.
While only 26.1% disagreed with this notion
(16.8% ‘strongly disagree’ and 9.3% ‘somewhat
disagree’). Also, notably, 43.7% said that they
‘don’t know’ whether the Jirga is inclusive of
religious minorities. This figure depicts the lack
of awareness in the region, regarding the Fun-
damental Rights of minorities and their right of
participation in the decision making process.
Analogous results were found in the cross-tab-
ulation of data, where 28.2% of the respond-
ents in KP and 39.6% in Balochistan agreed
with the notion. While 26.3% of the respond-
ents in KP and 24.8% in Balochistan disagreed
and; similarly, 45.5% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and 35.3% in Balochistan ‘didn’t know’ of the
role of minorities in the Jirga process.
Conclusion
The reality in the Pakhtun belt of Pakistan is
that justice mechanisms, especially the Jirga
system, has been and is insufficient to redress
the Human Rights violations of the marginal-
ized segment of the society. Recongnising both
the strength and weakness of the Jirga system,
majority of the respondents are defensive of
this traditional mechanism. However, both
male and female respondents agreed in most
cases that the system needs to be reformed to
safeguard the fundamental Human Rights of
the vulnerable segment of the society.
Responce
Male Female Total
Somewhat Dsiagree 174 123 297
Don’t Know 299 606 905
No Response 5 5 10
Total 1205 1195 2400

77
Chapter: 8
Women and the Jirga system

78
Women and the Jirga system
Introduction
This chapter is based around the status of
women in the Pakhtun region and its interre-
lation with Pakhtunwali and the Jirga system.
The tribal code (Pakhtunwali) and the Jirga’s
fundamental principles of justice have been
criticised by human rights organizations glob-
ally and nationally because certain traditions
and customs that impinge on women’s rights
have been part of the culture in the region. The
survey, focus group discussions and interviews
with key informants examine the perception
of males and females of the Pakhtun popula-
tion regarding three distinct topics concerning
women and the traditional justice mechanism:
Rights Of Women and the Jirga system
Patriarchal values of the Pakhtun society em-
bedded in the local tradition and culture ex-
clude the voice of women in the Jirga system.
Traditionally women are represented by their
male relatives and do not have direct participa-
tion in the traditional justice system. Therefore,
in disputes involving women that infringe upon
their fundamental rights, their fate is depen-
dant on the decisions of the Jirga elders and
the male members of the family.
Types of Jirga Cases and the Interests of Women
Although Honour related disputes are wide-
spread in the Pakhtun region and given that
Nang (honour, particularly of women) is among
the most fundamental notions of Pakhtunwali,
these types of cases are often not reported to
the media or the police except as stories. For
that reason, the local population prefers the
Jirga to resolve honour related disputes for
example, marital, divorce and child custody
cases. Honour related crimes, according to the
code and tradition, include infidelity or men
and women running off to marry without fam-
ily consent. This errant behavior brings shame
or a loss of honour to the families involved.
Violence Against Women and the Assessment
of Justice for Women in those cases
Violence against women is a common phenom-
enon across the Pakhtun region142
; women,
despite their social and educational status, are
subject to violence at every stage of their life
within the extended family. This section exam-
ines the types of violence inflicted on Pakhtun
women and the role played by the traditional
Jirga to address these crimes.
Rights of Women and the Jirga system
There is no denial of the fact that there is no
direct representation of women in Jirga system,
therefore in practice this traditional justice mech-
anism is discriminatory against women by block-
ing their access to the tribal council. Jirgamaars/
tribal elders hold the right to decide the fate of
women involved in disputes, based on customs,
without seeking the opinion or consent of the
concerned female.143
This is contradictory to the
requirements of modern justice and international
human rights standards. The cost of such abuse is
borne by the Pakhtun society, because, by mar-
ginalising women, the tribal society is not only
committing a crime of violating various interna-
tional and domestic legal mechanisms, it is also
142) “Honour killings in Pakistan and compliance of law” by Maliha Zia Lari, Aurat Foundation, 2011.
143) Naveed Ahmed Shinwari (2010),’ Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan’s Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas’

79
desecrating half of its potential and thereby en-
cumbering development, security and peace.144
A Pakhtun woman does have an identity- a
name, which marks her individuality. She is
someone’s daughter, mother and wife. A young
tribal woman is generally seen as the guardian
of the tribal/familial honour among most Pakh-
tuns. Thus, as a woman can easily be a source
of shame to the male-dominated extended
family/tribe, she does exercise a significant
degree of hidden control over them.145
Notions, institutions and customs of Pakh-
tunwali have been interpreted and practiced
to exercise, justify and reinforce patriarchal
authority. Pakhtunwali, with an admixture
of Islam and Pakhtunwali, has been used
throughout the ages to establish superiority of
men over women in the Pakhtun-dominated
areas.146
The most fundamental notions of
Pakhtunwali, revolve around women and land.
Man claims to have the right to control a wom-
an’s body, thoughts and emotions. Any real or
imagined violation of the boundaries, drawn by
man, grants him the right to even kill her with
impunity in the name of honour.147
Divorces are also very rare if not non-existent in
the Pakhtun belt. Women are told at the time of
their marriage to bear everything in silence, as
there exists no recourse for anybody, not even
the parents to turn to in case of a dispute with
the husband or in-laws. If there is dislike and
conflict between wife and husband, the hus-
band may marry another girl if he can financially
afford it and would keep his old wife as well.148
In addition to blood feuds, honour related dis-
putes are also settled by giving/taking Swara.
The tradition of Swara is prevalent in various
parts of the Pakhtun belt and is deeply en-
trenched in Pakistan’s tribal culture. The custom
calls for a girl to be given away in marriage to
an aggrieved family as compensation for a se-
rious crime committed by her father, brothers
or uncles. Generally, a girl is given in Swara
marriage as compensation for murder, adultery,
abduction and/or kidnapping committed by
the men of her family. This appalling decision
is usually made and supported by the tribal/
local institution of decision-making and dispute
settlement149
. Since the Jirga decision making
process is completely male dominated, it takes
the liberty to decide the fate of women and the
pronouncement of Swara without seeking the
opinion or consent of the women concerned.
The practice of Xhag or Ghag is also one of cus-
toms that is an inherent part of Pakhtunwali
in some of the Pakhtun dominated areas. This
historical custom, Xhag, is a man’s declaration
of claim over a woman for marriage. Through
this custom, males (particularly paternal cous-
ins) have a birth right to marry their female
cousins, even if their match is incompatible.
There are many cases of women being forced
to marry men from their family who are crim-
inals, or suffering from mental or physical
disability under this custom.150
This implies
that if someone has an advanced claim (Xhag)
over a girl and if anyone else wishes to marry
her, he will have to deal with the claimant first.
Therefore, far better proposals for girls cannot
be even considered and at times, girls who are
affected because of this custom, are forced to
remain spinsters all their lives.
Furthermore, Walwar, bride price, has been a
cultural practice for centuries in the tribal areas
of Pakistan. Bride price usually consists of tangi-
ble items (cattle, gold etc.) or money that is paid
by the groom to the bride’s family in exchange
for the bride. Traditionally, this custom was a
gift which aimed to bring families together, by
easing the financial burdens of the bride’s family
associated to the wedding ceremony as a token
of appreciation. Today, however, unfortunately
this practice appears to have become com-
mercialised and has lost much of its traditional
value in many instances. The significance of this
centuries old custom has now changed to a list
of demands made by the bride’s family. It now
appears as if the man is ‘buying’ his wife as a
commodity, with the price wholly depending on
her beauty, monetary status and age. The im-
144) “Women Rights in FATA Pakistan: A Critical Review of NGOs’ Communication Strategies for Projects’ Implementation”
tered Tribal Areas’
146) Maryam Bibi, Chief Executive, Khwendo Kor, Hayatabad, Peshawar, 11 February 2011
147-148) Fakhr-u-Nisa Advocate, F.R Lakki, Former vice President Peshawar High Court Bar Association, Peshawar,
22 January 2011
149) ‘The Dark Side of Honour’ Women Victims in Pakistan, Rabia Ali, Shirkat Gah, 2001
150) Roundtables/Awareness sessions held by CAMP, Phase II of Jirga Project Islamabad 2011
Chapter8|WomenandtheJirgasystem

80
pact of this iniquitous custom on young women
is catastrophic as it reduces them to chattels - a
clear violation of their fundamental human
rights and dignity.151
Women in the Pakhtun belt are vulnerable to
economic poverty and scarcity. There is a dire
need to enforce and implement international
law, to which Pakistan is a signatory includ-
ing; ‘The Convention for the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW)’ and ‘The United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT)’;
As well as domestic laws that safeguard the
rights of women in KP and Balochistan, such as
the recent Prevention of Anti-Women Practic-
es (Criminal Law Amendment) Act 2011, that
includes the punishment for giving a female in
marriage or otherwise in badla-e-sulh, wanni
or Swara. This act also prohibits further offenc-
es against women which include depriving a
woman from inheriting property, prohibition
of forced marriage and prohibition of marriage
with the Holy Quran.152
However, due to Article
247(3) of the Constitution, no act of Parliament
applies to FATA unless the President so directs.
Therefore, it is essential to repeal this section
of the Constitution to extend all national legis-
lation to FATA in order to articulate issues con-
cerning tribal women, such as lack of health,
education and employment opportunities,
restrictions on mobility, bride price, domestic
violence, and denial of share in inheritance,
representation in parliament and Jirga, as well
as consensual marriage, are amongst the more
important ones.
The following is a list and brief description of
the issues that should be addressed and will be
discussed in this report:
Jirga and Women’s rights
The Jirga at times fails to safeguard the
rights of women in disputes because the
decision making process is dominated by
male Jirga members, who are reluctant to go
against certain tribal customs that infringe
women rights.
No representation
At present, the Jirga system is not inclusive of
the communities it serves because it excludes
women from directly participating in and influ-
encing Jirga decisions.
Indirect representation
Women in the Pakhtun region can be repre-
sented in the Jirga system by entrusting a male
member of the family (usually father, husband
or son) to advocate on their behalf.
Jirga in family Disputes
Family disputes in the tribal region are usually
resolved behind closed doors or among the
families; however there are numerous cases
where the Jirga intervenes to resolve these
disputes especially if they are longstanding.
Due to the predominance of male Jirga mem-
bers and deeply entrenched social values, due
weight is not given to the opinion of females
involved in these family disputes.
Honour Killings
Honor killing is the practice of killing women
(and men) if they are suspected of violating
family/ tribal honour. Tribal Jirgas rarely per-
petuate honour killing as they are crimes com-
mitted by families without consulting a Jirga.
However the traditional Jirga system has been
indicted over time for supporting families re-
sponsible for honour crimes in the region.
Swara
Swara is the process through which conflict is
resolved by giving a girl in marriage to another
family. This tribal custom has been practiced
by the Jirga to resolve longstanding enmities
over time. As will be reported, this practice
was banned by a Grand Jirga of Maliks only in
2012 in FATA.
Inheritance
Women in the Pakhtun region have a right
to inheritance protected by Shariah law and
national legislation; however Pakhtunwali and
social traditions do not endorse this funda-
mental right.
We begin this analysis with a general question,
of the sampled respondents. “Do you agree or
disagree that the Jirga Process violates wom-
en’s rights?”
In spite the commonly held negative percep-
tion of the Jirga system with regard to wom-
en’s rights, the overall results from the survey
depict a very different picture as shown in the
following figure:
151) Roundtables/Awareness sessions held by CAMP, Phase II of Jirga Project Islamabad 2011.
152) http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1321415693_161.pdf(accessed on 15th
September 2012)

81
First we note that 25% of the respondents did
not know, then we note that only 20.8% agreed
with the statement. 54.1% disagreed, that is
thought that the Jirga system did not violate
women’s rights.
Jirga violates women’s rights
As shown in the figure above, cross-tabulation
by gender demonstrates substantial differenc-
es between men and women and across the
Pakhtun region. The ‘Do Not Know’ category
shows a uniform 30+% among women, in FATA,
when considering 21.4% ‘Do Not Know’ and
10.1% of women did not provide a response
the 30+% is reaffirmed. Males have a lower ‘Do
Not Know’ or ‘No Response’ rate.
The other point that should be highlighted is
that on this question, the responses in Baloch-
istan are quite different from the other two
provinces, that is, at the 50% level, both males
and females in Balochistan agree that the Jirga
process violates women’s right, but in the other
two provinces approximately 20% agree. The
inverse, logically, is seen in the disagreement
categories with an interesting finding in the case
of women in FATA and KP where 50% of the
women disagree, that is, they do not believe
that the Jirga process violates women’s rights.
These positions will be explored in more detail
in the following sections of the report.
No Representation of Women in Jirgas
The issues of access, participation and repre-
sentation of women in the Jirga have received
criticism on both the international and domestic
front. The reality is that local leadership out-
side of the district headquarter town is entirely
dominated by men, as a consequence the Jirga,
the lone social system which regulates all facets
of Pakhtun life, deprives women of the right of
access to justice. The tribal code of Pakhtunwali
allows the men to regulate a woman’s body,
thoughts and emotions, which has been inter-
preted to and practiced to exercise, justify and
reinforce patriarchal authority. To explore the
level of isolation or the lack of representation
for women in the Jirga process we framed two
questions: 1) “Do you agree/disagree with the
statement, that there is no representation of
women in the Jirga system?” and 2) “Do you
agree/disagree there is indirect representation
of women (through male relatives) in the Jirga
system?” The first question was only asked in
the survey, but the latter was asked in the FGD
and reveals interesting cultural perspectives.
Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that
there is no representation of women in the Jirga
system?
The survey results verify the concern of
women’s exclusion because over 70% of the
respondents agreed that there isn’t direct repre-
sentation of women in the Jirga system. Approx-
Jirga violates women’s rights?
Balochistan KP FATA
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Strongly Agree 20.3 11.5 2.9 7.5 10.03 4.8
Somewhat Agree 22.6 37.3 9.1 11.1 11.5 9.4
Somewhat Disagree 12 7.8 15.7 19.9 23.26 13.4
Strongly Disagree 43.3 5.5 50.2 30.9 45.99 40.8
Do Not Know 1.8 37.8 22.1 30.6 7.89 21.4
No response NA NA NA NA 1.34 10.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that there is
no representation of women in the Jirga system?
Balochistan KP
Strongly Agree 54.4 42.4 50.6 55.3
Somewhat Agree 20.3 31.8 23.1 10.4
Somewhat Disagree 7.4 3.7 6.7 6.5
Strongly Disagree 12.9 7.8 9.8 10.3
Don’t know 4.1 13.4 8 7.7
No Response 0.9 0.9 1.8 9.7
Total 100 100 100 100

82
imately 20% disagreed with the notion. Differ-
ences between provinces are minor with one
exception. More women (13.4%) were unaware
in Balochistan as compared to KP. Balochistan is
a less urban area compared with KP.
This was reflected in the survey results as 62.7%
of the respondents agreed that women have
indirect representation in the Jirga; including
42.3% who ‘strongly agree’ and 20.4% who
‘somewhat agree’. Whereas, 17.6% disagreed
with this notion, including, 12% who ‘strongly
disagreed’ and 5.6% who ‘somewhat disagreed’.
The cross-tabulation by province and gender
produced surprising results, as 93.5% of the
male respondents, and only 45.6% of the fe-
males in Balochistan agreed that women are
represented indirectly in Jirgas. Furthermore,
4.1% of the males and 21.2% of the females
disagreed with the statement. The results can
also be attributed to the low level of awareness
in females regarding justice mechanisms, as
26.7% of the females answered that they ‘don’t
know’. Whereas, in KP, 78.6% of the male and
43.7% of the female respondents agreed that
there is indirect representation of the female
voice in a Jirga. While a mere 8.1% of the male
and 28.1% of the female respondents disagreed
with the notion. The results re-establish the
extent to which Nang/Ghairat is embedded in
the Pakhtun society, as most tribal women be-
lieve that they have no recourse to justice in the
region. Even though the men seem convinced
that female voices are heard through indirect
representation, the female respondents howev-
er are not content.
The conclusion at the end of this first part of
the chapter is that because of the increase in
awareness and education in the rural society,
it has now become possible to root out the age
old tribal tradition of isolating women from the
tribal justice system. However, significant steps
need to be taken in further educating the tribal
society regarding the fundamental rights of
women in the region. Now that the findings on
the overall issue of women and participation
and representation in the Jirga process have
been presented, the second section of this
chapter will deal with specific types of cases.
Types of Jirga Cases and the Interests of
Women
The Jirga and the Resolution of Family Disputes
Introduction
In Pakhtun dominated regions of Pakistan, es-
pecially the rural areas, Jirgas deal with a vast
array of matters, including matters related to
matrimonial disputes of divorce and guardian-
ship of children. Even in the presence of formal
judicial and police systems in settled districts of
KP, the Pakhtun population of Balochistan and
FATA people prefers to resolve their matters
through the Jirga. It must be kept in mind that
in Pakhtun society cases of divorce might be
rarely reported or brought before a Jirga and
are usually resolved behind closed doors.153
This research question will be explored
through focus group information and the
sample survey responses to questions con-
cerning marital disputes, divorce, and the
custodianship of children. Of particular im-
portance is the extent of and differences in
the belief of men and women as to gender
bias when resolving these types of disputes
through Jirga.
Do you agree/disagree there is indirect
representation of women (through male
relatives) in the Jirga system?
Balochistan KP
Strongly Agree 85.3 17.5 55.8 24.4
Somewhat Agree 8.3 28.1 22.9 19.2
Somewhat Disagree 2.3 2.3 5.5 7.3
Strongly Disagree 1.8 24.9 2.6 20.9
Don’t know 2.3 26.7 8.9 17.3
No Response 0.0 0.5 4.4 10.9
Total 100 100 100 100
tered Tribal Areas’.

83
Female FGDs
Nearly half of the female participants believed
that the Jirga is biased against women when
addressing matrimonial disputes. They confid-
ed that the fear of losing their children forced
many to stay in abusive marriages as in cases of
divorce, the custody of children is given to the
husband by the Jirga. A female participant from
Zhob quoted a recent example of the Jirga giv-
ing shelter to a woman whose life was endan-
gered by her family and husband. Comparatively
majority of the participants from KP assured
that the Jirga is impartial and fair when deciding
the fate of women in family disputes. They be-
lieved that Jirga elders consulted religious lead-
ers when deciding cases related to child custody
to make decisions that are in conformity with
Shariah. A respondent from Swat narrated the
occasion where a woman was forced to leave
home due to her husband’s mistreatment was
helped by the local elders and residents to get
divorce and the custody of her two children.
The conclusion is that the experience of the FGD
participants is varied and that there are cases
showing bias for and against women as well as
what one would call a just decision.
Male FGDs
Even though the majority of the male respon-
dents disregarded the fact that the Jirga is biased
against women, several participants from Baloch-
istan accepted that in women related disputes,
Pakhtunwali and customs supersede Shariah.
Therefore, in cases related to women, the Jirga
at times disregards the principles of justice as per
Shariah law and instead follows discriminatory
tribal customs. A participant agreed that since
in the male dominated Pakhtun society there is
no direct representation of women in the Jirga,
their grievances are not heard and justice is rarely
served. Therefore, in cases of divorce, the wom-
an is thrown out of her matrimonial home and
is denied the custody of her children. Whereas,
supporting the traditional justice system, a partic-
ipant gave an account where he was part of the
Jirga, resolving a case of child custody of a five
year old boy after the parent’s divorce. The Jirga
decided to give custody of the child to the moth-
er till the age of 16, which he believed was in con-
formity with women’s inherent Islamic and legal
right. It was noted that an overwhelming majority
of participants in KP believed that the Jirga, being
an institution of fairness and justice, protects the
rights of both men and women. Supporting this
argument, a respondent from Timergara narrat-
ed the occasion where in the case of a conjugal
dispute, the local Jirga supported the woman in
getting a divorce and compelled the husband to
pay her dowry and other expenses.
The FGDs bring up particular cases or exam-
ples that are not consistent evidence of the
Jirga being biased toward or against women.
However, the survey data provides a means for
weighing the research question based on the
percentages of the sample that agree or dis-
agree that there is bias against women under
specific circumstances. Furthermore, we can
examine the collective opinion by gender.
Do you agree with the statement, that the
Jirga at times is biased against women when
resolving matrimonial disputes, including
divorce and custody of children?
In the figure below showing the tabulation of
responses to the question, we first find that
almost a quarter of women and a tenth of men
do not have an opinion. The high percentage
of women not having or sharing an opinion is
a concern. Could it be that bias is not a sub-
ject of concern for women? Overall, the male
opinion is the inverse of the female position,
that is, males believe that bias against women
Do you agree with the statement, that the Jirga
at times is biased against women when resolv-
ing matrimonial disputes including divorce and
custody of children?
Percent by Gender
Male Female Sum Male Sum Female
To a large extent 7.3 13.1
To some extent 12.9 25.0 20.2 38.1
Not to some extent 20.2 15.9
Not at all 47.7 22.1 67.9 38.0
Don’t know 11.9 23.9
Total 100 100

84
is less than women believe. However, we find
that females are evenly divided, that is, 38%
believe that there is some bias against the
woman’s side of family disputes when mediat-
ed by a Jirga and 38% believe that the Jirga is
not biased against the women’s position. Men,
on the other hand believe (3:1 20.2% to 67.9%)
that the Jirga is not biased against women.
The conclusion is that although a minority (20%
male and 38% female) believe that there is a
gender bias in these decisions against females,
the majority believes that there is no bias. The
survey data indicates that the severity present-
ed in anecdotal and historical description is
overstated at the present time. One also has to
consider that the urbanisation of the Pakhtun
may have had an impact over the decades. For
example, when we examine the same ques-
tion by province, we find that more than half,
(55.1%) of the respondents in KP, and less than
half, (43.1%) of the respondents in Balochistan.
indicated that there was bias on the part of
Jirgas against women in marital disputes. The
variation in results by province can be attributed
to the difference in mindsets in the provinc-
es when dealing with a social taboo such as
divorce, which historically has no place in Pa-
khtunwali.154
Note that KP is more urban than
Balochistan and FATA is the least urban, one
would expect that with modernisation or urban-
isation that the opinion of males and females
will reflect a change in culture, in this case, bias
against women in the traditional Jirga. The fol-
lowing figure shows the data by Province. This
question was not asked in the FATA survey.
In the figure above, we note that males re-
spond inversely to females in both provinces.
That is, proportionally more women than men
believe that Jirgas are biased against women,
and more men than women believe that the
Jirga is not biased. The second observation is
that women in Balochistan (59% - 11.5+47.5)
are more likely to believe that Jirgas are biased
against them when compared with women
from KP (33.4% - 13.4+20). This difference,
that is the tendency for women to be disad-
vantaged in Balochistan in comparison with
KP, is found in many of the questions of this
research. We attribute the difference to the
rural-urban difference with rural traditions
being more prevalent in Balochistan. The third
finding is that women are twice as likely not to
know or have an opinion compared with men.
The third area of inquiry concerns Honour
Killings
As described in the introduction to this chap-
ter, a tribal woman is generally seen as the
guardian of the tribal/family honour among
most Pakhtuns. Thus, a woman can be a source
of shame to the male-dominated extended
family/tribe. Although she may exercise a sig-
nificant degree of hidden control over males,155
she may also be the subject of punishment if it
is perceived that she has violated the code of
Pakhtunwali, that is, brought shame upon her
family or tribe. As a result, hundreds of wom-
en in Pakistan are murdered by their fathers,
husbands or brothers for allegedly dishonoring
their family every year.156
In reference to the
Constitution and human rights, “Any practice
legitimized by custom that infringes the right
Do you agree with the statement, that the
Jirga at times is biased towards women when
resolving matrimonial disputes including
divorce and custody of children?
Balochistan KP
To a large extent 6.9 11.5 7.4 13.4
To some extent 14.7 47.5 12.6 20.0
Not to some extent 10.1 6.9 22.4 17.9
Not at all 59.9 9.2 45.0 24.9
Don’t know 8.3 24.9 12.7 23.7
Total 100 100 100 100
154) Ibid
tered Tribal Areas’.
156) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9160515/1000-Pakistani-women-and-girls-hon-
our-killing-victims.html

85
157) The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/ (accessed on 11 October
2012)
to protect from torture or the right to life
guaranteed by Pakistan’s constitution is illegal
and punishable by law.”157
The subject of hon-
our killings was presented to both discussion
groups and in the general survey question.
Female FGDs
Most of the respondents condemned the
custom of killing in the name of honour in the
Pakhtun belt. They were of the opinion that
Islam lays a strong foundation of forgiveness
and equality throughout history, and based on
that, and then what right does a human have
to punish and kill? The tribal belt is filled with
stories of innocent women losing their lives to
suspicion and distrust. A few of these stories
were retold by the respondents in our FGDs,
which included the time a father brutally mur-
dered his daughter by poisoning her when he
suspected her of having an illicit relationship.
The father was found crying and begging her
for forgiveness when she was taking her last
breaths and explained that he was forced to
take this step to be able to live in the Pakhtun
community. Another respondent from Swat
narrated the time where a tailor from their
community had befriended a local girl. One
day they were caught talking to each other in
a room by a villager, who locked them in and
called their parents. After which, the parents
shot both of them on the spot. The concept of
killing in the name of honour may be accept-
able in a Pakhtun man’s point of view and then
justified by the Jirga.
Conversely, female participants believed that
Jirga elders discourage honour killing as it
undermines the principles of Shariah and
infringes upon the inherent rights of women.
However, they were convinced that honour
related crimes were widespread in the Pakh-
tun belt due to the social pressure and the
family’s Nang/ Ghairat (individual and family
honour) the most fundamental notions of
the tribal code. A respondent further ex-
plained this by narrating the story of a local
man, who was forced to commit suicide after
being socially shunned by the village for his
sister’s alleged disreputable character. Some
respondents claimed that the custom is justi-
fied if it deters others in the community from
taking such an ignominious step. Others
argued that in certain cases, only the ac-
cused woman is stoned to death due to her
weak stature, and the unquestionably pure
role that she is expected to play in society,
whereas the man goes scot free. However,
it is still believed to an extent that the Jirga
makes just decisions by investigating all as-
pects of the case and in the light of Shariah.
At times the Jirga even tries to intervene
and stop families killing their children in the
name of honour.
Male FGDs
According to the male participants, the institu-
tion of Jirga condemns blood-shed therefore
the Jirga mediates to resolve disputes and ulti-
mately avert further violence. However, heart-
rending cases of killings in the name of honour
were not denied by the respondents, as a par-
ticipant narrated the incident where a man from
his village, shot his wife and younger brother
on the spot when he saw them alone in a room
suspecting them of having an illicit relationship.
Another respondent gave an account of the oc-
casion where two students of class 6 and 7 were
caught talking to each other after which people
of the village brutally killed both of them. Post-
mortem and medical reports proved that they
were not guilty, which shows that innocent peo-
ple are killed due to social pressure. A number
of participants from Balochistan argued that
the concept of honour constitutes an inherent
aspect of Pakhtunwali, therefore elimination of
honour crimes is considered next to impossible.
However they believed that the Jirga plays a sig-
nificant role in investigating honour crimes from
various dimensions to ensure that ‘innocent’
lives are not lost.
In cases where the murderer is found guilty of
using honour as an excuse to commit crime,
then a girl from his family is given away in mar-
riage to the aggrieved party as compensation.
This illustrates how the Jirga deprives women
from their fundamental rights to provide jus-
tice to men. Comparatively, certain respon-
dents defended the tribal custom of killing
in the name of honour to stop such ills from
spreading in the society. However, another
respondent disagreed with this argument and
suggested that the culprits should be married
to each other.
The survey data reveals the weighting of opin-
ions identified in the FGD.
The analysis of the data by provinces and gen-
der illustrated that in Balochistan 70% of the

86
male respondents and 41.9% of the female
respondents opposed the Jirga making deci-
sions that favour the custom of honour killing.
Conversely, only 12.4% of the male respon-
dents and 38.2% of the female respondents
supported the notion. Whereas, in KP majority,
60.3% of the male respondents and 52.9% of
the female respondents opposed the Jirga
making decisions in favour of honour killing.
However, 26.3% of the male respondents
and 19.7% of the female respondents were in
support of this. The disparity in the opinion of
male and female respondents demonstrates
the dire need for education and awareness on
fundamental human rights in the Pakhtun belt
with a culturally sensitive approach. Further-
more, the higher percentage of female support
towards honour killing can also be attributed to
the more traditional and rural nature of Baloch-
istan compared with KP.
The Inheritance of Property
The Holy Quran states very clearly and specifically
the inheritance rights of family members includ-
ing women – wives and daughters. However,
when it comes to inheritance, social and religious
values are in conflict. Society gives precedence
to social values over religious ones. In Pakistan
women have a right to inheritance protected
by Islamic principles and the legislation of Pa-
kistan158
; however Pakhtunwali and social tradi-
tions do not endorse this fundamental right.
The subject of inheritance was posed in focus
groups and then followed up in the surveys.
Female FGDs
There was a consensus among those consulted
that women should be given the right of inher-
itance in their region, in conformity with prin-
ciples of Islam and the constitution of the na-
tion. A female respondent from Buner said that
over the years, with the increase in awareness
and education in the region, the traditional
justice system has become relatively sensitive
to fundamental rights of women.
Male FGDs
Similarly, the opinion of male respondents coin-
cided with that of the females. One respondent
explained that as a common practice, widows are
denied a share in their late husband’s property.
Typically, after the completion of the mourning
period, the widow is married to her brother-in-
law, at times without seeking her consent. It was
noted that family disputes including conflicts
related to female inheritance are rarely brought
to the Jirga and are usually resolved within the
family behind closed doors. This long standing
defect of the justice mechanism was reiterated
Do you agree/disagree that women should have a
right of inheritance in your community/area?
Balochistan KP
Strongly Agree 94.5 53 88.7 87.4
Somewhat Agree 4.6 35.5 7.5 4.1
Somewhat Disagree 0 1.8 2.4 0.6
Strongly Disagree 0.9 0 0 0.3
Don’t know 0 9.7 0.9 3.6
No Response 0 0 0.5 4
Total 100 100 100 100
Do you support/oppose the Jirga making
decisions in favour of honour killing?
Balochistan KP
Strongly Support 8.3 19.8 17.4 9.2
Somewhat Support 4.1 18.4 8.9 10.5
Somewhat Oppose 11.1 15.2 15 17.1
Strongly Oppose 59 26.7 45.3 35.8
Don’t know 17.5 19.8 13.4 27.4
Total 100 100 100 100
158) http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1321415693_161.pdf(accessed on 15th September 2012)

87
by a participant who said that Pakhtunwali is
prejudiced towards women as nearly all Pakhtun
women are deprived of their right of inheritance.
What we find in the survey data, because of
the way the question was asked, was that,
overwhelmingly, males and females agreed
that women should have inheritance rights.
But, when considering the FGD and under-
standing how widows are married to brother
in law or assumed under the protection of
younger male relatives who receive the inheri-
tance, it is clear that women do not receive the
shares prescribed in the Holy Quran.
In the figure above, almost all males in both
Balochistan and KP agree that women should
have a right of inheritance in their region.
Women, overwhelmingly also agree, but not as
strongly as men.
Swara as a Violation of Women’s Rights
Blood feuds and honour related disputes can
be settled by giving/taking Swara. The custom
calls for a girl to be given away in marriage
to an aggrieved family as compensation for a
serious crime committed by her father, broth-
ers or uncles. It is believed that Swara ends
lifelong enmities and prevents further violence
and bloodshed. It must be kept in mind that
the role of Jirgas is to reduce tension between
families, sub-tribes and tribes so that some
normalcy of collective life can continue. The
value of individual rights, compared with col-
lective needs, has been given secondary im-
portance. The exchange of women as a valued
property has been the traditional system. In
modern times, there is a growing recognition
that women have fundamental rights and that
they are not “property.” We will see this in the
FGD and survey data that follows.
Female FGDs
Participants raised concerns about the use of
the custom of Swara, which is associated with
low levels of awareness and lack of education
in the region. A respondent from Charsadda
noted that in general, local people have a strong
concept of rights and are taking significant steps
in preventing this outdated custom from being
wrongly practiced. Participants also expressed
their sympathy toward the innocent girls who pay
for the crimes committed by their male relatives.
While Swara is an effective tool to resolve long-
standing disputes, it sacrifices the life and future
of a girl; and is against Islamic principles and
teachings. Children often become victims of this
brutal custom, girls as young as eight or nine are
often given in marriage to men old enough to be
their grandfathers to resolve disputes and only in
certain fortunate cases, the victim’s family waits
for the child to reach puberty. However, several
participants defended this tribal custom by giving
examples of occasions in their families where girls
given in Swara were treated well by their in-laws
and were even given the permission to associate
with their families after the marriage.
Male FGDs
Recognising the importance of the Jirga system
in the Pakhtun society, several respondents
were of the opinion that the life of a girl given
as Swara is endangered as she is mistreated,
degraded and despised for the rest of her life.
Pakhtunwali and the concept of Nang (hon-
our) has been interpreted and practiced to
exercise, justify and reinforce traditions such
as Swara based on the notion of preventing
further bloodshed between sub-tribes, tribes
or families.
The majority of the respondents thought that
this local tradition was oppressive and un-Is-
lamic because the principles of Shariah strongly
forbid forced marriages without the consent of
the female. One respondent reported that he
once stood before a Jirga of 400 participants
and announced a perpetual ban on Swara and
asked the participants who concurred with his
decision to raise their hands. All four hundred
participants including a renowned religious
leader endorsed the decision. While defending
Do you believe that Swara
violates women’s rights.
Balochistan KP FATA
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Yes 77.4 63.1 87.3 83.4 81.7 51.9
No 4.6 16.1 6 4.7 7.6 18
Don’t Know 18 20.7 6.7 11.9 10.7 30.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

88
its continued importance in the Pakhtun society,
stressing on its values and relevance, several
respondents were reluctant to accept that this
custom was widespread in the Pakhtun belt.
According to them, this tradition was practiced
by their forefathers and has perished over time.
They claimed that now a days, the Jirga resorts
to monetary compensation when deciding intri-
cate matters that involve bloodshed and honour.
In the figure above regarding “Do you believe
that Swara violates women’s rights?” We find a
few themes. 1) The majority of men and women
believe that Swara violates women’s rights, 2)
A greater number of men support Swara, as
compared to women; 3) Women, however show
significant and important differences across the
three provinces. Note that in the most rural,
FATA, only 51.9% say yes it is a violation, in Ba-
lochistan 63.1% say yes and in the most urban
province, KP, 83.4% of women say yes, it is a
violation. “Not knowing” follows a similar pat-
tern: 30% of the females in FATA do not know
and 11.9% of women in KP do not know.
Swara as a way of resolving conflicts be-
tween two families or parties
One of the beliefs is that conflicts between
two parties may be resolved by exchanging an
unmarried woman or girl from the party found
guilty of the grievance to the aggrieved party.
The girl or woman does not have a say in the
matter. The ancient practice is considered a vio-
lation of human rights. The question was posed
in both focus groups and also in the overall sur-
vey. We begin with the focus groups for general
opinions and then use the survey data to weigh
the differences in the population.
Female FGDs
Most of the respondents expressed their concern
over the practice of Swara to resolve complex
disputes concerning murder or honour related
crimes at the cost of an innocent girl’s life.159
Ac-
cording to a participant the principles of retribu-
tion and justice lie in the heart of Islam through
the notion of ‘a life for a life’, but where has Islam
permitted exchanging a girl for a life? He further
explained that there are several other methods
of resolving such grave issues, for example, by
compensating the victim’s family with money or
property. Therefore, there is no need for Pakh-
tun men to sacrifice their sisters and daughters.
Another respondent was of the opinion that girls
given in Swara are treated worse than animals
or chattels, as they lose the right to speak, feel,
think or live; as it is culturally accepted that the
only escape from their fate is death. It has also
been evident that Jirga decisions that call for
Swara cause graver problems rather than resolv-
ing the dispute. While some respondents did
not necessarily consider Swara to be negative,
they believed that “Swara is an effective tool to
resolve old enmities provided the victim’s family
treats the girl with respect and honour.” In their
opinion, this outdated custom clearly defies the
fundamental rights of women, however, it also
saves a family from the catastrophe of losing their
breadwinner and in certain cases, the birth of
the offspring of the marriage effectively turns an
enmity in to friendship.
Male FGDs
There was not much disparity between the
responses of the male participants from that of
the females. Respondents from both provinces
outlined substantive concerns about women’s
rights in Jirga, particularly by the use of Swara;
describing it as a ‘curse’. Despite this, several
participants were of the opinion that Swara is
only given in circumstances to resolve disputes
where the culpable family is underprivileged
and cannot afford to pay the blood money.160
The supporters of this rigid custom claimed
that it restores family ties, which is impossible
to achieve by blood money. Defending the rele-
vance of Swara in the tribal code, respondents
argued that historically, Swara successfully
resolved disputes. However, over the years,
individual Pakhtuns have been exploiting
this custom for personal gain or to settle old
scores.161
Matching the opinion of the female
respondents, there was a consensus that rather
than restoring justice and harmony, the practice
of Swara gives birth to more complex issues.
To what extent do you support Swara as a
way for resolving conflicts between two fami-
lies/parties?
The result of the survey shown in the figure
above is that there is not an important difference
between the views of men and women on this
issue and that only about 10% of the sample sup-
ported the practice in comparison with approx-
imately 80% of them being against the practice.
In conclusion, the consensus is that the custom
that infringes on women rights is opposed. This
conclusion by the Pakhtuns is extremely encour-
159) Timargara female FGD
160) Qillah Abdullah male FGD
161) Swabi male FGD

89
aging, and, as was portrayed in the Grand Jirga
held on 22nd
May 2012 by CAMP, 800 tribal elders
from FATA declared a permanent ban on the cus-
tom of Swara along with Xhag and Walwar (bride
price) through the Jirga.
The justification for practicing Swara over the
centuries is that it is an effective mechanism
of resolving conflicts between two parties. The
statistics also show an increase in the levels of
awareness and education in the region. As a
result, the Pakhtun society is now more sym-
pathetic towards the impact of this custom on
a girl’s life. The cross tabulation of the data by
provinces establish that, 8.6% of the respon-
dents in KP, 4.8% in FATA and 15.9% in Baloch-
istan supported the notion that Swara resolved
enmities between two families. While, 81.9% of
the respondents in KP, 67.4% in FATA and 7% in
Balochistan opposed the practice of the tribal
custom as a mechanism of dispute resolution.
Violence Against Women and the Assessment
of Justice for Women
We now move to the subject of the types of
violence that women suffer in the Pakhtun ar-
eas and the assessment of the interviewees as
to the efficacy and fairness of the Jirga when
it deals with these crimes. We begin with the
reports from focus group discussions and then
move on to the statistical data from the survey.
Interviewees were first asked about the types
of violence most experienced in their areas.
Then those interviewees who indicated a type
of violence were asked about the level of sat-
isfaction with the performance of the Jirga in
dealing with this type of violence.
Physical Abuse
Physical abuse includes acts of violence such
as slapping, beating, arm twisting, stabbing,
strangling, burning, choking, kicking, threats
with an object or weapon and murder. It also
includes traditional practices harmful to wom-
en such as female genital mutilation, honour
killing and wife inheritance (the practice of
passing a widow, and her property, to her dead
husband’s brother)162
. According to media
monitoring by HRCP, there were reports of at
least 366 women who suffered from domestic
violence in 2011. Amongst them, 81 suffered
attempted murder, 47 were set on fire, 98
were tortured and 9 women had their nose or
other parts of their body amputated as pun-
ishment. The common reasons found for this
inhumane and brutal treatment were some
form of domestic dispute and the suspicion of
illicit relations.163
Furthermore, it was reported
at a discussion organized by ‘Insaani Haqooq
Ittehad’, that approximately 80% of the wom-
en in Pakistan were subjected to physical and
psychological domestic violence, which is
unreported since 66% accept it as their fate,
33% only complained while less than 5% took
actions against it.164
CAMP’s report evaluated
the role played by the tribal Jirga’s when deal-
ing with crimes related to ‘Physical Abuse’ of
women; 89.1% agreed with the notion, includ-
162) http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf (Accessed 20 November 2012)
163) State of Human Rights, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2011
164) Ibid

90
ing 50.5% who ‘strongly agree’ and 38.6% who
‘somewhat agree’. Whereas 10.9% disagreed
with the notion, including 5.1% who ‘strongly
disagree’ and 5.8% who ‘somewhat disagree’.
In the cross tabulation of data according to the
provinces, 77.2% of the respondents agreed
and 8.9% disagreed with the notion in KP, con-
versely 86.8% agreed and 12.2 % disagreed in
Balochistan.
The issues are presented one by one, always
with regard to the Jirga as a system of justice
for these issues. The number of cases is stated
in parenthesis and the statistics refer to those
cases and not the whole sample of 2,400 in-
terviewees.
Acid throwing is a form of violent assault usual-
ly inflicted on women. It is defined as the act of
throwing acid onto the body of a person “with
the intention of injuring or disfiguring [them]
out of jealousy or revenge”.165
According to Aurat
Foundation (AF) fourth Annual Statistics reports
of Violence against Women 2011, there were 44
reported cases of acid throwing (32 in Punjab;
6 in Sindh; 0 in KP; 4 in Balochistan; 2 in Islam-
abad). The ‘missing cases’ in the data could be
blamed on the reluctance of families to report
cases related to domestic violence to the police
or media; as it damages the Nang/Ghairat of
Pakhtun families. Therefore these cases are usu-
ally taken to the local Jirga or resolved behind
closed doors in conformity with the fundamen-
tal notions of Pakhtunwali.
The statistical data collected by CAMP regard-
ing the effectiveness of the Jirga resolving acid
throwing disputes showed that 78.9% agreed
agree’ and 60% who ‘somewhat agree’. Whereas
165) Karmakar, R.N. (2003). Forensic Medicine and Toxicology. Academic Publishers

91
166) http://watandost.blogspot.com/2006/02/domestic-violence-in-pakistan.html (Accessed 20 November 2012)
167) http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf (Accessed 23 November 2012)
168) Tinker GA. Improving women’s health in Pakistan. Karachi: World Bank; 1999
169) Aurat Foundation, Violence Against Women in Pakistan, 2011
11.6% disagreed with the notion, including 3.2%
who ‘strongly disagree’ and 8.4% who ‘somewhat
disagree’. In the cross tabulation of data according
to the provinces, 61.3% of the respondents agreed
and 12.9% disagreed in KP, conversely 87.5%
agreed and 11% disagreed in Balochistan.
Burning of Women is also an Issue
Burning’ or ‘stove burning’ is a popular form of
domestic violence in Pakistan practiced by hus-
bands and/or in-laws because it is easy to pass
off as an accident and can easily be undetected
by the media or police authorities. Victims of
burning usually succumb to the injuries before
getting medical treatment or justice.166
Aurat
Foundation’s latest report accounted for 29 cases
of burning (28 in Punjab; 1 in Sindh; 0 in KP; 0 in
Balochistan; 0 in Islamabad). The lack of statis-
tical data, compounded by the fact that women
do not come forth and report violence makes it
difficult to estimate the frequency and magni-
tude of the problem. CAMP’s report evaluated
the role played by the tribal Jirga’s when dealing
with ‘burn crimes’, 84.8% agreed with the notion,
including 18.5 % who ‘strongly agree’ and 66.3%
who ‘somewhat agree’. Whereas 11.9% disagreed
disagree’ and 6.5% who ‘somewhat disagree’.
In the cross tabulation of data according to the
provinces, 82.0% of the respondents agreed and
10.2% disagreed in KP, conversely 86.8% agreed
and 13.2% disagreed in Balochistan.
In the present survey, only 92 interviewees
knew of burn cases. They were asked if they
believed that burn cases are justly resolved by
Jirgas. As shown in the figure below, over 80%
of the males and females stated that they be-
lieved that Jirgas do resolve burn cases.
Mental Abuse
The United Nations Declaration on the Elim-
ination of Violence against Women (1993)
defines violence against women as “any act
of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psycho-
logical harm or suffering to women, including
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life”.167
Psychological/
mental abuse which includes behaviour that
is intended to intimidate and persecute, and
takes the form of threats of abandonment
or abuse, confinement to the home, surveil-
lance, threats to take away custody of the
children, destruction of objects, isolation,
verbal aggression and constant humiliation.
A United Nations research study found that
50% of the women in Pakistan are physically
battered and 90% are mentally and verbally
abused by their men.168
According to the mon-
itoring cell of Aurat Foundation, 8539 women
became victims of violence in 2011.169
In the figure below the instance of abuse and the
ability of Jirga to address the issue is presented

92
170) The Dark Side of Honour, Women Victims in Pakistan, Rabia Ali, Shirkat Gah 2001
by gender. Again, we see that over three quarters
of the men and women and three quarters of the
females agree that the Jirga as a system of justice
deals with the issue of metal abuse. Note howev-
er, that twice the proportion of males compared
with females ‘Strongly Agree.’
Physical Abuse
Physical abuse is more general than the abuse
described above, but, once again, we find sim-
ilar patterns, although three quarters of Pakh-
tun males and females surveyed agree that the
Jirga brings justice here too, more males (54%)
strongly agree than do females (34.3%). Clear-
ly females, when it comes to the issue of the
Jirga process treating women’s issues, do not
agree as do males that they are receiving the
justice that they are due.
Restricted Mobility
Restricted mobility is presented in the figure
below. Again we see that the majority agrees
that the issue is handled by Jirgas. Neverthe-
less, the pattern shows that women strongly
agree to a much lesser extent than do men.
Honour Issues
In Pakistan, when a man takes the life of a
woman or physically harms her in suspicion
that she was guilty of immoral sexual conduct,
it is called an ‘honour crime’. The killing of the
‘adulterous’ female, and at times her illicit
partner, is intended to erase shame, restore
honour170
to the family. It is justified by a
social code that controls the lives of women
especially in the Pakhtun region. According to

93
171) Aurat Foundation, Violence Against Women in Pakistan, 2011
172) HRCP 2011,supra, note 13 at 211
Aurat Foundation’s Annual report, there were
705 cases of ‘honour’ killing reported in the
country last year (322 in Punjab; 266 in Sindh;
30 in KP; 86 in Balochistan; 1 in Islamabad).
Unfortunately, that most of the perpetrators
of violence against women were found to be
relatives of the survivor or the victim such
as husband, brother, cousin, father, uncle,
father and mother in law, brother in law, son
or step son.171
The tribal Jirga has faced criti-
cism globally and nationally for justifying and
sustaining honour killing in the Pakhtun belt.
Contrary to the negative perception, CAMP’s
study shows, in the following figure, that an
overpowering majority (85.5%) believed that
the tribal Jirga resolves honour issues effec-
tively, including 53.9% who ‘strongly agree’
and 31.6% who ‘somewhat agree’. While 6.1
% of the respondents disagreed with the no-
tion, including, 1.6 % who ‘strongly disagree.’
Cross tabulation of the data by province pro-
duced similar results - 84.6% in KP; 88.7% in
Balochistan. Again, we find that women (48%)
do not agree as strongly as men (58%) that
the Jirga resolves the problem justly.
Forced Marriages
Statistics on the prevalence of forced marriage
in Pakistan that would allow for a comparison
between provinces are unavailable. However,
the HRCP observed in its 2010 report that,
‘[Pakistani] girls and women continued to be
forced into marriages against their will, killed or
intimidated for asserting their right to choose
their spouse or generally to make decisions
about their own lives. The practice of giving
away women and even underage girls in mar-
riage to settle men’s disputes also continued”.172
According to the survey reported here, in the
following figure, an overwhelming majority of

94
the respondents (77.4%) agreed that the Jirga
resolves issues involving forced marriages effec-
tively. Interestingly, more women (81.6%) than
men (72.9) agree with the notion. The ‘disagree-
ment” responses, although small in proportion,
showed that men strongly disagree compared to
women with the way that Jirgas handle forced
marriages. When cross-tabulated by province,
the data reveal that 74.3% of the respondents
in KP and 82.3% in Balochistan agreed, whereas
13.4 % of the respondents in KP and 15.9 % in
Balochistan disagreed with the notion.
Conclusion
It is evident from the findings of the survey,
focus group discussions and key informant in-
terviews that the patriarchal Jirga system fails
to provide access to justice to the women be-
longing to the Pakhtun region. Therefore, there
is a need to support and promote education on
human rights within communities to increase
understanding and awareness. Furthermore,
it is also essential to promote evidence based
reforms and advocate for a more representative
and inclusive Jirga system, in a culturally sensi-
tive manner to improve access to justice for all
members of the society especially women in
KP, Balochistan and FATA. The support for the
Jirga system and its impact is also evident in the
results; consequently it is necessary to promote
locally owned and led reforms that take place in
a locally acceptable timeframe.

95
Chapter: 9
Conflict Dynamics and
Access to Justice

96
CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Introduction
This section begins with information collected
from focus group discussions on the presence of
various formal and informal dispute resolution
systems, people’s access to such institutions,
and the nature of disputes/cases that instigate
conflicts. After the FGD findings, the survey data
is presented so that the weight of the opinions
can be taken. We have also tried to document
respondents’ level of confidence in formal and
informal justice systems. The chapter closes
with an analysis of different modalities of the
preferences expressed by respondents for the
justice systems within their areas.
Understanding of Access to Justice
This section begins by documenting how re-
spondents understand the meaning of ‘Access
to Justice’.
Male FGDs
This question was asked in all 12 FGDs organised
in KP and Balochistan. In almost all FGDs, the
majority view was that everyone has the right to
have Access to Justice without any discrimina-
tion. Participants were of the view that access
to formal justice system is expensive and time
consuming while informal ways of justice are
transparent, easy for the people to access and
inexpensive. Respondents shared that elders of
their communities are held in great respect with-
in their communities and that they work self-
lessly providing justice to all on equal footings.
Although some FGD participants had concerns
or reservations about the Jirga process, they
believed the Jirga to be less corrupt and a better
option than formal system of justice.
Some of the respondents opined that the Islamic
system of justice is the best way, because it en-
sures that every human being is treated properly
and justly without discrimination on the basis of
colour, gender, race, and nationality.
Some of the respondents had had some harsh
experience in the formal justice system and
opined that the formal system of justice is
incapable of ensuring justice. They noted that
cases are usually pending in courts for de-
cades and people have to visit courts regularly,
spending a huge amount of money and at the
end they do not get anything but pain, waste
of money, and time. They believed that infor-
mal ways of mediation and resolving disputes
do serve majority of the people.
Nevertheless, a few respondents believed that
criminal cases, if properly investigated, are
settled quickly in formal courts. This school of
thought believed that the number of cases on
formal courts have been increased because
Jirga system has no value anymore and people
are losing their trust in Jirgas.
Another group of respondents thought that the
formal justice system needed to be revived and
improved so that people regain trust in it. This
will help the state to discourage informal ways
of justice dispensation that, at times, leads to
violation of human rights, especially those of
women and minorities.
Most of the respondents from Swabi district iden-
tified the police as the main source of trouble
when accessing justice. They believed that the
most important stage in getting justice is the First
Investigation Report (FIR) that the police depart-
ment handles. They complained that police casu-
ally treat cases or manipulate crime scenes and
that poor reporting leads to confusion, leading to
delays in accessing proper justice.

97
Respondents from Peshawar district, capital of
KP and the most modern urban center of Pakh-
tun population, had reservations against formal
courts. In spite of being an urban area with for-
mal courts the majority believed that the Jirga
ensures some level of justice while formal courts
have disappointed the majority because they
consume resources and time.
In summary, the male FGD, had grievances
with the formal justice system, including the
police and the courts. Their criteria for ‘Access
to Justice’ was very simple; they believed that
people getting proper, inexpensive, and timely
justice defines “Access to Justice.” Additionally
that the process must not be discriminatory
no matter if it is a formal or an informal justice
process. The majority concluded that Access to
Justice is a rare commodity as far as formal jus-
tice system is concerned. They concluded that
the Jirga is the only process that ensures Ac-
cess to Justice to a large extent. This is not sur-
prising as the survey data and other responses
to several questions favour, overwhelmingly,
the Jirga as the most trusted system of dispute
resolution.
Female FGDs
According to the Pakhtun tradition, women are
not allowed to take part in the informal Jirga
proceedings. Furthermore, the conservative
Pakhtun society does not allow women to visit
the courts or police stations because they con-
sider this against family honour.
In spite of the exclusion of women, and we
have to assume lack of experience in these
matters, the responses of the women were
not different from the men. Despite the lack
of access to Jirgas, the women concluded
that the Jirga is the only justice system that
ensures justice to all. Women respondents
also believed that ‘Access to Justice’ is difficult
through formal courts while they believe that
the Jirga ensures justice to all without discrim-
ination. Interestingly they offered an opinion
not expressed by the males which was that
the rich and influential could get justice from
formal courts. They also feared that Jirga deci-
sions are sometime biased and favour the rich
and influential.
In Pakhtun society, females have very rare in-
teraction with both formal and informal justice
systems. Generally, their close family members,
such as husband, father, brother or son, etc.,
depending on the nature of the case, represent
women. However, surprisingly, the majority
of female respondents of 12 FGDs of KP and
Balochistan had a very simplistic approach
like the men. The simplicity shows that they
had little knowledge about these systems. The
women agreed that visiting a court or a police
station is not acceptable for women in their
society and it would be considered against
family honour. They showed satisfaction with
the informal systems of justice, which they
believed, is accessible to all, including women.
However, when asked whether women could
access the Jirga system, they said no, but they
thought that they could trust their men who
represented them in Jirga proceedings.
Survey Findings
The question asked in the survey was: “What
is your understanding of Access to Justice?”
The respondents were provided with multiple
options and were allowed to select more than
one option. Looking carefully at the data in the
Chapter9|Conflictdynamicsandaccesstojustice

98
figure below reveals important gender issues.
Although, overall, half of the respondents
(50%) believed that ‘Access to Justice’ means
that the litigants should be provided with the
‘right to fair and just trial,’ but there is a differ-
ence between men and women’s opinions. A
similar pattern is seen in reference to a ‘Proper
hearing, trial and remedies against grievances.’
Interestingly, equal proportions of men and
women, 40.5%, thought that ‘Access to Justice’
should be available to all, especially women
and vulnerable groups (minorities, children,
etc.). Only 7.3% did not have an opinion.
The result shows that people have expectations
and very rightly identified areas of concerns.
Perception of Access to Justice
Once the respondents had been asked to de-
fine access to justice, that is their expectation,
they were asked their perception of how ac-
cess really was provided.
As shown in the following figure, the majority,
68.3%, believed ‘to a moderate extent’, (there
has been Access to Justice in their districts or
area) while just 9.2% thought that there has
been no Access to Justice at all. Some 17.1%
respondents opined that there has been ‘Access
to Justice’ to a large extent. This set of respons-
es reinforced the conclusion from the FGDs that
access to justice was not as expected.
Perception of Equal Access to Justice - Under
the Formal System
Respondents shared their opinion on the
categories of individuals/groups that do not
have Access to Justice under formal justice
system. Respondents were asked through
a multiple-choice question as shown in the
figure below.
What categories of individuals/groups do not
have Access to Justice in your district/area un-
der the formal justice system such as the Su-
preme Court, High Courts and Lower Courts?
According to the data, close to two-third,
65.6%, respondents believed that low caste
groups and poor people do not have Access to
Justice under the formal justice system. An-
other group of respondents, 29.8%, identified
women who do not have ‘Access to Justice’.
Some 15.4% opined that physically challenged
people do not have ‘Access to Justice’ while
only 4.5% respondents thought that minorities
do not have ‘Access to Justice’. The case of mi-
norities is quite weak and shows that respon-
dents have been biased in their opinion when
it comes to minority rights. Close to one-fifth of
the respondents (19.5%) could not share their
opinion, a substantial number which needs to
be considered.
Perception of Equal Access to Justice – Infor-
mal Justice System (Jirga)
A similar question with similar options is repeat-
ed here, but this time the question is in reference
to the informal justice system, specifically the
Jirga. The data provides a striking contrast with
the previous opinions about the formal system
of justice. Recall that for the Pakhtun society the
formal system was imposed while the informal
justice system is rooted in Pakhtun culture and
tradition; the Jirga is, after all, Pakhtunwali.
In the figure below we first note, in comparison
with the previous figure, that twice as large a
proportion responded that they did not know.
This is odd considering that one would expect
greater knowledge about a local, culturally
based system than about a system that came
from “outside.” The major difference however,
is that in the previous question 65.6% respon-
dents opined that low caste groups and poor
do not have Access to Justice under the formal
justice system. Now that figure has dropped to
just 21.7% under the Jirga system. The remain-
der of the groups is believed to have similar ac-
cess in both the formal and informal systems.
Results for Jirga show that Pakhtun society has
more confidence and believes that Jirga is more
accessible for low caste and poor groups as
compared to formal justice system for justice.
Perceived reasons for limited Access to Justice
under formal justice system
The survey used another dimension to ex-
plore Access to Justice, and the reasons for
limited access.
Male FGDs
Male respondents were posed with this com-
plex question. Majority of the respondents
of almost all FGDs had identical views on
limitations of formal justice system. The most
striking shortcoming of formal justice system,
as per the majority respondents, was that the
formal system is time consuming and it is very
costly. They shared that it takes decades for
them to get justice, which consumes a huge
amount of money in the shape of court fees,
lawyers’ fees, bribes to police, and secretarial
staff fees in the courts. During the course of
time, they shared that most of the litigants lose
their patience and finally resort to out of court
settlements, and end up making compromises.

99

100
Some of the participants also informed the
survey team that for the poor it is hard to pay
lawyers’ fees and therefore cases are usually
decided against them, because there is no
proper public defending system available with-
in the government system that could ensure
free and accessible legal aid for such people.
Formal courts are mainly located at district
headquarters, quite far from rural areas, and
this makes it quite challenging for them to
travel to the courts. On the other hand, they
opined that the informal justice system, Jirga,
is very much accessible for them, because in
each village a Jirga can be convened.
Some respondents shared a very interesting di-
mension. They believed that the majority is not
fully aware of how to access formal courts. This
lack of awareness leads them to confusion and
they end up having their cases settled through
the Jirga system. These findings show that there
is a need for general awareness to clear any
misperceptions regarding formal justice system.
Female FGDs
Female’s views on the subject were not dif-
ferent from their male counterparts, as stated
with regard to previous questions. They have
a very concise and simple approach towards
both formal and informal justice system. The
majority opined that the formal justice system
is expensive and beyond reach. They believed
that as long as they have access to an inex-
pensive system of justice, then they do not
bother to approach the formal system where
corruption is also rampant. Female respon-
dents, in support of their argument, shared
their family and neighbors’ stories of how
they faced difficulties in formal courts where
it took them years to settle their cases.
They pointed out that if women access the
courts it is considered against family honour
and therefore, they believed, that it is also a
major limitation when it comes to the formal
justice system. Going to courts and police sta-
tions is considered a taboo in Pakistan’s rural
areas, especially in the Pakhtun society.
Survey findings
A multiple-response question was asked from
2,400 male and female respondents of KP and
Balochistan in a qualified manner. As shown in
the figure below, more than half (57.8%) of the
respondents believed that one of the reasons for
limited access to formal justice is that it is a time
consuming process where cases are not expedit-
ed. 56.5% offered the opinion that high fee rates
of lawyers have made it difficult for common
people to have access to justice. The responses to
Q28 confirmed the conclusions of the FGDs.
What are the reasons for limited access to
formal justice?
Another set of reasons that 36.5% respondents
identified was ‘long distance, high cost of lawyers
and court fees, and lack of legal aid’. While 18.5%
shared that usually the accused overstay at jails
without proper trial due to lack of understanding
of their legal rights. Unfortunately, majority of
Pakistani community do not have proper orienta-
tion or education of their legal rights.
Another reason identified by 17.1% respondents
was lack of proper reporting of cases. It has
been observed that most cases go unreported.

101
16.0% respondents also pointed out that cor-
ruption in the formal legal system has also
affected the justice system. Though lowest on
the list of reasons, still the number of respon-
dents identified this reason is quite substantial,
and one can get convinced that corruption is
perceived by common people as one of the
causes in getting proper justice.
15.0% respondents believed that people living
in remote areas are not aware of how to access
formal justice system set up in urban centres/
cities. The data also shows other reasons iden-
tified by respondents, which could be seen
clearly but are not of great significance.
All of these reasons would be very useful for
designing a public education program so that
people become aware of their rights and also
become aware of how to manage the system
for their benefit.
Perceived reasons for limited Access to Justice
under informal justice system
Just as in reference to the formal system, the
respondents were asked to share the reasons
for limited Access to Justice under the informal
justice system, such as the Jirga.
Male FGDs
In the male FGD, the majority favoured the Jirga
system over the formal system, and there were
few respondents who shared their reservations
on the Jirga system. However, some believed
that implementation of Jirga decisions in KP
and Balochistan is a challenge, as opposed to
FATA where Jirga decision implementation is
strong and sustainable. They opined that Jirga
decisions are to be accepted voluntarily and
Jirga cannot force its decisions on parties to the
dispute. This is true to a large extent, however,
there is a social pressure, which compels parties
to come to terms and accept the decision.
Because there is a suspected element of cor-
ruption in the Jirga system too, a large group of
respondents thought that Jirga members are
sometime biased and favour a particular party.
In some cases, a politically stronger party to
the dispute gets favours and, therefore, people
have developed grievances against Jirga sys-
tem too. Nonetheless, this group also pointed
out that the level of corruption is far less than
in the formal system.
A considerable number of respondents in all
these FGDs feared that Jirga members do not
have sufficient technical knowledge to resolve
some complex cases and, therefore, they point-
ed out the need for including educated and
technically qualified people in the Jirga proceed-
ings, such as lawyers and retired judges.
On the question of the inclusion of women in
the Jirga process, the majority thought that
women are represented through their male
family members and that the Jirga ensures
when there is a need, to take the testimony
of a woman. However, some respondents
contested this view and feared that such rep-
resentation leads to confusion and in the end
women are deprived of proper justice.
On the question of minorities, the majority
informed the survey team that minorities are
given the option to either access formal courts
or resolve their disputes through their own reli-
gious or customary practices. Respondents also
informed that since minorities represent a small
portion of the population, seldom do such is-
sues come up and, therefore there are not wide-
spread grievances against the informal system.
Nonetheless, there were a few respondents in
different FGDs, who raised concerns regarding
disputes arising between local Muslims and a
non-Muslims. They opined that in such a situ-
ation, it has been observed that Jirga, unfortu-
nately, favours Muslims against a non-Muslim.
Female FGDs
Because women do not have more than basic
knowledge of the informal justice system beyond
what they learn from their male family mem-
bers, the female respondents in their FGDs could
provide much more than the males. The women
agreed that inclusion of women in the Jirga pro-
cess is against their culture and that their male
family members could represent them in such
matters. However, a considerable number of re-
spondents, especially from Peshawar, Charsadda,
and Swabi (urban areas) thought that women
should be given space to take part in the process.
Nonetheless, there was still confusion about the
role of women in the Jirga process. They were
still not very sure whether a woman could take
part as a decision maker, be a party to, or just be
a spectator during the process.
Survey Findings
A different list of options/reasons/limitations
was provided keeping in view the nature of
informal justice system. The following figure
lists the multiple responses from the survey.
The data shows that against each option, the
response level is considerably low as compared
to respondents’ reaction against formal justice

102
system, and, furthermore, 38.3% did not have
opinion and 8.4% did not know of precedents.
Although the responses in the survey echo
the FGDs, the percentage of the respondents
stating these reservations was small – consis-
tently less than one fifth.
The conclusion is that when compared with the
formal justice system, the Pakhtun population
has more confidence in the Jirga system, as
seen in the low response rate or statements of
weaknesses.
Experience in Litigation
This section aims to document the respon-
dents’ or their family members’ experience
with litigations.
Male FGDs
Members of FGDs were asked whether they
faced any litigation. The majority confirmed that
they never faced any such issue. However, the
issues of those who responded affirmatively
were mainly, as identified in the previous ques-
tion, over land issues, shared property, fraud,
water distribution for irrigation, etc. Fewer re-
spondents shared that they had business dis-
putes, and some informed the survey that they
faced cases of murders and family feuds.
Female FGDs
Surprisingly, female respondents shared some-
thing unusual, as opposed to male respondents.
Those who confirmed that they had experienced
conflicts said that they were mainly over children
fighting where older family members had gotten
involved. Some respondents shared their family
experiences of issues raised due to forced mar-
riages while some informed that their domestic
violence had led to disputes between families.
At the end a few female respondents con-
firmed that they or their families faced cases of
murder, fraud and property. Interestingly, some
female respondents informed that the use of
mobile phones between boys and girls had led
families to fight.
Survey Findings
To ascertain the level of these types of issues or
conflicts all of the options were provided so that
the interviewee could respond: yes, no, do not
know or simply not reply. Because crimes should
be assumed as a rare thing in any society and
that the majority may not have experienced it,
we start with the ‘Yes’ attribute of the question
rather than counting those who said ‘No’. This
will help us to understand the level of violence
and nature of litigations within Pakhtun pop-
ulation living in KP and Balochistan. The figure
below shows the responses to question 8 “Have
you or your household members experienced
any of the following?”
After all of the discussion about cultural issues
or rural life, it is surprising that 12.9% of the
responses confirmed that they or their family
members had sustained injuries in road acci-

103
Have you or your household members experienced any of the following
Household Members Experienced Yes No Don’t
Know
No Re-
sponse
Total
Victim of theft or fraud 11.5 84 3.3 1.3 100
Victim of assault 5.5 88.7 4.2 1.6 100
Victim of domestic abuse 3.8 88.3 5.3 2.5 100
Victim of forced marriage 0.8 90.9 6.2 2.1 100
Victim of tribal customs such as Swara, Bride price
and Xhag
0.6 89.4 7.9 2.1 100
Family member has gone missing or disappeared 2 90 6 2 100
Arrested without warrant by the administration or
police
1.9 88.1 7.2 2.8 100
Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 0.8 87.9 7.7 3.7 100
Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault (under
the Hudood Ordinance or the Pakistan Penal Code)
0.2 88.3 7.8 3.7 100
Accused of committing any other crime 1.2 88.1 7.9 2.8 100
Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the political
administration
0.8 89.7 7 2.6 100
Bribery by police, Khasadar or levies force 3.6 86.3 7.8 2.3 100
Assault or torture by FC or Army 0.9 89.8 6.9 2.4 100
Money Recovery, or Debt/Obligation Settlement 1 87.5 9.3 2.3 100.0
Contract enforcement in business dealings 2.7 84.8 10 2.4 100
Purchase or sale of movable property 7.3 80.5 9.6 2.5 100
Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc. 2.5 85.8 8.9 2.9 100
Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child
custody, guardianship, inheritance
1.9 86.9 8.3 2.9 100
Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 0.6 87.5 9.5 2.4 100
Debt bondage 1.1 88 8.5 2.4 100
Found involved in sectarian violence 0.4 89.6 7.2 2.8 100
Found involved in tribal/family clashes 3.2 87.8 6.3 2.7 100
Injured in an accident (motor vehicle, etc.) 12.9 79.2 4.8 3.1 100

104
dents. This attests to the urbanisation of daily life
and the access to cars in the rural areas (or the
access to the rural areas by cars). Road accidents
were followed by ‘theft or fraud’ (11.5%) as an
experience by interviewees or their families. Both
issues are important because a considerable
proportion of respondents confirmed them.
7.3% shared that they or their family members
faced litigations when purchasing or selling
movable property, followed by 5.5% respon-
dents who confirmed that they or their family
members had been a ‘victim of assault’.
The rest of the list is self-explanatory and
does not need a detailed analysis but is left
for readers’ observations.
Access to justice systems in case of litigation
Once experiences of respondents or their fam-
ily members were documented the next step
was to analyse their experience with different
formal and informal dispute resolution systems
that they approached to seek justice.
Male FGDs
Those respondents, who informed the survey
team that they or their family members had
experienced litigations, were asked which jus-
tice system they accessed for getting justice. An
overwhelming majority confirmed that they had
approached Jirga for resolving their disputes. In
a few cases, respondents said that they had to
submit FIRs and ultimately approached formal
courts, however, they also informed that their
cases were ultimately resolved through Jirga.
Female FGDs
Interestingly, all female respondents who con-
firmed they had disputes identified the Jirga
system where they or their family members
went to access justice.
Survey Findings
A multiple-choice question was asked of those
respondents who had stated ‘Yes’ in the previous
question. Those who said ‘No’ were not asked.
As shown in the figure above, from the small
proportion of respondents having experienced
of litigation, a higher number of them, 17.5%,
confirmed that they accessed the ‘local Jirga’,
followed by 16% respondents who identified
the ‘District Administration and police’. Some
4.6% respondents confirmed that they access
formal courts to get justice. Generally, this is
seen in complex cases, which are reported by
litigants and where either Jirga has failed to
reach any conclusion or one, or both parties
trust the formal system and are determined to
get justice according to universal standards.
As stated in the previous sections, it is gener-
ally believed that litigants report to the police
administration and the Jirga simultaneously
in order to pressurise the opponent party
to come to terms with the Jirga decision. To
verify this belief the data from questions 12
and 12c were cross tabulated. In the figure
below it is clear that simultaneous access is
used. 61.4% of the cases in reference were
managed simultaneously.
Simultaneously Accessed District Administra-
tion/Police and Jirga
Other options are of little importance to be
elaborated and analysed here. The data is
self-explanatory.

105
Level of contentment in choosing dispute
resolution systems
This question intends to document the level
of contentment in choosing and experiencing
various dispute resolution systems in resolv-
ing respondents’ legal issues. Because this
question was asked only of those who had
approached and involved various dispute
resolution systems in resolving their legal
issues, logically, the majority that had not
responded ’yes’ to the previous question were
not included. The responses are shown in the
following figure:
Local Jirga: Looking at the survey results, we
see huge gaps in the satisfaction levels among
various institutions. Out of the 419 respon-
dents who were involved with the local Jirga
94.6%, expressed satisfaction. Only 4.5% were
unsatisfied while just 1% were un-decisive
about their opinion. This shows a surprising
result for a system which is being criticised by
the civil society in Pakistan while survey results
show an exemplary level of legitimacy within
the affected population.
Peace Jirga: 45 respondents involved a Peace
Jirga to resolve their dispute. The data shows
the respondents also appreciate the peace
Jirga. The majority, 64.4%, showed satisfaction
with the peace Jirga while one quarter of re-
spondents, 25.7%, were not satisfied.
District Administration and police: Out of
385 respondents who approached district

106
administration and the police, more than half
(54.3%) showed satisfaction with District Ad-
ministration and Police involvement, however,
the response level is low as compared to the
informal Jirga system. A substantial number of
respondents(38.9%) shared their dissatisfac-
tion; 6.8% were un-decided.
Formal courts (Supreme Court, High/Session
Courts): A total of 111 respondents confirmed
that they had apprached formal courts.
According to the results, more than three
quarters of respondents (76.5%) showed
their satisfaction with the formal courts while
19.8% were not satisfied. Some 3.6% could
not share their opinion. Comparing with in-
formal Jirga, the satisfaction level is, again,
considerably low.
Ant-terrorism court: A total of 242 respon-
dents accessed Anti-terrorism courts for jus-
tice. As stated earlier, the majority in Pakistani
society is not very aware of the existence of
Anti-terrorism courts. Besides, few people
have interaction with these courts, because
only cases of special nature are dealt with in
such courts, therefore, only 12.4% respon-
dents showed their satisfaction while 9.5%
were not satisfied. More than three quarters
of the survey sample could not share their
opinion, because they were unaware and
presumably had no experience dealing with
such courts.
Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only): In-
terestingly, only 12 respondents shared that
they or their family members had to access
the Nizam-e-Adl in Malakand Division. These
courts are not fully functional or wide-spread
yet. However; the data shows that people still
have high expectations, especially respon-
dents from the Malakand region. According
to the data, 91.6% respondents have shown
their satisfaction, while only 8.3% of the re-
spondents have shown their dissatisfaction.
In this case, surprisingly, every respondent
shared his/her opinion, which is very rare in
surveys. The Nazim-e-Adl are described in
detail in the chapter “Informal Justice Systems
and Shariah-Based Systems”.
Musalihati Anjuman: Only 30 respondents con-
firmed that they or their family members had
to access Musalihati Anjuman to settle their
disputes. Supported by UNDP and provincial
governments in all four provinces of Pakistan,
the Musalihati Anjuman/councils were set-up
as part of the local government plan. Musa-
lihati Anjuman was meant to reduce burden
on formal courts by resolving petty disputes
between the conflicting parties on a consensus
basis. This system is a mixture of all prevailing
informal systems of different ethnic groups in
Pakistan.
As mentioned earlier, only three districts in the
survey areas had this service - D.I. Khan in KP
and Loralai and Quetta in Balochistan. Accord-
ing to the data, 80%, have shown their satisfac-
tion, none were dissatisfied, while 20% did not
have an opinion.
Reasons for choosing various justice systems
Respondents or their family members who
accessed various dispute resolution systems
were asked a subsequent multiple-response
question. They were asked to share the rea-
sons they chose these institutions.
Male FGDs
Because the majority had chosen the Jirga
system, they reflected that Jirga quickly dis-
penses justice and compensates victims. They
added that the Jirga is easily accessible and
affordable. Besides, they opined, the Jirga is
the oldest institution of Pakhtun community
and therefore people approach it rather than
wasting time and money in formal courts.
Some respondents thought that it is against
the Pakhtun code of honour to go to courts
and conveys weakness of the disputant while
Pakhtun always convey a message of strength
within their locality.
However, some respondents also said that they
approached the formal court system because
they thought that Jirga members are no longer
respected within their community and there-
fore they had to rely on formal courts.
Female FGDs
Not surprisingly, female respondents in almost
all FGDs gave responses similar to the males.
The exceptions explained that their family
members had to approach the courts because
of the complexity of cases. Those cases were
mainly land disputes or murder cases.
Survey Findings
The question was asked only of interviewees
who had responded affirmatively that they
had used justice systems in question 14. They
consisted of 30% of the interviewees. The
percentages in the right-hand column in the
following figure are only from those 1,469
interviewees.

107
The largest response category (20.8%) shared
that the decision was based on the efficiency
and effectiveness of that particular insti-
tution which helped resolve their dispute,
while almost equal number of respondents,
18.6%, informed that the system they chose
was close to where they lived. Some 18.5%
believed that it was a fair and trusted system,
and 16.2% respondents thought that the sys-
tem followed accepted local norms/values.
Some 11.9% believed that the system they
chose was quick in deciding their cases, fol-
lowed by 6.9% who thought that the system
they chose was less expensive. Surprisingly,
just 3.8% believed that the system they chose
was less corrupt. Generally, both formal and
informal systems are perceived to be corrupt
but at different levels.
Where would you refer your critical criminal
disputes (Murder/Theft/Robbery etc) for
resolution?
The 2,400 adult male and female respon-
dents were asked where would they refer
cases of a criminal nature, and interestingly,
a higher number of respondents (47.6%)
confirmed ‘Jirga’ and a lesser percentage
(37.7%) of the respondents stated the Dis-
trict Administration and police. In previous
questions this fact, the preference of Jirga
over the Formal system, was established for
Pakhtun inhabited areas of both provinces.
Hence the Jirga, the District Administration
and the police are three of the most import-
ant of the systems.
A very small percentage of the respondents
(8.0%) identified the formal courts; that re-

108
flects the fact that the respondents do not
have faith in the formal courts system. Other
options identified by respondents are not of
importance and can be seen in the figure.
Where would you refer your civil dispute
(Land Disputes/Divorce etc) for resolution?
After examining the respondents’ institution
of choice for resolving criminal cases, the next
question concerned the preferred system for
civil cases. For civil cases more than half of the
respondents (59.1%) confirmed that they would
refer their civil cases to a local Jirga, followed
by 16.9% respondents who identified District
Administration and police. The data in the figure
below shows that more people prefer referring
their civil cases to a local Jirga than their crim-
inal cases. 14.0% respondents also identified
‘Formal courts’. In the previous question for
criminal cases only 8% respondents confirmed
that they would take their criminal cases to
formal courts while 14.0% respondents would
refer their civil cases to formal courts.
Again, the data shows the level of confidence
of the local people in local Jirgas over the po-
lice and formal courts. We have already seen
that the preference is due to speedy justice;
civil cases may take years or decades while
the formation of a Jirga and its decision takes
weeks or months to reach a settlement.
The rest of the figure is of negligible impor-
tance and the data is self-explanatory.
Respondents’ inclination towards different
dispute resolution systems
Formal courts
This question intends to gather respondents’
inclination towards various dispute resolution
systems, depending on the nature of dispute.
They were asked what system they would pre-
fer if they were faced with a dispute. Several
options are provided in the list. Let us examine
these one by one.
The largest category (44.5%) confirmed that
they would refer their complex cases to formal
courts. Here, respondents are confirming the
role of formal courts and showing the weak-
ness of an informal system. Only 5.8% respon-
dents identified Jirga when it came to resolving
a complex dispute. Nevertheless 38% said that
they would refer all cases to the informal sys-
tems. Followed by 14.5% who said they would
refer no case to the formal courts, while 12.6%
respondents confirmed that they would refer
cases concerning land and property.
The result pattern in this regard shows that
people have a faith in Jirga but they do realise
the necessity of formal courts when they are
faced with complex issues.

109
Informal Jirga
Comparing both formal and informal systems,
it is clear that respondents showed greater
trust in the informal rather than formal courts
for all cases. For instance, only 9.5% respon-
dents in the previous question confirmed
that they would take all cases to formal court
while data gathered for informal systems
shows that 38.0% respondents would take all
their cases there.
The data reveals another striking comparison.
Only 2.1% respondents believed that they
would refer cases of public interest to formal
courts while one-fifth of the respondents
(22.5%) believed that informal dispute resolu-
tion systems are the best places to take cases
of public interest.
Formal courts take the lead only in cases of
complex nature (44.5%) compared with only
5.8% for the informal justice system.
Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division)
Because the Nizam-e-Adl is partially established
in Malakand Division and not in the other dis-
tricts, the survey was conducted only in three
districts of Malakand division and the number of
respondents were few. Therefore, 46.7%, of the
Malakand sample could not share an opinion,
16.8% informed the survey that they would not
take any case to a Nizam-e-Adl. A very small
number of respondents, 5.4%, confirmed that
they would take all cases to this institution while
1.7% respondents believed that all cases of
public interest should be referred to this system.
The data is self-explanatory and shows that the
local people in Malakand Division have not yet
gained confidence in the Nizam-e-Adl. There
could be several reasons – either the system is
not yet fully functional; or it is not fully estab-
lished; people are not aware; or because it is
new, people have to experience the system. The
Nizam-e-Adl is examined in further detail in the
chapter “Informal Justice Systems and Shari-
ah-Based Systems.”
Musalihati Councils/Anjuman
The survey was conducted in Balochistan and
KP, including some of the districts where Mu-
salihati Councils were set-up by UNDP with the
provincial governments.
An overwhelming majority, 79.4%, could not
share their opinion as they did not know about
the functions of Musalihati Councils while
12.7% informed the survey that they would not
take a case to this institution.
A very small number of respondents, 2.1%,
confirmed that they would take all cases to this
institution while 2.3% respondents believed
that all cases of public interest should be re-
ferred to this system.

110
Overall, the conclusion about all four institu-
tions is quite clear. Pakhtun communities across
the region have shown greater confidence in the
Jirga system as compared to other formal and
informal systems. Based on this evidence, it is
time for the policy makers to review the options
and try to reform the formal system so that
people start gaining trust of formal systems. The
alternative and it may be the more practical al-
ternative, would be to make the informal system
a recognized part of a greater formal system of
justice so that more people have access to quick
and inexpensive justice and also relieve the
formal system of backlog.
Conclusion
The survey reveals that Pakhtuns view Access
to formal Justice system as expensive and time
consuming while they believe that informal
ways of justice are transparent, easy for the
people to access and inexpensive.
Overall, the conclusion about all four insti-
tutions is quite clear. Pakhtun communities
across the region have shown their greater
confidence on the Jirga system compared to
other formal and informal systems. However,
the data also shows that Pakhtuns have little
confidence on the implementation of Jirga
system and that a minority identified the im-
portance of women participation. How it is
possible for women to sit in a Jirga is an inter-
esting aspect which needs further exploration
and research.
Furthermore, looking at the evidence, it is now
time for the policy makers to think and review
the options and try to reform the formal system
so that people start gaining trust on formal
system. The alternative, and which may be the
more practical alternative, would be to make
the informal system a recognized part of a great-
er formal system of justice so that more people
have access to quick and inexpensive justice and
also relieve the formal system of congestion.

111
Chapter: 10
Legality & Legitimacy
of Jirga and Institutions
Dispensing Formal Justice

112
Legality & Legitimacy of Jirga and Institutions
Dispensing Formal Justice
Introduction
This chapter presents the perception of the
Pakhtun regarding the legality and legitimacy
of formal and informal systems of justice by
presenting survey and FGD findings concern-
ing trust, effectiveness and fairness of various
justice systems.
At present, there are two types of justice-relat-
ed services in Pakistan: operating through two
modalities: formal justice system and commu-
nity-based dispute resolution or informal justice
systems. On the informal side, the Pakhtun Jirga
operates in FATA, KP and Balochistan’s Pakhtun
populated districts while Panchayat , Faislo and
Baloch Jirga are practiced by communities in the
Punjab, Sindh and in the Baloch areas of Baloch-
istan, respectively.
With the exception of FATA, the formal system
described in previous chapters applies to the rest
of the nation and the remaining Pakhtun areas.
This report, as stated earlier, analyses the Pa-
khtun Jirgas of FATA, KP and Balochistan. In this
chapter, the descriptions and analysis of the two
different forms of justice systems in the survey
area are based upon a conceptual division be-
tween legality and legitimacy.
The principle of legality is easier to define
and comprises the body of laws which es-
tablished the congress or parliament of the
nation under a constitutional framework.
Thus, its focus is on the written rules that
comprise the State’s system of statutory law,
and the application by decision makers of
those rules – which have been established
beforehand - in a manner that does not entail
discretionary departures from established
law. In other words, the principle of legality
is closely related to the formalist approach
to rule of law, which tends to focus on purely
formal characteristics that a legal system must
possess, and shies away from assessments of
the fairness of specific laws or legal decisions.
Law is a codification and replacement of tra-
ditional authority.173
That does not alter the
fact that the courts have to decide many cas-
es, often with respect to immensely complex
and interwoven problems.174
Sometimes the
legitimacy of a court decision is questioned
because a decision in a case runs contrary to
public opinion that is often quite superficially
informed by the media.175
Another problem is
that formal legal procedures may take a long
time, whereas the `substance of individual
consent to a process of decision-making, that
may initially attach to and legitimate out-
comes, thins as the process expands in scope
and lengthens in time.176
On the other hand, the principle of legitimacy
is linked to criteria such as clarity and compre-
hension, and non-arbitrary and non-retrospec-
tive application. The ability of a legal system
to deliver justice in a form that is acceptable
to the people it governs is one of the tasks
for gaining legitimacy. Indeed, it is the notion
173) L.M. Friedmann, The Republic of Choice. Law, Authority and Culture, Harvard University Press: Cambridge
Mass., 1994a (1990), p. 17
174 - 175) J.L.M. Gribnau, LEGITIMACY OF THE JUDICIARY
176) Vining 1995, p. 280. In urgent cases, a party can resort to a speedy civil or administrative procedure (interim
injunction proceedings or provisional relief) before the president of a district court; see Blankenburg and Bruinsma
1991, p. 23 ff

113
of justice that makes laws meaningful to or-
dinary people in their day-to-day lives. How-
ever, the idea of justice is different for each
society based on its particular assessment of
right versus wrong. In other words, it is the
values, norms, and expectations of the people
towards the legal system that conveys legit-
imacy. As one would expect, in each society
the notion of justice and how it is rendered
are not static, but rather subject to change in
response to evolving social, political and eco-
nomic conditions. In the end, for a particular
legal system to be considered just, the present
normative values, sensibilities and expecta-
tions of a society must be reflected in the legal
system. In other words, social definitions of
justice should coincide with the institutions,
laws, and procedures of a State’s justice sys-
tem. In this respect, legitimacy conforms with
substantive conceptions of the rule of law,
which looks to the outcome of laws against
criteria such as justice or fairness.
The Jirga system does not have legal status
in the settled districts of KP and Balochistan.
Nonetheless, it is accepted under the law in
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
This section deals with Jirga’s legality and legit-
imacy in Pakistan’s Pakhtun populated areas,
including FATA. It is important to understand
that although the Jirga and its process are not
codified, i.e., written laws, it does have a juris-
prudence that is transferred by oral tradition
and observation in practice from one genera-
tion to the next.
Effectiveness of various systems in resolving
disputes
Male FGDs
The overwhelming majority in male FGDs were of
the opinion that informal ways of mediation and
dispute resolution are the best ways to get justice
on time and without spending too much money
and resources. Some respondents thought that
one could get justice from both formal and infor-
mal systems. However, getting justice through
formal ways is very time consuming and there-
fore people generally rely on informal ways.
When further probed, the majority preferred
the Olasi Jirga. They thought the Jirga is as old
as Pakhtun society and because it is tested,
people rely on it. Several respondents quoted
their own cases as well as their family mem-
bers cases, which were resolved, according to
them, through Jirga.
There were a few respondents in almost all
FGDs who did not have much confidence in the
informal justice system and thought that the for-
mal court system provides the best solution for
conflicts. They believed that the Jirga puts one
in a compromising position while court system
provides equal opportunity to both parties ac-
cording to the generally accepted national laws
and international Human Rights standards.
Female FGDs
Female respondents’ opinion was not very dif-
ferent from males. Almost 90% of the respon-
dents confirmed that they and their families
Chapter10|Legality&LegitimacyofJirgaandInstitutionsDispensingFormalJustice

114
trusted the Jirga system and believed that the
Jirga adheres to both Shariah and local Riwaj
(customs). There were a couple of female re-
spondents who shared a very interesting idea –
they said the formal and informal justice sys-
tem should have coordination mechanisms so
the load between them could be divided with
clearly defined Terms of Reference. Most of
the respondents were of the opinion that since
their childhood, they have been hearing about
the Jirga system and shared that their families
do not trust any other system but the Jirga.
The survey responses that follow will show the
relative importance of these opinions.
Survey Findings
By means of a single-response, closed-ended
question, the opinion of 2,400 adult respon-
dents of KP and Balochistan was taken on
the effectiveness of various dispute reso-
lution systems. The question was, ‘which
institution resolves the dispute effectively?’
As shown in the graph below, two-thirds of
the respondents (68.5%) believed that the
Jirga effectively solves disputes that arises in
communities followed by just over one-fifth
of the respondents (22.3%) who identified
the District Administration and police as the
institutions which usually resolves issues in
their communities. The third significant op-
tion identified by 3.1% respondents was the
‘Peace Jirga’, which is, as described above, a
specialised type of Jirga found only in some
Pakhtun areas. Only 2.3% respondents could
not share their opinion.
Effective system in dispensing justice
Male FGDs
Male FGDs respondents expressed their trust
on the Jirga system when they were asked this
question. The majority supported the notion
that the Jirga is very effective in dispensing jus-
tice. They added that the Jirga provides cheap
or free justice services in less time as compared
to the formal justice system, which is seen as
expensive, time consuming and corrupt.
However, there was a small number of respon-
dents who believed that it is not the Jirga that
provides answers to all the issues but it is the
local administration and police. They believed
that the Jirga’s role is to convey their issues to
the local authorities and request for assistance.
They also added that although the Jirga may
help resolve petty issues and other common
disputes over matters such as electricity, water,
roads and communication, etc. When it comes
to complex issues, the Jirga fails to come up
with appropriate solutions.
There was another small group of respondents
who was not very optimistic about the Jirga’s
role and believed that the Jirga cannot play any
role all when settling disputes.
Nonetheless, as was seen in the survey data
above and will be confirmed later, the majority
in the FGDs believed that the Jirga is effective
and can play a major role in resolving issues of
communal interest.

115
Female FGDs
Women were also very vocal in sharing their
thoughts on the Jirga’s effectiveness. The
majority of female respondents in KP and
Balochistan were of the view that the Jirga
is effective in dispensing justice quickly and
cheaply and is seen as a viable institution at
the community level. Some were pessimistic
and shared that the Jirga cannot address is-
sues concerning women of Pakhtun society in
both KP and Balochistan.
Some female respondents were more con-
cerned about the implementation of the Jirga
verdicts. They thought that hardly any decisions
are being followed and implemented by people.
Overall, majority supported the notion that
Jirga is effective in dispensing justice.
Survey Findings
In this question, respondents’ views were docu-
mented on the effectiveness of various institu-
tions. Options on five formal and informal jus-
tice systems were provided so that respondents
could share their opinion on the effectiveness of
these institutions when dispensing justice.
Interestingly, out of all five institutions, once
again the Jirga came out as the most effective
justice system. According to the data, 85.9%
rated the Jirga as effective in dispensing jus-
tice; 62.1% of the respondents thought that
the formal justice system is more effective
in dispensing justice. Furthermore, 38.4% of
the respondents rated the Nizam-e-Adl as
effective while 28.7% believed Peace Jirga is
effective in dispensing justice. The last on the
hierarchy is Musalihati Council, which, ac-
cording to 14.9% respondents, is effective in
dispensing justice.
Looking at frequency under ‘don’t know’, we see
that the institutions that are specialised in oper-
ating in specific areas are not known to the local
population. Musalihati Council, (82.8%) Peace
Jirga (68.8%) and Nizam-e-Adl (59.3%).
The response pattern shows that, overall, the
respondents are satisfied with both the formal
and informal systems with the vote going to
the informal Jirga system.
Fairness of the justice system
The respondents were asked to rate the fair-
ness of the justice systems. Again, this was first
discussed in focus groups and then polled in
the survey of the 2,400 males and females.
Free and fair trial
Male FGDs
During the course of fieldwork, it was ob-
served that the overwhelming majority was
not satisfied with many forms of justice – for-
mal and informal. The majority of the FGD
commentary expressed trust in the Jirga and
confirmed that the Jirga is the only institu-
tion which ensures free and fair trial without
discrimination on the basis of economic and
political condition. They added that the Jirga
treats both rich and poor equally. In addition,
a considerable proportion of the FGDs re-
spondents were of the opinion that the Jirga
provides free and fair trial to both parties
involved in a dispute.
Some respondents feared that the Jirga is
partial and supports those who are rich and
politically powerful by forcing underprivele-
ged and poor, victim party to accept the Jirga
decisions.
Female FGDs
Female respondents shared similar views and
thought that the formal courts system is a
waste of time and money and in the end, nei-
ther party is satisfied with the dicision. Some
respondents expressed distrust of the Musa-
lihati Anjuman. However, there was a large
group of respondents who shared their posi-
tive experience with Musalihati Anjuman.
Female respondents shared their thoughts in a
qualified manner despite being out of the deci-
sion making process. They believed that the Ji-
rga is fair in dealing with cases and treats both
parties equally and without any discrimination.
They viewed the Jirga as the most trusted insti-
tution because of its impartial role and fairness
in providing justice to all.
Survey Findings
As shown in the graph below, the result for this
question is identical to the previous questions,
and this reinforces the overall impression from
the responses.
Jirga: Interestingly, 85.7% respondents be-
lieved that the Jirga process is a fair justice
system providing services to the common
people; only 19.5% believed that this system
is not fair. Also it is clear that the Jirga process
is biased against women and cannot be con-
sidered completely fair according to the reality
on the ground. However, another reason for
the popularity of the Jirga could be its quick

116
resolution of disputes in Paktun districts when
compared with the slow pace of the country’s
formal system.
Formal Justice System: 60.4% of the interview-
ees believed that the formal justice system is
fair in dispensing justice to common people
while 19.5% disagreed. Some 20% respondents
did not share their perception.
Nizam-e-Adl: 40.2% believed that Nizam-e-
Adl is fair while only 2.0% believed that it is
an unfair justice system. The majority, 57.8%,
did not share their opinion. This is surpris-
ing, considering that this question was only
applied to the sample living in the districts
of Malakand Division, where the system is
established.
Peace Jirga: 17.8% thought that the Peace
Jirga is fair in providing justice services to
the people and 1.4% shared that this sys-
tem is unfair. More than two-thirds of the
respondents (69.48%) could not share their
experience. This is odd considering that this
question was only applied to the sample living
in the districts of Swat only where the system
was established.
Musalihati Anjuman: 14.5% respondents
were of the opinion that Musalihati Council
is a fair system of justice while 1.2% thought
otherwise. Again, almost all of the respondents
(83.4%), did not know about this system. The
low response rate, as in the case of the Peace
Jirga and Nizam-e-Adl, shows how much more
effort remains to be made when introducing
new systems to locals.
Judging the “Free and Fair” criteria
Survey Findings
The respondents were asked to share their
opinion on the criteria of the systems being
free and fair for disputants. Again, interest-
ingly, respondents seemed to be very content
with the Jirga system when compared to other
formal and informal justice systems. The graph
reveals the following:
An overwhelming majority, 85%, opined that
the Jirga system provides a free and fair trial
to both parties to the dispute during the pro-
cess while a negligible number of respondents
(2.4%) disagreed.
Looking at the data, Nizam-e-Adl follows the
Jirga system in terms of respondents’ positive
opinion. More than one-third of respon-
dents (37.9%) believed that the Nizam-e-Adl
provides a free and fair trial to both parties
during the process while only 2.4% had a neg-
ative perception. Again, the majority (59.7%)
of the sample in Malakand could not share
their perception.
The Peace Jirga is the third most favourable
institution on the list. One quarter of respon-
dents, 27.7%, believed that Peace Jirga pro-
vides a free and fair trial to both parties during

117
the proceedings, while just 1.4% had negative
views. An overwhelming majority, 68%, could
not share their opinion despite of the fact
that the Peace Jirga was specifically instituted
in Swat in late 2007 by the NWFP Cabinet177
during the period of military operations as an
important strategy for resolving the conflict.
Perhaps they never had experienced the sys-
tem or, perhaps, the system was not promoted
by the media.
The empirical data shows a negative percep-
tion about formal courts. Only 17.8% believed
that formal courts, to some extent, provide
free and fair trial to both the parties during the
process of justice dispensation while a higher
number of respondents (45%) have the oppo-
site view. A considerable number, more than
one quarter, did not share an opinion.
The last on the list is Musalihati Council. Only
14.4% of the respondents believed that Mu-
salihati Council provides a free and fair trial
to both the parties while only 1.4% had a neg-
ative perception. An overwhelming majority,
86.4%, did not know about this institution and
could not share their views.
Overall, an overwhelming majority believed
that Jirga is an institution from where people
could get free and fair trial.
Are you satisfied with the probing/inquiry
mechanism of the Jirga process?
Male FGDs
The Jirga, as a mediation process, has a very
simple and straightforward probing/inquiry
mechanism. It is said that Pakhtuns know their
enemies without any doubts and hardly any case
goes without being noticed by the community,
because crimes committed in the region, most of
the time, are seen as a restoration of family hon-
our and avenging old insults. Therefore, gathering
evidence in most cases, if not all, is easy. Cases
are brought to the Jirga with all the evidence
beforehand and communities have little doubt on
the evidence or proof. Therefore, Jirga members
have to do little with collecting evidence, while
they engage both parties and mediate for reach-
ing a settlement rather than establishing evi-
dence and nature of a crime as in formal courts.
Respondents were asked whether they were
satisfied or dissatisfied with the probing/inqui-
ry aspect of the process and, an overwhelming,
majority of FGDs respondents confirmed that
they were satisfied with the probing inquiry.
However, there were a few respondents who
were not satisfied and complained that Jirga
sometimes fails to collect all the evidence be-
cause the members of the Jirga usually believe
what they are told by the disputants.
Female FGDs
The women shared the same views as the men.
Overwhelmingly, the majority was supportive
of this notion and have shown their trust on
the probing/inquiry mechanism.
177) Daily Times, “NWFP cabinet to call Jirgas for peace in Swat,” November 25, 2007.

118
Survey Findings
The respondents were asked to share their lev-
el of satisfaction with the probing mechanisms
of Jirga process. The results of the survey are
amazing and astonishing. It is interesting to
see that 85.7% of the sample confirmed their
satisfaction with the probing mechanism of the
Jirga process. Those who have shown dissatis-
faction are just 2.9%, which should be alarming
for those who support formal justice system.
Do you seek aid of police/local administration
to implement Jirga decisions?
Once a Jirga and the disputants have arrived
at a settlement or conclusion, enforcement
then becomes a question. We wanted to as-
certain the involvement of the police or local
administration for enforcement. Recall that
disputants will involve local administrative
and police authorities as a means to pressure
the opponent, but also recall that the Jirga,
except FATA, is not part of the formal system
of justice.
Male FGDs
Male respondents of all focus group discus-
sions were requested to share their knowledge
on whether Jirga seeks help of local police or
administration to implement its decisions. An
overwhelming majority argued that because Jir-
ga is a community institution and based on local
customs and norms, the involvement of police
or local administration is irrelevant.
Respondents shared that Jirga members take
an oath from all disputing parties that they
would accept the decisions of the Jirga. On the
other hand Jirga members also take bail money
into their custody (good faith deposits), which
may be confiscated if a party does not accept
the decision. This way, parties are bound to
accept Jirga decisions.
Another argument that respondents shared
was that because the Jirga is widely respected
by communities and decisions are announced
after gaining consensus from the disputing par-
ties on the basis of good intensions, therefore
implementation is respected.
However, a few respondents, in almost all
FGDs, believed that Jirga decisions are not
respected because in the settled districts of KP
and Balochistan, decisions are accepted vol-
untarily. Therefore, the administration and or
police have to play their role in implementing
Jirga decisions. However, this could be possible
if the Jirga process were mainstreamed into a
formal justice system.
Female FGDs
According to the majority of the respondents
in the female FGDs, Jirga decisions are seen
as just and therefore not only respected but
also obeyed. Female respondents believed that
social pressure is also very vital for respect and
cannot be avoided. An important dimension
that female respondents shared, which males
overlooked, was the fact that the Jirga process
of mediation seeks reconciliation, and if both
parties agree to come to terms and give their
consensus, then there is no room for either
party to disobey the verdict.
Hence, majority of female respondents con-
firmed that police or local administration’s
involvement is irrelevant and not necessary for
implementing Jirga decisions.

119
Survey Findings
Administration or police cannot take part in
the Jirga process, legally, however, respon-
dents were asked to share their opinion
whether they have ever sought police or local
administration’s support in implementing Jirga
decisions. More than half, 53%, confirmed that
they do not seek the help of police or local
administration in implementing Jirga decisions,
while one quarter, 27.1%, informed the survey
that they seek the support of police or local ad-
ministration in implementing Jirga decisions.
In Balochistan, the research team was in-
formed by the key informants that in some
special cases, the local administration helps
implement Jirga decisions.
This could be done off the record, as stated
above, legally police or administration is not
allowed to assist communities in implementing
Jirga decisions.
Does the police/local administration interfere
in the Jirga proceeding?
Male FGDs
Jirga decisions are not implemented with the
involvement of police as that would mean the
State’s official entities are recognizing the ex-
istence of the Jirga as an institution. However,
there has been some political support by the
police to certain Jirga decisions. Besides, Pakh-
tunwali has strong roots in the Pakhtun society
and therefore avoiding or disobeying a Jirga
decision is seen as going against the Pakhtun
code which will remain in people’s memories
for a long time and haunt those who breach
the fundemental principles of Pakhtunwali.
The overwhelming majority informed that in Jir-
ga proceedings locals do not wish to involve the
police department or local administration. They
added that people believe that it would make
the case worse if the police were involved. They
argued that involving police would mean opting
for formal ways of justice which would make the
process more complicated and expensive for the
parties to the dispute.
Some thought that because the Jirga takes
power of attorney from the disputants and bail
money, therefore, it makes it easy for the Jirga
members to enforce the decisions and make
sure that the decision is properly implemented.
Nonetheless, some respondents in almost all
FGDs argued that cases of political nature and
where public safety is involved, people make
sure that police is taken into confidence unof-
ficially. They added that it is certain that local
leaders and politicians seek support of police
department, discretely, and therefore in such
cases, police try to make sure that the Jirga
decision is implemented.
Female FGDs
Surprisingly, female respondents shared almost
similar views. They thought that Jirga members
are selected because of several qualities, includ-
ing their ability to implement their decisions. In
that case they do not need police support. They
were of the opinion that police do not interfere
in Jirga proceedings or decisions. However, they
added, it is known that in some cases where Hu-
man Rights are at stake, then the involvement of
the police has to be sought.
The media has reported that in certain cases,
where Human Rights are feared to be violat-

120
ed, the local administration through its police
force is supposed to interfere and prevent any
such violation.
Survey Findings
The direct question reflecting the FGDs asked
of the sampled respondents was “whether
“the police or local administration interferes in
the functioning of Jirga proceedings.
More than two-thirds of the respondents
(68.2%) replied that the police and local
administration do not interfere in the Jirga
proceedings. Only 7.3% informed the survey
that police or local administration interfere in
Jirga proceedings. A considerable number of
respondents, 24.5%, replied that they did not
know or have an opinion.
Is there any provision for the parties to appoint
a legal representative (similar to a lawyer in
formal justice system) in the Jirga proceedings?
Male FGDs
An overwhelming majority of respondents
confirmed that there are rare cases where Jirga
members sought legal expertise for some com-
plex natured cases. However, generally, Jirga
members are not flexible in this regard.
Generally, disputants nominate a Jirgamaar,
with wisdom of local Riwaj and history, who is
assigned to argue and mediate with the other
party and reach to a point where both parties
could agree on a settlement. This nominated
person could be a doctor, lawyer, businessman,
councilor or politician, etc.; however, appoint-
ing a legal expert would be a special case and,
as such, is rare according to the FGD.
There was another group of respondents who
thought that a disputant is more aware of his
problem and could express himself in a more
clear manner as compared to a legal repre-
sentative.

121
Female FGDs
Interestingly, female respondents were fully
supportive of the idea of having a legal rep-
resentative in Jirga proceedings. They simply
believed that a legal representative could
represent a disputant with strong technical
knowledge of the State’s laws so as to avoid
any confusion and not to breach the law.
There are cases of a complex nature where
Jirga members do seek some guidance from
people having technical knowledge, such as
lawyers or retired judges, religious scholars,
etc., according to some key informants. How-
ever, some Jirga members could be lawyers or
retired judges too, depending on the situation.
In complex cases, where lawyers’ services are
acquired, especially in Balochistan province,
Jirga members have shown flexibility, which is
a positive sign, according to key informants.
The survey intended to document the gener-
al feelings of the respondents regarding this
question.
Survey Findings
The opinion of the 2,400 respondents is divid-
ed. A greater proportion (44.5%) confirmed
that provision is not made for a legal repre-
sentative in Jirga proceedings, compared to
21.3% who said that there is a provision for the
parties to appoint a legal representative. One-
third of the respondents (34.2%) did not know
the answer.
To what extent does the community have
faith in the Jirga process?
Another question was posed about another
dimension of the Jirga process. They were
asked whether the community had faith in the
Jirga institution. Out of 2,400 respondents,
the majority (59.7%) confirmed that they had
faith in the Jirga process to a large extent and
an additional 28.3% said that they had to some
extent. Combined, the 88.0% positive response
reinforces the faith in the Jirga system. Only
1.7% did not have any faith in Jirga institution.
These consistently high response rates seem
quite astonishing considering all of the com-
mentary about the Jirga’s limitation on Human
Rights, especially women’s rights.
Which sections of the community display
more faith in Jirga?
Now the focus of the survey shifted to know
which sections of the Pakhtun community have
more faith in the Jirga institute. Few options
were given and respondents were allowed to
identify one or more options.
A higher proportion of respondents (46.5%)
thought that the Pakhtun community as a
whole has faith in the Jirga institution; more
than one-third (37.5%) thought that tribal
elders have more faith in Jirga as compared
to other sections of the community; 7.0% be-
lieved that religious leaders have more faith in
the Jirga system; while only 2.4% believed that
political and influential families possess greater
faith in Jirga system. These statistics are shown
in the graph below. It is interesting that from
reviewing the individual personal opinions to
the questions one would have expected larger
percentages when asking those same people to
guess in which section of the community had
faith in the Jirga process.
Interestingly, just 1.3% identified women
followed by 0.3% who confirmed ethnic and

122
religious minorities have more faith in Jirga
system. The survey clearly highlighted the fact
that Jirga has limitations when it comes to
women and minorities participation.
How far is the Jirga relevant to redress the griev-
ances and dispense justice to the community?
Male FGDs
The question of Jirga relevancy was also
checked through FGDs. An overwhelming
majority were of the opinion that Jirga is very
relevant to their circumstances and is effec-
tive in resolving their issues. They shared that
Jirga resolves their personal/family issues as
well as issues communities face, such as road,
electricity and water, etc. They also argued that
Jirga provides cheap and quick justice without
delays and therefore, fits in to their culture and
environment.
However, a minority of the respondents also
believed that all issues are resolved mainly by
the government department/administration
and not Jirga. They added that Jirga is irrele-
vant in today’s situation and should not be en-
couraged and relied on. They also added that
Jirga should only be used to convey communal
issues to the local administration and not be
taking up issues which it cannot resolve.
Female FGDs
Female views were slightly different from males.
They thought that Jirga is not taking up women’s
issues seriously and therefore women felt left
out. They argued that Jirga has answers to many
communal issues, local crimes and civil disputes.
However, women are not treated justly under
Jirga. They demanded that their voices should be
heard according to Constitution of Pakistan and
international Human Rights standards.

123
Survey Findings
Respondents were asked to give their opinion in
a systematic way about whether Jirga is relevant
to redress the grievances and dispense justice
to the community. The respondents were very
vocal and generous in sharing their opinion.
According to the survey results, an overwhelm-
ing majority (88.8%) believed that the Jirga is
relevant to redress grievances and dispense
justice to the community. This is surprising and
again poses a challenge to the formal justice
system of Pakistan. Another surprising element
of these responses is that it includes women
respondents’ opinion, which could have been
negative, as they do not participate in the pro-
cess and it is also believed that they do not get
justice from the Jirga process. However, the
women’s perception may be based on their
male family member’s opinions. Then again,
the women may believe that the formal system
would not be able to address their issues.
Only 2% respondents thought that Jirga is irrel-
evant for redressing grievances and dispensing
justice to the community.
Is Jirga inherently class and gender biased?
The survey questionnaire has questions with dif-
ferent dimensions, which helps gather informa-
tion from respondents through different angles.
To reconfirm this, the survey respondents were
asked whether Jirga has some inbuilt mecha-
nism, which is class and gender biased. A clear-
cut majority, 63.6%, completely denied that and
only 6.6% believed that Jirga was inherently
unjust with class and gender.
The survey result show some confusion and
conflict with the previous questions. More
than one quarter, 29.8%, could not share their
opinion, which shows that they were lacking
confidence on this aspect of Jirga, which cre-
ates doubts on Jirga institution when it comes
to class and gender.
However, the reality might be different from
what the respondents perceive. Jirga has no
women representation, which shows very
clearly that it is gender biased. In regards to
class, there are mixed views and different ex-
periences of people who accessed the Jirga.
If yes, should Jirga be abolished?
Those 6.6% who believed that Jirga has in-
herent biases against class and gender were
asked whether Jirga should be abolished. Out
of 6.6%, only 1.4% thought that Jirga should
be abolished. However, surprisingly, 3.9% still
believed that it should not be.
The 93.4% ‘Not Applicable’ sample size itself
falls under the ‘No category’, which means
that an overwhelming majority does not ap-
prove the idea of abolishing Jirga from the
Pakhtun society.
How strongly do you agree/disagree with the
statement: ‘Jirga is a speedy and less expen-
sive mechanism of dispute resolution’?
Poverty is widely spread all over Pakistan and
people do not have adequate resources to
make both ends meet. In this situation acquir-
ing justice services in Pakistan through formal
means is beyond one’s imagination where
courts’ and lawyers’ fees are quoted in hun-
dreds of thousands. Besides, the time consum-
ing process also creates frustration and gener-
ally, when justice is served, it is often too late.
In this situation, it is perceived that, the poor
end up in compromising standard justice with Chapter10|Legality&LegitimacyofJirgaandInstitutionsDispensingFormalJustice

124
informal ways of resolving their disputes – no
matter big or small.
Respondents were asked how strongly they
agreed/disagreed with the statement that Jirga
is a speedy and less expensive mechanism of
dispute resolution. Out of 2,400 respondents,
unsurprisingly, an overwhelming majority,
85.7%, agreed that Jirga is a speedy and less
expensive dispute resolution system. While,
only 1.1% did not agree with this notion. 13.2%
were indecisive and could not share their
opinion. The data shows that women also do
consider Jirga as a viable system when it comes
to cheap and quick justice no matter how far
women’s issues are addressed through it.
How strongly do you agree with the state-
ment: ‘One of the main outcomes of Jirga
decision is just and fair compensation to the
victim’s family?
The element of compensation is one of the ma-
jor attractions for the people who use the Jirga
system. Under the formal justice system, the
State is mainly compensated against a crime (in
criminal cases), while victims get no financial
compensation in the end, despite spending a
lot of money and time. However, on the other
hand, in the Jirga process, the victim’s family’s
honour is restored and compensated financial-
ly and without taking too much time.
Keeping in view this aspect, the respondents
were asked how strongly they agree/disagree
whether the Jirga decision is a just and fair
compensation to victim’s family.
Out of 2,400 respondents, more than two-
third, 72%, agreed that a Jirga decision com-
pensates the victim’s family fairly while only
3% thought the opposite.
Both parties are provided with equal opportu-
nities to express their views in Jirga process

125
Another aspect which Jirga is known for is
its mechanism where both parties are given
equal opportunity to express their viewpoints.
However, similar to the formal justice system
in Pakistan, as per the laws.
Unsurprisingly, an overwhelming majority
of 89.5% agreed that Jirga provides equal
opportunities to both parties in expressing
their viewpoints. Only 1.0% believed the
opposite while 9.5% were indecisive about
their opinion.
Nepotism or favouritism influences the deci-
sion making process of Jirga
There is an impression that Jirga decisions are
usually influenced by the powerful and rich. It
is perceived generally that Jirga members are
allegedly involved in favouritism and nepotism.
However, this could also be true for any other
formal or informal system.
The survey tried to confirm this by gathering
the perception of 2,400 male and female adult
respondents. The response is surprising, and
does not go in favour of Jirga as compared to
previous responses favouring the Jirga system.
Results show that close to half of the respon-
dents, 49.8%, agreed with the notion that nep-
otism or favouritism influences Jirga decision
making process. There were a considerable
number of respondents, 30.2% who disagreed
with this notion while 20.1% could not share
their opinion. The survey trend shows confu-
sion, however, still the response favouring the
notion is worrisome and should be compared
with other results on Jirga’s legitimacy.

126
There is another argument that Jirga as a sys-
tem is accepted by the majority. However, this
is being manipulated by the powerful due to
the element of materialism introduced recent-
ly. Therefore, Jirga as a system is accepfigure
but it should be transparent.
Decisions given by Jirga are unbiased and free
from all kinds of pressure from the rich or priv-
eleged section of the society
Male FGDs
The perception survey data supports the no-
tion overwhelmingly while only a handful of
respondents disagreed. An overwhelming ma-
jority in the FGDs also believed so and were of
the opinion that Jirga is respected because it
favours both rich and poor and can yield to the
pressure from the influential. They added that
the Jirga satisfies both the poor and the rich so
that both parties save face and that the poor
are compensated accordingly.
Nonetheless, there were respondents who
were not very supportive of Jirga and argued
that Jirga always favours the rich and influen-
tial and poor received compensation according
to the Jirga members discretion.
Female FGDs
Female respondents were slightly pessimistic
about the role Jirga plays in dealing with cases
where women are a party. They believed that
Jirga always favour men who are powerful and
can manipulate the system easily as compared
to women who are not allowed to even take
part in the proceedings. Therefore, the women’s
argument came up quite strong on this aspect.

127
Survey Findings
Respondents were provided with an option that
all Jirga decisions are unbiased and free from all
kinds of pressures from economically and polit-
ically powerful elite of the society. Out of 2,400
respondents, two-thirds (66.6%) agreed with
the notion of being unbiased while just 11.9%
disagreed. A considerable number of respon-
dents, 21.8%, could not share their opinion.
The graph below confirms previous results
which show that the population generally and
in most responses overwhelmingly favours the
Jirga from various perspectives.
For these two questions, one message is con-
veyed clearly – that Jirga in recent times has
been corrupted materially where rich can ma-
neuver and can easily get justice – sometimes
if not always.
Some decisions are harsh and not commensu-
rate with the deed done between the parties
Male FGDs
Throughout the focus group discussions, re-
spondents repeatedly confirmed that Jirga is
fair in dispensing justice to all. However, there
were few instances where respondents agreed
with the notion that sometimes decisions taken
by Jirga are harsh and not commensurate with
the deed between the parties. This could not be
denied and was true to some extent. However,
in majority cases, people have shown their trust
on the Jirga and confirmed that its decisions are
just and punishments are not out of proportion.
Female FGDs
Female respondents shared the views of their
male counterparts. They viewed Jirga as a system
which is fair and respected by all because of its
just treatment to all. They disagreed that Jirga
decisions are harsh and not commensurate to
the deeds done between the parties. They added
that if that was the case, then people would have
discouraged Jirgas and that the practice of aquir-
ing justice through it would have diminished from
the society long time ago.
However, they repeated that decisions regard-
ing women are sometimes harsh which could
have been avoided.
Survey Findings
Since Jirga decisions are made through con-
sensus and that both parties have to agree
however, in some cases it has been observed
that either party, which might not be happy
with the decision, has to accept this after being
pressurised by the Jirga. Therefore, the sur-
vey intended to document what respondents
opined about this fact.
The survey results show a mixed response.
Close to one-third (32.1%) agreed that some
decisions are harsh and not commensurate
with the deed done between disputing parties
while just slightly over one-third (35%) op-
posed this notion.
An equal number of respondents, 32.7% could
not share their opinion. This clearly shows a
state of confusion, depending on what the
respondent’s experience might have been.
Jirga fails to resolve disputes effectively
Male FGDs
The responses from FGDs are stronger than
the perception survey on the issue of Jirga be-
ing effective in resolving disputes. Throughout
the discussions, the overwhelming majority
confirmed that Jirga has the ability to resolve
disputes effectively, while only few respon-
dents had the opposite view. Respondents

128
from D.I. Khan shared some bad experiences
of the Jirga process and therefore were not
quite content with the Jirga institution.
Female FGDs
Except a few, an overwhelming majority shared
their views and were having the same views
as their male counterparts. Some respondents
added further that it is Jirga, which binds Pa-
khtun society together and resolves all kinds of
issues effectively.
Survey Findings
There is a strong belief among the Pakhtun
communities across KP and Balochistan (and
of course FATA) that Jirga effectively re-
solves disputes. The survey documented this
fact but through a negative notion. In this
question, 2,400 male and female adult re-
spondents were asked whether they agree/
disagree with the notion that Jirga fails to
resolve disputes effectively.
Only 14.7% respondents agreed with the
statement while majority (63.5%) did not
agree. A significant number, 21.8%, did not
share their opinion.
Jirga maintains social order and restores har-
mony in a village
One aspect that Pakhtun communities across
Pakistan are content with Jirga institution is
its ability to maintain social order and restore
communal harmony after a conflict. This ques-
tion is similar to the previous one but with
another angle so that the survey gathers each
dimension of Jirga’s ability to resolve disputes
and bring life to normalcy.
To confirm this fact, 2,400 respondents were
asked in a qualified manner whether they
agree/disagree with this notion.
Unsurprisingly, more than three-quarter,
76.2%, agreed with the notion that Jirga main-
tains social order and restores communal har-
mony with in communities after conflict. Only
4.9% disagreed with this notion. Some 18.9%
could not respond to this question, as they did
not know the answer.
Jirga plays a role in conflict transformation
and resolution.
Jirga, as an indigenous institution, is rooted
within Pakhtun society for many positive
aspects, according to Pakhtun communities.
This question brings us to another aspect of
peace building when conflicts are resolved
and transformed into peace among warring
families and tribes. Therefore, the survey
intended to confirm this notion from the sur-
vey sample.
Out of 2,400 male and female adult respon-
dents, more than two-third majority, 73.3%,
agreed that Jirga plays its role in conflict trans-
formation and resolution while only 5.3% did
not agree with this notion. One-fifth (21.3),
a considerable number of respondents did
not share their opinion, which shows that a
considerable proportion of Pakhtun society is
confused and cannot give any credit or discred-
it to Jirga institution for its ability to manage
conflicts. This could be their lack of exposure
to the Jirga institution, which, if experienced,
could have developed their opinion – whether
negative or positive.
Jirga can play a role in reducing the levels of
militancy in the region
Male FGDs
Male respondents shared that the communi-
ties across FATA, KP and parts of Balochistan
are faced with a unique militancy where locals
are recruited, trained and involved against
State’s law enforcing agencies and civilians.
They believed that the role of Jirga has not
been fully and truly utilised, which could have
played a role to prevent this militancy from
spreading across the region. They were of
the viewe that Jirga could be best placed to
help resolve the militancy issues at grassroots
level. They confirmed that Jirga could play an
effective role in conflict transformation and
reconciliation of individuals and families af-
fected by militancy. They added that recruits
are locals and should be provided a fair chance
under Jirga to give up their weapons and rec-
oncile within local society and live normal lives.
However, this is not very simple, according to
some respondents, as State should patronise
Jirga and support it to revive and strengthen
this age old institution for people’s good. Some
respondents quoted examples of how their
local Jirgas had been able to curb the militancy
in their areas or villages. They also suggested
that mediation with militants should be initiat-
ed through local Jirgas rather than government
taking the lead on such negotiations. They
believed that the Jirga should be provided with
a mandate to talk to the militants.
Some respondents blamed the Jirga, for pro-
moting militancy. However, they could not

129

130
provide any strong justification or evidence to
support their argument.
Female FGDs
The female respondent’s views were mixed.
Although half of the respondents supported
what male respondents had said about the
Jirga’s role to reduce militancy, the other
half were not quite happy with Jirga’s role
in curbing militancy and manage conflict in
the region.178
They could not give reasons to
support their argument in criticising Jirga’s
role. However, their discontentment also
reflects that in some areas, the Jirga did not
play its due role.
Survey Findings
Apart from political and sectarian violence,
post 9/11, Pakistan has been suffering from a
severe form of militancy in many parts of Paki-
stan, especially in Pakhtun dominated areas of
FATA, KP and Balochistan. It has been observed
that indigenous institutions such as Jirga have
not been fully utilised to play a role in reduc-
ing the impact of militancy, especially in the
post-military operation phases.
Respondents were asked whether Jirga could
play a role in reducing violence in the region.
Out of 2,400 respondents, more than two-third
majority (65.6%) agreed that Jirga could play
its role in reducing militancy while only 5.7%
did not agree.
More than a quarter (28.8%) did not know the
answer and did not share an opinion. This is
understandable, looking at the complexity of
the militancy problem, as everyone in Pakistan
is confused and does not have the precise
answer to this issue. Jirga, for the simplicity
of the Pakhtun masses, could be the answer,
but one cannot claim that it can reach to any
conclusion reducing militancy. However, it does
have the capabilities to face the challenge and
could be utilised accordingly.
Jirga is more effective in resolving only civil
disputes
It is believed that Jirga resolves some very
complex and long-standing civil disputes
among families. Respondents were asked
whether they agree/disagree with this notion.
Out of 2,400 respondents, a high number of
respondents (40.5%) agreed while 29.1% did
not agree with the notion.
Quite a large number of respondents, 30.5%,
did not share their opinion.
Jirga reintegrates militants/extremists into
the community
Male FGDs
This question is related to two previous ques-
tions. According to majority of the respon-
dents, once the Jirga takes place and reconciles
warring parties [local population and militants]
and decisions are reached, then the next step
178) One has to keep in mind that the Jirga process will only work if both parties to a dispute o conflict agree to
mediation by a Jirga. In the present context of Taliban militancy where the Taliban are rebelling against traditional
custom, there is no the willingness to enter into mediation. Local Jigas should not be expected to mediate when
armed rebellion against a government beyond their community is the context.

131
is how to live together peacefully. They argued
that in that case, an amnesty has to be provid-
ed to those who fought, after penalising them.
Jirga will help both parties to forgive each
other, lead peaceful lives and victims should be
compensated accordingly.
This is not very simple, as one respondent
added that forgiving is not that easy in Pakhtun
culture but the Jirga process saves face and
therefore, after Jirga decisions, a militant could
be reintegrated into the society, keeping in
view the crime he committed. So it depends on
the nature of crime and the context.
Female FGDs
The results of the FGDs were not different from
the male FGDs, except that a few respondents
protested and asked, “How could people for-
give the treatment meted out to local commu-
nities by militants. They were of the opinion
that such criminals should be tried under State
law and should not be forgiven.
Some experts are suggesting that Jirga should
be utilised, as an indigenous conflict transfor-
mation mechanism to reintegrate conflicting
groups or offenders into communities to en-
sure lasting peace. However, no such efforts
have been initiated by any government or
non-governmental entity.
Survey Findings
Let us examine what the general perception
would be about the ability of Jirgas to reintegrate
extremists or militants into society, after rehabili-
tation. Out of 2,400 respondents, a high number
of respondents (41.8%) agreed that Jirgas can

132
help reintegrate militants into communities com-
pared with only 17.2% who did not agree.
The data shows that a substantial number of
respondents, 40.9%, were indecisive and could
not share their opinion. This could tilt to either
side and can make a good case for both options.
Jirga is effective in resolving both civil and
criminal disputes
This question intends to document respon-
dents’ opinion on the effectiveness of Jirga in
resolving both civil and criminal disputes.
Out of 2,400 male and female adult respon-
dents, interestingly, close to three-quarters,
72.6%, agreed that Jirga is effective in resolving
both criminal and civil disputes while only 6.7%
did not agree with the notion. Some 20.9%
could not share their perception.
Jirga can prevent some very serious crimes
During Key Informant Interviews, the survey
team was told that Jirga could play its role in
preventing serious crimes within communities.
To test this angle, the survey asked this ques-
tion from 2,400 male and female respondents
in a qualified manner.
Again, interestingly, more than half, 53%,
agreed while a quarter of them, 25.5% did not
agree with the notion. Close to one quarter
(23.4%) did not share their opinion as they
did not know.
Jirga is an organised, well-established, trans-
parent and an efficient institution in the Pakh-
tun society
Now is the time to document how well organ-
ised, well established, transparent and efficient
institution Jirga is for the Pakhtun society.
Respondents were asked whether they agree/
disagree with the notion that Jirga is an organ-
ised, well-established, transparent and efficient
institution of Pakhtun society.
Out of 2,400 respondents, an overwhelming
majority, 84%, agreed with the notion while
only 1.8% did not agree with the notion. Some
14.2% could not share their opinion. With the
passage of survey questionnaire, it seems as
more respondents are favouring different char-
acteristics of a Jirga.
Jirga makes lasting peace between/among
disputants
Formal justice system satisfies international
standards and conveys a lesson to the society
that every criminal will be punished. However,
sometime formal ways of settling disputes
cannot ensure peace between the disputing
parties, especially in Pakhtun society, because
Pakhtun society believes in concept of Badl,
according to the Islamic code – an eye for
an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and blood for
blood.179
Because of this conflicts may go on
for years and decades if they are not resolved
through Jirga. In that case, Jirga has proved to
bring lasting peace between conflicting fami-
lies after proper mediation to prevent further
bloodshed or damage to any of disputants.
To test this perception, 2,400 respondents
were asked whether Jirga has the ability to
bring lasting peace between or among dis-
putants. Interestingly, eight out of ten, 83%,
agreed while only 2.1% did not agree with
the notion. Some 14.9% could not share their
opinions, as they did not know the answer.
How strongly do you support the involvement
of government officials in Jirga proceedings?
Male FGDs
Majority opposed the idea of government
officials’ involvement during the Jirga proceed-
ings. They believed that if government officials
are involved then the Jirga institution will be-
come corrupt and people will lose their confi-
dence in this century’s old institution.
Some respondents had an opposite view and
supported the idea of government officials’
involvement. They argued that this way parties
to the conflict will take the matter seriously
and that the implementation of the Jirga deci-
sion will become binding on both the parties
to the dispute. Nonetheless, overall, an over-
whelming majority did not support the idea.
Female FGDs
Female respondents shared mixed views. Half
of the female respondents supported the no-
tion and thought that government should en-
sure that Jirga proceedings are transparent and
that decisions are implemented accordingly.
However, half of the respondents were having
opposing views and had shown their concerns
on the credibility of government departments.
179) The theology of the expression is that the punishment should not exceed the damage done; it does not mean
that the price has to be exacted. This interpretation is also found in other religions, e.g., the Old Testament in Chris-
tianity.

133

134
During the KIIs in KP and Balochistan, some
experts on Jirga shared their experiences on
government officials’ involvement, such as
police officers, or a representative of a local
administration. They opined that police in-
volvement or any official from the local admin-
istration always failed to resolve issues. Most
of the time, interference by these officials lead
to more complexities in the end.
This conveys a strong message of mistrust on
the government departments and ownership for
Jirga as indigenous institution. This aspect was
tested through the quantitative survey too. The
response is mixed and shows confusion.
Survey Findings
Out of 2,400 respondents, a higher number of
respondents, 46.2%, supported the idea that gov-
ernment officials should be involved in the Jirga
proceedings. However, almost equal number of
respondents, 42.1%, opposed the idea.
Some 18.8% could not share their opinion,
which could go either way.
How are the decisions of Jirgas
implemented?
Male FGDs
Respondents informed that the Jirga gives
considerable time to the parties to implement
its decision, which makes it easy for either
party to adhere to the decision. Some respon-
dents also pointed out that Jirga takes bail
money and take an oath from both the parties
and in case of breach of rules, Jirga can con-
fiscate the money and can give it to the victim
party. Some respondents added that since
Jirga decisions are taken after getting con-
sensus from both the parties therefore, they
thought, that there is little room left for either
party to disobey.
An overwhelming majority also pointed out
that community pressure is always behind the
implementation of Jirga decisions and therefore
it seems unlikely that a disputant would try to
offend the entire community and make enemies
rather than following the Jirga decision.
Female FGDs
Female respondents’ views were not much
different from those of the men. However,
they shared a new dimension. They believed
that Jirga is a step towards reconciliation be-
tween the conflicting parties, which means
the process of peace has already begun and
therefore, there is less likelihood that a party
will breach any such agreement. They also
said that there is social pressure behin Jirga
decisions and therefore no one dares to of-
fend the entire community by not complying
with the Jirga decision.
Survey Findings
To know how the Jirga decisions are imple-
mented, an important question was asked
from the respondents. Out of 2,400 respon-
dents, an overwhelming majority (86.8%)
shared that Jirga decisions are implemented
through pressure by community. As the Jir-
ga does not have a legal or State back up, a
mechanism, beyond social pressure, does not
exist to enforce Jirga decisions. Social pres-
sure within the Pakhtun society ensures Jirga
decisions are implemented accordingly.
Some other options are identified by very
few respondents. For example, 2.5% believed
that Jirga decisions are implemented through

135
Lashkars180
, and another 2.5% confirmed that
police and local administration help imple-
ment the Jirga decisions. The concept of Lash-
kar is very old and in recent times we have
had few instances where Lashkars have been
raised for enforcing Jirga decisions especially
in the settled districts of KP and Balochistan’s
Pakhtun areas. Lashkars have been raised
recently to curb Taliban militancy in parts of
FATA and KP’s few non-urban areas. None-
theless, this is quite surprising and needs
cross-tabulation to know in which districts
such implementation takes place.
2.5% respondents identified police and local ad-
ministration who helped enforced Jirga decisions.
If the decision is not acceptable to a party,
what happens?
In FATA, defiance to Jirga decision is very rare
while in the settled districts of KP and Baloch-
istan, there are many such instances when
Jirga decisions are not accepted by any or both
parties. This is because in settled districts of
KP and FATA, Jirga is practiced but it is not very
well-organised and communities accept deci-
sions, mostly voluntarily. However, since Jirga
decisions are based on consensus, therefore
it is less likely that any or both parties to the
dispute would defy the decisions.
Male FGDs
This question was repeated during the FGDs.
An overwhelming majority confirmed that Jirga
decisions are generally accepted and honoured
by both disputing parties. However, respon-
dents view that if any party to the dispute is
not content with the Jirga decision and believes
that justice has not been served then they can
appeal to the community for another Jirga to be
formed, which is generally an accepted practice.
Respondents also informed that in case the
Jirga decision is not accepted even after the
second Jirga, the bail money is confiscated,
and the local community cuts off social ties
with that particular party.
Female FGDs
Unsurprisingly, female respondents had the
same view. They added that if any party dis-
agreed with the Jirga decision, it may lead to
prolonging conflicts and therefore result in
more bloodshed and loses.
Survey Findings
To test this, respondents were asked what hap-
pened if the Jirga decision is not acceptable to
one or both parties to the dispute. Respondents
were given different scenarios and the option to
choose one or more options.
The survey results show that half of the respon-
dents, 50.3%, confirmed that the accused party
can submit an appeal to the same Jirga which
decided the case, while more than one-third
informed the survey that the accused party can
take the case to the formal court. More than
one quarter, 28.3%, thought that the accused
party can simply defy the Jirga decision, as there
is no strong mechanism in place to compel the
accused party to accept the decision. A quarter
180) A Lashkar is a group of men who, by tribal decision, are brought together to enforce a decision of the elders. The
men will be armed and expected to fight the person, family or group that has violated the code or committed a crime

136
of the sample size, 25%, shared that the accused
party can take the case to the local police. Some
10.1% came up with various options on their
own, while only 2.8% did not know the answer.
Various scenarios mentioned above may be
applied by parties in different situations. How-
ever, the intention was to find out which one is
more generally practiced.
Should the party be expelled from the com-
munity in case it defies the Jirga decision?
Expelling the accused party from the commu-
nity is an extreme step, which any Jirga could
take. Even in worst situations such decisions
are avoided by the Jirga itself. On the other
hand, the accused party usually follows the
decision and does not let the situation reach a
level where the Jirga is compelled to take such
steps. In FATA, a Jirga can expel the accused
party from the village in case of defiance, as
it has the ability to do so. While in settled
districts, such steps could not be taken as the
accused parties usually follow the decisions
voluntarily. Nonetheless, Pakhtun communities
could react this way too, depending on the
complexity of the situation as well as on the
accused party’s political and social status.
Male FGDs
Respondents were asked whether a criminal or
offending party could be expelled from a village
as a punishment decided by a Jirga, it is sur-
prising to know that an overwhelming majority
disagreed. They shared that such incidents have
occurred in the past. However, it is no more the
case. Some respondents believed that it could
happen in FATA in the absence of any security
apparatus, but in settled districts such incidents
are rare due to the presence of police and local
authorities who could interfere and prevent
such gross violation of Human Rights.
There was a small minority who believed that
if expelling a party from the village as a punish-
ment could bring some peace, then it could be
a good measure.
Female FGDs
Female respondents’ views were mixed and
confusing. One group of respondents opposed
the idea of punishing a disputing party by telling
them to leave the village. However, some be-
lieved that it would be a good idea and a lesson
for all villagers to avoid committing such crimes.
Survey Findings
When tested though the survey question, re-
sponses were mixed. A high number of respon-
dents, 41.5%, opposed the idea while more than
one-third, 35.9%, supported the idea. Close to a
quarter did not know the answer.
Are there any instances of defiance of a Jirga
decision?
Connected to the previous question, the
survey wanted to guage whether defiance of
Jirga decisions is commonplace. Out of 2,400
respondents, a high number of respondents,
45%, shared that accused parties do not defy
Jirga decisions while 24% thought the oppo-

137

138
site. A large number of respondents, 31%, did
not know the answer.
If yes, how often does this happen?
The 575 respondents who confirmed that Jirga
decisions are not followed by accused parties,
were asked how often such instances happen.
Out of 575 respondents, 76.9% thought that
such instances happen sometimes while 14.1%
believed that such instances happen often.
Some 8% thought that such instances rarely
happen, and 1% did not know the answer.
Conclusion:
The present report supports the proposition
that legality is an attribute of the formal justice
system, while its legitimacy amid Pakhtun com-
munities is quite limited as evidenced by their
negative perceptions of its ability to deliver just
outcomes. By way of contrast, the Jirga is not
formally recognised by law, but it is perceived
as the more legitimate system by the Pakhtun
population of KP, Balochistan, and FATA. While
the FCR Sarkari Jirga (not to be confused with
the community-based Olasi Jirga) is convened
under a system of rules inherited from the
British colonial period, its processes, i.e. deci-
sion-making by a political agent, and its sanc-
tions that include collective punishment, are
generally known to FATA residents. Moreover,
it is backed by the force of law and coercive en-
forcement tools. Thus, by and large, it possess-
es legality. On the other hand, few respondents
would identify FCR Jirga as capable of deliv-
ering justice. Alternatively, community-based
dispute resolution processes are not subject
to state rules. Also, their decisions cannot be
legally enforced, and instead, rely on the com-
mitment of community members who share
a set of cultural values. However, this lack of
legality for Olasi Jirga has not undermined its
legitimacy. Indeed, what sets the Olasi Jirga
apart from FCR Jirga are its timely decisions,
limited costs, consistency with local notions of
equity derived from customary laws, as well
as the promotion of community harmony and
stability through mediated settlements.
In the end, the present study puts forward a
general finding, that while FATA residents are
able to access both formal and informal, com-
munity-based dispute resolution processes to
seek relief, it is due to compulsion in the former
case, while in the latter, it is the result of the
greater legitimacy of the forum and its process-
es in the eyes of its adherents that results in
preference for the informal over the formal.

140
Way forward
Due to numerous confusions and limitations
connected with Jirga institutions, the Jirga has
attracted criticism from civil society, Human
Rights activists, and the media for perceived
gaps that lead to the violation of Human Rights,
especially those of women and children.181
Hence, support for the Jirga in the 21st
century
is not appreciated much by modern society. It
might be added, that the Jirga is misunderstood
in the 21st
century, but this research draws on
the peoples opinions who form Jirgas and who
use it as a traditional justice system.
The Jirga is a century’s old and trusted institu-
tion rooted within the Pakhtun society.182
As
discussed in this report, the Jirga has several
positive attributes that make it a legitimate
justice dispensation institution in Pakhtun
community despite its limitations. Jirga is not
expensive, it is accessible to the poor, and
delivers quick justice compared to the formal
justice system.
On the other hand, the State’s formal system
itself has limits, which provide ample reasons
for the people to turn to the Jirga as a means
of justice dispensations.183
The formal system
is seen as corrupt, expensive, time consuming
and not very accessible to poor and vulnerable
groups.184
In contrast, the informal system of
Jirga in Pakhtun communities is mainly based
on the Pakhtun code of conduct – Pakhtunwa-
li - and its many dimensions - which include,
the concept of collective defence of honour
and prestige, the restoration of peace, and the
maintenance of basic order.185
Furthermore, the recent militant threat in Pa-
kistan has raised the importance of indigenous
institutions.186
The Pakhtun region has faced
both internal and external conflict for centuries.
However, the recent threat from militants is
unprecedented that the local communities and
the State machinery cannot address completely.
Out of confusion or lack of political will, local Pa-
khtun indigenous or traditional institutions were
overlooked in addressing the militant issue; they
could have been used to minimise the militant’s
threat and to fill the vacuum created by the lack
of trust on State institutions, developed over the
years. People have developed grievances against
the State for leaving them at the mercy of mil-
itants, especially in FATA and PATA and parts of
Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas.187
However, lately,
the militants’ threat has led to realisation of the
importance of the Jirga process in the Pakhtun
areas of FATA, KP and Balochistan for reconcili-
ation of the communities to return to peace.188
Given this situation the State has to show inter-
est in relying on traditional ways, which would
mean that the Jirga would play a central role (on
the part of the formal system) by helping the
government institutions reconciliation and me-
diation, for peacebuilding.189
In order to respond to this new role, there is
a dire need for reform in the Jirga system to
bridge modernity with tradition. This survey
was designed to document what 2,400 re-
spondents thought about reform in the Jirga
system and the support it will receive from
the communities and State machinery across
the Pakhtun areas in Pakistan.
181) Interviews with Women Rights Activists in Peshawar and Quetta – April 2012
182) Interviews with Key Informants in Peshawar and Quetta – April 2012
183) Interviews with NGOs, lawyers and journalists, etc. in Peshawar and Quetta – April 2012
184) Interviews with Key Informants in KP and Balochistan – March and April 2012
185) Page 88. Pakistan: A Hard Country by Anatol Lieven, Penguin Publication 2011
186) Interviews with Key Informants in KP and Balochistan – March and April 2012
187 - 189) Interviews with Key Informants in Peshawar and Quetta – March and April 2012

141
This chapter focuses on respondents views on
how to reform the Jirga system so that it will
be in compliance with international Human
Rights standards and acceptable to the State of
Pakistan under the Constitution of 1973.
Integration of the Jirga into formal justice
system
FGD respondents were very vocal in sharing
their opinion in a qualified manner. The major-
ity confirmed that if the Jirga were formalised
or made part of the formal court system, then
it would lose its credibility and people would
not have faith in its judgments and process.
However, we also saw that the younger gener-
ation was supportive of innovative ideas and
wanted to bring certain reforms to bring the Ji-
rga in compliance with international standards
and the Constitution of Pakistan, while keeping
its traditional essence in order to ensure peo-
ple’s ownership and respect for it.
The survey data shows respondents’ confusion
on the question of whether communities will
support it if the Jirga is integrated into the
State’s formal system. Looking at the data, it is
clear that respondents are divided. One quar-
ter of the sample (25.6%) approved the idea
while one-third (34%) rejected the idea. Sur-
prisingly, 40.5% were indecisive and could not
share their opinion.
In order for there to be gradual change in the
role of the Jirga in becoming part of the formal
system, a comprehensive education campaign
on the Jirga’s pros and cons is needed so that
people can incorporate knowledge into prac-
tice and can then make choices before ap-
proaching any justice system.
Recording or Transcribing Jirga decisions
It is perceived that Jirga decisions are based
on the word of honour given by mediators
and disputants, and that all such decisions are
honoured. Also it is believed that its traditions
are based on oral tradition. However, during
the Focus Group Discussions and Key Infor-
mant Interviews, it was revealed that, gener-
ally, Jirga decisions are recorded and written
especially in cases of land disputes, business
deals, etc.190
Due to population growth, ero-
sion of local values, influence of money and
material, people’s psyche and mind set has
changed considerably.191
Therefore, lack of
trust has compelled Jirga members to record
decisions and proceedings in writing, signed
by witnesses, so that no one can backout
from their decision at the end.192
In addition,
if a party has to approach the formal system
to get justice, then a written document is
helpful and saves time.193
Let’s examine how 2,400 male and female re-
spondents reacted to the question of recording
Jirga decisions.
Looking at the data, the majority of respon-
dents (65.4%) agreed with the notion that Jirga
decisions should be documented while only
16.6% disagreed. Some 18% were undecided.
190) Interviews with Jirgamaars in KP and Balochistan, March-April 2012
191) Interview with Nawab Ayaz Jogezai, Quetta, Balochistan, 30th April 2012
192) Ibid
Chapter11|Wayforward

142
The conclusion is quite clear; the people want
Jirga decisions to be recorded.
Jirga verdicts’ official implementation
In FATA there is a strong tribal structure and
social bonds, and, based on this solidarity,
local decision makers can enforce Jirga de-
cisions. Seldom are there instances when
disputants disobeyed such decisions.194
Fur-
thermore, the Jirga is also a traditional way of
accessing justice in FATA and decisions could
also be enforced through the State’s machin-
ery. The case of Jirgas in KP and Balochistan
is different; there is only social pressure to
enforce Jirga decisions.195
Disputants feel
insecure when it comes to enforcement of
Jirga decision.196
There are instances in KP and
Balochistan when the Jirga decisions have
been dishonoured and disputants, sometime,
ended up taking their cases to courts. 197
The survey question determined what per-
centage of respondents of KP and Baloch-
istan would agree/disagree on whether Jirga
decisions should be enforced with the help
of government authority. Majority (61.8%)
agreed while only 18.1% disagreed. There is
a considerable percentage of respondents,
20.1%, who did not know. Overall, the data
conveys that people believe that the official
government courts can be brought in to en-
force Jirga decisions.
The right to appeal to the Courts against Jirga
decisions
Since Jirga is not part of the State’s judicial
system therefore there is no such provision
available for the appellant to access courts af-
ter the Jirga decision. Those who are not con-
tent with the Jirga decision access the courts
and file a fresh case rather than submitting
194) Interviews with Key Informants in FATA – January 2010
195) Interviews with Key Informants in KP and Balochistan, March-April 2012

143
an appeal. However, Jirga decisions, if docu-
mented, could help the applicant by providing
some evidence when processing a case in the
formal courts.198
The survey question asked if
disputants for a Jirga have the right to appeal
against Jirga decisions. The majority (60.9%)
agreed and thought that it would be good
if the right to appeal were provided against
Jirga decisions. Only 18.6% did not agree with
this. Again, a fifth (20.5%) were undecided or
did not know.
Vetting of Jirga decisions by Human Rights
bodies
Generally, Jirga is perceived as an institution
parallel to State’s judicial system, which threatens
State’s authority.199
It challenges the State’s ability
to provide justice to all and has legitimised its ex-
istence due to numerous reasons.200
However, at
the same time, the Jirga is perceived as a system
that tends to violate Human Rights.201
Key Informants expressed that the Jirga is not
in compliance with the Constitution of Pakistan
and it tends to threaten the rule of law.202
Based on these opinions, the need to bring Jirga
under some regulation is the need of the hour.
Therefore, the survey asked the Pakhtun respon-
dents’ approval on setting up a Human Rights
Commission or entity, that should be mandated
to scrutinise every Jirga decision before the Jirga
announces it. According to the survey results
shown in the figure above, a high number of
respondents (45.6%) agreed while 17.5% did
not agree. More than one-third (36.9%) of the
respondents were not clear or did not know.
The conclusion is that setting up an appropriate
199) Interviews with Human Rights and Women Activists, March-April 2012
201) Interviews with Human Rights and Women Activists, March-April 2012
202) Interviews with lawyers and administration in KP and Balochistan, March-April 2012

144
Human Rights body for reviewing of decisions
would work and people will accept it.203
Women inclusion as observers
Under the principles of Pakhtunwali, women in
the tribal society are supposed to remain in the
sanctity of their homes at all times. Therefore,
when disputes arise, such as matrimonial and
child custody cases, women are not aware of
their rights and have no recourse to justice. If
tribal women are allowed to sit in Jirga pro-
ceedings as observers, they will be able to gain
knowledge regarding various tribal laws and
principles of justice. This would be a significant
step towards including the voice of women
in the Jirga proceedings. Key informants al-
leged that there are certain Jirgas in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan where women
are allowed to sit as observers. However, it is
essential to advocate for this with Nawabs and
Maliks (tribal leaders) in the region.
Respondents were asked whether women
should be given the right to sit in the Jirga pro-
ceedings. The graph below shows that 39.7%
agreed with the notion, including, 21.8% who
strongly agreed and 17.9% who somewhat
agreed. Whereas, 46.5% disagreed with the
Statement, including, 35.0% who strongly dis-
agreed and 11.5% who somewhat disagreed.
The response is encouraging, as the Pakhtun
tribal culture and the concept of Pardah (veil)
does not allow the participation of women
in the Jirga process as an observer alongside
men. The 39.7% who agreed with the presence
of women in Jirgas represents a change in the
local mindset which also may be attributed
to the increase in the level of education and
awareness in the region, it also illustrates the
possibility to change culture through aware-
ness and exposure to fundamental rights.
The cross tabulation of the data by gender,
showed that a majority of the female respon-
dents, 50% agreed and 42% disagreed, while only
28% of the male respondents agreed and 59%
disagreed with the notion. This shows that Pakh-
tun women are willing to sit in the Jirga as ob-
servers, however, the men and the Pakhtun code
are hindering this process. Therefore, it is essen-
tial to sensitize men on the fundamental rights of
women through education and awareness.
Women inclusion as decision-maker/Jirga
member
The reality is that the Jirga members or deci-
sion-makers are all men. This gender bias has
received criticism on the international and do-
mestic fronts, because it deprives women of the
right to participate and gain access to justice.204
However, one woman in the FGD suggested that
the representation of women in the Jirga system
could be in three different capacities: 1) as a
Jirgamaar, 2) as a party to the dispute, and 3) as
an observer.205
She explained that having female
representation in the Jirga is possible, because,
in her case, renowned tribal elders had asked
her to visit their villages and convene their
Jirgas. She believes that is because of the devel-
opmental work her organisation is undertaking
in their areas and also the respect given to her
old age.206
Furthermore, she offered that people
203) One would have to weigh this against the earlier findings that the people appreciated the speedy justice of the
Jirga and just what would the addition of such a commission mean in terms of speedy justice.
204) Key Informant Interview, Mariam Bibi, Peshawar, 16 April 2012
205) Ibid
206) Women Elders are respected females in most cultures

145
in the Pakhtun belt are drowning in their sorrow
and are no longer concerned whether their
saviour is a man or a woman.207
According to a
prominent tribal leader in Balochistan, women
should be asked about their basic rights. Indirect
representation of women should be ensured
in a Jirga, because without safeguarding the
rights of women, it is not possible to reform this
traditional justice system. He further explained
that if a Jirga is held in his presence, women are
given the opportunity to explain their views in
any disputes related to them.208
After the focus group discussion the survey
respondents were asked whether women
should be given representation in the Jirga as a
decision maker. In the graph given below are the
results: 38% agreed, including 22% who strongly
agree and 16% who somewhat agree, but 46.9%
disagreed, including 35.1% who strongly dis-
agree and 11.8% who somewhat disagree with
the notion. The results illustrate a willingness to
move towards inclusivity of women in the deci-
sion making process; but cultural and religious
sensitivities are still strong and conservative.
The difference between male and female
responses is quite revealing. When cross tab-
ulated by gender it is found that of females,
49.3% agreed and 33.1% disagreed that wom-
en should be part of the Jirga process, but only
26.9% of the male respondents agreed and a
majority (60.7%) disagreed with the idea of
female participation. Therefore, there is a dire
need to educate the people of Balochistan and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Inclusion of religious and ethnic minorities as
observers in the Jirga proceedings
Consultations with key stakeholders in the re-
gion deduced that minorities belonging to the
Pakhtun region resolve their disputes amongst
themselves and their cases are rarely heard by
the tribal Jirga. However, in conflicts between a
Pakhtun and religious or ethnic minorities, the
Jirga usually supports the Pakhtun and justice is
seldom served. Key informants were also of the
opinion that in such cases, the social status of
the disputant plays a significant role, as under-
privileged and vulnerable segment is often dis-
criminated against even by the police and formal
administration.209
Representing a different view,
a local Jirga elder in Quetta said, the principles
of justice are taken into account when resolving
such disputes and both parties (the religious mi-
nority and the Pakhtun) are given an opportunity
to plead their case in front of a Jirga.210
The data from the survey, see figure below,
exemplifies a positive disposition because the
majority of the respondents (59.9%) agreed,
including 39.3% who strongly agreed and 20.6%
who somewhat agreed. Whereas only 12.5%
disagreed, including 8.5% who strongly dis-
agreed and 4% who somewhat disagreed, with
the notion that religious and ethnic minorities
should be allowed to sit in the Jirga proceed-
ings. Keeping in view the results, one can anal-
yse that there is a potential for bringing reforms
to the Pakhtun Jirga system by providing more
space to the minorities. Involving minorities in
the Jirga proceedings will also make the tradi-
tional justice system acceptable to all.
207) Key Informant Interview, Mariam Bibi, Peshawar, April 2012
208) Key Informant Interview, Nawab Ayaz Jogzair, Quetta, May 2012
209) Key Informant Interview, Khizer Hyat, Peshawar, April 2012
210) Key Informant Interview, Nadir Khan Achakzai, Quetta, May 2012

146
Cross tabulation of the data by the level of
education illustrates that the more educated
respondents (secondary school and higher) sup-
ported the inclusivity of minorities in the Jirga
proceedings as compared to the respondents
with only primary education or lesser education.
This reaffirms the need for increased education
in the region.
Religious minorities should be given a fair
chance to resolve their disputes according to
their customs and religious beliefs
There is a consensus amongst all key infor-
mants that generally there is no interference
with religious minorities resolving their dis-
putes according to their own customs and
religious beliefs. Even though there is not a
significant composition of religious minorities
in the Pakhtun belt of Balochistan and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, they are still respected by the
locals and are not discriminated against.211
The general perception of the respondents
was the same as the Key Informants, that is,
majority (66.3%) agreed, including 46.5% who
strongly agreed and 19.8% somewhat agreed
that religious minorities should be given a fair
their customs and beliefs. Only 6.5%, including
3.4% who strongly disagreed and 3.1% who
somewhat disagreed, with the notion that re-
ligious minorities should be given a fair chance
to resolve their disputes according to their
customs and religious beliefs.
Election and not selection of Jirga members
In the first chapter and in subsequent sections
it has been explained how some notables can
become Jirga members or Jirgamaar or Jirgab-
aaz. There are several arguments that Jirga
members should be elected. However, the Jir-
ga institution is as old as Pakhtun society while
the system of democracy is new and has been
practiced in patches for the last few decades
in Pakistan, including KP and Balochistan. Jirga
members inherit their status from their fathers
211) Key Informant Interview, Esa Khan, Quetta, May 2012

147
and others gain this status due to their wisdom
and knowledge of culture and history. Further-
more, some Jirga members reach this status
due to their piety and welfare work that they
become recognised for in their communities.
However, the younger generation has a dif-
ferent mindset since they are brought up
in a democratic culture and practices, who
are now trying to take this power away from
their elders.212
Through the survey we tried to document how
many respondents approve of the idea of an
election process to select Jirga members. The
data seems to be quite supportive of the idea.
The majority (56.8%) agreed that Jirga mem-
bers should be elected rather than selected,
and only 17% did not agree. The 23.2% group
of respondents did not have an opinion or did
not know.
The results are encouraging and if Jirga mem-
bers are elected, it will show some level of
transparency and accountability. An electoral
process would also bring credibility to the sys-
tem, legitimise it, and, perhaps minimise the
level of criticism against it.
Sensitising Jirga members to Human Rights,
Women Rights, Shariah, and the Constitution
of Pakistan
CAMP has been conducting training to sensi-
tise Jirga elders on Human Rights, Women’s
Rights, Shariah and the Constitution of Pa-
kistan since the second phase of its Rule of
Law programme; it has trained over 400 tribal
elders and Mullahs from FATA. The pre and
post evaluation of the trainings found a sub-
stantial change in attitude towards the funda-
mental rights of women in the region. Many
tribal elders accepted that rights of women
were not taken into account when resolving
conflicts through the Jirga due to ignorance;
however they expressed their commitment to
change and to ensure that women’s rights are
not infringed upon by Jirga decisions.

148
Survey respondents were asked whether Jir-
ga members should be sensitised on Human
Rights, Women’s Rights, Shariah and the Con-
stitution of Pakistan. An overwhelming majori-
ty of the respondents (74.2%), including 58.8%
who strongly agreed and 15.4% who some-
what agreed; while 5.5% disagreed, including
3.2% who strongly disagreed and 2.3% who
somewhat agreed with the Statement that
Jirga members should be sensitised through
an educational programme on Human Rights,
Women’s Rights, Shariah and the Constitution
of Pakistan. The result is encouraging, espe-
cially for the organisations that are working on
educating and creating awareness regarding
fundamental rights in the region.
Cross tabulation by gender demonstrates that
the majority of females (66.4 %) and males
(79%) supported the Statement, whereas only
8.5% males and 2.3% females disagreed with
the notion. This shows the change in mindset
towards education and awareness, and the fact
that both genders accept the importance of
education of fundamental rights in the region.
Women Jirga for women’s issues
According to a Key Informant working in KP on
women’s rights, women belonging to rural Pa-
khtun areas prefer traditional system of dispute
resolution because they do not have access to
the formal courts. Furthermore, due to the harsh
treatment of the local police, there exists an
environment of fear when it comes to going to
the police and local police stations. Pakhtuns in
KP and FATA access local Jirga’s to resolve their
conflicts. However, in a country with a formal
court system and police, alternate judicial sys-
tems merely exist because the formal systems do
not provide justice.213
People are being forced to
access other instruments that dispense justice. In
response to this, the State must ensure that the
rule of law is extended to each and every corner
of Pakistan so that people can rely on an effective
and formal source of justice.214
Given the support
Pakhtun women give to the traditional justice
system, it is essential to ensure that women have
representation in the decision making process.215
Another Key Informant was of the opinion that
Pakhtun women can play a significant role in
dispute resolution if a platform were provided
to them. Therefore, women Jirgas can play an
effective role in resolving women-related conflict
in the region216
.
The survey asked this question of respondents
in KP and Balochistan, i.e., whether women
Jirga institutions should be formed to resolve
women related issues. The majority of the re-
spondents (59.6%), including 40.1% who strong-
ly agreed and 19.5% who somewhat agreed,
believed that women Jirga institutions should
be formed to resolve women’s issues. 24.3% of
the respondents were in disagreement with the
notion, including 17.1% who strongly disagreed
and 7.2% who somewhat disagreed.
Cross tabulation by gender showed that almost
half (49.5%) of the male respondents agreed
and 36.5% disagreed with forming women
Jirgas; while a majority (69.1%) of the female
respondents agreed and 12% disagreed with
establishing women Jirgas to resolve women
related disputes. The results demonstrate
213) Key Informant Interview, Mariam Bibi Peshawar, April 2012
214) Interview with Zubaida Noor, Noor Education Trust, Peshawar, 17 April 2012
215) Key Informant Interview, Shabina Ayaz, Peshawar, April 2012
216) Key Informant Interview, Mariam Bibi Peshawar, April 2012

149
the reluctance of the male respondents to
accept the need for women to have recourse
(towards justice), whereas the females believe
that in modern times and with progression of
education in the region, Pakhtun women can
advocate for themselves and their grievances
in front of a decision making body.
CAMP Initiative to change Jirga customs
CAMP decided to take a significant step forward
in the reform of the tribal justice system by
holding Jirgas in every agency in FATA to address
the core issue, which is criticised globally, ‘viola-
tion of the rights of women’ in the Jirga System.
In order to address this extremely multifaceted
task, CAMP gained the approval of the tribal
Maliks to hold these local, agency-wise Jirgas,
which included all the influential and prominent
Jirgamaars, Maliks and traditional Qazis from
every tribe of the region. In these local Jirgas,
facilitated by CAMP, the tribal elders banned dis-
criminatory traditional practices such as Swara,
Bride Price and Xhag, which have deprived
countless Pakhtun women of their fundamental
Human Rights. These local Jirgas also decided
the mode of punishment for these crimes ac-
cording to the tribal code in their agency.
Based on the agency-wide Jirgas, CAMP organ-
ised, on the 29th
of May 2012, a Grand Jirga
in the Jinnah Convention Centre in Islamabad,
where more than 800 Jirga members from all
of the agencies of FATA announced a ban on
these customary practices. The 800 Jirgamaars
included tribal elders and traditional Qazis
from all agencies and FRs of FATA. This case
study exemplifies the power and influence of
the Jirga to bring about reform in practices
that deprive the women in Pakhtun society of
their fundamental rights.
An overwhelming majority of the respondents
(80.3%) agreed that the Jirga system can be uti-
lised to bring positive reforms in customs, which
included 67.8% who strongly agreed and 12.5%
who somewhat agreed. Whereas, a mere 2.5%
disagreed with this suggestion, including 1.3%
who strongly disagreed and 1.2% who some-
what disagreed. The result demonstrates the
significance of the institution of Jirga in Pakhtun
culture even today and the role that it can play
in bringing positive change in local customs.
Therefore, in order to strengthen and reform
the tribal code and customs, it is essential to
engage the Jirga in this process.
Cross tabulation by gender exemplifies that
both male (81.7%) and female (78.9%) respon-
dents believed that the Jirga institution should
be utilised to reform tribal customs. Conversely,
3.8% of the male and 1.1% of the female re-
spondents were against the notion. The accep-
tance of this use of the Jirga format portrays
the social acceptability of a justice mechanism
by both genders that can work towards bringing
much needed social change in the region.
Role of Jirga in conflict transformation/res-
olution
In the conflict areas of FATA, KP and Balochistan,
Jirga could play a role in reconciling warlords
and warring communities. Historically, Jirga has
been very effective in resolving long-standing
disputes and has helped reconcile quarrel-
ling families and tribes, thus restoring peace.
However, the magnitude of the atrocities that
militant groups have committed in the region in
the name of Jihad, has left the informal justice
system helpless and ineffective. Under these
circumstances, Jirgas are unable to satisfy the
anger of the victims’ families and communities
who were terrorised; after the expulsion of the

150
Taliban from power in Afghanistan and the sub-
sequent US war on terror after 9/11. Those who
only supported militants politically or ideologi-
cally and did not take part in the actual armed
fight may have a chance to come back and be
reunited in their communities.217
However, for
those who are fighting and have committed
gross criminal acts and atrocities, it would be
very difficult to be reintegrated into the commu-
nity.218
Nonetheless, there should be some solu-
tion to this problem and it is perceived that Jirga
could play a role in reconciliation and conflict
transformation. 219
The researchers wanted to seek the respon-
dents’ views on the Jirgas role in conflict res-
olution. The survey result for this question is
encouraging when an overwhelming majority
(86.9%) agreed with the Statement that Jirga
should play its role in conflict transformation
while 1% did not agree, whereas, 12.2% did
not know.
After the successful military takeover of Swat
and Buner, the government of KP had formed
Aman (peace) Jirgas. The Aman Jirga itself is
involved in raising armed militia against mili-
tants, which in turn raises the risk for civil war
or conflict between two communities. This
could lead to a prolonged conflict.
Because the Jirga is an old tradition, which
has evolved through time and remained in
its original form, any effort to change its
form or spirit would be a mistake.220
Own-
ership of the Jirga by the local people in
its original form is important; however, its
mandate could be expanded. The role of
Jirga has always been conflict resolution and
peace building and it should remain so in the
218) Ibid
219) Ibid

151
current situation. The government should
partronise the Jirga, however it should not
be influenced by politics.
Role of Jirga in reducing militancy
Key informants were confident in arguing
that Jirgas have always played a role in
reducing armed violence within Pakhtun
communities and could have played its role
in reducing militancy. However, the militant
groups knew the strength of the Jirga and
therefore they inflicted severe blows to this
institution by targeting well known tribal
elders and bombing a few Jirga proceedings.
This may have weakened this Jirga tempo-
rarily because, the Jirga tradition contains
strong cultural roots and a long history of
survival. Therefore it will survive through this
difficult situation.221
The survey asked the respondents whether
Jirgas could play a role in reducing militancy
in Pakhtun areas. The results are very clear,
eight out of ten respondents agreed with the
Statement while just 1% disagreed. These
findings show the Pakhtuns’ strong belief
in the system for reducing militancy in their
areas, if given a chance.
Conclusion
The way forward is clear. The findings of this
research on systems of justice are encouraging,
but questions have been raised too. One thing
which is very clear from the research findings is
that Jirga needs to be reformed while leaving it
as an informal justice dispensation and media-
tion institution.
The findings indicate that there is support
for bringing change in the Jirga system. Men
are seen to be supportive of the inclusion of
women and minorities and respondents have
shown their willingness to bring in the element
of Human Rights, women’s rights and Shariah
while bringing Jirgas into compliance with the
Constitution of Pakistan and international Hu-
man Rights standards. In addition, the role of
Jirga in bringing peace to the region is being
supported and recommended to the govern-
ment of Pakistan.
The Pakhtun have also shown their resolve in
keeping the system in its original form – own-
ing it as a traditional dispute resolution system.
Integration of the Jirga into the formal justice
system in not supported much and Jirga imple-
mentation through official means is also not
supported by majority.
Another surprising aspect of Pakhtun opinion
is their overwhelming agreement on utilising
Jirgas to change unjust customs in their area.
This is something CAMP has applied when con-
vincing tribal elders to ban certain bad practic-
es against women’s rights in FATA .
The overall results are very encouraging and
there is sufficient evidence for the policy mak-
ers to take steps in bringing reforms in FATA
through educational programmes, providing in-
centives to the Jirga institution and assisting it
to come into comply with the laws of Pakistan
and International Human Rights standards.
221) Ibid

152
Research
methodology and
sample plan

153
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
AND SAMPLE PLAN
Introduction
The focus of the “Understanding Justice System
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA & Balochistan
the Pakhtun Perspective” research is the
opinion of Pakhtun people living in Balochistan
and KP, with regard to the systems of justice in
those Provinces. In 2010 similar research was
conducted among the Pakhtuns in FATA. In this
report comparisons between these provinces
and FATA will be presented.
The report is based on both qualitative and
quantitative data. For the qualitative informa-
tion, 24 focus-group discussions (half male and
half female) and 60 key informant interviews
were conducted to gather opinions. Minutes
were recorded, analysed and utilised to write
this report. Because the FGDs were used to
inform the design of the final survey question-
naire, not all of the questions in the survey
were asked or discussed in the focus groups.
Background and historical material used in the
report came from a review of historical books,
newspapers, reports, articles, journals, and the
experience from CAMP’s programmes.
The quantitative data was collected through
structured questionnaires. The objective was to
sample enough adult males and females, urban
and rural, to ascertain their opinion on key is-
sues related to Jirgas and the system of justice
for the people of KP and Balochistan with a 95%
confidence and interval of 2%. Because gender
plays such an important role in public opinion,
equal numbers of men and women interviewed
at all levels of community hierarchy, that is, in
each village, community and urban neighbor-
hood in eight districts of KP and four districts
of Balochistan among Pakhtun and non Baloch
population. The sample goal was 2,400 males
and females, and to accomplish that, using a
trustworthy system of substitution, over 3,600
sample contacts were made. Although there
may be slightly unequal proportion of males and
females in each district due to seasonal migra-
tion and immigration of males, plus the cultural
tendency to keep women away from work, an
exact sample based on gender is not possible
because current statistics are not available. It is
assumed that the unknown deviation from the
actual male/female proportion is slight and that
it will not cause doubt about the conclusions
and descriptive statistics herein.
Research Methods and Instruments
Qualitative
Focus-group discussions (FGDs)
The organisation of the 24 focus-groups, as
a qualitative research tool, was planned to
document the opinion of key informants. All
sections of the KP and Balochistan society
were included in these discussions. Partici-
pants were chosen so that they would have
diverse political, social, technical and religious
backgrounds. They were also chosen because
they were respected people within their
circles. The technique was to provide all of
the informants with substantial opportunity
to express their viewpoints so that they would
help provide informed and representative
perspectives on key issues related to the Pa-
khtun Jirga in KP and Balochistan. An average
of nine participants attended each FGD. A
total of 24 FGDs were held as per the follow-
ing plan:
ResearchMethodologyandSamplePlan

154
Key Informant Interviews
60 key informant interviews (KIIs) were con-
ducted in 12 districts representative of the
two provinces to inform and complement
data collected in the FGD and the quantita-
tive surveys. The purpose of the key inform-
ant interviews was to collect information
from a wide range of people—community
leaders or elders, lawyers, religious leaders,
teachers and civil society professionals who
have firsthand knowledge about the commu-
nity and Jirgas in general. A total of 60 key
informant interviews were conducted in KP
and Balochistan Province as per the follow-
ing plan.
Desk review
To understand historical background of the
people and the area; facts about the govern-
ance system of KP and Balochistan, consti-
tutional standing of the two provinces; and
formal and informal justice systems in KP and
Balochistan a desk review was conducted us-
ing books, newspapers, reports, articles, jour-
nals, and CAMP’s experience in prior research
and project implementation.
Themes for the qualitative discussions (FGDs)
and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)
The following themes were used to focus the
interviews on the research subject: Awareness
of formal and informal justice systems; conflict
S.# District Province Male FGD Female FGD
1. Peshawar KP 05-May-12 05-May-12
2. Swat KP 04-May-12 04-May-12
3. Swabi KP 30-Apr-12 30-Apr-12
4. Charsadda KP 30-Apr-12 30-Apr-12
5. D.I. Khan KP 02-May-12 02-May-12
6. Dir Lower KP 05-May-12 05-May-12
7. Buner KP 02-May-12 02-May-12
8. Batagram KP 04-May-12 04-May-12
9. Quetta Balochistan 07-May-12 07-May-12
10. Loralai Balochistan 08-May-12 08-May-12
11. Qilla Abdullah Balochistan 09-May-12 09-May-12
12. Zhob Balochistan 11-May-12 11-May-12
S.# District Province Community
Elder
Lawyer Religious
Leader
Teacher Civil Society
Member
1. Peshawar KP 1 1 1 1 1
2. Swat KP 1 1 1 1 1
3. Swabi KP 1 1 1 1 1
4. Charsadda KP 1 1 1 1 1
5. D.I. Khan KP 1 1 1 1 1
6. Dir Lower KP 1 1 1 1 1
7. Buner KP 1 1 1 1 1
8. Batagram KP 1 1 1 1 1
9. Quetta Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1
10. Loralai Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1
11. Qilla Abdullah Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1
12. Zhob Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1
Total 12 12 12 12 12

155
dynamics and access to justice; legality and le-
gitimacy of formal and informal justice systems;
hearings and proceedings used in the informal
justice system; hearings and proceedings used
in Jirgas; implementation of Jirga verdicts; the
state of fundamental rights in the Jirga system;
the state of rights of children and youth in the
Jirga system; the state of rights of women in the
Jirga system and Swara; and the inclusion of
women in the Swara decision-making process.
Quantitative
In addition to a well structured questionnaire,
the key to successful social research is in the
sampling frame. If well designed, then the
population and segments will be represented
by a manageable number of interviews. The
objective was to sample 12 districts of KP and
Balochistan with a sample size so that the mar-
gin of error would be small. The desired margin
of error for the whole of KP and the Pakhtun
areas of Balochistan was 2%. This margin of
error, in reference to the selected 12 districts
with an estimated population of approximately
9.42 million, called for a sample of 2,400
interviews.
The sample size of 2400 was drawn from the 12
districts of KP and Balochistan. The sample per
district used Proportionate Stratified Sampling
Method (PSSM), and to ensure a representative
sample for the entire population as well as each
district is as per the following table:
Thus, based on the use of small samples per
district, it is possible to make inferences about
the sampled population which is, in this case,
the people of KP and the Pakhtuns of Balo-
chistan within the planned margin of error.
Margin of Error
The overall margin of error with all interviews
pooled under “people of KP and the Pakhtun of
Balochistan” for single questions of a “Yes/No”
nature was planned to not exceed 2% at the
95% confidence level. That is, if a random sam-
ple were drawn 100 times, then in 95% of the
cases, one would expect there to be 2% plus or
minus difference around a sample mean. That
being said, once one begins to partition the
data set and look at specific districts of KP or
Balochistan, then, within those units, the mar-
gin of error increases because of the smaller
population size and sample size. The right-hand
column in the table above summarizes the
margin of error by district.
Sampling Plan and Field Implementation
Accessibility
District Province Population (1998
Census)
Sample Size Margin of Error
Buner KP 506048 129 8.6
Batagram KP 307278 78 11.1
Charsadda KP 1022364 260 6.1
D.I.Khan KP 852995 218 6.6
Dir Lower KP 717649 183 7.2
Peshawar KP 2026851 516 4.3
Swabi KP 1026804 262 6.1
Swat KP 1257602 320 5.5
8-Districts KP 7717591 1966 2.2

Lora lai Balochistan 297555 76 11.2
Qilla Abdullah Balochistan 370269 94 10.1
Quetta Balochistan 759941 194 7.0
Zhob Balochistan 275142 70 11.7
4-Districts Balochistan 1702907 434 4.7
12-Districts 9420498 2400 2.0
222) Note that for smaller samples of smaller populations, the margin of error increases.
223) Current population statistics for KPK and Balochistan are not available; it was assumed that the 1998 census
figures would be accurate enough.

156
At the beginning of this project, CAMP
gathered information on the accessible areas
within KP and Balochistan by making a list of
villages, towns and Tehsils that were not acces-
sible because of security concerns, government
imposed curfews, and/or extreme weather
conditions. That list was removed from the
master list of approximately 1180 villages and
urban locations of the master list across KP and
Balochistan, 270 (23%) of which were located
in inaccessible areas. The 360 villages and ur-
ban locations sampled came from the remain-
ing 910 villages and urban locations.
Two stages were used to select the sample. In
the first stage, CAMP randomly selected among
the accessible tehsils. In the second stage
CAMP randomly selected 360 villages/towns
in the tehsils that were selected in the first
stage. In addition to the evenly divided male
to female ratio, the second stage was planned
so that both urban and rural locations were
sampled 50/50 and not according to the rural/
urban population distribution.
In each village and urban location, 5 interviews
of males and females were conducted. Because
of the culture of the region female enumera-
tors interviewed women, and male enumera-
tors interviewed men.
The resulting sampling frame is shown in the
following table:
Bias due to Inaccessibility:
As pointed out in the description of the
selection of villages, access to all villages was
limited due to the conflict and the threat of
violence. Thus, the sample was biased towards
more peaceful areas of each district of KP and
Balochistan in general. One would expect,
therefore, that by not being able to include
people in the conflict areas that there is a bias
in the conclusions. Unfortunately, except for
the former IDPs, we do not know which way
the opinion of those areas would swing the
results. Inaccessible villages totalled 23% of the
approximately 1180 villages/towns in KP and
Balochistan. Unfortunately, the characteristics
of those unsampled villages are not known,
but one could assume that they were the
more rural and remote villages and that would
change the demographics and cultural perspec-
tive of the survey. We do not know how the
practice of Jirga and the resulting perception
of the process of justice are influenced in the
context of conflict.
SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES:
Method of selecting starting points
In villages, the survey universe was divided
into four areas i.e. two for male enumerators
and two for female enumerators. In each area,
two starting points were selected by male and
two by female enumerators. Male and female
enumerators interviewed three respondents
from one point and two from the other point.
These starting points were local landmarks such
as Hujra of a prominent Malik, popular shops,
mosque, Imam Bargah of Shia community,
schools and hospitals, etc. From each point, the
enumerators (both male and female) would in-
District Province Sampling frame
Total Rural Urban
Buner KP 129 65 64
Batagram KP 78 39 39
Charsadda KP 260 130 130
Dera Ismail Khan KP 218 109 109
Dir Lower KP 183 91 91
Peshawar KP 516 258 258
Sawabi KP 262 131 131
Swat KP 320 160 160
Lora lai Balochistan 76 38 38
Qilla Abdullah Balochistan 94 47 47
Quetta Balochistan 194 97 97
Zhob Balochistan 70 35 35
12-Districts 2400 1200 1200

157
terview five respondents. In urban city or town,
five respondents, male or female were inter-
viewed with two starting points for each urban
location. In the city or town, male and female
enumerators were assigned different urban
locations for interviewing respondents.
After the selection of the starting points, the
male enumerators selected a household on
their left hand while female enumerators
selected a household on their right hand. In
some areas where the houses were scattered
and this rule could not be applied precisely, the
survey enumerators made note of the difficulty
on the contact sheet.
Bias due to “Starting Point” Methodology:
As stated above, the starting points in each
village/town were local landmarks such as
Hujra of a prominent Malik, popular shops, and
mosque, Imam Bargah in Shia communities,
schools and hospitals. From each point the
enumerators (both male and female) would in-
terview five respondents by counting off every
third door or compound. This approach biased
the sample toward the centre of villages. Typi-
cally, the wealthy or more established families
are located at these locations (for example, the
Hujra) or in close proximity. These would be
the more urban and educated citizens of the
community and their status probably influenc-
es statistics such as literacy, the use of media
and educational status when compared to a
general population in those same villages and,
of course, other parts of Pakistan.
Method of respondent selection
Before selecting the interviewees, the enumera-
tors made sure that the respondents were 18
years old or above, that they were Pakistani
nationals belonging to KP and Balochistan, and
were from the district and from that particular
village or urban location. The survey enumera-
tors also ensured that the respondents had not
participated in any survey in the last six months.
Guidelines for replacing respondents (substi-
tution)
During the respondents’ selection, if a desired
respondent was not available or refused to be
interviewed, the enumerator would try three
times to interview the designated sampled
household. If the interview was refused or the
three attempts did not work, then the enu-
merator would skip three houses and knock at
the forth house for a substitute.
The substitution system was a crucial part of this
research. As is shown in the final table of this
annex, in order to achieve the sample of 2,400
interviewees, 3,614 contacts had to be made for
various reasons, while 1,208 of the randomly
selected interviewees did not meet the criteria.
In summary, the overall sampling design was
robust and limited the margin of error for KP
and Pakhtun areas of Balochistan statistics.
When specific districts are noted, the margin
of error in the table above must be considered.
Overall, the urban and accessibility biases must
be kept in mind when reviewing the findings.
Questionnaire
In 2012, CAMP used a structured questionnaire
with both open and close response possibilities
to replicate the methodology used for 2011
Jirga Perception Survey in FATA. After consul-
tation with the donor, the previous question-
naires were revised for use in the 2012 Jirga
Perception Survey in KP and Balochistan.
Interviewer training
Prior to conducting the survey, CAMP enumer-
ators were trained by independent consultants,
under the supervision of CAMP senior manage-
ment who observed the training and pre-test
interviews. The training for KP field enumera-
tors and supervisors on the quantitative survey
tool, methodology and pre-testing was con-
ducted on 02-03 April 2012 and for Balochistan
was conducted on 12-13 April 2012.
The purpose of the pre-testing was to:
• Determine the length of time of the
interview
• Check questionnaire content
• Check the skipping and coding patterns
• Correct and improve translation
The pre-tests were conducted with adult Paki-
stani males and females aged 18 and above in
the Pakhtun community of Islamabad suburbs on
4 April 2012. The average time of the interview
during the pre-tests was 50 minutes. The mini-
mum time taken to complete the interview was
40 minutes while the maximum time taken to
complete the interview was 60 minutes. Hence,
the general understanding of the enumerators
on the questionnaire was found to be adequate
and satisfactory. The enumerators were able
to handle the questionnaire well and they read
the questions to the respondents as written on
the questionnaire without introduction of bias.
Enumerators were also able to comply with

158
the field methodology for data collection. Their
understanding of the house skipping pattern
and following the left hand/right hand rule was
also at par. The supervisors were able to manage
the field supervision through different checking
methods. Feedback related to the substance and
structure of the questionnaire was shared with
the senior management of CAMP.
Data entry and cleaning
Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP
did the data entry of the 2400 questionnaires
using a database entry program. The data was
then checked and cleaned using SPSS.
Survey Management and Monitoring
The CAMP Project Coordinator (PC) coordinat-
ed the survey with the Survey Manager (SM),
based in the Peshawar regional office. CAMP’s
PC and SM coordinated the initial training of
the enumerators, the pre-tests, and the field
implementation. During the implementation
of the survey, CAMP’s head office regularly fol-
lowed up with the PC and his SM at CAMP’s re-
gional office in Peshawar. The regional office, in
turn, coordinated closely with the field teams
to monitor the progress of the survey as well
as to make sure that the survey and sampling
plan were being implemented properly.
Description of field team
1. The enumerators were from the areas
in which they conducted interviews.
2. The content of the questionnaire
focused mainly on Pakhtun Jirga, and
respondents appeared willing and
happy to participate in this study.
3. Because the sampling plan was based
on the feedback received from the field
teams, the areas where these inter-
views took place were relatively safe
and accessible for the enumerators.
Back-checking and method of contact
The table below provides a breakdown of the
number of questionnaires back-checked per
agency. Back-checking was done by CAMP’s five
field offices in FATA as well as from the CAMP re-
gional office in Peshawar. The following table is a
summary by type of back-checking derived from
the contact sheets used by the enumerators:
Back-checking of the data collection process
was done through different methods. 8.2% of
the total interviews were personally observed
by the supervisors during the interviews, 7.0%
were back-checked by the supervisors during
data collection process by revisiting the villages
and confirming the respondents, their family
members, or locals, and 6.1% of the interviews
were back-checked and confirmed by tel-
ephone contacts from the CAMP regional office
in Peshawar. A total of 21.3% of the interviews
were back-checked for quality control. All the
back checked interviews were confirmed by
the respondents. This confirm the validity of
the interviews that were conducted.
Contact Sheet and Response Rate:
Successful Interviews / Successful Contact as
per Specification
District Sample
Back Checked
Personally
Back Checked
on Telephone
Accompani-
ments
Total Interviews
with Quality Control
Swat 320 19 20 34 73
Swabi 262 10 10 36 56
Peshawar 516 21 56 16 93
Charsadda 260 13 6 12 31
Batagram 78 7 6 0 13
DI Khan 218 16 5 35 56
Buner 129 5 4 4 13
Dir Lower 183 13 0 11 24
Qilla Abdullah 94 16 8 8 32
Loralai 76 10 9 15 34
Zhob 70 13 7 10 30
Quetta 194 25 15 15 55
Total 2400 168 146 196 510
Percentage 7.0 6.1 8.2 21.3

159
Conclusion
The methods selected produced both the
quantitative and the qualitative information
desired for ascertaining the opinions of the
people of KP and Pakhtun areas of Balochistan.
Although compromises or assumptions had
to be made due to a lack of current statistics
and also because of the accessibility issue,
the sampling frame was executed and this
provided the confidence intervals and margin
of error desired. When interpreting the results,
it is important to keep the accessibility and the
starting point biases in mind. The knowledge
of bias is crucial to the rational interpretation
of the apparent opinions; it is not a weakness
such as hidden bias.
S.#
District
SampleSize
NoResponse/
DoorLocked
Refusedto
Cooperate
AgeNotRe-
quired
GenderNot
Required
Nationality
NotRequired
Interrupted
Interview
Successful
Interview
TotalContacts
1. Swat 320 84 59 46 17 6 3 320 535
2. Swabi 262 33 21 10 6 0 1 262 333
3. Peshawar 516 109 92 39 58 26 1 516 841
4. Charsadda 260 7 8 6 6 4 0 260 291
5. Batagram 78 0 14 1 0 1 2 78 96
6. D I Khan 218 11 69 7 18 11 13 218 347
7. Buner 129 46 45 5 3 0 0 129 228
8. Dir Lower 183 11 9 12 11 3 1 183 230
9. Quetta 194 19 47 38 10 32 1 194 341
10. Qilla Abdullah 94 9 16 2 2 0 3 94 126
11. Lora Lai 76 19 16 2 16 7 0 76 136
12. Zhob 70 4 13 13 0 4 0 76 110
2400 352 409 181 147 94 25 2406 3614
Percentage 9.7 11.3 5.0 4.1 2.6 0.7 66.6

161
Questionnaire
Jirga Research STudy
March 2012
Serial Number: Date of Interview:
Province:
District:
Urban/Rural:
City/Village Name:
Area Name:
Male/Female:
Supervisor Name:
Surveyor Name: Questionnaire

162
1: Sources of Information
Q1: What sources of information do you have access to? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate
box) - Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code
Pakistani Newspapers 1 Friends & family 10
Pakistani radio 2 Work colleagues 11
Pakistan TV 3 Neighbours 12
British Newspapers 4 Friday sermon 13
British TV channels 5 Communal gathering 14
British radio 6 Government officials 15
American Newspapers 7 Tribal elders 16
American radio 8 Other (specify) 77
Internet, books and films 9 Don’t know 88
Q2:Which sources of information do you trust the most? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate
Pakistani Newspapers 1 Internet, books and films 10
Pakistani radio 2 Friends & family 11
Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues 12
British Newspapers 4 Neighbours 13
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon 14
British radio 6 Communal gathering 15
American Newspapers 7 Government officials 16
American TV 8 Tribal elders 17
American radio 9 Other (specify) 77
Q3: Which newspapers do you read regularly? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box) -
Multiple responses are allowed)
Daily Ausaf 1 Daily Pakistan 13
Daily Times 2 The Post 14
The Dawn 3 Daily Aaj Kal 15
The Frontier Post 4 Daily Aaj 16
Daily Jang 5 Daily Mashriq 17
Daily Khabrain 6 Daily Wahdat 18
The Nation 7 UK newspapers 19
Daily Nawa-e-Waqt 8 Afghan newspapers 20
The News 9 Do Not Read Newspapers 21
Observer 10 Other (specify) 77
The Statesman 11 Don’t know 88
Daily Express 12
Q4: What television stations do you watch regularly? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate
Aaj 1 BBC 14
ARY News 2 CNN 15
Geo News 3 Sky News 16
Dunya News 4 ARY Digital 17
Samma 5 Geo Entertainment 18
Express News 6 AVT 19

163
Din 7 PTV 20
Dawn News 8 Hum 21
CNBC 9 Star 22
Waqt 10 Century TV 23
Bolan 11 Geo Super 24
ATV Khyber 12 Do Not watch TV 25
Al Jazeera 13 Other (specify) 77
Q5: Which radio stations do you listen to regularly? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box)
- Multiple responses are allowed)
BBC Pushto 1 FM 103 10
BBC Urdu 2 FM 104 Buraq 11
BBC English 3 FM 106 12
Dewa (Voice of America) 4 Miranshah, 1593 KHZ 13
Radio Pakistan 5 Khyber Agency 91 MHZ 14
RADIO Pak MW 6 Razmak 1584 KHZ 15
FM 88 Lakki 7 Do Not Listen Radio 16
FM 100 8 Other (specify) 77
FM 101 9 Don’t know 88
2. Awareness of the institutions and actors
Q6: Are you aware of the following institutions and actors? (Multiple-choice question)
Name of Institution / Actor Yes No Don’t Know
a) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 1 2 88
b) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 1 2 88
c) Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts 1 2 88
d) Federal Shariat Court 1 2 88
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris and other registered Madaris) 1 2 88
f) Ombudsman 1 2 88
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 1 2 88
h) Jirga system or other informal dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g. Taliban
Shura)
1 2 88
i) Police Department 1 2 88
j) Nizam-e-Adl Courts (Malakand Division Only) 1 2 88
k) Musalihati Council 1 2 88
Q7: What is your opinion/perception of the following institutions and actors? Perceptions of
Institutions and Actors – Codes: Affordable (01) Speedy (02) Bribes (03) Influence Peddling (04)
Unresponsive to Criticism (05) Ignores Human Rights (06) Gender Equality (07) Class Bias (8) Don’t
know (99). (Multiple-choice question)
Name of Institution / Actor
Affordable
Speedy
Bribes
InfluencePed-
dling
Unresponsiveto
Criticism
IgnoresHuman
Rights
GenderEquality
ClassBias
Don’tknow
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local
representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court
and High Courts) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate,
District & Sessions Courts) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
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164
d) Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
e) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
f) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul
Madaris or other registered Madaris) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
g) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88
h) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88
i) Informal dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g.
Jirga, Shura, respected elder(s), or other
influential person(s) in your family/community) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
j) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
k) Police Department or their local
representatives 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
l) Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
m) Musalihati Council 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
n) Taliban Shura 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88
3. linkages between formal and informal justice systems
3.1 conflict dynamics and access to justice
Q8: Do you have the following institutions in your community/area? (Multiple-choice response is
allowed)
Response Code
a) Local Jirga 1
b) Aman Jirga 2
c) District Administration and police 3
d) Formal courts (Supreme Court, High Court, Session Court etc) 4
e) Taliban Shura 5
f) Qazi courts (Nizam-e-Adl) (Malakand Division Only 6
g) Musalihati Anjuman 7
h) Other (specify) 77
i) Don’t know 88
Q9: Who do you first contact in case of any conflict or dispute? (Single Response)
Response Code
a) Local Jirga 1
b) Aman Jirga 2
e) Taliban Shura 5
f) Qazi courts (Nizam-e-Adl) (Malakand Division Only) 6
h) Do not contact anyone 8
i) Other (specify) 77
j) Don’t Know 88
Q10: What are the main issues that instigate conflict in your community? (Multiple-choice
response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Cultivated land 1
b) Distribution of water sources (Warabandi) 2
c) Neighborhood (position of shared wall, property, etc) 3
d) Political violence 4
e) Grazing animals 5
f) Sectarian 6

165
g) Family issues (forced marriages, divorce, child custody, shared property, wedding expenses) 7
h) Youth/children quarrelling and fighting 8
i) Family honour issues 9
j) Tribal clashes 10
k) Tribal customs such as Swara, Bride prize and Xhag 11
l) Militancy 12
m) Terrorism 13
n) Unequal distribution of aid 14
o) Theft/robbery 15
p) Murder/homicide 16
q) Other (specify) 77
Q11: Have you or your household members experienced any of the following? (Multiple-choice
Issues Yes No Don’t Know No Response
a) Victim of theft or fraud 1 2 88 99
b) Victim of assault 1 2 88 99
c) Victim of domestic abuse 1 2 88 99
d) Victim of forced marriage 1 2 88 99
e) Victim of tribal customs such as Swara, Bride prize
and Xhag
1 2 88 99
f) Family member has gone missing or disappeared 1 2 88 99
g) Arrested without warrant by the administration or
police
1 2 88 99
h) Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1 2 88 99
i) Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault (under
the Hudood Ordinances or the Pakistan Penal
Code)
1 2 88 99
j) Accused of committing any other crime 1 2 88 99
k) Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the political
administration
1 2 88 99
l) Bribery by police, Khasadar or levies force 1 2 88 99
m) Assault or torture by FC or Army 1 2 88 99
n) Money Recovery, or Debt/Obligation Settlement 1 2 88 99
o) Contract enforcement in business dealings 1 2 88 99
p) Purchase or sale of movable property 1 2 88 99
q) Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc. 1 2 88 99
r) Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child
custody, guardianship, inheritance
1 2 88 99
s) Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 1 2 88 99
t) Debt bondage 1 2 88 99
u) Found involved in sectarian violence 1 2 88 99
v) Found involved in tribal/family clashes 1 2 88 99
w) Injured in an accident (motor vehicle, etc) 1 2 88 99
Instruction: If respondent experienced any then ask Q12, 13 and 14 otherwise move to Q15.
Q12: If yes, which of the following justice systems did you access for resolving your conflict/
dispute? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Local Jirga 1
b) Aman Jirga 2
e) Taliban Shura 5
f) Qazi courts (Nizam-e-Adl) (Malakand Division Only) 6
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166
h) Do not contact anyone 8
Q13: What were the reasons for choosing the justice systems to deal with the dispute?
(Multiple-choice response is allowed) – provide response for each mentioned in Q12.
Response Code
a) Efficient and effective at resolving the dispute 01
b) Close to where I live 02
c) Fair and trusted 03
d) Follows accepted local norms/values 04
e) Less expensive 05
f) Less corrupt 06
g) Speedy 07
h) Other (Specify: __________ ) 77
Q14: How satisfied were you with their involvement?
Response
Very Sat-
isfied
Somewhat
Satisfied
Somewhat
Unsatisfied
Not Satis-
fied
Don’t
know
a) Local Jirga 1 2 3 4 88
b) Aman Jirga 1 2 3 4 88
c) District Administration and police 1 2 3 4 88
d) Formal courts (Supreme Court,
High/Session Courts) 1
2 3 4 88
e) Ant-terrorism court 1 2 3 4 88
f) Taliban Shura 1 2 3 4 88
g) Qazi courts (Nizam-e-Adl) (Malakand
Division Only) 1
2 3 4 88
h) Musalihati Anjuman 1 2 3 4 88
i) Other (specify) 1 2 3 4 88
Q15: Generally, who solves the conflict/dispute that arises in your community/area? (Single
Response)
Response Code
a) Local Jirga 1
b) Aman Jirga 2
e) Taliban Shura 5
i) Don’t know 88
Q16: Where would you refer your severe criminal dispute (Murder/Theft/Robbery etc) for
resolution? (Single Response)
Response Code
a) Local Jirga 1
b) Aman Jirga 2
e) Taliban Shura 5

167
i) Don’t know 88
Q17: Where would you refer your civil dispute (Land Disputes/Divorce etc) for resolution?
(Single Response)
Response Code
a) Local Jirga 1
b) Aman Jirga 2
e) Taliban Shura 5
i) Don’t know 88
Q18: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the formal courts (Supreme Court, High
Court, Session Court etc)? Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) All cases 1
b) All cases of public interest 2
c) Only complex cases that the informal systems could not solve 3
d) All cases of crime 4
e) Cases concerning land or other property 5
f) Certain family cases like divorce 6
g) None 7
i) Don’t know 88
Q19: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the Jirga? Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) All cases 1
e) Cases concerning land property 5
g) None 7
i) Don’t know 88
Q20: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the Nizam-e-Adl Qazi courts? (Malakand
Division Only) Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) All cases 1
g) None 7
i) Don’t know 88
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168
Q21: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the Musalihati Anjuman? (Multiple-choice
Response Code
a) All cases 1
g) None 7
i) Don’t know 88
Q22: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the Taliban Shura? Multiple-choice
Response Code
a) All cases 1
g) None 7
i) Don’t know 88
Q23: What is your understanding of Access to Justice? Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Right to fair and just trial 1
b) Access to justice for all, specially women and vulnerable groups (minorities etc) 2
c) Proper hearing, trial and remedies against grievances. 3
d) Other (specify) 77
e) Don’t know 88
Q24: To what extent do you think there has been Access to Justice in your district/area?
Response Code
Not at all 1
To a moderate extent 2
To a large extent 3
Don’t know 88
Q25: What categories of individuals/groups do not have Access to Justice in your district/area
under the formal justice system such as the Supreme Court, High Courts and Lower Courts?
(Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Women 1
b) Minorities 2
c) Low cast groups and poor 3
d) Disabled 4
e) Other (specify) 77
f) Don’t know 88

169
Q26: What categories of individuals/groups do not have access to justice in your district/area
under informal justice system such as Jirga? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Women 1
b) Minorities 2
c) Low cast groups and poor 3
d) Disabled 4
e) Other (specify) 77
f) Don’t know 88
Q27: Other than the formal justice system, are there other informal structures like NGOs,
religious institutions, traditional ones concerned with increasing access to justice for various
groups of people?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q28: What are the reasons for limited access to formal justice? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Time consuming and cases not expedited 1
b) Legal aid department understaffed 2
c) Inaccessible legal aid (Criminally abused have no support, inaccessible legal aid) 3
d) Accused overstay without trial due to lack of understanding of their legal rights 4
e) High Legal fees of lawyers out 5
f) Not all cases reported 6
g) Long distance, high cost of lawyers and court fees, lack of legal aid 7
h) High level of corruption affects access to justice 8
i) Justice structures concentrated in towns 9
j) Not aware of how to access justice by those in remote areas 10
k) Widespread confusion about the legal system 11
l) Other (specify) 77
m) Don’t know 88
Q29: What are the reasons for limited access to informal justice mechanisms? (Multiple-choice
Response Code
a) Informal systems lacks authority to implement its decisions 1
b) Members of informal systems are not qualified to resolve some complex disputes 2
c) Informal systems are inaccessible for women 3
d) Informal systems are inaccessible for minorities 4
e) Sometime members of informal systems take bribes 5
f) Members of informal systems are biased at times 6
g) Sometime their solutions are unsustainable 7
h) No precedents of previous decisions 8
j) Don’t know 88
3.2 Legality and legitimacy of formal and informal justice systems
Q30: For the following systems please indicate your level of trust in them for dispensing justice.
Response Very
Trusted
Somewhat
Trusted
Somewhat
Untrusted
Very Un-
trusted
DK
a) Formal justice system (supreme
Court/High Court/Session Court etc)
01 02 03 04 88
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170
b) Jirga system 01 02 03 04 88
c) Aman Jirga 01 02 03 04 88
d) Taliban Shura 01 02 03 04 88
e) Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only) 01 02 03 04 88
f) Musalihati Council 01 02 03 04 99
Q31: For the following systems please indicate how effective they are for dispensing justice.
Response Very ef-
fective
Somewhat
Effective
Somewhat
Ineffective
Very Inef-
fective
DK
01 02 03 04 88
c) Aman Jirga 01 02 03 04 88
Q32: For the following systems please indicate how fair they are for resolving disputes..
Response Very
Fair
Somewhat
Fair
Somewhat
Unfair
Very
Unfair
DK
a) Formal justice system (supreme Court/High
Court/Session Court etc)
01 02 03 04 88
c) Aman Jirga 01 02 03 04 88
Q33: For the following systems please identify how free and fair trial the trials are for both the
parties?
Response To a large
extent
To some
extent
Not at some
extent
Not at all Don’t
Know
a) Formal justice system (supreme Court/
High Court/Session Court etc)
01 02 03 04 88
c) Aman Jirga 01 02 03 04 88
Q34: Please evaluate the following systems with regard to their level of compliance with
International Human Rights standards?
Response To a large
extent
To some ex-
tent
Not at some
extent
Not at all Don’t
Know
Court/High Court/Session
Court etc)
01 02 03 04 88
c) Aman Jirga 01 02 03 04 88
e) Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand
Division Only)
01 02 03 04 88

171
Q35: Please evaluate the following systems with regard to their level of compliance with
Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan?
Response To a large
extent
To some
extent
Not at some
extent
Not at all Don’t
Know
01 02 03 04 88
c) Aman Jirga 01 02 03 04 88
3.3 Hearing and proceedings of the informal justice system
Q36: How long has that informal justice system been operating in your community/area?
Response 0-5 Years 5-25
Years
25-50
Years
50 +
Years
Don’t know
a) Local Jirga 1 2 3 4 88
b) Aman Jirga 1 2 3 4 88
c) Musalihati Anjuman 1 2 3 4 88
Q37: What is the composition of the informal justice system in your community/area? – Who
are the members? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Tribal maliks/elders 1
b) Influential, rich and political leadership 2
c) Councillors of the Union Councils 3
d) Religious leaders 4
e) Civil society members 5
f) Other (specify) 77
Q38: Do women have representation in informal justice system?
Response Yes No Don’t know
a) Jirga system 01 02 88
b) Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only) 01 02 88
c) Musalihati Council 01 02 88
d) Taliban Shura 01 02 88
Q39: Do ethnic non-Pakhtuns have representation in informal justice system?
Jirga system 01 02 88
Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only) 01 02 88
Musalihati Council 01 02 88
Taliban Shura 01 02 88
Q40: Do ethnic religious minorities (Christians, Sikhs and Hindus) have representation in
informal justice system?
Jirga system 01 02 88
Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only) 01 02 88
Musalihati Council 01 02 88
Taliban Shura 01 02 88
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172
Q41: Are members of the following systems elected/selected/nominated by the community?
Response Elected Selected Nominated Don’t Know
a) Jirga system 01 02 03 88
b) Nizam-e-Adl (Malakand Division Only) 01 02 03 88
c) Musalihati Council 01 02 03 88
d) Taliban Shura 01 02 03 88
Q42: What are the criteria for membership in the Jirga system? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Member should belong to a respected family 1
b) Member should have wisdom of local culture and history, inherited from his forefathers 2
c) Member should have a good reputation in his community 3
d) Member should have formal education 4
e) Member should have religious education 5
f) Member should have legal education 6
g) Member should be known for his piety 7
h) Member should have a political back-up 8
j) Don’t Know 88
Q43: What are the criteria for membership in the Nizam-e-Adl? (Multiple-choice response is
allowed) (Malakand Division Only)
Response Code
j) Don’t Know 88
Q44: What are the criteria for membership in the Musalihati Anjuman? (Multiple-choice
Response Code
j) Don’t Know 88
Q45: What are the criteria for membership to the Taliban Shura? (Multiple-choice response is
allowed)
Response Code

173
d) Member should formal education 4
e) Member should religious education 5
f) Member should legal education 6
k) Don’t Know 88
Q46: Do disputants pay fee to the Jirga members when their disputes are resolved through Jirga?
Response Code
Yes 01 Go to Q47
No 02 Go to Q48
Don’t know 88 Go to Q48
Q47: If yes, Please specify amount ………………………….
Q48: How do Jirga members receive compensation for their services? Multiple-choice response is
allowed)
Response Code
a) As travel/food expenses 01
b) As a widely accepted and agreed upon fee 02
c) As a gift 03
d) As a bribe 04
e) Do not take any compensation for their services 05
f) Other (please specify) 77
g) Don’t know 88
3.4 hearing and proceedings of the Jirga
Q49: Who attends the proceedings of Jirga? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Only Jirga Committee members 1
b) The entire community, including minorities 2
c) The entire community, except minorities 3
d) Only the heads of the families involved in the dispute 4
e) Women allowed to attend 5
f) Government officials 6
Q50: Have you attended these proceedings?
Response Code
Yes 1 Go to Q51
No 2 Go to Q52
Q51: If yes, in which capacity? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) As a Jirga member 1
b) As a Government official 2
c) As a disputant 3
d) As an observer 4
e) Others (specify) 77
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174
Q52: How do Jirgas convene their proceedings?
Response Code
In open 1
Behind closed doors 2
Q53: Are both parties to the dispute always present at the hearing?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Q54: Is the decision of a Jirga final?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Sometimes 3
Q55: Is there a provision of appeal in the Jirga proceedings?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q56: Is there any higher authority/superior court/tribunal to which you can appeal against a
decision?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q57: How are Jirga decisions usually taken? (single response)
Response Code
Through consensus 1
Unanimously (Unanimous decision by all members) 2
Through vote (Majority Decision) 3
Don’t know 88
Q58: What procedures/rules are applied to resolve conflict/dispute through the Jirga?
Response Code
Tribal law (customs) 1
Islamic law 2
Combination of both 3
Q59: Are you satisfied with the probing/inquiry mechanism of the Jirga process?
Response Code
Satisfied 01
Somewhat Satisfied 02
Dissatisfied 03
Somewhat dissatisfied 04
Don’t know 88

175
Q60: Do you seek the aid of the police/local administration to implement the Jirga decisions?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q61: Does the police/local administration interfere in the functioning of the Jirga?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q62: Is there any provision for the parties to appoint a legal representative (similar to a lawyer
in formal justice system) in the Jirga proceedings?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q63: To what extent does the community have faith in Jirga?
Response Code
Community have a faith to a large extent 1
Community have a faith to some extent 2
Community have no faith in Jirga to some extent 3
Community have no faith in Jirga to a large extent 4
Don’t know 88
Q64: Which sections of the community display more faith in Jirga? (Multiple-choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Tribal elders 1
b) Religious leaders 2
c) Women 3
d) Ethnic and religious minorities 4
e) Community as a whole 5
f) Political and influential families 6
g) Other (specify) 77
h) Don’t know 88
Q65: How relevant is Jirga for redressing the grievances and imparting justice to the community?
Response Code
Very relevant 01
Somewhat relevant 02
Somewhat irrelevant 03
Very irrelevant 04
Don’t know 88
Q66: Do you believe that community will support the Jirga system if it is integrated into the
state’s formal justice system like the Supreme Court/High Court/Session Court?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
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176
Q67: If integrated do you think it could be plagued by the same weakness that afflict the existing
formal justice system like the Supreme Court/High Court/Session Court ?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q68: Once integrated, would Jirga lose the advantages it has over the formal justice system like
the Supreme Court/High Court/Session Court (less expensive, speedy, less corrupt, etc)?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q69: Is Jirga inherently unjust with class and gender biases?
Response Code
Yes 1 Go TO Q70
No 2 Go to Q71
Don’t know 88 Go to Q71
Q70: If yes, should Jirga be abolished?
Response Code
Yes 1
No 2
Don’t know 88
Q71: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the statement: ‘Jirga is a speedy and less expensive
mechanism of dispute resolution’?
Response Code
Strongly agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Somewhat Disagree 03
Strongly Disagree 04
Don’t know 88
Q72: How strongly do you agree with the statement: ‘One of the main outcomes of the Jirga
decision is a fair compensation to victims’?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Q73: How strongly you agree/disagree with the following statements?
Response Strongly
Agree
Somewhat
Agree
Somewhat
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
DK
a) Both parties are provided with equal
opportunities to express their views in
Jirga process
01 02 03 04 88

177
b) Nepotism or favouritism influence the
decision making process of Jirga
01 02 03 04 88
c) Decisions given by Jirga are unbiased
and free from all kinds of pressure from
the economical and politically powerful
section of the society
01 02 03 04 88
d) Some decisions are harsh and not
commensurate with the deed done
01 02 03 04 88
e) Jirga verdicts come into conflict with
modern notions of justice or human
rights
01 02 03 04 88
f) Jirga fails to resolve disputes effectively 01 02 03 04 88
g) Jirga violates women’s rights 01 02 03 04 88
h) Jirga violates minorities’ rights 01 02 03 04 88
i) Jirga maintains social order and
restores harmony in a village
01 02 03 04 88
j) Jirga plays a role in conflict
transformation and conflict resolution.
01 02 03 04 88
k) Jirga plays a role in reducing the levels
of militancy in the region
01 02 03 04 88
l) Jirga is well placed to resolve civil
disputes only
01 02 03 04 88
m) Jirga reintegrates offenders into the
community
01 02 03 04 88
n) Jirga is well placed to resolve both civil
and criminal disputes
01 02 03 04 88
o) Jirga contributes to rule of law 01 02 03 04 88
p) Jirga resolves some very serious crimes 01 02 03 04 88
q) Jirga is organized, well established,
transparent and an efficient institution
in the Pakhtun society
01 02 03 04 88
r) Jirga makes lasting Aman among
disputants
01 02 03 04 88
Q74: How strongly do you support the involvement of government officials in Jirga proceedings?
Response Code
Strongly Support 01
Somewhat Support 02
Somewhat Oppose 03
Strongly Oppose 04
Don’t Know 88
4. Implementation of Jirga verdicts
Q75: How are the decisions of Jirga mostly implemented?
Response Code
a) Through community social pressure/ Riwaaj 1
b) Through raising Lakhkar 2
c) Through police and local administration 3
d) Other (specify) 88
Q76: If the decision is not acceptable to a party, what happens? (Multiple responses is allowed)
Response Code
a) The accused party can take the case to another Jirga/Nizam-e-Adl or Qazi court 1
b) The accused party can take the case to the formal court 2
c) The accused party can appeal to the same Jirga 3
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178
d) The accused party simply defy the Jirga decision 4
e) The accused party can take the case to the police 5
f) Other (specify) 77
Q77: Do you support the Jirga exiling the party defying the Jirga decision from the community?
Response Code
Strongly Support 01
Somewhat Support 02
Somewhat Oppose 03
Strongly Oppose 04
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Q78: Are there any instances of defiance of a Jirga decision?
Response Code
Yes 1 Go to 79
No 2 Go to 80
Don’t know 88 Go to 80
Q79: If yes, how often does this happen?
Response Code
Very often 01
Somewhat often 02
Rarely 03
Never 04
Don’t know 88
5. The state of fundamental Rights the Jirga system
Q80: Do you agree/disagree that the Jirga process is at times in conflict with International
Human Rights standards?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
Q81: Do you agree/disagree that the Jirga process is at times in conflict with Fundamental
Rights given by the Constitution of Pakistan?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88

179
Q82: Do you agree/disagree that the Jirga process is at times in conflict with rights given in Islam?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
6. The state of rights of minorities in the Jirga system.
Q83: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the statement that: ‘ethnic minorities have not
been given equal chance to participate in Jirga decision-making processes?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
Q84:How strongly do you agree with the statement that: ‘religious minorities have not been
given an equal chance to participate in Jirga decision-making processes?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
7. The state of rights of children and youth in the Jirga system.
Q85: Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that tribal elders take into account the rights of
a child while making Jirga decisions?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Q86: Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that the Jirga effectively and fairly solves
juvenile cases?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Questionnaire

180
8. The state of rights of women in the Jirga system.
Q87: Do you agree with the statement, that the Jirga at times is biased against women when
resolving matrimonial disputes including divorce and custody of children?
Response Code
To a large extent 01
To some extent 02
Not to some extent 03
Not at all 04
Don’t know 88
Q88: Do you support/oppose the Jirga making decisions in favour of honour killing?
Response Code
Strongly Support 01
Somewhat Support 02
Somewhat Oppose 03
Strongly Oppose 04
Don’t know 88
Q89: Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that there is no representation of women in the
Jirga system?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Q90: Do you agree/disagree there is indirect representation of women (through male relatives)
in the Jirga system?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
No response 99
Q91: Do you agree/disagree that women should have a right of inheritance in your community/
area?
Response Code
Strongly Agree 01
Somewhat Agree 02
Don’t know 88
No response 99

181
Q92: Does Swara resolve some very complex disputes?
Response Code
Yes 01
No 02
Don’t know 88
Q93: Do you believe that Swara violates women’s rights.
Response Code
Yes 01
No 02
Don’t know 88
Q94: To what extent do you support Swara as a way for resolving conflicts between two families/
parties?
Response Code
Strongly Support 01
Somewhat Support 02
Somewhat Oppose 03
Strongly Oppose 04
Don’t Know 88
Q95: What are the main cases of violence against women in your community/area? (Multiple-
choice response is allowed)
Response Code
a) Accusations 1
b) Acid throwing 2
c) Burning 3
d) Mental abuse 4
e) Physical abuse 5
f) Restricting mobility 6
g) Indifferent attitude 7
h) Denial of conjugal rights 8
i) Family honour issues 9
j) Forced marriages 10
k) Other’s Specify 77
Q96: Does the Jirga fairly and effectively resolve these issues? (Ask for only circled in Q95)
Circle
from
Q95
Response Strongly
Agree
Somewhat
Agree
Somewhat
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Don’t’
Know
A a) Accusations 1 2 3 4 88
B b) Acid throwing 1 2 3 4 88
C c) Burning 1 2 3 4 88
D d) Mental abuse 1 2 3 4 88
E e) Physical abuse 1 2 3 4 88
F f) Restricting mobility 1 2 3 4 88
G g) Indifferent attitude 1 2 3 4 88
H h) Denial of conjugal rights 1 2 3 4 88
I i) Family honour issues 1 2 3 4 88
J j) Forced marriages 1 2 3 4 88
K k) Other’s Specify 1 2 3 4 88
Questionnaire

182
9. Recommendations for reforms
Q97: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the statements listed below?
Response Strongly
Agree
Somewhat
Agree
Somewhat
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
DK
a) Jirga decision should be recorded officially 01 02 03 04 88
b) Jirga decision should be enforced officially 01 02 03 04 88
c) Provision of a right to appeal to the Courts
against Jirga decisions
01 02 03 04 88
d) Final Jirga decision need to be subject to
the approval of appropriate Pakistan Human
Rights bodies
01 02 03 04 88
e) Women should be given the right to sit in the
Jirga proceedings
01 02 03 04 88
f) Women should be given representation in the
decision-making body of a Jirga as member
01 02 03 04 88
g) Religious and ethnic minorities should be
allowed to sit in the Jirga proceedings
01 02 03 04 88
h) Religious minorities should be given a fair
their customs and religious believes
01 02 03 04 88
i) Jirga can be integrated into formal justice
system
01 02 03 04 88
j) Jirga members should be elected through a
proper electoral process
01 02 03 04 88
k) Jirga members should be sensitized through
an educational programme on Human Rights,
Women Rights, Shariah, and Constitution of
Pakistan
01 02 03 04 88
l) Women Jirga institutions should be formed to
resolve women issues
01 02 03 04 88
m) Jirga should be utilized effectively to bring
reform in the customs and to ban traditional
practices such as Swara, Bride price and
Xhag.
01 02 03 04 88
n) Jirga institution should play a role in conflict
transformation/resolution
01 02 03 04 88
o) Jirga should play its role in reducing the level
of militancy in the area
01 02 03 04 88
10. Demographics
D10.1: Gender of respondents:
Male 1 Female 2
D10.2: Age group of respondent
18 – 29 years 1 50 – 65 years 3
30 – 49 years 2 65+ 4
D10.3: Education level of respondent
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Bachelor level 7
Religious education only 2 Master degree 8
Schooled up to Primary level 3 Those up to professional education
(Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers)
9
Schooled up to Middle level 4

183
Schooled up to Secondary Certificate level
(Metric)
5
Schooled up to Intermediate level 6
D10.4: Education level of head of the household
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Bachelor level 7
Religious education only 2 Master degree 8
Schooled up to Primary level 3 Those up to professional education
(Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers)
9
Schooled up to Middle level 4
Schooled up to Secondary Certificate level
(Metric)
5
Schooled up to Intermediate level 6
D10.5: Monthly income of respondent’s family in PKR? If respondent refuses to disclose the
income of the household, ask for overall expenses and circle the appropriate code.
Upto Rs 3000 1 Rs 7001 – Rs 10000 4
Rs 3001 – Rs 5000 2 Rs 10001 – Rs 15000 5
Rs 5001 – Rs 7000 3 More than Rs 15000 6
Refuse to answer 7
D10.6: Occupation of respondent
Agricultural labourer 1 Provincial civil servant 12
Chowkidar (watchman) 2 Skilled labourer 13
Civil servant 3 Small business owner 14
Clerical employee 4 Teacher 15
Farm owner 5 Technician 16
Home-based worker 6 Unskilled labourer 17
Lady health worker/Visitor (LHW/V) 7 Student 18
Large business owner 8 House Wife 19
White colour employee 9 Unemployed 20
Management/supervisor 10 Other (specify) 77
Military, police, security personnel 11
D10.7: Marital status of respondent
Married 1 Single 4
Widowed 2 No response 99
Divorced 3
D10.8: How many people live in your household/compound?
Number of People: ___________________
Male (adult) Code Female (adult) Code Male children Code Female chil-
dren
Code
1-2 persons 1 1-2 persons 4 1-2 children 7 1-2 children 10
3-5 persons 2 3-5 persons 5 3-5 children 8 3-5 children 11
6 and above
persons
3 6 and above
persons
6 6 and above 9 6 and above 12
Questionnaire

184
D10.9: Religion of respondent
Christian 1 Hindu 4
Sikh 2 Other (specify) 77
Muslim 3 No response 99
(Ask if answer is 3 in D10.9)
Shiite 1 Sunni 2
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D10.9)
D10.10: Please tell me whether you regularly, sometimes, or never engage in the following
religious practices
Response Regularly Sometimes Never Not Asked No Response
Pray five times a day 1 2 3 4 99
Fast during Ramadan 1 2 3 4 99
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D10.9)
D10.11: How often do you pray at the mosque?
Five times a day/daily 1 Monthly 5
Less than five times/daily 2 Several times a year 6
Several times a week 3 Never 7
Once a week 4 No response 99
D10.12: Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year?
Response Code
Yes 1
Don’t know 88
No Response 99

185
Read Closing Statement
To the Respondent: “Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any
questions? In the next few days my supervisor may contact
you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other
questions you may have about the interview. To help him do
that, could I have your telephone number?”
Respondent Information: Name: _______________
Address: _______________
Tel No. _______________
NIC Number ___ ___ ___ ___
Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the
instructions provided to me.
Name: _______________
Signed: _______________
Date: _______________
To be completed by the Supervisor:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interview subject to Back-check/Control
1. Yes
2. No
Method of Back-check/Control
1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office
4. Not subject to back-check
Initial Questions (for Interviewer only)
Name of surveyor ---------------------------------- Date of interview -------------------------
Province ---------------------------------- District ----------------------------- Tehsil ---------------------
[1] Rural. [2] Urban
Questionnaire

186
ANNEX II
TARGET DEMOGRAPHICS

187
ANNEX II TARGET DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender of the respondents
The survey was planned to incorporate men and women’s perceptions on different aspects of dis-
pute resolution mechanisms affecting the life of the people of KP and the Pukhtuns of Balochistan.
The following statistics show that the survey interviews included 50.27% men and 49.8% women.
Gender Frequency Percent
Male 1205 50.2
Female 1195 49.8
Total 2400 100.0
Age group
The survey aimed to interview respondents between 18 years of age and above. The data shows
that the survey mostly interviewed middle age group (30-49 years old) respondents, compared
with the youth and old age respondents. Nevertheless, considering the population pyramid the
middle age is not over-represented nor the older cohorts under-represented as shown by the
average number of interviews by year in the table below.
Age Group Frequency Percent No./Year
18 – 29 years 793 33.0 66
30 – 49 years 1172 48.8 59
50 – 65 years 369 15.4 23
65+ 66 2.8
Total 2400 100.0
The age group 30-49 made up the larger group of the interviewees, because this age group is the
most involved in Jirga proceedings.
Education
The following table shows statistics for the educational level of the respondents. The survey re-
sults show that 32.5% of the respondents had not attended school while only 10.3% have primary
level education. The table shows that only 9.3% of the respondents received middle level school-
ing, while 14.4% are those respondents have Secondary Certificate level education. Moreover,
only 3.5% of the respondents received religious education. There are other categories explained
in the table below.
Education of Respondent Frequency Percent
Not schooled 779 32.5
AnnexIITargetDemographics

188
Religious education only 83 3.5
Schooled upto Primary level 247 10.3
Schooled upto Middle level 223 9.3
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level (Metric) 345 14.4
Schooled upto Intermediate level 269 11.2
Schooled upto Bachelor level 232 9.7
Master degree 196 8.2
Those upto professional education (Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers) 26 1.1
Total 2400 100.0
If we analyze the entire data set, we can conclude more than 60% of the sample is literate,
even if we exclude the ‘religious education only’-category. This is higher than the Census Report
data of 1998 for Pakistan. This could be because the respondents gave incorrect information or
it could be because of the sampling bias toward families closest to the center of towns, hence
more urban and better off who would have both access and have taken advantage of educa-
tional opportunities.
Education of the head of the family
If the respondent was not the head of the family himself/herself, they were asked about the
education level of the head of the family. (Note: there are hardly any female heads of families in
Pakhtun society overall). In general, the survey has sampled more literate people than the general
population for the given age group.
Education Head of the Household Frequency Percent
Not schooled 793 33.1
Religious education only 168 7.0
Schooled upto Primary level 201 8.4
Schooled upto Middle level 205 8.5
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level (Metric) 363 15.1
Schooled upto Intermediate level 206 8.6
Schooled upto Bachelor level 203 8.5
Master degree 211 8.8
Those upto professional education (Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers) 50 2.1
Total 2400 100.0
Occupation
In the table below the occupation of male and female respondents shows 81% of the females
identified themselves as house wives (83%). The remaining 17% of the women carried on special-
ized roles such as teachers and health workers as well as shopkeepers. The younger women iden-
tified as students. The predominant male roles were shopkeepers and labourers, but men were
distributed over a wider range of occupations then women.
Occupation
Male Female Overall
No. % No. % No. %
Agricultural labourer 182 15.1 2 0.2 184 7.7
Chowkidar (watchman) 26 2.2 0 0.0 26 1.1
Civil servant 5 0.4 0 0.0 5 0.2
Clerical employee 29 2.4 0 0.0 29 1.2
Farm owner 4 0.3 0 0.0 4 0.2

189
Home-based worker 9 0.7 5 0.4 14 0.6
Lady health worker/Visitor (LHW/V) 0 0.0 20 1.7 20 0.8
Large business owner 39 3.2 1 0.1 40 1.7
White collar employee 28 2.3 1 0.1 29 1.2
Management/supervisor 13 1.1 0 0.0 13 0.5
Military, police, security personnel 29 2.4 1 0.1 30 1.3
Provincial civil servant 45 3.7 1 0.1 46 1.9
Skilled labourer 122 10.1 21 1.8 143 6.0
Small business owner 206 17.1 33 2.8 239 10.0
Teacher 75 6.2 43 3.6 118 4.9
Technician 28 2.3 2 0.2 30 1.3
Unskilled labourer 65 5.4 2 0.2 67 2.8
Student 96 8.0 53 4.4 149 6.2
House Wife 0 0.0 992 83.0 992 41.3
Unemployed 91 7.6 18 1.5 109 4.5
Other (specify) 84 7.0 0 0.0 84 3.5
Not Answered 29 2.4 0 0.0 29 1.2
Total 1205 100. 1195 100 2400 100
Marital status
Early marriages are common in the Pakhtun areas, which is mainly tribal in characteristics. Not
surprisingly for the population sampled, 81.9% of the women were married and the proportion of
single men to single women was almost twice the proportion. The practice of divorce is very rare
and is considered a sin in Pakhtun society, a fact that can also be inferred from the data results. The
number of widows is also very low and because men readily remarry, the number of widowers is
very small compared with females.
Marital status
Male Female Overall
No. % No. % No. %
Married 894 74.2 979 81.9 1873 78.0
Widowed 3 0.2 41 3.4 44 1.8
Divorced 0 0.0 2 0.2 2 0.1
Single 302 25.1 168 14.1 470 19.6
Not Answered 6 0.5 5 0.4 11 0.5
Total 1205 100.0 1195 100.0 2400 100.0
Religion
Generally, non-Muslims make up less than 3% of the population of Pakistan. However, the survey
result shows that the survey could not interview non-Muslims proportionately. There could be
several reasons to this un-proportionality. In addition to Muslims, there are Christians, Hindus,
and Sikhs. Although very few in number, they may be even fewer as many became displaced
during the continuing crisis.
Religion Frequency Percent
Christian 2 0.1
Sikh 1 0.1
Muslim 2396 99.8
AnnexIITargetDemographics

190
Hindu 1 0
Total 2400 100.0
Shia-Sunni proportion
Respondents who identified themselves as Muslim were subsequently asked which sect they
belonged to. As per the data sets, the ratio for Shia and Sunni is 1.5% and 98.3% respectively.
Sect Frequency Percent
Shiite 37 1.5
Sunni 2359 98.3
Not Applicable 4 0.2
Total 2400 100.0
Shiites are mainly concentrated in Peshawar and Quetta districts of LP and Balochistan, respec-
tively, and therefore, the survey could only access them in these districts mainly.

191
Adl Justice
Awami For public
Ghairat Honour
Hadith Sayings of Prophet Mohammad (SWA)
Hujra A place for guests and gatherings for the male population in the community. Hujra is
usually attached to the house of a local leader.
Huquq Rights
Jirga Refers to the practice and to the institution. A Jirga is a gathering of elders, convened
by an intermediary (Jirgamaar, see below) between contesting parties, to hear the
arguments of the parties
Jirgamaars The leader of a Jirga who hears the arguments of the plaintiffs
Khasadar Tribal Policemen
Loya Large
Maliks Tribal elders
Musalihati Anjuman The institution of Musalihat Anjuman (literally meaning conciliation forums) has been
provided at the level of Union Councils for dispute resolution through ADR (including
conciliation, mediation and arbitration).
Nang Honour
Nizam-e-Adl Justice System based on Shairah law in the Malakand division
Olasi National
Pakhtun Ethnic group
Pakhtunwali The inherited moral and social code of Pakhtun society
Pashtu Language
Pathan Cast
Qazi Judge
Qazi courts an Islamic court headed by a Qazi (Judge)
Qaumi National
Riwaj Tradition
Sarkari Official
Shariah Islamic code of life
Shariat Islamic code of life
Swara The giving of young women and girls in marriage as a method of resolving confict,
this is also known as Badal-i-Sulh and Vani
Tehsil Administrative units in cities and towns (a district subdivision)
Tigah Guarantee
Union council Elected group of people for administration in cities and towns. The territory of a
union council is usually part of tehsil
Waak Consent
Walwar Bride price
Xhag Man’s declaration of claim over a woman for marriage.
Zakah Obligatory payment made annually under Islamic law on certain kinds of property
GLOSSARY

192
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196
CAMP has surveyed over 3900 Pakhtun men and women from
Balochistan, Pakhtunkhwa, PATA, and FATA on their knowledge of
and experience with Jirgas, Federal Courts, Nizam-e-Adl, Musalihati
Anjuman, the Police, and District Administration when seeking justice
or the resolution of disputes. The findings of the levels of trust and
confidence in these systems, plus the evaluation of the Pakhtuns
concerning the efficiency and effectiveness of these systems, provide
thought provoking perspectives that bode well for reforms and the
expansion of justice to all.

Understanding Justice Systems of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA & Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective | CAMP report

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Understanding Justice Systems of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA & Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective | CAMP report