Unit 13 j.s. mill
- 1. Structure 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Life and Times 13.3 Equal Rights for Women 13.4 The Importance of Individual Liberty 13.5 Representative Gavernrnent 13.6 Beyond Utilitarianism 13.7 Summary 13.8 Exercises 13.1 INTRODUCTION : The economic principles of utilitarianism were essentially proyided by Adam Smith's classic work The Wealthof Nations published in 1776. The political principlesof classical utilitarianism mainly emerged out of Bentham's application of rationalistic approach and his deep suspicion of "sinister interests" of all those entrenched in power and as a counter check he advocated annual elections, secret ballot and recall. But the Bentliamite presumption of a mechanical formula of quantifying all pleasures and all pains equally exemplified by his farnous uttering 'pushpin is as good as poetry" could not satis& his most farnous pupil John Stuart Mill who himself admitted that he was "Peter who denied his master". In h'is writings the first great criticism of Belithamite Utilitarianism emerged and with considerable impact of Wordsworth and other romantic poets he tried to work out a synthesis of rationalism and romanticism. In the process he transformed the entire underpinning of Benthamite utilitarianism by claiming that pleasures have great differentiation and that all pleasures were not of equal value as a dissatisfaction of a Socrates is more valuable than the satisfaction of a fool. J. S, Mill's inlportance lies not only in his criticism of i~tilitarianismbut also in his rich contribution to liberalism by his memorable defense of freedom of speecliand individuality and in his defense of a liberal society as a necessary precondition for a liberal state. 13.2 LIFE AND TIMES 3' John Stuart Mill was barn in London on 20 May 1806. He Iiad eight younger siblings. All his learning came from his fatlier James Mill and lie read the books his fatlier tiad been reading for writing the book on India, History of BritishIndia (1818). At the age of eleven he began to help his father by reading the proofs of his father's books. l~nmediatelyafter the publicatioii of History of British India James Mill was appointed as an Assistant Examiner at the East India House, It was an important event in his life as this solved his financial problems enabling him to devote his time and attentionto writeon areas of his prime interest, philosophical and political problems. He could also conceive of a liberal profession for his eldest son, John Stuart. At the beginning he thought for Iiim a career in law but when another vacancy arose for another Assistant Exanliner in 1823, John Stuart got the post and served the British dovernrnent till his retirement. 152
- 2. As James Mill decided to teach his son all by himself at hon~e,the fatter was denied the usual experience of going to a rcgular school. His education did not include any childretl's book or toys for he started to lean1 Greek at the age of four and Latin at eight. By the time he was ten he had read many of Plato's dialogues, logic and history. He was familiar with the writings of Euripides, Honler, Polybius, Sophocles and Thucydides. He could solve problems in algebra, geometry, differential calculus and higher mathematics. So dominant was his father's influence that Jolm Stuart could not recollect hiis mother's coiltributiolls to his fornlative years as a child. At the age of thirteen he was introducedto serious reading of English Classical Econonzists and published an introductory textbook in economics entitled Elements of Polilicnl Econoniy (1820) at tlze age of fourteen. From Tllornas Carlyle (1795-1881), Sazzuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), Isidore Auguste Conlte (1798-1857), Goetlle (1749-1832), and Wordswort11 (1770- 1850) he came to value poetry and art. He reviewed Alexis de Tocqueville's (1805-59) Democracy in America 111 two parts in 1835 and 1840, a book that left a thorougl~impact on him. From the training that Johz Stuart received at ho~nehe was convinced that nurture more than nature played a crucial role in the fornlation of character. It also assured him of the importa~zce education could play ill transfortning llun~annaturc. In his Azbtobiography, which he wrote in the 185Os'heacknowledged his father's contributioll in shaping his mental abilities and physical strength to the extent that he never had a nor~~zalboyhood. By the age of twenty Mill started to write for newspapers and periodicals. He contributed to every aspect of political tlzeory. His Sy,stt'17?($Logic (1843) whiclz lle beg'm writing in 1820s tried to elucidate a colzerent ~)hilosopl~yof politics. The Logrc conzbilled the British empiricist tradition of Locke and Hume of nssociational psychology with a colzception of social sciences based on the paradigin of Newtonian plzysics. His essays On L~herfy(1859) and The Sz~biection of Women (1869) were classic elaborations of liberal thought on importatzt issues like law, rights and liberly. His The Con.sidemtions on liepresentntive Government (186I) provided an outline of lzis ideal gover~unentbased on proportional representation, protection of ~ninorities and iiistitutions of self govcnmleizt, His famous pamphlet Utilitarianism (1863) elldorscd the Bentllanlitc principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest nui~lber,yet made a significant depa~turefrom the Baltl~amiteassunlptio~lby arguing that this priizciple could oi~lybe defcnded if one dislng~~islzedhappiness from pIeasure. His essays on Bellthan1 'and Coleridge written between 1838 and 1840 enabled him to critically dissect Benttzamism. I11 1826 Mill espericnccd 'mental crisis' when he lost all his capacity for joy in life. He recovered by discovering romantic poetry of Coleridge and ~ordswortl~.He also realised the incomplctcness of lzis cducntion, lzanlcly thc lack of einotioilal side of life. In his re-exainination of Benthal~zitcphilosophy he attributed its one-sidedncss to Benthartz's lack of experience, imagillatiorl and anotions. He made use of Coleridge's poelns to broaden Benthamism and made roonl for en~otional,aesthetic and spiritt~aldimensions. However he never wavered from tlze fbtida~~~enmlsof Benthamism though the major diffcrellce bet~veenthem was tllat Be~ltlzain followed a more siizlplistic picturisatiolz of 1zuma11nature of the Frelzclz utjlitaria~ls~vhereasMill followed the tnorc sophisticated utilitarianisln of Ht~rnc. Mill acklzowledgcd that both On Liberi-y and ?'he Si~hjecfiono f Wun~enwas a joint eildeavour witlz Harriet Hardy Taylor whom he met in 1830. Tl~o~~glzHarriet was married Mill fell in love witlz her. The two inaintaitled a11 intimate but cilaste frielldsllip for tllc next ilincteen years. Harriet's husband Jo1111Taylor died in 1849. In 1851 Mill married Harriet and described her tlle honour and chief blessillg of lzis existence, a source of a great.inspiration for his attelupts to bring ribout human improvement. He was confident tlld bad Harriet lived at a time when
- 3. women had greater opportunities she would have been 'eminent among the rulers of mankind'. Mill died in 1873 at Avignon, England. 13.3 EQUAL RIGHTS FOP WOMEN.I The Subjection of Women (1869) begins with the revolutionary statement, "the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes-the legal subordination of one sex to tlle otller-is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to llinma11in~provemait; and... it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality," (p. 119) Mill's referent for the legal subordination of women was the mid 19th Century English law of the marriage contract. By this law, married Englishwonlen could hold no property in their own name, and even if their parents gifted the111 any property that too belonged to their l~usbands.Unless a wornan was legally separated from her husband, (a difficult and expensive process) even if she lived away froi1-1him, her earnings belonged officially to him. By law, only the father and not the mother was the guardian of a couple's children. Mill also cited the absence of laws on lllarital rape to prove the inequality suffered by the Englishwomen of that time. I What Mill foulid paradoxical was that in the modern age, wl~enin other areas the principles of liberty and equality were being asserted, they were yet not applied to the condition of women. No one believe'd in slavery ally more, yet women were sometimes treated worse than slaves and tl~iswas accepted as beyond questioning. Mill wanted to explain this resista~lceto women's equality in the contest of a general acceptance of the principles of equality and liberty. We did so by first presenting and then defeating the arguments for women's subordination, and then providing his own arguments for wo1ne11's equality. The first argument for women's inequality which Mill refkted was that since llistoricallyit has been a universal practice, therefore therc must be some justification for it. Contra this, Mill showed that other so called universal social practices like slavery, for example, had beell rejected, so perhaps given tilne womcn's inequality would also becoitze unacceptable. Mill also said that from the existence of something, one could argue for the riglltness of that thing, only if the alternative 1x1s been tried, and in the case of wonial, living with them on cqual tenns had never been done. The reason bvl~ywomen's inequality had survived slavery and political absolutism was not because it,was justifiable, but because whcrcas only slave holders and despots had mi interest in holding on to slavery and despotism, all men, Nlill argued, had an intcrest in women's subordination. A second argunlent for womea's inequality was based on women's naturc-women werc said to be naturally inferior to men. Mill's response was that oilc could not inake arguments about women's ineq~~alitybased 011 natural differences because these differences were a result of socialisation. Mill was generally against using human nature as a ground for any claim, since he believed that l~umannature changed according to the social envirolunei-It.At the sstue time, Mill also pointed out that in spite of being treated so differently from men, many woinen f tl~roughouthistory had'shown an extraordinary aptitude for political leadership-here Mill cited examples of European queens and Hindu princesses. The third argunleilt rchted by Mill was that there is nothing wrong wit11woitzen's subordination i i because women accept it voluntarily. Mill pointcd out tint this claim was empirically wrong- i many won1e11 had written tracts against women's inequality and hundreds of women wcre i I . already demonstrating in the streets of London for women's suffrage. Further, since women had ; 1-10 choice but to live with their husbands, they were afraid that their cox~~plaintsabout tlleir , position would only lead to worse treatnlent fro111them. Lastly, Mill also claimed that since all *
- 4. women were brought up from childl~oodto believe-"that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and govenlnzeilt by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others," (p. 132)-what was not to be remarked was that some women accepted this subordination willingly but that so Inany wonlcll resisted it. The last ,point against which Mill argued was that for a family to hnction well, one decision maker is needed, and the Izusba~dis best suited to be this decision maker. Mill scoffed at this argument-the husband and wife being both adults, there was no reason why the ll~lsband should take all the decisions. Having refiited all of these four arguments for women's inequality, Mill wrote: "Tllere are inany persons for wlloin it is not enough that the inequality has no just or legitimate defence; they require to be told what express advantage would be obtained by abolisl~ingit." (p. 196) The question was, would society benefit if wonleiz were granted equal rights. Answering in the affirmative, Mill detailcd four social benefits of woinen's equality. The first advantage would be that tlle family would no longer be "a scllool of despotism7'.(p. 160) According to Mill, tl~c.patriarcl~alfamily teaches all its me~nbershow to live in lzierarcliical . relationships, since all power is conceiltrated in the I~andsof tlze l~usba~~dfatherl~nasterwllom the wifelchildreidservantshave to obey. For Mill such fanzilies are ml anachronism in lnodern ' denlocratic polities based on the principle of equality. Individuals cvllo livc in such fanlilies cannot be good democratic citizeizs because they do not know how to treat azotller citizen as an equal: "Any sentiizlellt of freedom which can exist in a man wllose nearest and dearest intimacies are with those of wliom he is absolute master, is not the geiwille love of frecdom, but, what the love of freed0111generally was in tbe ancients and in the iniddle ages-an inte1.1~~ feeling of the dignity and inlportance of his own personality; lncakillg him disdain a yoke for l~inzself,...but wllich he is abunda~ltlyready to inlposc on others for his own interest or giorification." (p. 161) In the interests of democratic citizenship then, it was i~ecessaryto obtain equality for women in the fanlily. Another advantage, Mill pointed out, would be the "doubling of the mass of lnental faculties" (p. 199) available to society. Not only would society benefit because there would be more doctors, engineers, teachers, and scientists (all women); ail additional advantage would be that men in the professiolts would perfornl better beciuse of conzlletition from their fenlnle colleagues. Third, women enjoying eq~~alitywill 11ave a better influence oil mankind, Under relations of subordination, women asscrt their wills only in all sorts of perverse ways; wit11 equality, they will no longer need to do this. > Finally, by givil$ women equal rights, their happiness would be increased manifold, and this would satis%-,Mill argued, the utilitarian principle of tlle greatest hal~pinessof the greatest number. Note soine of Mill's conceph~almoves-for i~lstailllce,the link Ile cstablislzed between the private and tlxe public. Unlike other liberals, who not only saw the extant family as the realm -of freedoill, but since this freedom was mostly defined as arbitrariness, disassociated the falllily as irrelevant to larger public concerns of liberal democracy, Mill argued that witl~oiitthe reform of the ptriarcl~alfamily, it would be impossible to fimly ground denlocracy. Note that he was not merely saying that witl~outequal rights to women, 'thc democratic project is incon~pletc,but that democracy in tlze politicallp~~blicsphere will remain shaky unless we bring up or create democratic citizens in egalitarian families.
- 5. What still makes solne feminists i~ncoll~fortnbleis that Mill insisted that patriarchal families are an anachronisln in modem society: "[tlhe social subordination of women thus stands O L I ~as a11 isolated fact in ~tlodernsocial institutions...a single relic of an old world of thought and practice. .." (p. 137) Many feminists now talk about capitalist patriarchy-the reinforcing of patriarchal institutions by mod en^ capitalism. 13.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY On Liberty (1859) begins with a parados-civll liberties are under greater threat in denlocratic that1 in despotic regimes, wrote Mill. In the absolutist states of earlier times, the nller's interest was see11as opposed to that of tllc subjects, who were specially vigilant against ally encroachment on their existiilg freedoms. 111modern delnocracies based on tile principle of self govcrn~ne~lt, the people fecl lcss undcr threat fronl their own goveniment. Mill bcrated this laxity and said that illdividuals needed to be lnorc vigilant about the danger to their liberty not only froill the governmellt, but also from social morality and custom. 'bVliy is it important to protect it~dividualliberty'? Wllen individuals nlake t11cir own choices, they usc many of their faculties-"The Ilumail faculties of perception, judgement, discrimil~ative fceling, 111altal activity, and eve11inoraI preferencc, are excicised only in ~nakinga choicc...The mental and moral, like the n~uscularpowers, are improved only by being tlscd...He 1~110 cl~ooseshis plan for himself, clnploys all his faculties. He n~ustuse observation to see, reasoiling and judgement to foresee, activity to gather n~aterialsfor decision, discriminatiotl to decide, and when he has decided, firn~nessand self-control to hold to his clelibcrate decision." (p.59) Individuals who act in a certain fashion only because they have been told to do so, do not develop ally of tllcse faculties. Elnphasisillg that what is important is "not oi~lywhat rnen do, but also what manner of men they are that do it", (p. 59) Mill said t11at we might be able to 'guide' individuals in 'some good patJl'.without allowing thcm to make any choices, but the 'wortlz' of si~chhuman beings would be doubtfill. - Mill clarified and detailcd his position on liberty by defendill8 tl~rcespecific liberties, tl~e liberty of thaught and expression i~lcl~ldillgthe liberty of syeakiilg and publishing, the liberty of action and that of association. We will follow Mill's argument in each of these cases. Libel9 of tllouglzt and expression: "If all lna~llti~ldmillus one, wcrc of one opinion, and only one person were of the contra~yopinion, mankind would be no lllore justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified 111 silencing mankind." (p. 20) Mill providcd four reasons for this freedolll of cxpressloll. For Mill, since tlle domi~lalltidcas of a. socicty usually emanate froin the class iiltercsts of that society's ascendant class, the majority opinion may bc quite far from the truLh or fro111the social interest. It's inorc than iilcely that the suppressed nlinority opinion is tme, and those suppressi~lgit will olily prevent or at least delay mankind from knowing the tnit11. Huilia~lbeings are fallible creaturcs-and their certainty tlld tl~eopinioll they Ilold is true is justified only when their opi~iio~lis consta~~tlyopposed to contrary opinions. Mill wanted us to give up the assu~llptionof ii~fallibility-when our certainty about our beliefs rnnkes us cn~shall contrary points of view so tliat oour opinion is not subject to criticism. What if the ~~~inorityopiilioll were false4 ? Mill gave three reasoils for why it sho~tldstill be allo~~edfreed0111 of expression. It% 011ly by constantly being able to refkte wrong opinions, that we hold aur correct opinions as Iiviilg truths. If we accept nil opii~io~~,even if correct, on the
- 6. basis of authority alone, that opinion beco~nesa dead dogma. Neither do we understand its grounds, and nor does it luould our character or move us to action. Finally Mill argued that trutli is a multifaceted thing and usually contrary opinions both contain a part of the truth. Suppressing one opinion then, leads to the suppression of one past of the truth. When it comes to tlie liberty of action, Mill asserted a very simple principle: "tlie sole end for which mankind are warranted, individi~allyor col1ectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection...the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either pli)lsical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." (p. 13) Mill acknowledged that it was difficult to draw a line between self-regarding and other regarding action, and lle provided sollie Ilypothetic~lexaruples as proof of this difficulty. If a man destroys his own property, this is a case of other regarding action because otl~ersdependent on that man will be affected. Even if this person Iias no dependants, his action can be said to affect others, who, influenced by his example, might behave in a similar manner. Against this, Mill said that only wlrc:: Q!W has specific obligations to anothcr person, can one be said to affect his or her interests; therefore the case of an individual affecting others by his example will 1101: stand. On his own ground, Mill cited all lcinds of restrictions on not eating pork or beef, or priests being required not to marry, as examples of unnecessary restrictions on self-regarding action. Other esampl~sare Sabbatarian legislation which prevents individuals from working or even singing and dancing on Suticlays. Mill wrote that sometimes even in the case of other regarding action, 110 restrictions can be placed on one-for instance, if one wills s job through competition, this action can be said to affect others' interests by ensuring that they do not get the job, but no restrictions are applicable here. Similarly, trade has social consequences, but believing in the principle of free trade, Mill argued that lack of. restrictions on trade actually leads to better pricing and better qr~alityof products. And when it conies to self-regarding action, as we already showed, the principle of liberty requires the absence of all restrictions. Mill defended freedom of association on three grounds. First, "wllen the thing to be done is likely to be dotie better by individi~alsIllan by government. Speaking generally, there is 110one fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it." (p. 109) Second, allowing individuals to get together to do something, even if they do not do it as well as the governlnent might have done it, is better for tlie tneutal education of these individuals. The right of association becotnes, for Mill, a "practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and fatilily sel.fishness, and accustoming them to the co~nprelrensionof joint concer~is-habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another." (pp. 109-110) Fustlier, government operations tend to be everywliere alike; with individuals arid voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. Third, if we let tlie government do everything, there is the evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Mill's ideal was improvement-he wanted individuals to constalitly better themselves morally, mentally and materially. It was to this ideal that lle saw i~ldiviclualliberty as instrumeintal: "'l'ie only ilnfailing and permanent source of impl*ovementis liberty, since by it there are as Inally possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals." (p. 70) l~~dividltals impro~ingthemselves would naturally lead to a better and improved society.
- 7. 13.5 R E P R E S E N M M GOVERNMENT Mill began his Representative Government by stating that we can only decide which is the best form of govenunent, by examining wl~ichform of governmellt fulfils nlost adequately tl~e purposes of government. For Mill, the point of having a gove~mnelltwas that it perform two main functions: it nlust use the esisting qualities and skills of the citizens to best serve their interests, and it must improve the moral, intellectual and active qualities of these citizens. A despotic government may be able to fulfil the first purpose, but will fail in the second. Only arepresentative govenllnentis able to fulfil these two filnctions. It is a representative governlent that combines judiciously the two principles of part~cipationand conlpetence which is able to fulfil the two functions of protecting and educating the citizens. Let us look more carefully at what Mill had to say about the first function of govenmlent. Mill began his discussion of this subject by introducing Bentha111's concept of sinister interests. How does representative govenlnlent ensure tl~atthe com~~oninterest of society is being furthered instead of the partial and sinister interest of sonle group or class? Even though Mill distillguished between short tenn and long tenn interests, he was certain that every individual and every class is the best judge of its own interests. He scoffed at the idea that some hunlan beings may not be aware of their 'real' interests, retorting that given these persons' currenthabits and dispositions, what they choose are their real interests. It follows then that participation in the political process must be as extensive as possible, so that every individual has a say in controllinli,h e gov~rment and thus protecting his interests. It is on this basis that Mill demalded the right to vote for women. He advocated the extc~lsionof the suffrage'to cover everyone except those ~ 1 1 0C O L I ~ ~ not read and write, did not pay taxes or were on parish relief. It was this same impetus for wanting everyone to be represented that made Mill support Hare's system of proportional represelltation for electing deputies to Parliament. Under the current system, Mill pointed out, minorities went unrepresented, and since they too needed to protect their interests, another' elcctoral lnechanislll should tie found to ensure their representation. Wllereas his belief in participation led him to advocate a widening of the franchise, his belief , in competence led him to recommend plural voting. In fact, lie said that the franchise should not be widened without plural voting being introduced. Plural voting meant that with everyoneT having at least one vote, sonle individuals would have more than one vote because they were, for example, more educated. It assumed 'a graduated scale of educational attainn~ents,awarding at the bottom, onc additional vote to a skilled labourer and two to a foreman, and at tlie top, as many as five to professional men, writers and artists, publicfunctionaries, universitygraduates and nlenlbers of learned societies 3 %(see p. 285). Plural voting would ensure that a better calibre of deputies would be elected, and so the general interest would not be hanlpered by the poor quality of nlenlbers of Parliament. Mill sought .to combine his two principles in other institutions of representative dimocracy as m7ell. Take the representativeassembly, for instance. Mlll said that this body must be 'a conunittee of grievances 7 and 'a congress of opinions'. Every opinion existing dn the nation should find a voice here; that is hotv every group's interests have a better chance of being protected. At the same time Mill argued that this body was suited neither for the business of legislation nor of adtninistration. Legislation was to be framed by a Codification Conunission madc up of a few co~npeteiltlegal experts. Adlninistration should be in the 11ands of the bureaucracy, an institution characterised by instrunlental cot1lpetence, that is, the ability to find the nlost efficient means to fillfil given goals. Mill's argume~ltsemployed two kinds of cotllpete~~ce-instlullue~ltal
- 8. and moral. lnstru~nentalcolllpctence is the ability to discover tl~ebest ineans to certaili ends and tile ability to identify ends that satisfy individuals' interests as they perceive thenl. Moral ~ompetenceis the ability to discem ends that are intrinsically superior for individuals and society. Morally competent leaders are able to recognise the general i~lterestand resist the interests that dwell not only in the govenune~ltbut also in the democratic mqority. The purpose of plural voting is to ensure that nlorally conipetent leaders get elected to the legislature. what about the other goal of govenlmetlt, that of making the citizens i~ltellectnallya11d morally better? Again it is a,representative government that is based on a co~nbi~~ationof parlicipation and con~petencewllich is able to iniprove tl~equality of its citizens in the mental, moral and practical aspects. Let us again look a: some of the specific institutiollal changes recolnn~ended by Mill. FIe wanted to replace the secrtt ballot wit11 open voting, that is, eveIyone must know how one has voted. For Mill, tile franchise was not one's right in tlie sense of, for example, tllc right to property, which inlplies that one can dispose of one's propcl-ty in any arbitrary rtlanner. The francllise is a. tnlst, or a public duty, and one must cast one's vote for that calldidate whose policies seem to best further the con~tnoninterest. It is the need to justify one's vote to others that makes tlle vote a11 instn~melltof one's intellectllal and moral growth. Othcnvisc one would use one's vote arbiilaliij; -;,-tizg Fnr ~zIc:o:::~, ,CC; ;~iii~;-unebecause of the colour of his eycs. Everyone itlust have tl~efranchise, but it must be open-this 1s how Mill col~lbinedthc principle of participation and competencein tlle suffrage, to ensure the inlprovelnent of the voting citizens. We find here the nlotif of improvemer;t again. Representative government scores over despotisnl not because-it better protects the given ifiterests of the citizens, but because it is able to improve tllese citizens. The citizeils develop their capabilities by being able to participate in govcn~ment, lninirnally by casting their vote, and also by actually taking decisions in local government. At the sanle time, this participation is leavened by the principle of competence to ensure that the political experience does have an educational effect; 13.6 BEYOND UTILITARIANISM I-Iaving lookcd scpnrntely at tl~reetests, let us bring out some general tl~en~csin Mill's ~vritillgs. Mill never 'gavc up his self-characterisation as a utilitarian, no matter how far his principles seenled to have n~ovedaway from that creed. When l ~ espoke about rigllts, for instance, he subsu~ncdrights urlder tl~econccyt of utility, defining rights as notlling else but sonle extremely important utilities. As we all know, Mill's fatllcr, Ja~nesMill, was the closest associate of Jerany Bentham, the founder of utilitarianis~n.J .St Mill grew up ill the shadow of utilitaria~~ism, and eve11 afier llis emotional crisis in his early twenties, llc managed to writc a defence of utilitarianism. Throughout his work we have sccn hinl applying the standard of utility. Onc collsideration for giving eqllality to women was that it ~vouldincrease their happiness. The prillciple of liberty was defended on the grounds of its social utility-social progress depended on individLlalfreedom. A nlodified liberal den~ocrslcywas clhracterised as the best fonn of g'6vemment becwse of its usefi~lness. ~tilitm.iani,sm(1862) is the slim tract which Mill put together to answer all the objections tl~iit had been raised against this philosopl~y.T11e work begins by Mill poillting out that there has been, ovcr tlle ce~lt~aies,little agreement on the Giteria of differdating right from wrong. Rejectillg the idea of llulllal beings havillg a moral sense like our S ~ I I S ~of sight or sn~ell,which ca11 scnse what is rigllt in concrete cases, Mill put fonvard the criteria of Utility or the Greatest Hallpilless principle as basis of morality, Tllat action is moral wllich increases pleasure and'
- 9. diminisl~espain. I11defending utilitarianism herc, Mill inade a significant change froill Bentham's position. Pleasure is to be counted not only in tenns of quantity but also in tenns of quality. A qualitatively higher pleasurc is to count for more than lower pleasures. '71 is quite compatible with thc principle of utility to recognisc tl~efact, that some kinds of pleas~lreare more desirable and Inore valuable than others...It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." (pp. 7-9) Having responded to tlie criticism that utilitariallisnl assumes an animal like human nature, Mill moved to the next serious problem. Why would individuals be interested in the happiness of others? Mill answered in tenns of tlie "social feelings of mallkiad; the desire to be in unity with , our fellow creatures: a powerfill principle of human nature." (p. 29) Beca~ise"the social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man," Mill believed that our taking an interest in other's l~appinesswas not questionable at all. Finally, tlze only objection that Mill took seriously was that justice instead of utility is the foundation of morality. Mill's response was first to link justice with rights-an injustice is done when someone's rights are violated-and then to assert that rights are to be defended because of their utility. "To have a right, tllen, is, to have something whicll society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought'?I call give him tzo other reason than gcileral utility" (p. 50). A society in which iildividuals are certain of enjoying their rights is the one, wlzich accordiilg to Mill is able to progress. Tl~tisrights do not replace the conccpt of utility; for Mill utility was the justification for rights. 13.7 SUMMARY Mill's liberalisnz provided thc first inajor framework of modern deinocraticequality by extending the logic of the defence of liberty to end the subjection of wome~l.As a Member of Parlialne~lt he tried to push througli a law allowing wornell to vote, alld was disappointed wlieil that did not happen. Hc was the first male philosopher, as Okili points o~ltto writc about women's oppression and subjugation. Hc also portrayed the wide diversity in our society and cautioned the need to protect the individual from the fear of intmding llis private doinain by a collective group or public opinion. The distinction betuleen self-regarding and otller-regarding action would determine the individual's private independent sphere and the later, the individual's social public sphere. He stressed on the ileed to protect the rights of the minority within a dc~nocracy.He uiiderstood the shortconlings of classical utilitarian liberalisnl and advocated vigorously for il~lportatltstate actions in providing compulsory state education and social control. Realising that his scheme is very different from timt of Bentliam, he also described hin~selfas a socialist. His revision of liberalis111 provided the iinietu~sto T.H. Green who co~nbiningthe British liberal tradition with the continental one provided a new basis of liberalism wit11 his notion of COIIUIIOII good. It might bc apposite here to citc his characterisation, ill the Azctobiography, of his later developmellt a1iJ;lyfroill denlocracy and towards socialisl~l."I was a democrat, but not least of a socialist. We were now kuch less den~ocraticthan I had been...but our ideal of ultimate irt~proveineiltwent far beyond Denlocracy, and would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists" (p. 239). "Tile social problenl of the future we considered to be, how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action, with a comnon ownerslzip in tlie raw material of the globe, and an equal participatioil of all in the benefits of combined labour." If these are the requisites of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the link between capitalism and democracy, had become questionable for tllc later Mill.
- 10. 13.8 EXERCISES 1) What did Mill meall by the statement that "the family is a school of despotism"'? Explain his claim that children who grow up in such families cannot be good democratic citizens. 2) One of Mill's arguments for women's equality is that it will make so many woinen happier. Is it a good idea to try to-get rid of a11 injustice by making an argument about happiness? 3) How would you cboose between a natural rights and a utilitarian defence of individual liberty? 4) Does it make sense for Mill to say that after food and clothing, liberty is a 'want' of I~uman nature. Does not this claim go against Mill's own historicist position on human nature? 5) What do you tlzink of some of the specific institutional reforn~sin the liberal democratic form of govenxnent advocated by Mill-for instance, open voting, plural voting, Hare's system of proportional representation, and the Codification Commission? Are these rcforms consistent wit11 each other'? 6) What do you think of tlie utilitarian idea that a moral persoti is impartial between his own happiness or tlie happiness of his loved ones m~dthe happiness of strangers? 7) How does Mill attempt to subsume justice and rights under the concept of utility'?What do, yorl think of this attenzpt?