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Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol 3, No 7, 2012

Mandatory Audit Rotation and Audit Independence: Survey of
Southern Nigeria
John Chika Onwuchekwa1* Dominic Erah2 Famous Izedonmi3
1. Department of Accounting, Rhema University, Aba. 153/155 Aba/Owerri Road, P.M.B 7021 Abia State
Nigeria
2. Department of Accounting, University of Benin, Benin City, Edo State Nigeria
3. Department of Accounting, University of Benin, Benin City, Edo State Nigeria
*E-mail of the corresponding author- chikajohn29@yahoo.com

Abstract
The quest for mandatory audit rotation has been a concern to academics, investors, practitioners and the public at
large. This study is designed to determine the relationship between mandatory audit rotation and audit
independence in Southern Nigeria. The data used were collected through the distribution of questionnaires to
investors, lecturers, consultants, accountants and auditors in Southern Nigeria. Percentage analysis was used to
analyze the data while the specified model was estimated using binary logistic regression technique with the aid
of computer software Eviews 7. One hypothesis was stated and tested. The study revealed that mandatory audit
rotation has a positive relationship on auditors’ independence. We therefore recommended that though audit
rotation will improve auditors’ independence, rotation of external auditors should be made voluntary.
Keywords: Mandatory Audit Rotation, Audit independence, Southern Nigeria

1. Introduction
1.1 Background To The Study
Research studies have in the recent past done to investigate the impact of mandatory audit rotation on auditor
independence. This became a concern as a result of some worrisome audit failures recorded across the world. For
instance, the case of the world celebrated Enron and WorldCom in the United States of America, Northern Rock
in the United Kingdom, Metagelshaft in Germany, Parmalat in Italy (Healey & Kim, 2003; NYSE, 2002;
Adeyemi & Okpala, 2011, Arel, Brody & Pany 2005, Appah, & Oyadonghan, 2011) have refocused attention on
the professional effectiveness in protecting public interest.
Arthur Andersen’s role in the Enron scandal of 2001 cast doubt on the independence and quality report of the
external auditors. In a quick response to the public outrage caused by the Enron saga, the U.S. government
passed the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOx) in 2002. One of the Act's provisions which seek to address threats to the
auditor’s independence was the introduction of mandatory partner rotation where the lead audit partner is restricted
from auditing a particular client longer than five years (Cameran., Prencipe., & Trombetta, 2008) .
In Nigeria, the recent happenings in the financial institutions and other sectors of the economy have put
auditors under scrutiny. This came as a result of the simultaneous collapse of Afribank Plc, Union bank Plc, Bank
PHB, Spring Bank Plc, Oceanic bank, Intercontinental bank plc, African Petroleum Plc, Fin Bank Plc, Lever
Brothers and Cadbury Plc raising an eye brow on the integrity, independence and qualifications of the external
auditors.
Mandatory rotation of external auditors have been suggested as one of the measures to reduce the possibility
of fraud, and minimise familiarity threat, meaning that a maximum limit is set for the tenure of an auditor with a
firm resolve to preserve auditors independence (Healey & Kim, 2003; Francis, 2004).
1.2 Problem Analysis
Mandatory rotation of audit firms is a topic that has been debated for over six decades around the world.
Crusaders for mandatory auditor rotation argue that audit quality is diminished with long audit tenure, that
mandatory rotation will reduces familiarity threat, ensures auditors independence and provides a greater
scepticism and a fresh perspective that may be lacking in long-standing auditor client relationships (Firth, Rui &
Wu, 2010; Hyeeso, 2004; Riuz-Barbadillo & Gomez-Aguilar, 2002). They claim that the longer an audit firm
retains a client; the client can be viewed as a source of perpetual income, potentially impairing the auditors’
independence (Dopuch, King & Schwartz, 2001).
On other hand, the opponents of mandatory audit argue that longer audit-client relationships improve audit
quality because the auditor acquires client specific knowledge over time. This implies that audit quality is lower
during the early years of the audit client relationship and audit quality increases with length of audit tenure due to
the reduction in information unevenness between the auditor and the client. Also, increasing the frequency of audit
changes will raise the frequency with which the start-up costs associated with first-year engagements are incurred
and, consequently, increase total audit costs (Johnson, Khurama & Reynolds, 2002; Francis, 2004; Arrunada & Paz
Ares 1997; Nagy, 2005; Chung, 2004). These higher costs will be passed on by auditors in order to maintain

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profitability and consequently result in higher audit fees for clients. Clients would suffer additional increased costs
due to the periodic need to devote resources to assist auditors in obtaining an understanding of their operations and
information systems. Perhaps more importantly, costs would rise as the result of decreased audit quality.
1.3 Objective Of The Study
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of mandatory audit rotation on auditors’ independence in
southern Nigeria.
1.4 Research Question
• Does mandatory rotation of auditors affect audit independence in Nigeria?
1.5 Scope Of The Study
The focus of this research work is to examine the impact of mandatory audit rotation on auditors’ independence
in Southern Nigeria with emphasis on qualified accountants including those in the public sector and private
sector. Those in the public sector shall comprise of qualified lecturers in accounting, banking, management and
economics department while the private sector shall comprise of selected accredited auditing firms in Abia State,
Edo State and Lagos State respectively. A total of five hundred (500) consultants, lectures, accountants and
auditors are examined upon which questionnaires are administered.
1.6 Hypothesis Of The Study
For the purpose of our research study, the hypothesis is formulated in null form:
• Mandatory audit rotation has no significant relationship on the independence of auditors in Nigeria.

2. Review Of Relevant Literature
2.1 Concept Of Mandatory Audit Rotation
Mandatory rotation of audit firms is a statutory prescription of the length of time an audit firm stays and renders
professional services to its clients. It requires audit firms to be rotated after a specified number of years despite
the efficiency, quality, and independence of the audit firm, the willingness of the shareholders and the
management to keep the audit firm.
According to Zawawi (2007), the concept of mandatory audit rotation was introduced as a result of the highly
publicized corporate failures that resulted in litigations. Asein (2007) further notes that the issue of rotation of
external auditors was conceived to be a solution to possible familiarity threat between personnel of the audit firm
and the client.
Rotation of external auditors is not an unprecedented policy though, is novel in Nigeria following the
pronouncement by the Central Bank of Nigeria mandating banks to rotate her external auditors after ten
consecutive years of audit engagement. E.I.U Pont De Nemours and Company, commonly known as DuPont, a
United State of America company started rotation of her external auditors in 1910 (Marquita, 2002).
Mandatory rotation of auditors became a national interest and was first introduced during the Mckesson
Robbins accounting scandal in the late 1930s (“Question”, 1967). Mckesson Robbins was involved in a huge
scandal in which the accounting firm Price Waterhouse were unable to detect nineteen million US dollars
misstated in the inventory and the receivables. Mckesson Robbins falsified records and Price Water House did not
question or verify the validity of their financial statements. What followed after the discovery of this fraud were
congressional hearings and debate by lawmakers to reform the accounting profession. (“Question”, 1967).
2.3 Mandatory Audit Rotation and Auditors Independence
External auditors play important roles in the capital markets by providing services to protect the interests of the
investing public. These public watchdogs’ functions require that accounting firms remain independent of the
audit client and act on behalf of the shareholders. However, the control over hiring and firing of auditors by
client’s management, combined with managers strong motivation to attain or exceed stated goals and objectives,
imposes a heavy burden upon the auditors to stand firm. Managers may try to actively use auditor-switching to
avoid qualified reports, and may also use switch-threat to obtain a more favourable report from an incumbent
auditor.
Mautz & Sharaf (1961) developed a concept of independence with two components: practitioner‘s
independence and professional independence. According to them, practitioner‘s independence, on the one hand, is
a state of mind and equates the notion of integrity and objectivity of the individual auditor. Professional
independence on the other hand, is apparent independence of auditors, as a professional group, to the public. This
implies that an auditor should avoid undue influence. In this regard, an auditor must not be interested in running the
affairs of the company covertly or overtly (Izedonmi, 2000). Auditor’s independence in its most general form
allows external auditors to reduce agency cost between corporate managers and shareholders (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1983).
Independence of an auditor is the probability of reporting a discovered breach and joint probability of
detecting financial material statement errors (De Angelo, 1981). Brody & Moscove, (1998) asserts that auditor
rotation will enhance greater independence and audit quality through a reduction of clients’ inadequate influence

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on auditors. This may come from the risk of losing clients if the auditors do not agree with managers’ financial
reporting preference.
Dopuch, King & Schwartz, (2001) assesses whether mandatory rotation of auditors increases their
independence. A multi-period interaction between a manager who invests in a risky asset and an auditor who
issues a report about this asset was used. This was analyzed through the willingness of the auditor to issue a report
biased in favour of management. The authors draw their conclusions from data collected in an experiment in order
to test the relationship between auditor rotation and independence; a setting was created in which the auditor has
the incentive to compromise his independence. The experiment was conducted under four regimes: In the first, no
mandatory rotation or retention is required. The manager can decide in each period to maintain or retain the
auditor; In the second regime, the manager must retain the auditor for a minimum of three years; In the third, the
auditor has to be rotated each four period. One hundred and fourty-four (144) subjects participated in the
experiment, whose role, as manager or auditor, was assigned randomly. The results support the hypothesis that the
auditor compromises his independence most often in the no rotation regimes.
In United Kingdom, Hussey & Lan, (2001) analysed the opinions of financial directors about the factors
which may affect the roles and responsibilities of the external auditor. Three main topics were identified. One of
them was on mandatory rotation. The opinion of United Kingdom Chief Financial Controllers on the rotation of
auditors after a certain period of time was collected. Three thousand questionnaires were mailed with a response
rate of 25.9%. Seven hundred and seventy six usable replies were obtained. The majority of the respondents agreed
that there should be no compulsory rotation of audit firms after a fixed number of years. A multiple regression
analysis was further used in order to test the relationship between rotation and the other variables identified. These
were the Finance Directors’ perception of audit quality, the costs of the audit and the assessment of the nature of
the relationship with external auditor. The result shows that the perception of audit independence would be
enhanced by prescribing the rotation of auditors.
In Australia, O’Leary, (1996) work aims to analyse the concept of independence and the relative
consequences that mandatory rotation may have. For this intention a questionnaire was mailed to three hundred
Australian listed companies and to one hundred and eighty audit partners. Three aspects were considered: the
actual audit independence, the perceived independence and mandatory rotation. Ninety seven percent (97%) of the
auditors and eighty seven percent (87%) of the public listed companies were against compulsory auditor rotation.
The respondents consider the cost of rotation to outweigh any benefit. However, when the perception of
independence is considered, the results changed. Indeed, sixty seven percent (63%) of public listed companies and
thirty seven percent (37%) of auditors consider the introduction of such a proposal as a useful means of improving
the perception of independence.
Vanstraelen (2000) work considers the impact of renewable long-term audit engagements on the auditor’s
reporting behaviour and independence. The empirical analysis was conducted on the basis of two samples taken
from the data submitted to the Belgian National Bank over the period 1992-1996. The annual accounts of Belgian
companies were considered. The two samples containing the data of large companies were divided in financially
stressed and financially non-stressed. A logistic regression was used in which the dependent variable was
“unclean” audit reports that occurred in case of qualified opinion, adverse opinion and disclaimer of opinion. The
researcher used tenure as the independent variable. The relationships between the identified variables were tested
using both univariate and multivariate analyses. The results shows that companies receiving a clean audit report
have a significantly longer relationship with the auditors than companies that receive an unclean report. This
suggests that auditors are more willing to issue an unclean report in the last year of the official mandate than in
previous years. So a long tenure reduces the likelihood that the auditor issues a qualified report. The author states
that the implication of this finding is the usefulness of mandatory auditor rotation to maintain the value of an audit
to external users.
Healey and Kim (2003) asserts that over the unlimited period of most continuing audits, members of the audit
firm will become too familiar with the companies whose records they are meant to review objectively, honestly
and accurately. This is similar to the work of Arel, Brody & Pany (2005) believe that with no long-term connection
between auditors and clients, the auditors will not face the conflict of interest and can act more freely. Jackson,
Moldrich & Roebuck (2008) posit firm rotation may help to prevent large scale corporate collapse. Further if a
client seeks a new auditor, auditors will compete with other firms to win the tender and differentiate themselves in
terms of service, improving audit quality. From this perspective, a new auditor brings in more objectivity as they
are not familiar with the client, potentially improving the quality of the audit.
Riuz-Barbadillo & Gomez-Aguilar, (2002) considers the relationship between the contract length and the
issue of a favourable opinion and find that the variable “tenure” has a negative coefficient and that in the
subsequent years of the engagement auditors are less obliging and more independent. On the basis of this evidence,
Riuz-Barbadillo & Gomez-Aguilar, (2002) conclude that mandatory rotation is not a suitable mechanism for
improving auditor independence in the Spanish context. Summer, (1998) analysis of the hypothesis that mandatory

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audit rotation can enhance auditor independence find that in the short run, auditors are less independent than in
long term engagement and that a mandatory rotation might have negative effects on auditor independence as it
might undermine the incentives for building up a reputation for honesty.

3. Methodology
This research is designed to examine the impact of mandatory audit rotation on audit independence, audit quality,
cost and shareholders confidence in the southern part of Nigeria. The researchers made use of primary sources for
data. Accordingly the data were sourced from three out of the six geo-political zones in Nigeria: South East,
South-South and South West collectively referred to as the southern part of Nigeria. Abia State, Edo State and
Lagos State were chosen to represent each zone under study. A survey research design was used to gather
information from the respondents concerning their opinion on the impact of mandatory audit on auditor
independence in southern Nigeria. Five hundred questionnaires were administered to Audit firms, consultants,
lecturers and investors out of which four hundred and fourty-two were returned. The questionnaire has two
sections, A-B. Section A contains some personal data of the respondent ‘that is’ sex, age group, academic
qualification, name of organisation/institution and length of service, knowledge of financial statements.
Section B contains five statements related to mandatory rotation of external auditors and audit independence.
Section B is designed in likert form scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. After sorting and
collating the data, respondents’ appropriate option ticked were analyzed using tables in presenting their actual
opinion and the percentages. The model specified was estimated using the Binary Logistic Regression technique
with the aid of computer software Eviews 7. The hypothesis of the study was tested using Z-test.
3.1 Model Specification
For the purpose of measuring the significant relationship between the dependent and independent variable, an
econometric model is hereby specified:
AUDIND = AO + A1MAT + Et …………………………………… (1)
Where: Ao = Constant
A1 = Parameter estimate
MAT = Mandatory Audit Tenure
AUDIND = Auditor Independence
Et = Stochastic error term
The model specified above captured auditor independence as the dependent variable while Mandatory audit tenure is the
independent variable.

4. Data Presentation And Analysis
4.1 Analysis of results
Here answers provided by the respondents to the questionnaire are analyzed and interpreted. The hypothesis
formulated previously is tested in this section. In testing the hypothesis the following decision rules are stated.
We accept the hypothesis if the calculated Z-statistic is greater than the Z-critical statistic. The Z-critical statistic
is ± 1.96 at 5% significant level (95% confidence) otherwise we reject. The hypothesis is restated in null form.
TEST OF HYPOTHESES 1
• Hypothesis formulated. The hypothesis is restated:
H1Mandatory audit rotation has no significant relationship on the independence of auditors in Nigeria.
• Test statistics: the statistic instrument employed in testing this statistic is the Z-test. The Z calculated
value is 2.00 (see appendix I).
• Decision: Following our decision rule. The regression result shows that Mandatory Audit Tenure
(MAT) with a calculated Z-value of 2.00 is greater than the critical Z-value of ± 1.96 at 5% level.
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis.

INSERT TABLE
Table 4.1 highlights respondents’ perceptions on issues relating to mandatory audit tenure and audit
independence. A total of 117 respondents representing 26.5 percent are of the Disagree view that the length of
audit contract affects the possibility that a company may receive a more favourable audit opinion, 67 respondents
representing 15.2% are Undecided while 258 respondents representing approximately 58.4% are of the agreed
view.
The table also deduced a total number of 90 respondent representing 20.4 percent disagree that auditors tend
to be more dependent in the first year of the audit engagement, 91 respondents representing 20.6 percent are
Undecided about the statement, 261 respondent representing 59.1 percent are of the agreed opinion.
The table also shows that a total of 72 respondents representing 16.3 percent disagree that long standing
relationship can induce an auditor to give much importance on the economic interest in preserving the client than

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to independence, 59 respondents representing 13.3 percent are Undecided while 311 respondent representing
approximately 70.3 percent agree that long standing relationship can induce an auditor to give much importance
on the economic interest in preserving the client than to independence.
The table further disclose that a total number of 50 respondents indicating 11.3 percent disagree that auditor
may tend to compromise his independence most often in the no rotation/retention regimes, while a total of 93
respondent representing 21 percent are Undecided, 299 respondents indicating 79.5 percent Agree that auditor may
tend to compromise his independence most often in the no rotation/retention regimes.
Furthermore, the table tell that 57 respondents representing 12.9 percent disagree that the perception of audit
independence would be enhanced by prescribing the rotation of auditors, 34 respondents are Undecided while 351
agree that the perception of audit independence would be enhanced by prescribing the rotation of auditors
4.2 Correlation Analysis
The spearman rank correlation was used to show the relationship between the variable used in the model. The
result is shown in table 4.2. The table shows that the co-efficient of correlation of a variable with respect to itself
is 1.000. This indicates that there exists a perfect Correlation between a variable with respect to itself.

INSERT TABLE

5. Summary
The study examined empirically, the association between mandatory tenure and auditors’ independence. The
binary logistic ordered regression shows that there exists a positive relationship between Mandatory Audit
Rotation (MAT) and audit Independence (AUDIND) with a value of 0.117 which means the strength of
relationship between them is about 12% which shows a weak positive relationship between Mandatory Audit
Rotation (MAT) and audit Independence (AUDIND). The result agrees with the works of Brody & Moscove.,
1998, Hussey & Lan., 2001, Dopuch & Swchwartz., 2001; Hussey and Lan., 2001; O’Leary., 1996. However, it
disagrees with that of Summer, 1998.
5.1 Conclusion
From the literature review, empirical results of scholars and also field results collected one could see that though
mandatory audit rotation could encourage auditors’ independence but that is not still guaranteed. This suggests
that the recent policy of mandatory audit rotation introduced by central bank of Nigeria may not augur well. For
auditors’ independence to be guaranteed, other factors are involved for example, the size of the audit firm, the
experience of the auditor, specialization, goodwill and reputation of the audit firm should also be taken into
consideration.
At the beginning of audit engagement, an audit firm takes time to understand the accounting processes,
procedures and the system of the new client which may go into years. Therefore implementation of tenure-ship
suggest that audit firms would always shop for new client at a higher rate than without rotation and where this is so
the audit firm may have to bend some rules in order to win a client and to a great extent this will affect the
independence of the auditor and by extension affect the quality of the audit work.
5.3 Recommendations
Based on the result of our research findings we therefore recommend the followings.
• Rotation of external auditors should not be made compulsory. Most of the banks that collapsed
employed the services of the big four (PWC, KPMG, Earnest & Young and Akintola Williams) auditing
firms in Nigeria. This implies that even if these banks were rotating they would still have collapsed.
One would not say that these firms are not independent or were not producing quality audit report.
Notwithstanding the independence of our audit firms, experience, size, reputation and goodwill.
Unscrupulous management could still hide under these characteristics to perpetrate their selfish aim so
mandatory rotation of external auditors cannot guarantee auditors independence.

• To have robust audit report shareholders should have a way of calling for the letter of representation
usually written by the auditor to the management and investigate whether the grey areas touched by the
auditor where addressed. Joint auditing can also be encouraged to avoid monopoly of audit opinion.

• In the field of medicine we have the dentist, the optometrist, gynaecologist, paediatrics and
neurosurgeons. There should be a law mandating our audit firms to specialize in one or two areas and
become consultants instead of being jack of all trade and master of none. Using mandatory audit
rotation as the solution to produce quality audit and auditors’ independence is just like using a hammer
to kill a fly. Although Central Bank of Nigeria may succeed but the accompanying damage may be
beyond repair.

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• Auditors’ independence can be encouraged through the law. The Companies and Allied Matters Act
requires auditors to be appointed by the shareholders but in reality, the appointment of auditors are
usually done by the directors of the company and where this happens, the auditor will have to dance to
the tune of the directors as they may not want to bite the very hands that fed them even if it means
compromising their independence. If the law mandating auditors to be appointed by the shareholders is
revisited and monitored that will improve auditors’ independence and audit quality.

• The appointment of auditors should be done by the audit committee since they are composed of non
executive board members and shareholders. The interest of the shareholders will be protected. This will
help to eradicate completely or reduce to the minimum the controversial management auditor romance
that could compromise independence.

• The Sarbenes Oxley act of 2002 which most countries are following like Nigeria requires audit lead
partners to be rotated after five years but was silent about rotation of the audit firms. If the Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN) wants to follow this US policy we can also begin with the rotation of the lead partners
and see how it goes before the introduction of complete audit firm rotation in Nigeria.

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rotation really improve audit quality. Working paper
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Question of Changing Auditors (1967). Journal of Accountancy, 123,31-33.
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Table 4.1: Mandatory Audit Tenure And Audit Independence
S/N
RESPONSES / PERCENTAGES
SD D UN A SA TOTAL
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
6. The length of an audit contract affects the 29 88 67 171 87 442
possibility that a company may receive a (6.6) (19.9) (15.2) (38.7) (19.7) (100)
more favourable audit opinion
7. Auditors tend to be more dependent in the - 90 91 171 90 442
first year of the audit engagement (-) (20.4) (20.6) (38.7) (20.4) (100)
8. Long standing relationship can induce an - 72 59 203 108 442
auditor to give much importance on the (-) (16.3) (13.3) (45.9) (24.4) (100)
economic interest in preserving the client
than to independence.
9. Auditor may tend to compromise his 12 38 93 149 150 442
independence most often in the no (2.7) (8.6) (21.0) (33.7) (33.9) (100)
rotation/retention regimes.
10. The perception of audit independence - 57 34 128 223 442
would be enhanced by prescribing the (-) (12.9) (7.7) (29.0) (50.5) (100)
rotation of auditors.
SOURCE: Field Survey (2011)

Table 4.2: Spearman Rank Correlation
MATR AUDIND
Spearman's rho MATR Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .117(*)
Sig. (2-tailed) . .014
N 442 442
AUDIND Correlation Coefficient .117(*) 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .
N 442 442

Source: Field Survey (2011)

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4.3 Ordered Probit Logistic Regression Analysis
Table 4.2 : Probit Logistic Regression for Model 1 (AUDIND)

Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.

MATR 0.112276 0.056050 2.003152 0.0452

Limit Points

LIMIT_12:C(2) -0.964845 0.140361 -6.874005 0.0000
LIMIT_14:C(3) -0.919972 0.139326 -6.603023 0.0000
LIMIT_15:C(4) -0.714167 0.135765 -5.260315 0.0000
LIMIT_16:C(5) -0.662125 0.135140 -4.899530 0.0000
LIMIT_17:C(6) -0.473867 0.133507 -3.549385 0.0004
LIMIT_18:C(7) -0.320251 0.132967 -2.408496 0.0160
LIMIT_19:C(8) -0.134575 0.133119 -1.010933 0.3120
LIMIT_20:C(9) 0.114992 0.133994 0.858188 0.3908
LIMIT_21:C(10) 0.299335 0.135055 2.216389 0.0267
LIMIT_22:C(11) 0.848380 0.138795 6.112476 0.0000
LIMIT_23:C(12) 1.202461 0.142133 8.460133 0.0000

Akaike info criterion 4.555989 Schwarz criterion 4.667065
Log likelihood -994.8735 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.599800
Restr. log likelihood -996.8797 Avg. log likelihood -2.250845
LR statistic (1 df) 4.012342 LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.002012
Probability(LR stat) 0.045168

Source: Eviews Output (2011)

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Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing.

More information about the publisher can be found in the IISTE’s homepage:
http://www.iiste.org

The IISTE is currently hosting more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals and
collaborating with academic institutions around the world. Prospective authors of
IISTE journals can find the submission instruction on the following page:
http://www.iiste.org/Journals/

The IISTE editorial team promises to the review and publish all the qualified
submissions in a fast manner. All the journals articles are available online to the
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than
those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. Printed version of the
journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.

IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners

EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar

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